Unity in Terrorism

the relationship between Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Militants in Pakistan

Simon Franzen

INSTMED © 2012

E: o!ce@instmed.org W: instmed.org

sometimes they compete with each other. Al-Qaeda. and al-Qaeda spread its ideology throughout northern Pakistan. However. relationship between al-Qaeda. they both regrouped in the FATA region over a period of years. it also left the Taliban severely weakened. and emerged only in 1994.. often misunderstood. General David Petreus claimed that there is “a symbiotic relationship between all of these different organizations: al-Qaeda.. and maintains close ties with al-Qaeda. http://www.Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy !"#$%&'(#)%"* This paper examines the complex. the Taliban and the various militant groups found in FATA (the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in Pakistan. the Pakistani Taliban is not the same Taliban as the one formed in 1994. They support each other. they coordinate with each other. misunderstanding or a misrepresentation of historical events. The creation of the TTP in 2007 is another matter. al-Qaeda and the Taliban were very much two different organisations. was the culmination of al-Qaeda as a tightly knit. The attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon (as well as the failed attack on Washington DC with the hijacked flight 93). and was created as an umbrella organisation for various Pakistani militant groups. did not receive money from the CIA during the 1980s. hierarchical organisation. and although it swears its loyalty to Mullah Omar. Before 9/11. The Taliban and alQaeda can in many ways be seen as sharing common values. and in 2010.org). its goals differ from that of the Afghani Taliban. Much of what is commonly assumed about the Taliban. including the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan). today. Al Qaeda and the Taliban 2 . the TTP and al-Qaeda is based on misinformation. and was only officially formed as an organisation in 1988. it is not so simple. the Pakistani Taliban. coalescing with militant groups and local warlords.cfr.” (cfr. although their ultimate goals remain very different. for all the conspiracy. the Afghan Taliban . The subsequent “War on Terror” and the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 destroyed much of its organisational capacity. [and] sometimes they even fight each other. However. The Taliban were not part of the mujahedeen fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan. We can speak of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in two broad strokes – pre 9/11 and post 9/11. 2010.

quoting Qutb).&. and would eventually greatly influence what is today commonly known as Wahhabism. pp. pp. Although his teachings did not gain much traction during his own lifetime. 2007:30. and the TTP.5*7%%#8*%9*#:. pp. the community “crushed under the weight of those false laws and teachings which are not even remotely related to Islamic teachings” (Wright. Al-Wahhab went further than Taymiyya: the Wahhabi code stated that “the moment a Muslim deviates from Al-Wahhab’s interpretation of monotheism he became an unbeliever – and the moment he became an unbeliever his life became forfeit” (Ibid. However. the Taliban had come to prominence in the late 1990s.5)<. 2007. Today. this was “in order to fashion an example that will eventually lead Islam to its destiny of world domination” (Wright. 46). was published in 1964. his ideas lived on. verse 193 – “Fight against them until idolatry is no more and God’s religion reigns supreme. 56). A third vital influence for al-Qaeda and the Taliban ideology was the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb."*. Al Qaeda and the Taliban 3 . pp. +.* While Al-Qaeda became the World’s most infamous terrorist organisation after September 2011. born in 1263. specifically chapters 2. 45). 2007. let them reflect upon the fate of bygone nations”. Taymiyyas “reinterpretation of Jihad lies at the heart of modern Islamist revivalism” (Allen.*. whose book “Milestones”.$#*!*-*+$.. pp. His answer was to argue that “We need to initiate the movement of Islamic revival in some Muslim country” (Ibid. the Afghan Taliban. and what it means for the future of combating al-Qaeda. 30.*/0112*3%4. But if they desists.5=>.%5%6)(. but if they persists in sin. 2007. the underlying ideology of these organisations have a long and colourful history that dates back almost eight hundred years to the Islamic jurist Sheikh Ibn Taymiyya. 2007. gaining their notorious reputation after the premeditated murder of the former President of Afghanistan Najibullah following their capture of Kabul on the 26th of September 1996. fight none except the evil-doers” – and chapter 8. verse 39– “Tell the unbelievers that if they mend their ways their past shall be forgiven. his teachings form the basis for the Islam enforced in Saudi Arabia. how it has evolved. quoting Qutb).. According to Charles Allen. author of “God’s Terrorists”. 30). Quoting two versus in the Quran. Qutb argued that the “Muslim community has long since vanished from existence”.Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy This paper explores how this relationship came about. from the 18th century figure Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.*!&. Taymiyya could declare jihad in “strictly literal terms: as unrelenting struggle against all who stood in the way of Islam’s destiny” (Ibid."&*. 2007.

Osama bin Laden would claim in 1984 that that “Oteibi [the leader of the insurgency] and his followers were true Muslims and innocent of any crime” (Ibid. throw out the Saudi royal family. 30. but not before hundreds of people were killed. but his legacy.. in many ways. 2007. The year saw the overthrow of the Iranian shah by the Shi’a Islamist cleric Khomeini. quoting Qutb). 2007. pp. women and children captured the Grand Mosque of Mecca on the last day of the Hajj. It was in Afghanistan that Bin Laden first met Ayman al-Zawahiri. After two weeks of fighting the rebels surrendered.$#*!!*-*?$%4*#:. the New Years day for the fourteenth hundred year in the Islamic calendar when an unknown number of men. By 1984 their “acquaintanceship had deepened into partnership” (Coll. as well as the Palestinian Abdullah Azzam. The demands made by Oteibi and the insurgency would later be echoed by Bin Laden. 94). 253). I have written Milestones for this vanguard which I consider to be a waiting reality about to be materialised” (Wright. This was the first Islamic takeover of a country and “showed that the Islamists’ dream was eminently achievable” (Wright. Al Qaeda and the Taliban 4 . pp.#8*#%*#:. as Abdullah Azzam and Bin Laden officially joined forces after Bin Laden argued that the Afghan fighters treated the few Arabs in Afghanistan as “glorified guests”. because we know them better and can provide more rigorous training for them” (Wright. not as mujahedeen. believing it to have betrayed true Islamic values. pp. who was to become a important figure for Bin Laden. or pilgrimage. The rebels had wanted to fundamentally change Saudi Arabia.*. The third." In 1979. 2007. stop oil exports to America. Sayyid Qutb was hanged in an Egyptian jail in 1966 following dawn prayers.*3%@). and subsequently suggested to Azzam that “we should take on the responsibility of the Arabs. several events dramatically shaped the world view of Osama Bin Laden and his future deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. lives on. 2009.5)<. pp. They wanted to “rupture” diplomatic relations with western counties. A second major event occurred on the twentieth November. and arguably most important event. wrote Qutb. and throw all foreign persons out of the Arabic Peninsula. “There should be a vanguard which sets out with this determination and then keeps walking the path. 2007:102 quoting Bin Laden). +. 48).Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy For this.

pp. They aimed to “restore peace. Of an estimated 175.000 Afghan mujahedeen. although some points are worth reiterating. al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were not connected to the Taliban when they arrived in Afghanistan in 1996. pp. with the Northern Alliance cornered in a small strip of land in north east Afghanistan. al-Qaeda had settled in Sudan. al-Qaeda alAskariya was officially established. instead living under the protection of the Jalabad shura until the capture of the city by the Taliban in September of that year. by which time the Taliban had conquered most of the country. produced a fatwa. Azzam. pp. The Taliban first burst into the scene in Afghanistan in 1994.Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy Although there were not many Arabs in Afghanistan at the time. who in May had officially declared it was withdrawing all troops from the country. 2007. By 1992. a residence and living expenses. 2011. on the eleventh of August a vote was taken in a meeting held by Azzam to create a new body to fight the retreating Soviets. Bin Laden offered every Arab and his family who came to fight in Afghanistan a ticket. pp. A week later. Just before 9/11. the Taliban controlled more than 90 per cent of the country. enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan” (Ibid. 22). 16). and four years later. although the then Pakistani Interior minister Naseerullah Babar told journalists in Pakistan that the Taliban were “our boys”. eventually issued as the book “In Defence of Muslim Lands” in which Azzam argued that “jihad was obligatory for every able-bodied Muslim” (Wright. It must here be noted that the so-called “Arab contingent” were a very small minority within the mujahedeen fighters. disarm the population. 2010. roughly amounting to three hundred dollars per household per month. 2010. Many mujahedeen who had left Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew saw the ruinous state of the country and formulated a series of objectives. Al Qaeda and the Taliban 5 . but would return to Afghanistan in 1996. 21). Firstly. There are a number of observations which can be made here. 102). 29). the number of Arab fighters at any given time in Afghanistan never “amounted to no more than several hundred” (Bergen. following their capture of Kandahar in November 1994 (Ibid. on the 20th August. 2010. The exact nature and relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban at this point is difficult to ascertain. This was to be the basis for al-Qaeda. when the Taliban emerged. Their rise to power in Afghanistan has been extensively covered by numerous authors. in turn. Afghanistan was in a state of “virtual disintegration” (Rashid. pp. Firstly.

After the Twin Towers fell on 9/11. the USled invasion of Afghanistan. pp. with double the number injured and up to seven thousand captured.292).$4*B%"8."(. pp.Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy It was not until he met with the leader of the Taliban Mullah Omar in October in Kandahar.8* It has been argued that since 9/11 al-Qaeda has “metamorphosed from an organisation to a movement that can be called “Al Qaedaism” (Gul quoting Burke. during his stay in Sudan. the second one authorised the murder of innocent civilians. al-Qaeda.$#*!!!*-*!44. and praised martyrdom.#. writing “Men of the radiant future of our ummah of Muhammad. 2009. 2007. his imam Abu Hajer had in 1992 declared two fatwas the first one authorised attacks on American troops. the relationship between Pakistan and the West. 220). 175)."&*A%"6*. A further important observation to make is that where the Taliban had “no wish to export their beliefs or their doctrine” (Ibid. Al Qaeda and the Taliban 6 . Rashid estimates that the Taliban lost eight to twelve thousand men. +. 2009. 12 – 13). 229). or roughly twenty per cent of their force. bin Laden issued his “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places” in August 1996.*. The personal bond between the two men was sealed when members of their respective families married (Griffiths. pp. pp. Bin Laden. the Taliban. 424). The Taliban were “seriously damaged. 2010. pp. the end of an era. as Rashid writes. where he would elude capture for over ten years before finally being killed in May 2011. Following “Operation Enduring Freedom”. pp. although originally trapped in the Tora Bora Mountains. This is vital if one is to comprehend the struggle now taking place in Afghanistan and Pakistan. and were able to reorganise in Pakistan. 228). 2010. It changed the West. 2009. pledging his “unconditional support and financial backing” on condition he was given official Taliban protection (Allen.&).C'.. 2007. and in many ways explains the ongoing struggle in both countries. it was. evaded capture and escaped to northern Pakistan. Although this was bin Laden’s first such declaration. the original idea of al-Qaeda as a form of mobile army which would “defend Muslim lands wherever they were threatened” was replaced by a policy of “permanent subversion of the West” (Wright. pp. but not defeated” (Rashid. to a large extent their leadership remained intact. raise the banner of jihad up against the Judeo-American alliance that has occupied the holy places of Islam” (Burleigh. Nothing has been the same since.

pp. and Pakistan’s FATA provided the right setting.7 million enrolled students. In perhaps one of the most interesting books on the links between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 2007. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. this figure had risen to more than sixty-five per cent (Allen. Shahzad argues that al-Qaeda and the Taliban have never been identical in personnel or objectives. pp. pp. which in 2006 produced fifty-eight propaganda videos. the military dictator of Pakistan Zia-al-Huq worked to Islamicise the country. 2008. 2007. and coupled with the popular firebrand anti-Americanism. In 1979 there were 893 madrassahs. 2008. 2011. and the number of madrassahs in the country exploded.000 Pakistanis were Al Qaeda and the Taliban 7 .al-Qaeda was so well protected it was able to set up a media production arm. The hard-line schools were often linked with the JUI (Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam). but that they still share a “unique” relationship. treble the number of the year before (Ibid. “little attention was focused on the legacy of jihad” (Gul. Out of 1. Disasterously. with over seven thousand of them Deobandi. 2010. and so both the Taliban and al-Qaeda were “free to move around at will” (Ibid. 275). pp.25 million were receiving a Deoband-based or Ahl-i-Hadith religious education” (Ibid. 278). by the end of the 1980s. 2008. Sayed Saleem Shahzad’s “Inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban” documentes the transformation that took place within each of the organisations following their escape into Pakistan. XVII). al-Qaeda required a number of different factors.000 youths who had trained and fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir since 1979. in 2004. Bin Laden’s group was able to gain a strong foothold in the country. 240). pp. 275). In doing so. they quickly began to use the respite to reorganise and re-equip. Pakistan had withdrawn troops from FATA to counter the threat of conflict with India. of which forty per cent were of the Deobandi school of Sunni jurisprudence. the number of madrassahs in Pakistan were estimated by the minister of Religious Affairs to be ten thousand.Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy Once al-Qaeda and the Taliban had fled to FATA. and were the schools from which “the boys who later filed the ranks of the Taliban received their education” (Allen. 244). pp. argues Gul. there were “at least” 600. In 2002. in which al-Qaeda aims to “bring the Taliban and all Muslim liberation movement into its fold and to use them to forward its global agenda” (Shahzad. 2007. by the time al-Qaeda moved into Pakistan. “at least” 100. FATA had become “terrorism central” . “1. As such. pp. Two years later. Pakistan was fertile ground for al-Qaeda’s extreme brand of Islam. 274 – 275). By late 2002 al-Qaeda set up training camps in FATA. 10). pp. and taught and recruited Pakistani and Kashmiri extremists. As many as “ten thousand fighters” were based in Kandahar in beginning of 2002 (Rashid.

pp. al-Qaeda and the Taliban saw the increasing employment of suicide attacks. Yet Pakistan did not see fighting between al-Qaeda and Pakistani forces until 2002 – 2003.:. +. pp. until 2004. 2010. was formed in December 2007. argues Claudio Franco. in 2007 and 2008. Instead they were Taliban and al-Qaeda sympathisers. 132).. or simply the TTP. But after that. in 2006 the number was one hundred and thirty six. al-Qaeda along with the Taliban re-emerged as a viable fighting force. it was ultimately a relatively “easy task because much of the groundwork had already been laid out” (Ibid. with new tactics and gradually expanding support around the FATA."*+.$#*!D*-*. The first ever suicide attack in Pakistan occurred in 1995. 10). and was conducted by an Egyptian. In 2008.*. the brains behind the TTP were able to introduce a mutual assistance Al Qaeda and the Taliban 8 . both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. when six attacks were reported early in the year. Between 2002 and 2006 there was a total of twenty two suicide attacks inside Pakistan. Not only did the conflict and violence spread to Pakistan proper. there were more than one hundred and six attacks in the country (Ibid. Subsequently. 2010. (Gul.. the head of al-Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan.. The first suicide attack ever to take place on Afghan soil was the 9th of September 2001 attack on Ahmed Shah Massoud. which was followed in 2004 by the first peace agreement (the first of many that were to be broken) between militants and the Pakistani army. Significantly. and “several hundred thousand” people supported Pakistan’s Islamic religious parties (Shahzad. saying it was “a legitimate weapon against the enemies of Islam” (Ibid. pp. but the merge between the militants. There were a reported 1100 casualties in 2006. the leader of the Northern Alliance. 2011. not a single suicide attack was reported against US or Afghan forces.E)8#. 145). the second attack was in 2002 in Karachi. pp. and one hundred and thirty seven in 2007. The TTP.:$)E=)=. agenda . the signatories representing the militants did not belong to the old tribal structures that had been in place for centuries. al-Qaeda was behind the attack.Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy active in different jihadi cadres. As such. 2010. the Pakistani Taliban. perhaps even pan-tribal. pp. pp. 2011. claimed suicide bombing was in accordance with Islam. In 2005 twenty-one suicide attacks were reported. 2010.. 135). and in 2007 the figure was an astonishing 1730 (Gul. 133). Shahzad argues that although al-Qaeda initially struggled to acquire new allies in Pakistan." The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Mustafa abu al-Yazid.5)<. 8). was created on the basis of an “anti-tribal.

which was based on the tribes structural propensity for internal conflicts” (Franco. still the TTP must be viewed as the “most formidable fighting force within the FATA” (Ibid.Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy mechanism designed to break the government’s strategy. Approximately forty militant commanders with some forty thousand men under their command formed the group in South Waziristan. pp. and in the period 2007 – 2009 more than three thousand people were killed in attacks. almost “all the top militant leaders operating in the tribal regions and NWFP (North Western Frontier Provinces) or their representatives who managed to set aside their differences” (Hussain. Baitullah Mehsud. 2011. in Giustozzi. pp. it is now “easier than ever” for foreigners to get in touch with al-Qaeda. prey to al-Qaeda-leaning and Takfiri ideologies”. After the region was overwhelmed by the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. +. as well as plots in Denmark and Germany in 2007.$*7. primarily focusing on the post-9/11 world. Following the creation of the TTP violence in Pakistan went up. A further worrying development has been the failure of the international community to prevent the region to continue being a breeding ground for international terrorism. and interviews in 2010 with former and active Taliban commanders have indicated that during the 2004 – 2006 period the ISI was “actively encouraging a Taliban revival and assisting their war effort after two years of training Taliban on a large scale in Quetta and other locations” (Riedel. but now it is reportedly just “a few weeks” (Rashid. prior to 9/11 it could take “several months” before a new recruit joined a training camp. Almost all al-Qaeda related terrorist plots following 2004 can be traced back to FATA and Waziristan. Its first leader.$E8 This paper has shown the evolving nature of the Taliban and al-Qaeda over a period of time. 2011. including the July 7 attacks on London. 281). We have seen adaptive shifts from both organisations. 81). 283). 280). 82). 2009. 2009. was killed in August 2009 (the exact date is disputed) in a CIA drone attack in South Waziristan. pp. and that much of the top leadership has long standing ties to the organisation."&*?'$#:. the TTP is “nothing more than a limb of the mainstream Afghan Taliban” (Franco. pp. pp. in Giustozzi. The TTP was quickly seen by Pakistan as an entity “out of control.$#*D*-*B%"(5'8)%"8*. Some of this can be directly laid at the feet of Pakistan’s ISI. as well as the Al Qaeda and the Taliban 9 . 138). 2009. in Lodhi. as they have successfully expanded to their surroundings in FATA and Waziristan. Hussain contends that the TTP charter “clearly” reflected al-Qaeda’s ideas.4. 2008. pp. yet he contends that based on current understanding of the organisation.

and by default. attempting to court educated constituencies. brought together through “al-Qaedaism”. for coalition forces in Afghanistan. pp. www. 236). By 2009. Rashid's article was accurate: it was written in July of 2009. www. and there were “serious differences emerging between America and the various power centres in Pakistan which could adversely affect the entire region “ (Rashid. 236). following some form of settlement. However. as the movement was evolving in a number of ways: embracing new technologies.bbc. Following the creation the TTP. the fight in Pakistan and Afghanistan is not against the Taliban or against al-Qaeda.bbc. 2009. and insisted that the Americans share the technology with them. which combine “reactionary” attitudes with. the Pakistani military “abandoned plans to mount a military offensive against the terrorist group responsible for a two-year campaign of suicide bombings across the country” as it “concluded that a ground attack on its strongholds in South Waziristan would be too difficult” (Ghosh. and embracing new sources of support.uk). Western diplomats have claimed that “Pakistan is choosing to fight only those Taliban who threaten the government. Yet 2010 saw a “sudden surge” in Pakistani military activity against the militants Al Qaeda and the Taliban 10 . the leader of the Taliban. www. but against a “neoTaliban” force of various militant Islamic Jihadists. electoral competition” (Ibid.Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy North-West Frontier Province.co. was killed in a drone led strike. (Guistozzi. 2007.uk). rifts between Pakistan and the U.” (Rashid. France and NATO stake an enormous amount of political prestige on rapidly improving the security situation in Afghanistan and receiving more co-operation from Pakistan on combating the Taliban in both countries” (Ibid. in August. the same year the TTP was formed in December. The creation of the TTP must be regarded a major failure for Pakistani long-term interests.uk).com). but refusing to act against those groups which are fighting in Afghanistan. Either. the former would seem to be the case. Britain.S regarding the handling of the Taliban had flared up. Guistozzi argued that the ideological aspect of the “neo-Taliban” was not well defined. for example. While Pakistani officials were enraged about the use of drone attacks inside their own country. or alternatively. These differences manifest as “the US. pp.co. www. Antinio Guistozzi argued that the “old” Taliban were turning into the “neo-Taliban”. and that the movement itself could take two paths. and a mere month later.bbc. 2009. 2007. In many ways. become fully radicalised and become “incorporated into a global jihadist perspective”.co. 2009. in the same month. 2009. become something akin to “the Islamic parties of Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud. In 2007.time.

com). be viewed as a separate body from the larger insurgency (Guistozzi. remains active. in Guistozzi.foreignaffairs. 104). Yet. However. With the increasing number of drone attacks in the FATA region under the Obama administration. or the beginning of its end. and should not. pp. TTP and Haqqani network will cease to fight . they “depend on the jihad for their survival and thus have to oppose any settlement. It is perhaps. if there's no war in Afghanistan.! Al Qaeda and the Taliban 11 . 2009. they have no reason for being” (Semple.Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy (Gul. the end of its beginning. 2010. al-Qaeda and the Taliban are capable of restructuring. “the Taliban’s real strength” (Shazad. rebuilding and remodelling. Similarly. 2011. 299). as has been demonstrated on a number of occasions. After all.these factions depend on the ongoing struggle. the death of bin Laden in 2011. it is tempting to be optimistic. 213). http://www. pp. according to Guistozzi. and continued killing of many senior al-Qaeda and TTP leaders damaging their capabilities. It is impossible to imagine a situation in which the Taliban. although major targets such as Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are to this day still at large. the Haqqani network. pp. it would be a mistake to presume an end to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan is in sight or expect a decrease in jihadist activity in FATA. 2011. To paraphrase Winston Churchill: the death of bin Laden did mean the end of al-Qaeda.

P. C. The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and al-Qaeda. Andre Deutsch. A.. in Guistozzi. London Al Qaeda and the Taliban 12 .cfr. I. S.. C. in Lodhi. 2009. & Bajoria. Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. London ! Hussain.. M. The Tehrik-E Taliban Pakistan. Z.8599.. Money. C.00. 2011. Decoding the New Taliban.. The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier. The Bin Ladens: Oil. London ! Bergen.time.. 2010. 2011. HURST Publishers ltd. Conclusion. A. 2009. 2009.time. 2009. Koran.1919327.Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy References ! Allen.com Time.. Decoding the New Taliban. Shared Goals for Pakistan’s Militants.. God's terrorists: the Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad. London ! Guistozzi. Harper Perennial. [online] http://www. J. London ! Guistozzi.cfr. M. Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism.org Council on Foreign Relations available at: http:// www. (ed). London ! Ghosh. 2007. g. Abacus.html [accessed 1st June 2012] ! Gul. London ! Coll. in Guistozzi.. London ! Griffiths. HURST Publishers ltd. Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State. New York ! Bruno.. 2010. 2009. Free Press. available at: http://www.com/time/world/ article/0. A. Pakistan’s Noncampaign Against the Taliban [online]www.. Terrorism and the Secret Saudi World. Penguin Books.. 2007. Penguin Books. London ! Franco. Hurst & Co. B. A. Battling Militancy. (ed). Afghanistan: Land of Conflict and Beauty. HURST Publishers ltd. J.org/pakistan/shared-goals-pakistans-militants/p22064 [accessed on 1st June 2012] ! Burleigh. (ed). 2009.

. The Looming Tower.Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy ! Rashid. 2010. How the Haqqani Network is Expanding From Waziristan [online] www. Rifts emerge over tackling the Taliban [online] www. America. 2011.bbc. The Brookings Institution. London ! Rashid. Decent into Chaos: How the war against Islamic extremism is being lost in Pakistan.com Foreign Affairs. Deadly Embrace: Pakistan. Allen Lane. 2008.... and the Future of the Global Jihad. S. Afghanistan and Central Asia. London Al Qaeda and the Taliban 13 . I. Washington ! Saleem Shahzad. L. Inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11.foreignaffairs. 2007. Pluto Press. B. 2011. available at: http://news. A. available online at: http://www. London Reidel.B. Penguin Books. http://www.uk/1/hi/world/ south_asia/8170142...stm [accessed 1st June 2012] ! ! Rashid. 2009.bbc.foreignaffairs. 2011. A.com/articles/68292/michael-semple/ how-the-haqqani-network-is-expanding-from-waziristan?page=show [accessed 1st June 2012] ! Wright. Taliban. Tauris & Co Ltd. London ! Semple..co.co.uk BBC. M. A.

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