THE PARADOX OF IDENTITY* William J.

Greenberg

ABSTRACT:

Call a semantics for singular terms extensionalist if it embraces (1) and classical if it embraces (2). 1. The meaning of a singular term is exhausted by its reference. 2. The reference of a singular term is an entity that is logically simple. Call a semantics adequate if it distinguishes material identity (the identity of a and b) and formal identity (the identity of a and a). Frege reacts to the inadequacy of classical extensionalist semantics by rejecting (1). This he does without a sideways glance at (2), whose background ontology he implicitly accepts. In contrast, my account of the difference between material and formal identity replaces that background ontology, the so-called ontology of individuals (van Heijenoort's term), with an ontology whose ground-level objects are ontologically differentiated and logically complex. The semantics I urge for singular terms, while extensionalist * in the sense of (1), is thus a nonclassical semantics in which singular terms take structured individuals, or complexes (as I will say), as their referents. For, unlike the logically simple units of the ontology of individuals, complexes keep (true) 'a = b' and 'a = a' apart.

*Epistemologia XIX, 1996, pp. 207-226

1

1.0 Introduction1 'A Theory of Complexes'2 presented a formal theory of the identity-relation. The foundationstone of this theory is the particular-cum-complex, an entity which is ontologically differ differentiated and logically complex. The deductive apparatus of the theory is that of the formal system P.3 Viewed as an abstract calculus, P says nothing about the world. Like other theoretical models, however, P can be endowed with empirical content by identifying C-complexes with particulars. The effect of this identification is to replace the standard ontology of quantification theory by an ontology of complexes. I will warrant this identification by showing that important logicosemantic features of particulars which the standard ontology cannot explain, can be explained in terms of the principles governing the relations of complexes and their constituents. An ontology of complexes is capable of such explanation because complexes incorporate essential features of the particularity of individual things from which the standard ontology prescinds. In Appearance and Reality, F. H. Bradley cites the two aspects of particularity I have in mind: If we take up anything considered real, no matter what it is, we find in it two aspects. There are always two things we can say about it; and if we cannot say both we have not got reality. There is a 'what' and a 'that', an existence and a content, and the two are inseparable. That anything should be, and should yet be nothing in particular, or that a quality should not qualify and give a character to anything is obviously impossible. (Appearance and Reality, p. 162, cited in Murphy's 'Substance and Substantive,' U.C. Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 9, 1927, pp. 63-87) Complexes incorporate these aspects of an individual thing's particularity, for every complex encapsulates a haecceity and an individual. In contrast, the ground-level objects of the "ontology of individuals", as Van Heijenoort calls the standard ontology of quantification theory, are qualitatively indefinite--and intrinsically so. The translation of everyday assertions about ordinary objects into the language of quantification theory thus involves replacement of the qualitatively definite individual things and events such assertions are about by ground-level objects of the standard ontology, "bare individuals" with no "inner structure, . . . mere pegs".4 Logico-semantic analyses which proceed by translating such assertions into the language of quantification theory5 thus obliterate the nexus of that and what
1 2 3

I am grateful to Paul Schachter, John Olney, and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier versions of this This journal

P is presented in Appendix Two.

4 5

Van Heijenoort, Jean (1976). 'Set-Theoretic Semantics,' in Selected Papers, p. 48. The logical technique for obtaining such objects is well-known. First, an object, say an apple, is separated from its color, so becoming an x such that red(x). Divested in turn of its other attributes--its shape, feel, taste, kind,..., etc.-the apple emerges as an x such that red(x) and round(x) and soft(x) and sweet(x) and (fruit)x ... etc. (Francis Pelletier, Review of E.J. Lowe's 'Kinds of Being,' History and Philosophy of Logic 13, 1992, pp. 125-128.) The entity which

2

constitutive of the particularity of the objects these assertions are about. As a result, such analyses fail in two related respects. First, they fail to convey the complex states of affairs to which truthful singular identity and existence statements refer; and second, they fail to uncover a basis for the "referential opacity" of singular terms in propositional attitude and modal contexts. Nowhere is the insufficiency of classical analysis more apparent than in its inability to resolve the so-called "problem of identity". 1.1 The Problem of Identity No instruction in semantics is required to grasp that (1) and (2) do not mean the same thing. (1) Hesperus = Hesperus. (2) Hesperus = Phosphorus. Of course, it is one thing to note that sentences such as "Hesperus = Hesperus" and "Hesperus = Phosphorus" differ in what they assert--and quite another thing to adduce why this should be so. I will venture an explanation of this from the standpoint of a referential view of meaning. Such a view holds that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are names, and that the meaning of a name is what it stands for. In coming to terms with what sets (1) and (2)--and such pairs of sentences generally--apart, I will adopt a referential view of meaning--not only, as is sometimes done, for proper names like "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus", but for other singular terms as well. 6 On the view of meaning I have in mind, "Hesperus" will mean Hesperus and "Phosphorus" Phosphorus. As a result, (1) will assert--as intuitively and pre-theoretically it appears to assert--that Hesperus is identical with Hesperus; and (2) will assert--as intuitively and pre-theoretically it appears to assert--that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus. What sets apart (1) and (2) will thus reflect some difference between the identity of Hesperus and Hesperus and the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus--and so, ultimately, some difference between Hesperus and Phosphorus, which--notwithstanding the historic principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals--are, as (2) suggests, one and the same entity. 7 1.2 Extensions as Meanings: Chronicle of an Exile Foretold

stands in for "x" is thus no longer an apple, but--like Aristotelian matter or Thomas's materia insigna--an attributeless bearer-of-attributes. 6 By singular term, I mean any nominal referring expression which purports to pick out a particular--the category "particular" being broadly construed so as to include things, processes and events. Singular terms include proper names ("Scott", "Vulcan", "the Palmdale Bulge"), definite descriptions ("the author of Waverley", "the largest prime number", "the round square"), and singular possessive phrases ("Euclid's fifth axiom", "Smith's hangover", "Yugoslavia's tragedy"). 7 According to the Indiscernibility of Identicals, if x and y are identical, every property of x is also a property of y-and conversely. So if, as I maintain, Hesperus and Phosphorus are numerically identical yet differ in some respect, then the Indiscernibility of Identicals is false.

3

A referential theory of meaning for singular terms does two things. First, it equates the meaning of a singular term with its reference. In this way, such a theory links naming and meaning. Second, it equates the reference of a singular term with a particular, concrete or abstract. 8 In this way a referential theory avoids making singular terms the vehicles of a strictly conceptual content.9 A referential theory thus assigns meanings in such a way as to satisfy EX1. EX1: The meaning of a singular term is a particular. An extensional semantics encapsulates a referential theory of meaning for singular terms. Call a semantics which satisfies EX1, EX1-extensional. The second criterion for an extensional semantics is of a different sort. Whereas EX1 equates the meaning of a singular term with its reference, EX2 exacts a tribute from sentence meanings. EX2: When in a sentence, a singular term is substituted for another with the same meaning, the meaning of the sentence remains constant. It is sometimes supposed that a semantics which is EX1-extensional must also be EX2extensional: If [singular terms] have no other semantic role but to refer, then it appears that if two [singular terms] refer to the same individual, then a principle ... is warranted ...that says that substitution of one [term] for the other will...preserve...the proposition expressed. (Donnellan, 1990: 202)10 But this is not so. Whether a singular term's reference is its meaning, and whether the meaning of a sentence remains constant when one singular term is replaced by another with the same meaning, are separate questions--as are whether "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" mean Hesperus and Phosphorus, and whether the meaning of "Hesperus = Hesperus" is the same as that of "Hesperus = Phosphorus". Whether a theory of meaning is EX1-extensional is independent of whether it is EX2-extensional. In my semantics, the concrete particulars Hesperus and Phosphorus exhaust the meaning of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus". The EX2-semanticist and I thus both commence by treating the referents of singular terms as their meanings. But here we part ways. For the tribute exacted by the EX2-semanticist's commitment to Hesperus and Phosphorus is one that "Hesperus = Phosphorus" and "Hesperus = Hesperus" cannot pay. And

8

"Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" refer to concrete particulars, while "nine" and "the number of planets" refer to abstract ones. 9 There is no general agreement concerning what the intension of a singular term might be. The distinction between intension and extension, however, is often taken to reflect Frege's distinction between the particular a singular term stands for and the conceptual content it expresses. 10 For my "singular terms"/"term", read Donnellan's "proper names"/"name".

4

so the EX2-semanticist casts out Hesperus and Phosphorus from the Garden of Meaning. I will not recount the ensuing fall from semantic grace of extensions generally. 1.3 Sense and Reference Thomas garners points toward promotion by working the semantic circuit in the Valley of the Shadow of Doubt--for all it's worth (and then some). A highly regarded younger scholar, Thomas does the right thing in philosophical semantics. At desk. Reflective. When in a sentence, a singular term is substituted for another with the same meaning, the meaning of the sentence remains constant. Brow Darkens. Some people still say meaning is naming. They say "Hesperus" means Hesperus and "Phosphorus" means Phosphorus. Leaps to his feet. But Hesperus IS Phosphorus. So if "Hesperus" meant Hesperus and "Phosphorus" meant Phosphorus, "Hesperus = Hesperus" and "Hesperus = Phosphorus" would mean the same thing. But they don't! Sniffs. Meaning as naming. Extensional semantics. What a crock! Mephisto. From behind desk. Wait a minute! Not so durn fast! Maybe it's not meaning as naming that's a crock. Maybe it's something else. Like "The meaning of a sentence remains constant when a singular term is substituted for another with the same meaning". Maybe there's your crock. Who's to say? Thomas. Stamps foot. Mine is NOT a crock! Mephisto. "This is a crock and that is not." O lover of wisdom, `give me an ARGUMENT. Thomas. Resolute. All right. Meaning as naming is a crock because it is inconsistent with a SelfEvident Principle of Philosophical Semantics... Mephisto. Evident, schmevident... Thomas. ...and Touchstone of Self-Consistent Thought, mere reflection on--it's Frege's Principle, you know--suffices--(Mephisto smirks) Meaning as naming? I'll show you! Advances on Mephisto, brandishing reprint. Voice. Unswerving devotion alone to Transcendent Truth would never have provoked Thomas's willy nilly flight from extensions. Had "Hesperus = Phosphorus" and "Hesperus = Hesperus" meant the same thing, as it was an article of faith that extensionally proper such sentences should--or had it been possible to predict such perturbations on the basis of the regnant ontology, Thomas would never have cast his lot in with those creatures of darkness that EX2semanticists call intensions. Nor would Thomas have been likely to prostrate himself before whatever avatar of Fregean semantics was currently making the rounds of his culture circle.

5

Unfortunately, "Hesperus = Phosphorus" and "Hesperus = Hesperus" didn't mean the same thing; this was something on which Thomas--and members of his culture circle--fervently agreed. 11 As for the ground-level objects of the standard ontology, no amount of prodding could force them to cough up the difference between "a = a" and "a = b".12 Thomas. To Mephisto. And so it was that Gottlob Frege, with his doctrine of sense and reference, cast extensions out from the Garden of Meaning. In the words of the Master: It is natural...to think of there being connected with a sign (name, combination of words, letter), besides that to which the sign refers, which may be called the reference of the sign, also what I should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained. (Frege, 1892, 1992: 24) It is to Frege, the Founder of Intensional Semantics, that we owe the insight that the senses of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are ingredients in the meaning of "Hesperus = Hesperus" and "Hesperus = Phosphorus". Not their reference, their sense. Substitute reference for sense and there is nothing to set sentences like these apart. Suppose the reference of " a" and "b" determines what "a = a" and "a = b" mean. In the Master's words: ...the cognitive value of a = a becomes essentially that of a = b, provided a = b is true. (ibid.) On the other hand, if the sense of "a" and sense of "b" determine what "a = a" and "a = b" mean, the cognitive value of "a = a" is different from that of "a = b", even when "a = b" is true. For although "a" and "b" are, then, identical in reference, they are different in sense. What IS a sense, you ask? Well, some say a sense is an object's mode of presentation. Others say it's an individual concept. Some say it's a criterion for a word's application. Others say it's an incomplete state of affairs. Some say it's a context in which a reference is found in the world.13 Others say (brightening)...it's a function! A mathematical mapping! Take a sheet of paper. Draw a vertical line. On one side, put--put--Falters. I don't KNOW what a sense is. Takes a deep breath. Alright, alright. A sense--a sense--is whatever it is about "a" and "b" that makes "a = a" and "a = b" differ in cognitive value. Mephisto smiles. Voice. Mephisto's smile means Mephisto knows something that Thomas doesn't. Indeed, Mephisto is about to give Thomas the Real Low Down about Hesperus and Phosphorus, with oodles of fire and brimstone, but minus the fonts and curlicues with which Thomas and his
11 12

With the exception of Nathan Salmon. Indeed, when questioned about identity or difference, they would but give forth with a surly "Yea, Yea" or "Nay, Nay". 13 See Panayot Butchvarov, "Identity", in Peter A. French et. al. (eds.), Contemporary Studies in the Philosophy of Language, U. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1979, p. 163 f.

6

symbol-thumping cohorts religiously anoint the ponderous, mulled over dullness of their journal submissions; and with put-downs galore of "Frege fairy-tale semantics" that will make Thomas, his editor friends, their sustaining subscribers--and all those fervid little investors in Frege Futures over at the Oxford and Cambridge presses do a not-so-slow burn. Reflects. If Mephisto opens his trap again, this thing will never get published. To Mephisto. I'm sorry, Bub, but I'm TIRED of goosing electrons! Yells. Pull the plug on Mephisto! Mephisto squeals. 1.4 The Word Well-Lost Mephisto called our attention to the fact that it was Thomas's uncritical adherence to a presupposition common to every variety of Fregean semantics--that the meaning of a sentence remains constant when a singular term is substituted for another with the same meaning--which led him to conclude, from the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus, and cognitive distinctness of "Hesperus = Phosphorus" and "Hesperus = Hesperus", that the customary reference of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" plays no role in the meaning of "Hesperus = Phosphorus" and "Hesperus = Hesperus". What Mephisto was unable to do, thanks to a less than timely intervention on the part of the Voice, was explain what it is about the customary reference of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" that makes "Hesperus = Hesperus" and "Hesperus = Phosphorus" cognitively distinct. What is it, then, about the customary reference of singular terms which causes assertions of formal and material identity so to misbehave? Contra countless journal articles which take their cue from turn-of-the-century writings by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, my account of what sets such assertions apart will not evoke the language in which these are cast. Instead the point of departure for my account of the fall of Frege's Principle will be a less-than-modern view of identity and the entities it relates. 1.5 Identity as Oneness in Substance Identity, Aristotle informs us in Metaphysics, is oneness, in matter or substance. En sentido esencial, las cosas son idénticas del mismo modo en que son unidad, ya que son idénticas cuando es una sola su materia (en especie o en número) o cuando su sustancia es una. (Met., V, 9, 1018 a 7. Cited in Nicola Abbagano, Diccionario de Filosofía, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1986, p. 640). Concerning Aristotle's view of identity as a kind of oneness, Nicholas White observes: ...it is clear that in saying that X and Y are one, Aris-totle does not simply mean that [X and Y] are parts of the same compound entity; he also means that [X and Y] are in some sense the same, as each other. (1971: 187)

7

Aristotle is thus not "keeping separate the use of ' X and Y are one' to mean that they are in some way identical from its use to say that they make up a unitary entity". (ibid.) Now, if identity is oneness in substance, "Hesperus = Phosphorus" and "Hesperus = Hesperus" assert different things. Thus, suppose that z = y iff x and y are one in substance. Suppose also that x and y are one in substance iff for some z, x and y are moments of z. Then x = y iff for some z, x and y are moments of z. Therefore, if identity is oneness in substance, material identity is a relation that relates moments of a self-same particular. Not so formal identity. Consider. Since x = y iff x and y are one in substance, y = y iff y is a moment of some substance. Similarly, since x and y are one in substance iff for some z, x and y are moments of z, Y and Y are one in substance iff for some y, y is a moment of z.14 Hence y = y iff for some Z, Y is implected in Z. Thus, unlike material identity, which relates co-implected moments of a self-same particular, formal identity relates to itself a single such implected moment. To sum up so far: If identity is oneness in substance, the ground of the cognitive difference between "Hesperus = Phosphorus" and "Hesperus = Hesperus" is not a mode of presentation, or an individual concept, or a criterion for a word's application, or an incomplete state of affairs, or a context in which a reference is found in the world, or a function or mathematical mapping of any kind. The ground of this difference is simply the circumstance in the world which makes each assertion true: in the case of "Hesperus = Phosphorus", that there is some particular of which Hesperus and Phosphorus are moments; and in the case of "Hesperus = Hesperus", that there is some particular of which Hesperus is a moment. An ontological foundation is now taking shape for Aristotle's statement at 1018a79: ...la identidad de cualquier modo es una unidad, ya sea que la unidad se refiere a pluralidad de cosas, ya sea que se refiera a una única cosa, considerada como dos, como resulta cuando se dice que la cosa es idéntica a sí misma. (Ibid.) As we will see, the road--from a foundation for Aristotle's statement at Metaphysics 1018a79, to the shipwreck of Sense, to a solution for the problem of identity--the road, from the return of extensions to the Garden of Meaning, to the twilight of Fregean semantics, to a recon14

Render "x and y are one in substance just in case for some z, x and y are moments of z" as: (i).xy(one(x,y)  z(moment(x,z) & moment(y,z)) Now (ii) follows from (i) by Universal Instantiation: (ii) y(one(y,y)  z(moment(y,z) & moment(y,z)) But (ii) is logically equivalent to (iii). (iii) y(one(y,y)  z(moment (y,z)) Therefore, if z and y are one in substance just in case for some z, x and y are moments of z, then y and y are one in substance just in case for some z, y is a moment of.z.

8

ciliation of the theory of meaning and theory of reference--this road passes by way of the particular-cum-complex. 1.6 New Foundations From Old White's remarks about the "state of Aristotle's thinking in Metaphysics V" are meant to show why Aristotle "is neglecting to give a clear account of the notion of identity": Rather than thinking about what it is for X and Y to be identical, he has his mind fixed on what it is for an entity to be unitary… This discussion drags the treatment of sameness along on its coattails. (ibid., 188) Nevertheless, an account of the notion of identity which specifies what it is for x and y to be identical need not, as White suggests, dispense with an Aristotelian notion of sameness as oneness in substance. If particular and complex are one and the same entity, not only are the usual properties of identity engendered by the mutual relations of complexes and their constituents, but these relations also provide a foundation--as evidenced by the theorems of Theory P which follow--for the Aristotelian notion of sameness as oneness in substance. T1a,b and T2a,b specify identity-conditions for the constituents of complexes. T1a spells out when individuals are materially identical; and T1b, when individuals are self-identical. T1a

xy(x = y  wz(w.Z cont x & w.Z cont y))

(Individuals are materially identical iff there is some complex of which they are moments.) T1b x(x = x  wz(w.Z cont x)) (An individual is self-identical iff there is some complex of which it is a momentt. ) T2a,b do the same for haecceities, T2a spelling out when haecceities are materially identical; and T2b, when haecceities are self-identical. T2a xy(X = Y  wz(w.Z emb X & w.Z emb Y)) (Haecceities are identical iff there is some complex of which they are moments.) T2b x(X = X  wz(w.Z emb X)) (A haecceity is self-identical iff there is some complex of which it is a momentt. )

9

The "b" member of each theorem-pair is a corollary of its "a" counterpart. The identity of the individuals x and y is thus sufficient for the self-identity of x and pf y, as is the identity of the haecceities X and Y for the self-identity of X and of Y. T3a-d specify identity conditions for complexes (a complex being, arguably, an Aristotelian tode ti in modern garb). T3a spells out when complexes are materially identical; T3b, when a complex is self-identical; T3c, when C-complexes are materially identical--a C-complex being a complex whose constituents correspond; and T3d, when a C-complex is self-identical. T3a uvwx(u.V = w.X  yz(y.Z cont u & y.Z cont w & y.Z emb V & y.Z emb X)) (Complexes are materially identical just in case there is some complex of which their constituents are moments.) T3b xy(x.Y = x.Y  wz(w.Z cont x & w.Z emb Y)) (A complex is self-identical just in case there is some complex of which its constituents are moments.) T3c xy(x.X = y.Y  wz(w.Z cont x & w.Z cont y & w.z emb X & w.Z emb Y)) (C-complexes are materially identical just in case there is some complex of which their constituents are moments.) T3d x(x.X = x.X  wz(w.Z cont x & w.Z emb X)) (A C-complex is self-identical just in case there is some complex of which its constituents are moments.) T3b is a corollary of T3a, as is T3d a corollary of T3c. For complexes as well as their constituents, material identity is thus a sufficient condition for self-identity. 1.7 Bringing It All Home It's time to give Mephisto his due. He demands to be told what all those symbols, and the particular-cum-complex, have to do with Frege's Principle and the problem of identity. Now, Frege's Principle says that the meaning of a sentence remains constant when a singular term is substituted for another with the same meaning. If Frege were right, "Hesperus" couldn't possibly mean Hesperus and "Phosphorus" couldn't possibly mean Phosphorus. Granted that Hesperus = Phosphorus, if "Hesperus" meant Hesperus and "Phosphorus" meant Phosphorus, "Hesperus = Phosphorus" and "Hesperus = Hesperus" would mean the same thing. But they don't. Therefore, either "Hesperus" doesn't mean Hesperus and "Phosphorus" doesn't mean

10

Phosphorus--or Frege got it wrong, and the meaning of a sentence does not remain constant when a singular term is substituted for another with the same meaning. Frege got it wrong. Let me say why. Symbolize Hesperus by "h" and Phosphorus by "p". The identity of Hesperus and Hesperus then comes to: (3) h = h and the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus to: (4) h = p By hypothesis, Hesperus and Phosphorus are complexes--C-com-plexes, to be exact. As a result, (3) and (4) go over into assertions about C-complexes, thus: (5) h.H = h.H (6) h.H = p.P Now, T3c says that C-complexes are identical just in case there is some complex of which their constituents are moments--so that by being moments of that complex entity these are one in substance. By hypothesis, Hesperus and Phosphorus are C-complexes. Consequently, the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus involves the oneness in substance of the constituents of both Hesperus and Phosphorus. Not so the self-identity of Hesperus--for, as T3d suggests, Hesperus's self-identity depends, not upon the oneness in substance of the constituents of both Hesperus and Phosphorus, but upon the oneness in substance of the constituents of Hesperus alone. Therefore, since "Hesperus = Phosphorus" and "Hesperus = Hesperus" differ in what they assert, "Hesperus = Phosphorus" and "Hesperus = Hesperus" differ in meaning, even though Hesperus and Phosphorus are one and the same. 15 1.8 Dead Meat Voice. Thomas's parting comment about Sense reflected the sorry state of official wisdom-seeking in that domain. Although a tumble with Sense racked up more points for an academic fast-tracker than a pit stop with Phlogiston or "Fido"-Fido, the contribution to a solution of the enigma of Sense of a century's worth of tumbling had been vanishingly small. Indeed, the sum total of what any wisdom-seeker might stand and knowingly deliver about Sense, despite a bloat of sclerotic monographs, journal articles and lecture notes on that and
15

The solution to the so-called "Paradox of Analysis" proceeds along similar lines.

11

related topics, was epitomized in Thomas's parting words to Mephisto: "A sense is whatever it is about 'a' and 'b' that makes 'a = a' and 'a = b' differ in cognitive value." Why the sorry state of Sense? Was there no more to Sense than the self-indulgent and pretentious set-theoretic ersatzism with which Thomas and his Frege-worshipping colleagues sought to stave off the downfall of the regnant ontology? Was there no more to Sense than the accumulatory zeal of investors in Frege Futures over at the Oxford and Cambridge presses? For somebody with no interest in the sociology of knowledge, was Sense anything more than dead meat? Thomas. DEAD MEAT? Voice. Philosophically speaking. Thomas. Petulant. How would YOU know? Voice. Here. Take a whiff. Thomas holds nose. Now look. Retching sound. Thomas, muffled. THAT kind of dead is a matter for philosophical reflection. Louder. Worms propose. Wisdom-lovers dispose. Out of control. Pull the plug on the Voice! Shudders. Ferchrissake, did you see those fucking WORMS?16

16

"Desideria: The Voice explained to me that the barbarians, being pagans or else forming part of some heretical sect, did not hesitate to desecrate churches or other places dedicated to religious observance. According to the Voice, this way of acting on the part of the barbarians could be described as desecratory precisely because the places that they desecrated were sacred. But what did it really mean--desecratory? It meant that the barbarians with their devastations did not so much destroy churches as despoil them, once and for all, of their sacred character. Before the desecration, the church was a place which one entered bareheaded, in a state of reverence, walking slowly and speaking in a low voice; after the desecration it was nothing more than a warehouse, a big shed, in fact a structure possibly intact but devoid of any sacred character." Alberto Moravia, Time of Desecration (Playboy Paperbacks, 1981), p. 110.

12

APPENDIX ONE Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens17 His advanced logic class does not share Thomas's conviction that the notions intuitively valid18 and valid in all set-theoretic structures are extensionally equivalent. After today's lecture they will. Or else. Addresses class. An argument due to Georg Kreisel (19 69, 1971) shows that the notions intuitively valid and valid in all set-theoretic structures are extensionally equivalent. Goes to board. Kreisel notes that (1) D(A)19  Val(A)20 (2) Val(A)  V(A)21 (3) V(A)  D(A) jointly establish (4) (V(A)  D(A)) & (D(A)  Val(A)). A corollary of Kreisel's argument is that intuitively valid and valid in all set-theoretic structures have the same extension. (5) V(A)  Val(A)) (Mephisto emerges from behind podium.) Mephisto. Wait a minute. Not so durn fast! Thomas. YOU again! Mephisto. You claim intuitively valid and valid in all set-theoretic structures have the same extension. Thomas. Kreisel's argument shows that.
17

"one philosopher's modus ponens is another philosopher's modus tollens." (Hilary Putnam, 'Realism Without Absolutes', International Journal for Philosophical Studies, Vol 1(2), p. 180). 18 That is, valid in every conceivable circumstance--in every possible state of things. 19 "A" ranges over formulas of first-order predicate logic with identity. 20 "D(A)" means "A is formally derivable", and "Val( A)" means "A is intuitively valid". 21 "V(A)" means "A is valid in all set-theoretic structures".

13

Mephisto. No, it doesn't. All it shows is what follows from what. Goes to board. Take the negation of (5) as a premise, and you'll see what I mean. From the negation of (**), it follows that if (II) holds, either (I) or (III) does not: (*) not-(5) ⊦ (2) → (not-(1) v not(3)) But (II) is vouchsafed by the meaning of its terms. So if intuitively valid and valid in all settheoretic structures do not have the same extension, either (1) or (3) is false. (**)' _ ¬(D(A)  Val(A)) v ¬(V(A)  D(A)) But (3) "is precisely the mathematical content of Gödel's completeness theorem". 22Hence if intuitively valid and valid in all set-theoretic structures are not extensionally equivalent, firstorder predicate logic with identity is either unsound or incomplete. So Kreisel's argument does not establish the extensional equivalence of intuitively valid and valid in all set-theoretic structures. What Kreisel's argument does show is that if Gödel's completeness theorem holds, the extensional equivalence of intuitively valid and valid in all settheoretic structures is a sine qua non for the soundness of first-order predicate logic with identity. V(A)  D(A) ⊦ ((D(A)  Val(A)  (V(A)  Val(A)) Thomas snorts. Mephisto. Thomas? Thomas. Yes. Mephisto. Is The Law of Contraposition a crock?

22

Kreisel (1971), p. 254

14

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful