BACKGROUNDER | NO.

2824 JULY 11, 2013

opposition political parties, which he linked to foreign conspiracies. Under these conditions, Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. On July 3, Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi, who had “failed to meet the demands of the people,” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak, this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders, political leaders, and youth activists, many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement.

During his year in office, Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic, social, and political problems.
The next day, the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour, chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court, had been sworn in as interim president. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. As a judge, he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. mr. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward, although he gave no indication of when they would be held. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6, but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party, one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. Baradei, a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front, a coalition of
1.

leftist and liberal parties, frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators, but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. Mohammed Badie, the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday,” Badie warned, “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes, leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1,000 injured. On Monday, at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections, more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai, a hotbed of Islamist extremism, launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish, the provincial capital. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law), a new Islamist group, announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government. Similar organizations in Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations.

Matt Bradley, Tamer El-Ghobashy, and Reem Abdellatif, “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt,” The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2013, http:/ / online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940.html (accessed July 8, 2013). 2

arsenal to meet his arms control objectives and then changed the policy to justify the lower number. are already controversially low. Ask Questions Later: Obama’s Nuclear Weapons Policy Baker Spring Abstract President Barack Obama’s declared goal of eliminating the U.S. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage. the Obama White House released a fact sheet on its updated nuclear weapons policy.S. 2826 | JULY 11.org/bg2826 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue.S.2 The report provides evidence that President Barack Obama first chose the reduced numbers in the U. in its entirety. The Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study (NPRIS)1 has been a long time in coming. nuclear policy.S. strategic nuclear arsenal and then used the NPRIS to justify these numbers. This will require more nuclear weapons and a higherquality nuclear force than what the President says he wants.S. requirements for deterrence first and then choosing ■■ ■■ ■■ This paper.S. can be found at http://report. which recommends reducing the number of U. nuclear arsenal appears to be driving U. The Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study. n June 19.S. NE Washington. Further. The result will be a nuclear arsenal that both quantitatively and qualitatively is insufficient to defend U. The United States needs a nuclear force along with defensive and conventional strike weapons that can protect and defend the American people and U. 2013 Disarm Now. strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third.S. rather than assessing U.S. deterrence needs first and then choosing the number of weapons that would meet that need. Current levels. the NPRIS contends that the United States can safely reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third below the current levels. the White House issued a statement on how the President had adopted a policy that would change how the United States might employ nuclear weapons in the midst of a future crisis. which were set by the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Key Points ■■ O While President Obama was speaking in Berlin on June 19 about taking a step toward total nuclear disarmament. appears to have resulted from choosing the amount of reduction first and then justifying the number after the fact. The Administration’s backward approach to policymaking threatens to undermine the security of the United States and its allies. allies. President Obama has apparently decided first to reduce the number of weapons in the U.heritage. 2013. but prefers to reduce through a negotiated agreement with Russia.BACKGROUNDER No.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. may do this unilaterally. instead of assessing U. the NPRIS states that the U.S. Not surprisingly. . vital interests.

Chilton. The fact sheet states this determination was made after a comprehensive review of the requirements for nuclear forces. Baker Spring. “Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix. 2013). nuclear weapons in the pursuit of his aspiration for zero nuclear weapons is bolstered by a statement by the then-Commander of U. nuclear posture will remain ■■ ■■ The White House. geopolitical concerns that might…cause us to need more weapons deployed.” Clearly.. Code § 2573. 2013). strategic nuclear weapons by up to onethird below New START levels. 2466. but even he recognizes that the American people will reject an attempt to go directly to zero nuclear weapons. Commits to reducing the number of U. 2. September 16. 2012). South Korea: “But even as we have more work to do. 4. we can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need. Yet as detailed in the next section of this paper.S. I think the arsenal that we have is exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent. which the fact sheet reaffirms in its first paragraph. arsenal] is more than is needed. the NPRIS: Reaffirms the President’s goal of achieving “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. In July 2010. in contrast to the commitment to disarmament. And I say this in light of—when we talk about the nondeployed portion of the arsenal—it is sized to be able to allow us to hedge against both technical failures in the current deployed arsenal and any 1.S. 2010. http:/ /www.S. 111–5): Views from the Pentagon. The fact sheet further states that the U. General Kevin Chilton testified about the proper relationship between the numbers and deterrence capabilities: I do not agree that [the number of nuclear weapons in the U. http:/ /www. Specifically. .S.S.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states (accessed June 19.BACKGROUNDER | NO. http://www.S. 2826 JULY 11. 2013. what was? The overwhelming evidence suggests that he was focused on reaching his declared goal of zero U. nuclear weapons. June 16. Committee on Foreign Relations. This likelihood that President Obama is foremost concerned about reducing the number of U. strategic nuclear weapons.whitehouse. 2 5. the true number he desires is zero. video file. “Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States.”3 Since meeting deterrence and military requirements was clearly not foremost in President Obama’s mind when he chose these numbers. Senate. nuclear weapons policy.S.whitehouse. 2013 the numbers of nuclear weapons that would meet the requirements. but fails to indicate that an agreement with Russia is in any way necessary or that any agreement with Russia will be concluded as a treaty in accordance with the law. Accordingly. Barack Obama.senate. 2nd Sess.gov/thepress-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university (accessed May 29. the numbers recommended in the NPRIS were essentially chosen for aesthetic reasons. The second most important aspect of the NPRIS is the commitment to reduce the number of U. the preponderance of the evidence strongly suggests that the scope of the reduction was chosen first and the NPRIS was pursued to justify it.5 Asserts that the United States will maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.S. See 22 U.” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. March 26. it states the U. President Obama indicated his thinking more than a year ago in a speech at Hankuk University in Seoul.gov/hearings/the-new-start-treaty-treaty-doc-111-5views-from-the-pentagon (accessed May 8.S. testimony in The New START Treaty (Treaty Doc. Strategic Command during President Obama’s first term..” The White House. nuclear weapons may now be reduced further.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/twelve-flaws-of-new-start-that-will-be-difficult-to-fix. intends to seek the reductions in negotiations with Russia. General Kevin P. http:/ /www. this has been and remains President Obama’s highest priority in U.4 His testimony sharply contrasts with the assertion in the NPRIS that U. U. The NPRIS ■■ According to the fact sheet. 3. Indeed.foreign. “Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk University. 2010.” June 19. 2012.S. 111th Cong.S.S. These numbers look about right as an intermediate step between what is permitted by New START after its execution and zero.

7 The plausible answer to this question is that the White House recognizes that the President’s own budget policies make the guidance provided to the Department of Defense for retaining the triad untenable. Attempts to reaffirm the President’s earlier pledge that. NPRIS directs the DOD will retain a launch-under-attack capability.S. nuclear arsenal and weapons infrastructure. ■■ Narrows the focus of U. submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). At the same time. Apparently.C. Shortly after release of the fact sheet. This is supposed to lead to more effective management of the nuclear weapons stockpile.S. it is impossible to discern how U. The accompanying DOD employment report states that the NPRIS and the guidance provided to the DOD endorse retention of the triad. U. secure. which results from the NPRIS. As a way to justify this attempt.” June 12. by contrast. p. strategic nuclear delivery systems. secure. and effective arsenal. nuclear strategy to focus on only those objectives and missions that are necessary for deterrence in the 21st century. ■■ ■■ ■■ 6.. but only after taking that step may it examine why this is desirable. Presidential guidance to the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military on the U. and heavy bombers. which the President stated were necessary during Senate consideration of New START. security strategy. ■■ Codifies an alternative approach to hedging against technical or geopolitical risk..S.S.S.S.S.pdf (accessed June 19. 2013).S. nuclear strategy has been narrowed. as long as nuclear weapons exist. the Department of Defense is being instructed to reduce the role of launch under attack in contingency planning. the funding levels for supporting the U. Directs the Department of Defense to strengthen non-nuclear capabilities. the United States will maintain a safe. have not been met. the Department of Defense released a more detailed description of the modifications that the NPRIS made to U. and effective arsenal. The purpose behind this provision. nuclear force. as opposed to a complement to. On this basis. In other words. is exceedingly remote.defense. 3 . conventional capabilities are being redefined as a replacement for. 2013 “capable of convincing any potential adversary that the adverse consequences of attacking the United States or our allies and partners far outweigh any potential benefit they may seek to gain through an attack. Ibid. it instructs the Department of Defense to focus planning on the more likely 21st-century contingencies. It moves further toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the broader U. Department of Defense. it does not provide a clear justification for this assertion. http://www. nuclear strategy. nuclear employment and targeting policies. disarming nuclear attack against the U. In reality. but this raises the question of why it was omitted from the White House fact sheet. “Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States Specified in Section 491 of 10 U. 2826 JULY 11. Nowhere in the fact sheet is a statement that the President will honor his commitment to the Senate to modernize or replace the triad of U.S. 7. it is entirely plausible that the actual text of the NPRIS instructs the Department of Defense to de-alert the U. which consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).” However. Specifically.S. it observes that the President has supported significant investments to modernize the nuclear enterprise and maintain a safe. the nuclear arsenal in meeting the needs of deterrence. narrows U. However. This provision clarifies that U. Directs the Department of Defense to examine and reduce the role of launch under attack in contingency planning. nuclear policy and posture. it appears to weaken the hedging policy. is clear. it does not describe the nuclear force’s specific objectives and missions. but the DOD report suffers from several internal contradictions and contradicts the fact sheet.S.S. 5.6 Therefore. However. This provision is supposedly justified by the observation that the potential for a surprise. it could mean that NPRIS could weaken the requirements for the hedging policy. 2013.BACKGROUNDER | NO.S.gov/pubs/reporttoCongressonUSNuclearEmploymentStrategy_Section491.

particularly U.S. policy is to narrow the requirements for its nuclear employment and targeting policy.S.S. the President is in a rush. Presumably. The NPRIS states that U. Notes that the President has directed the DOD to begin updating and aligning its directives and contingency plans with the new guidance and to implement them over the course of the next year.” targeting populations and economic centers. States that the U. Indeed. Ibid.S. Finally..S. while protecting and defending the populations and economic capacity of the U. history suggests that foreign tyrannies do not value their people. against a repressive regime would be a “counterforce policy” that targets the regime’s internal security forces and strategic military forces. as a free country and therefore is not compatible with a credible deterrent. http://www.S. “Deterrence and Nuclear Targeting in the 21st Century.S. deterrent.S.BACKGROUNDER | NO. ■■ The most effective nuclear deterrent for the U. recommendations. the most effective nuclear deterrent for the U. in the direction of “countervalue targeting. 2826 JULY 11. President would choose to use nuclear weapons to cause widespread death and destruction in an enemy country in which the population is repressed and poses no significant threat to the U. p.S. 2747. This is problematic because a countervalue targeting policy is not compatible with the values of the U. The NPRIS is accompanied by a guidance document. must remain vulnerable to nuclear attacks by either Russia or China.9 No U.8 For whatever reason. to redesign the U.S. The most significant flaws are: Flaw #1: An obscure targeting policy. However.. and its allies. not for deterrence and defense.” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. drive a review of the U.S.S. particularly in relation to such weapons deployed in Europe. is focused on maintaining and improving strategic stability with both Russia and China. The fact sheets states that the President has directed the Department of Defense to use the new guidance resulting from the NPRIS to begin updating and aligning its directives and contingency plans in order to implement this policy over the next year.org/research/reports/2012/11/deterrence-and-nuclear-targeting-in-the-21st-century.S. The accompanying DOD employment report acknowledges that the DOD has received this guidance document. was founded on the principle of liberty. the ■■ The evidence in the NPRIS fact sheet supporting the argument that the numbers were chosen for reasons of arms control and disarmament. deterrence posture for both the U.heritage. These Evidence of Arms Control and Disarmament-Driven Numbers 8. Rebeccah Heinrichs and Baker Spring. which go beyond the numbers themselves. this further codifies the earlier stated policy that the U. The fact sheet states that NPRIS did not set out to address this matter. 2012. and its allies. would result in a dangerously weak U. 4 . nuclear force. including the U. that pose an ideological threat to their repressive regimes. Instead. it values the security and prosperity of its people. 2013 ■■ Defers the question of reducing the disparity between the U. not strengthening the overall U. This requirement is designed to force the Department of Defense. November 30. and Russia in short-range nuclear weapons. they value the means of repressing their populations and of threatening free nations. because the U. follows from the wide variety of flaws in the report’s recommendations. Thus. in the form of a directive to the Department of Defense. 1.S. Further. Strategic Command.S. 9. against a repressive regime would be a “counterforce policy” that targets the regime’s internal security forces and strategic military forces. and its allies. This is the inevitable result when arms control and disarmament goals. nuclear posture in a year’s time. the reduced number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons will drive the U.S. not just directly but in short order.S. if followed. Deferring this issue represents a presidential repudiation of his commitment to the Senate to address the matter.S.S.

2824 JULY 11. The Nour Party. it could devolve into an even bloodier version of Algeria’s civil war. Egypt’s army is sitting on a volcano and knows it. The splintered Islamist movement is by no means unified in support of Morsi. Other Islamists will likely increasingly criticize and ostracize the Nour leaders.000 lives since the Algerian Army stepped in to avert an Islamist election victory in 1991. particularly in southern Egypt. symbols of the anti-Morsi revolution such as Tahrir Square. and rising sectarian tensions. preventing the rise of an Islamist totalitarian state. It eagerly 3 U. widespread unemployment. who supported the military intervention. The army can only do so much to repair Egypt’s dysfunctional political system. The army needs to put Egypt’s house in order quickly and then get out of the way. Islamist extremists will likely target tourists once again to undermine the new government. bread riots. An outburst of violence by Islamist extremists could open a dangerous new chapter in Egypt’s unfinished revolution. which formerly generated the bulk of Egypt’s foreign currency earnings and provided jobs to about one of every seven workers. as it did between Mubarak’s fall in February 2011 and Morsi’s purge of top army leaders in August 2012. It inevitably will lose popular support the longer it rules. Foreign currency reserves are nearly exhausted. Sitting on a Volcano Egypt. Egypt’s economic woes have created a huge reservoir of unemployed youth who are vulnerable to the siren call of radical ideologies. a Salafist movement that favors the immediate imposition of Sharia law and resented Morsi’s high-handed efforts to monopolize political power. and the figure is much higher for young men. and preventing the eruption of a full-blown civil war on the scale of Algeria’s in the heart of the Arab world.S. surging crime rates. 2013 Islamist militants will likely soon expand their attacks beyond the Sinai region to include army. The United States has a national interest in stabilizing Egypt. which will require considerable American and international support. Morsi further sabotaged the tourism industry by appointing as governor of Luxor Province a member of the Islamist terrorist group that massacred 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997—not exactly a reassuring signal for nervous tourists. The army cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. Egypt is imploding in a bitter political struggle fought amid economic collapse. social turmoil. which has consumed more than 100. it cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. about 10 percent of Egypt’s more than 80 million people. Egypt has fallen into dire economic straits.BACKGROUNDER | NO. Moreover. There will likely be a surge in anti-Christian attacks. police. Help Needed in the Struggle for Freedom . Nearly one-quarter of Egypt’s workers are unemployed. joined non-Islamist opposition parties in pushing for early elections. American companies. labor strikes. which provide nearly half of Egypt’s food consumption. which will require considerable American and international support. and other Western companies. which will make it difficult to pay for wheat imports. Islamists charge that Egypt’s ancient Christian community was complicit in inciting protests to bring down Morsi. is a bellwether for the Arab Middle East. and government facilities. Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority.S. Left unchecked. a focal point for sectarian violence. who form the shock troops for street protests. and political stability will likely be elusive until the country’s worsening economic situation is reversed. Washington also has a humanitarian interest in preventing food shortages if Egypt’s social fabric continues to unravel. the largest Arab country. falling standards of living. and growing political polarization. The Obama Administration has been asleep at the switch for much of the past two years. anti-Morsi political groups. will likely become even more of a lightning rod for terrorist attacks. The political turmoil and rising crime rates of the past two years have severely hurt tourism. embassy. The imminent bankruptcy of Egypt’s state-dominated economy could quickly lead to catastrophic food shortages. and symbols of “foreign conspiracies” such as the U. particularly Islamist extremism.

It should also find an inclusive way of writing a new constitution to establish the rules of the political competition before elections. policy toward Egypt has gone off the rails.S. General el-Sissi’s “road map” for a democratic transition included no dates. and the restrictions that the Morsi government placed on freedom of the press. angry that the Obama Administration uncritically supported the Morsi regime.5 billion in annual U. which was headed for dictatorship. Morsi relentlessly expanded his own power in a winner-take-all manner while neglecting Egypt’s festering economic problems. Army War College in 2006. However. The lack of a shared understanding of the rules of the game enabled Morsi to stage a power grab. 2012. The Obama Administration failed to publicly criticize Morsi’s excesses. aid to Egypt. after the date of enactment of this Act. Egyptian advocates of freedom should know that Americans support their efforts and do not side with an Islamist authoritarian leader who is hostile to American values and policies. General el-Sissi reportedly was a student at the U. and Related Programs Appropriations Act. The Obama Administration has stopped short of calling the army’s intervention a coup to avoid triggering an aid cutoff. President Mansour has laid out a vague timetable for a constitutional referendum in four and a half months and parliamentary elections in six months. the rising persecution of Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. Section 7008 of the Department of State. but the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties should be allowed to participate only if they publicly choose a path of nonviolence. aid. Military coups have advanced the prospects for democracy at least two times in the past: Portugal in 1974. Foreign Operations. the crackdown on pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that the Mubarak regime formerly tolerated. in which case he may have absorbed the professional standards and nonpartisan apolitical tradition of the U. It is a sad sign that U. It remains to be seen whether Egypt’s latest coup will succeed in salvaging Egypt’s dim democratic prospects. 2013 embraced Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood–dominated government and was surprised that Egypt’s people so quickly became violently opposed to Islamist rule. a coup d’état or decree ■■ 4 .S.BACKGROUNDER | NO. What the U. not leading a backlash against American policy. and Egypt in 2011. The fact that Egyptians resent the Obama Administration’s courting of the Muslim Brotherhood should be a wake-up call for the White House. The interim government established by the army has a better chance of laying the groundwork for a democratic transition than did Morsi’s regime. support economic reforms to revive the economy.. In any event. The United States should support freedom in Egypt to advance its own interests as well as those of the Egyptian people. power grabs. Should Do In addressing Egypt’s deepening crisis.S. felt no need to compromise with the opposition or temper his Islamist ambitions because the Administration was reluctant to use the leverage afforded by $1. the United States should: ■■ Press Egypt’s army to hold elections and step aside as soon as possible. The Administration has called for a transparent and inclusive political transition process. Morsi. and freedom of religion.S. for his part. Washington should urge the interim government to adhere to this timetable.S. The Administration gambled that the practical responsibilities of governing would dilute the hostile anti-Western ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt’s military leaders are much more likely than Morsi’s cronies to advance freedom in Egypt. The Obama Administration’s enthusiasm for the Muslim Brotherhood led it to turn a blind eye to Morsi’s power grabs. Secular. Army.S. freedom of speech. Yet once in office. bars “any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree or. Many protesters demonstrating against Morsi before the coup also carried signs protesting President Obama’s support for the Morsi regime. 2012. 2824 JULY 11. and play a stabilizing role in the volatile Middle East. Attach tight strings to any U. and abuses. This led Egypt’s secular and liberal opposition to turn to Egypt’s army in despair.S. as contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act. and liberal Egyptians opposed to an Islamist takeover should be natural allies of the U. democratic.

both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. doubt. population. p. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. 2821 JULY 11. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. At the same time. All the while. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. In addition. but once the conflict is concluded. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. it is not solely by killing the enemy. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. from the context to the biases. Instead. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. 14. and similar outlets. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. influencing the course of the conflict. 3 . however. anxiety. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. or winning a piece of ground. operations. friendly elements in the opponent’s society.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. “When one defeats the enemy. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. including various forms of media. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. employing all the tools of communications. undermining their positions. and tactics. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. By employing various forms of strategic communications. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. regret. including the “Great Firewall of China.BACKGROUNDER | NO. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. between military and civilian. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). Finally. terror. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. and exhaustion in an opponent. can create a strong psychological impact. and leaders. In wartime. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. fear. Ideally. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. including diplomatic efforts. and among strategy. Guo. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. To be effective.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale.

economic. appropriately control the level of attack. p. and habits while at the same time strengthening friendly psychology. 404. but also against friends. No. Because of the complex. it targets externally. is not necessarily restricted by “wartime” versus “peacetime” categorizations. between military and civilian. manage.4 This philosophy is echoed in other PLA writings. 4 (2003). The interconnected nature of information. p. pp. will target not only the physical information infrastructure and the data that pass through it. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. intertwined nature of modern international politics and economics: [I]t is necessary in peacetime to undertake information warfare in the political. 4.” This in turn requires the ability to collect.5 Rather than trying to draw artificial boundaries among these categories. especially those who are making decisions. 1. makes clear-cut classifications of “military” and “civilian” almost impossible. 2008).)—are as important as the computers and networks and the software that runs them. clerks. and among strategy. information warfare is the struggle to dominate the generation and flow of information in order to enhance and support one’s own strategic goals while degrading and constraining those of an opponent. A product of the Information Age. appropriately calculate gains and losses in a conflict. Nanjing Political Academy.” China Military Science. PRC: National Defense University Press. and even exploitation. Li Naiguo. 2. and military realms. but also the human agents that interact with those data. The ability to triumph in future “Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions”—the most likely form of wars in the Information Age—rests upon the ability to secure “information dominance (zhi xinxi quan). therefore. information collection. 5. and one must rely on the media acting in multiple directions jointly. it must deal with allied countries. PRC: National Defense University Press. it is applied against the enemy. psychological operations are seen as an essential part of future conflicts. as well as information systems. Information dominance rests on two primary factors: modern information technology. 2821 JULY 11. and seek the best strategic interest and long-term benefit. Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide (Beijing. Guo Yanhua. precisely strike predetermined targets. 2013 Specifically: There are myriad targets and objects of psychological warfare. operations designed to influence a rival nation can no longer be aimed solely at military leaders or reserved for wartime. but also internally. Psychological Warfare Knowledge (Beijing. Yuan Wenxian. Academy of Military Science. 30. which is integral to information collection and transmission. affecting the 1. etc. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. the users of information—both high-level decision-makers and lower-level policy implementers (individual soldiers. emotions. Efforts to secure information dominance. whether by slowing down transmission or by introducing false or inaccurate data. As one Chinese volume observes. November 2005). “Study of the Journalistic Media Warfare in the Iraq War. But in the Chinese conception of psychological warfare. and the ability to degrade the quality of information. p. 2 . Similarly. In this context. 2004). New Theories of Information War (Beijing. in order to comprehensively realize the various goals. 77–79. Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department and Informationalized Operations Theory Research Office. but also the entire globe. the implication is that information should be treated as an integrated whole. 3. 154. The Science of Military Information (Beijing. technical.BACKGROUNDER | NO. with effective coverage of many areas. whether in wartime or peacetime. which emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. operations.2 The goal of psychological warfare is to influence. Military News Department Study Group. 2005).3 Psychological Warfare and Information Warfare Psychological warfare operations are integral to the broad concept of information warfare (xinxi zhanzheng). as only then can one scientifically establish operational plans. and exploit accurate information more quickly than an opponent. p. information warfare is constant and ongoing. Given the nature of modern technology and informationized societies. constrain. and tactics. and/or alter an opponent’s thoughts.

highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. or winning a piece of ground. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. influencing the course of the conflict. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. doubt. In addition. anxiety. can create a strong psychological impact. To be effective. and leaders. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. terror. it is not solely by killing the enemy. including diplomatic efforts. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. 2821 JULY 11. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. and tactics.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. Finally. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. In wartime. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. All the while. and similar outlets.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. At the same time. p. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. undermining their positions. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. regret. operations. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. including various forms of media. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. Ideally. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. By employing various forms of strategic communications. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. and exhaustion in an opponent. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state.BACKGROUNDER | NO. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. but once the conflict is concluded. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. from the context to the biases. Guo. including the “Great Firewall of China. “When one defeats the enemy. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. fear. population. and among strategy. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. however. between military and civilian. employing all the tools of communications. 3 . Instead. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. 14.

the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. 2 . The next day. http:/ / online.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law). Baradei. which he linked to foreign conspiracies. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. Yemen. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. 2013 opposition political parties. more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently.” The Wall Street Journal.000 injured. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations. the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour. who had “failed to meet the demands of the people. “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt. Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi. and youth activists. although he gave no indication of when they would be held. at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. leftist and liberal parties. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. had been sworn in as interim president. mr. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections. Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic.” Badie warned.BACKGROUNDER | NO. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6.wsj. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. Matt Bradley. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. During his year in office. this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders. 2013). a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him. Tamer El-Ghobashy. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court. but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. political leaders. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended. many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940. and Reem Abdellatif. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes. the provincial capital. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. a coalition of 1. Similar organizations in Libya. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government.html (accessed July 8. and political problems. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. As a judge. 2824 JULY 11. On Monday. On July 3. 2013. a new Islamist group. July 6. Under these conditions. Mohammed Badie. social. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward. a hotbed of Islamist extremism.