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An administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to him by the statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. The general power to regulate which the Commission has does not imply authority to prohibit. The resolution of the Commission would permit monopoly considering that there is only one stock exchange The Manila Stock Exchange. Even if the Commission permits the Makati Stock Exchange to deal only with other securities it would be just as the same as allowing the opening of a store on the condition that it would not sell the same goods as the other store is selling. A stock exchange is essentially monopolistic, the Commission states in its resolution. Double listing of a security, explains the Commission, divides the sellers and the buyers, thus destroying the essence of a stock exchange as a two -way auction market for securities, where all the buyers and sellers in one geographical area converge in one defined place, and the bidders compete with each other to purchase the security at the lowest possible price and those seeking to sell it compete with each other to get the highest price therefor. In this sense, a stock exchange is essentially monopolistic. The Court thinks that such premise is inconclusive. For it is debatable whether the buyer of stock may get the lowest price where all the sellers assemble in only one place. The price there, in one sale, will tend to fix the price for the succeeding sales, and he has no chance to get a lower price except at another stock exchange. Therefore, the arrangement desired by the Commission may, at most, be beneficial to sellers of stock not to buyersalthough what applies to buyers should obtain equally as to sellers (looking for higher prices). Besides there is the brokerage fee which must be considered. The Legislature has specified the conditions under which a stock exchange may legally obtain a permit; it is not for the Commission to impose others. If the existence of two competing exchanges jeopardizes public interestwhich is doubtfullet the Congress speak. Undoubtedly, the opinion and recommendation of the Commission will be given weight by the Legislature, in judging whether or not to restrict individual enterprise and business opportunities. But until otherwise directed by law, the operation of exchanges should not be so regulated as practically to create a monopoly by preventing the establishment of other stock exchanges. Further it has been held that where the licensing statute does not expressly or implied authorize the officer in charge, he may not refuse to grant a license simply on the ground that a sufficient number of licenses to serve the needs of the public have already been issued. The Court ruled in favor of petitioners. 2. The Court held in the negative. It is well-settled that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of quasijudicial powers. The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations. In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. Control on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does nto include any restraining authority over such body. The Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow the Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit to interfere in purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments. Indeed, is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. This state policy is echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that th e State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. To deny the Secret ary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local governments. Although the Department is given the power to prescribe the rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely monitoring compliance by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means to watch, observer or check. This is compatible with the power of supe rvision of the Secretary over local governments which as

earlier discussed is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. 3. Same; Administrative Law; Administrative Agencies; Statutes conferring powers on administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. Following this policy in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, the Court sustained the competence of the respondent administrative body, in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot. 4. ISSUE: Whether or not whether or not the CHR, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. HELD: The Court held that the CHR has no such power. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." The Commission has only the power to investigate but not adjudicate. Note: The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function the Commission does not have. 5. Administrative law; Authority of Commissioner of Civil Service to investigate and remove presidential appointees.The Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, being a'presidential appointee, belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint" as can be implied from Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260. Consequently, the Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative charges filed against said official, because his authority to pass upon questions of suspension, separation or removal can only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified service to which classification the administrator does not belong. Same; Administrative proceedings commenced upon authority of the Chief Executive; Complaint need not be verified. The administrative proceedings, having been commenced against petitioner, upon the authority of the Chief Executive who was his immediate administrative head, the same may be commenced by him motu proprio without previous verified complaint pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941. Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office with payment of back salaries in a petition filed before this Court on April 1, 1964. He alleged that he was nominated as chief of said office on May 20, 1958 and two days thereafter his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments; that on May 26, 1958 he took his oath of office as such after having been informed of his nomination by then Acting Assistant Executive Secretary Sofronio C. Quimson; that in a letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed to the President of the Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman of the Committee on Good Government of the House of Representatives, the latter informed the former of the findings made by his Committee concerning alleged gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed by petitioner in the Motor Vehicles Office which are summed up in the letter as follows: (1) malpractice

in office resulting in huge losses to the government; (2) failure to correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the same, facilitating thereby the commission of graft and corruption; and (3) negligence to remedy unsatisfactory accounting; that as a result of said findings, Congressman Roces recommended the replacement of petitioner and of his. assistant chief Aurelio de Leon as well as the complete revamp of the offices coming under the Motor Vehicles Office by the new chief who may be appointed thereafter; that having been officially informed of the content of said letter, then Secretary of Public Works and Communications furnished petitioner with a copy thereof requiring him to explain within 72 hours why no administrative action should be taken against him relative to the charges contained in the letter; that petitioner answered the letter as required wherein he explained and refuted in detail each and everyone of the charges contained in the letter of Congressman Roces; that on February 15, 1960, the then Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo suspended petitioner as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, having thereupon created an investigating committee with the only purpose of investigating the charges against petitioner and his assistant Aurelio de Leon, and to undertake the investigation a prosecution panel was created headed by Special Prosecutor Emilio A. Gancayco; that after the investigation said committee submitted its report to the President of the Philippines who thereafter issued Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing the removal from office of petitioner; that as a result of petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as acting administrator; and that, after having been officially notified of his removal, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and/or reinstatement, and when this was denied, he filed the instant petition before this Court, Respondents in their answer denied the claim of petitioner that the charges contained 111 the letter 01 Congressman Roces were not directed against him but against his office in general for the truth is that he was, specifically charged with mismanagement, gross inefficiency and negligence in the performance of his duties as Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office, and as a result he was required to answer the same within 72 hours to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondents also denied that petitioner was investigated without being accorded due process as required by law for in fact he was given every reasonable opportunity to present his defense, to secure the attendance of witnesses, and to produce documents in his behalf in a manner consistent with administrative due process. Respondents also averred that the President of the Philippines, contrary to petitioner's claim, has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Section 5 of Republic Act No, 2260. Respondents finally averred that the letter of Congressman Joaquin R. Roces is in effect a valid administrative complaint because it contained specific charges which constitute just causes for his suspension and removal; that said charges need not be sworn to for the Chief Executive, as administrative head of petitioner, is empowered to commence administrative proceedings motu proprio pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941, without need of any previous verified complaint And as special defense respondents averred that petitioner is guilty of laches for having allowed almost four years before instituting the present action. 6. FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order ("AO") No. 218 dismissing petitioner Eliseo Ruiz for cause from his office as President of the Central Luzon State University ("CLSU"). The Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, denied petitioner's first and second motions for reconsideration. Petitioner filed several actions among different courts and eventually resorted to this petition contending grave abuse of discretion on public respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing AO No. 218. HELD: Petitioner has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents in rendering the assailed administrative orders. Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented against him during the hearings of the investigating committees. There is no doubt that he has been accorded his rights. AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner was removed from office. Those findings included the facts that (a) petitioner terminated the CLSU's Executive Vice-President, offered new academic courses, undertook unprogrammed projects resulting in wastage of university property, all without the necessary approval of the Board of Regents; (b) he directed the purchase at uncanvassed prices of chemicals unsuitable for the required school purposes from a firm owned by him; (c) he executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop harvest sales agreement in favor of a company where he was holding a directorship; and (d) he collected financial contributions from the faculty and students in disregard of the provisions of R.A. No. 5546. 18 These acts constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct, and furnish legal basis for dismissal from the public service.