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Rev. Nardo B. Cayat filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of
Buguias, Benguet for the May 2004 elections. Thomas Palileng, another candidate for Mayor filed a petition to annul/nullify his certificate of candidacy and/or to disqualify on the ground that Cayat has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Twenty three days before the election, Cayat’s disqualification became final and executory. He, however won and was proclaimed and assumed office. Palileng filed an electoral protest contending that Cayat was ineligible to run for mayor. The Vice-Mayor intervened and contended that he should succeed Cayat in case he is disqualified because Palileng was only a second placer, hence, he cannot be declared as the winner. Is the contention of the Vice-Mayor correct? Why?
ANS: No, because there was no second placer, hence, Palileng should be proclaimed as the winner on the following grounds: First, the COMELEC‟s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat‟s certificate of candidacy due to disqualification became final and executory on 17 April 2004 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections. Twenty-three days before the election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the present case because Palileng is not a secondplacer but the only placer. Consequently, Palileng‟s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question. Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan‟s favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayat‟s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat‟s disqualification became final only after the elections. (Cayat v. COMELEC, April 27, 2007).
On election day itself. ANS: The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for. and votes cast for him shall not be counted. Labo and other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition – the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. In Labo. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidate‟s disqualification in Labo and the other ca ses had not become final before the elections. (Cayat v. states: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for. Labo‟s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992. Q— What is the effect if a candidate is disqualified by final judgment? Explain. Reason in Labo. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election. three days after the 11 May 1992 elections. Is the contention correct? Why? ANS: No. does not apply because in Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. COMELEC). The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. In the case of Cayat he was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 lections. v. Labo. COMELEC should apply. may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. Labo was still legally a candidate. Cayat‟s candidacy for Mayor was legally non existent in the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day. inquiry. Section 6 of Republic Act No. In short. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections. This is a mandatory provision of law. . Jr. which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer. or protest and.Q— It was contended that the doctrine of rejection of the second placer laid down in Labo v. the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action. Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6. 6646. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. This essential condition does not exist in the present case. upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor. COMELEC. which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections.
the disqualification was final and executory before the election. Q — Mayor Marino Morales ran for a fourth term despite having served for three (3) consecutive terms as Mayor of Mabalacat. (Cayat. COMELEC).The present case falls under the first situation. There is no longer any need to ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of his disqualification when they casted their votes on election day because the law mandates that Cayat‟s votes “shall not be counted”. Palileng‟s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate. he alleged that while he served his second term. hence. In answer to a petition to cancel his certificate of candidacy. The petition-in-intervention should be rejected because the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer does not apply to this case. 2001. second to none. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004. and thus their votes are stray and “shall not be counted”. The COMELEC declared him disqualified. Q— Why is the proclamation of Cayat void? Explain. even if “as caretaker”. v. In this case. Therefore. 1999 and that his proclamation was declared void and which became final and executory on August 6. the voters are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate. (Cayat v. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for. COMELEC). Q— Is the intervention of the Vice-Mayor proper? Why? ANS: No. ANS: Cayat‟s proclamation is void because the decision disqualifying him had already become final on 17 April 2004. Pampanga. he did it as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “ de facto officer” because he was suspended by the Ombudsman from January 16. 1999 to June 30. all the 8. Rather. Three-term limit. Is the contention correct? Why? . and votes cast for him shall not be counted. COMELEC). there was no second placer. The doctrine applies only if the winning candidate‟s disqualification has not yet become final and executory before the election. (Cayat v. he contended that his second term from July 1. Before the Supreme Court. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. 2001 may not be counted since his proclamation was void. There is no disenfranchisement of the voters. way before the 10 May 2004 elections. 164 votes cast in Cayat‟s favor are stray. 1999 to July 15.
COMELEC. G. December 10. v.. In Lonzanida v. shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. May 9. Morales has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1. The framers of the Constitution wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. No. et al.R. For one. 2007).R. COMELEC. he voluntarily vacated when there was a declaration of failure of election. because his service from July 1.A. Q— ANS: Explain the reason for the maximum term limit. and. G. January 23. 167591 and Dee v. 170577. 1995. 2001. there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.R. Article X of the Constitution provides that the terms of the office of elected local officials x x x. the three-term limit rule applies to him. No. while he assumed office. This is especially so that he assumed office. the result of the mayoralty elections was declared a nullity for the stated reason of “failure of election”. Nos. the three-term limit is an exception to the people‟s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. No. followed by an order for him to vacate the office of the mayor. 2003. he was qualified to run for a third term. G. such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. et al. 1999 to June 30. 167591 and companion case. Section 8. May 6. For another. 162395 and 163354.. et al. COMELEC. (Rivera III. 2006. G. there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. hence. 479 SCRA 473. as a consequence thereof. (Rivera III. hence. He served as mayor up to June 30. 417 SCRA 601. The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. G. COMELEC. . the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified. No. ANS: No. Q— Is not the case of Morales similar to the case of Lonzanida v COMELEC? Explain. COMELEC. As held in Latasa v. 7160 (the Local Government Code) clearly provides that no local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. 154829. Alegre. In Ong. x x x Section 43(b) of R. he is disqualified. hence. 2007).R.ANS: No. he served the full term even as there was a declaration of failure of election. et al. In fine. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the decision in the electoral protest case ousting him as mayor. He did not fully serve the term. v. As held in Ong v. in Lonzanida.R. 2001 was for a full term. No.
G.On the other hand. et al.. Alegre applies to Morales. COMELEC. May 9. Is this case applicable? Why? ANS: No. and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. e al. Capco assumed office as mayor by virtue of the principle of succession. 211. 2007). et al. G. (Sec. the votes cast for him should not be counted and must be considered stray votes. it was held that assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the remaining term is not the “term” contemplated under Section 8. Instead.A. No. COMELEC. No. Unlike Lonzanida. There is no reason why this ruling should not also apply to Morales who is similarly situated. COMELEC. February 4. 6 and 7. . here. his assumption of the office of the mayor upon the death of the incumbent mayor may not be regarded as a term. there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis‟ service respecting the 1998-2001 term. he being the vice-mayor. G. Ong v. v. Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for an office for which he did not present himself shall be considered as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate the whole ballot. Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R. et al. the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. 147927.. (Rivera III. hence. COMELEC. Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms. v. 7160 (the Local Government Code). v. Clearly. RA 6646). because with the death of Mayor Cruz. 167591. 376 SCRA 90. (Rivera III. May 9. the three-term limit rule applies to him. Francis was never unseated during the term in question. COMELEC to apply to him. in Adormeo v.R. May 9. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election was declared void. (Rivera III. But more importantly. Q — What is the effect if the certificate of candidacy of a candidate is cancelled? Explain.R. he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente. Francis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of the mayor of San Vicente. (Secs. Morales can not be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being a candidate. Q— Morales cited Borja v. 2002. elected even if he served the rest of the term of the mayor. There was a “break” in the service of the mayor. 167591.R. As ruled. Similarly. 2007). 2007). He was not therefore. No. ANS: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for. Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term. his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full term. et al. He was a “private citizen” for a time before running for mayor in the recall elections. Omnibus Election Code).
No. v. or in cases where two or more candidates are to be elected for the same position and two or more candidates received the same number of votes for the last place in the number to be elected. G.R. July 3. (Rivera III. 211 SCRA 297). As a consequence of ineligibility.R. 105111. after recording this fact in its minutes. upon five days notice to all the tied candidates. and 2. 133495.Q — It was contended that since Morales was disqualified. that he has fully served three consecutive terms. shall by resolution. Is the contention correct? Why? ANS: In Labo v. et al. Q — What is the proper procedure to be resorted to in case of a tie? Explain. 44 of the Local Government Code. COMELEC. G. Q — What are the requirements which must concur for the three-term limit to apply? ANS: For the three-term limit to apply. a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. COMELEC. the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. G. et al. 1992. Sept. No. May 9. the second placer should be proclaimed as the winner. Adormeo v. hold a special public meeting at which the board of canvassers shall proceed to the drawing of lots of the candidates who have tied and shall proclaim as elected the candidates who may favored by luck. No.. Effect if there is a tie. COMELEC. 2007 citing Labo v. (Lonzanida v. et al. 479 SCRA 473. No. 2007). COMELEC. 295 SCRA 157.R. the following two conditions must concur: 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post. COMELEC. Alegre. 3. 167591. G. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Sec. ANS: To resolve the tie. 376 SCRA 90.R. COMELEC. 167591. and the candidates so proclaimed shall have the right to assume office in the same manner as if he had been elected by plurality of votes. the Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner. The board of canvassers shall forthwith make a certificate stating the . 1998. there shall be drawing of lots. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. et al. v. May 9.. Rivera III. the board of canvassers. Whenever it shall appear from the canvass that two or more candidates have received an equal and highest number of votes. The rule is that. Ong v.
Tugade v. Did the COMELEC act correctly? Why? ANS: No. G. Del Rosario. . 240. extent of power of COMELEC. Pre-proclamation controversy. could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and.R. G. G. No.name of the candidate who had been favored by luck and his proclamation on the basis thereof. Withdrawal of certificate of candidacy.. by itself.R. 171063. 436 SCRA 45). Q — What is the extent of the power of the COMELEC in pre-proclamation controversy? Explain. There was. 165983. COMELEC. deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez v. No. without the proper proceedings. 2007). his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code. could not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and. Nothing in this section shall be construed as depriving a candidate of his right to contest the election. et al. was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna‟s certificate of candidacy.. He was substituted by Joy Luna but the COMELEC denied due course to her certificate on the ground that Hans being under age. 2007). The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger. thus. without the proper proceedings. August 10. COMELEC. cancelled Hans Roger‟s certificate of candidacy and declared the substitution of Luna invalid. the COMELEC. No. (Sec. he could not have filed a valid certificate of candidacy.R. If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy. (Cipriano v. BP 881. 2004. however. being under age. COMELEC. thus. et al. Q— Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy but withdrew the same. no petition to deny Hans certificate of candidacy. In effect. (Luna v. there was no petition to deny due court to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger. The COMELEC may not. April 24. the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. March 2. In this case. 158830.
1989. 125 Phil. but the divergence must be something more than mere superficial differences. July 4. Handwritings have only one general appearance.R. this rule is not without any exception. (G. p. et al. 2003. Delos Reyes v. General resemblance is not enough to warrant the conclusion that two writings are by the same hand.ANS: It is a well-established rule in pre-proclamation cases that the Board of Canvassers is without jurisdiction to go beyond what appears on the face of the election return. No. votes cast for a candidate for the wrong or inexistent office. The votes contested in this appeal are all misplaced votes. No. et al. 34. COMELEC. However. (Silverio v. Neighborhood rule. the COMELEC may applied the “neighborhood rule. it was held that if there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine. The rationale is that a full reception of evidence aliunde and the meticulous examination of voluminous election documents would run counter to the summary nature of a pre-proclamation controversy. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) which provides: Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for an office for which he did not present himself shall be considered as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate the whole ballot. Clamor. 170070. Dureza..R.R. the doctrine does not apply.. 2007). Commission on Elections. v. several entries having been omitted in the questioned election return. 138). ANS: No.” As used by the Court. In Lee v. i. 171882. this nomenclature. loosely based on a rule of the same name devised by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in Nograles v. The COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the questioned returns. 2007). 244.e. April 3. COMELEC. or we may find divergences in both. Ewoc. (Osborn‟s Questioned Documents. 405 SCRA 303. No. February 28. G. 1 HRET Rep. In appreciating such votes. 157004.. June 16. to reach the conclusion that writings are by different hands we may find numerous likeness in class characteristics but divergences in individual characteristics. refers to an exception to the rule on appreciation of misplaced votes under Section 211(19) of Batas Pambansa Blg. . 917 (1967)) In order to reach the conclusion that two writings are by the same hand there must not only be present class characteristics but also individual characteristics or „dents and scratches‟ in sufficient quantity to exclude the theory of accidental coincidence. HRET Case No. et al. G. Q — May the COMELEC invalidate certain ballots merely on a finding that the writings have the same general appearance and pictorial effect? Explain.
Tinga.R. COMELEC. 496 SCRA 505 and Ferrer v. 2007).. Co. In these instances. thus defeating the secrecy of the ballot which is a cardinal feature of our election laws. (b) slightly underneath the line for the contested office (Sarmiento v. February 22. The distinguishing mark which the law forbids to be placed on the ballot is that which the elector may have placed with the intention of facilitating the means of identifying said ballot. 347 (1958)). 5 SCRA 438) misplacement of names where such names were preceded or followed by the title of the contested office or where the voter wrote after the candidate’s name a directional symbol indicating the correct office for which the misplaced name was intended (Moya v. No. 25 July 2006. each voter must “fill his ballot by writing in the proper place for each office the name of the individual candidate for whom he desires to vote. (c) immediately above the title for the contested office ((Villavert v. 29 June 1962. Samonte. Moya v. 174010. 217 Phil. Quemado. 386 Phil. Del Fierro. Hon. ANS: In order for a ballot to be considered marked. No ballot should be discarded as a marked ballot unless its character as such is unmistakable. Feb. (Velasco v. (Perman v. (2) a single (Farin v. 598 (1973)) or double (Sarmiento v. Thus. the purpose of which is to identify them. 84 Phil. 199 (1939)). J).Section 211(19) is meant to avoid confusion in the minds of the election officials as to the candidates actually voted for and to stave off any scheming design to identify the vote of the elector. Del Fierro. G. ((Abad v. This is in consonance with the settled doctrine that ballots should be appreciated with liberality to give effect to the voters‟ will. Moscardon.” Excepted from Section 211(19) are ballots with (1) a general misplacement of an entire series of names intended to be voted for the successive offices appearing in the ballot (Cordero v. 152 Phil. . 392 (1984)). No. 10 Phil. G. L-18027. 8. Commission on Elections. in the sense necessary to invalidate it.R. 167438. 69 Phil. No. Fornier. 431 (2000)). et al. (Amurao v. or (d) in the space for an office immediately following that for which the candidate presented himself . L-18027. No. Quemado. it must appear that the voter designedly place some superfluous sign or mark on the ballot which might serve to identify it thereafter. 199 (1939)). et al. Calangi. 69 Phil. 2007. G. and (3) a single misplacement of a name written (a) off-center from the designated space (Mandac v. 706 (1930)). Section 211(19) also enforces Section 195 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that in preparing the ballot. 54 Phil. COMELEC. the misplaced votes are nevertheless credited to the candidates for the office for which they presented themselves because the voters‟ intention to so vote is clear from the face of the ballots. No. Q— When is a ballot considered as marked? Explain. marked ballots are ballots containing distinguishing marks.R. Gonzales. 756 (1949)). 166931. Marked ballot. for the purpose of defeating the secrecy of suffrage which the law establishes. 5 SCRA 438. 29 June 1962.
. substitute voting. fraud or other analogous causes. v. Q— When is there failure of election? ANS: There are three instances where a failure of elections may be declared. such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure. Thus. there was a situation where the petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Division and the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on the main case were consolidated. In this case..R. 2007). and farcical and statistically improbable results. COMELEC. fraud or other analogous causes. G. In the third instance. Note: None of the three instances is present in this case. 164496-505. April 2. the election has not been held.R. No. et al. there is a resulting failure to elect. Petitioner contests the results of the elections on the grounds of massive disenfranchisement. the elections took place.Failure of election. April 2. Soriano. et al. terrorism. (b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure. Petitioner alleges that no actual election was conducted because the voters did not actually vote and the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters. violence. In all three instances. private respondent was proclaimed the winner. violence. No. Jr. or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof. terrorism. ANS: As a rule. In the first instance. G. (Rosal v.R. No. the main case which was meanwhile decided by the COMELEC En Banc was likewise elevated to the Court. COMELEC. No. Q — May an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division be the subject of certiorari to the SC? Explain. et al. 2007). 168253 and 172741.. March 16.. COMELEC. 171248. the preparation and the transmission of the election returns give rise to the consequent failure to elect. the third instance is interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner. violence. G. fraud or other analogous causes. The issues raised in the petition for certiorari were also raised in the main case and therefore there was actually no need to resolve the petition assailing the interlocutory orders. the election has been suspended. In the second instance. 2007. thus: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure. In fact. (Mutilan v. terrorism. The exception is in an unusual case where the petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division was pending before the SC.
Thus. as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining order without a time limit. resolution. or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The exception enunciated in Kho and Repol is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory order. or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer w/ counter-protest w/c was filed beyond the reglementary period. the assailed interlocutory orders of the COMELEC First Division in this case are not a patent nullity. a motion to reconsider a decision. Thus. Furthermore. RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Art. To rule otherwise would not only delay the disposition of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court docket and unduly burden the Court. a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order. 2004-38. order or ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that. 2004-42. the Court have this peculiar situation where the interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division is pending before the Court but the main case has already been dismissed by the COMELEC First Division. However. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. 2004-40.” The exception provided in Kho and Repol is unavailing in this case because unlike in Kho and Repol. The Court has already ruled in Reyes v. and 2004-45 for failure of the protestants and protestees to pay the required cash deposits. 2004-44. that “it is the decision. The Court also notes that the COMELEC First Division has already issued an Order dated 31 May 2005 dismissing the protests and counter-protests in EPC Nos. in accordance with Section 7. 2004-37. The assailed orders in this case involve the interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither will the Rosal case apply because in that case the petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Second Division and the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on the main case were already consolidated. 2004-43. 2004-41. nor can they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. This does not mean that the aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the motion for reconsideration. interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable. 2004-39. which is the Repol case. may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. IX-A of the Constitution. This situation is precisely what the Court are trying to avoid by insisting on strict compliance of the rule that an interlocutory order cannot by itself be the subject of an appeal or a petition for certiorari.Note: The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. order. . except when all the members of the division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc. w/c is the Kho case. in general. 2004-36.
Profession or occupation not being a qualification for elective office. Lluz. June 7. the candidate may not be disqualified from running for office under Section 78 as his or her certificate of candidacy cannot be denied due course or canceled on such ground. Third.R.R. is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. the fact misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for the office sought by the candidate. COMELEC. in a situation where a candidate misrepresents his or her profession or occupation in the certificate of candidacy. he or she may be proceeded against through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. et al. 2007). when a candidate commits a material misrepresentation. . or through criminal prosecution under Section 262 for violation of Section 74.. a misrepresentation of a nonmaterial fact. Q — If a candidate misrepresents his profession. (Nelson T. v. In other words.Misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy. (Nelson T. v. Certainly. or a non-material misrepresentation. G.. et al. COMELEC. et al. No. is he disqualified? Explain. Lluz. No elective office. 2007). for a candidate‟s certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or cancelled by the COMELEC. Second. 172840. 172840. requires a certain profession or occupation as a qualification. effect. No. ANS: A misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate‟s eligibility. Q — When is misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy material? Explain. ANS: No. June 7. misrepresentation of such does not constitute a material misrepresentation. et al. G. not even the office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines.
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