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Title II DAVID VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary.[1] Superior strength – the use of force – cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty. Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban‘s philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: ―In cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak.‖ Laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts ―with a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity.‖[2] These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.

Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the Constitution of a free people combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes license?[3] On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus: NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: ―The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,‖ and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. She cited the following facts as bases: WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists – the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004; WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media; WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State – by obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the people‘s confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country; WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy; WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State; WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government; WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus: WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004; WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government; WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media; WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the people‘s confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this country; WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy; WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State; WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government; WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National Emergency; NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country; I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads: WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency; WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary; WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion; NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People‘s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.[4] They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger. During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners‘ counsels. The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases.

While he explained that it is not respondents‘ task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues. On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to ―show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms.‖ [5] On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled ―Oplan Hackle I ‖ which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself.[6] Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground. On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the National People‘s Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents.[7] Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the ―Magdalo‘s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.‖ On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP- Special Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to ―disavow‖ any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: ―All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty.‖ On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquino‘s brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his group‘s plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Army‘s elite Scout Ranger. Lim said ―it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo.‖[8] B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.

Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio ―Ka Roger‖ Rosal declared: ―The Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to end it.‖[9] On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly announced: ―Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field.‖ He claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the President‘s ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006. Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.[10] By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region. For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the President‘s mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that ―warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented.‖[11] Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.[12]

According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies. During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building.[13] A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is ―meant to show a ‗strong presence,‘ to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government.‖ The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would not follow ―standards set by the government during the state of national emergency.‖ Director General Lomibao stated that ―if they do not follow the standards – and the standards are - if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 – we will recommend a ‗takeover.‘‖ National Telecommunications‘ Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to ―cooperate‖ with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He asked for ―balanced reporting‖ from broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is threatened.[14] Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltran‘s lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions. When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by the police. Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody. Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmariñas, Cavite.

petitioners Jose Anselmo I. No. David. petitioners argued that ―it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval. Cadiz et al. (c) Section 23[19] of Article VI.[16] 2. Teodoro Casiño. In G. Escudero. Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran. No. .R. Later. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress. No.. On March 3.‖ They alleged that President Arroyo ―gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so. of speech and of assembly. et al. In the interim. No. Representative Rafael Mariano. and (d) Section 17[20] of Article XII of the Constitution.O.O.‖ In G.. No. these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G. No. 2006. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent. In G. Satur Ocampo. Inc. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law. and Josel Virador. In G. 171483. hurricane and similar occurrences. Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casiño and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. No. petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. challenged the CIDG‘s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of ―censorship‖ or ―prior restraint. petitioner Alternative Law Groups. Inc. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees.‖ In addition. 171485.. and twenty one (21) other members of the House of Representatives. petitioners KMU. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.[17] and 4[18] of Article III. No. 171396.O. hence. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 4[15] of Article II.O.R. No. 5 were filed with this Court against the above-named respondents. there is ―absolutely no emergency‖ that warrants the issuance of PP 1017. he was turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the ―Batasan 5‖ decided to stay indefinitely. (b) Sections 1.R. Liza Maza. President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. alleged that PP 1017 is an ―arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers. (2) their issuance was without factual basis. 5 constitute ―usurpation of legislative powers‖.R. et al. ―violation of freedom of expression‖ and ―a declaration of martial law. Rafael Mariano. 171409.R. and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances. petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co.Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo. NAFLU-KMU. 171400.‖ They also claimed that the term ―emergency‖ refers only to tsunami. 171489. In G.‖ And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law.R. No. including Representatives Satur Ocampo. petitioners Randolf S. typhoon. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G. In G. are not being raised in these petitions. and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press. and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.

third. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control. the petitions should be dismissed for being moot. there must be an actual case or controversy. and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution.petitioners asserted that PP 1017 ―goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code. it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent. and fifth. petitioner Loren B. This power the courts exercise.R. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G. 2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.). the ultimate source of all political authority. the Solicitor General countered that: first. including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern. B. Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. 2006. 171424 (Legarda). PROCEDURAL: 1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic. she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.). 171485 (Escudero et al. 171400 (ALGI).[21] This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation -The Constitution is the supreme law. second. 5 are unconstitutional. Madison. On March 7. a. petitioners in G. we must resolve the procedural roadblocks. all guaranteed under Article III. in G. fourth. 171483 (KMU et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al. the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above interlocking issues which may be summarized as follows: A. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review. I. PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis.R.) have no legal standing. G. 2) Whether PP 1017 and G. and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing. No. PROCEDURAL First. second.O.‖ And lastly. petitioners have to raise a question . As Applied Challenge A. SUBSTANTIVE: 1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.).). No. 171424. Nos.[22] But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a ―self-starting capacity.‖[23] Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first. It was ordained by the people. 171483 (KMU et al. Facial Challenge b. Constitutional Basis c. 171400 (ALGI). No. 5 are ―unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression.‖ In this regard. In respondents‘ Consolidated Comment. Nos. to thwart its unconstitutional attempt. It confers limited powers on the national government.O. PP 1017 does not violate the people‘s right to free expression and redress of grievances. 171489 (Cadiz et al.Moot and Academic Principle One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v.R.

and in the present petitions.O. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions.[33] and fourth. the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts. 5 violates the Constitution. inoperative. No.[34] All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court‘s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions.‖ a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. it confers no rights.of constitutionality. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public‘s interest. an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. Certainly. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. It is ―definite and concrete. according to petitioners. they failed to take into account the Chief Justice‘s very statement that an otherwise ―moot‖ case may still be decided ―provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to . touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar. we shall limit our discussion thereon. doctrines or rules.‖[30] The ―moot and academic‖ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. involving as they do the people‘s basic rights to freedom of expression. the police officers. No. it is in legal contemplation. Are PP 1017 and G. the military and the police.[32] third. the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. the bar. Courts will decide cases. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved. the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity.O. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G. respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. It must be stressed that ―an unconstitutional act is not a law. if: first. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events. of assembly and of the press.[35] And lastly. hence. third.[24] Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent. otherwise moot and academic.[36] However. courts decline jurisdiction over such case[28] or dismiss it on ground of mootness. contending that the present petitions were rendered ―moot and academic‖ by President Arroyo‘s issuance of PP 1021. Executive Secretary.[29] The Court holds that President Arroyo‘s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.[26] so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. it affords no protection. Moreover. there is a grave violation of the Constitution. and fourth. Such contention lacks merit. respondents‘ contested actions are capable of repetition. In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case.[27] Generally. on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right. and the public. it imposes no duties. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench.[31] second. committed illegal acts in implementing it. Panganiban‘s Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. the petitions are subject to judicial review. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative.[25] The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy.

the plaintiff who asserts a ―public right‖ in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished. Jordan[41] held that ―the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.[39] where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer‘s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen‘s suit. Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. does so as a representative of the general public. as amended.‖ . while in the latter. Here. however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the right. the Court deems it imperative to have a more than passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi. he is but the mere instrument of the public concern.‖ In either case. Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both ―citizen‖ and ―taxpayer‖ standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v.‖ or in the category of a ―citizen. Terr v. Locus standi is defined as ―a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. and that a public grievance be remedied.‖ The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.‖ or ‗taxpayer. In the former. In other words. It provides that ―every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.‖[38] Succinctly put. The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. the ―real-party-in interest‖ is ―the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. the plaintiff‘s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.‖[37] In private suits. he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a ―citizen‖ or ―taxpayer. standing is governed by the ―real-parties-in interest‖ rule as contained in Section 2. He could be suing as a ―stranger. Silk. II.‖ Accordingly. Collins:[40] ―In matter of mere public right. if not the duty.‖ With respect to taxpayer‘s suits.Legal Standing In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities. the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds.be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance.

and bring the latter to their detachment at Brgy. Negros Occidental. willfully.PEOPLE VS FLORES PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Negros Occidental. Wennie Tampioc. he has not been found. however. were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan. plaintiff-appellee. They allegedly succeeded in their plot and. More specifically. of the above-named municipality. Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran were at the same store drinking beer. 1992. Philippines. It was the prosecution‘s contention that on that fateful evening. vehemently denied committing the acts charged. Negros Occidental. Aaron Flores. under restraint and against his will. Brgy. detain and keep under guard one SAMSON SAYAM y GEPANAO from Km 117. in the Municipality of Ilog. Detachment Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade detailed at Barangay Tabu. vs. by means of force. and three (3) members of the local Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) under his supervision. kidnap. all the accused and the victim left the store and walked towards the direction of the military detachment headquarters. After the accused left the store with Samson Sayam. 1992. Thus. witnesses heard a single gunshot followed by rapid firing coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters. Hda. Wennie Tampioc. Sulpecio Silpao y Ortega alias ―Sulping‖ and Edgar Villeran y Magbanua. the trial court proceeded to determine the individual liabilities of . the victim. Sometime later. Shangrella (sic). thereby depriving said victim of his civil liberty since then up to the present.[1] All the four accused pleaded ―Not Guilty‖ when arraigned. All the accused. Sgt. did then and there. the trial court found the following antecedent facts to be undisputed. the prosecution failed to show an apparent common design by and among the accused to kidnap and detain Samson Sayam against his will. The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a conspiracy among the four accused. without proper authority thereof. Tabu. AARON FLORES @ ―RONITO‖. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO. namely. the abovenamed accused. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA @ ―SULPING‖ and EDGAR VILLERAN y MAGBANUA.: Sgt. violence and intimidation. accused-appellants. Samson Sayam. with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. based on the testimonial evidence presented. On the night of September 29. Branch 61. to this day the accused have not released Samson Sayam. Ilog.[2] That was the last time Samson Sayam was seen. The Information charged as follows: That on or about the 29th day of September. Aaron Flores alias ―Ronito‖. and despite diligent efforts of Sayam‘s mother and relatives. Sayam joined the four accused at their table. unlawfully and feloniously take. armed with high powered firearms conspiring. all four accused hatched a conspiracy to kidnap the victim and thereafter detain him at the detachment headquarters. CONTRARY TO LAW. Tabu. confederating and helping one another. Trial ensued and. Ilog. the prosecution avers. was drinking beer at the store owned by Terry Cabrillos located at Barangay Tabu. J. Province of Negros Occidental.

[7] . on the one hand. such that no ill-motive was attributed to him by the trial court. on the other hand. the straightforward and emphatic manner in which Wennie Tampioc testified inspired belief in the trial court‘s mind. had nothing to do with the disappearance of Samson Sayam. and that he was the commander of the detachment. The said affidavits merely mentioned an ―unidentified member of the 7th IB. thus. 2-92. dated October 21. conflict as to the kind of firearm allegedly carried by Tampioc.00) Pesos as damages. As regards Wennie Tampioc. SO ORDERED.000. While Golez stated that he was armed with an Armalite rifle. the trial court found that the identity of Sgt. assigned at Brgy. detachment. Edgar Villeran and Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. 1992.[3] Manlangit testified that Tampioc was armed with a short firearm. this Court finds the accused Aaron Flores. premises considered. 1992 of the Supreme Court.the four accused based on the degree of their participation in the commission of the offense charged. Philippine Army. the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE. dated January 20.‖ At the time of the execution of the affidavits. in the alternative. Finally. 1992. in accordance with Administrative Circular No. the witnesses could have known that Wennie Tampioc was a sergeant. and that of Carlos Manlangit. the trial court held that the three accused were responsible for the former‘s disappearance.[5] the original complaint filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ilog Candoni. the trial court found that he left the store ahead of the three (3) coaccused and. Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran. the trial court rendered the assailed judgment. Wennie Tampioc was newly assigned as Detachment Commander and did not know Samson Sayam.[6] On December 8. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit. none of the prosecution witnesses specifically or categorically mentioned Tampioc as among those who actively participated in bringing Samson Sayam by force to their headquarters. Unlike his co-accused who are natives of the place of the incident. 1993. Likewise. his heirs the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50. Tampioc as one of the perpetrators of the crime was doubtful. the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Nelson Golez. and there being no proof that Samson Sayam is dead. did not mention Wennie Tampioc as one of the respondents. The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. which was based on the affidavits of Golez and Carlito Manlingit. because notwithstanding the fact that Nelson Golez knew Wennie Tampioc even before September 29.[4] More importantly. Since Samson Sayam had not been seen nor heard from since then. or. they are ordered to pay him jointly and severally. The trial court gave credence to the prosecution‘s evidence that Samson Sayam was seen being forcibly dragged out of the store and pulled towards the direction of the detachment headquarters by accused Aaron Flores. Notably. Tabu. The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and the convicted accused ordered confined pending appeal if they so file an appeal.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO. or (d) That the person kidnapped is a minor. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED. 3. That the offender is a private individual. 4. III.Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. UNDER ARTICLE 267. Accused-appellant Sulpecio Silpao raised the following errors: I. After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced before the trial court. On the other hand. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal. That he kidnaps or detains another. That in the commission of the offense. accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar Villeran interposed a joint appeal based on the sole error that: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AARON FLORES AND EDGAR VILLERAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. In the case at bar. 7659. since the first element of the said crime is that the offender must be a private individual. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SULPECIO SILPAO OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION. accused-appellants were members of the local CAFGU at the time the alleged crime was committed. 2. (b) That it is committed simulating public authority. as amended by Republic Act No. female or public officer.[8] Clearly. any of the following circumstances are present: (a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days. REVISED PENAL CODE. or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty. The elements of the offense are: 1. we find that accused-appellants should be acquitted of the offense charged against them. AS AMONG THOSE WHO FORCIBLY BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN THE EVENING OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1992 AND RESPONSIBLE FOR SAMSON SAYAM‘S DISAPPEARANCE. The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. (c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made. . II. accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.

i. 264 for the purpose of complementing the operations of the regular force formations in a locality.e. The fact that Samson Sayam has not been seen or heard from since he was last seen with accused-appellants does not prove that he was detained and deprived of his liberty. all that Carlito testified to was that he saw Samson Sayam crossing the street alone from the store of a certain Moleng. without legal grounds.[12] it was held that in the crime of illegal or arbitrary detention. Fajardo. or in any manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty. argues that Samson Sayam was deprived of his liberty when accused-appellants forced him to go with them when they left the store of Jerry Cabrillos and brought him to the detachment headquarters.S. v.[16] A careful review of the records of the instant case shows no evidence sufficient to prove that Samson Sayam was detained arbitrarily by accusedappellants. they were provided with weapons. that the four accused apprehended Samson Sayam and brought him to the detachment headquarters. followed Sayam and asked for his residence certificate. Carlito Manlangit‘s testimony was offered to prove that Samson Sayam was forcibly taken from the store and that the latter tried his best to free himself from his abductors. We assayed the testimonies of the prosecution‘s main witnesses. that Samson Sayam was taken forcibly to the detachment headquarters. as well as actual confinement or restriction.. there is no shred of evidence that he was actually confined there or anywhere else. there must be uncontroverted proof of both intent to deprive the victim of his liberty. as well as to respond to threats to national security.[17] It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangit‘s testimony failed to prove the stated purpose thereof. As far back as the case of U. v. they may still be convicted of said crime. the Solicitor General submits that.S. While the prosecution witnesses testified that accused-appellants were seen walking with Samson Sayam toward the direction of the detachment headquarters. Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure. under the facts alleged. detains a person.[15] this Court reiterated the ruling in U.e. And yet. Cabanag. Carlito Manlangit and his son Jerry Manlangit. who were armed. namely.[10] The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and convicting accused-appellants of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention for the reason that the appellants are not private individuals.[13] just as the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty must also be established by indubitable proof. the question that remains to be resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accused-appellants.[11] Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers. and given the authority to detain or order detention of individuals.. but public officers. it is essential that there is actual confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party. defined and penalized in Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code.[14]1 In the more recent case of People v. and that he went home after he saw Samson Sayam talking to the accused. The deprivation of liberty must be proved. that the four accused.The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. however. The prosecution. accused-appellants can only be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention. The prosecution maintains that inasmuch as all the other elements of Arbitrary Detention were alleged in the criminal information filed against the accused-appellants.[9] It was composed of civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and order in their localities. As such. To be . i. Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who. As such. Cabanag.

no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golez‘s testimony. He also testified that he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters. At around six in the evening. however. drinking inside the store of Terry Cabrillos. Jerry Manlangit‘s testimony failed to establish that accused-appellants were guilty of arbitrary detention. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay evidence. 1992. Nelson Golez heard a single gunshot followed by rapid firing. Later. who identified the four accused as the persons with Samson Sayam. Nelson Golez did not affirm his earlier statement that the accused and Samson Sayam were engaged in a heated argument. The mere fact that Samson Sayam was being dragged towards the road does not constitute arbitrary detention.[20] In fine. the reactions of Carlito Manlangit do not conform to human experience. considering that there were other people within hearing and seeing distance. Jerry Manlangit.[21] The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of arbitrary detention. Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to show his residence certificate and barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron Flores. he saw the four accused drinking beer.‖ Ten minutes later. he and Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September 29. He also stated that following a heated argument.[23] In summary. while on their way home. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda Shangrila. the accused and Samson Sayam left the store and went towards the direction of the detachment headquarters.[24] On cross-examination.[25] Again. Most damaging is Carlito Manlangit‘s statement that he did not see Samson Sayam in the detachment headquarters with any or all of the accused. If he really witnessed Samson Sayam being apprehended. they passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. Neither did he say that Samson Sayam was taken at gunpoint. he said he did not hear them arguing as they were leaving the store. dragged. forcibly taken. who happened to be his cousin. According to him. Although Nelson Golez attested that Samson Sayam was protesting while the accused were dragging him. There. There is also no relevant testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam tried his best to free himself from the clutches of accused-appellants. For if that were the truth. he did not do anything to help Samson Sayam. for they dealt on a different set of facts.[19] More telling is the absence of testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam was being taken to the detachment headquarters against his will. and trying to free himself. also testified for the proseuction. son of Carlito. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of accused-appellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. it cannot be logically explained why Carlito Manlangit just went home. Carlito Manlangit‘s testimony failed to prove that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained or deprived of his liberty.sure. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his father. He admitted that he did not immediately report the incident to the authorities. the witness did not state that Samson Sayam was pulled. There is no showing that Samson Sayam was completely deprived of his liberty such that he could not free himself . Rather. he told his father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. located about half a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. or coerced to go with accused-appellants. He did not even see if accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and barangay clearance of Samson Sayam. The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez. that he was protesting his apprehension. or that he was asking for help. he was unsure of his assertion that there was an argument.[22] which has no probative value. He said that the accused were ―holding and pulling‖ Samson Sayam ―towards the road.[18] instead of doing anything to help Samson Sayam. Carlito. First of all.

He wavered on material points. a gunshot was heard coming from the direction of the detachment followed by rapid firing. 2. It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions. To our mind. lacks credibility. 5. the combination of all these circumstances would still not be able to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. or prevented from communicating with anyone. before the accused may be convicted of a crime. On September 29. where there were people milling about.[29] As already discussed. whether illegal or arbitrary. if he was indeed being held against his will. they were seen engaged in a heated argument. Nobody bothered to report the incident. 1992. his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter. to the barangay authorities. another prosecution witness saw accused-appellants on the road arresting Samson. together with their companions Sergeant Tampioc and fellow CAFGU Sulpecio Silpao. Later. Again. It is necessary that there must be a purposeful or knowing action by accused-appellants to restrain the victim by or with force. many of whom were his friends. And even if these acts were proven to be true. the factual findings of the trial court may be reversed.[28] The prosecution. if there are substantial facts which were overlooked but which may alter the results of the case in favor of the accused. sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accused-appellants. Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by accused-appellants by holding and pulling him towards the road. at about 6:00 o‘clock in the evening. was not clearly established by credible evidence. From another angle.[26] And where it appears that the trial court erred in the appreciation of the evidence on record or the lack of it. even as the prosecution failed to substantiate by direct or corroborative evidence the bare testimony of Nelson Golez. It cites the following circumstances: 1. there was no proof that there was actual intent on the part of accusedappellants to arbitrarily deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. Accused-appellants were having a drinking spree. 3. Although the findings of fact made by trial courts are generally not disturbed on appeal. restrained of his freedom. The incident transpired in a public place. Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of the detachment of Brgy. It is puzzling that Samson Sayam did not cry out for help. accused-appellants. the fact of detention. this Court finds the evidence of the prosecution grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction. Samson was never seen again or heard from. maintains that the evidence. even though circumstantial. however. Likewise. No one else came forward to corroborate the testimony of Nelson Golez. were seen with Samson at the store of Terry Cabrillos.[27] After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the testimonial evidence on the scale of creditworthiness and materiality. because taking coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or arbitrary detention. the totality of these circumstantial evidence do not constitute an unbroken chain . the above-enumerated circumstances were not established by clear and convincing evidence. such facts should be taken into account by the appellate court. Ten (10) minutes later. After the incident. Tabu. by itself. There was no showing that Samson Sayam was locked up. The testimony of Nelson Golez. if indeed it happened.from the grip of the accused. 4.

and inconsistent with the possibility that they are innocent. the Court must acquit the accused. the circumstances that there was a heated argument among them. that accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Samson Sayam. Even if it were.[35] The prosecution was not able to prove a possible motive why accused-appellants would arbitrarily detain Samson Sayam. In fact. the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that night have no relevancy to the case. An ordinary person a kilometer away cannot. with certainty. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: a) There is more than one circumstance. Consequently. while the detachment headquarters itself was also some distance from the barangay. especially in the rural areas when all is quiet. However.. However. In sum. said circumstance does not necessarily prove that they feloniously abducted him. Circumstantial evidence.e. mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson Sayam was a result of accusedappellants‘ alleged criminal acts and intentions is insufficient to convict them.[30] Thus: Section 4. point to the exact location where the gunshots would be coming from. That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again cannot be the basis for the trial court to render judgment convicting the accused-appellants.[34] An uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when the evidence itself is in serious doubt. At night. b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the required quantum of evidence.[31] The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete sequence leads to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. and that the accused-appellants held and pulled Samson Sayam to the road and brought him towards the direction of the detachment headquarters was not sufficiently proven by material or relevant testimony. only one relevant circumstance was proved. Since the pieces of circumstantial evidence do not fulfill the test of moral certainty that is sufficient to support a judgment or conviction. Moreover. when sufficient. it has no bearing in this case because it is not one of the elements of the crime of arbitrary detention.[33] Moreover. all the circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused-appellants are guilty. then arbitrarily detained him. The witnesses who testified that they heard the gunshots were at least half a kilometer away from the center of the barangay.[36] . and c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. there is no unbroken chain of circumstances leading to the conclusion that accused-appellants are guilty. it cannot be concluded that the gunshots came from the direction of the detachment headquarters. loud sounds such as gunshots reverberate and would seem to come from every direction.[32] It is admitted that Samson Sayam was seen drinking with accused-appellants on that fateful night. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction.pointing to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged. i. That would otherwise be attributing expertise on such matters to the prosecution witnesses.

[38] It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case with that degree of proof which leads to no other conclusion but conviction in an unprejudiced mind. .[40] WHEREFORE. Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved. Accused-appellants are ACQUITTED. In the case at bar. Unless being held or detained for some lawful reason. a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused. of the date and time when accused-appellants are released pursuant to this Decision. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court. within five (5) days from notice. the pieces of testimonial evidence relied on by the prosecution and the trial court to support a conviction have failed to overcome the constitutional precept of the presumed innocence of accused-appellants. there is a virtual dearth of convincing evidence to prove that a crime had been committed. not only is there a lot of room for reasonable doubt in regard to their guilt. accused-appellants are ORDERED RELEASED immediately.In the recent case of People v. There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense. Among other grounds. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits for it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Comesario. Logically. the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. for the prosecution bears the onus to distinctly and indubitably prove that a crime had been committed by accusedappellants. to the exclusion of all others.[39] Clearly. the prosecution in this case has failed to prove the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. as the guilty person. it is where the evidence is purely circumstantial that there should be an even greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt of the accused. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others as the author of the crime. it must be shown that there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. To validly invoke circumstantial evidence. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[37]3 we had occasion to rule that: Accused-appellant‘s conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial evidence. this Court has often and consistently ruled that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to convict an innocent one. In similar cases.

MisjÓ uris DECISION MENDOZA. The hearing was reset to January 16. on January 30. However.TOLENTINO VS. vs. but. the court in its Order dated November 13. Respondent judge denied the motion. Camarines Sur. The defense moved to quash the information on the ground that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the case was filed. 1996. 16. The case was filed in the RTC at Tigaon. 1995 ordered complainant state prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. . Jr. CAMANO. and. grave abuse of authority. 2 and 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.M. the hearing was postponed to January 24. January 20. 2000] ROMULO SJ TOLENTINO. Tigaon. 1995 denied said Motion finding merit however. of the Regional Trial Court. violation of Canons 1. complainant. Respondent judge stated in pertinent parts in his order: In resolving the Motion to Quash.000. the accused filed a petition for bail which respondent judge scheduled for hearing on January 9. grave abuse of discretion. Camano. 1996. Pending the holding of a preliminary investigation. JUDGE POLICARPIO S. 1996. during which settings the prosecution failed to appear and to adduce evidence to oppose the Petition. Camarines Sur and was later assigned to respondent judge of that court. complainant state prosecutor again failed to appear despite due notice to him.A. RTJ-00-1522. but on the scheduled date. 7610). for gross ignorance of the law. 1996.00. Tigaon. Camarines Sur. on the question of lack of preliminary investigation and as a consequence remanded the case to the prosecutor for preliminary investigation. JR. No. whereupon respondent judge on November 15.. Regional Trial Court. and 24. The notice of hearing was personally served on complainant state prosecutor. the accused filed the instant Petition for Bail which were set for hearings on January 9. CAMANO SECOND DIVISION [A. respondent. the assistant provincial prosecutor entered a special appearance in the case and moved for another postponement of the hearing. he again failed to appear. T1468. Just the same. Instead. The facts are as follows: The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur filed an information against Roderick Odiaman for allegedly engaging in sexual intercourse with a child in violation of §5(b) of the Child Abuse Act (R. No. J. and incompetence in connection with the granting of bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. both complainant state prosecutor and private complainant in the criminal case failed to appear before the court despite due notice.: This is a complaint filed by State Prosecutor and Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur Romulo SJ Tolentino against Judge Policarpio S. on the said date. granted the petition for bail which he fixed at P50. Jjä lex Pending preliminary investigation. 1996. Branch 58. State Prosecutor. Branch 58.

Section 5(b) of R. the court ruled.00. 11. thus: "Where the accused was charged for murder without the benefit of a preliminary investigation and trial had already began over his objections. 1996.) In the case of Go vs. respondent judge issued an order granting bail to the accused in the increased amount of P100. SO ORDERED. .000. 1994 edition). 12-94 and adhering to applicable doctrine. 7610. 4. entitled "Remedial Law" by O.00." Complainant state prosecutor again failed to appear although he filed a manifestation questioning the hearing set on the ground that it was premature to consider the question of bail as there was a pending "reinvestigation" of the case before the provincial prosecutor‘s office. it can be said that the accused is not yet charge[d] in court for Violation of Art. respondent judge set aside his order and set the petition for bail on March 4. 17(c) of Rule 114 as Amended by Administrative Circular No. this case being under preliminary investigation and/or reinvestigation. the Petition for Bail is hereby granted and the bail for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby fixed at P50. Vol.000. vol. 1994 ed. [but he] is behind bars. On May 9. Court of Appeals. G. However. city." WHEREFORE. 1996. His order stated: Any person in custody who is not yet charge[d] in court may apply for bail with any [court] in the province. Herrera. (Remedial Law by O. his case being under preliminary investigation." "The filing of the Petition for Bail does not constitute a waiver of accused[‗s] right to preliminary investigation. 1992. 3. or municipality where [he] is held." EXPLANATIONS: (Taken from the Book. No. Herrera. it can be discerned that the accused is not yet charged in court for violation of Art. thus: "Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province. 4. 5(B) of Republic Act 7610.From the foregoing antecedent facts. III. Feb.A. 17(c) Rule 114 provides. The issue to be resolved by the court is whether or not a Petition for Bail can be entertained by this court at this stage of the proceedings and under the attendant circumstances. city or municipality where he is held. Sec. the accused remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right pending the preliminary investigation. "if only to afford the prosecution another chance to present evidence to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. 101837. premises considered.R. The court applying Sec. In the case at bench. Sec. resolves the issue in the affirmative. on motion of complainant state prosecutor.

000. both of which were denied by respondent judge. it is needless for the court to make a conclusion of facts or assessment of the prosecution‘s evidence whether it is strong or not in order not to preempt the outcome of the reinvestigation." "It is not the denial of the right to be heard but the deprivation of the opportunity to be heard which constitutes a violation of the due process clause. (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. It is basic in law that actual hearing is not an indispensable requisite of due process. respondent judge ruled: Acctä mis Invoking denial of due process as a ground. Since the case is still under preliminary investigation and/or reinvestigation. Interlocutory orders are not appeallable in this jurisdiction. the prosecution cannot feign ignorance of the physical condition of the accused considering his medical records. evincing the evident effort of the court towards observance of due process for both the defense and the prosecution. National Labor Relations Commission. the court could not find any allegations that said Cecille Buenafe is a minor who for money. In his order. profit. dated May 30." Corollarily. 217 SCRA 237). Briefly stated. 1996 Order of this court granting bail to the accused. Romulo SJ. Tolentino.00. . right upper lobe. Tolentino‘s previous insistence for the hospital to produce the same. or any other consideration or due to the coercion of any adult. Administrative Officer IV of the Bicol Medical Center. Naga City at the instance of Atty. the prosecution moves for the reconsideration of the May 9. Thus: "There is no denial of due process where a party is given an opportunity to be heard and to present his case. Norberto P. syndicate or group indulge[s] in sexual intercourse for a fee to be deemed a child exploited in prostitution. 1996. Although from a perusal of the Complaint and affidavit executed by Cecille Buenafe and the witnesses. all certified copies. WHEREFORE. premises considered. the Petition for Bail is GRANTED for the temporary liberty of the accused and the same is hereby fixed at P100. vs. Villamor. The inaccuracy of the allegations so advanced in support of the Motion is readily emphasized by no less than the sequence of the dates of hearing with explicit order to adduce evidence to oppose the Petition for Bail as recited in detail in the questioned Order. 218 SCRA 183). SO ORDERED. Complainant state prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and a notice of appeal. but mere opportunity to be heard would suffice. (Imperial Textile Mills Inc. Prosecutor on Case which medical records now form part of the record of this case. The Order granting bail subject of the instant Motion falls within the ambit of Interlocutory Order. the records of the case strongly rebuff the contention of the prosecution in the Motion for Reconsideration. It cannot be gainsaid that the production of his medical records was the necessary consequence of Atty. The X-ray result confirms that the accused is suffering from tuberculosis. thus. National Labor Relations Commission.The court takes into consideration the health of the accused who is sick with diabetes and lung ailment needing medical attention. furnished to this court by Mr.

Complainant also claims that respondent judge acted on the petition for bail notwithstanding a pending "reinvestigation" of the case. In addition. respondent judge alleges: 3. were personally served with subpoenas. 1996 was reconsidered thru his application and at the same time the court set the bail application for hearing and ordering State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. which was fixed at P100. and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. After all these series of failures to appear and adduce evidence. From the foregoing chronology of events of the bail hearing.. both for LACK of MERIT. On May 31. 1996 bail hearing. The petition for bail was filed on December 26. 1996 bail hearing.. it is crystal clear that the prosecution was afforded reasonable notice and all the opportunities to adduce evidence of strong guilt in adherence to requirements of procedural due process. the court granted the petition for bail . In its resolution of November 18.00. if State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. The bail hearing was again reset to January 24. On [the] January 24. 1996. Complainant claims that the prosecution was not given an opportunity to adduce evidence to show that the guilt of the accused was strong.00 contained in its Order [of] January 30. 1997. reset the bail hearing to January 16. the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED and the Notice of Appeal incorporated therein is likewise DENIED. Cecile Buenafe.000. Tolentino to appear and adduce evidence which he likewise failed to comply. Hence. respondent judge approved the property bond filed by the accused and ordered his immediate release. The Order of this court granting and fixing the bail for the accused in the amount of P50. was 50% less than the recommended amount in the Bail Bond Guide of 1996. The prosecutor and the offended party failed to appear in this scheduled bail hearing. Sâ djad . Tolentino again failed to appear and adduce evidence of strong guilt and instead requested Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Victor de la Cruz to appear in his behalf and to ask for a postponement of the bail hearing. the instant complaint. 1996. Tolentino cooperated and obeyed the series of Orders issued by this court requiring him to appear and adduce evidence of strong guilt. SO ORDERED.000. 5. 1996. This incident could have not reached this far. during the bail hearing. dated January 24. 1996 and ordered the prosecution to adduce evidence of strong guilt. Tolentino was again ordered to adduce evidence of strong guilt. Said petition was set for hearing by the court on January 9. [At the] March 4. 1995. 1996. The bail hearing was again reset to March 4.WHEREFORE.. by the court and subpoenas were served [on] the State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. The court in its Order on January 9. In his comment. 1996 where the prosecution and the offended party. the prosecution again failed to appear and adduce evidence of strong guilt. 1996. Tolentino and the offended party Cecile Buenafe and their witnesses. a copy of the Order was personally served upon him. the Court required respondent judge to comment on the complaint. it ordered that a copy of the complaint furnished the Department of Justice for possible disciplinary action against complainant state prosecutor for deliberately delaying the administration of justice. and that the bail. State Prosecutor Romulo SJ.

in the absence of fraud. 6. The amount of P50.00 was withheld from his retirement benefits pending resolution of the complaint in this case and another complaint against him in OCA-I. 9 as basis. That is why in several decisions of the Supreme Court." (Heirs of the Late Nasser D. 12-94. it is advantageous for the prosecution because with one stone it is shooting two birds. Yasin vs.I. 7. Your Respondent is still human.00. 250 SCRA 545) Sppedscâ "If respondent judge committed any error at all it was a legal error rectifiable by appeal not by administrative sanction. 251 SCRA 111) "A judge cannot be held administratively liable for an erroneous ruling on first impression. the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. 1998.000. he is not exempted from the danger of falling into the path holes [sic] of legal error or errors just like his peers. and recommends that he be fined and sternly warned. Jr. respondent judge filed an application for optional retirement.00 relied on Administrative Circular No. Muro. In fact." (Alvarado vs. It will abbreviate the proceedings in the trial on the merits that would eventually result [in] the early disposition of the case. Its report states in pertinent parts: . For his repeated failure to appear and adduce evidence despite the repeated orders of this court. malice or corrupt purpose on his part. even though such acts are erroneous.000. although a judge." (Chin vs. Sec. Laquindanum. 247 SCRA 175). finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of law and grave abuse of authority in granting bail without hearing.00 bail is only 50% of the recommendable amount. Subsequently. 251 SCRA 174) "As a matter of public policy. in fixing the amount of P100. and malice cannot be inferred from his having rendered a decision rectifying an earlier impression without proof beyond doubt of a conscious and deliberate intent on his part to commit an injustice by such acts." (Castaños vs. 8." (State Prosecutor vs. The Office of the Court Administrator.-96-250-RTJ. thus: "In the absence of fraud.000. it was ruled. and his actuations not tainted with graft and corruption. Felix. and because of the consistent failure to appear and adduce evidence of the prosecutor and make known his recommendation as to the fixing of the bail. the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. or corruption. It being so.fixing the same in the amount of P100. 245 SCRA 501) "A judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment in the absence of a showing of any bad faith. which the Court approved on November 17. to which the complaint in this case was referred. dishonesty or corruption..000. Your Respondent.P. the Respondent should not be faulted nor punished administratively. Gustillo. A petition for bail can be entertained by the court while the preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is going [on] for as long as the accused is under detention. Escaño. Your Respondent acted in this case honestly and in good faith. State Prosecutor Tolentino contends that the P100. dishonesty.

In Petition for admission to bail the Judge is under legal obligation to receive evidence from the prosecution with the view of determining whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant the denial of bail. Dabalos.. While the Court does not require perfection and infallibility. which became effective [on] 1 February 1996 and the law enforceable at the time the Petition for Bail was filed by the defense." (Cited in Mamolo.In the first place. Rule 114. For this purpose therefore a hearing must be conducted to give opportunity for the prosecution to present evidence that the guilt of the accused is so strong before resolution of the motion (Sec. In doing so he acted with grave abuse of authority and in wanton disregard of established rules and jurisprudence.A. the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present. While it may be argued that the granting of bail is an exercise of judicial discretion. the Court has delineated a clear guideline on the exercise thereof to thwart any abuse. there would be a violation of procedural due process. yet it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles (Libarios vs. in granting bail to the accused respondent violated the fundamental law of procedural due process. this discretion by the nature of things may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at such hearing. vs. respondent Judge should not have acted on the petition for bail as there is still a pending reinvestigation of the cases at the Regional State Prosecutor‘s Office. RE: The 1996 Bailbond Guide. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. MTJ-94897. 238 SCRA 640). Under Justice Department Circular No. Reyes. While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody [for a capital offense be resolved] in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity. 5 December 1994. Tamin. the penalty for . Sr. . Narisma. 7610. Respondent Judge must not hide behind that fundamental rule for what he has violated is the basic principle of procedural due process. As to the amount of bail which is allegedly 50% less of the recommendable amount. in the case of Borinaga vs. 252 SCRA 613). and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground x x x x (E)ven where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. 4. He is required to continuously study the law and jurisprudence. Secondly.M. 5. all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for bail.. For it is in the Judge‘s industry in keeping abreast with the recent law and court rulings that the faith of the people in the administration of justice will be restored since the litigants will be confidently and invariably assured that the occupants of the bench are in full grasp of legal principles.. the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the state‘s evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail x x x x. Respondent Judge tried to absolve himself with the established dictum that a judge cannot be held administratively liable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders and that no one is infallible in his judgment. within a reasonable time. it is noted that the information filed is for violation of Section 5 of R. it reasonably expects a faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by those who are selected to fill the position of administrators of justice (Lardizabal v. 199 SCRA 48). thus: "x x x (w)hile the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion. A. Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure). No.

January 16. Be that as it may.000.00 payable within thirty days from notice with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same act or offense will be dealt with more severely. reserving to the prosecutor. Hence.00 fixed by the respondent Judge is even excessive. the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present within a reasonable time all evidence that it may want to adduce before the court. 1996.[1] In this case. Indeed. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. when the charge against an accused is for an offense punishable by death. the court must nevertheless endeavor to ascertain the strength of the State‘s evidence in order to determine whether bail should be granted. for his failure to afford procedural due process to the prosecution in the grant of bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. provides that "all persons in custody shall. Jr. 7610 (Law on Child Abuse)." Thus.A. January 24. T-1462. and be FINED P20. who was charged in court with murder without the benefit of a preliminary investigation. Art. §4 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure. 1996. 1996. before conviction. because a preliminary investigation had been ordered by the court. But complainant failed to present his evidence. . We find the complaint in this case to be without any basis. And even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the motion for bail. or life imprisonment. The State has a right to due process as much as the accused. bail was still a matter of right.000. respondent judge set the hearing on the bail petition at least four times: on January 9. It thus appears that it was the complainant prosecutor who was remiss in the .000. First. On the other hand. [be] found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority. 7610. 1996. is reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua and the amount of bail to be posted by the accused is P40. after the preliminary investigation. Court of Appeals. before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death. §13 of the Constitution provides that. the right to ask the trial court for the cancellation of the bail should he believe the evidence of guilt of the accused to be strong. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum. in Go v. WHEREFORE.. For this purpose. and ultimately to determine whether he should be granted bail. be admitted to bail as a matter of right. it cannot be claimed that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong so as to justify the denial of bail to him.. [it is hereby recommended that] respondent Judge Policarpio S. It would then be up to the trial court to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail after considering the evidence on record.A. No..[2] it was held that an accused. the amount of P100.00. and March 4. all persons shall be allowed bail. however. because the accused was charged with having "sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. it was not necessary to hold a hearing so that the prosecution could show that evidence of the guilt of the accused was strong.violation of Section 5 of R. was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right pending the preliminary investigation. in order to determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. reclusion perpetua. there must be a hearing with the participation of the prosecution and the defense." Under §5(b) of R. except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua (or higher) when the evidence of guilt is strong. Camano. Thus. At that point. the penalty for such an offense is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. if the propriety of charging the accused was yet to be resolved in the preliminary investigation. in order to allow complainant prosecutor present his evidence. III. Rule 114.

however. Not all errors of a judge can be the subject of disciplinary action.. Bellosillo. that respondent judge was led to his error by the prosecutor who moved for a reconsideration of respondent judge‘s order originally fixing the amount of bail at P50.00. respondent judge exceeded the limits. finding no merit in the instant complaint. the accused could be considered entitled to bail as a matter of right.00. the same is hereby DISMISSED. but only those tainted by fraud. so that. however. Second. At all events. the Office of the Court Administrator correctly finds that the amount of the bail under the Bailbond Guide is P40.performance of his duties. concur. Considering.. corruption or malice. (Chairman). Buena. JJ. of which none has been shown in this case.00 only.000. the fact that the case was referred to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation. Sceä dp SO ORDERED. and De Leon.000. in requiring the accused to post bail in the amount of P100. It appears. Quisumbing. Jr. dishonesty. WHEREFORE.000. Respondent judge should not have granted bail based simply on the failure of the prosecution to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong but should have endeavored to determine the existence of such evidence. the remedy was for either the accused or the prosecution to ask for a reduction of the amount of bail. As to the allegation that the amount of bail required by respondent judge is 50% less than the amount recommended in the 1996 Bailbond Guide of the Department of Justice. .

unlawfully and feloniously take. with evident premeditation and treachery. Quezon Province. where the latter is a third year high school student. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid amount. that Freddie was seen alive. to inform her that he will drive both accused to Barangay Maligaya. along with Lito Amido. belonging to the said Freddie Saavedra. Branch 62. with intent to kill. armed with bladed and pointed weapons. February 11.: May the confession of an accused. which directly caused his death. vs.00) Philippine currency. and that on the occasion of said robbery and by reason thereof. threats and intimidation. conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other. HERSON TAN y VERZO. at about 7:00 o‘clock p. the above-named accused. did then and there wilfully.R. violence. and taking advantage of their superior strength and in pursuance of their conspiracy. under an information[1] dated February 8. were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder before the Regional Trial Court. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Delfa. as early as 4:30 o‘clock a. along the Maharlika Highway at Barangay Tinandog. of Gumaca.PEOPLE VS. steal and carry away from one Freddie Saavedra. thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body. by means of force. 1988 inquired on his whereabouts from relatives and friends. at Our Lady of Angels Academy in Atimonan. they proceeded to the said place and found him sprawled on the ground with fourteen stab wounds in different parts of his body. a certain Arnel Villarama revealed that the lifeless body of her husband was discovered on the diversion road at Barangay Malinao in Atimonan. given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel. tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife. DW 9961 valued at THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30. 1988. Philippines. Municipality of Atimonan. DECISION ROMERO. J.m. a Honda TMX motorcycle with a sidecar bearing Plate No. which reads as follows: ―That on or about the 5th day of December 1988. TAN THIRD DIVISION [G. with intent to gain. It was the last time. relying on the information that an abandoned sidecar of a tricycle was sighted at Barangay Malinao. of December 6. Quezon. When the latter failed to return that evening. Contrary to law. assault and stab with the said weapon said Freddie Saavedra. accused-appellant. did then and there wilfully. the said accused. 1998] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Carlos Santos proceeded to the scene of the crime and recovered a blue sidecar which they brought back with them to . however.. Meanwhile.m. Forthwith.‖ On arraignment. plaintiff-appellee. unlawfully and feloniously attack. Lucena Philippine National Police (PNP) led by Lt. 1989. The relevant facts established by the prosecution are as follows: On December 5. No. Delfa. In the course of such inquiry. 117321. Province of Quezon. be admissible in evidence against him? Accused-appellant Herson Tan. the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.000.

00). unless he is being detained thereat for some other lawful cause. to the Atimonan Police Station for safekeeping. together with the sidecar. Atimonan on the day in question. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters. appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. is hereby ordered to release from custody the person of said Lito Amido. Upon proof shown that it was indeed registered under Amido‘s name. Amido sought him at his house and told him that the motorcycle he was riding on was being offered for sale. After admitting that it was purchased from both the accused and upon failure to present any document evidencing the purported sale. Lt. Amido presented alibi as his defense. he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel. he accompanied the latter to Manila on board the said motorcycle and they approached Antonio Carandang. Lucena City. alleged that he had no participation in the offense charged and contended that his only involvement in the matter was the referral of accused Amido to Teves. he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit. Lito Amido is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges against him and the Provincial Warden of Quezon. Subsequently. Santos. During their conversation. Cpl. he had no warrant for his arrest. on cross-examination. therefore. the dispositive portion of which reads: ―WHEREFORE.[2] Appellant.‖[3] .000. He is further ordered to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30. Carlos. but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. some seven kilometers from the town. 1994. the trial court convicted appellant. busy assisting in the renovation of his mother‘s house. In a decision dated April 21.00 as his commission. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Teves voluntarily surrendered it to the police who turned it over. thereafter.00. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station. this Court finds Herson Tan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery with Murder and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Due to insufficiency of evidence. the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same. He recounted that sometime in December 1988. on the other hand. he could not have participated in the gruesome death of the latter. he was at Barangay Malusak. not only in the instant case. SO ORDERED. premised in the foregoing considerations. He narrated that the victim was his friend and. Lt. nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing. Provincial Jail. brought them to a certain Perlita Aguilar and Danilo Teves with whom the sale was finally consummated. Muntinlupa for a sum of P4. he informed the latter that he was a suspect. He alleged that although a tricycle driver by occupation. In the course thereof. With the help of appellant as a guide.000. The latter. Moreover. He allegedly received P150. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City.their headquarters.

a pertinent provision[5] of which reads: ―As used in this Act. Article III.‖ Republic Act No.[7] Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence. as a requisite function of the investigating officer. the suspect is taken into custody. reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation. and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. No. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. 12.[8] . 7438).‖ Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel. he must be provided with one. Section 12. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect. not only does the fundamental law impose. In light of the above facts and circumstances.A. the appealed decision is set aside and appellant acquitted on the ground that his constitutional rights were violated. 7438 (R. and (4) it must be in writing. the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused.[6] Furthermore. a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary.Appellant assails the finding of conviction despite failure of the prosecution to positively identify him as the culprit of the crime and to present clear and convincing circumstantial evidence that would overcome his innocence. paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution provides: ―x x x xxx xxx Sec. ‗custodial investigation‘ shall include the practice of issuing an ‗invitation‘ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed. 1992. (3) it must be express. xxx xxx xxx (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible against him.[4] approved on May 15. without prejudice to the liability of the ‗inviting‘ officer for any violation of law. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.

Even if the confession contains a grain of truth. it becomes inadmissible in evidence. you also took Herson Tan to your custody in connection with another case that happened in Lucena? A Yes. is that what happened in this case? A Yes. sir. shall be inadmissible in evidence. did you tell him that he is one of the suspects in the robbery slain (sic) that took place in Atimonan on December 5. The records of this case do not indicate that appellant was assisted by counsel when he made such waiver. sir. 1988? A Yes. be ―voluntary. This will not suffice to .‖[9] To reiterate. thus: ―Q Now. is it not? A Yes. sir.While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel. Q Now. however. Q Did you notify him of his constitutional right to counsel before you propounded questions to him? A No. sir. he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. you invited him in your headquarters. because we were just conversing. it must. Q Before propounding question or information you sought to elicit from him.[11] (Underscoring supplied) The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police headquarters. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. and he was also suspect to the robbery case which was investigated at Lucena Police Station. knowing and intelligent. Q And it just happened that without applying third degree to him he gave you that information? A Yes. so in addition to the Atimonan case.[10] it was ruled therein that any statement obtained in violation of the constitution. in People v. Javar. Santos on cross-examination. if it was made without the assistance of counsel. There were two (2) cases which were investigated on Herson Tan. did you inform him of his constitutional right not to testify against himself because he is a suspect in these two (2) cases? A No. a finding evident from the testimony of Lt. regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. Q And you happened to have Herson Tan in your list as suspect in both cases because Herson was previously incarcerated at Lucena City Jail in connection with a certain case. sir. when you brought Herson Tan to the Headquarters. Q Just for curiosity sake. and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel. in whole or in part. because we are asking question only to him. sir. sir.

convict him. ―This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government. we are constrained to acquit the appellant. however. CJ. and Purisima. (Chairman). Kapunan. Francisco. Quezon (Branch 62) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Narvasa. unless there is any other lawful cause for continued detention. Appellant HERSON TAN y VERZO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and his immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered. JJ. even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. Costs de oficio. of said crime.‖[12] What remains of the evidence for the prosecution is inadequate to warrant a conviction. The constitutional rights of appellant. are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed. .. WHEREFORE. concur.. in view of the foregoing. Considering the circumstances attendant in the conduct of appellant‘s investigation which fell short of compliance with constitutional safeguards. particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel. the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca. SO ORDERED.

JR. Quisumbing.J. 157399 Present: Davide. ERNESTO GAMUS y SOTELO. being the Treasurer of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).[2] docketed as Criminal Case No.[1] Jaime Ochoa and Raul Gutierrez were indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents defined and penalized under Articles 217 and 171 (8). Jr.versus Carpio. G. in an amended Information. J. (Acquitted). Jose Ting Lan Uy. conspiring. did then and there willfully. November 17. alias George Añonuevo. Alias George Añonuevo. Ynares-Santiago. Ernesto Gamus. a private individual being a foreign exchange trader. all of the National Power Corporation. Accused. JAIME OCHOA.: For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).PEOPLE VS.. Jr. UY FIRST DIVISION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. also of NAPOCOR. . with grave abuse of authority and committing the offense in relation to their office. Promulgated: JAIME OCHOA. unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified the NPC‘s application for managers checks with the Philippine ..R. alias Raul Nicolas. a public accountable officer. Jr. with their private co-accused. and Azcuna.x DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. (Chairman). 2005 x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. confederating and mutually helping one another. No. alias Mara Añonuevo. respectively. JJ. JOSE TING LAN UY. in Quezon City. alias Mara Añonuevo (At large).. C. and RAUL GUTIERREZ alias Raul Nicolas. Appellee. which alleges – That sometime in July 1990. Appellant. accused Jose Ting Lan Uy. or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto. Philippines. and accused Raul Gutierrez. 19558. both public officers being the Manager of the Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED) and Foreign Trader Analyst. said public officers taking advantage of their official positions. Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa.

Uy and Ochoa pleaded not guilty to the charge.25) solidarily with accused Jose Ting Lan Uy. 5.291. Philippine Currency. accused succeeded in diverting. 2002.805. the prosecution and the defense stipulated – 1.[3] Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. That accused Ochoa‘s position as Sr. That accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned in the information was (sic) the Manager of Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED). Upon arraignment. Ochoa is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation thru falsification of Commercial Document and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed which is ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183.291. while Gutierrez has remained at large. Jr. NPC Branch in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS and TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183. embezzle.805. accused Jaime B. 6. That accused Gamus does not have any custody to (sic) public funds.291. On pre-trial. intended for the purchase of US dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).National Bank (PNB). That accused Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst. the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision. That accused Uy at the time stated in the information was a Treasurer at the NPC. On May 28. by inserting the account number of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-121204-4. LOMAFED.75). accused JOSE TING LAN UY. Jr. at the time mentioned in the information. when in truth and in fact as the accused well knew that the Payment Instructions (PI) when signed by the NAPOCOR authorities did not indicate the account number of Raul Gutierrez. 3. collecting and receiving the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183. That the application forms for cashier‘s check or Manager‘s check are not accountable forms of the NAPOCOR. Financial Analyst did not require him to take custody or control of public funds.805.25). On the ground of reasonable doubt. Costs against the accused. premises considered. . Gamus. 2. CONTRARY TO LAW. thereby making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning. misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the National Power Corporation in the aforementioned sum.[4] the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. is hereby ACQUITTED of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Commercial Document. Accused Ochoa shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification. Philippine Currency from the National Power Corporation. and with the use of the said falsified commercial documents. which they thereafter malverse. 4.

are not disputed by the parties: In July of 1990.[6] The factual antecedents of the case. 3.M. naturally.[7] . the Bank of Japan. 1990). admitting and considering his alleged sworn statements. Manila. considering the alleged transcripts of stenographic notes and the NBI Report.25 to Credit Lyonnais.291.291.000.000. Tokyo.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to have remitted on said value date the amount of US$7. despite the fact that the PNB had already issued two (2) manager‘s/cashier‘s checks (―Manager‘s check‖ for brevity) for such purpose.805.316. Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Raul Gutierrez. convicting him based on the allegations in the information. UCPB T. Roxas Boulevard. The Hold Departure Order against the accused embodied in this Court‘s Resolution dated April 18. T. however. as summed by the Sandiganbayan.25 of its funds which were originally on deposit with the Philippine National Bank. Both the State and the accused have offered explanations for the failure of UCPB.00 to the Bank of Japan.M. per routing procedure. alias Raul Nicolas. alias George Añonuevo. UCPB T.However.740. Kalaw Branch to remit the dollar equivalent of P183. SO ORDERED.80. The contracts of NPC with the concerned banks (embodied in three [3] ―Payment Instructions‖) included a ―value date‖ (which was July 13.143. Mabini Street. Tokyo Branch. Manila or Suite 603 VIP Building. Tokyo Branch) which would then credit the funds to the account of the ADB. alias Mara Añonuevo with last known address at 1348 A. Kalaw Branch). so Credit Lyonnais received no payment for the funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan. 2002 is recalled. Likewise. 2.805. As NPC‘s debt in favor of ADB was in yen. Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that the Sandiganbayan erred in – 1. the mere arrival of which would trigger the above-mentioned procedure.291. the National Power Corporation (―NPC‖) became embroiled in a controversy involving the disappearance of P183. On value date. culminating in the payment to ADB of the NPC obligation in the foreign currency agreed upon.799. the Credit Lyonnais.291. This off-shore bank (in this case.805. Credit Lyonnais (the second bank) remitted Japanese Yen 1. New York) was then supposed to remit the yen equivalent of the US dollars to a third bank (in this case.25) in order to comply with its loan obligations to the Asian Development Bank (―ADB‖). which local bank was supposed to remit the US dollars to an off-shore bank. NPC Branch (―PNB‖) but were subsequently used to purchase two (2) managers‘/cashier‘s checks (the first check was in the amount of P70. United Coconut Planters Bank or UCPB T. Ermita. did not make the agreed remittance to Credit Lyonnais.130.[5] Aggrieved.00 while the second was for P113. Both explanations.805.25) solidarily with accused Jaime Ochoa. were diametrically opposed. NPC was obligated to follow an intricate and circuitous procedure of buying US dollars from a local bank (in this case. because of preponderance of evidence. per routing procedure.M. he is CIVILLY LIABLE for the damages suffered by the NPC in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183. Kalaw.

He claims that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant by the NPC personnel and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). d.] b. that he deposited the checks subsequently issued or that he received the proceeds thereof. the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor.[9] To sustain a charge of malversation. He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.M. the prosecution must prove the following essential elements: a. the felony involves breach of public trust. In his defense. who is still at large. the accused allegedly succeeded in diverting the funds from the UCPB.] c. Kalaw Branch. He points out that the information alleges willful and intentional commission of the acts complained of while the judgment found him guilty of inexcusable negligence amounting to malice. Through the insertion. there must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence[10] and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense. conviction for malversation through .] and The offender is a public officer. Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or passively through negligence by allowing another to commit such misappropriation. T.[8] Appellant insists that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the information without violating his constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. taken or misappropriated. Even when the information charges willful malversation. It claims that NPC did not authorize the insertion considering that the Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to prepare a Manager‘s check to be charged to NPC‘s savings account did not contain any account number. particularly the intercalation on the ACC. or has consented to. permitted the taking by another person of. The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable. and whether it is committed through deceit or negligence. Appellant‘s contention lacks merit. To be found guilty of malversation.The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the funds covered by the two PNB Manager‘s checks by falsifying a commercial document called an ―Application for Cashier‘s Check‖ (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C #111-1212-04) of a private individual after the name of the payee. T. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez @ Raul Nicolas @ George Añonuevo @ Mara Añonuevo. or through abandonment or negligence. appellant asserts that there was no evidence that he committed any of the acts alleged in the information. such funds or property.] He has appropriated. it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined at the Philippine Heart Center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him.M. or that he conspired with any of his co-accused. More pointedly. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit. UCPB.

… but a distinct crime in itself. and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal. as we held in Quizon vs. Court of Appeals. which are incompetent evidence. thus: While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime.[12] The question of whether or not an information charging the commission of the crime by means of deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is neither novel nor of first impression. in an information containing allegations similar to the present case. In other words. that an accused charged with willful malversation.negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense. the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony.[13] we ruled that an accused charged with willful or intentional falsification can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof. upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved. can be validly convicted of the same offense of malversation through negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the offense. . He contends that his sworn statement was taken without the benefit of counsel.. Consigna. it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense. under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in order.. In Samson v. Appellant next claims that he should be acquitted since his conviction was based on his sworn statement.. The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. In People v.[14] we ruled that the afore-stated rationale also applies to the felony of malversation. Certainly. that is. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12. et al. it would be incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence. This is the situation that obtains in the present case.. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties. having alleged that the falsification has been willful. transcript of stenographic notes from which the sworn statement was taken and the NBI Report. the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent.[11] Explicitly stated – Even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation. the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. . Justice of the Peace of Bacolor. appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code.. et al.

[16] More specifically – Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that – Section 12. And.[17] Succinctly stated. The ―investigation‖ under the above-quoted provision refers to a ―custodial‖ investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody[15] and the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. Section 12. therefore.. (1).[22] or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the investigation. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth. we held that a videotaped interview showing the accused unburdening his guilt willingly. custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. or what may pass for it.[24] Along the same vein. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. he must be provided with one.[20] Thus we held in one case[21] that admissions made during the course of an administrative investigation by Philippine Airlines do not come within the purview of Section 12.Paragraph 1. the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accusedappellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture. And even if they were. we warned trial courts to take extreme caution in further admitting similar confessions because we recognized the distinct possibility that the police.[23] or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity.[19] Clearly. He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen is not covered by the provision although in so ruling.[18] Such a situation contemplated has been more precisely described thus where – After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. out of the detainee. The protective mantle of the constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or confessions made to a private individual. the rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit incriminating statements. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions ...

While he may have been persuaded into doing so. while indeed Galman taken together with the 1986 deliberations on what was later to become Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution may lead to the conclusion that the rights are available when the person is already in custody as a suspect. Appellant invokes Galman v. As such. ―extorting‖ means ―compelling or coercing a confession or information by any means serving to overcome his power of resistance.[29] Appellant can hardly claim that. distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter. he cannot feign that he was intimidated in such a way as to bring his statements within the ambit of the exclusionary constitutional provision. Bernas[34] qualified this statement by saying that ―[J]urisprudence under the 1987 Constitution. considering that his statement was taken during the administrative investigation of NPC‘s audit team[28] and before he was taken into custody. Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate.‖ The contention is tenuous. The essence of the constitutional safeguard is protection from coercion. not to police authorities. Pamaran[30] in insisting that the constitutional safeguard should have been applied notwithstanding that he was not yet arrested or under detention at the time. the inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was. we qualified the ruling with the statement that what is being eschewed is the evil of ―extorting‖ a confession from the mouth of the person being interrogated. As defined. whatever degree of compulsion may have existed went beyond the borders of the unobjectionable where impermissible levels of duress would force him into making false and incriminating declarations against his interest. has . whether by force. The interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted by NPC personnel for the NPC‘s administrative investigation.‖[33] In this case. or making the confession or admission involuntary. He also invites our attention to the pronouncements of Fr. ―extortion‖ is an act or practice of taking or obtaining anything fr om a person by illegal use of fear. the flaw in appellant‘s argument in this regard becomes immediately apparent vis-à-vis the foregoing legal yardsticks. Fr. Furthermore. even if he is not a suspect. as yet.[25] Neither does the constitutional provision on custodial investigation extends to a spontaneous statement. no specific suspect.[26] nor to a person undergoing an audit examination because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer.[32] In the context of obtaining an admission. but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits having committed the crime. under the prevailing circumstances at the time. or if the person is a suspect even if he is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty. Bernas[31] that ―the right to counsel is available if a person is in custody. Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody because he was confined at the time at the Philippine Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel. however. not elicited through questioning by the authorities. or even if not yet in custody but he is a suspect. Joaquin G. Although we held in Galman that the constitutional protection covers not only confessions but admissions as well. The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at the time the sworn statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his predicament.and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. threats or any undue exercise of power. we find nothing on record to support appellant‘s claim that his statements were extorted from him.[27] Thus.

It bears stressing that the prosecution presented as witness Atty.[39] affirmed the contents of the document as a true reflection of his statements.‖ Moreover. Lamberto P. gave the inconclusive reply that it ―may or may not. the admission of the report‘s existence is an acknowledgment that it is neither spurious nor counterfeit. the May 28. evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness. Teresita Sadava. the stricter view.[43] Appellant finally contends that both the NBI Investigation Report and the transcript of stenographic notes are hearsay for having been made extra-judicially. as well as the statements and the authenticity of the signatures thereon. his appeal must fall.[38] Appellant denied that he was coerced or intimidated. who is supposedly astute in business matters as he then occupied the position of Foreign Trader Analyst of the NPC. The argument is puerile. Verily. the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its execution. nevertheless felt it unnecessary to execute another affidavit retracting the same after his recovery from illness. although supposedly violated and repulsed as he was by the alleged falsity of the affidavit. who. appellant insists that at the time he signed the document. when queried whether ―ischemic heart disease‖ had any emotional or psychological effect. Without that sort of evidence. The record. it can be contradicted only by clear and convincing evidence. . but must be credible in itself – such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. Melencio testified that he asked appellant to go over the document before affixing his signature thereto. Dr. He contends that although his statement was supposedly gathered from the transcript of stenographic notes of the conversation between him and Atty. the contents thereof may not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. neither Atty. the presumption of regularity. that the rights begin to be available only when the person is already in custody. All told.[40] and signed the same. Bagcal. who stated that appellant was confined for three days and.consistently held.[42] In disclaiming the authenticity of his sworn statement. following Escobedo. 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. Therefore.‖[35] Appellant next advances the argument that even if his sworn statement were admissible in evidence. however. although his testimony was dispensed with as the parties stipulated on the existence and due execution of the NBI Investigation report albeit without admitting the truth of its contents. WHEREFORE. given the paucity of substance in the arguments advanced by appellant to prop up his cause.[41] It need not be overemphasized that the sworn statement is a duly notarized document which has in its favor the presumption of regularity and. stand.[36] Atty. Melencio who saw appellant at the hospital to show him the prepared statement and to verify from him the truth of its contents. as aptly observed by the Sandiganbayan. If at all. the sworn statement is hearsay. thus.[37] He also inquired whether or not appellant was coerced or intimidated by anybody when the statement was taken. it is strange that appellant. he was confined in the hospital and therefore not physically and mentally fit to assess the significance of his signature. This pretext however collides with the testimony of his own witness. Bagcal nor the person who actually prepared the sworn statement was presented. shows that the prosecution presented the team leader of the NBI investigators who conducted the investigation.

all of Manaoag. (Emphasis supplied. Third Judicial District. Sr. On April 4.. of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION. committed as follows: That on or about the 21st day of April 1973. J. an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera. without legal grounds. a barrio captain. ANGELITO C. in Criminal Case No. Sr. CALDONA Assistant Provincial Fiscal All the accused. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. (SGD. Pangasinan. Pangasinan conspiring.P. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. which reads as follows: The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera. then and there. SALANGA.. D-529 entitled "The People of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera. including respondent Juan Tuvera. 1972. GANCAYCO. in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. and JUAN TUVERA.. in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan. confederating and helping one another. Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy. MILO. The facts are as follows: On October 12. Manaoag.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. No.. 1972.. L-37007 July 20. et al. lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag. herein respondent. Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not ." granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan Tuvera. Sr. respondents. willfully. Sr. October 12. maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and immediately thereafter. vs.. accused Juan Tuvera.. Sr. SR.. accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera. Jr. 1973. Sr. 1987 RAMON S. Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat. Dagupan City. unlawfully and feloniously. did. in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IV).) VICENTE C. Cpl.R.MILO VS SALANGA G. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention. Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.) CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R. and ARMANDO VALDEZ. members of the police force of Mangsat.. petitioners. Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong. in barrio Baguinay. namely Juan Tuvera. Pangasinan. with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty. Sr. Rodolfo Mangsat. were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.C.. at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening. with the aid of some other private persons.

That the offender is a public officer or employee.. Mangsat.sufficient to support the filing of the information. if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) hours. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Granting that it was Tuvera. Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention. nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain. (4) That he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner Valdez. respondent Judge Angelito C. a barrio captain is a public officer who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.(2) That he is neither a peace officer nor a policeman. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. (5) That he is not connected directly or indirectly in the administration of the Manaoag Police Force. That the detention is without legal grounds. Juan Tuvera. Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera. Sr. private respondent Tuvera asserts that the motion to quash was properly sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the authority to make arrest. without legal grounds. the judges or mayors. Sr. (6) That barrio captains on April 21. In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga. that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary Detention. detains a person. Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez for about eleven (11) hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. it was not he who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority vested in him as a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay. Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as such public officer when the former made this finding in the questioned order: Apparently. Pangasinan. The only question is whether or not Tuvera. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25. 3.. Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who. 1972 were not yet considered as persons in authority and that it was .. who are members of the police force of Manaoag. Hence. The Information charges Tuvera. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law. No doubt the last two elements of the crime are present. The elements of this crime are the following: 1. a barrio captain. has nothing to do with the same because he is not in any way connected with the Police Force of Manaoag. Milo filed an opposition thereto. Pangasinan. this petition. that is. That he detains a person. (3) That he was not a public official. who ordered Valdez arrested. Mendoza and Pat. Manaoag. Sr. 2. to have conspired with Cpl. 1973. The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash the information which was sustained by respondent Judge.

both must be and are given . vs. the powers and duties of a barrio captain include the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the performance of their duties in such barrio. a municipal councilor.only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No.20 In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration. and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.S. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order.S. In U. Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary Detention. to wit: "Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he was in his church. "In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public order. Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law. with the help of Filoteo Soliman. and delivered him to the justice of the peace. who act with abuse of their functions.21 (Emphasis supplied.16 Under Republic Act No. to behave well. this Court deemed them as persons in authority.18 to enforce all laws and ordinances which are operative within the barrio. vs. The two public officials were convicted of Arbitrary Detention. his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. and that the proper charge was Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention. and Hilario Braganza. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors.) One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. We disagree.m. inevitably people blame him. what can the barrio captain do? Understandably. otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter.17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio. "He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. Gellada. Sixto was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a. bound and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p. They made him pass through the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal building. Professor Jose M. they told him that he was under arrest.14 In U. As such. where possible. He may take preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and persuading them. In various cases.13 Martin Salibio. barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. Aruego has this to say about the above-mentioned powers and duties of a Barrio Captain. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter.15 Geronimo Gellada.19 and to organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and order within the barrio. a barrio lieutenant.m. 299 that Barrio Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who are persons in authority. he first resorts to peaceful measures. a barrio lieutenant. of the next day when he was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not committed any crime. Braganza. The priest had not committed any crime. may be guilty of this crime. he may subject them to the full force of law. There. he may make arrest and detain persons within legal limits. 3590. For public disorder therein. but when necessary.

1973 in Criminal Case No.J. From the foregoing. This rule admits of only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the prosecution. prescription.30 this Court held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. Teehankee. C. An order granting a motion to quash. The accused cannot claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his instance.. vs. private respondent Tuvera. private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of the motion to quash jeopardy has already attached in his favor32 on the ground that here. Next. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police. . Let this case be remanded to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention. concur. in view of the foregoing.. could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez. and former jeopardy. Cruz and Paras. Sr. such as extinction of criminal liability. is a final order. Perez. Narvasa. unlike one of denial.33 WHEREFORE. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the facts and evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention. he as a barrio captain.S. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.the authority to detain or order detention. D-529 is hereby set aside. the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Respondent's contention holds no water.31lawphi1 Lastly. cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of the information.27 Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the Information.28 Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion. We have repeatedly held that Courts.26 and that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's personal safety.. the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. JJ. It is not merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable.29 In the case of U.25 that he only sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force. like private respondent Tuvera. except where the Rules expressly permit. Sr. in resolving a motion to quash. The questioned Order of April 25. there is no doubt that a barrio captain. SO ORDERED.

R. on the ground that it has not been proven that she had conspired with her brothers to assault said appellant. that the assault committed by the Sanson brothers and justice of the peace Salazar upon the accused-appellant took place immediately after the latter had been approached by Bibiana Sanson in the middle of the street. and at the same time wresting from him the revolver which he carried in his belt. That it is an error to hold that the detention of Bibiana Sanson ordered by the appellant was not justified. and her brothers. Gaz. however. Rufo and Cirilo and by justice of the peace Guillermo Salazar. second. after this Supreme Court has found in its decision that "there are circumstances in support of the theory of the defense" that the appellant ordered the arrest of Bibiana Sanson for having conspired with her brothers and with the deceased Salazar to assault said appellant. 1939 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. That the conviction of the appellant in this case. 45344 (37 Off. We have reviewed the record and firmly adhere to the finding that it was the accused-appellant who really ordered the arrest of Bibiana Sanson upon the belief that she had taken part in the assault committed upon him by the Sanson brothers. VICENTE P. to approach him in the middle of the street feigning friendship. No. 620). immediately afterwards and knowing him to be a peace officer. The only question now to be determined anew is: "Was the detention of said woman arbitrary under said circumstances?" Without making a tedious repetition of the facts pertinent to the case. punching and kicking him until he fell to the ground. II. it should be stated. defendant-appellant. Under said circumstances. a thing she had never done before. because it was strange for her. vs. Claro M. L-46250 July 26. to fall upon him and assault him. Recto for appellant. the appellant undoubtedly had well founded reasons to believe that Bibiana Sanson was not innocent of said aggression: first. because the four of them harbored a . is a deviation from the uniform ruling that peace officers are empowered to make arrests without warrant when they have reasonable cause to believe that an offense or violation of law has been committed and that the accused is guilty thereof. which already appear in the decision rendered in case G. Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta for appelle.R. PER CURIAM: Again this case occupies the attention of this court by reason of the petition filed by the accused and appellant Vicente P. and is likewise contrary to the express provision of section 848 of the Administrative Code pertinent thereto. Rufo and Cirilo and justice of the peace Salazar. while he was passing in front of the store situated under the house owned by the Sansons.. plaintiff-appellee. and in the one under reconsideration. with the costs of the proceedings. His petition is based on the following grounds: I. No. which affirms that formerly entered by the Court of First Instance of Palawan sentencing him to the indeterminate penalty of from six months of arresto mayor to four years of prision correccional. which already appear in the decision rendered in case. Ancheta for reconsideration of the judgment rendered against him. ANCHETA.PEOPLE VS ANCHETA G.

in the absence of the justice of the peace and of the municipal president of Balbac. after the corresponding preliminary investigation. the indubitable existence of a crime. and lastly.. The complaint was filed with the acting vice-president Emilio Castro. 1892). It seems clear that the appellant ceased to have any responsibility from the time the complaint was filed with the authorities. it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 5. by reason of his position. In crimes of arbitrary detention (article 124 of the Revised Penal Code. where it was stated that the reasonable or probable cause which must exist to justify an arrest without warrant consists in a ground sufficient in itself to . because he was then of the opinion that such was the crime committed by them against him.grudge against him. he caused the presentation of a complaint for frustrated homicide. and by reason of having complained of the behaviour and investigated the conduct of justice of the peace Salazar in various cases in which the latter had intervened as such justice of the peace. or that of dismissing the complaint against her for the reason that she does not appear to be liable for any crime. This same ruling was upheld by this court in several cases. but upon the nature of the deed. on the belief that said official could act upon it. such as that of effecting the provisional release of Bibiana Sanson on bail. the legality of the detention made by a person in authority or an agent thereof. at the time of its commission. For the detention to be perfectly legal. called upon. locking up themselves therein until they were compelled to surrender by the Constabulary. among them being that of United States vs. which is equivalent to article 200 of the old Penal Code). 1855. which was so done in fact not only against her but also against her to brothers. because after the assault. Santos (36 Phil. wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen. by reason of his break with Bibiana and of the slander of which she had allegedly been informed and which she had reached the ears of the Sansons thereby naturally offending them. that he had been spreading the news that she had in his possession some of the Bibiana's innermost garments. who have believed so himself and would have made the same decision. 853). The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime. does not depend upon the judicial and much less judicial fact of a crime which. Anybody who found himself in the same circumstances as the appellant. all the more so because the person involved was not merely a peace officer but a commanding officer of a detachment of constabulary soldiers. It should be borne in mind that on the same day on which the appellant ordered the detention of Bibiana Sanson. third because Bibiana made no efforts to prevent her brothers and said justice of the peace from maltreating as they in fact maltreated him. to act promptly in order to preserve order and to bring to the authorities those whom be believes in good faith to be violators of the law. is not and cannot definitively be determined for lack of the necessary data and of jurisdiction. because it was not then incumbent upon him to take the steps subsequent to said act. as stated by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of January 27. all the four went up the house of the Sansons. and he knew it. does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof. There is no doubt that the above-stated facts constitute in themselves strong circumstantial evidence that the aggression was premeditated and was the result of a previous conspiracy in which Bibiana Sanson could not but have a part.

Fortaleza. JJ. to make arrest without warrant. .J.S. adding that one should not expect too much of a policeman. but also when they reasonably believe or have ground to suspect that a crime has been committed and that it has been committed precisely by the person arrested (U. in view of the circumstances surrounding the same. Diaz. 23 Phil. even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent. Avanceña. Kagui Malasugui.S. and Moran.S. supra. Ancheta. besides reasonable ground of suspicion. of the crime of arbitrary detention with which he was charged. So ordered. vs. 12 Phil.. Bibiana Sanson's detention ordered by the appellant took place exactly under these same circumstances. Batallones. Santos. every public officer or employee. and that. Samonte. vs. 63 Phil. It should likewise be borne in mind that the law (section 848 of the Administrative Code and article 124 of the Revised Penal Code) allows members of the Constabulary or policemen.. the detention of Bibiana Sanson ordered by him being as it is now declared sufficiently justified. because both are not presumed to have the training and preparation of a judicial officer.convince a reasonable man to believe that the person arrested by him is guilty. Imperial. 46. It was likewise stated therein that under such conditions.. People vs. U.S . 472. action in good faith is another protective bulwark for the peace officer making the arrest. Villa-Real. not having as they do not often have the opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on their own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. U. the peace officer who arrested him is not liable.. Wherefore. C. vs. judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Vicente P. Concepcion. lieutenant of the Constabulary. and in general. 221). 516. with the costs de oficio. vs. not only when a crime is being committed or is about to be committed in their own presence. 16 Phil. U. concur... and the same is true with a constabulary officer as the appellant.

F. an eye. did then and there wilfully. Manila Police Department (MPD). thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter. the prosecution presented the testimony of Ramon Ching. Philippines. J. . Abelardo Lucero. a Sketch.000. On April 6. 1971. Virgilio Baluyot alias Boy Bakal. and I. 1978 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. to death. Precinct 9. ROBERTO MOLLEDA y GERONA alias TIKBOY. L-34248 November 21. Pamaran. in the City of Manila. Patrolman Nestor Miguel. Medico-Legal officer of the Manila Police Department. each and all. to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12. unlawfully and feloniously. B. conspiring and confederating together with one whose true name and Identity are still unknown.00 as exemplary. Bongco for appellant Evelyn Duave. for appellee. Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Jr. and helping one another with the use of superior strength. D. Human Sketch. Solicitor General Estelito P. H. Statement of Reynaldo Nicolas. No.000. CCC-IV-548(71) in which the above-named accused were each and all convicted as principals in the crime of murder. Statement of Roberto Molleda. MOLLEDA G. and with treachery and evident premeditation. E. VIRGILIO BALUYOT y DIESTRO alias BOY BAKAL. Joshua T. de Pano. Mendoza. vs. Judge Manuel R.000. assault and use personal violence on one Alfredo Bocaling then and there stabbing him with a knife on the stomach and left arm. and the costs. Caponong for appellants Baluyot and Nicolas.PEOPLE VS. attack. to pay P8. and sentenced. Necropsy report. the said accused. Identification Slip. Statement of Virgilio Baluyot. Dr. filed by Assistant Fiscal Bernabe Tiongco. and P8. Postmortem findings. 1971. in Criminal Case No. Kapunan and Solicitor Nathaniel P. Certificate of Death. qualified by taking advantage of superior strength and with the aggravating circumstance of "deceit". with intent to kill. C. defendants-appellants.R.00 as moral. damages. That on or about January 7.: Mandatory review of the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court. Marcial Desiderio and Gamaliel G. presiding. G. plaintiff-appellee.00. the above-named accused were charged with murder in an information. SANTOS. Reynaldo Nicolas alias Boy Miroy and Evelyn Duave alias Baby China. Manila. hitting him several times on the head with a piece of wood and kicking him. Detective Amador Jose. to wit — The undersigned accuses Roberto Molleda y Gerona alias Tikboy. MPD and Investigator. REYNALDO NICOLAS y MANANSALA alias BOY MIROY and EVELYN DUAVE y ORTEGA alias BABY CHINA. Contrary to law. and Exhibits A. At the trial.and ear-witness to the killing.

to join them as they — Evelyn and Melinda — will return a radio at Suter St. While Ching was being chased.. The operative facts of and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime and the apprehension and investigation of the accused as gleaned from the testimonies of the witnesses and the extra-judicial statements of three of the accused follow. while the three remained inside. 2-c (Molleda) Voter's I. Evelyn stood up and asked permission to go to a nearby store to buy lollipop. 2-a (Molleda) I. he turned his head towards Suter and saw several persons ganging up (pinagtutulungan) on Freddie Bocaling. She then returned with Roberto Molleda. The rest of the group also prepared to leave. Duave. at or about 10:00 P. At or about 8:00 in the evening of January 7.D. 1971. Bay. of Molleda. she was with a male companion. waiting for one Daniel Morosi.) alighted therefrom and then took a taxi for the house where Gordon lived. Virgilio Baluyot and Evelyn Duave and Exhibits 1. They arrived at Suter Street. 2-b (Molleda) I. possibly because he tripped. After about five minutes. Virgilio Baluyot alias Boy Bakal and Reynaldo Nicolas alias Boy Miroy. Ching and Bocaling saw four persons drinking.M. 1-a (Molleda) Statement of Sta. a certain cursillista whom they did not know and one Ngongo. When Melinda returned. Ching hastily boarded a passenger jeep and proceeded . and Virgilio Baluyot to the house. whereupon.The defense presented the testimonies of the accused Roberto Molleda. one of whom is a friend of Gordon. to whom the transistor radio will be returned. While thus waiting for Morosi. Ching was suddenly boxed on the nape by Nicolas and at almost the same time." and ran towards Pedro Gil.D. Ching and Bocaling indicated that they wanted to go home. near Herran. their friend. Freddie. They were introduced to each other and the group continued with their drinking. When they stepped out of the house. Actually. Since Ramon Ching had known Evelyn Duave alias Baby China for two years already as a call girl. Evelyn Duave alias Baby China and Melinda. Ching and Bocaling were introduced to her male companion. They rode in a bus and at some point on Herran (now Pedro Gil St. a certain Paking. now Pedro Gil. Baluyot boxed Bocaling also on the nape. They were thereafter told to alight from the taxi and to proceed to a certain house nearby with Evelyn. nearby. while Baluyot alias Boy Bakal did the same to Bocaling in an apparent show of friendliness to dispel any suspicion on the part of the two. As they were proceeding towards Herran. They dropped there and stayed for a while. A little while later.D. but Ching was able to make good his escape. of Molleda. He was chased by two or three male companions who were earlier introduced to them. of Molleda. Reynaldo Nicolas. Brigida. Ching sensing trouble. "Takbo na tayo. shouted to Bocaling. as they reached the corner of Suter and Tejeron streets. they were invited by two women. Paking. After drinking and conversing for sometime. Evelyn contacted Roberto Molleda alias Tikboy. she returned with three men.D. all members of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik gang. She informed them that the persons who robbed and raped her were there in the house. They joined the four and drank with them. Reynaldo Nicolas alias Boy Miroy. Baluyot and Nicolas. Melinda alighted from the taxi in which they were riding. He was being hit with bottles and pieces of wood by Molleda. Manila. the two — Bocaling and Ching — agreed to go with them because they were also going to one Gordon. Nicolas alias Boy Miroy placed his hand on the shoulder of Ching. Melinda asked permission from them to go out to buy something. A little while later. Alfredo Bocaling and Ramon Ching were in the ground floor of the Good Earth Emporium on Rizal Avenue. and Baby China hit Bocaling with a belt. who joined them. after which the group went to the corner of Suter and Tejeron streets.. A while later. the group saw a wake in another house. namely. 2 (Molleda) I. Alfredo Bocaling fell at the corner of Suter and Tejeron streets. of Molleda. Melinda said that she would talk to somebody. a sketch.

failed to see Morosi and instead saw one Ruding Bakal. The incident was reported to Precinct 9 at Sta. said that the cause of death was "intrapericardial tamponade due to multiple four (4) stab wounds lacerating the heart. who examined the cadaver of Bocaling.. (7) Multiple (8) abrasions in the anterior left chest.. they went to the house of a friend. who was on duty as investigator of the Precinct. The statements of Ramon Ching and one Manuel Sta.5 x 0. . At or around 11. (1) which was "directed obliquely upwards to the left and slightly to the back lacerating the right lobe liver. located in the posteroateral portion of the upper 3rds of the left arm. (5) (6) Multiple (2) lacerated wounds in the parietal region of the head. Detective Jose found and established the Identities of the suspects as the above-named accused — Roberto Molleda alias Tikboy. through the right ventricle of the heart" was fatal. x 3 cm. Manila Police Department (MPD). located in the anterior upper left lateral chest. Alfredo Bocaling died as a result of the mauling. liver and diaphragm.. another person also by the name of Rudy and Junior. Baluyot. Exhibit "E".to Rizal Park to look for Danny Morosi. Multiple (4) hematoma located in the frontal region. Ching learned that Bocaling was dead. Abelardo Lucero. with Rudy Aguilar. Reynaldo Nicolas alias Boy Miroy all members of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik gang — and Evelyn Duave alias Baby China. The police investigated him. whereupon he reported the incident to the authorities. he suffered the following injuries — (1) Stab wounds measuring 2 x 1 x 18 cm. Brigida were taken. on the evening of January 7. located at the right axillary line at the level of the 6th interspace . 1971. According to the post-mortem findings. blunt injuries.5 x 1 x 6 cm. Meanwhile. Ching returned to the corner of Suter and Tejeron. (3) Stab wound measuring 1. located in the left anterior chest at the level of the anterior axillary line (slight).2 x 1 cm. He informed them of what had happened to Freddie Bocaling." Stab wound No. It was investigated by Detective Amador Jose. however. medical examiner of the Manila Police Department. Thereafter. They did not see Bocaling anymore. Virgilio Baluyot alias Boy Bakal.5 x 2 cm. Nicolas. right knee and another in the anterior surface of the lower right lip. Molleda. Ching.. Ana.. contributing. diaphragm. shortly after the mauling incident.00 P. On the following day. Dr. (4) Stab wound measuring 2. where they tarried for a while.M. (2) Punctured wound measuring 0. After a follow-up of the case. . Chiqui. Duave and Melinda proceeded to Cine Rey. They then proceeded to the house of Evelyn Duave who gave her electric fan to Nicolas who in turn hocked the same to her aunt.

Alicia Nicolas. Therafter. the common-law-wife of Reynaldo Nicolas was able to evade the operatives of the Anti-Hoodlum Unit and has remained at large. Reynaldo Nicholas. Ana. Sta. Rizal Ave. respectively before Pat. Pateros. 8. Miguel.Maaari mo bang sabihin dito sa amin ang mga bagay.Ayun po sina Reynaldo Nicholas. Nestor T. one Carling Esmeralda on Pag-asa street. Amador Jose. 1971. si Virgilio Baluyot alias Boy Bakal at si Baby China at si Melinda. she did not contradict their statements. T . Makati. kami nina Reynaldo Nicolas alias Boy Miroy at Virgilio Baluyot alias Boy Bakal ay nag-inuman ng alak sa Bagong Bituin Restaurant sa J. they proceeded to Olongapo City after they received information that masked men were coming back to Suter Street.. Baby China at S . Baby China na ang tunay na pangalan ay Evelyn Duave y Ortega at si Melinda po ay wala rito. After a day or so they rented a house near Gordon Avenue somewhere near Pag-asa street. for investigation. who were then in hiding. Maynila? S . Ana. Manila. 1971. Manila. While in Olongapo. 1971. T . Enero 7. Roberto Molleda fell into the hands of the operatives of the Anti-Hoodlum Unit thru which the alarm for the apprehension of the suspects was flashed. Ana. Evelyn and Melinda continued with their calling and worked as hostesses to provide the expenses of the group.Ang mga kasama po ay sina Reynaldo Molleda alias Boy Miroy. Nuong mga 10:00 ng gabi ng araw na iyon ay umalis kami sa nasabing resturant at sumakay kami ng isang pangpasaherong jeep at bumaba kaming tatlo sa kanto ng Tejeron at Suter at sinalubong kami ni Baby China at Melinda at sinabi ni Baby China sa amin na pinagnakawan siya ng pera at ni rape pa siya sa isang hotel ng ilang lalaki.Sino sino ang mga kasama mo sa pagpatay sa isang lalaki duon sa Suter Sta. Enero 7. alias Boy Miroy. Rizal. sa Suter. Ana. nuong 10:00 ng gabi. 1971. T Melinda? . Virgilio Baluyot. 9. who was investigated by Det. Rizal. at inabot kami ng gabi doon. who lives at Sta. (Itinuro ang mga nabanggit na mga tao na nasa loob ng opisina. alias Boy Bakal. 1971. Sta. But the long arm of the law finally caught up with them in their hiding place and on March 5.Opo. During the investigation Roberto Molleda. while Virgilio Baluyot and Reynaldo Nicolas gave their written statements on April 4 and 5. Sinabi ni Baby China na ang dalawa sa mga lalaking nagnakaw ng kanyang pera at ng . gave his statement on April 5. Molleda's account of the killing follows — xxx xxx xxx 7. Melinda. 1971 na binanggit mo sa itaas nito? S .Saan naroroon ngayon sina Virgilio Baluyot. Virgilio Baluyot. the group stayed in the house of another friend. Nuong hapon ng Enero 7. Reynaldo Nicolas and Evelyn Duave also fell into the hands of the law and were also likewise brought to Precinct 9.bagay tungkol sa ginawa ninyong pagpatay duon sa isang lalaking ipinaalam namin sa iyo na si Alfredo Bocaling y Barcenas ng mga 10:00 ng gabi. Molleda was brought to Manila for investigation in connection with the killing of Bocaling on January 7. Evelyn Duave was present when the three pointed to her as their companion and incriminated her.

Ganito po iyon.. at duon kami nagpaumaga at kinabukasan ay nagpunta kami sa Olongapo City. sa Tejeron St. kami pong tatlo nina BOY MIROY. Dumampot ng isang kahoy si Boy Miroy at pinagpapalo sa ulo iyong lalaki. Nagdaan ako sa isang patay duon sa Suter at sina Boy Miroy. hinabol namin ni Boy Miroy iyong lalaking nakatakbo at hindi namin siya inabutan at nagbalik at nakita ko na bagsak na sa dean dahil sa palo iyong lalaking nahawakan ni Boy Bakal. Baluyot's account in turn. Baby China at Melinda na lamang ang nagpunta duon sa bahay na pinagiinuman na binanggit ni Baby China. Manila? S . sa loob ng Bagong Bituin Restaurant nuong gabi ng mga oras na humigit-kumulang sa ika 9:00 ng gabi ng bago mangyari ang patayan sa daang Suter at matapos na kami ay makapag-inuman ay umuwi na at pagdating namin sa kanto ng Suter at Tejeron ay aming nakita itong si Baby China tinawag po ni Baby China sina BOY MIROY at TIKBOY at niyaya na magtuloy sa bahay nila POPOY na ang tunay na pangalan ay MANUEL STA. Sta. follows — 06. Rizal.rape sa kanya ay nanduon sa isang bahay duon sa Suter Sta. nauuna si BOY MIROY at kaakbay ang isa sa dalawang lalaki ay nakita ko na sinuntok ni BOY MIROY ang kanyang kaakbay at ang kasabay naman namin ni TIKBOY ay tumakbo at kami naman ni TIKBOY ay tumakbo palapit kay BOY MIROY at tinanong ko si BOY MIROY kung bakit niya sinuntok o inumpisahan at sinabi niya sa amin ni TIKBOY na iyon ang siyang nagnakaw ng pera ni BABY CHINA at matapos na aking malaman kay BOY MIROY na iyon ang siyang nagnakaw ng pera ni BABY CHINA ay sinuntok ko po iyon (lalaki) at bumagsak sa lupa at ng iyon po ay bumulagda ay nilapitan naman siya ni TIKBOY at sinaksak at si BOY MIROY po naman ay kumuha ng isang pirasong kahoy. Boy Bakal. inakbayan po ni BOY MIROY and isa sa dalawang lalaki at ang isa po naman sa kanila ay kinausap namin ni TIKBOY. T .. Nang malapit na kami sa kanto ng Tejeron ay pinalo ni Boy Bakal ng hibilya ng sinturon sa ulo ang lalaking akbay niya at sinuntok naman ni Boy Miroy iyong lalaking akbay niya at nakatakbo ang nasabing lalaki. likod at ibang parte ng katawan ang nakahandusay na tao at ako po naman ay hinugot ko ang aking sinturon at pinalo ng hibilya ang taong nakahandusay at bago kami umalis ay minsan ko pang hinataw ng hibilya ng aking sinturon ang . MELINDA. BRIGIDA at sila po ay nag-inuman samantalang ako po naman ay nasa bahay nina ELSA na nakaburol ng mga pagkakataong iyon na malapit sa bahay nina POPOY at hindi po natagalan ay lumabas sina TIKBOY. Pagkatapos na murahin ng marami ang lalaking sinaksak ko ay umalis na kami at nagpunta kami duon sa bahay na may patay at pagkatapos ay nagpunta kami sa Pateros. Ana. at may kasama pang dalawang lalaki na hindi ko po kilala at ako po ay kinalabit ni BOY MIROY at sinenyasan naman ako ni TIKBOY na sumunod sa kanila at nang kami po ay naglalakad ay aking tinanong si BOY MIROY kung bakit at sinabi niya sa akin na ang dalawang lalaki na kanilang kasabay ay mayroong atraso kina BABY CHINA at MELINDA at mayroon tatak na BAHALA NA GANG. Pagkaraan ng humigit kumulang sa beinte minutos ay nakita ko silang nagdaan papunta ng Tejeron at akbay ni Boy Miroy ang isang lalaki at akbay din ni Boy Bakal ang isa pang lalaki at kasama nila sina Baby China at Melinda at ako'y sumunod sa kanila. BOY MIROY. Nahawakan ni Boy Bakal iyong lalaking akbay niya. pinalo po niya sa ulo. BABY CHINA.Maaari ba naman na isalaysay mo sa pagsisiyasat na ito. Manila at kami ay naglakad napapunta doon sa nasabing bahay. TIKBOY at AKO ay nag-inuman sa Makati. kung ano ang mga bagay-bagay na iyong nalalaman na may kinalaman din naman sa patayan na naganap sa Suter St. Ana. Sinaksak ko naman ang nasabing lalaki ng isang kutsilyo sa kanyang tiyan at pinagpapalo pa ni Boy Bakal at Boy Miroy ang lalaking sinaksak ko habang sinasabi ni Baby China na tuluyan siyang patayin kung hindi isasauli iyong pera niya. at tinanong kung saan sila umuuwi at ako po ay nagpakilala na ako si BOY at samantalang kami po ay naglalakad na. Rizal.

tao na tumama sa kanyang noo at ako po at si BOY MIROY ay tinawag ni TIKBOY at nagsabi na "PARE. HALIKA NA KAYO. ang sagot ko ay ito raw ang nagnakaw ng pera ni Evelyn at matapos na malaman ni BOY BAKAL ay sinuntok niya iyong tao at bumagsak naman at lumapit si TIKBOY at sinaksak iyong Lao at. kami nina BOY MIROY. sila ba ay narito ngayon? S . Rizal. Ana.Sinabi mo na ikaw ay narito sa aming tanggapan. TAMA NA YAN" at habang kami po ay papalayo sa lugar na pinangyarihan ay sinabi niya sa amin ni BOY MIROY na sinaksak niya iyong tao at kami ay nagtuloy sa patay at hindi nagtagal ay mayroong dumating na taong lalaki at kinausap si BOY MIROY at TIKBOY at ng bumalik po sina BOY MIROY at TIKBOY. T .. sa Suter St. Ana at nakakulong at si TIKBOY po naman ay nakakulong din sa Olongapo City ayon sa kina BABY CHINA at BOY MIROY. . nalalaman mo ba naman kung saan ngayon naroroon itong iyong mga kasamahan na ito? S . nasa Makati po kami at nag-iinuman sa Bagong Bituin Restaurant na nasa daang J. EVELYN at TIKBOY ay nagpunta doon at sa pagdating po namin doon ay tamang-tama na lumalabas na sila. xxx xxx xxx 11. dahilan sa pagkakapatay ninyong magkakasama na iyong binanggit sa salaysay na ito. 1971. ito po si BOY MIROY (Declarant pointing to the person Reynaldo Nicholas y Manansala) at iyon po naman si Baby CHINA (Declarant pointing to the person Evelyn Duave y Ortega). TIKBOY at BOY MIROY. Brigida na nasa kalye Suter. T . maaari ba naman isalaysay mo sa lalong maikling pananalita ang buong pangyayari? S . xxx xxx xxx And Nicolas' account follows — xxx xxx xxx 09. dahilan iyon daw po sa mayroong pending case doon at si Melinda po naman ay hindi ko alam.Opo. pagkatapos poniyon ay hinagupit ng sinturon ni BOY BAKAL iyong tao at kami ay tinawag ni TIKBOY at sinabi na tama na pare at umalis na kami. MELINDA. sa isang bahay na inyong inupahan sa Olongapo. Maynila ay nasalubong namin si Evelyn at nagsumbong sa akin na iyon daw pong tao na nagnakaw ng kanyang pera ay naroon sa bahay nina Manuel Sta. Matapos po kaming mag-inuman. tinawag ko po sila ng "PARE PUEDE BANG MAKAUSAP KAYO SANDALI" at kinalabit po ni TIKBOY SI BOY BAKAL o VIRGILIO BALUYOT na ng mga sandaling iyon ay nasa lamayan at aming sinabayan ang dalawang tao sa paglakad nila sa kalye Tejeron hanggang kanto ng kalye Suter at aking sinuntok iyong isa sa dalawang magkasama at lumapit sina BOY BAKAL at TIKBOY sa akin at ako po ay tinanong ni BOY BAKAL kung bakit ko sinuntok. at itong si Baby China. Manila.Sinabi mo na itong si MIROY ay narito ngayon dito sa presinto ng Sta.Ayon sa iyo ay nagkasama kayo nina BABY CHINA. kami ay umuwi at pagdating namin sa kalye Suter. noong ika-7 ng Enero.Ganito po iyon. sa isang tao. 16. T .Si BABY CHINA at BOY MIROY po ay narito ngayon dito sa presinto ng Sta. tinawag ako na nang mga pagkakataong iyon ay umiinom ng kape at sinabi sa akin noong tao na tumawag sa kanila na patay na iyong tao at ako nga po ay niyaya na nilang magtago.

Rizal. after trial.Amin po ipinaalam kay BOY BAKAL na patay na ang tao na aming binugbog sa kalye Suter at kami po ay nagpunta sa bahay ni EVELYN Sa kalye San Jose malapit sa kanto ng Legaspi.e.in detailing its rationale for its findings on the guilt of the herein accused-appellants and its sentence-held as follows: As to the proofs on record. He declared that he was running sidewise when he saw Bocaling being mauled and he was only eighteen (18) meters away from him.Ano naman ang ginawa ninyo matapos na inyong mapag-alaman na patay na iyong S . rolled the end of it around her right palm and with the buckle at the other end made a swinging motion of the belt from his back to the front and at the same time made a step forward. Ching testified in a categorical. he saw the victim already being mauled. The positive categorical testimony of Ching became more convincing in the cross-examination to which he had been exposed wherein he reiterated in full details the mauling of the victim. straightforward and logical manner with marked ease and fluency that while he and the victim (Alfredo Bocaling) were on the way to the intersection of Suter and Tejeron Streets. he turned his back towards Suter and saw several persons helping one another in mauling the victim. he was boxed by Nicolas on the nape. Manila. Ana.Saan naman kayo kumuha ng inyong iniuupa sa bahay na inyong inupahan sa Gordon Avenue? S xxx . He even demonstrated with particularity how Duave hit the victim with a belt by taking hold of a leather belt. Kinuha ni Evelyn ang kanyang bentilador at iyon po ay ibinigay sa akin at isinanla ko naman kay Alicia Nicholas na aking tiyahin na nakatira sa Sta. the court a quo rendered its decision. . Baluyot and Nicolas were among those persons mauling the victim. Makati. 1971. Rizal. bottles and pieces of wood. while Bocaling fell at the corner of Suter and Tejeron possibly because he tripped. He ran towards Herran St. While he was being chased.. spontaneous. Accused Duave also participated in the mauling of the victim by hitting him with a belt. xxx xxx xxx 20. T . There was even a light at the corner about twelve (12) meters away from where the victim was mauled.xxx T tao? xxx xxx . Bocaling was also boxed on the nape either by Molleda or Baluyot and for which he shouted "Takbo na tayo. xxx xxx On June 11. with the four (4) accused and others like a certain Melinda. The victim was being hit by a belt. Pateros. Freddie". the eyewitness testimony of Ching and the extrajudicial statements which establish the conspiracy to kill Alfredo Bocaling — xxx xxx xxx The testimony of Ramon Ching indubitably shows that the four (4) accused conspired and confederated with one another in killing the victim. AccusedMolleda.Nag-hostess po si BABY CHINA at ang aking asawa na si MELINDA. which . at nagtuloy na kaming magkakasama sa Olongapo City. with two or three persons chasing him. He looked back three (3) times while running and the first time he looked back. i.

The trial court then explained why the extra-judicial confessions of the three — Molleda. xxx xxx xxx . March 15. L-22426. Albapara. April 29. May 29. 1968). Settled is the rule that where no evidence whatsoever have been presented to show bad or evil motive why the witnesses for the prosecution should have testified falsely against the defendant (People versus Macalindong. Condemena. Provo. L-28347. the victim was boxed again by Baluyot and stabbed by Molleda. At this juncture. 702. 719). 76 Phil.The fact that no evil or bad motive was presented by the accused why Ching will testify in the manner he did if such were not the fact further augments his testimony. While already in that position. Duave was giving orders to maul the victim as he was really the one who stole her money. Virgilio Baluyot also admitted in his statement (Exhibit "H") that after he was informed by Nicolas that the victim was the one who stole the money of Duave. January 20. Baluyot and Nicolas. The testimony of Ching that the accused helped one another in assaulting the victim is corroborated by the extra judicial confessions of accused Molleda. 77 Phil. Accused Roberto Molleda admitted in his statement (Exhibit 'G') that he stabbed the victim on the stomach with a kitchen knife while Baluyot and Nicolas were hitting the victim all to the tune of Duave's utterances that they kill the victim if he will not return her money. People vs. (People v. and where the defendant failed to show that the prosecution witnesses have any special interest in the conviction of the accused. he boxed the victim who fell on the ground. Baquiño. Prosecution witnesses who had no reason to falsely impute on the defendants the commission of so grave an offense deserve credence (People vs. L-25001. In this particular case. Ching corroborated the fact that Duave was one of those who assaulted the victim by hitting him with the buckle of a belt. It has been repeatedly held that 'extra-judicial confessions independently made without collusions. It cannot be assumed that in seeking justice and the punishment of the assailant. 1968). Baluyot and Nicolas were admissible against Evelyn Duave alias Baby China. Borbono. which are Identical with each other in their essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on records are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the crime. he even hit again the victim's forehead with the buckle of his belt. point to the wrong parties (People vs. 1971). 427). Before they finally left. In the process. he pulled his belt and hit the victim with the buckle while the latter was lying flat on his back. at the back and other parts of his body. and cited decisions in support thereof — These extra-judicial confessions of Molleda. People vs. 1968. Reynaldo Nicolas likewise admitted in his statement (Exhibit "I") that he boxed the victim and thereafter. 76 Phil. the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive existed and their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit (People vs. L25856. Ricaplaza. prosecution witnesses would indiscriminately and without any motive. Molleda approached the victim and stabbed him while Nicolas got a piece of wood and hit the victim on the head. Baluyot and Nicolas which Identically show also that Duave instigated the assault on the victim can be taken likewise against Duave.

In passing upon the claims of the accused that their statements were extracted from them through third degree, i.e., maltreatment, force and intimidation, the trial court observed — The claim of accused Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas that they were forced to give their statements has the earmark of artificiality. Their statements contain details which could only be given by them and for which the police could not be much interested or possibly concoct like for example, the fact that they assaulted the victim because according to Duave he was the one who raped her and stole her money; that they first came from the Bagong Bituin Restaurant in Rizal, Makati, where they had a drinking spree before they proceeded to Suter and many more. The answers to the questions appearing in the statements of the accused appear also to be fully informative and even beyond the requirements of the question indicating that the minds of the accused were free from extraneous restrain. It has been held that where the statements of the appellants in answer to the questions are responsive and informative containing details which only the declarant could have furnished, and could not have concocted by the investigators the said statements are considered to have been voluntarily given (People v. Dorado, L-23464, Oct. 30, 1969). The Court has likewise observed that the statements of the accused were not only subscribed but signed before the Inquest Fiscal who, before swearing the accused, even inquired from them whether their statements contained the truth and they so answered in the affirmative. They did not make any complaint or protests before the Fiscal. It is well established jurisprudence that where the confession was subscribed and sworn to by the appellant before an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila and it was not shown at all that appellant ever hesitated or refused to sign and swear to the same, much less did he protest to the fiscal regarding the way he was investigated, the confession is considered to have been voluntarily given. (People v. Racca, et al., L-15812, December 30, 1961; People v. Dorado, L-23464, October 31, 1969). The Court then observed that the injuries inflicted on the victim as revealed in the statements of the accused were corroborated by the post-mortem findings — and the testimony of the lone eye-and ear-witness to the killing — It is also worthwhile to note that the injuries inflicted on the victim as confessed by Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas in their respective statements were corroborated by the post-mortem findings of Dr. Lucero. The post-mortem findings (Exhibit 'E') shows that the victim actually suffered stab wounds on the front part of his body, namely, one 'in the left anterior chest at the level of the anterior axillary line' (wound no. 3) and another one 'in the right axillary line at the level of the 6th interspace' (wound no. 1). These wounds corroborated the stabbing of the victim as admitted by Molleda. The four (4) hematomas located in the frontal region or on the forehead of the accused (wound no. 6, Exhibit 'E'), corroborated the fact that the victim was hit with a piece of wood by Nicolas or a buckle and the two (2) lacerated wounds on the parietal region of the head (wound no, 5, Exhibit 'E') bolster the fact that accused was hit also by a blunt or a hard object. The same is true with the abrasions on the anterior left chest, right knee and on the anterior surface of the right lower lip (wound no. 7, Exhibit "E"). They indicate that the victim had really been hit by a blow of a blunt object. It is important to stress that the facts narrated in the confession of the accused were more or less corroborated by the testimony of Ramon Ching. In the statements of Molleda (Exhibit "G"), it was admitted therein that a companion of the victim was boxed but he was able to run away, hence, they chased him. Ching testified that he was boxed on the nape and he was able to run

away but chased by the friends of the accused. Ching also testified that the four (4) accused helped one another in assaulting the victim. The Court noted that all the accused fled to Olongapo City after the murder — The fact that accused Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas truthfully confessed their participation in the commission of the crime is further augmented by the fact that they, with Duave and Melinda, fled from the crime scene to Olongapo City immediately after the happening of the incident. Nicolas testified in Court that he and Baluyot went to Olongapo the day immediately after the incident and there saw Duave and Melinda. Baluyot also testified that they all did not go home that evening but went straight to Olongapo City after staying for a while in Chiqui's house. But two (2) weeks after, he left Olongapo and went to the house of his aunt in Pasig, Rizal, instead of going to his residence in Suter, where he was apprehended. Duave likewise testified that she went to Olongapo with Melinda on January 8, 1971. And it has been held that 'the wicked flee, when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion (US vs. Algad, 25 Phil. 510; U.S. vs. Uy, 37 Phil. 618; People vs. Manalo and Atienza, 46 Phil. 572). This is especially true in this case where all the accused were not able to explain their flight to Olongapo, and flight, when unexplained, is proof of guilty (People vs. Bacra, L-11485, July 11, 1958; People vs. Cidro, L11804, February 28, 1959). Only Baluyot made the explanation that he went to Olongapo because they received news that masked men were coming back, which explanation however, being uncorroborated and made in general terms is too flimsy to discuss. The Court also considered the defenses — alibi and non-participation — put up by the accused — Accused interposed different defenses. Roberto Molleda interposed the defense of alibi for the reason that in the evening of January 7, 1971, he was in Olongapo City. But alibi, however, is considered a weak defense not only because of the facility with which it is fabricated but also because it is so easy for witnessses to get confused as to the dates (People vs. Ramos, L17404-03, August 31, 1963) and becomes worthless in the face of positive Identification by prosecution witnesses pointing to the accused as particeps criminis (People vs. Peralta et al., L19019, October 29, 1968). In this particular case, the alibi of Molleda does not measure up to that standard for here he was categorically and positively Identified by witness Ramon Ching. He was even invariably implicated by his co-accused Baluyot and Nicolas in their respective statements and which statements according to the case of People v. Condemena and People v. Provo, supra, can be considered against him. Accused Baluyot, Nicolas and Duave admitted their presence in the crime scene but denied, however, having inflicted any injury on the victim. But their testimony lack the sincerity and candidness of a credible testimony. They cannot prevail over and above the positive, categorical and clear testimony of Ramon Ching whom this Court found to have passed the test of credibility as he appeared to be very truthful in his behavior giving quick, frank and straightforward answers to all material questions in an easy and fluent manner. The denial of Baluyot and Nicolas likewise falls by its own weight in the light of their respective extra-judicial confessions which this Court found to have been voluntarily given. But what exposed the inherent weakness of the denial of Baluyot, Nicolas and Duave is, as discussed before, their failure to explain why they fled to Olongapo in the following morning after the incident. Finally, as to the nature of the crime committed by the accused, the trial court held —

The crime committed is murder qualified by taking advantage of superior strength. It is clear from the testimony of Ramon Ching and the extra-judicial confessions of Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas that all of the four accused armed with pieces of wood, bladed instrument and belt helped one another in assaulting the victim who was alone and unarmed. The fact that said accused took advantage of the superiority that their number and arms can afford is shown by the fact that they were able to mercilessly and indiscriminately assault the victim inflicting on him three (3) stab wounds, one (1) punctured wound, two (2) multiple lacerated wounds, four (4) hematomas and eight (8) abrasions on the different parts of his body (Exhibits 'C' and 'E'). The said injuries show that the victim was not match at all to the accused. The aggravating circumstance of deceit is considered against all the accused. It appears from the statement of Molleda (Exhibit "G") and that of Baluyot (Exhibit "H") that all of the accused, with murder in their hearts, pretended to accompany the victim in a friendly manner in going home. And in order to lure the victim into a full sense of security and make him unmindful of the tragedy that will befall upon him one of the accused even placed his hand on the shoulder of the victim while walking, but before reaching the corner of Tejeron and Suter the victim and his companions were immediately assaulted. As a matter of fact, there was deceit right from the start when Duave invited the victim and Ching to Suter upon meeting them in the Good Earth Emporium in Rizal Avenue, Manila, under the pretext of returning a radio. Upon arrival thereat, the victim and Ching were entertained in a drinking spree and in the course thereof Duave left and contacted her co-accused and informed them that the persons who raped and robbed her in the hotel are in the house drinking. All the while, the victim and Ching did not know of the evil plot to liquidate them. These facts were established by the testimony of Ching and the statements of Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas. The Court did not consider anymore treachery as it is absorbed already in abuse of superior strength (People vs. Redoña, 87 Phil. 743; People v. Alcantara, 33 SCRA 812). Neither did it consider evident premeditation because there was no showing that there was a sufficient length of time that transpired from the plan to kill to the actual killing of the victim for the accused to cooly and serenely think and deliberate on the consequences of their evil act (People v. Mendoza, et al. 91 Phil. 64). The penalty imposed herein may seem harsh especially on Evelyn Duave but considering, however, the gruesome killing of the victim whom they beat and stabbed to death with extreme cruelty the Court has no alternative but to impose it for the law gives no mercy to perpetrators of heinous crime. As a matter of fact, even the Beatitudes says that only the merciful shall receive mercy. xxx xxx xxx

The four accused-appellants filed three separate briefs. * Roberto Molleda alias Tikboy raises the following Assignments of Errors: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THE SUPPOSED CONFESSION OF MOLLEDA, AS NOT ALL THE WITNESSES TO IT TESTIFIED, PARTICULARLY CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS REPUDIATED BY SAID ACCUSED AND THAT THIS CASE INVOLVES THE CAPITAL PENALTY.

II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING AS PROOF OF GUILT OF MOLLEDA THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF FLIGHT TO OLONGAPO AS HE WAS A RESIDENT OF AND EMPLOYEE IN THAT CITY. III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING MOLLEDA'S OF ALIBI. IV ASSUMING, IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI, THAT ACCUSED HELPED KILL THE OFFENDED PARTY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM FOR MURDER, AS THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION WAS NOT DULY PROVED DURING THE TRIAL. V ASSUMING, IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI, THAT ACCUSED HELPED KILL THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE WAS CHARACTERIZED BY DECEIT. VI ASSUMING, IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI, THAT ACCUSED HELPED KILL THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED AMONG APPELLANT MOLLEDA AND HIS CO-ACCUSED. VII ASSUMING, IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI, THAT ACCUSED HELPED KILL THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED WAS ENTITLED TO THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INTOXICATION. VIII THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING ACCUSED'S SUPPOSE I CONFESSION SINCE, DURING THE INTERROGATION, HE WAS NOT DULY AFFORDED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED TO SUSPECTS. IX THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AGAINST MOLLEDA EVIDENCE COMPRISING THE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT. X THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE WRITTEN EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED WAS EXTORTED BY FORCE, VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION.

XI THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING MOLLEDA GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. Evelyn Duave y Ortega alias Baby China raises the following Assignments of Errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF RAMON CHING IMPLICATING ACCUSED-APPELLANT EVELYN DUAVE ON THE GROUND THAT SAID TESTIMONY IS INCREDIBLE AND CONTRARY TO THE NATURAL COURSE OF THINGS. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED- APPELLANT EVELYN DUAVE HAD NO EXCUSE IN HER FLIGHT TO OLONGAPO CITY. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ACCUSED APPELLANTS. IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF MURDER ON THE GROUND THAT THE ALLEGED QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF USE OF SUPREME (SIC) STRENGTH WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. V THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DECEIT IN THE INSTANT CASE. VI THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE STATEMENTS MARKED EXHS. "G", "H" AND "I" BECAUSE THEY WERE OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE AND MALTREATMENT AND MOREOVER, THEY ARE INADMISSIBLE AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANT EVELYN DUAVE. VII THE LOWER COURT DENIED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT GAVE THEM ONLY ONE DAY TO PREPARE THEIR DEFENSE. Reynaldo Nicolas alias Boy Miroy and Virgilio Baluyot alias Boy Bakal raise the following Assignments of Errors:

I IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE STATEMENT OF APPELLANT MARKED EXHIBITS "G", "H" AND "I", ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED ROBERTO MOLLEDA, VIRGILIO BALUYOT AND REYNALDO NICOLAS, RESPECTIVELY, DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SAID ACCUSED IN PRECINCT 9 OF THE MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT. II IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE HEREIN APPELLANTS. III IN FINDING THAT THE FOUR ACCUSED CONSPIRED AND CONFEDERATED WITH ONE ANOTHER IN KILLING THE VICTIM. IV IN FINDING THAT THERE WERE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF USE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND DECEIT IN THE INSTANT CASE. V IN DENYING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. For the purpose of this mandatory review and in the interest of logical and systematic treatment of the foregoing several assignments of errors raised by the four accused-appellants in their separate briefs, the errors alleged and relied upon by them in their respective briefs for the reversal of the trial court's findings and sentence — which are similar and therefore duplicate each other in many respects — may be collated and discussed logically as follow. Accusedappellants, in synthesis, claim that the Circuit Criminal Court erred — (1) In according credence to the testimony of prosecution witness, Ramon Ching, (Error I, Duave); (2) In admitting the confessions of accused-appellants Molleda, Nicolas and Baluyot (Exhibits "G", "H" and "I") (Errors I, VIII, IX & X, Molleda; Error I, Nicolas and Baluyot); (3) In according credence to the extra-judicial confessions of accused Molleda, Nicolas and Baluyot and in holding that the same are admissible against accused-appellant Duave (Error VI, Duave); (4) In rejecting accused-appellant's defenses (Error III, Molleda; Error III, Duave; Error II, Nicolas and Baluyot); (5) In not according credence to the testimonies of accused-appellants (Error III, Duave; Error II, Nicolas and Baluyot): (6) In appreciating the qualifying circumstance of superior strength (Error IV, Molleda; Error IV, Duave; Error IV, Nicolas and Baluyot);

. i. Rollo. in the manner he demonstrated in Court (Brief. In a clash between a fact. the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of a witness are matters that are left mainly to its discretion because the trial court observed the demeanor and the manner of his testimony. And. the findings of the trial court on the credibility of a witness are not disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it failed to consider certain facts and circumstances which would change the same. Nicolas and Baluyot). It is urged as the main thrust of this assigned error by appellant Evelyn Duave that the account of the incident by prosecution witness Ramon Ching should not have been accorded belief because . he saw Bocaling being mauled and ganged upon (pinagtutulungan) by all the herein accused including appellant Evelyn Duave alias Baby China. as in the case at bar. self-serving assertion of appellant Duave. We find this assigned error without merit.. Error V. (9) In taking their trip to Olongapo as proof of guilt (Error II. and. (8) In finding that conspiracy existed among the appellants (Error VI. Duave). In the first place. consisting of confessions of her co-conspirators and now. and a self-serving hypotheses. testified in a natural. The trial court held the eye and ear-witness account of witness Ching as credible because he ". the trial court cannot be faulted for electing to accord credence to the former and disbelieving the latter. Error II.. That the testimony of prosecution witness Ramon Ching should not have been accorded belief. which is a mere generalized hypotheses. seriatim.. The bare. as the trial court observed.(7) In appreciating the aggravating circumstances of "deceit" (Error V.. Duave. This is specially so where. and that it was impossible for the lone prosecution witness Ramon Ching to have observed. It is urged in connection with the second common error assigned. Error IV. That the extra-judicial confessions of accused Molleda. there was need for the prosecution to call on everyone . Nicolas and Baluyot are not admissible in evidence. "H" (Baluyot) and "I" (Nicolas)]. Error III.. p. cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of Ching on a matter of fact. "G" (Molleda). Now. Duave. Error V. Nicolas and Baluyot). Molleda. (10) In denying the accused-appellants due process of law when it gave them only one day to prepare for their defense (Error VII. systematic. that. that while he and the victim (Alfredo Bocaling )were at the intersection of Suter and Tejeron streets. 14-18. as he testified. "it is very unnatural for a woman to be standing amidst the mauling that ".e. as a matter of established jurisprudence. pp. appellant Duave could not point to any evil or bad motive on the part of Ching to testify in the manner that he did. In addition. Molleda. which was able to withstand the cross-examination of appellant's counsel. as testified to by a credible witness. as the case involves a capital offense.. Duave. positively naming the herein accused Duave as having taken an active part in mauling the victim — by hitting him with the buckle of a belt. to consider and resolve the foregoing. it is hard to imagine a girl who would have the nerve to stand a gruesome sight". Nicolas and Baluyot). 2.. 1.. co-accused [Exh.". 194). the eye-witness account is corroborated by other evidence on record. as alleged by the accused herself. Molleda. straight-forward and logical manner with marked fluency and ease . Manila. that as a woman she could not have committed the acts imputed to her. that she hit the victim with a belt.

respectively) were obtained thru maltreatment. Upon the other hand. Appellants Nicolas' and Baluyot's claim that the trial court should have rejected their extrajudicial confessions. torture and intimidation and should have been rejected (Error I. Molleda). the right to counsel was not applicable in their case. and that his extra-judicial confession should not have been taken into account. The right to be represented by counsel at custodial investigation became effective and enforceable only after the enactment of the Constitution on January 17. they were invited by the Anti-Hoodlum Unit for investigation on well-grounded suspicions for their part in the killing. therefore — as maintained by the Solicitor General in his reply briefs — correctly concluded that the same were voluntarily given and consequently are admissible in evidence. since the same is the result of an illegal arrest without a warrant (Error IX. is premised on the facts that the accused were investigated in the open and before several witnesses. The justification for arrests on reasonable suspicion that a person has committed an offense has been stated thus — One of the duties of the policeman is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them at the disposal of the judicial or executive authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the act . Molleda). force and intimidation. In brief. to wit. It is also urged that the extra-judicial statements of Baluyot and Nicolas (Exhibits "H" and "I". apart from their self-serving assertions. Molleda). there was clearly no need on the part of the prosecution to present all the persons who witnessed the investigation to testify on the voluntary character of the confessions. Upon being discovered in their hideouts in Olongapo. the extra-judicial confession of accused Molleda (Error 1. 1973. and. The records also show that they never complained to anyone that they were maltreated or tortured in the course of their investigations. is bereft of any evidentiary support apart from their own testimonies to this effect. 1971. appellants Baluyot and Nicolas argue that their extra-judicial confessions (Exhibits "H" and "I") were extracted thru intimidation and maltreatment. that accused Molleda was not afforded the right to counsel during the interrogation (Error VII. violence and coercion. Accused-appellants were apprehended by the Anti-Hoodlum Unit of the Manila Police Department while in hiding in Olongapo City on April 5. 1971. Molleda's claim that he is entitled to counsel is without merit. 3 Molleda's claim that his statement is inadmissible in evidence because it is the fruit of an illegal arrest is also not well-taken. that.. "G") — were voluntarily executed. and appellant Molleda in turn claims that the offense charged being capital in nature. i. 1 Since no evidence was adduced by the appellants to support their claim that the confessions were extracted thru third degree. his statement is inadmissible in evidence. the trial court's finding that the statements — including that of appellant Molleda (Exh.e. the prosecution should have called on everyone who witnessed the execution of Exhibit "G" to testify thereon. and that the same contain details which could have been given only by the accused themselves. Exhibit "H" and Exhibit "I" — on the ground that these were not voluntarily given but were obtained by force. pursuant to an alarm flashed after they were Identified and verified to be the perpetrators of the killing of Alfredo Bocaling on the evening of January 7. having been allegedly illegally arrested. Baluyot and Nicolas).who witnessed the execution of Exhibit "G". that he was not afforded the services of counsel in the course of his investigation. 2 The investigations of the accused-appellants having taken place much earlier or in April 1971. The trial court. that they were thereafter brought in the presence of the Inquest Fiscal before whom they signed and affirmed to the truth of their statements.

It is urged in connection with the third common error that the trial court erred in according credence to the extra-judicial confessions. That they are rich in details which only the accused themselves could have given to the police rendered each and every statement not merely competent but also relevant and credible. This.. The confessions having been voluntary and freely given are admissible in evidence. it is now settled that "extra-judicial confessions independently made without collusion which are Identical with each other in their essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on record are admissible. Exhibits "G". It is apparent that all the three accused wanted to make a clean breast of their respective participation in the commission of the offense. to delay the trial and postpone their punishment. In the course of their investigations. Molleda. 'The legality of the detention does not depend upon the actual commission of the crime but upon the nature of the deed. all the three accused in the presence of several witnesses including their co-accused. Q & A No. Nicolas. did not give any statement — confessed freely and voluntarily to the commission of the offense in Exhibits "G".constituting the violation or to prosecute and secure the punishment thereof. Baluyot and Nicolas [Exhibit "G". and thus show the earmarks of a free and voluntary statement. are rich in details which jibe with and corroborate each other. L-6357. obviously is clearly without merit. Molleda. that an extra-judicial confession is admissible against the maker. In each instance. Their claim now that they have been illegally arrested is rather late in the day and is clearly an after-thought. the statements are corroborated by other evidence on record. e. 6 Thus. 06.g. who should be arrested by the police for the purpose of such investigation. Evelyn Duave — who. 4 In point of fact. the records show that accused-appellant Evelyn Duave alias Baby China was present personally when their statements were taken from each of the affiants. 09. which they perpetrated on the evening of January 7. It is not necessary that the crime should have been established as a fact in order to regard the detention as legal. 32 Phil. it should be noted. or three months earlier. and has been repeatedly acknowledged and applied by this Court in several cases. it is incompetent evidence against his co-accused.S.. the policeman who in compliance with the orders of his chief. arrests a suspected criminal for the purpose of Identification is not guilty of arbitrary detention. 3. 8 In addition. "H" and "I" should not have been accorded belief and credence and that the same are not admissible as against accused Duave alias Baby China. Lumahong. as circumstantial evidence. Molleda. as observed by the trial court. People v." 5 This general rule is not without its exceptions. One means of conducting to these ends is Identification of the alleged criminal or lawbreaker." 7 This doctrine was upheld by this Court as early as November 5. 1971. Q & A. against the person implicated to show the probability of the latter's actual Participation in the commission of the crime. 173. with respect to whom it is hearsay. Exhibit "H". Q & A No. Perez. Thus.. a transparent defense gimmick. Their statements. they were transported from Olongapo City to Precinct 9 at Sta. 1954 and so forth. 163. Ana of the Manila Police Department. He has acted in the performance of his duty. which had police jurisdiction over the place where the offense was committed. Finally. . the general rule is ". With respect to the claim that the same is not admissible against accused Evelyn Duave. 1915 in U. wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen. May 7. 08. "H" and "I". Question and Answer (Q & A) No.. Baluyot. No. the affiants pointed to Duave alias Baby China as a participant in the killing of the victim (Id. That the extra-judicial confessions. and Exhibit "I". v. 11].

Appellant Duave urges that the theory of the prosecution that because she was raped and robbed by Ching and Bocaling. Q & A No. Their testimonies. In this case. Q & A No. not only did Molleda not present any witness to support his alibi. but urged them to do so as well. Appellants herein have not shown any special or compelling reason why this rule should not be observed in their case. This assignment of error is clearly without merit. Time and again. as the trial court observed. were on their way home. Exh. 12-13). which Nicolas resented. The same are. 5. thus acquiesced to these statements. Nicolas. Appellant Molleda defended on the ground of alibi. having inflicting any injury on the victim. however. and Id. .. therefore. Nicolas alias Boy Miroy and Baluyot alias Boy Bakal — all Sigue-Sigue Sputnik gang members — whom they informed to the effect that the two — Ching and Bocaling — previously raped and robbed Baby China.. 09. logically and in a straight-forward manner (Brief. "G". Finally. the defense of alibi is a weak defense not only because of the facility with which it is fabricated but also because it is not uncommon for witnesses to get confused with the dates. p. who was barely able to escape from their clutches. that the prosecution presented no evidence to support its theory that Duave was raped and robbed by Ching and Bocaling.. however. admissible in evidence even as against her. Baluyot. is improbable because their meeting was admittedly accidental. [Exh. They denied. Exh. 9 4.. in turn. therefore. that. where they implicated accused Duave who not only took an active and direct part in assaulting Bocaling. 06.Id. But. appellants Nicolas and Baluyot urge in this regard. That the lower court should not have rejected accused-appellants' defenses. Nicolas and Duave. 06). "I". 091. That the trial court should have accorded credence to the testimonies of the accusedappellants. The trial court accorded credence to the theory that Bocaling and Ching were lured and invited by accused-appellant Duave alias Baby China and Melinda to join them from the Good Earth Emporium to Suter street. that Duave and Melinda thereafter contacted their co-accused Molleda alias Tikboy. because she did not contradict the same during the investigation. Duave. This defense was also properly discredited in the face of Baluyot's and Nicolas' confessions of their participation in their extra-judicial confessions. as the trial court observed " . "H" and "I". It is urged in this fourth common error that the trial court erred in rejecting appellant's defenses. 19). 09]. Baluyot. the records also show that he was implicated by his coaccused — Nicolas and Baluyot — in their extra-judicial confessions. Upon the other hand. (Brief. Bocaling and Ching. cannot prevail over the positive Identification of eye-and earwitness Ramon Ching. "H" (Baluyot). as the accused-appellants explained. lacked sincerity and candidness " and. the immediate cause of the incident in the evening of January 7 was when Ching molested Melinda by placing his hand over her shoulder. she claims that the appellants testified clearly. Appellant Duave. killed Bocaling and nearly succeeded to kill Ching. admitted their presence at the scene of the crime at Suter street on the fatal night of January 7. Q & A No. "G" (Molleda). and that the incident was triggered when Ching molested Melinda. she and Melinda lured and invited the two to join them from the Good Earth Emporium to Suter street. 1971. Q & A No. Nicolas and Baluyot. Q & A No. That thereafter and as their intended victims. pp. this Court has held that it will not alter the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses principally because they are in a better position to assess the same than the appellate court. except Exhs. all the accused with obvious concert of purpose taking advantage of superiority and by means of craft. The rule is well-settled that the issue of credibility is left to the discretion of the trial judge who has had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial.

that the trial court should not have appreciated the qualifying circumstance of superior strength. after he tripped and fell.. All the while the victim and Ching did not know of the evil plot to liquidate them. which is a mere statement of a self-serving assertion on their part. The concerted action of the above-named accused. "H" and "I"). The bare assertions of the appellants. her common-law-husband. respectively) — that all the accused . "there was deceit right from the start when Duave invited the victim and Ching to Suter .". bottles and pieces of wood and a bladed weapon — until he succumbed to their merciless assault. The efforts during the trial on the part of the accused to show that the incident was triggered when Ching allegedly molested Melinda by placing his hand over her shoulder which action was allegedly resented by Nicolas.. It is argued. do not show any evidence adduced on the part of the accused to discredit the testimony of eye-and ear-witness Ramon Ching that they ganged upon their hapless victim. immediately after they were apprehended at their hiding place in Olongapo were made when they had no opportunity to contrive their defense.which they did not state in their confessions. the four accused. with murder in their hearts pretended to accompany the victim in a friendly manner in going home and in order to lure the victim into a false sense of security and making him unmindful of the tragedy that will befall him.. This assignment of error. It is urged in connection with the sixth common error. 6. one of the accused even "placed his hands on the shoulder of the victim while walking .. Nicolas and Baluyot. It is urged that the lower court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of "deceit" (craft). The trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of "deceit" (sic. This error is. clearly without merit.. . Alfredo Bocaling. therefore. are known Sigue-Sigue Sputnik members — to the urgings of accused Baby China fully justified the appreciation of the employment of superior strength upon a hapless and defenseless victim. with clear and obvious concert of purpose ganged up (pinagtulungan) the fallen victim thru a series of intermittent blows — with belt. that. should be craft) upon its finding-which is based upon the statements of Molleda and Baluyot (Exhibits "G" and "H". It should be noted that these confessions which were voluntarily and freely given and thereafter subscribed before the Inquest Fiscal of the City of Manila. are clearly an after-thought which they have contrived as part of their defense to delay the trial and their punishment for an offense to which they had earlier confessed. The records. without any supporting evidence..The trial court based its findings as to the motive behind the killing upon the confessions of the accused themselves (Exhibits "G". three of whom — Molleda. that the attack was spontaneous and without any preconceived design on the part of all the accused. the victim and Ching were entertained in a drinking spree in the course of which Duave left and surreptitiously contacted her co-accused and informed them that the persons "who raped and robbed" her were in the house drinking. as a matter of fact. 10 7. is clearly without merit. to the effect that the incident which led to the killing of the victim was Ramon Ching's alleged attention to Melinda that aroused the jealousy of her common-law-husband Nicolas . under the pretext of returning a radio". instead. Ching testified that when Bocaling fell after he tripped. therefore. and upon arrival thereat. however. Baluyot and Nicolas. and are affirmed by the confessions of the three (3) accused-Molleda. These findings find support in the testimony of Ching. But the evidence that they ganged upon their hapless and defenseless victim did not come from Ching alone — it is provided by their own statements. wherein they described in detail the gruesome manner in which they subjected Bocaling to their vicious attack until he died. cannot prevail over the lower court's findings which are based on substantial evidence on record. including Evelyn Duave alias Baby China.

she was expected to accompany her to Olongapo City where Melinda's common-law-husband. Conspiracy arose the very moment they agreed to attack their victim and it is clear that the assault was not the lone and solitary act of one but of all the accused. supra].8. Nicolas. as a friend of Melinda. he and his co-accused Nicolas and Baluyot had been drinking at the Bagong Bituin Restaurant at J. 14. in a manner indicating community and concert of purpose by inflicting upon him several wounds. that the accused were denied due process of law when they were given only one day to prepare their defense. It is argued that after the prosecution rested its case on May 1971. A review of the records. Ana. That appellants conspired in the commission of the offense finds support in the testimony of Ching corroborated by the appellants' own statements that they attacked their victim. with each of the conspirators doing his part to achieve their common objective to avenge Baby China (Exhs. it is argued that she went to Olongapo because she joined her sister and Melinda. Q & A No. See p. but the righteous are as bold as the lion. 06 and 09. it is argued that according to the statement of appellant Molleda. to finance their trip to Olongapo leave no room for doubt that they fled to said City [Exh. that it was only on May 26 when they knew of the nature of the accusation. 14. of Sta.. respectively). his aunt. The trial court did not err in considering the appellants' hasty and clandestine refuge to Olongapo after the killing as a circumstantial evidence indicating guilt. the wicked flee when no man pursueth.. "H" and "I". that they have a right to know the accusation against them. that the one day allowed them to prepare for the defense is tantamount to denial of due process. finally. 11 9. Rizal. Direct proof of conspiracy is not necessary it may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense. and. In support." It was fully justified in doing so because it is established by the evidence on record that they were the ones who assaulted the victim. It is urged that the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy existed among the appellants. 10. as soon as he fell to the ground. since conspiracy must be consciously and deliberately entered into by sober persons. That they fled from the scene of the crime is a form of admission by conduct which gives rise to the inference that they committed it. and to be confronted by the witnesses who were cross-examined by their counsel. 1971 and they must have been drank when they were met by Baby China and Melinda. Nicolas' statement that Baby China gave him her ventilador (electric fan) to be pawned (isinanla) with one Alicia Nicolas. and. It is urged in this connection that the trial court erred in taking the accused's trip to Olongapo as proof of guilt. Q & A Nos. on the biblical adage that ". "G". the trial court ordered the accused-appellants to present their evidence on the following day. It is argued specifically in the case of appellant Molleda that he had been living and working in Olongapo since 1967 and that he was in Olongapo all the time. up to 10:00 o'clock in the evening of January 7. to be informed of the nature and the charge against them. shows that the trial court gave full consideration to the rights of the accused-appellants to be assisted by counsel. With respect to appellant Duave. on the other hand. that there is no direct proof available to show that he and his co-accused conspired. 09. 12 Baluyot's explanation that he went to Olongapo because they received news that masked men were coming back lends additional support for the inference. had gone. It is urged. If appellants believed that one day was not sufficient for them to prepare for their . "I" (Nicolas). Pateros. Alfredo Bocaling. Makati. That the accused were denied due process. Finally.

which action irked and angered Reynaldo Nicolas. In resume. viz a viz. which are not supported by any other evidence on record. therefore. "G". Reply to the Brief of Duave. We are not persuaded to give our favorable consideration to these conclusions drawn from a consideration of the evidence on record. p.. an obvious defense tactic to camouflage the conspiracy and convert the nature of the offense to homicide merely — fully justify the finding of guilt of herein appellants beyond reasonable doubt. took the position that the assignments of errors which assail the trial court's findings of the presence of "abuse of superior strength" as qualifying and "craft" as generic aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime. "H" and Reynaldo Nicolas alias Boy Miroy.. the circumstantial evidence of flight. the extra-judicial confessions of Roberto Molleda alias Tikboy. which was not even mentioned in accused' statements and is. but which in an important aspect contradict their own statements — e. In justifying his recommendation in this respect. (4) that. that the hot-blooded and spontaneous attack upon Bocaling and Ching by the appellants is shown by the fact that the weapons used were belts. (2) that later. the qualitative and quantitative preponderance of the evidence adduced by the prosecution-consisting of the eye-and ear-witness account of the killing by Ramon Ching who was present at the scene of the killing. that the only evidence concerning the presence and use of bladed instrument was given by accused Duave. and that the penalty should not be imposed in the maximum degree. that the incident was triggered by Ching's placing of his hand on Melinda's shoulders and the resultant jealousy of Nicolas alias Boy Miroy. and. and implicated accused Duave alias Baby China. "I". Exh. the Solicitor General argues that (1) Melinda and Baby China were picked up by the victim and Ching from the Good Earth Emporium. As a result. not the prosecution. Virgilio Baluyot alias Boy Bakal. We have taken note that the Solicitor General in the People's briefs. then I saw the bladed instrument with Roberto Molleda". and. that Nicolas boxed prosecution witness Ching in the nape. which they did not. (3) that the eternal human triangle represented by Melinda as the common point of interest between Ching and Nicolas spurred the sudden and spontaneous attack in the heat of jealousy and injured pride. therefore. The findings of fact submitted by the Solicitor General are not supported by the evidence on record and the conclusions therefrom are. the Solicitor General submits that the killing falls under Art. should be favorably considered and/or appears to have merit (Reply to the Brief of Nicolas and Baluyot. Exh.g. therefore. barely escaped death by the skin of his teeth. 249 of the Revised Penal Code on homicide. Bocaling drew a knife . p. her common-law-husband. rather than murder.. 13. Ching held Melinda on the shoulder. which taken separately and without collusion corroborated each other in material respects. they should have moved for a longer period within which to present their evidence. as revealed in the autopsy report — considered. unjustified. nor do We concur in the recommendations as to the nature of the offense committed and the penalty to be imposed. and the corroboration and congruence of the evidence as to the injuries inflicted upon the victim Bocaling. filed by way of answer to the three briefs submitted by the accused-appellants. 12). Reply to the Brief of Molleda. p.. who testified that ". in fact. who by the way is the common-law-husband of Melinda and not a legitimate spouse. the self-serving and uncorroborated testimonies of each of the accused. the accused did not deliberately seek or take advantage of superiority of numbers or deceit (craft) to commit the crime against Bocaling.defense.. 10. while Ramon Ching and Alfredo Bocaling were walking towards Herran street on their way home. Exh. bottles and pieces of wood. The pivotal and basic premises upon which the Solicitor General bases his view of the case are — that the killing was a spur-of-the-moment incident arising from the alleged act of Ching in placing his hand on the shoulder of Melinda which in turn .

in relation to Art. the four accused engaged the two. It results. Furthermore. while the manner in which they perpetrated this act by first making them believe that no harm will befall them and keep them off-guard. the judgment of conviction as regards defendant Evelyn Duave alias "Baby China" should be reversed and said defendant should be acquitted. shows the utter falsity of this defense. not even Nicolas. only eight (8) Justices 13 voted to affirm the judgment of conviction with respect to defendants Roberto Molleda. the common-law-husband of Melinda revealed this to the investigators. the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Art. her common-law-husband. 64 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. which resulted in the death of the former. Virgilio Baluyot and Reynaldo Nicolas. supra]. pursuant to Section 3. only seven (7) Justices concurred in holding her guilty. The confessions of the accused taken at a time when they could not have contrived their defense leave no room for doubt that the two. Duave and Melinda lost no time in contacting and then pointing to the three co-accused. as the trial court found it to be. In the over-all context of the evidence on record . the trial court committed no error in finding all of the accused guilty of the crime of murder — qualified by taking advantage of superior strength and attended by the generic aggravating circumstance of craft with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same. without their awareness. should be overruled. they managed thru craft to make them unaware of their impending fate. and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of superior strength and "deceit" (craft). 248. a clear but transparent attempt to show that the killing was not the result of a conspiracy among them. specifically mentioned the role of Duave and one of them even said that she gave the orders to kill as long as Bocaling will not return her money [Exh.the conclusion is inescapable that the assault on Bocaling and Ching. the People's brief concludes that the offense is merely homicide. clearly underlined the craft by which they executed their nefarious scheme. that the three — who were told that the two had previously robbed and raped Duave — contrived to execute their scheme to kill them. Q & A No. See pp. which the trial court appreciated. which resulted in the death of Bocaling. in a fight. Baluyot and Nicolas. three hardened members of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik gang. that close upon this provocative act of Ching. But the fact that none of the accused. and that in the process. We cannot agree. the manner in which they pounced and ganged upon Bocaling and the merciless assault they perpetrated upon his person when he fell down after the initial blow leave no room for doubt that they did in fact avail of their superior strength to snuff the life of their victim.spurred the jealousy of Nicolas. Thus. Ching and Bocaling. . However. Molleda. The concerted action among all the accused. and only seven (7) 14 with respect to defendant Evelyn Duave. who acted as anybody would in a melee. Virgilio Baluyot and Reynaldo Nicolas. The appellants' claim that the incident was triggered by the indiscreet act of Ching is very obviously an after-thought.consisting mainly of the accused's own confessions and the testimony of Ramon Ching . not murder. all the three without exception. Bocaling and Ching. was. 9-10. Bocaling and Ching as having allegedly raped and robbed Duave. Hence. that the killing was thus a result of a chance encounter with no foreknowledge on the part of the appellants. "G" (Molleda). or for lack of the requisite eight votes. therefore. that with respect to defendants Roberto Molleda. From these factual premises. Accordingly. the penalty of reclusion perpetua is to be imposed. after the deliberation of the Court en banc. Rule 125 of the Revised Rules of Court. 09. were lured by Duave and Melinda from the Good Earth Emporium. that once they were in a house at Suter street. qualified by superior strength and aggravated by craft. As regards defendant Evelyn Duave. as the lower court observed.

C.. but REVERSED as regards defendant Evelyn Duave — as to whom only seven (7) Justices concurred in the finding of guilty — and is. took no part. Jr. Fernandez and Guerrero. Makasiar.WHEREFORE. ... Aquino. Concepcion. J. Fernando. the decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED as regards defendants Roberto Molleda. JJ. Castro. acquitted of the crime charged.J. SO ORDERED. therefore. concur. Virgilio Baluyot and Reynaldo Nicolas.. with the only modification that the penalty of death imposed upon them is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

1948 MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO. the petitioners were still detained or under arrest. when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard. But whatever night have been the action taken by said office. "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law".: Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao. 1948. if there was any." Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article. And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for deliberation and decision. vs. Montesa. Acting City Fiscal A. Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. P. which penalized a public officer other than a judicial officer who. 1948.R. L-2128 May 12. respondents. We have not until now an official information as to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the petitioners. THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL. Guinto Lazaro for respondents. petitioners. Jabile for petitioners. the precept of our Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty. arrested the petitioners on April 2. and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an information with the proper courts justice.) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal Code formerly in force of these Islands. that is. (Section 1. Enrique Q. and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus. FERIA. Article VIII of the Constitution. charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery. without warrant. we are of the opinion that the words "judicial authority". J. This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum in Manila. is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code? Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next proceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours. BOTH OF CITY OF MANILA. Until April 7. we have to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for the information and guidance in the future of the officers concerned. No. a policeman of the City of Manila.SAYO VS CHIEF OF POLICE G. and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. "shall arrest a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to . as used in said article. Benjamin Dumlao. mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense. The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty.

. He shall also informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him.against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated. "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty". "Which a contrario sensu means that. Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Besides. otherwise. Any judicial officer who. to be determined by the judge after the examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may produce. referring to the duty of an officer after arrest without warrant. and "if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge. after a proper investigation. without unnecessary delay. of the same Code provided that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed upon the following persons: 1. The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city." Under this constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his liberty. Because article 204. Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17." and by section 11 of Rule 108. shall fail to release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner formally by written order containing a statement of the grounds upon which the same is based. Article III.. he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4. detention or confinement] shall issue but upon probable cause. Rule 109 of the Rules of court. or by virtue of a judgement or order of a court of record. who are not authorized by law to do so. render judgment. Without such warrant of commitment. if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor. of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons. which reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to the Court. section 1 (3). the writ shall be allowed and the person detained shall be released." Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can not be construed as having been modified by the mere omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code. except by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant and his witness. According to the provision of said section." There was no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice empowered by law. within the period prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force. and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him. and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process. and not the city fiscals or any other officers. the writ shall not be allowed. which. he may be allowed to do so.deliver such person to the judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest. and. take the person arrested to the proper court or judge for such action for they may deem proper to take. which complements said section 202. or make the order. to order the temporary commitment or detention of the person arrested. provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall. and no warrant [of arrest. because they cannot issue a warrant . And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a public officers must be surrendered can not be any other but court or judge who alone is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial of the case against the latter. the detention of the person arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our Constitution.

When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw.of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant. and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13. above quoted. Rule 108. The complaint must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who. to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17.. 1947. town or place. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith. a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila. of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious prosecution. Boncan. where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance. or is not ready to file the information on the strength of the testimony or evidence presented. Lino vs. are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of the caused. to which all person charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled. promulgated on January 30.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may conduct under section 2. personally or through one of his assistants. 43 Off.. Gaz. Rule 108. Rule 109). the officer or person making the arrest should. and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused. Rule 108. either release the person arrested or file the corresponding information. It is provided by a law as a substitute. 13th Supp. because as above stated. is the investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph. p. but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants.13. Fugoso. unless it is materially impossible for them to do so. without unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested. and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file. and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction over the offense charged. in connection with section 6. Rule 108. in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. makes the investigation. The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality. L-1159. so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the accused. Rule 108. he should release and not detain the person . because the testimony of the person or officer making the arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and available. but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation so warrants. not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused. since defendant charged with offenses triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary investigation. immediately after the investigation. In the City of Manila. the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal. or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original jurisdiction. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having committed the offense charged. 1214). within the period of time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code. Under the law. and section 2 of Rule 109. in a certain sense. (Section 7. The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided for in section 11. Hashim vs. the latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. Gaz. Rule 108. (Section 3. and shall. as abovestated. 40 Off. the corresponding information within the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code. if proper.

Actg. C. without prejudice to making or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the proper information against him with the court. in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal. and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged. . must be taken into consideration. To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Pablo. we hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty. after due investigation. A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any other person. such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information. that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof. after investigation.. without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the petitioners.. a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though. Paras. except in those cases expressly authorized by law. The city fiscal. So ordered. for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith. In view of all the foregoing. If the City Fiscal has no authority. and Bengzon. after due investigation. Of course. would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. and the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal. concur. and he has not. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila. after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge. the means of communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances.J. or directly with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. may not. JJ. find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him.arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code. to order the arrest even if he finds. in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest.

posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store.. apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a . the investigating officer. in Criminal Case No. No. 1997] SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR. testified that on 27 August 1990. 123595.38 caliber revolver was recovered.[5] At trial on the merits. Quiapo. with each group. respondents. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.. Upon searching petitioner.‖[4] while the prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they arrested petitioner. These men were acting suspiciously with ―[t]heir eyes … moving very fast. Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner‘s ―front waist line. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1866. Manila. Josefino G. entered a plea of not guilty. Philippines. in the City of Manila. near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. the arresting officer. in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier.‖ and ―A2.‖[7] Yu‘s companion. vs.[2] as follows: That on or about August 27. Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police. Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District. J. Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an ―X‖ mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits ―A. likewise at Plaza Miranda. who examined the grenade. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men. 1990.‖[6] Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. COURT OF APPEALS. the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu. 3. comprised of three to four men. Branch 5.R. Manila. police officer Rogelio Malibiran. at about 6:30 p.m. he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard.MALACAT VS CA EN BANC [G. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. JR.: In an Information[1] filed on 30 August 1990. As the policemen gave chase. The police officers then approached one group of men. possess and/or acquire a hand grenade. Serapio. At arraignment[3] on 9 October 1990. assisted by counsel de oficio. unlawfully and knowingly keep. who then fled in different directions. petitioner. The attempt was aborted when . December 12. Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade. and Orlando Ramilo. petitioner. petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.[8] On cross-examination. At pre-trial on 11 March 1991. without first securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities. Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday. 25 August 1990. DECISION DAVIDE. the said accused did then and there willfully.‖ ―A-1. Quiapo.

Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a. The officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner ―[i]to ang tama mo sa akin.Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his companions. of 28 August 1990. Shortly after. Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. the former were unable to catch any of the latter. However. Later. the situation called for an investigation.‖ and concluded that the grenade was ―[l]ive and capable of exploding. Petitioner was once again searched. Serapio then took petitioner‘s uncounselled confession (Exh. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990.[12] Orlando Ramilo. Despite Serapio‘s advice. Ramilo then affixed an orange tag on the subject grenade detailing his name. he received a request dated 19 March 1991 from Lt. however. where he was accused of having shot a police officer. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990 and resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo. Saquilla[10] for investigation. however. Serapio admitted that he took petitioner‘s confession knowing it was inadmissible in evidence. whose principal duties included. Yu and his companions approached them. there being no PAO lawyer available. hence to require probable cause would have been ―premature. Manila. During the preliminary examination of the grenade.‖ This officer then inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioner‘s mouth and said.[13] Petitioner was the lone defense witness. he was arrested with two others. in which the delay necessary to . but nothing was found on him. Although they were not creating a commotion.‖[16] The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were ―[c]onfronted with an emergency. among other things. he ―[f]ound that [the] major components consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly [were] all present. he issued a certification stating his findings. testified that on 22 March 1991. wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade. since they were supposedly acting suspiciously. informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent counsel. Eduardo Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Serapio turned over the grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit for examination. but found nothing in their possession. several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside.‖ where a ―warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest‖ and ―whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects. However. petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of a lawyer.m. ―[y]ou are the one who shot me. Forthwith.‖ On even date. a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit. brought to and detained at Precinct No. The policemen searched petitioner and two other men.‖ Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. Thereafter.[14] The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a ―stop and frisk. hitting him with benches and guns. the date and time he received the specimen.[11] On cross-examination. several other police officers mauled him. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990. petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt. 3.‖[15] Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed. he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. the examination of explosive devices. a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991. ―E‖).[9] Josefino G. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.

‖ concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner‘s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.‖[18] The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest. 1866. and second. Meeting the issue squarely.‖ the hand grenade seized from petitioner.obtain a warrant. CR No.[24] In its decision of 24 January 1996. the Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was ―attempting to commit an offense. FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL. the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime. that petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was ―planted‖ by the police officers.[21] In his Appellant‘s Brief [22] filed with the Court of Appeals. In sum. the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto.[23] As such.D. respondent court focused on the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit ―D.‖ as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE FROM HIM ―WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST. first. 15988 and issued a notice to file briefs. In its Brief for the Appellee. noting. as minimum. petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. petitioner‘s group suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach. as maximum. However.‖ Further. citing People vs. No. thus ―[i]t is reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search. the search was illegal. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH. place and ―reported cases of bombing. the trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.R. and since petitioner ―[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store.[25] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. On 18 February 1994.‖ 2. the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.‖ thus: . inadmissible in evidence. and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA. the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from petitioner‘s possession was not raised as an issue. threatens the destruction of evidence‖[17] and the officers ―[h]ad to act in haste. petitioner asserted that: 1. In its decision[19] dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994. but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. and the hand grenade seized. considering the time. Further. petitioner filed a notice of appeal[20] indicating that he was appealing to this Court. Mengote. and sentenced him to suffer: [T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS.

the ―accumulation‖ of which was more than sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an offense was about to be committed. We need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite bomb site especially during times of political upheaval. Finally. before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. As the mere possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense. the Court of Appeals observed: The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty. PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days before he finally succeeded in apprehending him. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.‖ as the evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was ―standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard‖ with his eyes ―moving very fast‖ and ―looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them. petitioner . then disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he was ―attempting to commit a crime. and kill several innocent persons while maiming numerous others. and that petitioner and his companions acted suspiciously. Here the police officers were responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a check on the series of terroristic bombings in the Metropolis. petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity of the warrantless arrest and search. the fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to the latter‘s arrest. in Mengote. Here. or on 27 August 1990. In so doing. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL. Mengote. [can] claim that he was not attempting to commit an offense. petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the following errors: 1.[26] which petitioner relied upon. was inapplicable in light of ―[c]rucial differences. In support thereof. will ordinarily act. Malacat‘s posture is simply too preposterous to inspire belief. if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade. not to mention of gross incompetence. Moreover. We are in agreement with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not be the kind of proof necessary to convict. MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.‖ Finally. but rather the practical considerations of everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind. the Court of Appeals took into account petitioner‘s failure to rebut the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda.We are at a loss to understand how a man. 2. the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. who was in possession of a live grenade and in the company of other suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of terroristic activities. Unable to accept his conviction. Furthermore. the police officers [had] no personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed. after receiving intelligence reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically notorious Plaza Miranda. and. is actually committing. or is attempting to commit an offense.‖ to wit: [In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone [at] the corner of a busy street [would] be in possession of a prohibited article. they conducted foot patrols for about seven days to observe suspicious movements in the area. and not legal technicians.

In its Comment. or on 19 March 1991. 129). the commander was not presented to corroborate this claim. No. On the other hand. In his testimony. serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from petitioner‘s possession.P. the penalty imposed by the trial court was: [N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS. further. the maximum of the penalty. 129. pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. the grenade presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt. with the petition for review as petitioner‘s Brief for the Appellant. as maximum. but nearly seven (7) months later. Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings. identify the grenade examined by Ramilo. Blg. Yu did not. and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not immediately after petitioner‘s arrest. Yu never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated from petitioner. The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. we resolved to give due course to the petition.points out the factual similarities between his case and that of People v. and consider the appeal as having been directly brought to us.[28] Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution[29] and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. and not the Court of Appeals. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully possess grenades is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. First. Petitioner‘s Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial court‘s decision to this Court. and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.P. For being impressed with merit. We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without jurisdiction. as minimum. To repeat. Blg. Yu did not identify. and not the minimum. yet the trial court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve the appeal. The penalty provided by Section 3 of P. FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL. in court.D. and was not made to. For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases.[27] in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was .[30] The term ―life imprisonment‖ as used in Section 9 of B. According to him. Since the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua. there was no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. is taken into account. Notably. Mengote to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals miscomprehended the latter. the grenade he allegedly seized. however. the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged decision. the comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental Briefs. we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution failed to establish petitioner‘s guilt with moral certainty. the appeal therefrom should have been to us. the Judiciary Act of 1948. he turned it over to his commander after putting an ―X‖ mark at its bottom.

xxx (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.Arrest. neither was it executed in the presence of counsel. Second. these are found in Section 5. 12 (1). which provide as follows: SEC.[32] subject to certain exceptions. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. in part: Sec. without a warrant. and Yu and his fellow officers chased. Plainly. the person to be arrested has committed. is actually committing. as will be discussed below. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio. 5. and . he must be provided with one. and that two days earlier he was with a group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda.that seized from petitioner. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. As regards valid warrantless arrests. Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. then considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers. the arrest and search of petitioner were invalid. Thus.[31] The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests. in his presence. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available.A peace officer or a private person may. -. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him. when lawful -.‖ Finally. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. but failed to arrest them. the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing. searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel. it was then unnatural and against common experience that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. or is attempting to commit an offense. such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. the law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in cases such as these. without warrant. arrest a person: (a) When. which reads. The general rule as regards arrests. searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in order to discern petitioner‘s eyes ―moving very fast. Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade.

e.‖ hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.[36] In this instance. the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.[34] and (6) a "stop and frisk. Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest. the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy."[35] In the instant petition. whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search.[33] (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment ***[39] Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk. they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. thus: We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous. assuming a valid arrest.[38] Here. where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries.(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped *** A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto.[37] At bottom. the trial court validated the warrantless search as a ―stop and frisk‖ with ―the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest. and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime. (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. the arresting officer. and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety.the process cannot be reversed. the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases. we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu.g. (2) search of moving vehicles." while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. or an overt physical act. was being committed or was going to be committed. as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. or that which may be used as evidence. or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence." as laid down in Terry. he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him."[40] it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and . Turning to valid warrantless searches. plainly. the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -. or the fruit of the crime. indicating that a crime had just been committed. on the part of petitioner. (4) consent searches. At the outset. We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons..

upon arrival of five (5) other police officers. there was nothing in petitioner‘s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were ―moving very fast‖ – an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p. as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination: Q A Q A And what were they doing? They were merely standing. thus presumably dusk. sir.[42] Third. as noted by the trial court: . None was visible to Yu. i. to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Here.. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. there were nothing or they did not create any commotion? A Q A None. any telltale bulge. could not have been visible to Yu. a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. there was at all no ground. the alleged grenade was ―discovered‖ ―inside the front waistline‖ of petitioner. contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being apprehended. You are sure of that? Yes. the affidavit of arrest (Exh. approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause. probable or otherwise." Second. petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared. here are at least three (3) reasons why the ―stop-and-frisk‖ was invalid: First." A genuine reason must exist. for as he admitted.[41] Finally. and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner. this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. In fact. which underlies the recognition that a police officer may. Q And when you saw them standing. to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. Neither did you see them create commotion? None. in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions. sir. under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner. assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade.frisk.e.m. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness.. sir. we harbor grave doubts as to Yu‘s claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. "A") expressly declares otherwise.

Narvasa. please see separate opinion. the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention. Kapunan. Costs de oficio. Puno.. Bellosillo. Mendoza. unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause. Vitug. Regalado. the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. and Martinez. Melo.J. concur. CR No. . C. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and.R.. Panganiban. Francisco. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person. WHEREFORE. J.[43] What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner‘s rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution. SO ORDERED. they were not yet aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline.. on ground of reasonable doubt. Romero. JJ.When the policemen approached the accused and his companions.

ABDUL entered in each case a plea of not guilty.[5] The three cases were consolidated and raffled to Branch 31 of said court. CONTRARY TO LAW. ABDUL MACALABA y DIGAYON. 1238 That on or about April 12. 1236 That on or about April 12. appellant. 6425). in the Municipality of San Pedro. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession. did then and there willfully. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code[2].PEOPLE VS MACALABA FIRST DIVISION [G. with violations of the Presidential Decree No. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession. respectively. as amended. Province of Laguna. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. January 20.. 1237 That on or about April 12. said accused did then and there willfully. 2003] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. CONTRARY TO LAW. Nos. 1237 and 1238. and one (1) magazine with five (5) live ammunition thereof. CONTRARY TO LAW. 1866[1]. vs. did then and there willfully. 1999. appellee. knowing the same to be forged or otherwise falsified with the manifest intention of using such falsified or forged instruments. and feloniously have in his possession.J. 1236.[4] Criminal Case No. in Criminal Cases Nos.[3] Criminal Case No. JR. Upon his arraignment. the said accused without being authorized by law. custody and control one (1) caliber . said accused without the required permit/license from the proper authorities. 1999. custody and control one (1) self-sealing transparent plastic bag of methamphetamine hydrochloride ―shabu‖ weighing 226. unlawfully. and Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 1999. . custody and control two (2) ONE THOUSAND PESOS bill with Serial Numbers BG 021165 and BG 995998.67 grams (3 medium sized transparent plastic bags and 1 big heat-sealed transparent plastic bag). Province of Laguna.: Appellant Abdul Macalaba y Digayon (hereafter ABDUL) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro. DECISION DAVIDE. Province of Laguna. 909904.R. 146284-86. Laguna.45 pistol with Serial No. C. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. in the Municipality of San Pedro. The accusatory portions of the informations in these cases read as follows: Criminal Case No. in the Municipality of San Pedro.

testified that on 12 April 1999. a list of names of persons. UPV 511 and was a drug-pusher in San Pedro. going towards the Poblacion. and 7:00 p.21 grams. They likewise found a self-sealing plastic bag which contained the following items: two fake P1..[9] When ABDUL opened the zipper of the clutch/belt bag. ABDUL had a different story to tell. PO3 Ernani Mendez. who was driving the car. When it stopped due to the red traffic light. He testified that on 12 April 1999. San Pedro. Camp Vicente Lim.‖ based on a verified information that the latter was driving a carnapped Mitsubishi olive green car with Plate No. SPO1 Pandez saw a black Norinco . Laguna. a magazine and five ammunitions for a .m.[10] PO3 Mendez substantially corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Pandez.. While looking for ABDUL. The white crystalline substance contained in the four small plastic bags was subjected to physical and laboratory examination conducted by Police Inspector Lorna Tria. he was driving a borrowed Mitsubishi Galant Car with Plate No. between 6:50 and 7:00 p.45 caliber gun[8] inside an open black clutch/belt bag placed on the right side of the driver‘s seat near the gear. Percival Rumbaoa. lowered the glass window. They went to ABDUL‘s apartment where he was reportedly selling shabu. alias ―Boy Muslim. Rumbaoa positioned himself at the passenger side of the suspected carnapped car. the CIDG officers alighted from their vehicles.[7] When the light was already on. Laguna.[6] Between 6:30 p. or a total weight of 226. the shabu. a regulated drug. while Major Pagkalinawan stood in front of the car. and the second was led by Capt. The first was headed by Major Pagkalinawan. but the latter failed to show them any. Two teams were formed for the search. at 5:15 p. Laguna. they saw the suspected carnapped car somewhere at Pacita Complex I. the two groups proceeded to Barangay Nueva. SPO1 Pandez. Major R‘ Win Pagkalinawan ordered the search of ABDUL.[11] The two P1. He asked ABDUL for the supporting papers of the gun. with SPO4 Aberion and five others as members.000 bills and thereafter brought ABDUL to the CIDG office. and (c) the improvised tooter and the rolled aluminum foil with residue found in the self-sealing plastic bag were also positive of the presence for shabu residue.m. Laguna. With him was Rose. went straight to the driver and knocked at the driver‘s window. the CIDG officers saw inside it four plastic sachets of what appeared to be shabu.000 bills were found to be counterfeit after an examination conducted by Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura.46 grams. Her findings[13] were as follows: (a) the three small plastic sachets weighed 29. SPO1 Pandez introduced himself as a member of the Laguna CIDG and asked ABDUL to turn on the light and show them the car‘s certificate of registration. Capt. ABDUL. San Pedro.67 grams. a PNP member of the Laguna Criminal Investigation Detection Group (CIDG). Laguna. As expected. (b) representative samples taken from the specimens thereof were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. UPV 501 somewhere in San Pedro. apart from the car‘s certificate of registration. on board a car and a van. with SPO1 Pandez and PO3 Mendez as members. They confiscated the gun. SPO1 Pandez. with PO3 Mendez beside him. ABDUL was the sole witness for the defense.[12] a document examiner at Camp Vicente Lim. Calamba. Region IV.000 bills. while the big plastic sachet weighed 197. a Forensic Chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory. his live-in partner.m.m. the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Generoso Pandez.At the trial.. Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura and Police Inspector Lorna Tria.45 caliber gun. but they learned that ABDUL had already left. and the fake P1. whom he fetched .

1236 and 1237 for violations of Presidential Decree No. There.‖ However. alleging that the trial court erred in (1) convicting him for violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The next morning. as amended. together with some other pieces of paper. They asked him whether he had a license. 1866 and Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. custody and control … methamphetamine hydrochloride. They also took another cell phone from the car. He was never issued a receipt for these items. his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. and the money inside his belt bag was counted and it amounted to P42. due to insufficiency of evidence. which was also inside the bag. After taking his gun. He showed his gun license and permit to carry. Thus. 6425). Pampanga. who instructed him to return it in front of the latter‘s store at San Pedro Public Market. which was thereafter driven by one of them. which is a regulated drug. to the effect that he was not authorized to possess shabu. When the man asked him whether he was ―Boy Muslim. Rose was allowed to get out. The information charges him.from Angeles City. ABDUL learned that these people were C. it convicted him in Criminal Case No. ABDUL argues that the prosecution failed to prove the material allegations in the information. he was transferred to San Pedro Municipal Jail. and told him to alight. The same man opened the back door of the car and boarded at the back seat. . the trial court acquitted ABDUL in Criminal Cases Nos. they tried to remove his belt bag from his waist.[18] After the trial. and in the afternoon.000. [15] The other men likewise boarded the car. that ―without being authorized by law. the prosecution did not present any certification from the concerned government agency. despite insufficiency of evidence. However.[19] and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500.45 caliber pistol at the edge of the driver‘s seat. license.‖ he answered in the negative. Rose remained seated at the front passenger seat. while the third one positioned himself near the window on the passenger side and pointed a gun at his live-in partner Rose. they saw a . ABDUL interposed the present appeal. and permit to carry. as amended. Another one who was armed with an armalite rifle positioned himself in front of the car. he was told to surrender the belt bag to the officer who would issue a receipt for it. ABDUL denied ownership over the plastic bag.[14] ABDUL was about to park the car when a man knocked hard on the glass window on the driver‘s side of the car and pointed at the former a . They then got his money and the cellular phone. [he] did then and there willfully and feloniously have in his possession. 1238 for violation of Section 16.000. ABDUL then lowered the car‘s window. That same man then told him that it contained shabu. agents. and (2) admitting the evidence presented by the prosecution although it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. In his first assigned error. a man entered the office with a white plastic bag allegedly taken from the borrowed car.[17] Thereafter.I. While inside the car. like the Dangerous Drugs Board.45 caliber pistol. He did as he was told. respectively.[16] Upon reaching the headquarters. He had borrowed the car from his friend Ferdinand Navares. held him. as well as the costs of the suit.S. among other things. Dissatisfied with the judgment. ABDUL and Rose were detained at the headquarters. The man near him opened the door. but he did not allow them.

as amended. the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that ABDUL had the burden of proving that he was authorized to possess shabu.[20] In the instant case. The gun seen was properly documented. For example. the fact that he has a license is a matter which is peculiarly within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer conviction. we have held: Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof. The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation. Thus. However. searched the same and ultimately arrested him. could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence within the defendant‘s knowledge or control. Consequently. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Yet. where a charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a license (as in the case at bar. this rule is not without an exception. but he failed to discharge such burden. The OSG likewise refutes ABDUL‘s argument that there was a violation of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. where the accused is charged with the selling of a regulated drug without authority). consequently. The Constitution enshrines in its Bill of Rights the right of the people to be secure in their persons. And now on the second issue. Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. there was no legal basis for his warrantless arrest. the members of the CIDG merely relied on the information received from an anonymous telephone caller who said that ABDUL was driving a carnapped vehicle. he is liable for violation of Section 16. the negative averment that ABDUL had no license or authority to possess methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. and (c) the said contents were conclusively found to be shabu by the forensic chemist. It was taken in violation of his constitutional right against illegal search and seizure. They had no personal knowledge of the veracity of the information. if untrue. He could have easily disproved the damning circumstances by presenting a doctor‘s prescription for said drug or a copy of his license or authority to possess the regulated drug. Moreover. has been fairly indicated by the following facts proven by the testimonies of the CIDG officers and the forensic chemist: (a) ABDUL was driving the suspected carnapped vehicle when he was caught. Being a ―fruit of a poisonous tree‖ it should not have been admitted in evidence. thus. the burden of evidence was shifted to ABDUL.[21] To give full protection to it. ABDUL asserts that he was not committing a crime when the CIS agents boarded his car. a regulated drug. or where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused. it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which. he offered nothing. Therefore. Stated otherwise. houses. He was about to park his borrowed car per instruction by the owner when he was harassed by the operatives at gunpoint. (b) the contents of the sachets found in ABDUL‘s open clutch bag inside the car were prima facie determined by the CIDG officers to be shabu. The shabu allegedly found in the car was brought in by somebody at the time he was under interrogation. . the prosecution has the burden of proving the charge. it is presumed that he had no authority.In his second assigned error. there was no reason for the CIS agents to bring him and his companion to the headquarters. or that a negative averment is an essential element of a crime. and he appeared to be healthy and not indisposed as to require the use of shabu as medicine. the onus probandi rests upon him. With these established facts. In the Appellee‘s Brief.

and a bare denial on the other. (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are. the warrantless search and seizure conducted on ABDUL. for. (5) stop and frisk situation (Terry search). unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. as well as his warrantless arrest. Nonetheless.[25] They spotted the suspected carnapped car. Thus. while as a rule.[22] It is obvious from Section 2 of the Bill of Rights that reasonable searches and seizures are not proscribed. (2) seizure in plain view.A. who was also a suspect of drug pushing. an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent.[23] Another exception is a search made pursuant to routine airport security procedure. No. is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand. did not transgress his constitutional rights. We have time and again ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit. The evidence clearly shows that on the basis of an intelligence information that a carnapped vehicle was driven by ABDUL.[27] We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt under the circumstances above discussed that all the elements of seizure in plain view exist in the case at bar. unless there be evidence . As has been repeatedly held. If conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the guidelines prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. or warrantless search and seizure conducted on. the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests. 6235. which is authorized under Section 9 of R.[24] The warrantless arrest of. ABDUL constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. (4) waiver or consented search. we hold for the latter. The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles.[28] On the issue of credibility between ABDUL‘s testimony and the declarations of the CIDG officers. (3) customs search. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest. and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. the search and seizure is valid.the Bill of Rights also ordains the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. ABDUL‘s sole defense of denial is unsubstantiated. and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. which was indeed driven by ABDUL.[26] These sachets of shabu were therefore in ―plain view‖ of the law enforcers. just like alibi. Under the ―plain view‖ doctrine. and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. the former is generally held to prevail. The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. the seizure of evidence in plain view must comply with the following requirements: (a) a prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties. While ABDUL was fumbling about in his clutch bag for the registration papers of the car the CIDG agents saw four transparent sachets of shabu. to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto. the members of the CIDG of Laguna went around looking for the carnapped car. A mere denial.

to the contrary. 1238 was proved beyond reasonable doubt since ABDUL knowingly carried with him at the time he was caught 226. in Criminal Case No. shall prevail over accused‘s self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed. is.The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription. Application of Penalties. 4. Batas Pambansa Blg. WHEREFORE.D. JJ. and 1707. The penalty imposed by the trial court. Laguna. subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. in order. Carpio. therefore. as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. 7. the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the accused. Costs de oficio. concur. 179.000 and the costs of the suit. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride…. No. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. There being no modifying circumstance proven. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities: … 3. 6425). in relation to Section 20 of Article IV.[29] ABDUL miserably failed to rebut this presumption and to prove any ulterior motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses. 1675.A. the proper penalty pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua.A. 1238 convicting appellant ABDUL MACALABA y DIGAYON of the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R. SO ORDERED. Unauthorized possession of 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Section 16 of Article III.16. and R. . 7659 (now further amended by R.67 grams of shabu without legal authority. and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500. the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro. -. 44. These sections provide as follows: SEC. as amended by P. 1683.A. No. 9165). Ynares-Santiago. including the fine. 6425). as amended. is hereby affirmed in toto. 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14. Vitug. Nos. There is no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu in Criminal Case No. … SEC. -. No. 14-A. 20. and Azcuna..The penalties for offenses under Sections 3. of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No.

J. a regulated drug. PERFECTO A..380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.2941 kilograms. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms). without the corresponding license or prescription therefor. containing methamphetamine hydrochloride. 2828 in relation to R. The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. and (3) Criminal Case No. .R. 96-149990 for Violation of Section 16.A. 128587 March 16. Wang in the court of origin respectively read: Criminal Case No. (2) Criminal Case No. unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and one AMT Cal.) No. JR. Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2). in the City of Manila. petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to this Court via this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolution1 dated 13 March 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.A. Manila. 96-149992 for Violation of Comelec Resolution No. granting private respondent Lawrence C. Wang‘s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the three (3) charges filed against him. unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control a bulk of white and yellowish crystalline substance known as SHABU contained in thirty-two (32) transparent plastic bags weighing approximately 29. and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN. No. 3 Criminal Case No. Contrary to law. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban): . in his capacity as Presiding Judge. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). vs. namely: (1) Criminal Case No. entitled People of the Philippines v. the said accused did then and there willfully. Branch 18. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms): That on or about the 17th day of May 1996. in Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990 to 96149992. in the City of Manila. No.: On pure questions of law.PEOPLE VS JUDGE LAGUIO G. Contrary to law. Philippines. HON. Respondents. Article I of Republic Act (R. DECISION GARCIA. Philippines. the said accused did then and there willfully. Lawrence Wang y Chen. 7166 (COMELEC Gun Ban).2 Criminal Case No. Branch 18. Petitioner. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act): That on or about the 17th day of May 1996. 2007 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. LAGUIO.S. 9mm. 96-149991 for Violation of Presidential Decree No. RTC.

accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives.. respectively. for unlawful possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride. .5 Thereafter. The pertinent facts are as follows: On 16 May 1996. Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano. Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a. without first securing the written permission or authority from the Commission on Elections. 380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions. carrying the same along Maria Orosa St.6 They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May 1996. of 17 May 1996.That on or about the 17th day of May 1996. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor. the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him. Ermita. of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. At around 11:00 p. police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior and Local Government. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance. upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang. Manila. he (witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang. arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios. Thus. in the City of Manila. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for Wang. At the same time. immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.m. namely. Captain Margallo. Contrary to law. and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug.m. that same date. 380 9mm automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. An entrapment operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu.m. Manila. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. the other members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of 29. asked his name and. Wang. Redentor Teck. which substance was later analyzed as positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 4 During his arraignment. which is a public place. as provided by the COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation to Republic Act 7166. and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate. (b) cash in the amount of P650. unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. a regulated drug popularly known as shabu. at about 7:00 p.00.. who was described to the operatives by Teck. alias Frank. a regulated drug locally known as shabu.7 When frisked. joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases followed. Philippines.2941 kilograms. 9mm automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. on the date which is covered by an election period. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal. the said accused did then and there willfully.000. introduced themselves to him as police officers. Questioned. On nearing the car.

8 On 6 December 1996. David Lee. and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine.. trial continued. and not as regards the two cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim. On 13 March 1997. one AMT Cal. the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted. submitting that the trial court erred I XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2. Accordingly. PNP. Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer. Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search. for lack of evidence. Camp Crame. On 9 January 1997. SO ORDERED. Manila.(c) one electronic and one mechanical scales. the prosecution rested its case and upon motion. Then and there. this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People.S. Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act. accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence. Wang filed an Amplification12 to his Demurrer of Evidence on 20 January 1997. Quezon City. Perfecto A. issued the herein assailed Resolution14 granting Wang‘s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence.380 9mm and one Daewoo Cal. AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND THEREIN. the 32 bags of shabu with a total weight of 29. No costs. thus: WHEREFORE. ll XXX IN HOLDING. Case No. so it is now time for the defense to present its evidence. and Violation of Comelec Gun Ban.000. Department of Interior and Local Government. THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE AND CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST. the accused is acquitted of the charges against him for the crimes of Violation of Section 16.9 On 19 December 1996. for proper disposition.11 praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution‘s evidence against him. Hence. . Illegal Possession of Firearms. On 12 February 1997. IN EFFECT.00 to the accused. Jr. 9mm. ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.2941 kilograms and the two unlicensed pistols. and the two firearms to the Firearms and Explosive Units. the respondent judge. 96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. 96149992). . is ordered to return the confiscated amount of P650. the Hon. and the confiscated BMW car to its registered owner. Laguio. are ordered confiscated in favor of the government and the branch clerk is directed to turn over the 32 bags of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board in Intramuros. and the officer-in-charge of PARAC. Case No. the prosecution filed its Opposition13 alleging that the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case. the prosecution filed a Manifestation10 to the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96149990 is concerned. Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence.

required the public and private respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice. In effect. In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997. it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41. ordinary appeal by mere filing of a notice of appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal directly to this Court. too. Although Section 2. without giving due course to the petition. First off. disallows appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal. after several extensions. Generally. any further prosecution of the accused after an . Private respondent Wang filed his comment17on 18 August 1997.lII XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL. paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court raising only pure questions of law. Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may appeal.18 which the Office of the Solicitor General did on 5 December 1997. and it amounts to an acquittal. the Court. it bears stressing that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant. Then. On 10 September 1997. it being merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals21). the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. in the very same provision. V XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AND OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION AND IN NOT DENYING ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. expressly made subject to the prohibition against putting the accused in double jeopardy. the right of the People to appeal is. and (b) whether there was lawful arrest. An order granting an accused‘s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits. that is why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy. The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may appeal the trial court‘s resolution granting Wang‘s demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. the Court required the People to file a reply. IV XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED.19 On 20 October 2004. It also basic that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole records of the case wide open for review by the appellate court. Section 2. HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND HIS OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED. the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. AS A RESULT OF HIS SUBMISSION AND FAILURE TO PROTEST THE SEARCH AND HIS ARREST.20 which they did.

No double jeopardy. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military men) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. — It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. when the prosecution is denied due process of law: No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8. In death. without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice. its right to due process is thereby violated. deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law.acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Sandiganbayan22 presents one exception to the rule on double jeopardy. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial — the non-trial of the century — and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio. which is. The celebrated case of Galman v. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused. As the writer then wrote. More so. as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial. instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories. Ninoy.D. and not by preselection of the Executive. which is the very essence of due process of law. which could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. . As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar. 1. that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. In life." This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them. can be an impartial court. There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court. however. as mandatorily required by the known P. the Court has previously made some exceptions. in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth. To this general rule.

who has been acquitted. 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. United States. or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule: In our jurisdiction. 19731. As succinctly observed in Green v. we had the occasion to explain: The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. 851). 49 SCRA 416 Feb. The cases of United States v. to name a few. he may be found guilty. final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. L-30111-12. Yam Tung Way. 30. Flores. the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction. supra). is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense. Enage. which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent. vs. and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. 58 Phil. United States "(t)he underlying idea. The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant. Flores. verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. In point is the fairly recent case of People v. Lutero. People v. 1973]). People v. Bringas. 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. Bao. Gandicela v. courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing. In this case. In effect. (c) after arraignment. People v. People v. 51 SCRA 78. a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs." (Underscoring supplied) . Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused‘s demurrer to evidence. the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. supra). Director of the Bureau of Prisons. Thus. xxx xxx xxx Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment. expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity. as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent. one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence. (d) a valid plea having been entered. Shell Co. the first jeopardy was never terminated. The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. 27. L-30370 [May 25. Uy. and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy. Zosa. Ylagan. resulting in their acquittal of their respective charges of murder due to insufficiency of evidence. In resolving the petition for certiorari filed directly with this Court.23 which involved the trial court‘s decision which granted the two separate demurrers to evidence filed by the two accused therein. (b) before a competent court. Cabarles. thereby subjecting him to embarrassment. L-30026. both with leave of court. are illustrative cases. the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v.The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights. and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy. Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7.

in acquitting the accused. committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. The verdict being one of acquittal." which supposedly "positively identified therein petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged.) In Sanvicente v.24 the Court allowed the review of a decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the accused‘s acquittal upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with leave of court. explaining thus: Under Rule 119. In resolving accused‘s demurrer to evidence. the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. the CA ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity of certain letter marked therein as Exhibit "LL. is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case. (Emphasis supplied. Sandiganbayan: The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases." The Court. is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment. thus rendering the assailed judgment void. the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt. he may be found guilty. however. the case ends there. Significantly. expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in People v. one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence. Velasco: The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the "humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizens. once the court grants the demurrer.The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. sustained the CA‘s power to review the order granting the demurrer to evidence. (Italics in the original) Like any other rule. for to do so would be to place the accused in double-jeopardy. Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea. as amended. By way of exception. such as the one at bar. resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits. such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. As held in the case of People v. when brought in unequal contest with the State xxx. as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent. the above-said rule is not absolute." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed. in a petition for certiorari." . a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy." and when the same is granted. it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt. People.

a desire to know the exact extent of one‘s liability. If it did. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction. it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused‘s demurrer to evidence. even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. Jr. even those whose innocence rests upon a jury‘s leniency. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. does not result in jeopardy. what petitioner People of the Philippines. As to the Purpose. the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent. an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. Such dismissal order. Lapanday Holdings Corporation.25 we have enumerated the distinction between the two remedies/actions.) By this time. With this right of repose. (Emphasis supplied. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity. However. the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light: "When a court exercises its jurisdiction. Given the far-reaching scope of an accused‘s right against double jeopardy. filed with the Court in the present case is an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law. In Madrigal Transport Inc. is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose". when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari. being considered void judgment." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule. Consequently. Bello." . The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. and then Solicitor General Silvestre H. which is different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In Pure Foods Corporation v. such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. v. confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty. This cannot be allowed. an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari. while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal. to wit: Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari. there are substantial distinctions which shall be explained below. Thus. Unfortunately. fairness and justice. through then Secretary of Justice Teofisto T. every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. III. not errors of judgment. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. NLRC. Guingona.

As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment. For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in this case. or where there is no appeal or any plain. or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction. is allowed. speedy or adequate remedy. however. the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency.appeal is the remedy. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed. the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. or resolution. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit. this petition is outrightly dismissible. Where a record on appeal is required. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect. respectively). The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by appeal without violating private respondent‘s right against double jeopardy. As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. On the other hand. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion. Since the issue is jurisdiction. In an appeal by certiorari. Also in Madrigal. Over a certiorari.a mistake of judgment -. the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declared are appealable. appeal is not available as such an appeal will put the accused in double jeopardy.on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case. the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order. and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents. or of the petitioner‘s timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Certiorari. Over an appeal. but of an error of law or fact -. we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari and appeal are two different remedies mutually exclusive. they are neither alternative nor successive. . as long as it has jurisdiction over the case. a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment. Where appeal is available. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. In contrast.The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -. or of the denial of the petitioner‘s motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari. certiorari will not prosper. As to the Manner of Filing. while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order. order. the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence. As to the Subject Matter.

9mm Pistol with magazine that were found and seized from the car. or is attempting to commit an offense. when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court.Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of certiorari. Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar. And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done by the accused. (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed. Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court. a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when in his presence. The police officers had no information. or that the accused had placed them there. The trial court‘s ratiocination is quoted as follows: The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his warrantless arrest and search were lawful as argued by the prosecution. Under Section 5. or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car. which definitely this Court has the power to do. There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case. namely. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence. or unlawful as asserted by the defense. The police officers searched the car on mere suspicion that there was shabu therein. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense.26 However. The unlicensed AMT Cal. the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime. The accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. None of these circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. the instant petition will nevertheless fail on the merits as the succeeding discussion will show. because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto27 without need for a warrant of arrest. pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SP03 Reynaldo are hereunder quoted: . The arresting officers had no information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun. Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement to another. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. the person to be arrested has committed. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made. and the Daewoo handgun was underneath the driver‘s seat of the car. the process cannot be reversed. is actually committing. On this matter. The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment. nor did they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view.

xxx xxx xxx Q. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear. How many of your approached him. Mr. Witness? A. what was your role or participation in this case? A. Q. Mr. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria Orosa Street.m. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused. Witness. What date was that when you arrested the accused? A. They were position in strategic places within the area. Manila. . xxx xxx xxx Q. xxx xxx xxx Q. You yourself. Where did you make that arrest. xxx xxx xxx Q. at about 2:10 a. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of those whom we have previously apprehended in connection with the delivery of shabu somewhere also in Ermita. What about your other companions where were they? A. Ermita. We waited for him. Inspector Margallo. A. Q. what did you do? A. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa.POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONEL‘S TESTIMONY "PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination Q. Mr. What was the reason why you together with other policemen effected the arrest of the accused? A. Witness. That was when the accused arrived. Q. where did you position yourself during that time? A. Q. It was on May 17. 1996. What happened when you and your companions were positioned in that place? A. Manila. myself and two other operatives.

You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged transporting of shabu on May 16. Mr. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. is it not? A. Q. what did you do with that? A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm. ATTY. is it not? . He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded magazine and likewise when the compartment was opened several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu (were found).Q. What happened when you approached the accused. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS Q. Sir. Q. (TSN. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang. pp.. November 15. Witness? A. Witness? A. Yes. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI for laboratory examination. is it not? A. is it not? A. What did you do when you found out Mr. . Sir. at 11:00 p. xxx xxx xxx Q. Then what happened? A. 3-8. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and we asked him to open the back compartment of his car. You said you frisked him. a Daewoo Pistol at the place under the seat of the driver. Yes. Q. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further investigation. Q. Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed.Q. Did you come to know the results? A. Q. 1996. what was the result of that? A. 1996). Sir.m. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the Glenmore Modeling Agency. Yes.

Yes. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is an employee of the Glenmore Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. xxx xxx xxx . I was one of the arresting officers and investigator. Sir. Sir. Yes. Q. Yes. pp. Q. is it not? A. Sir. (TSN. your companions at the same time searched the BMW car described in your affidavit of arrest. is it not? A. is it not? A. is it not? A. November 15. Yes.A. Sir. Yes. When the search was made on the BMW car. What is you role or participation in this case? A. Sir. 3-12. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not? A. is it not? A. Sir. I supposed. naturally. none. When you effected the arrest. you spotted a person previously described by Redentor Teck as Lawrence Wang. is it not? A. Yes. Q. Thereafter. Sir. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search were made. He was likewise outside. He was outside. is it not? A. Sir. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang. you and your companions look for Lawrence Wang to shed light on the transporting of shabu by Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. xxx xxx xxx Q. Sir. Q. Q. Sir. there was no warrant of arrest. Q. there was no search warrant. 1996) SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBAL‘S TESTIMONY PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was searched. Q.

For violation of R. When they were arrested they divulged the name of the source. COURT: How were they arrested? A. Your Honor. of May 16. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that you arrested him. about 11:00 p. We let them call Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio thru the cellphone and pretend and to order another supply of shabu. SPO2 Vergel de Dios. you said that you recovered drug from the car of the accused. Then they divulged to us the name of the person from whom they get shabu.m. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p. COURT: They were arrested for what. May 16. Yes. Witness? A. . we arrested one Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Mr. Teck mentioned the name of Lawrence Wang as his employer. who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. arrested? A. this involved a series of operation? A.Q. COURT: So.m. COURT: So there was an entrapment? A. for possession? A. please tell us the antecedent circumstances which led you to recover or confiscate these items? A. For unlawful possession of shabu . Your Honor. Yes. xxx xxx xxx Q. a certain Arellano and a certain Rogelio Noble. One Alias Frank. we arrested three (3) persons. COURT: The same date? A. of May 16. COURT: Where did you arrest these people? A They were arrested in Metro Manila also. witness. 6425. COURT: Why were these people. They were arrested and when they were investigated. COURT: Whose name did they mention: A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or handling shabu to another previously arrested person.m. Mr. About 11:00 p. Your Honor. It was a series of arrest. Yes.A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his possession placed inside his car.

We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead us to Maria Orosa Apartment where we conducted a stake out which lasted up to 2:00 a. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there was a shabu inside the compartment of the car. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang. Your Honor. what did you do? A. Sir. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on that morning. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble and company.m. he was about to leave when you saw him? A. COURT: At what place? A. 1996. COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as to the source of the shabu? A. COURT: What did you do? A. Probably. when you saw the accused opened his car. COURT: So. we saw him opening his car together with his driver. COURT: What happened when you approached him? .COURT: So. COURT: What did you do when you were told about that? A. We approached him. COURT: When? A. these two (2) were arrested? A. xxx xxx xxx COURT: What happened during the stake out? A. COURT: What was the information? A. Of that date early morning of May 17. When the person of the accused was identified to us. Yes. xxx xxx xxx COURT: All right.

One of whom is a police officer. Q: You were present while they were investigated? A: I was the one whom investigated them. Sir. Q: Now. what did you do with that? A. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also investigated by your team? A: Yes.A. xxx xxx xxx Q: These two men. xxx xxx xxx COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were confiscated from them? A: Yes. COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the car. Sir. (TSN. Sir. 15-24. 1996). Well. Sir. this Court has gathered that prior to the arrest of the accused there were three (3) men that your team arrested. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio? A: Yes. Sir. pp. A: Yes. Coronel while I was the one who inspected and opened the compartment of the car and saw the shabu. Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men. CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE COURT COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel. you were able to discover that Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were the source of the regulated drug that were confiscated from the three men that you have arrested? A: Yes. he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to apprehend also these two men. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car. xxx xxx xxx Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated from them at the time of the (their) arrest? . December 16.

Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending to do something unlawful or illegal? A: No. They refuse to say the source. Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another delivery of shabu scheduled that morning of (stop) was it May 16 or 17? The other delivery that is scheduled on? A: On the 17th. xxx xxx xxx Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car. did you know whether he was carrying a gun? A: No. Sir. Q: So. Sir. Q: When you searched the car.A: Yes. xxx xxx xxx Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed light on the matter concerning the arrest of these two employees in possession of shabu. Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu. Did you and did your team suspect the accused as being involved in the transaction that lead (led) to the arrest of Redentor and Joseph? A: Yes. however. Sir. they told me that they were working for the accused. did the accused protest or try to prevent your team from searching his car? . Sir. Sir. xxx xxx xxx Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery? A: No. Q: It was concealed? A: Yes. Sir. It cannot be seen. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt. Margallo handed to me the gun. the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession of the gun is when he was bodily search? A: Yes. Q: Other than walking towards his car. Sir. the accused was not doing anything else? A: None.

arrest a person: a) When. Contrary to its position at the trial court. the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW car‘s trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs. The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search or vice versa. ." (TSN pp. the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car were without probable cause and could not be licit. the People now contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. in his presence. unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests. 26. Rule 113. Thus."28 In effect. 1997) Clearly therefore. and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. b) When an offense has just been committed. without a warrant. Since the case falls under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure.A peace officer or a private person may. The only legal basis for this Court to possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal order of the trial court upon demurrer to evidence would be if the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully effect a warrantless arrest. 5. Feb. it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Since a dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal and reviewable only by certiorari. the People. Arrest without warrant.A: No. the factual finding that the arrest preceded the search is conclusive upon this Court. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. x x x The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search. or is attempting to commit an offense. It entails appreciation of evidence. Rules of Court) and is therefore. and c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending. but not in the case of a petition for certiorari where the factual findings of the trial court are binding upon the Court. then the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto. and therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful. is actually committing. which may be done in an appeal of a criminal case because the entire case is thrown open for review. now posits that "inasmuch as it has been shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms in the accused‘s possession had been validly made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances. however. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide: Sec. the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence. the person to be arrested has committed. is a matter of credibility of evidence. Sir. . Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. 5. and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest. 3-16. (Sec. when lawful.

the accused-appellant was not.291awphi1. there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been committed. is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Aminnudin. the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5. because it had been illegally seized. (b) arrest of a suspect where. is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer. at the moment of his arrest. May 17. the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. And doubtless. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him. In People v. To all appearances. frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car.Section 5. he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The inevitable conclusion. is actually committing. It is settled that "reliable information" alone. Upon the duo‘s declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day. and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street. which is only a few hours thereafter. above. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid. or is attempting to commit a crime. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the . two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed. committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. hoping to find a person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang. David Lee. in disregard of the Bill of Rights: In the case at bar. as correctly made by the trial court. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5. provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. Ipso jure.nét The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. the arresting officers conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. He was not committing any visible offense then. absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers.30 Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. the employer of Teck and Junio.31 the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in appellant‘s possession during a search without a warrant. Therefore. which was later on found to be owned by his friend.

the continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment bolsters Wang‘s claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search. "I think it is less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. if there was any. The identification of the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officer (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. SO ORDERED. As Justice Holmes once said. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. It was the fugitive finger that triggered his arrest. the instant petition is DENIED.33 Moreover. The People‘s contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis.34 WHEREFORE. however." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another. . based on the evidence on record. Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person and belongings. We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order.marijuana that he suddenly became a suspect and so subject to apprehension. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search.32 The implied acquiescence to the search. could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

Yet. the verdict has already been rendered by many outraged persons who would immediately impose on him an angry sentence. The pertinent facts are as follows: On July 28. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila. CARLOS L. who stands accused of an unspeakable crime. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court. ZUÑO. We shall treat it as we would any other suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a just and impartial judgment from this Court. including the petitioner.: There is probably no more notorious person in the country today than Mayor Antonio L. respondents. . for all the prejudgments against him. 1993.SANCHEZ VS DEMETRIOU ANTONIO L. REYNALDO J. Pasig). The Solicitor General for respondents. SANCHEZ. LORENZO. Ongkiko and Marciano P. he is under our Constitution presumed innocent as long as the contrary has not been proved. for petitioner. J. DE LEON.1993. Laguna. On him. and RODRIGO P. At a confrontation that same day. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel. and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan. the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9. The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice). Branch 70. The Honorable HARRIET O. MISON. petitioner. Jr. in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. CRUZ. RAMONCITO C. Marciano Brion. Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge denying his motion to quash the informations for rape with homicide filed against him and six other persons. Brion. he is entitled to the full and vigilant protection of the Bill of Rights. the last six respondents in their official capacities as members of the State Prosecutor's Office). Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno. Mario E. who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. Atty. vs. Sanchez of Calauan. Like any other person accused of an offense. PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang. GUIYAB. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13. On August 12. JOVENCITO R. LEONARDO C. and he was immediately taken to the said camp. Jr. Acting on this request. 1993. the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against several persons. NCR. Laguna. LUGTU. 1993.

The Preliminary Investigation. . Judge Eustaquio P. The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed because: 1) he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation. 1993. George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. On that same date. Laguna. he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan. 1993. Pepito Kawit. After the hearing. The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13. the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition. seven informations charging Antonio L. in the trial court with one of the accused. On August 26. On September 13. including the petitioner. On September 10. Camp Crame. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused. Jr. 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons. which is a ground for its dismissal. Salvador Panelo as his counsel. in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 6713. the seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance. Baldwin Brion. No. in relation to Section 1. 1 The Reply was filed five days late. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center. 1993. The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee. This warrant was issued on August 13. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig. where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou. we shall disregard this procedural lapse and proceed to discuss his petition on the basis of the arguments before us. Luis Corcolon. of R. Sto. 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him.A. 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation. The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition. Rogelio Corcolon. and 6) as a public officer. belie the petitioner's contention that he was not accorded the right to present counter-affidavits. Branch 7. On August 16. Sanchez. by Judge Enrico A. 2 The Court may consider his non-compliance an implied admission of the respondents' arguments or a loss of interest in prosecuting his petition. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8. in connection with the said crime. to which we required a Reply from the petitioner within a non-extendible period of five days. Nevertheless. 1993. Metro Manila. 5) the informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia. the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba. a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez.The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival. with Atty. 1993. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.. after oral arguments. where he remains confined. 1993. the respondent judge denied the motion.

your honor. insofar as the respondent. We are not going to submit any counteraffidavit. and that he was not furnished with the affidavits sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio . manifested that his client was waiving the presentation of a counter-affidavit. 1993. Brion. unless there are other witnesses who will come up soon. respondent Zuño furnished the petitioner's counsel. we will not submit any counter-affidavit because we believe there is nothing to rebut or countermand with all these statements. The following exchange ensued: ACSP Zuño: For the record. ACSP Zuño: So. So far. you are waiving your submission of counter-affidavit? A. we are furnishing to you the sworn statement of witness Aurelio Centeno y Roxas and the sworn statement of SPO3 Vivencio Malabanan y Angeles. Mayor Antonio Sanchez is concerned. A. Atty. Q. thus: Atty. told Atty. there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent manifestation that his counsel. Salvador Panelo. 1993. this time Atty. Do I understand from you that you are again waiving the submission of counter-affidavit? Atty. Jr. the petitioner's counsel. ACSP Zuño to Atty. 1993.During the preliminary investigation on August 9. Atty. there are no other statements. and told him he could submit counter-affidavits on or before August 27. the head of the Panel of Prosecutors. Brion. So. 3 Nonetheless. Brion that he could still file a counter-affidavit up to August 27. Yes. Panelo: Yes. Marciano Brion. was not notified of the inquest held on August 13. respondent Jovencito Zuño. with copies of the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan.: [W]e manifest that after reviewing them there is nothing to rebut or countermand all these statements as far as Mayor Sanchez is concerned. No such counter-affidavit was filed. If there is none then. 1993. 4 On the other hand. During the hearing on August 1'3. 1993. this case is submitted for resolution. Brion: xxx xxx xxx Q.

During the entire proceedings. it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information. At any rate. Brion but Atty.A. Panelo. however. 1993. His claim is that it is the Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the investigation of all cases involving public officers like him. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. on motion of the accused. any crime imputed to a public official.e. provides that if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or. However. 6770 to investigate and prosecute. was not Atty. or with their supplemental affidavits dated August 15. the trial court may. Laguna. the respondent judge saw no reason or need for such a step.Centeno. the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant. 191 SCRA. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions. 1993. Thus. Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary investigation 5. does not submit counter-affidavits. Moreover. be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA at 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense here charged. so may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his defense. It must. however. we do not believe that such approval was necessary at all. Section 3. It was only in his tardy Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now question his representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and inofficious. Paragraph (d). if subpoenaed. . Domingo. Domingo. Panelo as his counsel. as the municipal mayor of Calauan. paragraph (1) of R. any illegal act or omission of any public official. as we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman Invoking the case of Deloso v. respect of the offense charged. 7 In the case at bar." Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case needed the approval of the Ombudsman. 9 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in. i. The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15. It is not disputed that the information and amended information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman. the noninvolvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended information. he remained quiet and let this counsel speak and argue on his behalf. The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. In Deloso v.e. 8 the petitioner submits that the proceedings conducted by the Department of Justice are null and void because it had no jurisdiction over the case.. the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal or omissions on the part of any public official. i. or if it is flawed. However. 545 (1990).. we shall defer to her judgment. 6 If no preliminary investigation has been held. the crime of sedition. Domagas. the abovequoted excerpt shows that the petitioner's counsel at the hearing held on August 13.

the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. however. Although in the guise of a request. where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted. required. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. by virtue of a letterinvitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said camp for investigation. . an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions. Thus. (Emphasis supplied) In the case at bar. the same can be easily taken. in ill-gotten wealth cases. petitioner had been "arrested. No. Canlubang. such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Laguna. 11 may conduct the investigation. The Arrest Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13. manual touching of the body. but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril. on the basis of the sworn statements of the two state witnesses. and the designated interrogation site is a military camp. In Babst v. . Application of actual force. of the government such as the Department of Justice. is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. 7438. It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim.A. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent onthe part of the other to submit. 10 and the Presidential Commission on Good Government." . Under Section 2 of the same Rule. it was obviously a command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be. in connection with the charge of sedition. Respondent Zuño himself acknowledged during the August 13. 1993? "Arrest" is defined under Section 1. . other investigatory agencies. 1993 hearing that. it is not idle to note that ordinarily. which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure. apparently cowed by the "invitation. the petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Under certain circumstances." he went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch him.In fact. under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. In fact. It may not be amiss to observe that under R. physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not. the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for questioning. National Intelligence Board 13 this Court declared: Be that as it may. 12 The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim.

but it was nonetheless legal. providing as follows: Sec. when lawful. The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. or is attempting to commit an offense. against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Moreover. this first warrant served as the initial justification for his detention.A No. — A peace officer or a private person may. Nevertheless. 15 Pending the issuance of the warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases. he may move to quash the information. he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court. Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26. 1993. or make the order. If. render the judgment. Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all. 6713. the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash. and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest. 5. Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L. we find that the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. is actually committing. to be sure. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5. or forty-six days before the date of the arrest. after the petitioner was unlawfully arrested. * Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that: Sec. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of R. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. in his presence. the writ shall not be . 1993. arrest a person: (a) When. as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29. The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. 4. without a warrant. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It was belated. and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process. Arrest without warrant. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. but only on that ground. 14 The Court notes that on August 13. as in this case. It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. the person to be arrested has committed. The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges. 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases.

allowed. amending the Revised Penal Code. returning her to the same prison she will just have left. 17 more recently in the Umil case. anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. the respondents declared that a new warrant specifically naming her had been issued. However. become moot and academic inasmuch as the new warrant of arrest complies with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Court regarding the particular description of the person to be arrested. homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape. In effect. case has. thus validating her detention. must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. 18 The Informations The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times. It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that: Sec. Thus. the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape. judgment. Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R. 13. there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed.A. the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape. loses its character as an independent offense. except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various offenses. Nor shall. Therefore. 16 the petitioner.by fiction of law. release of the petitioner for that reason will be a futile act as it will be followed by her immediate re-arrest pursuant to the new and valid warrant. 4111. 2632 and R. or order. sued on habeas corpus on the ground that she had been arrested by virtue of a John Doe warrant. This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise: Thus. i. A complaint or information must charge but one offense. and functions like a qualifying circumstance. the Court said: The.A. In one case. being a general warrant. or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed.e. The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the Court. In their return. While frowning at the tactics of the respondents. where there are two or more offenders who commit rape. but assumes a new character. . the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process. This Court will not participate in such a meaningless charade. While the first warrant was unquestionably void. thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. indeed. Duplicity of offense. death (reduced to reclusion perpetua with the suspension of the application of the death penalty by the Constitution). it merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree.

This contention . 19 The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor.The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. 23 At any rate. 22 Moreover. their lust satisfied. and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion. Afterwards. The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. the cases against them should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who in his opinion. it is a preposterous contention that because no charges have been filed against Alqueza and Lavadia. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him. 20 The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the President of the Philippines. the charges against the petitioner and his co-accused should also be dropped. but the informations do not make such a suggestion. he nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the information a person against whom he believes no sufficient evidence of guilt exists. 21 But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The Alleged Discrimination The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because of the non-inclusion of Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia in the informations must also be dismissed. not certiorari or prohibition. all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta. culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused. Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public officials or employees at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes. In other words. appear to be guilty. It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed seven times. The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. before resorting to this relief. the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times. But in such a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus. the party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the same case must first avail itself of other adequate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such inclusion. It is the petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own petard. with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six.

paragraph (a) of P. in our opinion. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: (1) Violations of Republic Act No.00. such as. which deals with graft and corruption cases. as amended by P. No. the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six. In other words. in which event the penalty is increased. 3019. provides: Sec. not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. direct and not accidental.D. the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute. (Emphasis supplied) The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall under paragraph (1).was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall discuss it just the same for the guidance of all those concerned. Title Seven. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 2. and Chapter II. as amended. whether simple or complexed with other crimes. . for instance. To fall into the intent of the Constitution. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner. the offense cannot exist without the office. 24 this Court described the "offense committed in relation to the office" as follows: [T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is. 1606. The offense can stand independently of the office. Hilario. In Montilla v. Montejo. and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator.D.1861. as alleged in this case. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant. Republic Act No. . Section 4. Public office is not of the essence of murder. being a public functionary took advantage of his office. where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years. it is not even alleged in the information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the exception laid down in People v. of the Revised Penal Code. Title VII of the Revised Penal Code: (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office. 4. or a fine of P6. Moreover. its materiality arises not from the allegations but on the proof. 1379. . But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element. including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations. and even as an aggravating circumstance. the relation has to be such that.000. in the legal sense. 25 . No.

101146 and 101147 and to decide them with deliberate dispatch. . 101142. the offense therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance. there is yet no basis for judgment. of their official functions. It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a decision on the merits of the criminal cases being tried below. is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan. only uninformed conjecture. The Court will caution against such irrelevant public speculations as they can be based only on imperfect knowledge if not officious ignorance. These will have to be decided by the respondent judge in accordance with the evidence that is still being received. Indeed they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. the petition is DISMISSED." As Chief Justice Concepcion said: It is apparent from these allegations that. as committed by the main respondents herein. being an ordinary offense. who has started the trial of the criminal cases against the petitioner and his co-accused. 101141.In that case. We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his office. They must. 101144. all be rejected. Conclusion As above demonstrated. as Mayor of Basilan City. therefore. The appearance of a senator as their counsel was questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited by the Constitution from representing them because they were accused of an offense committed in relation to their office. as alleged in the information. obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer. that brought it within the definition of an offense "committed in relation to the public office. It held that even if their position was not an essential ingredient of the offense. (Emphasis supplied). It follows that the said crime. according to the amended information. At this time. there was nevertheless an intimate connection between the office and the offense. a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the death of a suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation. 101145. The Court agreed. the respondent judge. 101143. WHEREFORE. The respondent judge is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are not supported by the facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. though improper or irregular. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. may proceed therewith without further hindrance. SO ORDERED. although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract. Brown. In consequence.

00. conspiring. 1995. 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1. then and there willfully. On December 5.641.PEOPLE VS DORIA EN BANC [G. 125299.600. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. J." accused-appellants. No. at 6:00 in the morning. received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. They . PO3 Manlangit set aside P1.00-. the above-named accused. From this sum. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law. the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1. did. January 22. Kamuning. in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom).a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills[3]-as money for the buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's. At 7:20 of the same morning. CONTRARY TO LAW. the CI and the rest of the team were waiting.[1] The information reads: "That on or about the 5th day of December. "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. 1999] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.00. members of the North Metropolitan District.600. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.R.[5] An hour later.600. DECISION PUNO.00 to cover operational expenses.: On December 7. unlawfully and feloniously sell. P/Insp. 1995. gave the team P2.000. Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation.[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area. plaintiff-appellee. 1995 at E. Philippines. Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom. SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO. administer. accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4."[2] The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. vs. deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit. and the rest of the team as perimeter security. a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara. and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH.

Totoy Gaddao. the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy. pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house for about three minutes.600. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door.641. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun. is the wife of his acquaintance. testified that on December 5. accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy. namely. she was at her house at Daang Bakal. Totoy's wife. a 35-year old rice vendor. They were brought to police headquarters where they were investigated. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth. PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. One of the men."[6] "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal. Simultaneous with the box's discovery.[11] Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao. the twins Raymond and . Thereafter. Florencio Doria. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the neighborhood store.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate.[9] The bricks. Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5) children. The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. Turning towards them. its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. The box was open and had something inside. Doria saw a box on top of the table. a 33-year old carpenter. accused-appellant stayed in the car. PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. claimed that on December 5.[10] The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy. Violeta Gaddao. Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused. three men were already inside. aged 8." together with the box. This closeness. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were." His suspicion aroused. aged 10."[8] The policemen arrested "Neneth.08 grams. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. PO3 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. later identified as PO3 Manlangit. he gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house. were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7." They took "Neneth" and "Jun." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers. however." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in their community. The policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. When Violeta entered her house." For five (5) minutes. 1995. Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. eleven (11) in all. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. at 7:00 in the morning. overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. Standing by the door. Accused-appellant Doria. Arvy. When accused-appellant denied the charge.[7] SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1. 1995. did not extend to Violeta.frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Arjay. by that time. "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. surrounding them. Upon inquiry. he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. then still at the door.

Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.Raynan. they are both CONVICTED of the present charge against them. confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. 13 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. She woke her children and bathed them. . Her eldest son.000. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. Along the way. had left for Pangasinan five days earlier.641. the provisions of Sec.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board.M. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person. They asked her about a box on top of the table. After seeing Arjay off. and Jason. also of Republic Act No. The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500. Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her husband. 4 of Republic Act No. That day. the Regional Trial Court. Jayson. Her husband.000. She found out later that the man was PO3 Manlangit. The confiscated marijuana bricks (7. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. 234 SCRA 555. accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's breakfast. An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating. Taking into consideration. and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan.' the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500. She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents. and accompanied Arjay to school. she and Jayson remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Ten minutes later. According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. they passed the artesian well to fetch water. Totoy. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt. the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. aged 5. She was pumping water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. the guilt of accused. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. a housepainter. The man pulled her and took her to her house. 7659 which explicitly state that: 'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group. 23. left for school at 6:45 A. however.00 each. Branch 156.[12] After trial. aged 3. Simon. Arvy. she carried her youngest son. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: "WHEREFORE. This was the first time she saw the box. NBI for destruction in accordance with law.

accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors. Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for Women. IV . OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME. INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER. WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE. SO ORDERED. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER. NEBULOUS.Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons."[14] Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends: "I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST AS CONDUCTED. Mandaluyong City. AT BEST. II THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY. Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory review. II THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. thus: "I THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES. NIL. AT WORST."[13] Before this Court.

the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed. Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation.[26] Where.[20] In the American jurisdiction. the search of her person and house. the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him.[30] When . and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery. the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state.[29] It is a positive defense. the burden shifts to the government to show otherwise. Once established. and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao. United States. Not every deception is forbidden. particularly liquor and narcotics offenses. persuasion or fraud of the officer. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes. and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom."[23] It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law. Initially. however. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense. there is entrapment and no conviction may be had.[16] Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense. or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him.[18] Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law. such that the crime is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer. there is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted.[19] It also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist. Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense[28] that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance. for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him. there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate the law. or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime. and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant. an accused has the burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense.[25] Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. trickery."[15] The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria.[21] The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v.[17] Entrapment was unknown in common law.[27] The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal. the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career.[24] It is recognized that in every arrest.[22] the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer.

[48] On the other extreme. but overbearing conduct. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged. however. at least if known by the police. His predisposition. are not. cajoling or importuning.. the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be countenanced. on police conduct.[32] All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits. Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation.[43] or appeals to sentiments such as pity. i.[47] Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures the more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. even if his guilt has been established. activities.[45] Hence.[36] Some states.entrapment is raised as a defense. his reputation. it is presumed that a lawabiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. the interaction between the accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's inducements. State[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. It ignores the possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition were. are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime.. not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. the accused might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements. the gravity of the crime. the transactions leading up to the offense.[40] The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct.[37] This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman v.[44] Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because. United States[31] to determine whether entrapment actually occurred.[46] Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. Here.[39] The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents. no level of police deceit."[35] If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity." To some extent. It is claimed that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule.e. sympathy. his past offenses. his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. other than one who is ready and willing. the court considers the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. may have an important bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police and their agents was proper. and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would be on a normal person. this reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties. to commit the offense. friendship or pleas of desperate illness.[33] The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct[34] and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.[41] for purposes of this test.[49] The undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy. etc. if the court determines that an accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged. such as badgering. American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v.[50] . the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular accused's predisposition. his eagerness in committing the crime.[42] Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible. have adopted the "objective" test. the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement. badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible.

[61] we convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. actually induced him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. State. has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable.[57] The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible. or. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris.[64] we held: "ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. If this objective test is satisfied. Smith's testimony was disregarded.While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored. Abella. then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime. and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public . this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused caught in flagrante delicto. testified that Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Phelps."[58] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng[63] we first laid down the distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant. free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The police officer offered "a tempting price. As early as 1910.[55] The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.[54] the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of entrapment. provided the original design was formed independently of such agent. and while instigation. the BIR agent.[59] we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. "direct. or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Some states in the United States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" tests. either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny. if the offense was committed by him. there was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused. a BIR personnel.Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. as distinguished from mere entrapment.[52] the Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng.[53] In Baca v. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this drug. and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. xxx a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. State.[56] we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the government employee. We found that there was inducement. In United States v. Smith. -.[51] In Cruz v. the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way. that the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation.[62] It was also in the same case of People v. persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony.[60] In People v.

Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused.[70] Entrapment. we further held. that government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws. the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v.[71] It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. theft. it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. not against particular individuals.[78] They are not the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder. adopting the "objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test.[72] To determine whether there is entrapment or instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. We also considered accused's previous convictions of other crimes[75] and held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. The "objective" test first applied in United States v. Tiu Ua.[73] Nevertheless. The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in antinarcotics operations. ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.' detective. or hired informer. In People v. In recent years. Anti-narcotics laws. our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers. not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals. etc. It is rare for any member of the public."[69] The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Yutuc[76] thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal.[68] the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v.[79] Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed."[65] The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals.[77] They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society. therefore. no matter how furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita. but upon the diligence of its own officials. but there are cases holding the contrary. like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes. Galicia. assists the thief in carrying out the plan. being authorised by them to do so. and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. rely. Tan Tiong. Conversely. It is necessary. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a 'spotter. This means that the police must be . and.[67] In People v.[74] we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang.[81] These offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. but against public order. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause. arson. is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal.authorities. rape. Boholst.[80] Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite person. that deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral. not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. In People v. the larceny is nevertheless committed. In entrapment. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases.[66] the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation.

[89] It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement.present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or through informants.[86] Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy. however.[83] Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous. juris tantum. of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. the payment of the "buy-bust" money. or other petty criminal.harassment. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. a person who accepts payment from the police in the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who deceive the police. whether to the informant alone or the police officer. or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors. For whatever noble purpose it serves. spies or stool pigeons. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher. and the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug cases. whether or not through an informant. . illegal detention and the third degree. and the delivery of the illegal drug. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency. pickpocket. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual. the confidential informant system breeds abominable abuse. They all spring from common motivations. wiretapping. This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases[84] where we observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons. corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. extortion. become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search."[88] It is thus imperative that the presumption. Like the informant. Along with illegal search and seizures. Barraza. pimp. the offer to purchase. it is a type of lawless enforcement. the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. blackmail. when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal classes. Frequently.[90] Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.[91] We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown.[92] The manner by which the initial contact was made. the offer to purchase the drug. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement. Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the end.[87] "[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem.[82] Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation. examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. then this must also be considered.[85] The use of shady underworld characters as informants.' justifies the employment of illegal means. The informant himself may be a drug addict. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. the spectacle that government is secretly mated with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an inspiring one. false arrest. As well put by the Supreme Court of California in People v. particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks. unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion-. although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer. vengeance. recidivism or plain criminal proclivity. the relative ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons. At the same time.

Police Officer. sir. After appellants' apprehension. the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court.. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accusedappellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana.In the case at bar.. were identified and marked in court. Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim. his back-up security. Tell the court.. VALDEZ. Witness bringing out from the said box. At the pre-arranged meeting. The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Counsel for Violeta Gaddao: . Moreover. the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted accused-appellant Doria. how were you able to identify that box? A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces of marijuana brick we confiscated from the suspect. spontaneous. Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police.[94] or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant. Thus: "ATTY.[97] There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses. The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar.[95] or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit. when you identified that box. Counsel for Florencio Doria: Mr. the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. PROSECUTOR ATTY. This is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court. ARIAS. PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank. however.[96] the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks. PO3 Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua.[98] The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers' testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence.[93] It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers. Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. straighforward and categorical manner and his credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel.

ATTY. What makes you so sure? . sir. sir. A Q A I have markings on these eleven bricks. Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature. sir. VALDEZ A We submit.Your Honor. Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?" COURT A Q Yes. your Honor. how did you know that those are the eleven bricks? x x x. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out item after item from the box showed to him and brought in front of him. there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court. where are those markings? Here. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I brought it to the PCCL. COURT Q Noted. PROSECUTOR Q Whose signature is that? ATTY VALDEZ Your Honor. What makes you so sure? A I am sure that this is the one. my initials with the date. your Honor. I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now dealing with eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to him by Jun? COURT So be it. Now tell the court. your Honor. your Honor? PROSECUTOR Your Honor. despite reconsideration. COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the court. sir. your Honor. your Honor. my signature. Q A Q What are you sure of? I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun. sir. may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to what was handed to him by the accused Jun. This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun. Point to the court. ATTY.

Q Now. sir. Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on this plastic? A Q A This one. PROSECUTOR Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul. with a newspaper wrapping with a piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95. 970 grams SSL" be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?" COURT Tag it. sir. x x x. Mark it. the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom? A Q A Q It was given to me by suspect Jun." Q To stress. sir. Exhibit A. ARIAS Your Honor. and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper." I was the one who made these markings. ATTY. etc. sir. who made the entries of this date. your Honor.. Whereat? At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St. I want to make it of record that there are other entries included in the enclosure. the signature.. also Exhibit "A." How about this one? I don't know who made this marking. PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed. How about the other items that you were able to recover? . Q This particular exhibit that you identified.. the date and the time and the Exhibit "A. PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be marked as Exhibit "D?" COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D. May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.. COURT Noted. there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95. I made the signature.A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we brought it to the PCCL. that was not pointed to by the witness. the date and the time and this Exhibit "A." etc." A This CLM. The court saw it.

A peace officer or a private person may.[104] The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao. as above-quoted. when lawful. the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. 5." "D-1. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. the person to be arrested has committed. and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters. Arrest without warrant. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system." and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams. because during our follow-up. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseurbuyer and the pusher. is actually committing. This brick." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. . x x x. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed."[99] The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. A These other marijuana bricks."[103] Under Section 5 (a). without a warrant.x x x.600. because according to Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending.[100] We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that PO3 Manlangit and his team waited for almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1. in his presence. to wit: "Sec. or is attempting to commit an offense. or is attempting to commit an offense. -. x x x.[101] Again. the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused-appellant.00 strains credulity. including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation. arrest a person: (a) When.[102] We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. is actually committing. the search of her person and residence. sir.

Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. . COURT There is. because according to Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth. your Honor. sir. sir. because during our follow-up. A These other marijuana bricks. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit. Counsel for appellant Gaddao: We submit at this juncture.[111] The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. VALDEZ: question. Q This particular exhibit that you identified. To be lawful. How about the other items that you were able to recover? We submit at this juncture. sir. Q A Q Whereat? At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard. not absolute. the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. It is claimed. that there will be no basis for that ATTY. your Honor. that there will be no basis for that question. however shows otherwise: "ATTY VALDEZ. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:[106] (1) search incident to a lawful arrest. And what happened upon arrival thereat? A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money.[108] (3) search in violation of customs laws.[109] (4) seizure of evidence in plain view. the arresting officer.[107] (2) search of a moving motor vehicle. Answer. however. that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest. Whereat? At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street. the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom? A Q A Q It was given to me by suspect Jun.[110] (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. sir. sir. however.[105] The rule is.

sir. it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money. sir. the marked money which Jun gave her. when you reached the house of Aling Neneth. Aling Neneth was there? A Q A Q A Q A Yes. sir. We asked her to give us the money. she was just inside her house? I saw her outside. Mr. sir. she was just outside the house? A No. Witness. if any memory of your testimony is correct. . And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. is it not? Yes. And what happened? At this instance. sir. That is correct. Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside the house. she was not committing any crime. x x x. sir. according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached her? A PO3 Manlangit. sir. Q But the fact is. sir. sir. Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing her daily chores. Q Now. sir. She was fetching water as a matter of fact? She was `sa bandang poso.' Carrying a baby? No."[112] SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that: Q A What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth? To arrest her. As far as you can see. sir.Q A Q A You mentioned "him?" Her. Am I correct? A Q A I just saw her outside.

because precisely according to you your role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up? A Q A Q A Q A Q Yes.Q A You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached her? Yes. sir. Q Alright. COURT: Sustained. Q During all the time that this confrontation. the buy-bust money. And the money from Aling Neneth? I don't know. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. Manlangit got the marijuana? Yes. there's no testimony on that. sir.600. your Honor. Neneth? PO3 Manlangit. sir. Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Money. ATTY. Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing. the amount of P1. VALDEZ: I was asking him precisely. According to the records. That's right? A Yes. . you were just in the side lines? A I was just watching. sir.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. sir. sir. You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth? PROSECUTOR: There is no basis for this question. sir. arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place. PROSECUTOR: No basis.

sir. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. with or without any conspiracy. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house."[114] In fact. coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one who retrieved the money from Aling Neneth. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. making its warrantless seizure valid. . it was Manlangit maybe? A Q A I saw it. VALDEZ: Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. PO3 Manlangit."[115] The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. i. Contrary to the finding of the trial court. declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was. is based on actual facts."[113] ATTY. I am through with this witness. in his own right. there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit.[116] A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause.. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. however. she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. sir. knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense.e. your Honor. It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth? The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth.[117] Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused.[120] Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had. not from the person of Aling Neneth.[119] with or without her knowledge. sir. She was not committing any crime. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. the arrest is legally objectionable. but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. Is that what you are trying to tell the Court? A No. it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.[118] Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business.

The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. I noticed that this carton has a cover? Yes. Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money? Yes. sir. then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. At that particular instance. VALDEZ: So here we are.[128] It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime. Aling Neneth was inside the house? A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Yes. sir. contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[121] The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area. (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime.Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.[123] In the course of such lawful intrusion. sir.[127] In other words. the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. This carton. if the package proclaims its contents. sir. testified on cross-examination as follows: "ATTY. Not like that. (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent.[122] The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. However. according to you was under a table? Yes.[129] PO3 Manlangit.[124] The object must be open to eye and hand[125] and its discovery inadvertent. if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article. sir. . or if its contents are obvious to an observer. contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. the Narcom agent who found the box. Where the object seized was inside a closed package.[126] It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. you saw the carton? Yes. When you and Badua arrived. dining table. whether by its distinctive configuration. I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed? It was open. then the article is deemed in plain view. he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. its transparency. sir.

sir. VALDEZ Yes. nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.COURT Go down there. Q A Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun? Yes. sir. Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton. INTERPRETER Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box. A Like this. COURT Noted.. sir. PROSECUTOR Can we describe it? ATTY. Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth? I asked her. you went inside the house? Yes. sir. Aling Neneth was not yet frisked. no. . what's this. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton? A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he asked "Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito.. PROSECUTOR One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible. no. And got hold of this carton? Yes. Q A Q A Q A Q At this juncture. sir. is it not [sic]? A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua. No. Show to the court.

Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?" . sir. sir. sir. there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. PROSECUTOR May we request the witness to place it. You did not have any search warrant? Yes. dining table. sir. with plastic. sir. It was in plain view. sir. you did not know whether Badua already retrieved the buy-bust money from her? A Q A Q A Q A Yes. sir. How far was this from the door? Two and a half meters from the door. Somewhere here? It's far. Gadao was in possession of the buy-bust money because according to you.Q A Q A Who got hold of this? I was the one. Under the table according to you? Yes. where he saw it? A Q A Q Here. sir. you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was already retrieved by Badua? A Q A Q A Yes. sir. You went inside the house? Yes. Q At that particular point in time. You were the one who got this? Yes. What you see is a carton? Yes. Q In fact. sir. sir.

Q You were only able to verify according to you. it could be "tikoy. this is not a piece of plastic. That is all that you saw? Yes. PROSECUTOR By reading it. Q The only reason according to you. VALDEZ That's a piece of plastic. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here... let's place the size of the plastic.. A piece of plastic may be big or a small one.. for record purposes.A Q A Q A Yes. I withdraw that. . VALDEZ What is that? What can you say. Fiscal? I'm asking you? PROSECUTOR With due respect. With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton? Yes. sir. your Honor... ATTY. And according to the Court. sir. PROSECUTOR Leave that to the court. sir. wait. no even Superman. what I am saying is. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. you were able to.. PROSECUTOR For the record. sir.. PROSECUTOR Panero. it will connote.. COURT Leave that to the court.... By reading it." is it not [sic]? A Yes. ATTY. Look at this.

[135] It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. It's the same plastic. sir." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. however. Ice Pop? I presumed it was also marijuana because it may .[136] . sir. x x x. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic. Let the prosecutor do that for you.. Next question.[133] PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana.[134] It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. COURT Continue. PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana.Q A Q A Q A Q A Siopao? Yes. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. sir. It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop. VALDEZ I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information..white."[130] PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there by appellant Doria. PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria named her and led them to her.[132] On crossexamination.[131] Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house. I'm asking you what it could possibly be. ATTY. pink or blue in color. Canned goods? Yes. I am not asking you what your presumptions are. In his direct examination. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.

as evidence in court. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.000. said.e. x x x. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500. what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug. Administration.The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana[137] was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged. again. Sale.' It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another. 6425. distribute. as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. however. deliver. Aminnudin. 4. Branch 156.-The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.. the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed. administration. distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500.000.00)."[140] Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows: 1. Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. i. accusedappellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.[139] viz: "The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people. the decision of the Regional Trial Court. including the basest of criminals. and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who. Delivery. 'I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm. especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. the corpus delicti." In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. the poseur-buyer. SO ORDERED.00 which he received. 2. The prosecution. But as demanding as this campaign may be. has failed to prove that accusedappellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. .600. Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. administer. delivery. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 7659 punishes the "sale. the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. however praiseworthy their intentions. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty.[138] Apropos is our ruling in People v. As Justice Holmes. give away to another.00 to P10 million. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities. shall sell.[142] IN VIEW WHEREOF. to wit: "Sec. unless authorized by law.[141] The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1. especially the susceptible youth.

please see concurring opinion. Martinez. .. Mendoza. JJ.Davide. Vitug. Quisumbing. Bellosillo. Pardo. J. Melo.. concur.. Jr..J. Kapunan. and Gonzaga-Reyes. Buena. Panganiban. C. Purisima. Romero.

101837 February 11. Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St. Branch 168. No. filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. FELICIANO. the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from. heading towards P. The police forthwith detained him. Eldon Maguan. the police launched a manhunt for petitioner. The following day.GO VS CA G. the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. in the presence of his lawyers.M. Regional Trial Court. Presiding Judge. petitioner. and before an information could be filed in court. Petitioner entered Wilson St. while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor. that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner. instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver. At the corner of Wilson and J. petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police. he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers.. J. THE COURT OF APPEALS. THE HON.. At the bottom of the information. Accordingly. An eyewitness to the shooting. Metro Manila. 1 on 2 July 1991..: According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report. M. walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. On 8 July 1991. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner. the victim. petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. on 11 July 1991. who was at the police station at that time. the Prosecutor. the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary . The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. positively identified petitioner as the gunman. NCJR Pasig. That same day. Guevarra St. vs. Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.R. On 9 July 1991. respondents. 1992 ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING.. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. No bail was recommended. San Juan. they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. Petitioner alighted from his car. PELAYO. BENJAMIN V. died of his gunshot wound(s). Abad Santos Sts. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene.

7 Petitioner was in fact released that same day. this motion was. petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.00. however.000. denied by respondent Judge. counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation. respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order.investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. in violation of his right to due process. prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order. approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991. 11 July 1991. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. however. this Court remanded the petition for certiorari. wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100. the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991. On 17 July 1991. who. acting on the omnibus motion. on the same date. On 12 July 1991. 10 embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled. 4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. In the afternoon of the same day. petitioner surrendered to the police. who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100. On 16 July 1991. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro. petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself. On 16 August 1991.000. He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. . On 19 July 1991. the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation 8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled. prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari. contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been previously conducted. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge.00. which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro. Also on 16 July 1991. On 23 July 1991. By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991.

He alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden). c. 13 The petition for certiorari. one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit. however. of his refusal to enter a plea. . on the following grounds: a. 15." His identity had been established through investigation. On 19 September 1991. 11 and 17 October.On 19 August 1991. he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus. on the one hand. 14. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and charged had been "freshly committed. the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing the two (2) petitions. were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals. issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic. upon the other. 24 and 26 September. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. Counsel for petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court. the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted. On the same date. At the time he showed up at the police station. the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. and the petition for habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals. prohibition and mandamus. there had been an existing manhunt for him. the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On 30 August 1991. petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. In view. petitioner was arraigned. 11 On 27 August 1991. b. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station. trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first witness. 3. d. on 2 September 1991. after the lapse of more than a month. 8. on 2. He waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the Rules. On 23 September 1991. petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment. On 23 August 1991. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice. The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19. 21 and 22 November 1991. thus prolonging his detention. and on 7. On 3 October 1991. with petitioner's conformity.

in the circumstances of this case. when lawful. the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder. whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. or is attempting to commit an offense. We consider these issues seriatim. the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested." Those offenses were subversion. the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. membership in an outlawed organization like the New People's Army. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation. etc. the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case. The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. in the view of the Solicitor General.. whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go. the provisions of Section 7. In Umil v. is actually committing. Station Commander. On 14 October 1991. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Moreover. Thus. petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for murder even without preliminary investigation. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime. the person to be arrested has committed. petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first. the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from this Court. without warrant. etc. an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. and second. v. . we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows: Sec. In the instant case. none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work. On the other hand. misplaced. petitioner argues. petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses. — A peace officer or a private person may. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Ramos. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly. Ramos is. 16 one of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil. could not apply in respect of petitioner. et al. Ramos. etc. et al. by an eight-to-six vote. Section 7.On 4 October 1991." Secondly. in his presence. upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes. In this Petition for Review. 5 Arrest without warrant.. arrest a person: (a) When. In respect of the first issue..

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail. within the meaning of Section 5(a). The "arresting" officers obviously were not present. as amended. before the filing of such complaint or information. constitute "personal knowledge. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant." 18 It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman. and he shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112. petitioner was not arrested at all. at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule. but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person However. Moreover. If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted. peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. Notwithstanding such waiver. none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. however. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112. he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. Indeed. accompanied by two (2) lawyers. Section 7.(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. When he walked into San Juan Police Station. a responsible person of his choice. with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of nonavailability of a lawyer. That information did not. the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information. in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty . (Emphasis supplied) is also not applicable. which provides: Sec.

since petitioner had not been arrested.. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. 20 (Citations omitted. In turn. as above stated. . the permission of the Court must be secured. petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation.of a crime. Mogul. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. the information for murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. . he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation. Instead. and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. xxx xxx xxx The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. not by the Regional Trial Court. . The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not. with or without a warrant. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor. at such stage. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. or the right of the People to due process of law. emphasis supplied) . as noted earlier. This was substantive error. Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court. 19 this Court held: The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. In Crespo v. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. Moreover. As earlier pointed out. the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion. for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor.

while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the . he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one. humiliation." 24 In the instant case. While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament. it is a substantive right. Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety. however. we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. is a valuable right. aggravation. since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a reinvestigation). We would clarify. Thus. is not a mere formal or technical right.Nonetheless. We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation. it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation. 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest. Again. In fact. At the time of his arraignment. petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari. petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary investigation. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. in the circumstances of this case. not to speak of expense. The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. Selfaison. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process.22 In the instant case. since it has in fact been established by statute. we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. to hardened criminals. and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court. In People v. even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable. prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial. the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7. Finally. a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion). the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save. we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. on the 5th day after filing the information for murder. perhaps. 21 The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty. Accordingly. when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation.

Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be. promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. If he submitted to arraignment at trial. to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. trial on the merits has already commenced. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout. firstly. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong. in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor. petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail? Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation. petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might. During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991. In respect of the matter of bail. did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 30 If he did not walk out on the trial. upon the other hand. was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. conclude that probable cause exists." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his detention. petitioner did so "kicking and screaming.statutory process of criminal justice. and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses." in a manner of speaking . the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. 25 It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. secondly. strong. It would then be up to the trial court. and just before arraignment. petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing objection. Accordingly. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. During the trial. impact upon. counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary investigation. the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses. after a . it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge. before the prosecution called its first witness. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation. the constitutional point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. with extraordinary haste. and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice. in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand. the date set for arraignment of petitioner. In any event. we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that. the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. in the instant case.

and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100. it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties. to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go. And. should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail. No pronouncement as to costs. It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point. Meantime. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. SO ORDERED.careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record. To reach any other conclusions here. in any case. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. ACCORDINGLY. rather. it would not be idle ceremony. that is. and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED. This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue. .000. could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise.00). This Decision is immediately executory.

Nos. and Commanding Officer. GEN. GEN. respondents. T/SGT. FIDEL V. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. PIAD. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. 83162 October 3. 85727 October 3. Muntinglupa. RAMOS. . DURAL. 1991 AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA. No. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. MANOLITA O. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. RAMON MONTANO. vs. NAZARENO: ALFREDO NAZARENO. GEN. ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. No. 86332 October 3. vs. vs. G. Nos. COL. petitioner.petitioner. BRIG. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE. No. respondents. 84581-82 October 3. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. RAMON MONTANO. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU. respondents. vs. DOMINGO T. COL. Quezon City.ALFREDO S. Camp Crame. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA. vs. GEN. COL. REX D. BRIG. FIDEL V. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE. G. THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION.R. HERCULES CATALUNA. UMIL and NICANOR P. GEN. FELICITAS V. HON. EVARISTO CARIÑO.R. RENATO DE VILLA. GEN. respondents. PC-INP Detention Center. G.UMIL VS RAMOS G. BRIG. petitioners. RAMOS. SESE. RENATO S. G. LIM. COL. S/SGT. RICARDO REYES. DE VILLA. BRIG. NESTOR MARIANO. MAJ.R. CONRADO DE TORRES.R. respondents.R.R. 84583-84 October 3. 81567 October 3. petitioners. No. petitioners. LT. COL. ARNOLD DURIAN. vs. G. petitioners.

The Solicitor General for the respondents. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G. 81567 and G. for brevity) which dismissed the petitions. and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court. and P/SGT.Metro Manila. Valmonte for petitioners in G. Mercado for petitioners in G. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). LEVI SOLEDAD. No.000. if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people. Enrile 2 should be abandoned. 84583-84.00 to P10. the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions. No. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New .R. No. Nos.00. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. change or modify them. particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest). with the following dispositive part: WHEREFORE.R. 85727 (Espiritu vs. MALTRO AROJADO. the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.R. It is elementary. in this connection. Potenciano A. in sum. No. Flores. seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision. 83162. 85727. in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without warrant. P/SGT. That the assailed decision. maintain: 1. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Lim). ELADIO TAGLE. Moreover. 3. Ricardo C. disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested. Jr. 2. petitioners.000. 84581-82 Josefina G. for petitioner in G. it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal. except that in G. P/SGT. Nos. the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60.respondents. Efren H.R.R. JACINTO MEDINA. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM:p Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions. P/SGT. The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. R. In their separate motions for reconsideration. No costs.

R. within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113. inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions.R. without warrant. . to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not. 81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that. 5. looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic. For. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which avalid arrest. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it. where membership penalized. when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army. no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest. the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990. which read: Sec.People's Army. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. That G. — A peace officer or a private person may. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts. in his presence. under the doctrine ofGarcia vs. an outlawed organization. No. and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms. Enrile. would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law. 4 Therefore. 8 a continuing offense. if the arrests were made in accordance with law. the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest. It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. he (Dural) was committing an offense. The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G. the focus is understandably on Section 5. paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113. . when lawful. 4. 5 so that if detention is illegal. Arrest without warrant. thus: . is actually committing. can be conducted. arrest a person: (a) When. as a general rule. the person to he arrested has committed. There can be no dispute that. except in those cases express authorized by law. and . In the present cases. 7 and for subversion which. or is attempting to commit an offense. without a warrant. like rebellion is. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. In the petitions at bar. the detainee may be ordered forthwit released. filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration. 5. No. (Emphasis supplied).

. subversion. Agnes Hospital. to verify a confidential information which was received by their office.The crimes of insurrection or rebellion.. is based on actual facts. Agnes Hospital. Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. without warrant. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. under the facts of the Umil case. conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes. No. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. were dispatched to the St. confined in the St." in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause. In G. i. It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts. Dural did not cease to be. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses. Viewed from another but related perspective. or incident thereto. which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first. refers to arrests without warrant. are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses. which generally end upon their commission. and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof. His arrest was based on "probable cause. at the time of arrest. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. Section 5(b)." as supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter. or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense.R. or became less of a subversive. and second. . etc. would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. Quezon City. Roosevelt Avenue. simply because he was. FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST. . 81567 (Umil case). adultery. it will be noted. on 1 February 1988. murder. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. arson.e. Rule 113. Agnes Hospital. coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 2045. Dural. i. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 11 These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.e.. that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the . paragraph (b). it may also be said. which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained. military agents. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government. that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5. given another opportunity. at the St. based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.

Laguna. Rule 113. As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before. it was found to be true. Rule 113. Parenthetically.said hospital with a gunshot wound. their arrests.R. 83162). 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest. 14 and. explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. third — as the records of this case disclosed later. Furthermore. in fact. or on 31 January 1988. 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St. an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. Lot 4. without warrant. without warrant. came from reliable sources. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G. 84581-82). or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon. he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.. Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court . of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5. before a road hump along Macanining St. C-30112). Parenthetically. caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant. to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital. thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition. under Sec 5(a). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G. that based on the same information. is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. therefore. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms. considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. informations were filed in court against said petitioners. 12 Said confidential information received by the arresting officers. therefore. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound. On 31 August 1988. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest. South City Homes. In fine. two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario. Nos. No. They were. As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers who make the arrest." twentytwo (22) years old of Block 10.R. Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural. Bagong Barrio.R. second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. No. Caloocan City. 84921. the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law. Biñan. without warrant. the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon. Rules of Court. it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant.R. the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith. Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural. that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before. are also justified.

she was arrested. which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably . that in view of this information. and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. 3. On 27 June 1988. radio and other communications equipment. And at the time of the actual arrests. pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court. a search of the house was conducted.18 4. the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque. 16 2. On the other hand.. and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. that when the agents frisked them. With regard to Vicky Ocaya. he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988. Marikina. subversive documents. without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra. when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date. the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque. Anonuevo. Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations. Molave St. More specifically. ammunitions. and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group. that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms. Marikina Heights. Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse. at the time of her arrest. the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are: 1. located in the Villaluz Compound. 20 It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque. with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof. Buenaobra. 17 that. and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 19 5.during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the authorities. Buenaobra. the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantine. the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions. Anonuevo and Casiple).

Casiple and Ocaya). 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions. For. one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved. hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied) . . on 23 November 1988. and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities. In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5. Roque. but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers. at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St. Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers. the corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house. . 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. Rule 113. the arresting officers are not liable. no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order. they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. as in the case of Dural. 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions. Espiritu. this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. third: at the time of their arrests. Manila. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5.guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse. where he said. Sta. Mesa. Rule 113. and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5. among other things: Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . during and after the arrest of the aforenamed persons (Dural. particularly paragraph (b) thereof. even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted. In G. second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine. the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention. 85727. Rule 113 are met. to conduct an arrest without warrant. With all these facts and circumstances existing before. The records also show that. was arrested without warrant.. who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. And then.R. ammunitions and/or subversive documents. on the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988. do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed. shortly after their arrests. Buenaobra. No. Anonuevo. 22 Not evidence of guilt. in their possession were unlicensed firearms. 23 The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. In view of these circumstances.

The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60.00. one of the suspects in the said killing. not for subversion or any "continuing offense. tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). this Court." but for uttering the above-quoted language which. . is still another thing. as follows: . Ramil Regala and two (2) others. 731. the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest.00 to P10. No. Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989. Muntinlupa. which obviously becomes difficult at times. on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant). Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. without warrant. since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly. at the time the words were uttered. Espiritu had not lost the right to insist. was granted by the same trial court. while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988. or 14 days later. On 7 January 1989.000. (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight. Metro Manila.R. But. In G.000. during the pre-trial or trial on the merits. the peace officers did not appear. that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II. As shown in the decision under consideration. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant. Because of this development. for investigation. . the Court has. the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113. even without warrant. For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation. Metro Manila. then. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. without warrant. in this case. the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988. in the perception of the arresting officers. that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988). with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati. the police agents arrested Nazareno. in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention. Ramil Regala. In the balancing of authority and freedom. But. 8868385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled. that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988. Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang. an information charging Narciso Nazareno. 86332 (Nazareno). Manuel Laureaga. . earlier filed by his co-accused. even as the motion to post bail. 29 Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988.and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. was inciting to sedition. or soon thereafter.

in fact. The Court. as revealed by the records. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses. Nos. it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. it is true. belonged to her.R. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits. No. To note these admissions. took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA. particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.e. strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant. Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission. these admissions. ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.R. still undocketed). As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. or on 1 February 1989. as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms. in the case of Amelia Roque. Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had. she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms. But again. are supported by probable cause. This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno. Laguna. is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. 84581-82). Enrile. this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same. the corresponding informations against them were filed in court. Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus. Parenthetically. This Court. denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him). The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests. In the case of Buenaobra (G. on the other hand. and Ilagan vs. Branch 24. the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus. in compliance with Section 5. it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. ammunitions and documents in their possession. ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest. On the other hand. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G. At the conclusion of the hearing. i. retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan.On 13 January 1989. Enrile should be abandoned. a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality .

JJ.. as warranted by the evidence. Narvasa. a long existing law. concur. SO ORDERED. the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. Melencio-Herrera. and which. then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released. but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5. Griño-Aquino. Rule 113. This denial is FINAL. Jr. Paras. 5 of Rule 113. Padilla. with the least delay. as elucidated in this Resolution. A Final Word This Resolution ends as it began. then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted. are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers. Rules of Court. but if such conditions are met. further. . not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion. ACCORDINGLY. are not met. the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990. what is important is that the Court be right. and.. are DENIED. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions. Medialdea and Davide. Bidin.of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. for stress. Rules of Court. reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. as the records show. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups. on the basis of.

J. as amended. . Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day. accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City. scheduled on 13 May 1989. 1 At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989). Tublay. in Criminal Case No. that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. Captain Alen Vasco. Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant. set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa. PADILLA. a Swedish national. Acop. for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. vs. Mabanta. The factual background of the case is as follows: Accused Mikael Malmstedt. *defendant-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. accused left for Baguio City. Buenaventura. in coordination with Tublay Police Station. From Baguio City. 89-CR-0663.R. II of Republic Act 6425.PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT G.:p In an information dated 15 June 1989. 91107 June 19. At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989. 2 The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers. accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. for violation of Section 4. Moreover. as amended. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT. 1991 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. No. plaintiff-appellee. then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country. accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14. that same morning. entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. From Sagada. he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Romulo. information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM. Mountain Province. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad. In the evening of 7 May 1989. Benguet. Branch 10. Art.

he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag.At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon. La Trinidad. Thereafter. The trial court did not give credence to accused's defense. Likewise. but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. When accused failed to comply. they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags. A teddy bear was found in each bag. accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other Identification papers. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him. the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. the bus where accused was riding was stopped. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish. he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Feeling the teddy bears. During the inspection. Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa. In the chemistry report. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. among others. accused entered a plea of "not guilty. . Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun. a derivative of marijuana. Upon stepping out of the bus. During the arraignment. the officers got the bags and opened them. the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. his passport. the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. But before he alighted from the bus. Sgt. Benguet for further investigation. the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof. When said officer came back. and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. it was established that the objects examined were hashish. he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing. the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. Thus." For his defense. The officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag. CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. return ticket to Sweden and other papers. At the investigation room. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport. as ordered. He was told to get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus.

00). was belied by his failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. when lawful. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons. SO ORDERED. there is no need to obtain a search warrant. the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. –– A peace officer or a private person may. the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him. the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. or is attempting to commit an offense. and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt. II of RA 6425. in his presence. Art. 6 Sec. therefore. arrest a person: (a) When. 3 The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE. without a warrant. specifically Section 4. Dangwa. Article IV of Republic Act 6425. In a decision dated 12 October 1989.The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim. where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest. as amended. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. 4 Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged. denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag. Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bado. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.000. this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. 5 Arrest without warrant. 5 However. as amended. Article 11 of Republic Act 6425. accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and. La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20. as amended. houses. .

which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein.In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof. and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Thus. who has nothing to hide from the authorities. (6a 17a). there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. to readily present his identification papers when required to do so? . the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant. a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused. In the Tangliben case. under the circumstances of the case. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man. at first. however. San Fernando Pampanga. 10or where the accused was acting suspiciously. When NARCOM received the information. where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused. 12 Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. during the course of the inspection. Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable. there was no time to obtain a search warrant. The failure of accused to present his identification papers. Section 7. only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs. because of existence of probable cause. discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. San Nicolas. It must be observed that. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City. 7 While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused. the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law. based on information supplied by some informers. 11 and attempted to flee. 8 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused. against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information. their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. 13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. that accused was required to present his passport. 9 Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid. and no extensive search was initially made. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. when ordered to do so. and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112.

Costs against the accused-appellant.. Paras. WHEREFORE. to the detriment of society. Griño-Aquino. Bidin.. premises considered. taken together as a whole. the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. is on leave. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly. in the light of such circumstances. .The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. JJ. were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport. including. J. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement. Regalado and Davide. Feliciano. plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport. In other words.. Melencio-Herrera. to search even without warrant. SO ORDERED. Sarmiento. the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them. Jr. Medialdea. led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. concur. and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession.

defendant-appellant. in Iloilo City. held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20. the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. vs.000. 1984. CRUZ. When they were verified as marijuana leaves. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI. 2Later. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he . His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen. he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana. 6 According to the prosecution. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation. averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket.R.No. who was eventually convicted . shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening. 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. In his defense. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant. and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 1 Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25. chemical and chromatographic tests on them. 8 Acting on this tip. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. they waited for him in the evening of June 25. plaintiff-appellee. 74869 July 6. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. 1984. 7 He was Identified by name. J. two shirts and two pairs of pants. disbelieving him.: The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested. and trial proceeded only against the accusedappellant. The trial court.PEOPLE VS AMINNUDIN G. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him. At the PC headquarters. the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin. Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana. who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic. On the basis of this finding. 4 Subsequently.00." 5 The motion was granted. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Herminio T.

For his part. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but. 14 The trial court was unconvinced. 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25. Lt. noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time. Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin.00 and gave away the other. who testified as follows: Q You mentioned an intelligence report. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip.parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. There is one point that deserves closer examination." 22 On this matter. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. strangely. however. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. Jr. That is hardly fair or realistic. we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team.. The decision did not even discuss this point. and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant. traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107. The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accusedappellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. are not described in the impersonal record. meaningful pauses and hesitation. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400. 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25. But the trial judge sees all of this. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment. 19 There is no justification to reverse these factual findings. one saying it was two days before the arrest. Cipriano Querol. they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. which may reveal the truth or expose the lie. the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113. No bail has been allowed for his release. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. not to mention his other expenses. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest. considering that it was the trial judge who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution. It is not disputed. observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. Nuances of tone or voice. flush of face and dart of eyes.00 for fare. that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. 1984? .

Q From whom did you get that information? A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information. 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin. 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources. sir. Q But you received it from your regular informer? A Yes. For instance. .A Yes. two days before June 25. sir. Q When did you receive this intelligence report? A Two days before June 25. I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin A Previous to June 25. maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the person. prior to June 25. sir. report of illegal gambling operation. 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin. Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report? A Well. Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date? A Yes. 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9? A Yes. Q What were those activities? A Purely marijuana trafficking. COURT: Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25. 1984. sir. 1984 when we received this information from that particular informer. Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25.

1984. only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned? A Yes. COURT: Q And as a result of that report. Q In the intelligence report.1984. you put him under surveillance? A Yes. 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming? A Before June 23. 1984.1984 two days before? A Yes. Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25. I. you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25. LLARIZA: Q Previous to June 25. in my capacity. you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs? A Marijuana. Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23.ATTY. Q You mean that before June 23. did not know that he was coming but on June 23. Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing? A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities. 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was coming. we have reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff. . sir. sir. Regarding the reports on his activities. 1984? A Only on the 23rd of June. sir. Q Are you sure of that? A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman. sir.

Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Q Why not? A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result. 2. especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. indeed. Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant anymore? A Search warrant is not necessary. 24 for example." . the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. The vehicle was Identified. In the case at bar. The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear: Sec. This is still a government of laws and not of men. there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured. 23 That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement. had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause. No effort was made to comply with the law. Contrary to the averments of the government. And from the information they had received. to justify the issuance of a warrant.Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report? A No. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. houses. Arca. it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. Yet they did nothing. more. The date of its arrival was certain. His name was known. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. The present case presented no such urgency.

What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. That evidence cannot be admitted. and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. As Justice Holmes." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another. "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. again. The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people. for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. the case of the prosecution must fall. when any one could be picked up at will. the accused-appellant was not. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent. we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return. it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm. however praiseworthy their intentions. and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him. said. it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed. to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees. committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. including the basest of criminals. especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. especially the susceptible youth. While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent. as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. In the case at bar. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin. But as demanding as this campaign may be. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised dictatorship. at the moment of his arrest. To all appearances. Hence. . The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree.In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act. detained without charges and punished without trial. to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase.handedness from the authorities. the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant. JJ. . It is so ordered. his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.. Gancayco and Medialdea. concur. the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. Narvasa. ACCORDINGLY.

PEOPLE VS TUAL .

Exploitation and Discrimination Act. 7610. 1997. Captain of Bgy. and SPO2 ELEAZAR M. vs. helping with one another. Medical Certificate issued from Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center. did then and there. 1997. before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R. petitioner. or on September 8.: This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military dated 19 January 1998[1] which recommended the dismissal of the criminal complaint filed by petitioner against herein private respondents for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code for delay in the delivery of detained persons. 1997. Philippines and within the Preliminary Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. SPO2 Eleazar M. J. SPO4 NEMESIO NATIVIDAD. petitioner filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against herein private respondents SPO4 Nemesio Natividad. GICAYARA. 1997. the above-named accused.A. Upon initial investigation of the Bgy.‖ On September 10. conspiring. the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan. while accused JASPER AGBAY manipulating to finger the vagina of GAYLE FATIMA AMIGABLE GICAYARA. Metro Cebu. the ―Special Protection of Children Against Child abuse. committing petitioner to the jail warden of Cebu City. Brgy. Catarman. Jr. or on September 17. 1997.[7] Five (5) days later. together with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot. confederating. JOAN A.A. 1997.[6] On September 12.‖[5] Private respondents did not act on this letter and continued to detain petitioner. SOLOMON. counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the immediate release of petitioner considering that the latter had ―failed to deliver the detained Jasper Agbay to the proper judicial authority within thirty-six (36) hours from September 7. Mrs. 7610 was filed against petitioner and Jugalbot before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan. feloniously and unlawfully. Liloan. The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows: On September 7. was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station.[9] . THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY. willfully.AGBAY VS OMBUDSMAN JASPER AGBAY. a Complaint for violation of R. respondents.[8] On September 26. petitioner was ordered released by the said court after he had posted bond.‖ [3] The following day. DECISION GONZAGA-REYES. Metro Cebu by one Joan Gicaraya for and in behalf of her daughter Gayle[4] The complaint. petitioner. reads as follows: ―That on the 7th day of September 1997 at Sitio Bonbon. Cebu City is hereto attached. accused SHERWIN JUGALBOT was released and accused JASPER AGBAY is presently detain Liloan Police Station Jail. 1997. while on board a tricycle going their destinations. and the Order of April 13 1998[2] which denied his motion for reconsideration. insofar as pertinent.. Salomon and other unidentified police officers stationed at the Liloan Police Substation. his companion block the sight of the Private Complainant. Catarman. JR. Metro Cebu issued an order. denominated as ―Detention During the Pendency of the Case‖.

‖[10] By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 125. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT IS BEYOND ITS COMPETENCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF LILOAN-COMPOSTELA HAS IN FACT NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE CASE FILED AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER. DATED 10 OCTOBER 1995. IV. it is alleged by petitioner that on November 10. the 7th MCTC of Liloan.[11] the case for delay in delivery filed by petitioner against herein private respondents before the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas was transferred to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for its proper disposition. Forward the record of this case to the Provincial Fiscal‘s Office for appropriate action. WHILE HAVING AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. IS NOT THE ―PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY‖ CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 125 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RELYING ON MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS COMPETENCE TO ACT ON THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE BEFORE IT. Thus. NULL AND VOID. THE SAID CIRCULAR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL. now denominated as OMB-VIS-CRIM-97-0786. Hence. HENCE. 1998 recommending its dismissal against herein private respondents.Regarding the complaint for violation of R. Series of 1995. 7610. 1997. SERIES OF 1995. II. III. Metro Cebu issued a resolution containing the following dispositive portion: ―WHEREFORE. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE MCTC. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this Resolution but this motion was denied in an Order dated April 13. and which issued the questioned Resolution dated January 19. this petition for certiorari. it is hereby recommended that an INFORMATION be filed against the two aforenamed accused. dated 10 October 1995 of the Office of the Ombudsman. The grounds relied upon in the present petition[12] are as follows: I. 14. THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT BEFORE IT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DID NOT INTERRUPT THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY ART. HENCE. 1998. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLIDING THAT THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDER OF DETENTION IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE . finding probable cause for the crime in Violation of Republic Act 7610.A. 14. it was this office which acted on the complaint.

V. 14. nothing can prevent Congress from giving the Ombudsman supervision and control over the Ombudsman‘s deputies. Structural Organization. the petitioners. the Ombudsman `may exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties‘ as Congress may prescribe through legislation.. has mandated the establishment of ―one police force. Therefore. Petitioner also questions the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. which shall be national in scope and civilian in character (underscoring supplied). No. Section 11 of R. The 1987 Constitution. one being the deputy for the military establishment. a review of the relevant Constitutional provisions reveal otherwise. 11.A. has no competence or jurisdiction to act on his complaint against private respondents who are members of the PNP. violates the latter‘s civilian character. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE DUTY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO FILE THE NECESSARY COMPLAINT IN COURT WAS FULFILLED WHEN THEY FILED A FORMAL COMPLAINT ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1997 WITH THE 7TH MCTC OF LILOAN-COMPOSTELA. this Court held that: ―The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do not yield conclusive evidence that such deputy is prohibited from performing other functions or duties affecting non-military personnel. who shall have supervision and control of the said Office. Office of the Ombudsman. As previously established. As opined by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment dated 7 December 1998[15]. In this light. the issue as to whether the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military has the authority to investigate civilian personnel of the government was resolved in the affirmative in the case of Acop v. in Section 6.[16] In that case. who were members of the Philippine National Police questioned the jurisdiction of the Deputy Ombudsman to investigate the alleged shootout of certain suspected members of the ―Kuratong Baleleng‖ robbery gang. 6770 provides: SEC. by virtue of the description of the Office. 6975[13] is categorical in describing the civilian character of the police force.The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Ombudsman.‖ Likewise.[14] The only question now is whether Memorandum Circular No. petitioner argues that due to the civilian character of the Philippine National Police. in vesting the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military with jurisdiction to investigate complaints against members of the PNP. R.A. Article XVI. 14 insofar as it purports to vest the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs with jurisdiction to investigate all cases against personnel of the Philippine National Police. On the first issue. the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. There is no dispute as to the civilian character of our police force. On the contrary.OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS. While Section 31 thereof declares: .

absent any grave abuse of discretion. The said Office was established ―to extend the Office of the Ombudsman to the military establishment just as it champions the common people against bureaucratic indifference‖. as in this case. Accordingly. 12. Petitioner further argues that Memorandum Circular No. We fail to see how the assumption of . state prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. is by no means a member of the military establishment. might be in derogation of the powers of the President as Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces[20] It must be borne in mind that the Office of the Ombudsman was envisioned by the framers of the 1987 Constitution as the ―eyes and ears of the people‖[21] and ―a champion of the citizen. This doctrine. which is seemingly independent of the President. ―applies only to isolated or individual cases involving non-military personnel referred by the Ombudsman to the Deputy for Military Affairs‖ and does not apply when. petitioner argues. may not interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his power of supervision and control over the said Office.A. Petitioner states that the doctrine laid down in the said case is simply that ―the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs. In these cases at bench. The Office was intended to help the ―ordinary foot soldiers‖ to obtain redress for their grievances against higher authorities and the drafters of the Constitution were aware that the creation of the Office.SEC.‖[19] Said contentions are misplaced. state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. 6975 to maintain the civilian character of the police force and ―would render nugatory and meaningless the distinction between cases involving civilian and military personnel and the creation of separate divisions of the Ombudsman. Those designated or deputized to assist him herein shall be under his supervision and control.. 31. The Office of the Ombudsman.‖[17] The cited case is determinative of the issue. XI of the 1987 Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his deputies as ―protectors of the people. the Ombudsman and his deputies. petitioner. in his Reply to Comment dated February 1.The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal. to perform functions which constitutionally should be performed by the President.[22]‖ Sec. argues that the ruling in the Acop case is not on all fours with the case at bar[18]. the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs. there is a wholesale or indiscriminate referral of such cases to the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs in the form of an Office Memorandum Circular.‖ Thus. in turn. However. is simply exercising the power vested in the Ombudsman ―to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal. Petitioner‘s arguments do not convince as there is no basis for the distinction. no irregularity attended the referral by the Acting Ombudsman of the Kuratong Baleleng case to respondent Casaclang who. The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. in issuing Memorandum Circular No. therefore. including the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military owe their allegiance to the people and ordinary citizens. it is clearly not a part of the military. first and foremost. There is no basis in the above-cited decision to limit the referral of cases involving nonmilitary personnel to the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs to isolated or individual cases. 15. despite his designation as such. created a panel of investigators. Art. 1999.‖ This Court. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. 14 violates the clear intent and policy of the Constitution and of R.

125 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as follows: ―Art. or their equivalent. Under these circumstances. an afflictive penalty. specifically section 5(b) thereof[23]. the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military in its 13 April 1998 Order. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.A. As such. As borne by the records before us the mother of private complainant. he still retains the authority to issue an order of release or commitment. 1997. to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel. petitioner was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station on 7 September 1997 for an alleged violation of R. 125[24] considering that under the Rules it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction to try the case against him. 125. and thirty-six hours (36) hours. 7610 before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan. As such. barely 20 hours after the arrest of herein complainant of September 7. upon the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. there was already compliance with the very purpose and intent of Art. 125[27] The core issue is whether the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court constitutes delivery to a ―proper judicial authority‖ as contemplated by Art. 125. a surplusage which did not interrupt the period prescribed by Art.A.The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours. The other issues raised by petitioner concerns the application of Art. In every case. eighteen (18) hours. for his part. . private respondents were already guilty of violating Art.‖[26] The Solicitor General. 7610. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. argues that while a municipal court judge may conduct preliminary investigations as an exception to his normal judicial duties. Thus. or their equivalent. Joan Gicaraya. 1997.‖ In the case at bar. This crime carries a penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. a criminal complaint or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within thirty six (36) hours of his arrest. 1997 with the 7th MCTC of Liloan-Compostela. upon the lapse of the thirty-six hours given to the arresting officers to effect his delivery to the proper Regional Trial Court.jurisdiction by the said office over the investigation of cases involving the PNP would detract from or violate the civilian character of the police force when precisely the Office of the Ombudsman is a civilian office. upon his request. stated that the duty of filing the corresponding complaint in court was ―fulfilled by respondent when the formal complaint was filed on September 8. for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties. was unnecessary. he was acting contrary to law since by then there was no basis for the continued detention of petitioner. filed a complaint on 8 September 1997 against petitioner for violation of R. the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed. Petitioner contends that the act of private complainant in filing the complaint before the MCTC was for purposes of preliminary investigation as the MCTC has no jurisdiction to try the offense.[25] In addressing the issue. for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties. This act of private complainant petitioner argues. or their equivalent. for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties. when the Judge-Designate of the 7th MCTC issued a Commitment Order on September 12. . Metro Cebu. petitioner argues.

the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and. 125. The cited cases of Sangguniang Bayan and Castillo dealt with the issue of whether or not the findings of the Municipal Court Judge in a preliminary investigation are subject to review by provincial and city fiscals. we note that it was the mother of private complainant who filed the complaint against petitioner with the 7th MCTC of Liloan. 862. that the city fiscal is not the proper judicial authority referred to in Art. conducts a preliminary investigation. Finally.‖ Thus. 171 SCRA 39. ‗the Sup reme Court and other such inferior courts as may be established by law. Metro Cebu. and Castillo vs. he performs a non-judicial function as an exception to his usual duties. as in the instant case. supra. Petitioner‘s reliance on the cited cases is misplaced. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail[34]. upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court. If there was any error in this . in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Sayocase[31]. Villaluz. it is undisputed that a municipal court judge. In Sayo. petitioner opines. There was no pronouncement in these cases as to whether or not a municipal trial court. 125 mean ―the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense. the complaint was filed with the city fiscal of Manila who could not issue an order of release or commitment while in the instant case. since the facts of this case are different. where it was held that ―when a preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge. In support. and in filing by the city fiscal of an information with the corresponding city courts after an investigation if the evidence against said person warrants. it punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law.‖ The power to order the release or confinement of an accused is determinative of the issue. even in the performance of his function to conduct preliminary investigations. this Court even made a pronouncement that the delivery of a detained person ―is a legal one and consists in making a charge or filing a complaint against the prisoner with the proper justice of the peace or judge of Court of First Instance in provinces. Thus. 80 Phil.[30]‖ Petitioner takes great pains in arguing that when a municipal trial court judge. is a proper judicial authority as contemplated by Art. that is. 260 SCRA 561. petitioner cites the cases ofSangguniang Bayan ng Batac. retains the power to issue an order of release or commitment[32]. 125 is applicable. Chief of Police of Manila. We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article. he may be released on bail[33]. the intent behind Art. Chief of Police. Furthermore. Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine enunciated in Sayo vs. the ruling in Sayo v.Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail[28]. 125 without such detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities[29] The words ―judicial authority‖ as contemplated by Art. the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act. More specifically. In contrast with a city fiscal. Ilocos Norte vs. the complaint was filed with a judge who had the power to issue such an order. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art. Furthermore. Albano. he is not acting as a judge but as a fiscal. in the exercise of its power to conduct preliminary investigations. upon his application with the court.

Romero. finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed January 19. .procedure. Vitug. JJ. and Purisima. SO ORDERED.. 1998 Resolution and the April 13. (Acting Chairman). abroad. J. Respondent police officers may have rendered themselves open to sanctions if they had released petitioners without the order of the court. No pronouncement as to costs. knowing fully well that a complaint was already filed with it. concur. WHEREFORE. 1998 Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. petitioner‘s argument that the controversial orders issued by the MCTC are contrary to law does not give rise to criminal liability on the part of the respondents. on official business leave. In the same manner. private respondents should not be held liable. Panganiban. the Court resolves to DISMISS the petition..

Cavite to sell there.R. TEEHANKEE. Dator for defendants-appellees. Pedro Figueroa. Limcaoco for plaintiff-appellant. No. 1969 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. The accused with their cargo were brought to Philippine Navy Headquarters at Manila. L-24273 April 30. KARIM JAUKAL. having in their possession and custody. 1 Provincial Fiscal Zoilo Alviar of Palawan later on the same day showed up at the Navy Headquarters and conducted a preliminary investigation. . defendants-appellees. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Sulu and which. taking the sworn written statements of the arresting officers. 1964.PEOPLE VS FIGUEROA G. Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. STAJI BADTANG and ENTAS BAANG. aboard the kumpit M/L "Pershia" three hundred eighty-eight cases (of 50 cartons per case) of "Old Gold" blue seal cigarettes. the accused were not given ample chance and opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted by the investigating fiscal. Tanza. where they were investigated on December 14. The accused were apprehended on December 13. which they had gotten from Jolo. he was taking to Hulugan.: Appeal by the State from the Order of the Court of First Instance of Palawan sustaining the motion to quash the information on the ground that in the Court's opinion. All nine accused admitted the fact of their having been apprehended off Tara Island aboard the kumpit loaded with the untaxed cigarettes. Na hinuli kami dahil sa ang aming sasakyang dagat (Unnamed) ay kinapapalagyan ng mga sigarilyong blue seal nangangahulugang walang bayad ng tax sa BIR. that they were agreeable to Fiscal Alviar conducting the preliminary investigation of their case in Manila and that they were waiving the provision of Section 125 of the Revised Penal Code. BOY AHIJAL.2 as well as of the accused. CELEDONIO CARINGAL. 1964 by investigating officers of the Naval Judge Advocate General and before whom they individually executed affidavits in question and answer form. RAJAH MAHAMMAD. Jesus M. without first having paid the Government the specific taxes due thereon in the amount of P102. among them Servicemen Rodolfo Baltazar and Esteban Sumil. MUSTALI GAJALI. Palawan sa umaga ng December 13. de Castro and Solicitor Conrado T.432. PEDRO FIGUEROA. malapit sa Busuanga. J. Alafriz. vs. plaintiff-appellant. as follows: SA SINUMANG KINAUUKULAN: Kaming nakalagda sa ibaba ay nagsasabing kami ay nahuli ng sasakyang dagat ng Philippine Navy sa dagat na pumapaligid sa isla ng Tara. ALI MAHAMMAD.00. 1964 by officers and crew of the Philippine Navy RPS "Antique" off the island of Tara within the province of Palawan. according to the patron of the vessel. The accused jointly executed a statement stating that they knew they would have to face criminal charges before the Court as a result of their apprehension.

counsel for the accused filed a Motion to Quash. Rule 112 of the new Rules of Court. 1965. si Fiscal ZOILO Q."5 This was what Assistant Fiscal Abaca did upon the arrival of the accused and the arresting officers at Puerto Princesa on December 19. kami ay sumasangayon na humarap sa Provincial Fiscal ng Palawan. alleging that in violation of Section 14.9 The information bore the earlier date of December 16. and the case was scheduled for arraignment on January 19. dito rin sa Maynila at makunan ng karapatang "preliminary investigation" sang ayon sa batas ng korte suprema (Rules of Court). the corresponding information for violation of Section 174 in relation to Section 183 of the National Internal Revenue Code. "to obviate any technical defect of the preliminary investigation that I conducted. na nahuli hinggil sa isang paglabag sa batas. 1964.M. Fiscal Alviar wrote a letter to Assistant Fiscal R. Nang dahil dito. Fiscal Abaca later stated under oath at the hearing that he prepared the information on December 19.6 He advised the accused that they were entitled to counsel. the latter should conduct still another investigation in Puerto Princesa. He suggested to his assistant that while he had already conducted a preliminary investigation in Manila. 1964 by Fiscal Abaca. the fiscal further asked them whether they had any questions to ask from Servicemen Baltazar and Sumil to which they replied in the negative. the information against the accused . Fiscal Alviar sent from Manila a telegram to his assistant at Puerto Princesa. appearing on the information was but a clerical error.Na nalalaman naming dahil sa pagkakahuli sa amin ay mapapaharap kami sa husgado upang harapin ang sakdal laban sa amin.10 The accused Pedro Figueroa and Celedonio Caringal posted bail. December 14. Servicemen Baltazar and Sumil. December 19. ALVIAR.8 Their sworn statements to this effect were again taken down in writing before Assistant Fiscal Abaca. sa opisyal ng husgado (judicial authorities) sa loob ng anim na oras. 1964 but was subscribed and sworn and filed in court on December 19. 1964. December 15. 1964. Upang mabigyan ng kaukulang panahon ang nasabing Fiscal. December 16.4 On the following day. the accused testified further that the contents of their affidavits were explained to them and that the facts stated therein were true. Maynila. who thereafter filed on the same day. confronted them with their affidavits in the presence of the arresting officers Servicemen Baltazar and Sumil and had the accused identify their respective affidavits and signatures thereon. stating that the accused would be brought by the Philippine Navy to Puerto Princesa by the same arresting officers. at 8:15 A. stating that he had conducted a preliminary investigation in Manila and instructing his assistant to file the corresponding information for illegal possession of the untaxed 388 cases of cigarettes against the accused. 1964. ay pumapayag kaming itatwa ang aming karapatang sang-ayon sa Sec.3 On the next day. 1964. Abaca. while their coaccused remained under detention. 1964 and that the date of December 16. 125 ng kodigo penal na naguutos sa sinumang opisyal ng gobierno na dalhin ang sinumang tao. On January 11. by asking all of the respondents and the arresting officers to identify and affirm the truth and correctness of their previous sworn statements given before Fiscal Alviar in Manila. Fiscal Alviar then interrogated the accused individually. 1966. Palawan.7 but they declined and readily reaffirmed their previous sworn statements before Fiscal Alviar in Manila. as amended by Republic Act No. 4097.

. Under these circumstances. 1964. The investigation was made hurriedly on the understanding of the investigating Fiscal that they were under custody. and there after dictated in open court his order. he showed and read to them their previous statements and asked each and every one of them whether. by the mere fact that instead of retaking their statements."11 The motion was heard on the next day and Fiscal Alviar filed a written opposition where he informed the Court that "According to the records of this case 2nd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Abaca conducted a preliminary investigation on December 19. questioned him extensively14 and likewise had him cross-examined extensively by defense counsel. Fiscal Abaca. The Provincial Fiscal sent a telegram to First Assistant Provincial Fiscal Miclat. there is no ground to say that accused were not given a chance to be heard or any opportunity to interpose their defenses in the preliminary investigation.. the lower court took the extraordinary step of placing Assistant Fiscal Abaca on the stand. The accused and the prosecution witnesses saw Fiscal Abaca on December 19. There is no showing at all whether they waived their rights to Section 125 of the Revised Penal Code or not to warrant an immediate preliminary investigation without giving the accused the chance to prepare. 1964. In said investigation. both the prosecution witnesses and those of the accused. Right then on December 19... dismissing the information and ordering the Fiscal "to conduct a new preliminary investigation in this case in order to afford the accused all the chances to be heard in the preliminary investigation. "A". Although these statements that were referred to in the investigation conducted by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Abaca. 1964. Then the accused were brought to Puerto Princesa. requesting him to file a rush case of Illegal Possession of Smuggled Goods against the herein accused. the accused did not raise any defense nor adduce any fact to exculpate them. the province where the alleged crime was committed. because the witnesses were only reiterating before him what they have already testified to before Fiscal Alviar. when the prosecution witnesses went to the office of the Provincial Fiscal. the accused were investigated also. After the investigation of the prosecution witnesses. it was conducted in Manila and not in Palawan.was "filed by the Provincial Fiscal without conducting a preliminary investigation or if there was any. The first questions appearing in the statement of the prosecution witnesses were the very questions which were suggested by Fiscal Alviar to Fiscal Abaca in his letter to him Exh. "1". in which investigation he interrogated the witnesses for the prosecution as well as the accused under oath and recorded their testimonies. "1" which is self-explanatory. 1954 Exh.13lawphi1. Exh.nêtNotwithstanding all these. There can be irregularity in the investigation conducted by 2nd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Abaca. In their statements. Besides." 12 Fiscal Alviar further presented to the Court the records of the investigation of the accused. in the opinion of the Court. was of the notion that the investigation made in Manila was sufficient as could be gleaned from the telegram Exh "A". denied summarily the fiscal's motion for reconsideration. the Fiscal. they all acknowledged that those were their statements and each affirmed the truth thereof. this fact makes no difference in the validity of the preliminary investigation conducted by 2nd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Abaca. were taken by Provincial Fiscal Alviar in the City of Manila. Fiscal Abaca supposedly conducted a preliminary investigation. which telegram was received by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Abaca who was then in charge of office in the absence of First Assistant Provincial Fiscal Miclat. 1964. these were their statements and whether they affirm the truth and correctness of the fact stated. by the apprehending officers on December 19. in which case. Hernandez of the Philippine Navy delivered to Fiscal Abaca a letter from Fiscal Alviar dated December 16.15 at the end of which he announced the granting of the motion to quash. all admitted and affirmed the truth and correctness of their statements which were shown to them and were read to them by the investigating Fiscal." The pertinent portions of his Order read: It appears that a preliminary investigation of this case was conducted by the Provincial Fiscal in Manila. Lt.

" 2. . and their affirmation thereof under oath was duly taken down in writing before the fiscal.xxx xxx xxx From the facts obtaining in this case.e. that in compliance with the requirements of Rule 112. the complaining witnesses and the accused in their previous testimonies before Fiscal Alviar. which statements remain unrepudiated by them. '1'". Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. however. Chief Justice Concepcion in People vs. was not to dismiss the information but to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the present case. the assistant fiscal of Palawan conducted the investigation in the presence of the arresting officers and the accused18 and afforded them "the right to be heard. to affirm the truth and correctness of their previous statements. section 14 on preliminary investigations by provincial or city. did not affect the validity and regularity of the investigation proceedings. in the light of their statements admitting their apprehension in flagrante delicto for possession of the untaxed cigarettes. The fact that the questions asked by the fiscal of the prosecution witnesses and the accused "were the very questions which were suggested by Fiscal Alviar to Fiscal Abaca in his letter to him. 14 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court has not been substantially complied with by the investigating Fiscal. the Court believes that Sec.17 had stressed this as the proper procedure. The lower Court's finding that "there is no showing at all whether (the accused) waived their rights to Section 125 of the Revised Penal Code or not to warrant an immediate preliminary investigation without giving the accused the chance to prepare" is not borne out by the record. as the lower court would apparently indicate as the appropriate procedure would have served no useful purpose nor added a whit of evidence as to the reasonable probability of the guilt of the accused. and to adduce evidence in (their) favor. fiscals or state attorneys. 3. to cross-examine the complainant and his witnesses. for the lower court's finding that the investigating fiscal had failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Rule 112. pointing out that "the absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. then what it could properly have done. therefore. Assuming that the trial court felt that the accused should have been given more "ample chance and opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation". and so holds." The fiscal duly advised respondents of their right to counsel but the accused chose merely to reiterate their sworn statements previously given before Fiscal Alviar in Manila. Where a witness or accused has previously given a statement. that the accused in this case were not given ample chance and opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation which is against the provisions of Sec 14. section 14 of the Rules of Court. i.nêt 1. since in its own Order it recognized that Fiscal Abaca had conducted a preliminary investigation although "hurriedly" in its opinion. for purposes of the filing of the information. There was no basis. it is a perfectly valid procedure often availed of to avoid needless waste of time to just ask him whether he affirms the same statement and the truth and correctness of the contents thereof. This Court. The accused chose not to raise any defense nor adduce any evidence to exculpate themseIves.16 We hold the lower court's order quashing the information for lack of substantial compliance with Section 14 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court to be patently erroneous and set it aside. Casiano. speaking through now Mr. the Court is of the opinion. and answered by. Exh. The record amply shows. To require the investigating fiscal to repeat the same questions asked of.lawphi1. Honestly speaking.

. but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. 1964. 1964 was but in compliance with the requirements of the abovequoted rule. Aside from the sworn certification in the information by the investigating fiscal that he had duly conducted a preliminary investigation. three days before it was actually subscribed and filed with the Court. for the information against them was filed on December 19. where the accused has not made such waiver. Notwithstanding such waiver the investigation must be terminated within seven (7) days from its inception. But assuming that the lower Court had correctly found that there was no waiver by the accused of the provisions of Section 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The immediate and "hurried" investigation conducted on December 19. If we will have the investigation later.21 4. the date when the preliminary investigation was conducted". — Where the accused is detained without a warrant for his arrest. It refused to believe the fiscal's explanation that the date "16" appearing oil the information was a typographical error . neither would it have been justified in dismissing the information. which provides: SEC." This. he may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with the preceding sections. 6. the accused have to be released"20 pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 112. 1964 by the investigation fiscal in Puerto Princesa. ask for a reinvestigation thereof with the same right to crossexamine the witnesses against him and adduce evidence in his favor. (to) ask for a reinvestigation thereof with the same right to cross-examine the witnesses against him and adduce evidence in his favor. without conducting a preliminary investigation. as held by the Court itself in its Order. this was a mere triviality which was of no relevance to the issues. Investigation of person in custody. the accused failed to do. If the case has already been filed in court and no preliminary investigation has been conducted by the fiscal because the accused has not made the waiver referred to in the preceding paragraph. Their Motion to Quash was filed much later only on January 11. The information was not complete until it was subscribed together with the fiscal's sworn certification "on December 19. as amended. section 15 expressly authorizes the fiscal to immediately file the case in court against a detained person arrested without a warrant. The right granted by the Rule to the accused in such cases is "within a period of five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information. the accused may. The lower Court erred in choosing to believe against the uncontradicted sworn testimony of the investigating fiscal that the information was prepared on December 16. so that in this case there is that element of expediency. 5. because if it was really so the subscribing fiscal should have corrected it.19 and the investigating fiscal had precisely informed the Court that "(N)otwithstanding such waiver the investigation must be terminated within seven days from its inception.. At any rate. 15. 1964 and they did not ask for such reinvestigation within a 5-day period thereafter." But such overlooked typographical errors do occur frequently. considering that the accused were under detention by virtue of their lawful arrest on December 13. This Court finds also that the procedure adopted by the lower court of placing the investigating fiscal on the witness stand and subjecting him to cross-examination by defense counsel was highly improper. 1965. the entire record of the investigation with the sworn statements of the complaining witnesses and the accused had .The joint waiver executed by the accused is reproduced hereinabove. within a period of five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information. 1964. For Rule 112.

Justice Jose P. malicious. The late Mr. Reyes. C. The investigating judge or prosecuting officer acts upon probable-cause and reasonable belief.. the time to ask for more is at the trial. When all this is fulfilled. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro voted for the setting aside of the order appealed from and the remanding of the case to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the decision.. expenses and anxiety of a public trial. . from the trouble.23 Certainly. thus ". Makalintal.. an objection on the ground of denial or deprivation thereof deserves scant consideration by virtue of the presumption that both the court as well as the prosecution proceeded in accordance with law. Dizon. The lower Court disregarded the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed22 and the well-settled rule that when nothing appears affirmatively on the record that a preliminary investigation was not in fact held. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. The Court had intended to remove this clog upon the judicial machinery and to make a preliminary investigation as simple and as speedy as is consistent with the substantial rights of the accused. speaking for this Court in 1941. such as giving them a chance to cross-examining the complaining witnesses. placed the role and object of preliminary investigations in proper perspective. in order to obviate the recurrence of these cases... to be followed by the trial proper. and oppressive prosecutions. as to whether the affirmation by the arresting officers and the accused of their previous testimonies without retaking them was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court and impertinent questions as to whether "the statement of the Philippine Navy as complainant" was taken. Sanchez.L. not upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. defense counsel must first overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and present strong prima facie evidence of irregularity or falsification of the investigating fiscal's certification and record of the investigation for the Court to deny them the faith and credence properly due them. Zaldivar. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.been presented to the Court. The lower Court may have had its reasons for directing questions to the fiscal to satisfy itself that the accused's rights had been duly safeguarded. where the State's efforts at great expense and zeal to thwart traffickers in smuggled goods who undermine the national economy are frustrated by a distorted view of the nature and purpose of preliminary investigations.J. J. 7. concurs and certifies that Mr. took no part. With costs in solidum against defendants-appellees. the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the lower Court is directed to proceed with the arraignment and trial of the accused upon the information filed in the case. A final word on the summary nature of preliminary investigation proceedings seems appropriate. concur. and also to protect the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. the accused will not be permitted to cast about for fancied reasons to delay the proceedings.. was uncalled for.B. and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime. J. Laurel. The investigation is advisedly called preliminary. Actg.. Capistrano.. JJ. But to have the fiscal placed on the witness stand and have the defense counsel cross-examine and argue with him on points of law.. Its oft-repeated purpose is to secure the innocent against hasty. The new Rules were drafted in the light of the Court's experience with cases where preliminary investigations had dragged on for weeks and even months. Fernando and Barredo."24 ACCORDINGLY.

Esam Gadi. On 9 February 1994. Admitting that this motion was filed beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 7. of Pasay city and granted the motion for reinvestigation of private respondent Esam Gadi.00. No. but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. as amended. 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE ALFREDO GUSTILO. a national of Saudi Arabia. the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this rule. Esam Gadi then posted a cash bond of P90. peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having first been conducted. 7. Esam Gadi filed an "Ex Parte Motion to Reduce Bail. However.PEOPLE VS CA G. J. RESOLUTION FELICIANO. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec." 1 claiming that the seriousness of the offense charged warranted the grant of his motion. COURT OF APPEALS and ESAM GADI y ABDULLAH.: Petitioners assail a Decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the Regional Trial Court. with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non- .000. 94-4826 in the Regional Trial Court. Branch 116. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Three (3) days later.R. on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person. Section 7.000. vs. respondents. on 6 January 1994. On 3 January 1994. 2 he contended that the reglementary period was not mandatory." from P90. Branch 116. was apprehended at the Manila International Airport and subsequently detained for possession of marijuana. as amended. Pasay City charging Esam Gadi with violation of section 81 Article 11. On 31 December 1993. This Motion was denied.000. Esam Gadi filed a motion for "reinvestigation.00 to P30. an information was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offensecognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party.00 which was approved by the trial court on 10 January 1994. before the filing of such complaint or information. 116623 March 23. of the Dangerous Drugs Act. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. petitioners.

ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. 5the . The period for filing a motion for preliminary investigation after an information has been filed against an accused who was arrested without a warrant has been characterized as mandatory by the Court. the Solicitor General contends that it is a mandatory rule that a motion for preliminary investigation be filed within five (5) days from the time the accused had learned of the filing of the information. the Court finds that the Court of Appeals fell into reversible error in granting the motion for "reinvestigation" of private respondent. he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated fifteen (15) days from its inception. considering the use of the word "may. Notwithstanding such waiver. Citing Tan vs. 7 Clearly. He then challenged the denial of his motion for "reinvestigation" in a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied) The motion for "reinvestigation" was denied by the trial court." The appellate court also relied on Go vs. The Supreme Court. Deliberating on the Petition for Review and the Comment of private respondent. Securities Exchange Commission. a responsible person of his own choice. 3 the Court of Appeals held that the five-day period for asking reinvestigation was only permissive. Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. In People vs. the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information. elaborating on the rationale of the rules on preliminary investigation.Supreme Court applied Section 15. The Court held that Section 15 of old Rule 112 granted the accused the right to ask for preliminary investigation within a period of five (5) days from the time he learned of the filing of the information. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and reversed the trial court Order denying reinvestigation. Court of Appeals" and held that a motion for preliminary investigation may be granted even if trial on the merits had begun. which is substantially reproduced in Section 7. Rule 112 6 of the old Rules. but it does not give him the right to do so after the lapse of the five-day period. As the accused in that case did not exercise his right within the five-day period. This is in accord with the intent of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to make preliminary investigation simple and speedy. A motion for reconsideration was likewise turned down on 8 March 1994. his motion for "reinvestigation" was denied. held: The new Rules were drafted in the light of the Court's experience with cases where preliminary investigations had dragged on for . provided that the motion was filed before arraignment. Figueroa.availability of a lawyer. the date of his arraignment where Esam Gadi pleaded not guilty. In this Petition for Review. If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been conducted. Section 7 of Rule 112 of the present Rules gives the accused the right to ask for a preliminary investigation. It is also maintained that Esam Gadi had waived his right to preliminary investigation when he posted bail for his release.

Put a little differently. Holding that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally and that the term "may" as used in adjective rules was only permissive and not mandatory. Two (2) cases relied upon in Tan are equally inapplicable to the present case. The investigating judge or prosecuting officer acts upon probable cause and reasonable belief. That term. 11 In Legaspi vs. however. The investigation is advisedly preliminary. When all this is fulfilled.S.S." was read as permissive rather than mandatory to avoid defeating the purpose of the law immediately to include sectoral representatives in the legislative councils of local government units. federal statute on equal opportunity for civilian employment in U. Securities and Exchange Commission 9 where the Supreme Court held that the term "may" as used in adjective rules is only permissive and not mandatory. that the five-day period prescribed in Section 7. the accused will not be permitted to cast about for fancied reasons to delay the proceedings. if he wanted to exercise that option. 8 (Emphases supplied) The respondent Court of Appeals held. legislation. Tan was concerned with "may" as used in a provision of theCorporation Code dealing with the transfer of shares of stock. The Court had intended to remove this clog upon the judicial machinery and to make a preliminary investigation as simple and speedy as is consistent with the substantial rights of the accused. the rule is mandatory. Upon expiration of that period. his option lapsed. not upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. Court of Appeals. he had to exercise it within the reglementary period. military installations which enumerated the remedies of an aggrieved party. however. this rule is permissive only. they cannot be used to support the proposition that the five-day period under section 7 of Rule 112 is not mandatory and may be disregarded at will. Rule 112 was not mandatory as the provision uses the permissive term "may. being indicative of a "possibility" or an 'opportunity. it does not refer to the filing of the motion after the expiration of the five-day period. Estrella. 13 While Tan and the cases there cited show that the use of the term "may" is indicative of an Opportunity or possibility. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. 337 or the old Local Government Code. Much the same situation obtains in respect of the period for filing a petition for review." As already noted. This rule grants the accused a right or faculty and not an obligation. In Shauf vs. to be followed by the trial proper. does not really support a ruling that the five-day period for asking for preliminary investigation of a person accused of crime is only permissive. In the sense that he is not obliged to exercise this right.S. however. The "opportunity" or "possibility" engendered by the use of the term "may" in this rule relates only to the option of filing a motion for preliminary investigation. Section 1. in the sense that he may exercise this right only within the five-day period. the Court of Appeals cited Tan vs. Esam Gadi had the option or faculty of demanding preliminary investigation. 12 the Court had to interpret "may" as used in section 146 of Batas Pambansa Blg.weeks and even months. Tan. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that: . 10 "may" was used in a U. it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. our Supreme Court held that the substantive remedies of a party were not limited to those enumerated in that U. the time to ask for more is at the trial.

Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party may appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by filing with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari within fifteen (15) daysfrom notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the corresponding docketing fee. The petition shall not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied) The use of "may" in Section 1 of Rule 45 refers only to the opportunity or option to file a petition for review. This, however, does not give a party a license to file a petition for review beyond the fifteen-day period. Hence, under Rule 45, Section 1, a petition for review filed after lapse of the fifteen-day period is not to be entertained. Innumerable petitions have been denied by the Court for having been filed unseasonably. The reliance of the Court of Appeals on the case of Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals 14 is misplaced. In Go, as in the present case, an information was filed without a prior preliminary investigation of the accused. The accused in both cases demanded their right to a preliminary investigation before arraignment. The similarity between the two (2) cases ends there. There are, upon the other hand, critical differences in the fact situations in one and the other case which must not be overlooked. In Go, the accused asked for preliminary investigation on the very day the information was filed. In the present case, Esam Gadi did so only on 9 February 1994, or a month after he had learned of the filing of the informationagainst him. In the present case, Esam Gadi insists on the application of Section 7, Rule 112 in effect claiming or conceding there was a lawful warrantless arrest. It appears that the accused was apprehended while engaged in the commission of an offense, i.e, possession of marijuana punishable under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended. In Go, the Court relied on the general rule that an information may be filed only after a preliminary investigation has been conducted. The Court did not apply Section 7, Rule 112 because there had been no arrest at all. The Court found that accused Rolito Go had merely walked into the police station in the company of his two lawyers and placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. In fact, the Court did not consider his act as surrender for the accused did not expressly declare that he was surrendering himself, probably to avoid the implication that he was admitting his guilt. Further, in Go, the Prosecutor had himself filed with the trial court a motion for leave to conduct a preliminary investigation. This motion, along with the application for bail, was in fact initially granted by the trial court. But the trial court a few days later turned around and inexplicably changed its mind, cancelled the bail, refused to accord preliminary investigation to the accused Go and the trial began over the vehement protests of Go. The court said: Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo vs. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion

was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner such preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period on Section 7 Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with. 15 (Emphases supplied) Hence, while the accused in Go was entitled to preliminary investigation as a matter of right, Esam Gadi is not. His right to demand preliminary investigation was subject to the condition that he should claim it seasonably. He did not do so. Esam Gadi, accordingly, effectively waived his right to a preliminary investigation. The denial of Esam Gadi's motion for preliminary investigation is also warranted: by his posting of a cash bail bond without previously or simultaneously demanding a preliminary investigation. In People vs. Hubilo, 16 an accused who had posted bail was deemed to have foregone his right to preliminary investigation. In the present case, EsamGadi asked for and was granted bail on 10 January 1994, or one month before he asked for a preliminary investigation on 9 February 1994. Once more Esam Gadi in fact waived his right to preliminary investigation. In Go, in contrast, the accused had asked for preliminary investigation and the right to post bail at the same time in one omnibus motion. Accordingly, the Court held that the accused in Go had not waived his right to preliminary investigation: Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison (110 Phil. 839 [1961]), we did not hold that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one. 17 (Emphases partly in the original and partly supplied) All in all, Esam Gadi's demand for preliminary investigation was an afterthought merely. WHEREFORE, the petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 116 of Pasay City dated 14 February 1994 and 8 March 1994 are hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 94-4820, with all deliberate dispatch. Costs against private respondent. WE CONCUR: Romero, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.

GUNABE ET AL VS DOP

G.R. No. L-1231 January 30, 1947 MACARIO GUNABE, SULPICIO GUNABE and MARGARITO DRILLON Petitioners, vs.THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, Respondent. Francisco Astilla for petitioners. Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, jr. and Solicitor Makasiar for respondent. PARAS, J.: The petitioners more or less admit that in November, 1942, they were charged in criminal cases Nos. 988 and 1010 of the Court of First Instance of Manila with murder and frustrated murder and that, in virtue of said cases (continued as criminal cases 1838 and 1839) which are still pending, the petitioners have been detained by the respondent Director of Prisons under proper commitment orders. Nevertheless, in the present petition for the writ of habeas corpus, the petitioners pray for their release on the grounds (1) that from one to four months after their arrest, their detention was unlawful as it was a brazen violation of their right to be delivered to the judicial authorities within six hours following their arrest, petitioner Macario Gunabe having been arrested on or about July 8, 1942, petitioner Sulpicio Gunabe on or about July 17, 1942, and petitioner Margarito Drillon on or about October 5, 1942; (2) that after the trial held about the end of September, 1943, the final termination of said cases were delayed to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the petitioners as defendants therein, nothing having been done by the prosecution since then until the liberation of the Philippines and until the date of the filing of the present petition for that matter, or for a period of more than three years now; (3) that, at any rate the petitioners should be released on amnesty, because the offenses for which they were prosecuted are political in nature, perpetrated by guerrilla men in the furtherance of their resistance movement during the enemy occupation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library With respect to the first ground, it is sufficient to state that the alleged failure of the authorities (who arrested or are detaining the petitioners) to deliver the latter to the judicial authorities within six hours - which may of course be the subject of criminal prosecution under article 125 of the Revised Penal Code - cannot affect the legality of the confinement of the petitioners which is admittedly under subsisting process, issued by a competent court. Indeed, if it appears that the persons alleged to be restrained of their liberty are in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge having jurisdiction to issue the process, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed. (Rules of Court No. 102, section 4.)chanrobles virtual law library The second ground cannot be sustained. An accused is entitled to speedy trial, but this right is necessary relative, consistent with reasonable delays, and usually depends upon circumstances. (Moran, Commentaries on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 476.) Said right may be waived by not objecting to postponements or other delays of the trial. (Id., p. 476.) The record does not show that the cases in question were not finally disposed of during the enemy occupation because of machinations of the prosecution, or that the petitioners objected to the alleged delays or insisted in the dismissal of the cases by reason by such delays. It cannot be reasonably expected that, after the liberation, trial could be resumed immediately, in view of the destruction of the records; and reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the

defense. It is to be noted that, when the original cases were in December, 1946, continued as criminal cases Nos. 1838 and 1839, the period within which court records may be reconstituted had not as yet expired. The cases of Conde vs. Judge of First Instance and Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas (45 Phil., 173), and Conde vs. Rivera and Unson (45 Phil., 650), are not in point, since the delay therein complained of was held to be due to the fault of the provincial fiscal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The third ground is likewise untenable. As to whether the petitioners were or are entitled to amnesty, is a question that should be ventilated in the trial Court (Villa vs. Allen, 2 Phil., 436), or before the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission created pursuant to Proclamation No. 8 dated September 7, 1946, by the President of the Republic of the Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The petition will be, as the same is, hereby denied. So ordered, with costs against the petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Moran, Bengzon, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Briones and Tuason, JJ., concur. Moran, C.J., I certify that Justice Padilla concurred in this decision.

PEOPLE VS MABONG

G.R. Nos. L-9805-06

March 29, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIONISIO MABONG, defendant-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Antonio A. Torres for appellee. Cipriano C. Alviso for appellant. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: In the afternoon on May 20, 1955, in the barrio of Rizal municipality of Lianga, province of Surigao, Rufo Verano, who was a rural policeman, heard some people shouting that one Dionisio Nabong went berserk. Verano went out of his house armed with a club and saw Mabong stab one Cipriano Tabel with a bolo. After pursuing and attacking his victim, Mabong faced Verano who told him to drop his bolo, and when he refused, Verano clubbed him on the face which caused him to stumble to the ground. Thereupon, Verano grabbed the bolo of the accused, tied him with a rope and brought him on a small boat to Lianga where he delivered him to the chief of police. On May 23, 1955, after proper investigation, Mabong was charged with murder in two separate informations by the chief of police before the Justice of the Peace of Lianga. When the, latter conducted the corresponding preliminary investigation, Mabong pleaded guilty, whereupon the Justice of the Peace forwarded the two cases to the court of first instance. In due time, the provincial fiscal filed against the accused the informations required by law, and when the court set the same for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to quash and a petition for habeas corpus alleging as main ground that his detention by the local authoritieds illegal upon the expiration of the period of eighteen (18) hours without having been proceeded with in accordance with law, and that the filing later on of the two criminal complaints against him by the chief of police did not have the effect of validating his detention. From the denial of said motion and petition, the accused took the present appeal. The law on which the accused relies in claiming the illegality of his detention is article 125 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. The penalties privided in the next preceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any persons to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and eighteen hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent. The law indeed provides that a public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within the period of eighteen (18) hours if the crime for which he is detained calls for an afflictive or capital penalty, may be held amendable to criminal prosecution, but there is nothing said therein that the charge fro which he has been detained and for which he has been properly indicted, becomes invalid or

As a matter of fact. It is true that the accused was detained in the municipal jail of Lianga for more than thrree (3) days before criminal charges were preferred against him before the justice of the peace court.) Wherefore. 1942 while the third petitioner was arrested in October. As the Solicitor General well observes. In a petition for habeas corpus subsequently filed in behalf of the petitioners. Reyes. that the justice of the peace of Lianga would issue a warrant for his arrest and start all over again with the case. and that since his detention no warrant of arrest has been issued by the court as a result of said charges. 77 Phil. J. with the filing on May 23. without costs. Labrador. (Rules of Court No. Padilla. JJ. "no practical good will come out of quashing the information presented and setting the appellant free. section 2.. of the Rules of Court. issued by a competent court. Director of Prisons.. 1955 of the corresponding criminal complaints against appellant.B. Concepcion. Indeed.. . A. among other things. the proceeding taken against him for the act he has committed remains unaffected.J. it is sufficient to state that the alleged failure of the authorities (who arrested or are detaining the petitioners) to deliver the latter to the judicial authorities within six-hours — which may of course be the subject of criminal prosecution under article 125 of the Revised Penal Code — cannot affect the legality of the confinement of the petitioners which is admittedly under subsisting process. it was alleged. Paras. 1942. the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. . such an act on the part of the public officer is not considered as one of the grounds on which one can predicate a motion to quash the complaint or information under Rule 113.L. the detention there after of the accused became legal and justified.. . C. for the two acts are distinct and separate. that their detention for periods varying from one to four months following their arrests was unlawful as it violated their right to be brought before proper judicial authorities within six (6) hours after their apprehension. is on all fours with the present case. Reyes. 993. if it appears that the persons alleged to be restrained of their liberty are in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge having jurisdication to issue the process. This cour denied the petition. two of the petitioners were arrested in July. the three were charged with murder and frustrated murder before the Court of First Instance of Manila. . Bengzon." The case of Gunable vs.nugatory. Endencia and Felix. In any event. 102. but the absence of such warrant can have no legal consequence it appearing that when the charges were filed he was already under the custody of local authorities. That will only mean a complaint will have to be filed anew against him. section 4. concur. There.. saying: With respect to the first ground. While public may be held criminally liable. and that the issuance of an of formality and had already become functus oficio. the writ of habeas corpus shall not be alllowed. In November ofthe same year.

m. 1966 ARTHUR MEDINA Y YUMUL. Federico Magdangal for petitioner.m. In these three no-office days. Petitioner claims violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. JR. Francisco A.: On application for habeas corpus. be justified even on the assumption that detention was originally arbitrary. First to be considered is the charge of arbitrary detention. Acting City Warden of Caloocan City.2 2. he was brought to court on the very first office day following arrest.. . Arraigned. by now. and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse. docketed as Criminal Case No. allegedly as one of those responsible for the death of one Marcelo Sangalang y Diwa which occurred on October 31. or thereafter release him. The arresting officer's duty under the law1 was either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours.R. on November 7 to 3:40 p. November 7. No.MEDINA VS ORCOZO G. it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer. an information for murder was filed against petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul. 1965 in said city. vs. L-26723 December 22. J. 1965. And then. OROZCO. At about 3:40 p. At about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day. Garcia for respondent. over 75 hours have elapsed. The fact however is that he was not released. and Antonio Olivar y Flores and Alexander Enriquez y Raginio in the Caloocan branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. But. draft the information and search for the Judge to have him act thereon. a capital offense. MARCELO F. where to locate and the certainty of locating those officers and employees could very well compound the fiscal's difficulties. and November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. 1965. November 8 was declared an official holiday. the case against Medina and two others for Sangalang's murder was referred to a fiscal. Medina and his co-accused stood trial — which has not yet terminated. SANCHEZ.m. on November 7. petitioner. who forthwith conducted a preliminary investigation in petitioner's presence. The facts are: At about 12:00 p. on November 10 when the information against him for murder actually was in court. they were promptly committed to jail. stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday. respondent. By court order. 1965. petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul was arrested and thereafter incarcerated in the Caloocan City jail. From the time of petitioner's arrest at 12:00 o'clock p. Nor could discharge from custody. C-1197 of said court. For. docket the case and have the order of commitment prepared. The crime — for which petitioner is detained — is murder. on November 10.m. 1.

They are separate concepts. Regala. 1966. Because. 1966. 1966 was transferred to September 6. Such detention remains unaffected by the alleged previous arbitrary detention. Finally. Indeed. Add to all of these the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. 1966. JJ. The arraignment of petitioner set for December 1. Costs against petitioner. petitioner's counsel moved to reset the date of hearing on the merits. 1965. the hearing scheduled on July 26. 1965.3 Thus. Concepcion. No bail was provided for him. 1965 he moved the office of the city fiscal for a reinvestigation of his case. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. The first is illegal.. the petition for habeas corpus came too late. The cry of deprivation of a speedy trial merits but scant consideration. Zaldivar and Castro. 5. Reyes. 1965 upon a murder indictment.Petitioner at present is jailed because of the court's order of commitment of November 10. And that reinvestigation was held on December 1.. . 1966 on motion of defendant Alexander Enriquez with the conformity of petitioner's counsel. petitioner has nothing whatsoever to show for it. J. 1965 was postponed to December 20. Besides. Reason is not wanting for this view. the case against him proceeded to trial. Other than that averment in the petition herein. it is frequently waived. 1966. the petition herein to set petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul at liberty is hereby denied.. we do not see denial to petitioner of the right to speedy trial.4 3. J. Makalintal.J. 1966 was recalendared for December 6. Delay of his own making cannot be oppressive to him. on April 14. to March 14. but the second is not..B. thence to February 28. is confirmed by the fact that on November 12. So ordered. the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance.P.6 These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court. It could even be waived. Thereafter. C. Dizon. As unavailing is petitioner's claim that no preliminary investigation was conducted by the fiscal before the criminal charge against him was registered in court. all on petition of counsel for the accused. In this factual environment. not this Court. arbitrary detention anterior thereto another. on motion of petitioner's counsel. Upon the other hand. because he is charged with a capital offense. detention under a valid information is one thing. Barrera. took no part. J. the assertion that such investigation was made on the very day of petitioner's arrest and in his presence.7 For the reasons given. Bengzon. And again. 4.L. including petitioner. the hearing on September 6..5 and the question of lack of preliminary investigation is well nailed down. not an appellate court. concur. Then. Simply because at the inception detention was wrong is no reason for letting petitioner go scot-free after the serious charge of murder has been clamped upon him and his detention ordered by the court.

assisted by Counsel Antonio Casurra. plaintiff-appellee. ROEL ENCINADA.[2] in Criminal Case No. did then and there willfully. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179. vs. with leave of court. 6425. No. Upon his arraignment. Indeed.[1] promulgated on July 15. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.[3] dated May 22.‖ Before arraignment. 1993 of the accused.[4] The trial court requested the prosecution to study the offer. PHILIPPINES. A yield of incriminating evidence will not legitimize an illegal search. J. Branch 32.. An Information. appellant pleaded ―not guilty‖ to the charge.R.[6] After the prosecution presented its evidence. 116720. the above-named accused. Surigao City Prosecutor Virgilio M. Egay charging appellant of said crime allegedly committed as follows: ―That on or about May 21. 1997] PEOPLE OF THE appellant. illegal possession of prohibited drugs.[8] questioning the admissibility of the evidence which allegedly was illegally seized from appellant. accused- DECISION PANGANIBAN. prohibited drugs) seized without a valid search warrant is inadmissible in any proceeding. October 2.[7] a ―Demurrer to Evidence‖ dated September 1. 1993. the Court reiterates the constitutional proscription that evidence (in this case. the end never justifies the means. more or less. in gross disregard of the prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act No.: In acquitting the appellant. The Case This principle is stressed in this appeal from the Judgment. was filed by Third Asst. which he transported to Surigao City from Cebu City aboard a passenger ship. appellant. 3668. 179. The court a quo denied the motion.[5] but the records do not show any agreement on such proposal. custody and control dried marijuana leaves weighing 800 grams. 1994 by the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City. Roel Encinada. 1992. convicting Appellant Roel Encinada of illegal transportation of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. i. 1992. as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. praying that he be acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of the inadmissibility . unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession. the defense filed. in the City of Surigao.e.PEOPLE VS ENCINADA [G. well knowing that such acts are expressly prohibited by law. offered to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Philippines. ruling:[9] ―For resolution is the demurrer to evidence dated September 1.

the decretal portion of which reads: ―WHEREFORE. premises considered. The search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of Rule 113. xxxx xxxx xxxx WHEREFORE. Tangliben (184 SCRA 220) the Supreme Court modified its ruling in the Aminuddin case when it held that the arrest and search is lawful when the police had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The boat carrying the accused was scheduled to dock in Surigao City at seven o‘clock the following morning when the courts had not yet opened. PNP chief of intelligence. After receiving the tip he relayed the information to SPO4 Cipriano Iligan. xxx xxx xxx A scrutiny of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the events leading to the arrest of the accused started when SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia. On cross-examination SPO4 Bolonia testified that the information was given to him by his asset at about four o‘clock in the afternoon of May 20. the assailed Judgment was rendered. Jr. and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20. of Republic Act No. The police cannot be faulted for acting on the tip and for stopping and searching the accused even without a warrant. the demurrer to evidence in question is denied for lack of merit. Malmstedt. It is therefore quite obvious that the police did not have enough time to apply for a search warrant in the interim. and to pay the costs. Roel Encinada. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179. chief of the PNP vice control section. . received a tip from his informer that the accused.of the evidence for the prosecution consisting of the marijuana (seized) from him by the police. SPO4 Bolonia further declared that he would have applied for a search warrant but there was simply no time for it. Roel Encinada would be arriving on board the M/V Sweet Pearl at about seven o‘clock in the morning of May 21.. He still had to inform SPO4 Iligan in order to coordinate with him. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 4. The accused raised the following issues.‖ After trial in due course. to wit: (1) Whether the arrest and search of the accused without a warrant would fall under the doctrine of warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest. (2) Whether the subject marijuana is admissible in evidence against the accused. 198 SCRA 401). xxx xxx xxx In the later case of People vs. Article II. 1992. premises considered. It is noted that the tip was given to SPO4 Bolonia by his informant at about the closing time of the offices of the various courts.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In the case at bar. the Court finds the accused. and. 1992. the accused was caught in flagrante delicto in actual possession of the marijuana. Section 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which allows a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest (People vs.000.

November 27. As the tricycle slowly moved forward. Iligan and other police officers deployed themselves in different strategic points at the city wharf to intercept Encinada. 1993. 13. March 3. of the same day. When the vehicle stopped. Bolonia already knew Encinada because the latter previously was engaged in illegal gambling known as ‗buloy-buloy. 29-30 TSN. TSN. 1992 on board the M/V Sweet Pearl bringing with him ‗marijuana. Bolonia. 30-32. ‗B‘. of the information he received. November 27.The marijuana (Exhibit B) involved in this case is hereby forfeited to the government to be destroyed or disposed of pursuant to present rules and regulations. SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia was in his house when he received a tip from an informant that Roel Encinada would be arriving in Surigao City from Cebu City in the morning of May 21. Bolonia chased it and ordered the driver to stop after identifying himself as a police officer. the chief of the Intelligence and Investigation Division. still holding the plastic chairs. to which the latter complied (pp. 1992). 1992). Between the stack of chairs. pp. 27-29. in the Appellee‘s Brief. 6-9 TSN. 4. In the early morning of May 21. May 14. From their various positions. Bolonia could see and smell the what appeared to be ‗marijuana. TSN. 11 TSN. pp. SPO3 Glen Abot and SPO3 Charlito Duero . November 27.as well as his colleague SPO4 Cipriano Iligan.‖ The Facts Version of the Prosecution The Solicitor General.m. p. Bolonia asked Encinada to hand over the plastic chairs. the M/V Sweet Pearl finally docked. 32-34. 1992. 1992. 6. The police officers saw Encinada walk briskly down the gangplank. there was a bulky package. 1993). March 3. At about 8:15 a. 1993. there was no more time to secure a search warrant (pp. 5. as follows:[10] ―At around 4 p. Exh. 38. Jr. TSN. 1993). 1992. carrying two small colored plastic baby chairs in his hand (p. 15-16 TSN.SPO3 Marcial Tiro. 10. ‗D‘ and sub-markings. 4. . Bolinia identified himself to Encinada and ordered him to alight from the tricycle. 1992.‘ Bolonia was then Chief of the Vice Control Squad of the Surigao City Police (pp. 29-30).m. pp. 35-39 TSN. 34-40. stacked together and tied with a piece of string. 1993. 35 TSN. 1992. November 27. The two plastic chairs (Exhibits D and D-1) are also forfeited to the government.‘ a prohibited drug (pp. pp. one green and the other blue.‘ After receiving the tip. May 14. of May 20. TSN.. 1993. pp. May 14. 17 TSN. 19. recounts the events leading to appellant‘s arrest. p. Bolonia examined it closely and smelled the peculiar scent of marijuana. 5. Bolonia notified the members of his team . pp. Making a small tear in the cellophane cover. the police officers followed Encinada immediately boarded a tricycle at Borromeo Street. March 3. Because the information came late. 1993. Bolonia noticed that there were two small chairs. March 3. November 27.

in the presence of one Nonoy Lerio who is a member of the local media and a friend of Encinada. Thereafter. The forensic chemist.)‖ Version of the Defense Appellant sets up denial as his defense. (within the City Proper). 24-40. the marijuana only weighed 610 grams. Bolonia. Daniel ‗Nonoy‘ Lerio. 1992. In the course of the investigation. 2) The accused proceeded to the Surigao PPA Gate and boarded a motorela bound for his residence at Little Tondo. 9-11 TSN. Cagayan de Oro City. the same was forcibly stopped by persons who ordered the passengers to disembarked (sic). tested the leaves and confirmed that they were positive for marijuana. ‗E‘. who was invited by the Police Investigators to witness the presentation of the alleged marijuana leaves. he denied ownership and possession of said plastic baby chairs. Exh.Encinada was brought to the central police station. he was openly protesting to the action taken by the police authorities and demanded from the apprehending officers a copy of a search warrant and/or warrant of arrest for the search made and for his apprehension. However. 12-17. The denial was witnessed by Mr. 34-35. 5) In the police headquarters. 41. the accused was made to undergo custodial investigation for which a plastic bag was presented to him allegedly containing the subject marijuana leaves. Inspector Vicente Armada. ‗B‘. March 3. 39-40 TSN. pp. November 27. The accused denied that the said plastic bag belonged to him. It was discovered that indeed. 1993. In his brief. 19-21. ‗C‘ and sub-markings. at around 8:00 o‘clock in the morning. On July 13. Before however the accused boarded the jeep. Encinada surrendered to Bolonia his passenger ticket issued by M/V Sweet Pearl (pp. during the said investigation. Bolonia brought the package of dried leaves for examination at the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Evangelista. The Motorela was fully loaded with passengers. the accused was seen to have disembarked from MV Sweet Pearl after an overnight trip from Cebu City. all the (baggage) of the passengers and the driver were ordered to stand in a line for which a body search was made individually (sic). the contents consisted of dried leaves known as marijuana. as follows:[11] ―1) In the morning of May 21. 3) When the motorela was already able to travel a distance of about ten (10) meters more or less. November 27. TSN. opened the package. 1992). 4) After the search was made. . 1992. with the accused as the fourth passenger. Jr. more or less. a member of the Surigao City Press. ‗A‘. Exh. which Armada opined to be probably due to shrinkage and moisture loss (pp. the accused was singled out in the line and ordered to board the service vehicle of the police and was brought to the PNP Police Station. Surigao City.1992.

the latter boarded back the motorela and directed the driver to proceed to the residence of the Encinada‘s at Little Tondo to verify whether it was really their son who was picked up by the police authorities. that the one who was picked up was the son of Mr. he was requested by the police authorities to witness the custodial investigation conducted upon the person of the accused. was ordered to board the Police service vehicle. 8. 8. All the four (4) passengers were ordered to disembarked (sic) from the motorela whereupon they were all subjected to body search including their (baggage). xxx xxx x x x‖ Aside from appellant. who. Encinada. and despite the protests made. while the 2 other male passengers just left the scene while the female passenger continued to board the motorela who directed him to proceed to the residence of Baby Encinada to verify whether the person picked up by the police authorities was related to the latter. the accused was singled out. and that she was one of the four (4) passengers of the motorela driven by Ruben Concha.‖ . the accused was placed immediately behind bars and the Information for Violation of RA 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. (the mother of the accused) is his (regular) customer. she and her husband immediately went to the Surigao PNP Headquarters to verify the (news) x x x. – testified that.a) Ruben Concha – the driver of the motorela who testified that he was surprised when the motorela he was driving was forcibly stopped (while already in motion ) by the police authorities while directing his four (4) passengers. 8. Jr.d) Isabelita Encinada – testified that she was informed by her manicurist (Josephine Nodalo) about the arrest x x x (of) her son. the defense also presented five (5) other witnesses whose testimony allegedly established the following:[12] ―8. (3 males and 1 female) to disembarked (sic) together with their (baggage). Encinada. being a member of the Press. She made this. That it was the male passenger who was sitting at the rear portion of the motorela who was picked up by the Police Authorities and despite the protests made was ordered to board the Police service vehicle. during the entire proceedings of the investigation vehemently denied having any knowledge about the marijuana leaves placed inside the plastic bag. That after the search was made. somewhere at the PPA Port Area and upon being informed. Daniel ‗Nonoy‘ Lerio.b) Josephine Nodalo – testified that she is a beautician. which motorela was forcibly stopped by men who are chasing it after travelling a distance of 5 to 10 meters away from its loading area near the PPA Gate. Upon learning from the persons who were gathered at the scene. as Mrs.‖ xxx xxx x x x.c) Mr. 179 was filed before the Court.6) After the custodial investigation.

the main issues are (1) the sufficiency of the evidence showing possession of marijuana by appellant and (2) the validity of the search conducted on the person and belongings of the appellant. The trial court further emphasized that appellant was caught carrying marijuana in flagrante delicto. Hence. First Issue: Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his possession and ownership of the plastic baby chairs. his denial is easily rebutted by Bolonia‘s testimony:[14] . Appellant adds that such testimonies also conflicted as to the place where appellant sat inside the motorela. appellant vehemently denied possession of the plastic baby chairs. The lower court gravely erred in finding that search and the arrest of the accused without a warrant would fall under the doctrine of warrantless search as incident to a lawful arrest -III. it deserves scant consideration. The Court’s Ruling The petition is meritorious. The lower court erred in finding that the accused was caught in flagranti (sic) delicto in possession of the subject marijuana leaves and is the one responsible in transporting the same. Such alleged conflict is peripheral and irrelevant. However. not marijuana. He contends that the testimonies of Bolonia and Iligan conflicted as to the number of passengers riding the motorela. In his testimony. The lower court gravely erred in finding that the subject marijuana leaves is admissible in evidence –‖ In short. stressing that he was not holding them when the search was conducted. This claim. the trial court gave credence to SPO4 Bolonia‘s story that he actually received from his police asset the information regarding appellant‘s arrival in Surigao City. the warrantless search following his lawful arrest was valid and the marijuana obtained was admissible in evidence. II. Hence. Emphasizing that the Surigao City Police had no ill motive against appellant.Ruling of the Trial Court The trial court rejected appellant‘s claim that he was merely an innocent passenger and that his package contained mango and otap samples. aside from being flimsy. appellant submits the following assignment of errors:[13] ―I. is also not supported by the transcript of stenographic notes. Assignment of Errors In his Brief.

the opinion of the trial court deserves great respect as it was in a better position to observe the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses on the stand. However.[16] it is sufficient that such drug is found in appellant‘s possession. such search and seizure is subject to challenge. is apropos: . the choice of the trial court prevails because this is a matter that involves credibility of witnesses.[15] hence. On this subject of credibility. otherwise. xxx xxx xxx Q: A: By the way. ([W]itness indicating that he was sitting (sic) an imaginary seat at the back of the motor and holding an (sic) imaginary chairs with his left arm). what did you and your companions do? We followed him behind because we posted in the different direction(s) in the wharf. the very evidence implicating him -. for that matter.[17] Section 2. proof of ownership of the marijuana is not necessary in the prosecution of illegal drug cases.‖ Generally. xxx xxx xxx Q: A: You said you followed Roel Encinada. what did you observe in his person.‖ Between these two contentions.the prohibited drugs found in his possession -. xxx Q: A: xxx xxx After you saw Roel Encinada disembarked (sic) from the boat.cannot be used against him in this case or. What kind of chairs? A (sic) plastic chairs. appellant‘s conviction could have been affirmed by this Court. it was in a superior situation to assess their testimonies. Second Issue: Illegal Search and Seizure Based on the foregoing discussion. in ―any proceeding. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured warrant. what happened next when you followed him? I saw Roel Encinada took (sic) a ride with a motorcycle so I chased him and let him stopped (sic).―Q: When you saw Roel Encinada who disembarked from M/V Sweet Pearl. Furthermore. if any? A: Q: A: He was carrying a (sic) baby chairs. where was (sic) this (sic) two plastic chairs placed in the motorize tricycle? He was sitting at the back of the motor at the right portion of the seat and the chairs was (sic) placed besides him.

‖ Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a ―fruit of the poisonous tree. Bolonia received at 4:00 p. as follows: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest. on May 20.[20] In this case. Although the term eludes exact definition. Bolonia explained that he could not secure a warrant because the courts in Surigao City were already closed for the day. and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.‖ This principle is covered by this exclusionary rule: ―SEC. 3. opining that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto at the time of his arrest. (4) customs searches. (3) seizure in plain view.―SEC. or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s). the magistrate stands as a mediator. Bolonia stopped the motor vehicle and conducted the search. Appellant contended before the lower court that the warrantless search of his belongings was proscribed by the Constitution. This protection is based on the principle that. probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man‘s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. He rummaged through the two strapped plastic baby chairs which were held by appellant and found inserted between them a package of marijuana wrapped in a small plastic envelope.[18] The right against warrantless searches. Hence. discusses the instances when a warrantless arrest may be effected. between a citizen and the police. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. he and the other lawmen had no choice but to proceed the next morning to the port area. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. papers. an authority clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. 2. is subject to legal and judicial exceptions. 1992 an intelligence report that appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next morning aboard the M/V Sweet Pearl.‖ The plain import of the foregoing provision is that a search and seizure is normally unlawful unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. the search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause as the essential requirement.m. it concluded that the warrantless search conducted after his ―lawful arrest‖ was valid and that the marijuana was admissible in evidence. Thus. But the trial judge rejected this contention. houses. (2) search of moving vehicles. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. Section 5. nay. article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. as follows: . and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.[19] In these cases. x x x (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Although such report could have been the basis of probable cause. Rule 113. After appellant disembarked from the ship and rode a motorela. however.

xxx xxx xxx Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: And after that. No act or fact . what happened next? I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried. And Roel Encinada alighted from the motor vehicle? Yes.‖ In this case. Possession of what? Possession of marijuana. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. The search cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Bolonia‘s testimony shows that the search preceded the arrest:[21] ―Q: You said you followed Roel Encinada. 5. arrest a person: (a) When. in his presence. The prosecution‘s evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. Arrest without warrant. Sir. the person to be arrested has committed. People vs. Raw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. xxx xxx x x x. Sir. Moreover. what happened next when you followed him? A: I saw Roel Encinada took (sic) a ride with a motorcycle so I chased him and let him stopped (sic). or is attempting to commit an offense. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. what happened next? I requested Roel Encinada to disembark from the motor tricycle because of that information given to us in his possession. appellant was not committing a crime in the presence of the Surigao City policemen. when lawful. xxx Q: A: xxx xxx You said you stopped the motor tricycle in which Roel Encinada (sic) riding. the lawmen did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed an offense. without a warrant.—A peace officer or a private person may. Tangliben[22] is factually inapplicable to the case at bar. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. what did you do? At first I identified myself to the driver and to some of the passengers. is actually committing. After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle.‖ Contrary to the trial court‘s ruling.―SEC.

Administrative Circular No.m. except only in case where an application for search warrant may be filed directly with any judge in whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located. after office hours. or during Saturdays. The different courts were closed by then. Sundays and holidays. Sundays and legal holidays. of May 20. entitled ―Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Applications for Search Warrants for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with Multiple Salas‖: ―This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle. Rafflling shall be strictly enforced. series of 1987.m. In the absence of the Executive Judge or ViceExecutive Judge. illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunition and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. and legal holidays. 2. albeit confidential information from their informant that Roel Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board the M/V Sweet Pearl. Sundays. shall no longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court. 13 allows applications for search warrants even after court hours: ―3. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-subversion Act. Metropolitan Trial Court. Unfortunately there was no more time for the police to apply for and secure a search warrant as the information was received late in the afternoon of May 20. in acting on applications for search warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and other serious crimes affecting peace and order. as amended.‖ Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p. or during Saturdays. 1992 at his house. The police had received reliable. there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest. There is a need for prompt action on such applications for search warrant. 19. the application may be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court where the application is filed. shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court having jurisdiction of .demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances. in which case the applicant is required to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after office hours. as the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock until 7:00 a. crimes against public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of the Executive Judge. the following day. We disagree with the trial court‘s justification for the search: ―The arrest of the accused without warrant was lawful because there was a probable cause or ground for his apprehension. 3. and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located. these amended guidelines in the issuance of a search warrant are issued: 1. as amended.‖ (Emphasis supplied) The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No. the Vice-Executive Judge shall take cognizance of and personally act on the same. during Saturdays. Nevertheless the police felt constrained to act on the valuable piece of information. Applications filed after office hours. 1992 and the accused was expected to arrive at seven o‘clock the following morning. Accordingly.

had determined on his own authority that a ‗search warrant was not necessary. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search. His name was known. to the satisfaction of the judge. if there was any. they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses. Taking a totally different approach to justify the search. what did you do next? I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs. It is significant that the Solicitor General does not share the trial judge‘s opinion. the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in appellant‘s possession during a search without a warrant.‖ We are not convinced. we believe that appellant -. By the way. 13. dated October 1. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay personally conduct the examination of the applicant and his witnesses to prevent the possible leakage of information. Such failure or neglect cannot excuse him from violating a constitutional right of the appellant.‖ In People vs. safeguards. Bolonia‘s receipt of the intelligence information regarding the culprit‘s identity. could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or . when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two plastic chairs that he carried.the place to be searched. it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9.did not voluntarily consent to Bolonia‘s search of his belongings. The date of its arrival was certain. what happened next? A: Q: A: Q: A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried. explaining: ―The present case presented no urgency. Are you referring to the two plastic chairs? Yes. The vehicle was identified. the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts underscored the need to secure a warrant for his arrest.based on the transcript quoted above -. Yet they did nothing. that its issuance is urgent. 1985. No effort was made to comply with the law. 4. and guidelines for the issuance of search warrants provided for in this Court‘s Administrative Circular No. he gleaned from Bolonia‘s testimony:[23] ―Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle. because it had been illegally seized. but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath. This. He shall observe the procedures.‘‖ Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate the very law they are expected to enforce. Appellant‘s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team. And from the information they had received. indeed. the Republic‘s counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless search.[24] The implied acquiescence to the search. But he failed or neglected to do so. The Court firmly struck down the policemen‘s cavalier disregard for the Bill of Rights. Sir. to justify the issuance of a warrant. Aminnudin.

who testified in open court that he allowed such search because he had nothing to hide.[26] In said case. without a warrant. we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. C. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society. the search was conducted at a validly established checkpoint and was made in the regular performance of the policemen‘s duty.J. Without the illegally seized prohibited drug. prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. herein appellant testified that he openly objected to the search by asking for a warrant. we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. quick solutions of crimes and apprehensions of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights. SO ORDERED.e. Appellant Roel Encinada is ORDERED RELEASED immediately. it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice. Lacerna.[25]Furthermore. considering that the search was conducted irregularly. we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty. In the present case. Truly. their efforts become counterproductive.. We remind them of this recent exhortation by this Court:[27] ―x x x In the final analysis. . An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search.. (Chairman). However. concur. and Francisco. In contrast to the accused in Lacerna. i. the end never justifies the means. Although it became intrusive when the policemen opened his baggage. did not cure its patent illegality. Otherwise. and the eventual denigration of society. The policemen stopped themotorela and forthwith subjected the passengers to a search of their persons and baggage. Unless convicted for any other crime or detained for some lawful reason.. That the search disclosed a prohibited substance in appellant‘s possession. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Appellant‘s alleged acquiescence should be distinguished from the consent appreciated in the recent case of People vs. Law enforcers are required to follow the law and to respect the people‘s rights. We should stress that the Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Narvasa. there was no checkpoint established. the appellant‘s conviction cannot stand. Romero. it was validated by the consent of appellant. Appellant is ACQUITTED. There is simply no sufficient evidence remaining to convict him. and thus confirmed the police officers‘ initial information and suspicion. Ironically. Melo. the appeal is hereby GRANTED.‖ WHEREFORE.coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. JJ. Some lawmen.

closed. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo. provincial governor of Davao. . petitioners. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. JUSTO LUKBAN. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25. yet. to exterminate vice. but are not essential to the disposition of this case.R. Between October 16 and October 25. 1919 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO. ET AL. after all. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings. J. for the best of all reasons.VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN G. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales. The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. Justo Lukban. Presumably. as laborers. acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police.: The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. who appear as parties in the case. At any rate. were constituted.. hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons. Mindanao. as an independent power of such a government. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Justo Lukban. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands? Omitting much extraneous matter. with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros. 1918. ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute. MALCOLM. vs. the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila. the police. Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila. respondents. and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners. the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government. and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts. and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo.. during this period. the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy. No. about midnight of October 25. but which might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government. which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila. ET AL. descended upon the houses. of no moment to these proceedings. City Fiscal Diaz for respondents. L-14639 March 25.

others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men. Mayor of the city of Manila. The fiscal appeared. as the same questions concerned them all. Hohmann. and Yñigo on January 13. admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation. December 2nd. in an order of November 4. which need not be repeated. To turn back in our narrative. an hacendero of Davao. 1919. and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban. governor of the province of Davao. Anton Hohmann. the 170 women were destined to be laborers. at good salaries. 1918. which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so. the application will be considered as including them. The court. Francisco Sales. and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban.Suffice it to say. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal. 1918. 1918. chief of police of the city of Manila. and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao. and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. The application set forth the salient facts. The court awarded the writ. the application. renounce the right. and by certain unknown parties. on December 2. repeated the facts more comprehensively. reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto. and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao. Mayor of the city of Manila. On the day named in the order. and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties. promulgated a second order. Lukban and Hohmann. the fiscal admitted. that directed Justo Lukban. Subsequently. The writ was made returnable before the full court. It was further . on December 10. generally. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents. to bring before the court the persons therein named. Sales. in answer to question of a member of the court. was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. Department of Mindanao and Sulu. through stipulation of the parties. that some of the women married. others went to work in different capacities. and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila. In open court. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts. unless the women should. Before the date mentioned. were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. chief of police of the city of Manila. or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. and Feliciano Yñigo. On motion of counsel for petitioners. just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao. alleged to be deprived of their liberty. because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao. the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application forhabeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. others assumed a life unknown and disappeared. in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court. Anton Hohmann. because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control. after due deliberation.

an hacendero of Davao. Mayor of the city of Manila. We will now proceed to do so. transportation fee. and one fact only. through their representatives and agents. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly. 1919. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination. were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Indeed. 1919. once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. by their returns. Act No. in contempt of court. In the second order. on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila. On January 13. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban. was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. or establish a quarantine. and Anacleto Diaz. need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society. Anton Hohmann. to the homeland. renounced the right through sworn statements. and then at night. Feliciano Yñigo. With this situation. One fact. Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. be struck from the record. Attorneys for the respondents. or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony. the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. fiscal of the city of Manila. In substance. further testimony including that of a number of the women. of certain detectives and policemen. Act No. chief of police of the city of Manila. that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means. who may have been convicted of vagrancy. members of the police force of the city of Manila. a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find — Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25. that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. and of the provincial governor of Davao. the attorney for the Bureau of Labor. had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women. Before January 13. the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. 1919. it was stated that the respondents. Modesto Joaquin.stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision. and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. it is . that eighty-one women were found in Davao who. this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos. without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights.

or liberties. then any other official can do the same. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. at Large.. liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. or be disseized of his freehold. or exiled. . Lee [1882]. We will sell to no man." said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case. 370." (Magna Charta. 1225. therefore. then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power. Much less.S. no matter how high. But one can search in vain for any law. but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us. then all persons would have just as much right to do so. which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. 29. and (3) habeas corpus. nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him. or be outlawed. who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. or regulation. but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate. at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives. and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy. has no such arbitrary prerogative. 7.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus.S. as being the essence of slavery itself. Even the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands.. then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen. and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken. is above the law. Cap. we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right. On the contrary. 220. And if any official can exercise the power.) "The very idea. delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country. or the means of living. "is the only supreme power in our system of government. Under the American constitutional system.) No official. stat. In other countries. 118 U. the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U. What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action. 111.. seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails. "that one man may be compelled to hold his life. "The law. 106 U. order. render the liberty of the citizen so insecure. compels any person to change his residence. either inherent or express." said Justice Miller. 1 eng. 9 Hen. at the mere will of another. not being expressly authorized by law or regulation.done pursuant to some law or order." (Yick Wo vs. or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life. or free customs. even the President of the United States.S. or imprisoned. 196. Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who. or any other wise destroyed. Law defines power. If the mayor and the chief of police could. vs. Hopkins [1886]. (2) criminal action. 356. The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. as in Spain and Japan. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action. has the executive of a municipality.

As to criminal responsibility. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty.) The law.) Petitioners had standing in court. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any . (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction. 93. shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners. Code of Civil Procedure. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime. petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao. Nevertheless. sec. that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against. (Code of Criminal Procedure. and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure. the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law. whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty. But this is not a hard and fast rule. (Art. in its zealous regard for personal liberty. The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined. and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. sec. after due investigation. ta be restored to his liberty. Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides: Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile. 416. 15 Mich. if. is no bar to the instant proceedings. 78. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. 527. 211. respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. 434. to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience. sec.. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ. (Code of Criminal Procedure.) We entertain no doubt but that. It is a general rule of good practice that. though no application be made therefor. Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy. The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action." (In the matter of Jackson [1867].

may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. the official. it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands. The respondents. acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus. and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary. deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. 526. When the writ was prayed for. within the reach of process. On the other hand. who deposited them in a distant region. and then. 79. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session. it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. If the mayor and the chief of police. The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ. We believe the true principle should be that. it is claimed. (Code of Criminal Procedure. and the two original respondents with their attorney. were free in Davao. the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. sec. Code of Civil Procedure. it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys. sec. had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he. if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted. could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. when called upon to defend his official action. it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. were in Manila. he should be compelled to do so. says counsel. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. this is a tenable position. while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. At first blush. the women. Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city. On closer examination. or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. who handed them over to other parties. . acting under no authority of law. and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose. the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty.

except as greater distance may affect . until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign. but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. On the question presented the court was equally divided. one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state.. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions. justices. after its many confirmations. the English courts have taken a contrary view. . The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent. . and set the prisoner free. and rivers of blood shed for its establishment. The place of confinement is. Campbell. Cooley. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.. . This is the ordinary mode of affording relief. It was composed of Martin. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors. after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta. If it is so. not the person confined. bill of rights and habeas corpus acts. the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. chief justice. as I can not doubt they would. and Cooley. with whom concurred Christiancy. they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. held that the writ should be quashed. if the guilty party is within reach of process. Statutes were not passed to give the right. . C. that the legislature may apply the proper remedy. J. . a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case.. J. The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted: I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition which was laid before us. and Christiancy. who has been and continues to be detained in another State. therefore. it is important that it be determined without delay. . It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. but to compel the observance of rights which existed. on the subject being brought to their notice.. The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is." and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right. at this late day.. . and if he fails to obey it. and if any other means are resorted to. held that the writ should issue. not important to the relief. Nevertheless. is so easy as is claimed here. with whom concurred Martin. but his jailor. it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty. Campbell. that it is directed to and served upon. strange as it may seem.It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ ofhabeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State. J. as will hereafter appear. J. so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. It does not reach the former except through the latter. It would be strange indeed if. and since. which is the life and soul of the whole instrument. . The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable.

See also Robb vs.) . The Queen vs. and was issued on January 22. 23 Q.) The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes. they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus. 622.. Connolly [1883].. 193. if he does not. 111 U.) The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. with the cause of their detention. as he believed. 624. Cas. that might be an answer. for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland.. or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. (The Queen vs. but he did not do so. He was found in contempt of court. that.) A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest.it. and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. Fed. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons. the defendant had no longer power to produce the child. Ex parte Young [1892]. Mitchell [1881]. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus.S. Law Rep. (Rivers vs. R. Barnardo. and Davis being present in court. 1000. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews. ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes. 305. through Lord Esher. M. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed.]. unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. On appeal. 5 Cranch C. D. where the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. together with the cause of her being taken and detained. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. 14926. [N. 57 Iowa. 50 Fed. 416. Com. the court. 233. People [1911]. and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The important question is. But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington. Davis [1839]. Thus. and. Breene vs.. (United States vs. S. 24 Q. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. (In the matter of Jackson [1867]. but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child. Bernardo [1889]. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child. 2nd ed. B. and refusing to produce them. No.. 283. 170. Church on Habeas. Rep..C. a child had been taken out of English by the respondent. he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. p. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another. 526. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ. Gossage's Case [1890]. Colo. that it was no longer in his custody or control. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. said: A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue. That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ.. Davis. 117 Pac. D.... in his return to the writ. 15 Mich. B. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. 12 Ir.

whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged. the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted. 1918. that he must advertise in America. having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act. there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila. and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court. some of which have since been repudiated by the signers. said: "We thought that. For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order. The. There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus. and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao. and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents. practically one month. and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court. and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back. The order was dated November 4. As far as the record discloses. and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. 87. it will be recalled. The court. and even if necessary himself go after the child. in Gossage's case. to comply with the writ. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named. they did not show impossibility of performance. directed Justo Lukban. and if it be found that they did not. three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ. or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. therefore. For example. that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose. he must take the consequences." In other words. or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court. but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. . Anton Hohmann. were appended to the return. the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. at the time the return to its first order was made.We find. 1918. could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao. (Code of Criminal Procedure. supra. Francisco Sales. that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary. and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong. sec. authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. at least sixty. both on reason and authority. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women. The respondents were thus given ample time. and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter. The first order.

chief of police of the city of Manila. His regard for the writ ofhabeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged. as the head of the city government. The city fiscal.. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty. and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs. who ordered the police to accomplish the same. Fiscal of the city of Manila. who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary. The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban. to vindicate its authority. the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation.In response to the second order of the court. the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected. His methods were unlawful. the attorney for the Bureau of Labor. C. When all is said and done. Anton Hohmann. and while. and must order him either imprisoned or fined. and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. Rodriguez. is a contempt committed in the face of the court. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so. Jose Rodriguez. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao. must be granted. 407. and does not offer a valid excuse. a court must. Anacleto Diaz. and with judicial regard for human imperfections. nothing further in this connection remains to be done. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Feliciano Yñigo. members of the police force of the city of Manila. and Fernando Ordax. Modesto Joaquin. it can be made the object of separatehabeas corpus proceedings. . Ordax. 99 N. under the law of public officers. and who later. 77 Cal. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt. we cannot say that any of the respondents. an hacenderoof Davao. the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court. the Mayor of the city of Manila. and Anacleto Diaz. this does not exonerate them entirely. was Justo Lukban. Since the writ has already been granted. which brings him into this undesirable position. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so. The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. it should receive an executive investigation. Respondents Hohmann. his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners. who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor. with the possible exception of the first named. 156.. had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila. (Ex parte Sterns [1888]. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. In re Patterson [1888]. Mayor of the city of Manila.) With all the facts and circumstances in mind. would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. as far as this record discloses. has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. placards were posted. we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. and since we find a substantial compliance with it.

. JJ. concur. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. C. JJ. Ordax. In resume — as before stated. and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct.. Avanceña and Moir. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive —such an amount is P100. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100).It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Arellano. Joaquin. and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Yñigo. may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment. which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ. 1919. The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record theReplica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25. he has purged his contempt of the first order. Johnson. is granted. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court. So ordered.. which would reach to many thousands of pesos. Rodriguez. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann.J. concur in the result.. and Street. In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view.

PABLO. 637) no es aplicable al caso particular. Ciudad de Quezon.L. Reyes. EL TRIBUNAL DEL PUEBLO Y JUAN M. Manila. sus derechos contitucionales garantizados por la constitucion quedarian violados. No. que a su llegada en la casa. recurrente. Estas peticiones demuestran que los docmentos son pruebas relevantes. El Primer Procurador General Auxiliar Sr. acusado del delito de traicion en la causa criminal No.: En una solicitud original de certiorari. ademas de adminisibles porque no hay regla que lo impide (Model Code of Evidence. 199-A. 1948 HILARIO CAMINO MONCADO. Y porque no tiene otro remedio sencillo. No. el Commonwealth con todos sus poderes y prerrogativas (41 Off. ella les acompaña. Rizal. recurridos. el General MacArthur en nombre del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos.MONCADO VS PEOPLE’S COURT G. rapido y adecuado en el curso ordinario de la ley. el recurrente. que una semana despues su esposa que se habia trasladado a su casa-residencia en la Calle Rosario.. Esta bien fundada la contencion del recurrente de que la decision en la causa de Alvero contra Dizon (76 Phil. Alvendia. que el 27 de Junio de 1946 el recurrente presento una mocion ante el Tribunal del Pueblo pidendo la devolucion de tales decumentos alegando como razon que han sido obtenidos de su residencia sin mandamiento de registro. 87).. Vicente J. 3. 3522 del Tribunal del Pueblo. per como aseguraron que aun sin su presencia tenian que hacer de todos modos el registro. que El Teniente Olves informo a ella que llevaba consigo algunos documentos para probar la culpabilidad de su esposo. Gaz.R. Ladaw en representacion de los recurridos. Jose B. y dicho tribunal. (b) que dicho Tribunal sea requerido a ordenar la devolucion al recurrente de tales deocumentos. Los documentos en el asunto de Alvero han sido decomisados por los miembros del CIC cuando el gobierno miliar ejercia en todo su apogeo sus funciones de ejercito de ocupacion. D. Procurador General Auxiliar Sr. ya habia restablecido en 27 de Febrero del mismo año. Carmelino G. L-824 January 14. que a menos que este Tribunal ordene al Procurador Especial que los devuelva al recurrente. con grave abuso de discrecion o exceso de jurisdiccion y siguiendo la doctrina sentada en el asunto deAlvero contra Dizon (76 Phil. Francisco en representacion del recurrente. cuandose apoderaron en 11 de Abril de 1945.. vs. y el Procurador Especial Sr. No. fue invitada por varios miembros de CIC bajo el mando del Teniente Olves para presencia el registro de su casa en la Calle San Rafael. LADAW. pide que este Tribunal (a) anule la orden del Tribunal del Pueblo de 9 Julio de 1946. alega que en 4 de Abril de 1945 a eso de las 6 de la tarde. (c) que se dicte una orden de interdicto prohibiendo al Procurador Especial a presentarlos como prueba contra el recurrente en el asunto de traicion. Juan M. vio que varios efectos estaban desparramados en el suelo entre los cuales varios documentos. El gobierno del Commonwealth estaba ya ejerciendo todos sus poderes constitucionales y legales sin . fue arrestado por los miembros del CIc del Ejercito de los Estados Unidos en su residencia en la Calle San Rafael. 637) la denego. 86). J. sin mandamiento de arresto y fue llevado a las prisiones de Muntinglupa. En cambio. de los docomentos que son objeto de esta causa. que rehuso seguirles porque no llevaban un mandamiento de registro. como Procurador Especial.

. (b) Entonces en el asunto de Adams vs. hecha antes del juicio. legislativo y judicial en el ejercicio de su fundciones. pidiendo la devolucion de los documentos ilegalmente sacados por los miembros del CIC. en 1904. parrafo 3.S. vilando el domicilio del ciudadano o incautandose indebidamente de sus bienes y documentos. 28 S. determina cuales son las pruebas que deben ser excluidas. U.S. E. depues de otros veinte años. Como dijo el Presidente Lumpkin en Williams vs. para la devolucion de las cosas decomisada. cuales son las admisibles y competentes y no clasifica como pruebas incompetentes las obtenidas ilegalmente..S. . a saber. fue como sigue. "No se violara el derecho del pueblo a la seguridad de sus personas. U. que ha ejercido perniciosa influencia en muchos Estados sobre opniones judiciales subsiquientes. (a) La causa de Boyd continuo sin ponerse en tela de juicio en su mismo tribunal durante veinte años. sin un mandamiento de registro debidamente expedido. States. bajo estas grantias consitucionales. Estas limitaciones constitucionales. Regla 123. (c) Luego. el legislador no debe aprobar leyes que hacen ilusorio lo sagrdo del hogar y los tribunales deben castigar a los infractores de la constitucion. el Tribunal Supremo Federal movido en esta epoca no por historia erronea." Bajo la autoridad de esta doctrina de Weeks vs.. parrafo 2183) fueron expresamente aprobados. U. El Reglamento de los Tribunales. sin tener en cuenta si son funcionarios publicos o no. La ley fundamental señada los limites hasta donde pueden llegar los poderes ejecutivo.. articulo 1.S. 47 Jur." "El desarrollo de esta doctrina del asunto de Boyd vs. despues dicha mocion.. y los precedentes ortodoxos registrados en los tribunales de Estados (ante. 660 — la funesta opinion de la mayoria en la causa de Boyd vs. El ejecutivo no debe abusar de su poder. U.) Concurrimos con la reclamacion del recurrente de que. sin embargo.o. 1 Es doctrina seguida por muchos años "hasta que surgio — dijo este Tribunal en Pueblo contra Carlos. La Constitucion grantiza la inviolabilidad de los derechos individuales en los siguinetes terminos. Inglaterra y Canada que la adminisibilidad de las pruebas no queda afectada por la ilegalidad de los medios de que la parte se ha valido para obtenerla. pero con una condicion. tenia derecho a que su casa fuese respetada. y solo entonces. El Presidente no habia suspendido las garantias constitucionales. la ilegalidad podria advertirse en el juicio principal y las pruebas asi obtenidas deberian excluirse. en la causa de Weeks vs. New York.limitacion alguna en la Ciudad de Manila. 624: . no llegan hasta el extremo de excluir como pruebas competentes los documentos obtenidos ilegal o indebidamente de el. fue implicitamente desechada en el Tribunal Supreme Federal. sino por un sentimentlismo extraviado — retrocedio a la doctrina original de la causa de Boyd. a no ser por causa probable que se determinara por el juez despues de examinar bajo juramento o afirmacion al denunciante y a los testigos que presentare. y con descripcion detallada del sitio que se ha de registrar y de las personas que se han de aprehender o de las cosas que han de ser incautadas.. que la ilegalidad del registro y decomiso deberia primero haber sido directamente litigada y establecida mediante una mocion. parrafo 2183). Estados Unidos. Fil. de modo que. en 1885.. en 1914. y otras decisiones de la misma escuela el recurrente ejercita el presente recurso. mientras tanto recibia frecuente desaprobacion en los tribunales de Estado (ante." (Titulo III. sus documentos no debian ser decomisados por ninguna autoridad o agente de autoridad. moradas. papeles y efectos contra registros y secuestros arresto.o. Es doctrina bien establecida en Filipinas.

by legislation or otherwise. If the search warrant where illegal. and not the state. if they were pertinent to the issue. not for the state. so as to render ineffectual any effort to legalize by statute what the people expressly stipulated could in no event be made lawful. the most that any branch of government can do is to afford the citizen such redress as a possible. or sought to be justified under the guise of legislative sanction. exceeds or abuses the authority with which he is clothed. or declare lawful. surely none of the three divisions of government is responsible. When papers are offered in evidence the Court can take no notice how they were obtained. — nor would they form a collateral issue to determine that question. El medio empleado en la adquisicion del documento no altera su valor probatorio. so that no law violative of this constitutional inhibition should ever be enforced. and bring the wrongdoer to account for his unlawful conduct. If he could not. justify. or the officer.. why shall a record. upon executives. But this is no good reason for excluding the papers seized. or a mere petty agent of the state. For the misconduct of private persons." El recurrente cita el caso de Bureau vs. 513. but otherwise free from suspicion. . still this is no legal objection to the admission of them in evidence. that the records. — whether lawfully or unlawfully.As we understand it. 329. e. would be responsible for the wrong done.. while the party thus procuring the attendance of the witness would be liable to severe punishment. sin mandmiento de registro. Creemos que los autores de la constitucion filipina nunca han tenido la mas ligera idea conceder inmunidad penal al que viola santidad del hogar. Tribunal dijo: "Admitting that the lottery tickets and materials were illegally seized. surely that could not be urged against the competency of the witness. the party on whose complaint the warrant issued. If the constitutional rights of a citizen are invaded by a mere individual. . Suppose the presence of a witness to have been procured by fraud or violence. or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his authority. so as to render it the duty of the courts to denounce as unlawful every unreasonable search and seizure. . se dijo: "It is contemplated. 80. but for himself only. he is to be deemed as acting. no importando si la prueba de su culpabilidad ha sido obtenida ileglmente. whether confessedly without any color of authority. however. and therefore he alone. for the mere fact of (illegally) obtaining them does not change that which is written in them . vs. we believe the framers of the constitutions of the United States and of this and other states merely sought to provide against any attempt. That is to say. Dana. ni a cualquier infractor de la ley criminal por el solo hecho de que las pruebas contra el hayan sido obtenidas ilegalmente. any unreasonable search or seizure. and upon the judiciary. . El procedimiento sano. . to authorize. the main. If an official. should be held accountable for his acts. Earnest. It does not logically follow. was to place a salutary restriction upon the powers of government. Asi en Stevenson vs. and such ought ever to be the fact. Ill. juto y ordenado es que se castigue de acuerdo con el articulo 128 del Codigo Penal Revisado al individuo que. purpose of our constitutional inhibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. if not the sole. as evidence. although illegally taken from its proper place of custody and brought before the Court. be hold incompetent? "En Com. indebidamente profana el domicilio de un ciuadano y se apodera de sus papeles y que se castigue tambien a ese ciudadano si es culpable de un delito. 2 Metc. cannot be used as instruments of evidence. being obtained. This wise restriction was intended to operate upon legislative bodies. acting upon their individual responsibility and of their own volition. as they unquestionably were. so capa de funcionario pubico.. that the records of courts remains permanently in the places assigned by the law for their custody. McDowell en los siguientes terminos: .

en 1940. Pero de los 45 Estados de la Union Americana — segun el Magistrado Cardozo en su decision dictada en 1926. Cada tribunal adopta su propio criterio. ¿por que el Estado tiene que devolverlos y librarle de la acusacion? ¿No es esto consentir y convalidar el crimen? ¿No constituye una aprobacion judicial de la comision de los delitos. etc.. de la propiedad privada de McDowell fueron robados por ciertas personas que estaban interesadas en la investigacion que iba a practicar el Grand Jury contra Mcdowell por ciertas ofensa que se decia habia cometido esta. papeles.. the other circumstances may be insufficient to connect the defendant with the crime. relativa al uso fraudulento del correo.. discloses counterfeit money or the implements of forgery. 3. Si los documenteos cuya develucion pide el recurrente. 150 N. McDowell trato de impedir que Burdeau utilizara dichos libros y documentos mediante una mocion que habia presentado en tal sentido. en People vs. manteniendo la doctrina ortodoxa. memoranda . prueban su culpabiblidad del delito de traicion. and the body of a murdered man is found.Ciertos libros." (Burdeau vs. Concretemonos al caso presente. La Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos sostuvo la contencion de Burdeau. 585 — catorce adoptaron la doctrina heterodoxa de Weeks y 31 la rechazaron. No es Extraño.) Y depues de considerar las varias decisiones de las dos escuelas. y a nuestro humilde parecer. Cardozo hizo estas atinadas observaciones sobre la doctrina de Weeks: We are confirmed in this conclusion when we reflect how far-reaching in its effect upon society the new consequences would be. The privacy of the home has been infringed.a Ed. 37 en total. alegando que tenia derecho de usar dichos papeles.) "¿Adoptara nuestra Corte Suprema la doctrina que se anuncia en esta decision? Sometemos que esta es una mala regla de derecho. and the murder goes free. el de violacion del domicilio del acusado cometido por los miembros del CIC y el de traicion cometido opor el recurrente? Semejante . catorce años despues. E. A room is searched against the law." El recurrente cita despues decisiones de algunos Tribunales Supremos de Estado que no han adoptado esta doctrina del Tribunal Supreme Federal. que iba a tener la direccion y control de la prolos Estados Unidos. que iba a tener la direccion y control de la prosecucion ante el Grand Jury. If the place of discovery may not be proved. paginas 5-11. Another search. The pettiest peace officer would have it in his power. through over-zeal or indiscretions. Burdeau era el ayudante especial del Attorney-General de los Estados Unidos. "The papers having come into possession of the government without a violation of petitioner's rights by governmental authority. McDowell. should prevent them from being held for use in prosecuting an offense where the documents are of incriminatory character. we see no reason why the fact that individuals unconnected with the government may have wrongfully taken them. seis Estados mas. Estos documentos y lobros fueron despues entregados a Burdeau por las personas que los habian rabaod. Defore. Like instances can be multiplied. Burdeau se opuso a la mocion. diciendo: "We know of no constitutional principal which requires the government to surrender the papers under such circumstances. no debe adoptarla nuestra Corte. The absence of a warrant means the freedom of the forger. once more against the law. (8 Wigmore on Evidence. to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagitious. y segun Wigmore. incluyendo Hawaii y Puerto Rico la rechazaron.

vs. The right of the defendant is not to exclude the incriminating documents from evidence. Consideremos un caso: Juan que presencia un asesinato. y con el cual le ordena que se de por arrestado y le conduce a la presidencia del pueblo. cod. los documentos serian pruebas admisibles.S. En U. se ordene por el juzgado la devolucion de los documentos que prueban su crimen? ¿No se daria aliciente al anarquismo con semejante practica? El juzgado desempeñaria el triste papel de ayudar a los que desean socavar las bases de nuestras institutciones. and the law having declared that the articles taken are competent and admissible evidence. Pen. Ademas. En el camino se encuentra con Pedro que intercede por el asesino.. 435. en su bolsillo encuentran una bomba que es capaz de volar toda la tribuna. la obtencion de los documentos no altera su valor probatorio. el Tribunal dijo: "To hold that no criminal can. Snyder. 650. Otro caso. in any case. to a large extent. at the mercy of the shrewdest. un tal Jose es arrestado por dos policias al lirigirse a la tribuna en donde estan reunidos los altos funcionarios del poder ejecutivo. Si hubiera mediado un mandamiento de registro.. un juzgado. in such a sense that the ruling thereon goes up on appeal as part of the record and subject to review by the appellate court? It seems to us rather an independent proceeding to enforce a civil right in no way involved in the criminal case. the most expert. se dijo: "Upon what theory can it be held that such proceeding (for the return of the articles) is an incident of the trial. notwithstanding the unlawful search and seizure. facilitating their escape in many instances. no solamente cometen actos indignos debuena ciudadania. and the most depraved of criminals. legislativo y judicial juntamente con los representantes diplomaticos de las naciones amigas para presenciar la parada del aniversario de la independencia. That right exists entirely apart from any proposed use of the property by the State or whereas it was the invasion of his premises and the taking of his goods that constituted the offense irrespective of what was taken or what use was made of its. Por sospechosa catadura. sino que deben ser castigados por encubridores (art. ¿Es justo que a mocion de Jose en la causa criminal seguida contra el. Juan. puede ordenar la devolucion del documento robado que prueba la culpabilidad de un acusado y dejar libre a este y al que robo el documento. en cambio. be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant.practica fomentaria el crimen en vez de impedir su comision. but to recover the possession of articles which were wrongfully taken from him. ni mandamiento de registro. 205 Pac." Y en People vs. Los policias no tienen mandamiento de arresto. Poner en libertad al culpabale por el simple hecho de que la prueba contra el no ha sido obtenida legalmente es sancionar judicialmente el crimen. 278 Fed. 19. how can the circumstance that the court erred in an independent proceeding for the return of the property on defendant's demand add anything to or detract from the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights in the unlawful search and seizure? . No hay niguna disposicion constitutucional. would be to leave society. requisan la casa de Jose y encuentran documentos que revelan que el ha recibido ordenes de una organizacion extranjera para polverizar a todo el alto personal del gobierno en la primera oportunidad. La vindicta publica exige que los infractores de la ley penal sean castigados. ni legal que libere al acusado de toda responsbilidad criminal porque no hubo mandamiento de registro. Mayen. Rev. Juan y Pedro.) El publico nunca llegara a comprender por que estos dos indivduos deben ser castigados y. bajo la doctrina de Weeks. Otros dos policias. consigue arrebator del asesino el puñal. devuelve el puñal y ayuda al acusado a hacer desaparecer todo vestigio del crimen para no ser descubierto. despues de enterarse del arresto. The right of the defendant is not to exclude the incriminating documents from evidence a civil right in no way involved in the criminal case. por un sentimentalismo mal comprendido.

37. in fact.) La teoria de Weeks vs. 1945. the war was continuing not only technically but actually in the island of Luzon. as late as June. Asi es como la ley impera.m. aunque las pruebas contra ellos hayan sido obtenidas ilegalmente... and there were still units of the Japanese Army resisting the liberation forces.. J. 43 Off. 1945.. Dizon.. dissenting: Petitioner stands accused of treason before the People's Court. PERFECTO. the information against him having been filed by Prosecutor Juan M. J. La doctrina ortodoxa se impone por su consistencia probada a traves de muchimos años. Los culpables deben recibir su condigno castigo. 1946. (Alvero vs. and the military security and safety of the liberation forces demanded such measures as were adopted by the CIC Detachment of the United States Army in making said search and effecting said seizure to the end that the activities of pro-Japanese elements and their chances of effectively aiding the Japanese forces which thus still continued to resist might be brought down to a minimum and. Moran. but I would further support the conclusion arrive at by the following additional considerations: In April.. petitioner was arrested by members of the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army at his residence at 199-A San . Se deniega la solicitud con costas.. Almost a year before. the cannonades and shellings could still be clearly heard in this City of Manila. if possible. y Padilla. entirely foiled. fighting continued in Luzon. concurring: I concur.S. Ladaw on February 28. concurs in the result. Gaz.. Under such circumstances. merely one of degree — the principle involved is identical in both cases. Pres. Separate Opinions HILADO. (8 Wig. 1945. estan conformes. as is of general knowledge and within the judicial notice of this Court. que subvierte las reglas de prueba no aceptable en esta jurisdiccion: es contraria al sentido de justicia y a la ordenanda y sana adminsitracion de justicia. majestuosa e incolume. to my mind. Feria. on April 4. 2 Y los que con infraccion de la ley y de la Constitucion se apoderan indebidamente de tales purebas deben tambien ser castigados. J. Tuason. MM. is. when the CIC Detachment of the United States Army made the search at petitioner's house and effect the seizure of his papers and effects mentioned in the majority decision. U. No hay que abandonarla si se desea que los derechos constitucionales sean respetados y no profanados. 429). The difference between this case and the case in L-342.The Constitutional and the laws of the land are not solicitous to aid persons charged with crime in their efforts to conceal or sequester evidence of their iniquity. at about 6:00 p.

from 1940 to 1941 — Los Angeles Examiner. Francisco. (d) The personal file and the love letters of Mrs. and National Geographic Society. Moncado and published in the United States. Olves informed Mrs. who transferred to their house at 3 Rosario Drive. where he was detained. (f) Private correspondence and letters of Dr. Manila. Olves. Mrs. (e) Marriage certificate of Dr. 1945. . (b) Correspondences of the petitioner as president of the Neighborhood Association in Quezon City during the Japanese occupation.. Moncado protested in vain. Nevada. Mrs. Lt. had been ripped open and their contents scattered on the floor. Harvard Classics (complete set). Moncado to and from his Filipino Federation of America in Hawaii and United States: (g) Several law books by Guevara. Moncado found the following things missing: (a) Passes issued by Japanese friends for the personal safety and conduct of the petitioners. Moncado with Mrs. (h) A complete collection of the 'Tribunal' compilation of the same during occupation until the last day of its issuance. Upon hearing from the officers that they did not have any search warrant for the purpose. and taken to the Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa. Moncado issued at Reno. petitioner's wife. Los Angeles Evening Herald and newspapers edited and owned by Dr. after making an inventory of their belongings at San Rafael. San Francisco Chronicle. Mrs. headed by Lt. Upon arrival at the house. Moncado decide to accompany them. Mrs. No receipt was issued to her. which were separated from the rest of the scattered things. and ordered to accompany them to the house at San Rafael to witness the taking of documents and things belonging to petitioner. without any warrant of arrest. international law. (c) Correspondence of the petitioner with certain Japanese officers. she refused to go with them. Moncado and vice versa. Subsequently. Albert. but after the officers told her that with or without her presence they would search the house at San Rafael.Rafael St. Quezon City. Moncado to Dr. Moncado that they were going to take a bundle of documents and things. because they proved the guilt of her husband. (i) Complete collection of American magazines. Moncado noticed that their belongings had been ransacked by American officers and that the trunks which she had kept in the attic and in the garage when she left the house. books on diplomacy. On April 11. was approached by several CIC officers.

Moncado. Moncado. Myrna Loy. petitioner filed with this Supreme Court on August 10. Moncado by actors and actresses from Hollywood. The fact is that is that the reality and existence of things and petitioners' ownership thereof. pamphlets of dancing obtained by Dr. that said court be required to order the return of the documents and things in question to petitioner. 1946. petitioner filed with the People's Court a motion praying that the return of said documents and things be ordered. New York. 1946. and Mrs. he would have alleged that such things are not in his possession. instead of objecting to the return on legal grounds. otherwise.000) in favor of Architect Mr. . Binnie Barnes. Bette Davis and Ceasar Romero. 1946. Moncado while he was studying dancing at Waldorf-Astoria. Moncado with several members of the United States Senate and Congress of the United States including a picture of President Hoover dedicated to Dr. Marquez of Quezon City. Wallace Beery. as to whether they were taken from the house at San Rafael or from the house at Rosario Heights. (o) two (2) volumes of rhumba. (m) A promissory note of Dr. and that in the present proceeding the prosecutor admits to have them in his possession. Whether the things were taken at San Rafael or at Rosario Heights is completely immaterial. and that they were taken from a house of petitioner. Gary Cooper. The petition was denied on July 9. Igmidio A. Thereupon. convinced us that in petitioner's and respondent's minds there is no disagreement on the identity in question.(j) Personal letters of Dr. be set aside. (n) Three (3) volumes of modern ballroom dancing by Arthur MacMurray of New York. Robert Montgomery. Moncado for fifty thousand pesos (P50. There should not be any doubt that the papers and things described and claims by petitioner are the ones in the prosecutor's possession. William and Dick Powell. (k) Pictures with personal dedication and autograph to Dr. 1946. or that they did not exist at all. (l) Certificate as first flighter in the Pan-American Airways and even several stickers issued by Pan American Airways for passengers' baggage. Clark Gable. without disputing their identity or correcting any error of description made by petitioner. and that the prosecutor be restrained from using and presenting them as evidence at the trial of the criminal case for treason.) On June 27. or he does not know where they are. Petition for Certiorari and Injunction. without disputing their identity. zamba and tango obtained from Mexico and Argentina by Dr. and as to whether they were taken at the time of petitioner's arrest or later. are undisputed." (Pages 3 and 4. a petition praying that the lower court's order of July 9. Boris Karloff. Before proceeding to consider the question of law raised in this case. we should not ignore three questions of fact raised in the answers of respondents: at to the identity of the documents and things. The fact that the return of the documents and things were opposed to in the lower court by the prosecutor. including Mary Astor.

section 1 [3] of the Constitution. decorated by the halo of authority of courts of a former metropolis. was and is illegal. they need the repeated pounding of intense discussion. clothed in tinsel and cellophane.That they were taken not at the time of petitioner's arrest but much later. or even a crime to serve its aims. is punished by law as an accessory after the fact. is indisputably proved by petitioner's and his wife's depositions not contradicted by any other evidence. cannot claim better merit than a servile adherence to a wrong legal doctrine. What is worse. to be determine by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. So that they may continue radiating the sparks of their truth and virtue. personal security against illegal searches and seizures. and the persons or things to be seized. decayed or relegated as useless scraps in the dumping ground of oblivion. they need the continuous smelting analysis and synthesis as the molten iron in a Bessemer furnace. There are minds that forget that duty of thinking by ourselves and of not sticking to the teachings of foreign mentors has become more imperative since July 4. papers. Otherwise. which pose with the deceitful dazzle of false gods. To make them glow with all their force. including the loftiest? May justice be administered by making use of the fruits of a lawless action? If a private individual. having been made without any search warrant. besides having been rendered by a second Supreme Court. why should the government or an official system of justice be allowed to ignore and mock the moral principle which condemns the individual? Is there a moral standard for the government different from the one by which private conduct is measured? While a private citizen is not allowed to violate any rule of decency and fair play. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. Human minds must always be kept well tempered and sharpened as damask swords. Other questions concern personal liberty as affected by illegal detention. whose existence is violative of the Constitution. 1946. when profiting from the fruits of a criminal offense. they are frequently replaced by their antitheses. May the government profit from an illegality. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. This case offers a conclusive evidence that fundamental ideas. they become rusty. The seizure of the papers and effects in questions. if we are not lacking the moral courage to face all the issues raised by the parties. why should a government be allowed to profit and make use of property tainted by theft or robbery or smeared with the blood of crime? The above are among the elemental questions that must be answered in this case. may the government follow a procedure which shock the common sense of decency and fair play? If a person cannot enrich himself with stolen property. (Article III. rules and principles are in constant need of restatement if they are not to lose their vitality. Dizon (L-342). which. an unconstitutional act. ready to decapitate the hydra of error and overthrow the gilded idols from the muddy pedestals of pretense and imposture. exacts continuous vigilance. and particularly describing the place to be searched. as the metal hammered on the anvil. houses. judicial emancipation from colonial mental attitude. The risks always lurking at every turn of human life.) . and was effected in open violation of the following provisions of the Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons. Respondents urge us to follow the decision in Alvero vs. purity and splendor.

Even more. together with a true inventory thereof duly verified by oath. which are as follows: SEC.. papers or other belongings of any persons. In the Bordeau case. shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof. 128. 3. — The officer must forthwith deliver the property to the justice of the peace or judge of the municipal court or of the Court of First Instance which issue the warrant. MacDowell (256 U. SEC. not being authorized by judicial order. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who. or in the absence of any person. 10. one of them heavily punished with prision correccional. Receipt for the property seized. the robbers delivered them to Bordeau. and 11 of Rule 122. shall refuse to do so. or. must. 465). which reads: 4. section 1 [5] of the Constitution. Upon finding that the documents contained evidence of the fraudulent use of the mails by MacDowell. The main authority upon which respondents rely is the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Bordeau vs. Delivery of property and inventory there of to court. The offenses are punished by articles 128 and 130 of the Revised Penal Code. SEC. and the persons or things to be seized. without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality. or in their default.S. the same followed in the decision in Alvero vs. shall search the domicile. leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property. any member of his family.The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise. in the absence of the latter. (Article III. ART. The latter filed a motion to prevent Bordeau from using the documents as . — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner. 10. ART. 130. and particularly describing the place to be searched. Searching domicile without witnesses. Violation of domicile. — The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was found.) The seizure was also in open violation of sections 3. in cases where a search is proper. and being required to leave the premises. or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender. in charge of the prosecution against MacDowell. the penalty shall be prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods. certain documents were stolen from MacDowell. Dizon (L-342). in the presence of at least two witnesses. having surreptitiously entered said dwelling. 11. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who. If the offense be committed in the nighttime. the illegality and unconstitutionality amounted to two criminal offenses. Requisites for issuing search warrant.

a doctrine that in principle and by its evil effects appears to be irretrievably immoral. written twenty years ago. he fought against all anti-social ideas and conduct and had to discover or invent and then develop the principles and qualities of sociability. Respect for law will not be advanced by resort. seems to be the lone and exclusive holder of the divine fire of reason. The mysterious genes which keep . whose dissenting opinions. The federal Supreme Court denied the motion on the ground that there is no law or constitutional principle requiring the government to surrender papers which may have come into its possession where the government has not violated the constitutional rights of the petitioner. That discrimination is further developed into a sense of justice. What is bad per se cannot be good because it is done to attain a good object. a government must be just. and which subjects them to the same rules of conduct that commands to the citizen. the poignant logic and rock-bottom sense of truth expressed by Justice Brandeis is enough to complete discredit the majority doctrine in the Bordeau case.evidence against him. he had so far failed to find the key to always correct thinking. While the advent of the astounding miracle of reason has so much kindled the pride of men. Principles are not to be sacrificed by any purpose. and of proclaiming himself as the king of the creation. to means which shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play. Good ends do not justify foul means. Reason is a fundamental characteristic of man. in the multifarious ensemble of the universe. And in the development of our liberty insistence upon procedural regularity has been a large factor. As a consequence. the latter saying: At the foundation of our civil liberty lies the principles which denies to government officials exceptional position before the law. The solution to the failure of reason is riddle yet to be unlocked. Two of the greatest American Justices. Justice cannot exist where the good is not distinguished from the wicked. To merit respect and obedience. in its enforcement. Taking aside the great intellectual. dissented. There is no greater miracle than when its first sparks scintillated in the mind of a child. the government must be good. Man is easily deceived into committing blunders or led into the most absurd aberrations. moral and judicial prestige of the two dissenters. man had taken millennia of struggles in order to develop the basic ideas which insure his survival and allow him to enjoy the greatest measure of well-being and happiness. These are some of the maxims through which the common sense of decency and fair play is manifested. suddenly begins to wield the prodigious power of understanding and intelligent grasping of the meaning and relations of the things with which he is in direct or remote contact though his senses. Justices Holmes and Brandeis. What before had only the vegetative life of a plant or the animal life of a mollusk or frog. The power of understanding brings forth the freedom of choice. To be just. by universal conscience. It is the same eternal struggle between truth and error. The struggle has been long and it will have to continue until the end of the centuries. are now the guiding beacons of the Supreme Court of the United States. He soon discovered that society is an indispensable condition to attain his ends. No one should profit from crime. To be good it must stick to the principles of decency and fair play as they are understood by a common man's sense. to the extent of symbolizing it wit the fire stolen by Prometeus from the heavens. This freedom develops the faculty of discrimination between good and evil. While man. between right and wrong. No wrong is atoned by good intention.

notwithstanding its being a human institution. without removing papers from secret drawers. "'Our government is the potent. democracy. If government becomes a law-breaker. That the inconsistency may be explained by its genesis is no ground why we should surrender to it. In the moral ctetology. either kind of characteristics and qualities may be originated and developed.uninterrupted the chain of heredity. For good or ill. 'Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the government. the promotion of social justice equal protection of the laws to everybody. delivering the opinion. it breeds . a strict one for private individuals and another vitiated with laxity for the government.. and is repugnant to its provisions. Anarchy and chaos will become inevitable. Ways may some day be developed by which the government. Quoting Chief Justice Marshall's famous — 'We must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding' — he pointed out that just as the power of Congress had by judicial interpretation been kept abreast of scientific progress. it teaches the whole people by example. . so there was neither search nor seizure. The inconsistency of respondents is thus explainable.. limitations on power no less than grants of power must be construed broadly. Their is the maxim that "the king can do no wrong. The infamy of Japanese occupation gave our people the bitter taste of the operation of the double moral standard. . To set two moral standard. While they would raise their brows at the mere insinuation that a private individual may justifiably profit by the result s of fruits of a criminal offense. all government authority emanates for the people in whom sovereignty resides. and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. It is the antithesis of the golden rule. — an unredeemable absurdity. can reproduce them in court. "For Justice Brandeis such a narrow construction degraded our great charter of freedom to the level of a municipal ordinance. overruled the defendants' claim that the evidence obtained when government agents tapped their telephone wires violated either unreasonable searches and seizures or the constitutional protection against self-incrimination. so also must the judges in construing limitations on the powers of Congress be ever mindful of changes brought about by discovery and invention. . Such a double standard will necessarily be nomoctonous. we quote an analogous legal situation: "In the famous wire-tapping case Chief Justice Taft." Among these ideals are justice. 568 and 569). they would not measure the government with the same moral standard. Such ideals are trampled down by the adoption of the double moral standard which can be taken its place in the ideology of the supporters of absolute monarchies. It would place government in a category wholly apart from humanity. To have a living Constitution. Taft reasoned. The Filipino people ordained and promulgated the constitution "in order to established a government that shall embody their ideals. . the omnipresent teacher. while permitting the transmission of the best qualities and characteristics. The idea of double moral standard is incompatible with the temper and idiosyncracy of social order established by our constitution. A Free Man's Life" by Alpheus Thomas Mason (pp. is to throw society into the abyss of legal ataxia. From "Brandeis. and extended the Fundamental Law to objects of which the Founding Fathers never dreamed. Crime is contagious.' Brandies observed. The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping." The iniquities and misery havocked by such maxim would need hundreds or thousands of volumes to record them. No tapped wires entered their homes and offices. seems to lack the power of checking and staving off the tendencies of atavism.

of permeability and isotonic equilibrium. and it is impossible to be proved before it can be of any use to support and clinch the argument. the assumption has yet to be proved. That presupposition. which fact may lead to the disputed right of the prosecution to retain the goods and properties illegally seized as essential evidence of the crime.] 438. and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs. whether in the development of a frog or in the attainment of the perfect curves and velvety skin of a lovely girl. . stolen. .. 479. Me born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. 473-474. The argument rests on the assume existence or commission of a crime as its minor premise. under the argument. . of assimilation and waste dislodgment.' he emphasized. it invites every man to become a law unto himself. The rules governing the phenomena of diffusion and osmosis. In a different plane and order. are uniform and universal. 478.) The argument that goods and personal properties illegally taken. pp. their thoughts. well-meaning. of his feelings and of his intellect. . "'The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.S. whether in the formation of the smallest bud or in the formation of the smallest bud or in the display of color and aroma by the most beautiful flower. The prosecution is called upon to make the assumption that the goods and properties in question are evidence of a crime. . "'Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purpose are beneficent. will entitled the prosecution to retain and use the goods and properties in question. it invites anarchy. as to the existence or commission of a crime. The line of reasoning the build up the argument can be restated in more abstract terms as follows: justify the means by their necessity to attain an end by starting from the premise that the end was accomplished. the assumption has to presuppose the commission or existence of the crime. They conferred.contempt for law. The prosecution cannot make a conclusive pronouncement. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means — to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal — would bring terrible retribution. 485. [1928]. but without understanding. and will lead to irretrievable disaster and destruction. of development and reproduction. Whether in the nuclear chromatin or the cytosome of a single protoplasmic cell of amoeba or in the sinews of the heaviest marsupial. in order to be valid. or snatched from the owner of possessor without a duly issued search warrant can be retained by the prosecution for use as evidence in a criminal case instituted is initiated by an original and basic flaw. they are but biological laws. their emotions. pleasure. Any disregard of them is fatal. "They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature. To be valid. 277 [U. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal.S. governing the vital processes and functions of . Such a reasoning process is fundamentally subversive to logic and is incompatible with the natural workings of the human mind. the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of right and the right most valued by civilized men. must in turn stand on an authoritative pronouncement which can only be made in a final and executory decision rendered by a court of justice. Moral standards are the laws of social life. U. the basic fact which. they knew that only a part of the pain. the uniformity and universality of biological laws are manifested unrelentlessly. . and their sensations.'" (Olmstead vs. like all laws of life. The argument assumes a fact the existence of which still remains to be proved and continues to be enveloped in the mists of the realm of uncertainties. under the orderly processes of law. as against the government. but.

. They are and should be uniform and universal and no single unit or organ of human society can disregard them or any one of them without alluring catastrophic consequences. has for centuries been protected with the most solicitous care. free from arbitrary invasion and search. the wind may blow through it. anytime. "The mere fact that a man is an officer. gives him no more right than is possessed by the ordinary private citizen to break in upon the privacy of a home and subject its occupants to the indignity of a search for the evidence of crime. It is only part of the crusade to curtail judicial delay which we felt our duty to engaged in since it had been our privilege to sit in the Supreme Court. No amount of incriminating evidence. "It may be frail. the rain may be enter. In stating this fact we do not want to put any blame on the distinguished member who penned the decision now to be promulgated. 64 Phil. The house of man was the first house of God.. when this Court took the vote for the disposal of this case. however mean or humble. be it place or hovel." His home was indeed his castle. 33. " (McLurg vs. In Rome the citizen's dwelling was a safe asylum. and it did not take him more than a month to have ready the majority opinion.S. . . is the ruling we announced in Alvarez vs. At the closed door of the home. defy all the forces of the Crown. Down through the centuries respect for men's abodes has remained a heritage of civilization. all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. Our decision is to grant all the prayers of the petition. Court of First Instance of Tayabas.) Logical culmination and practical application of the above principles embodied in our Organic Laws.social organism.S. 123 Iowa. whatever its source. but the King England may not enter. the poorest man could in his cottage. We followed the Federal rule in Boyd vs. And in the United States: "The right of the citizen to occupy and enjoy his home. dissenting: Sanctity of the home is a by-word anywhere. it is roof may shake. In justice to him. 368. will supply the place of such warrant. bids it open. J. In England. . U. whether of high or low degree. by authoritative process. In exposing the fact we mean only to emphasize the crying need of changing a situation or a system of procedure that permits the promulgation of our decisions one year or more after a case has been submitted to us for final action. whose vantage in the legal field imposes upon the members thereof the role of leadership in legal thought and practice for the most effective administration of justice. 1947. quoted in 20 Phil. .. the storm may enter.. that documents unlawfully seized in a man's home must be returned — irrespective of their evidentiary value — provided seasonable motions are submitted. without a legal warrant procured for that purpose. . Brenton. we may record that the drafting of the majority decision was transferred and entrusted to him many months after a final vote had been taken on the case. 473. 616 and many others. BENGZON. We had said before that "it is better oftentimes that crimes should be unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to have his premises . . even bloodhounds must wait till the law. and it was so ever since February 24. 116 U. Invasion thereof was anathema.

invaded, his desk broken open, his private books, letters, and papers exposed to prying curiosity, ... under the direction of a mere ministerial officer" ... insensitive perhaps to the rights and feelings of others. (U.S. vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, 20 Phil., 472, citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations.) In the Alvarez decision we reflected that "of all rights of a citizen few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others," and while the power to search and seize is necessary to public welfare, still it mist be exercised without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, because the enforcement of statutes is never sufficiently important to justify violation of the basic principles of government. It is agreed that the fundamental rights of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution, must be given such a liberal construction of strict construction as will be in his favor, to prevent gradual encroachment or stealthy depreciation of such fundamental rights. (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373.) Our constitution in its Bill of Rights decrees that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Constitution, Article III, section 1 [3].) This is an improvement over the provisions of the Jones Law regarding warrants and seizures. It was designed to make our Constitution "conform entirely" to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol., II, p. 1043.) The split between several State Supreme Courts on one side and the Federal Supreme Court on the other, about the admissibility of evidence obtained through illegal searches and seizures, was familiar to this Court (People vs. Carlos, 47 Phil., 626, 630) before it voted to adopt the Federal doctrine in Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, supra. This last doctrine, applied in several subsequent cases (People vs. Sy Juco, 64 Phil., 667; Rodriguez vs. Villamil, 37 Off. Gaz., 2416) was probably known to the Constitutional Convention that, the addition, made the Constitutional mandate on the point more complete and explicit, copying exactly the wording of the Federal Constitution, a circumstance which, coupled with the citation of Boyd vs. U.S., showed adherence to the Federal doctrine that debars evidence obtained by illegal search or unlawful seizure. It is significant that the Convention readily adopted the recommendation of the Committee on Bill of Rights after its Chairman had spoken, explaining the meaning and extent of the provision on searches and seizures and specifically invoking the United States decisions of Boyd vs. U.S., 116 U.S., 616 and Gould vs. U.S., 225 U.S., 298, which the majority of this Court would now discard and overrule. (Aruego op. cit. Vol. I, P. 160; Vol., II, pp. 1043, 1044.) Therefore, it is submitted, with tall due respect, that we are not at liberty now to select between two conflicting theories. The selection has been made by the Constitutional Convention when it impliedly chose to abide by the Federal decisions, upholding to the limit the inviolability of man's domicile. Home! The tie that binds, the affection that gives life, the pause that soothes, all nestle there in an atmosphere of security. Remove that security and you destroy the home.

Under this new ruling the "King's forces" may now "cross the threshold of the ruined tenement" seize the skeleton from the family closet and rattle it in public, in court, to the vexation or shame of the unhappy occupants. That those forces may be jailed for trespass, is little consolation. That those forces may be pardoned by the King, their master, suggests fearful possibilities. The sanctuary, the castle, are gone with the wind. An opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in the Court of Appeals of New York is cited as authority for the majority view (People vs. Defore, 150 N.E., 585). Yet it is markworthy that, in New York, protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is not promised by the Constitution of the State but by a mere statute. (Civil Rights of Law.) (See the same case, and 56 C.J., p. 1156.) New York is the only state that denies this privilege the status of a constitutional prerogative. (Supra.) Hence the precedent is obviously inconclusive. Moreover, admitting, for purposes of argument only, that the Alvarez decision is legally erroneous, I maintain that the new doctrine should apply to future cases — not to herein petitioner who had relied on it. In Santiago and Flores vs. Valenzuela, No L-670, April 30, 1947 (44 Off. Gaz., 3291, 3296) I argued for that proposition as follows: . . . The reserved right to upset previous decisions is likewise qualified by the proposition that such upsetting shall have prospective — not retroactive — effect. In Douglass vs. Pike Country, 101 U.S. 677 at p. 687, it was declared, "The true rule (of stare decisis) is to give a change of judicial construction ... the same effect in its operation" ... as to "a legislative amendment,i.e., make it prospective but not retroactive." And in Great Northern R. Co. vs. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S., 358, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Cardozo, said: "A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions. Indeed there are cases intimating, too broadly (cf. Tidal Oil Co. vs. Flanagan, 263 U.S., 444; 68 Law. ed., 382; 44 S Ct., 197, supra), that it must give them that effect; but never has doubt been expressed that it may so treat them if it pleases, whenever injustice or hardship will thereby be averted Gelpcke vs. Dubuque, 1 Wall., 175; 17 Law. ed., 25; Douglassvs. Pike Country, 101 U. S 677, 687; 25 Law. ed., 968, 971; Loeb vs. Columbia Twp. 179 U. S., 472, 492; 45 Law, ed., 280, 290, 21 S. Ct., 174, etc." This view is not unanimous, I know. However, inasmuch as one of the principal arguments of the opposing school of thought is that it makes the overruling decision a mere "declaratory judgment", and since that objection is untenable in this jurisdiction where declaratory relief is permitted (Rule 66), the view herein advocated — future operation only — future operation only — should all the more be acceptable to our system of jurisprudence. More about this in the future, if I should happen to agree to an overruling of previous decisions and the question should hinge on its backward or forward application. For the present, enough to note some of the abundant literature on the point.1

BRIONES, M., disidente: Disiento de la ponencia. Estimo que debe concederse la solicitude presentada por el recurrente. Creo que en esta jurisdiccion debemos adherirmos a la jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto de Weeks vs. U.S. que se cita en la decision de la mayoria. Si en una democracia como la norteamericana — ya madura y bien solidficada, fortalecida por una tradicion de siglos de respeto a las libertades individuales y ciudadanas y por el temperamento ecuanime y sereno de una raza tan admirable como la anglosajona — se ha considerado necesario garantizar los fueros del ciudadano bajo la coraza de semejante doctrina, con mayor razon debemos tener y asegurar esas garantias en un democracia como la nuestra, joven, que apenas esta haciendo los pinitos iniciales en el camino de la independencia politica, y donde la demagogia y la anarquia y las tendencias peligrosas al establecimiento de la libertad a tanta costa ganada. Paras, M., conforme.

Footnotes PABLO, M.:
1

Veanse las decisiones de Inglaterra, Canada, los Estados de Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utach, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, Hawaii y Puerto Rico citadas por el autor en 8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3.a Ed., paginas 5-11.
2

Barton contra Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., 46 Jur. Fil., 973.

PEOPLE VS DORIA

[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO, and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants. DECISION PUNO, J.: On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[1] The information reads: "That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law. CONTRARY TO LAW."[2] The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City. On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00-- a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills[3]-- as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter.[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area. At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw

Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate.[5] An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth."[6] "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal. The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate.[7] SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth."[8] The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory.[9] The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams.[10] The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in their community. When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accusedappellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house. Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later identified as PO3 Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door. The policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house, three men were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box. Turning towards them, Doria saw a box on top of the table. The box was open and had something inside. PO3 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. They were brought to police headquarters where they were investigated. Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.[11]

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995, she was at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5) children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Along the way, they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later that the man was PO3 Manlangit. Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person.[12] After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accusedappellants. The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt, they are both CONVICTED of the present charge against them. According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of Sec. 23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that: 'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group. An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.' the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board. AT WORST. II THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. AT BEST. SO ORDERED. OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME. NIL. Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory review. WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE."[14] Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends: "I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST AS CONDUCTED.The confiscated marijuana bricks (7. thus: "I THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES.641. Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons. II THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY. accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors. NBI for destruction in accordance with law. Mandaluyong City. ."[13] Before this Court. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER. Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for Women. NEBULOUS.

an accused has the burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him.[21] The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. persuasion or fraud of the officer. for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him.[19] It also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist.[26] Where.[20] In the American jurisdiction. and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom. the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state. the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes.[27] The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal. the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. Not every deception is forbidden. the search of her person and house. and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant. or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime. however.[17] Entrapment was unknown in common law.[16] Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. there is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted.IV THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law. the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed.[25] Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. particularly liquor and narcotics offenses. Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense[28] that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance.[22] the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer. and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao. Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. such that the crime is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense. there is entrapment and no conviction may be had.[29] It is a positive defense." [23] It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion. [24] It is recognized that in every arrest. Initially. trickery. there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate the law.[18] Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law. and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery. the burden shifts to the government to show . Once established. or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense. United States."[15] The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria.

badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible. are not.[50] Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment." To some extent.[40] The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person. no level of police deceit. not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime.[42] Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible.[48] On the other extreme. the gravity of the crime.[41] for purposes of this test. the court considers the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. the transactions leading up to the offense. i. at least if known by the police. such as badgering. other than one who is ready and willing. his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.[45] Hence. United States[31] to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged. on police conduct.otherwise.[39] The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents. to commit the offense.[47] Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures the more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. Here. State[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement. the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be countenanced. cajoling or importuning. and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would be on a normal person. [33] The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct[34] and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal. his past offenses. it is presumed that a lawabiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. friendship or pleas of desperate illness. have adopted the "objective" test. . this reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties.[37] This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman v. his eagerness in committing the crime.. [43] or appeals to sentiments such as pity. activities. even if his guilt has been established. It ignores the possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition were."[35] If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity. but overbearing conduct. however.[44] Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because. His predisposition. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct..[32] All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits.[49] The undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy.[30] When entrapment is raised as a defense. the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular accused's predisposition. etc. the accused might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements. are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime.e. Some states in the United States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" tests. It is claimed that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule. sympathy.[46] Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. may have an important bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police and their agents was proper. if the court determines that an accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged.[51] In Cruz v. his reputation. American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. the interaction between the accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's inducements.[36] Some states.

The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this drug. Smith's testimony was disregarded. Abella. the larceny is nevertheless committed. State. there was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug.While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored. the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way. and while instigation.[61] we convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. assists the thief in carrying out the plan. xxx a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. the BIR agent.[52] the Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. The police officer offered "a tempting price. provided the original design was formed independently of such agent. either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged. a BIR personnel. then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime. being authorised by them to do so. persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony. this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal. As early as 1910. free from the influence or instigation of the detective. as distinguished from mere entrapment. that the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation. [55] The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.[59] we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant.[60] In People v. -.[62] It was also in the same case of People v. "direct. and. and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng[63] we first laid down the distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. actually induced him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. or. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed. Smith. [57] The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible. Phelps. if the offense was committed by him.[54] the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of entrapment. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant.[53] In Baca v. testified that Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions."[58] In People v. If this objective test is satisfied. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng.[56] we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the government employee.State. and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.[64] we held: "ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for . We found that there was inducement. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable.

Boholst. This means that the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or through informants. to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. Yutuc[76] thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal. ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. theft. but there are cases holding the contrary. like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes. Tiu Ua. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases.[71] It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. but against public order.[80] Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite person. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. rape.[82] .' detective.[79] Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed. is not contrary to public policy." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. we further held. The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in antinarcotics operations. The "objective" test first applied in United States v.[73] Nevertheless. and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. It is necessary.[66] the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation."[65] The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. no matter how furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita. etc. that government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws. the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. We also considered accused's previous convictions of other crimes[75] and held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. It is rare for any member of the public. In People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v.[68] the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker. adopting the "objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. therefore. Tan Tiong."[69] The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. It is instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal. not against particular individuals. Galicia. or hired informer.[72] To determine whether there is entrapment or instigation. In entrapment. our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers. rely. but upon the diligence of its own officials. that deal with crimes mala in seor those inherently wrongful and immoral.[70] Entrapment. In recent years.[74] we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang.[77] They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society. not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. Conversely.an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a 'spotter.[67] In People v. Anti-narcotics laws.[78] They are not the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder. it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. In People v. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause. not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals.[81] These offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. spies or stool pigeons. arson.

Like the informant. of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. the spectacle that government is secretly mated with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an inspiring one." [88] It is thus imperative that the presumption. vengeance. extortion. For whatever noble purpose it serves. it is a type of lawless enforcement. whether or not through an informant. false arrest.[90] Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency. the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. They all spring from common motivations. unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion-.Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation. pickpocket. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.[85] The use of shady underworld characters as informants. juris tantum. then this must also be considered. .harassment. recidivism or plain criminal proclivity. corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. wiretapping. become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search.[83] Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous. the confidential informant system breeds abominable abuse. Frequently. particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks. or other petty criminal.[92] The manner by which the initial contact was made. Barraza. however. pimp. when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal classes. examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. illegal detention and the third degree. Along with illegal search and seizures. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. whether to the informant alone or the police officer. and the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extravigilant in deciding drug cases. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual.[89] It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement.[86] Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy. As well put by the Supreme Court of California in People v. although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer.[87] "[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. the payment of the "buy-bust" money. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. a person who accepts payment from the police in the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who deceive the police. and the delivery of the illegal drug. the relative ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons.' justifies the employment of illegal means. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.[91] We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. the offer to purchase the drug. or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors. At the same time. This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases[84] where we observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons. blackmail. the offer to purchase. Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the end. The informant himself may be a drug addict.

Police Officer.. Thus: "ATTY. Moreover.[94] or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant. Witness bringing out from the said box. were identified and marked in court. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks.. the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. Tell the court. sir. however.. Please open it and show those eleven bricks.In the case at bar. This is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court. straighforward and categorical manner and his credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel.[98] The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers' testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accusedappellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana.[95] or that only the informant was the poseurbuyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction. when you identified that box. I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now dealing with eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to him by Jun? COURT So be it. PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank. Counsel for Violeta Gaddao: Your Honor. PO3 Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua. . VALDEZ. the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court.[93] It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers.[96] the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.[97] There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses. At the pre-arranged meeting. The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. After appellants' apprehension. Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim. the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted accused-appellant Doria. his back-up security. Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. PROSECUTOR ATTY. spontaneous. Counsel for Florencio Doria: Mr. The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. ARIAS. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. how were you able to identify that box? A Q This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces of marijuana brick we confiscated from the suspect.

your Honor. Now tell the court. may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to what was handed to him by the accused Jun. my initials with the date. your Honor. ATTY. sir. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out item after item from the box showed to him and brought in front of him. Point to the court. my signature. who made the entries of this date. PROSECUTOR Q Whose signature is that? ATTY VALDEZ Your Honor." To stress. your Honor. your Honor? PROSECUTOR Your Honor. sir. sir. What makes you so sure? I am sure that this is the one. the date and the time and this Exhibit "A. how did you know that those are the eleven bricks? x x x." . This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun. Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on this plastic? This one. What are you sure of? I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun. the signature. PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be marked as Exhibit "D?" COURT Q A Mark it as Exhibit "D. your Honor. A Q A I have markings on these eleven bricks. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I brought it to the PCCL. COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the court. where are those markings? Here. there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court. sir.ATTY. Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature. COURT Q Noted. x x x. sir. your Honor. Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?" COURT A Q A Q A Q A Yes. despite reconsideration. I made the signature. your Honor. VALDEZ A We submit. What makes you so sure? Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we brought it to the PCCL.

Q A How about this one? I don't know who made this marking. x x x. The court saw it. the date and the time and the Exhibit "A. May we place on record that the one that was enclosed. with a newspaper wrapping with a piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95. COURT Q A Q A Q This particular exhibit that you identified.[100] We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that PO3 Manlangit and his team waited for almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1. COURT Q Noted." "D-1. PROSECUTOR Q A I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul.[102] . Whereat? At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St. because according to Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth."[99] The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. sir. ARIAS Your Honor.00 strains credulity.. sir.. 970 grams SSL" be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?" Tag it. etc." etc." I was the one who made these markings. PROSECUTOR ATTY.600. there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95. How about the other items that you were able to recover? x x x. I want to make it of record that there are other entries included in the enclosure. the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused-appellant. Exhibit A. This brick. Now. May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.[101] Again. sir. also Exhibit "A. A These other marijuana bricks. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. sir. that was not pointed to by the witness. Mark it." This CLM... and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper." and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseurbuyer and the pusher. the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom? It was given to me by suspect Jun. sir. including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D. because during our follow-up.

and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Q A Q This particular exhibit that you identified. in his presence. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. without a warrant. 5. and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. It is claimed. the person to be arrested has committed. is actually committing." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:[106] (1) search incident to a lawful arrest. arrest a person: (a) When. a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed. to wit: "Sec. the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. sir. x x x.[111] The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. Whereat? . or is attempting to commit an offense.[109] (4) seizure of evidence in plain view. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit. however shows otherwise: "ATTY VALDEZ. To be lawful. your Honor.[107] (2) search of a moving motor vehicle.[104] The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao. Counsel for appellant Gaddao: We submit at this juncture.A peace officer or a private person may. the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. not absolute. the search of her person and residence.[105] The rule is. Arrest without warrant. however. however. as above-quoted. is actually committing.[108](3) search in violation of customs laws. the arresting officer. -. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. when lawful.[110] (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. or is attempting to commit an offense."[103] Under Section 5 (a). that there will be no basis for that question. the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom? It was given to me by suspect Jun.

Aling Neneth was there? Yes. your Honor."[112] Q A Q A Q A Q A SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that: Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth? To arrest her. A . that there will be no basis for that ATTY. As far as you can see. sir. These other marijuana bricks. She was fetching water as a matter of fact? She was `sa bandang poso. sir. the marked money which Jun gave her. sir. because during our follow-up.A Q At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street. And what happened? At this instance. because according to Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth. VALDEZ: question. Whereat? At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard. it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money. We asked her to give us the money. But the fact is. And what happened upon arrival thereat? We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money. sir. she was not committing any crime. Mr. sir. sir. COURT A There is. Answer. sir. Witness. At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside the house. when you reached the house of Aling Neneth. she was just outside the house? No. sir. sir. x x x. sir. sir. sir. she was just inside her house? I saw her outside. You mentioned "him?" Her.' Carrying a baby? No. How about the other items that you were able to recover? We submit at this juncture.

sir. the amount of P1. Am I correct? I just saw her outside. Manlangit got the marijuana? Yes. sir. there's no testimony on that.600. sir. you were just in the side lines? I was just watching. sir. according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached her? PO3 Manlangit. PROSECUTOR: No basis. You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached her? Yes. COURT: Sustained. is it not? Yes. Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. And the money from Aling Neneth? I don't know. sir. because precisely according to you your role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up? Yes. Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs.Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing her daily chores. So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing. And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. sir. Now. That is correct. Neneth? PO3 Manlangit. Money. sir. According to the records. arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place. You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth? PROSECUTOR: There is no basis for this question.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. sir. sir. ATTY. VALDEZ: I was asking him precisely. if any memory of your testimony is correct. your Honor. That's right? . During all the time that this confrontation.

It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth? The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth. I am through with this witness. Contrary to the finding of the trial court. PO3 Manlangit. the arrest is legally objectionable." [114] In fact. in his own right. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her coaccused in pushing drugs. with or without any conspiracy. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house. your Honor. there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.e. sir. the buy-bust money..[118] Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business."[115] The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when.A Q A Q A Q A Yes. sir. she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. Is that what you are trying to tell the Court? No. coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. VALDEZ: Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view. She was not committing any crime. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was.[119] with or without her knowledge. It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth. it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.[117] Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused.[120] Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal. i. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word."[113] ATTY. sir. is based on actual facts. Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. making its warrantless seizure valid. it was Manlangit maybe? I saw it. but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. [116] A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense. What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one who retrieved the money from Aling Neneth.[121] The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law . not from the person of Aling Neneth. however. sir. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers.

I noticed that this carton has a cover? Yes. However. (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent. VALDEZ: So here we are. then the article is deemed in plain view. sir. then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. Show to the court. Aling Neneth was inside the house? A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Yes.[124] The object must be open to eye and hand[125] and its discovery inadvertent. or if its contents are obvious to an observer. sir. dining table. INTERPRETER Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box. At that particular instance. contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. PROSECUTOR . the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. sir. Where the object seized was inside a closed package.[129] PO3 Manlangit. sir. you saw the carton? Yes. testified on cross-examination as follows: "ATTY. I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed? It was open. A Like this. whether by its distinctive configuration. Not like that. its transparency. sir. contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. COURT Go down there. This carton. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money? Yes.[123] In the course of such lawful intrusion. sir.enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area. he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.[127] In other words.[122] The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.[128] It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime. the Narcom agent who found the box. if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article. (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime. according to you was under a table? Yes. if the package proclaims its contents.[126] It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. sir. When you and Badua arrived.

is it not [sic]? I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua. When you proceeded to take hold of this carton.. COURT Noted. You were the one who got this? Yes. Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth? I asked her. VALDEZ Yes. what's this. sir. You went inside the house? Yes. No. Aling Neneth was not yet frisked. you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was already retrieved by Badua? Yes.Can we describe it? ATTY. sir. sir. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton? I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he asked "Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito. you went inside the house? Yes. no. Who got hold of this? I was the one. You did not have any search warrant? Yes. Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun? Yes. sir. . sir. And got hold of this carton? Yes.. no. sir. Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A At this juncture. PROSECUTOR One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible. sir. sir. nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir. At that particular point in time. sir.

it will connote. sir.. where he saw it? A Q A Q A Q A Q A Here. sir. sir. PROSECUTOR By reading it. sir.. That is all that you saw? Yes.. It was in plain view. With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton? Yes. with plastic.. sir. ATTY. wait. By reading it. sir.Q In fact. VALDEZ That's a piece of plastic. this is not a piece of plastic. Somewhere here? It's far. Fiscal? I'm asking you? PROSECUTOR . sir. Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?" Yes. How far was this from the door? Two and a half meters from the door. dining table. Q You were only able to verify according to you. sir. sir. you did not know whether Badua already retrieved the buy-bust money from her? Yes... A Q A Q A Q A PROSECUTOR May we request the witness to place it.. VALDEZ What is that? What can you say. Gadao was in possession of the buy-bust money because according to you. PROSECUTOR Panero. PROSECUTOR For the record. your Honor. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. ATTY. Under the table according to you? Yes.. What you see is a carton? Yes. there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs.

Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-. I withdraw that... I am not asking you what your presumptions are." is it not [sic]? Yes. Let the prosecutor do that for you. A piece of plastic may be big or a small one. COURT Leave that to the court. Siopao? Yes.[132] On crossexamination. it could be "tikoy. It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop.white. you were able to.." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. A Q A Q A Q A Q A ATTY. And according to the Court.With due respect. Canned goods? Yes. VALDEZ I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. however. for record purposes. PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here.[131] Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house.. sir.. pink or blue in color. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria named her and led them to her.[133] PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents . I'm asking you what it could possibly be.. no even Superman. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic. let's place the size of the plastic. Q The only reason according to you. x x x."[130] PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there by appellant Doria. Look at this. sir. sir. sir. COURT Continue. he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana. Next question. Ice Pop? I presumed it was also marijuana because it may . In his direct examination. PROSECUTOR Leave that to the court. PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. It's the same plastic. what I am saying is. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box.

however praiseworthy their intentions. unless authorized by law.[134] It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. accusedappellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit. Branch 156. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. Aminnudin. x x x.of the box could be items other than marijuana.000. especially the susceptible youth. administer. or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. 6425. the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed. distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500. But as demanding as this campaign may be.. distribute. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. 4. it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm.[139] viz: "The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people. and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who. shall sell. as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. deliver. As Justice Holmes.[136] The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana[137] was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged. said. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. Administration. as evidence in court.[141] The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1.[142] IN VIEW WHEREOF. what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. Delivery. again. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows: . delivery. to wit: "Sec. Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No.600.e.00 to P10 million. i. dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities.[135] It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. administration."[140] Section 4 of Republic Act No. the corpus delicti. give away to another. the poseur-buyer.-The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Sale. The prosecution." In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. 7659 punishes the "sale.[138] Apropos is our ruling in People v. has failed to prove that accusedappellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. however.00 which he received.' It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another. especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. including the basest of criminals. 'I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

please see concurring opinion.. 2. concur. C. Buena. J. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500.000. . Purisima. Davide. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.. Kapunan. Romero. Melo. SO ORDERED. Vitug. Mendoza. and Gonzaga-Reyes... Quisumbing.1. Panganiban. Jr. Martinez. JJ. Pardo. Bellosillo.00).J.

No. 1965. On April 3. Amores for petitioners. 1964. 1964. 1964. petitioner Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III. Yuseco and A. 1964. 1965. respondents. denied. Tony Lex VI or Srta. J. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels. however. J. in his capacity as Acting Commissioner. the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Winnie however.: A petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain respondent Judge from enforcing his order dated October 18. L-25434 July 25. the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed Civil Case No. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A.R. On December 10.. but said prayer was. petitioners. 56701 against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Alafriz and Solicitor Augusto M. respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from herein petitioners by virtue of the abovesaid writ. Thus. Agnes. Jr. On August 5 or 6. the Court of First Instance of Manila set aside its order of April 10. and THE PHILIPPINE NAVY. DE GUZMAN & COMPANY. The vessel. as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch 1) and MORABE. 1964 and granted respondent company's motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary mandatory injunction. On April 28. respondent company filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a civil case docketed as No. ROLDAN. also respectively called Srta. remained in the possession of respondent company. vs. 56701 for failure of therein petitioner (respondent company herein) to prosecute as well as for failure of therein defendants (petitioners herein)to appear on the scheduled date of hearing. 1975 HONORABLE ARSENIO N. for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction thereunder issued. . 1965. On April 10. for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. respondent company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with respondent court. Philippine Fisheries Commission.. JR. Winnie and Srta. Narvasa for private respondent.R. C. MAKASIAR. Roldan.ROLDAN VS ARCA G. HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA. On July 20.

60-61. 1965 to the Acting Commissioner of Fisheries. 3416 and 3417 filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan. that: (1) the issuance of the writ would disrupt the status quo of the parties and would render nugatory any decision of the respondent court favorable to the defendant.). 462. and cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels (p. reiterating the grounds in their opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and adding that herein private respondent admitted committing the last violation when it offered in its letter dated September 21. represented by the Solicitor General. On October 18. On September 30. rec. 54. for illegal fishing with the use of dynamite. petitioners.e. the Court of First Instance of Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take the boats in custody. 1965. On October 9. to compromise said last violation (Exh. October 15. the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime (p. 1965. and another against the crew members of Tony Lex VI — both for violations of Act No. 62799. On October 2 and 4. 1965 by respondent company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 3215 in relation to Sections 903 and 2210 of the Revised Tariff and Customs Code. 62799 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against herein petitioners. On the same day. being instruments of a crime in criminal cases Nos. if any. 1965. as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. likewise. docketed as Civil Case No. 1965. 1965. 12. that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated September 13. on October 15.). filed their answer to the complaint with affirmative defenses. (3) that as petitioners herein were in possession of one of the vessels in point. opposed the abovementioned complaint.. (4) that petitioner Fisheries Commissioner has the power to seize and detain the vessels pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue. respondent company filed a complaint with application for preliminary mandatory injunction.). herein petitioners filed an urgent motion to submit additional documentary evidence. 1965. the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges against the crew members of the fishing vessels. i. rec. 659 and 1088. (6) that the compromise agreement approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and indorsed to the Fisheries Commissioner is never a bar to the prosecution of the crime perpetrated by the crew members of the vessels belonging to respondent company. (5) that respondents herein have not exhausted administrative remedies before coming to court. 1965. (2) that the vessels. 4003.On August 18. herein petitioners. rec. they cannot now be deprived of the legal custody thereof by reason of the dismissal of Civil Case No. as defendants in said Civil Case No. Among others. alleging among others. the release of the vessels sans the corresponding order from the above-mentioned court would deprive the same of its authority to dispose of the vessels in the criminal cases and the Provincial Fiscal would not be able to utilize said vessels as evidence in the prosecution of said cases. And again. 56. 56701. the same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan. On October 2. herein petitioners filed their memorandum praying for the denial of the application for preliminary mandatory injunction. one against the crew members of Tony Lex III. the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws. by the crew members of the vessels were settled. there were filed in the court of First Instance of Palawan a couple of informations. . pp. On the same day.

1966. 103-109. 619).). 108. Not even the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources nor the Fisheries Commissioner can direct that the fishing boats be turned over to private respondent without risking contempt of court. 1965 and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction pursuant thereto. . thus frustrating their forfeiture as instruments of the crime (pp. On October 19. 45. The orders of October 2 and 4. 1965. the respondent Judge issued the challenged order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the filing by private respondent of a bond of P5. rec.1äwphï1.000. 108. WE rule that the respondent Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when he issued on October 18.00 for the release of the two vessels(pp.On said day. rec.000.00 is grossly insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case the two vessels.).).). The grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Judge was heightened by the fact that he did not reconsider his order of October 18. 1965 directing the Philippine Navy to hold in custody the fishing boats until further orders. 29. 54. 54-55. 1965 that the Palawan Court of First Instance had already issued the two orders dated October 2 and 4.). 1965. 109. L-25795. 1965 by the Palawan Court of First Instance expressly direct the Philippine Navy "to hold in custody" the two vessels and that "same should not be released without prior order or authority from this Court" (pp. which are worth P495.-53. 95102. 1965 the order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and when he refused to reconsider the same. Paras. 3416 and 3417 for illegal fishing pending in said court (pp. 1965 after he was informed by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration filed on October 19. herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ on October 18. 109. Oct. 1965 the Philippine Navy received from the Palawan Court of First Instance two orders dated October 2 and 4. to be utilized as evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. respondent Judge denied the said motion for reconsideration (p. rec. The jurisdiction over the vessels acquired by the Palawan Court of First Instance cannot be interfered with by another Court of First Instance. I When the respondent Judge issued the challenged order on October 18. rec. which are subject to forfeiture as instruments of the crime. rec. rec. directing the Philippine Navy to detain (pp. are placed beyond the reach of the Government.) said vessels. The said vessels were seized while engaging in prohibited fishing within the territorial waters of Palawan (pp. 1965 on the ground.ñët On November 23. that on October 18. upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal (pp.) and hence within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan.000. 18 SCRA 616. 1965. 1965. rec. 48. the fishing vessels were already under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan by virtue of its orders of October 2 and 4. and that the bond of P5.00. rec. 1965 requiring the Philippine Navy to hold the fishing boats in custody and directing that the said vessels should not be released until further orders from the Court. 55. 110. Only the Palawan court can order the release of the two vessels. in obedience to the rule that "the place where a criminal offense was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction"(Lopez vs. among others.). October 18.

. L-23569. 592. p. Jesus de Vera. 525. May 29. 44 Phil. 1972. 188-9). supra. rec. et al. 56701 by the Court of First Instance of Manila had the necessary effect of automatically dissolving the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued therein on April 28. Mariano. Such a preliminary writ. orders or decrees of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction. May 30. Jesus de Vera. 59 Phil. and therefore cannot and does not extend to the seizure and detention of said vessel for violations on August 5 or 6.. As early as October 2 and 4. Insular Drug Company. G. NPC vs. L-15763. 56701 was directed against the detention of the vessel Tony Lex VI for violations committed prior to August 5. No.). cannot survive the main case of which it was but an incident. PNB vs. 182. Cabigao vs. 119. 646. Hon.1äwphï1. 22. Moran. Vol. et al. It is likewise of no moment that the herein respondents were not notified by the herein petitioners of the seizure of the questioned vessels by the Philippine Navy. Lazaro vs. Hacbang. 3 SCRA. directing the return of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (pp. 1964 (p.. Manila Cordage Company. Araneta & Uy vs. NPC vs. vs. Hubahib vs.R. 648. del Rosario. 33. 594). 64 Phil. decrees or injunctions. III. 109. Dec. et al.R. because "an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect after the dismissal of the main petition" (National Sugar Workers' Union. supra). 56701 which was filed on April 3. Saavedra vs.. L17907. 8 SCRA.). 1964 in Civil Case No. 330. 55 OG 431.. et al. G. 156-157.. vs. which has custody thereof through the Philippine Navy. like any other interlocutory order. Montesa vs. II The dismissal on December 10.. for the same in no way impugns the jurisdiction already vested in the Palawan court. 1964. Sugar Estate and Development Company. 64). This is analogous to the situation in Colmenares versus Villar (L27124. etc. the two boats were already in custodia legis under the sole control of the Palawan Court of First Instance. wherein We ruled "where the illegal possession of firearms was committed in the town where the Court sits. Hon. rec. 1965. the writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 28. It is immaterial that the vessels were then in the Philippine Navy basin in Manila. Phil. Leyte Bus Co. No. 56 Phil.ñët Moreover. 1970 ed. 1961. La Carlota Sugar Central. etc. 12. 1965. 189). 1963. vs. 92 Phil.It is basic that one court cannot interfere with the judgments. because such previous notice is not required by law. Javellana. 92 Phil. 6Z7. 25. The Manila Court of First Instance cannot interfere with and change that possession (Hacbang vs. 103. the fact that the firearms were confiscated from the accused in another town does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court" (pp. Comments on the Rules of Court. Commonwealth Insurance Company. 37. III . 631. 97 Phil. 1965. Tan. 45 SCRA 104. 186. 33 SCRA 186. which violations were not and could not possibly be the subject-matter of said Civil Case No. 107-109. 1964 of the first Civil Case No. because if coordinate courts were allowed to interfere with each other's judgments. May 25. Ibañez. Hi Caiji vs. 50 Phil. Inc. 1970. The Leyte Auto Bus Company. the same would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of justice (Ongsinco.

the master.. prohibits fishing with dynamites or other explosives which is penalized by Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less than P1. shall constitute a presumption that the owner. or imprisonment. That in the absence of a known owner of the vessel. apparel. furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government. together with its tackle. for not more than one year.00. apparel. association or corporation fishing in deep sea fishery without the corresponding license prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the Fisheries Act or any other order or regulation deriving force from its provisions. functions and duties heretofore exercised by the Bureau of Customs." Section 12 of the Fisheries Act. 389 of December 23." Section 78 of the same Fisheries Law provides that "in case of a second offense.. Section 4 of Republic Act No. aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives.Herein petitioners can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the vessels of private respondent for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses. . blasting caps and other explosives in any fishing boat shall constitute a presumption that the said dynamite and/or blasting capsand explosives are being used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section. Philippine Navy and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters . furniture and storesshall be forfeited to the Government" (Emphasis supplied).. 4003.. in the discretion of the Court.. Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act. patron or person in charge of such vessel shall be responsible for any violation of this Act: and Provided. 3512 approved on March 20. of dynamite.000." (46 OG 5905. "to assist the proper governmental agencies in the enforcement of laws and regulations pertaining to . That in case of a second offense.. as amended. 1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act. Under Section 13 of Executive Order No. boats.000. That in case of an association or corporation. the vessel together with its tackle. tackles. Provided. and by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six (6) months nor more than five (5) years. furniture.00. and that the possession or discovery in any fishing boat or fish caught or killed by the use of dynamite or other explosives. if present in the fishing boat. otherwise known as Republic Act No..00 nor more than P5. further. fishing . or both. among others." (Emphasis supplied). the President or manager shall be directly responsible for the acts of his employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with his knowledge.500. and other apparatus used in fishing in violation of said Section 12 of this Act. and all rules and regulations promulgated thereunder." The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the possession and/or finding.. tackle and other things that are subject to seizure under existing fishery laws". 1950. the vessel.. dynamites and the like . apparel." Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to and vested in the Philippine Fisheries Commission "all the powers. and "to effectively implement the enforcement of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing. to make searches and seizures personally or through his duly authorized representatives in accordance with the Rules of Court. 5911). otherwise the responsibility shall extend only as far as fine is concerned: Provided. or the fishing crew have been fishing with dynamite or other explosives. including fishery products.. finally. as amended. under expert testimony. reorganizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines.. of "explosives such as . "shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not more than P5. the Philippine Navy has the function. any person. as amended. fishing equipment.

. as amended by PD No. 46-47. and that the fishing vessel Tony Lex VI was suspended for one year from May 24. rec. therefore. 1964 and was actually ordered forfeited to the Government pursuant to the order of June 2. and illegally fishing with explosives and without fishing license required by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law (pp.Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code. 1964 (pp.). North Harbor. 48-53. 37. 34.) and remained suspended until its apprehension on August 5 or 6. a fine in the amount of P5. 1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries (pp. the renewal of the fishing boat license of Tony Lex VI was suspended for one year from the time said boat was moored at Pier 14 at North Harbor. rec.1äwphï1.ñët The operation of the fishing boat Tony Lex III was suspended pursuant to the order dated January 28. 1964 for repeated violations of Section 12 of the Fisheries Act (pp. package. that since January 28. apprehended on August 5 or 6. 1963. 1964 (p. the motion for reconsideration of which order was denied by the Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated August 17.). 1963. the operation of Tony Lex VI was suspended by the Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated April 1. apparel. both vessels were found to be without any license or permit for coastwise trade or for fishing and unlawfully fishing with explosives. furniture and all other apparatus used in fishing was ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and a fine in the amount of P5. 1964. rec.). 1963. otherwise known respectively as Srta. It appears.). upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner. rec. rec. 1972.). 37-38. the fishing boat Tony Lex III was suspended from operating and was ordered moored at Pier 14. without prejudice to the filing of the necessary criminal action. rec. When the Philippine Navy.1äwphï1. the fishing boat Tony Lex VI together with its tackle. bag or envelope on board and to search any person on board for any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws. rec. 62. Winnie. pursuant to the order of June 2. 1963 (p.).000. For illegal fishing with dynamite on March 28. pursuant to the order dated May 19. 46-47.ñët As a matter of fact. 35-36. 1963. to search and seize any vessel or air craft as well as any trunk. Manila.).). rec.00 was imposed on its owners-operators. Again. without prejudice to the institution of a criminal case against its owner and/or operator.). 1965. 39-40. these vessels were found to be without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and Customs Code and therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code. rec.. rec. Agnes and Srta. Manila (pp. authorized any official or person exercising police authority under the provisions of the Code. for which reason their owners and crew were accordingly indicted by the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan for illegal fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license (pp. 1965 (p.38. 41-42.00 was imposed on the owners-operators of fishing boat Tony Lex VI pursuant to the order of June 4. 1964 of the Commissioner of Fisheries(pp. 34. For illegal fishing with explosives on March 23.). when apprehended on August 5 or 6. for comitting the same violation on June 19. 1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries pending the final determination of the case against it for illegal fishing with explosives on January 21. 46. rec. 1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries (pp. 1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI.000. 34 of October 27. For illegal fishing again with explosives on April 25.

. Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and seizure.As heretofore intimated. the seizure of the vessel. p. 1965 (pp. its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest. 1965. 774. Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI. arrest a person (a) who has committed. sought to compromise by offering to pay a fine of P21. 1964. 132. Rule 113. Gonzales. rendered the said vessels subject to forfeiture under Sections 76 and 78 of the Fisheries Act. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful..000. hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected (Papa vs. 158. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. Moreover.S. otherwise the Department Secretary or any of his sub-alterns can render criminal prosecutions for violations of the fisheries law a mere mockery. 149. Justice Fernando. is a search or seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest (Alvero vs. as owner-operator. It is not in the public interest nor is it good policy to sustain the viewpoint that the Department Secretary can compromise criminal cases involving public. 1966 ed. The violations by the two vessels of private respondent by reason of which these vessels were apprehended and detained by the Philippine Navy upon request of the Commissioner of Fisheries. Revised Rules of Court).) cannot be invoked by the respondents because the said compromise referred to about thirty violations of the fisheries law committed by the private respondent from March 28. Justice Fernando. Magoncia vs.. 1965. offenses after the indictment had been instituted in court. 63-64. 267. 6. 300). p. In the case at bar. 224). They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. Philippine Constitutional Law. the power to compromise would exist only before a criminal prosecution is instituted. 225. 871-74. L-27360. p. The alleged compromise approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 13. as amended. 22 SCRA 857. 1972 ed. 80 Phil. 1963 to March 11. 1963 until August 5 or 6. Dizon. 76 Phil. The . 637. the two fishing boats were apprehended on numerous occasions for fishing with dynamite from March 28. because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured.00 for all said prior violations. 28. not private. from March 28. pp. The Bill of Rights. 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Act committed by the two fishing boats. Consequently. or (c) who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. 770. (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed. a police officer or a private individual may. the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license. Such previous violations of Sections 12. Under our Rules of Court. The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. 1964. Palacio. 158-159. 1968. is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence. rec. 1963 to March 11. Mago. 1972 ed. were committed on August 5 or 6. U. Caroll vs. without a warrant. The Bill of Rights. which violations private respondent. Feb.

4003.). 58-64. etc. precludes such a compromise the moment the Fisheries Commissioner decides to prosecute the criminal action in accordance with Sections 76 and 78 of the other penal provisions of the fisheries law. vs. It should be noted that in the first indorsement dated September 13. 65. 4003.) and the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. as amended. The said approval was granted after the private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the indorsement dated March 5. and Yu Con vs. etc. 4003). Hence.ñët The two fishing vessels Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI likewise fall under the term vessel used in Sections 17.). 365). 60-61.000. 78. 4003. 780). vs. as well as in its various communications to the Fisheries Commissioner (pp. . 63. Even private respondent refers to said fishing boats as fishing vessels "engaged in fishing operations" or "in commercial fishing" in paragraph IV of its complaint in Civil Case No. U. Act No. 199 U. as amended. 104 Fed. rec. Holmes. 77 NE 363. 76 and 78. 1965 of Section 12 in relation to Sections 76 and 78 of Act No. On the contrary. 625. the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Provincial Fiscal to institute the criminal cases (pp. rec. 48-53. 18. as amended). 895. rec.. vs. As a matter of fact. The fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI are likewise vessels within the meaning of the term vessel used in Sections 903 and 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code.fishing vessels together with all their equipment and the dynamites found therein are not only evidence of the crime of illegal fishing but also subject to forfeiture in favor of the Government as instruments of the crime (Art. 149-155. 1965 (pp. no useful purpose can be served in trying to distinguish between boat and vessel with reference to Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI. 3512.S. One Dredge Boat. 884. 169 Fed. rec. 41 Phil. 43-45. 1965 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources disapproving the offer by private respondent to pay the fine by way of compromise. 62799 (p. Charles Barnes Co. Section 80(j) of Act No. They can also fall under the term fishing equipment employed in Section 4 of Republic Act No.1äwphï1. The word boat in its ordinary sense. There can be no dispute that the term fishing boat (employed in the second paragraph of Section 12 of the Fisheries Act applies to the vessels Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI. Act No." (pp. And these two vessels of private respondent certainly come under the termfishing vessels employed in paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 creating the Fisheries Commission. the accepted definition of vessel includes "every description of water craft. used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water" (Cope versus Vallete.. rec. 1965 against the owners and the members of the crew of the vessels (pp. large or small. as well as the term boats utilized in the second paragraph of Section 76 of the Fisheries Act. Ipil. 1965 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approving the compromise fine of P21. rec.). 158-159. 47. 45. Sec.00 for the various violations committed previous to August 5 or 6. Hardsaw. because a fishing equipment is never complete and cannot be effectively used in off-shore or deep-sea fishing without the fishing boat or fishing vessel itself. means any water craft (Monongahela River Construction. any compromise shall be upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission (Section 80[i].. Revised Penal Code. 82. 34-42. 3416 and 3417 on September 30. the Department Secretary "believes that the offer made by the company was an implied admission of violations of said provisions of the Fisheries Law and regulations. .S.).). Furthermore. 158. which did not recommend such a compromise for the violation on August 5 or 6.

Muñoz Palma and Martin. Teehankee. Castro (Chairman. 1965. THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREUNDER AND THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 23. J. . 1965.. WITH COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT. ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID. Esguerra. concur. JJ. took no part. THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED OCTOBER 18.WHEREFORE..).

Pedro Pacis. No. Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.: This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo. REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Manila. Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. vs. allegedly misdeclared and undervalued. conducted surveillance at gate No. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction. Juan T. and the two trucks. having purchased them from the Sta. Upon investigation. against Remedios Mago and Hon. acting upon a reliable information received on November 3. were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Hilarion Jarencio. Remedios Mago and Valentin B. respondents. 67496. 67496 and from proceeding with said case. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of March 7. Chief of Police of Manila. Ermita. HON. 67496. as Commissioner of Customs. 1966. Pampanga. and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa. J. head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department. Commissioner of Customs. Court of First Instance of Manila. that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized. a patrolman of the Manila Police Department. would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks. petitioners. Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs.PAPA VS MAGO G. Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila. as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila. as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department. 1968 HON. enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil Case No. as Presiding Judge of Branch 23.R. When the trucks left gate No. 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects. David for respondents. elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle. 147-5501". 1 of the customs zone. a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. among others. but which were claimed by respondent Remedios Mago. Juan once Enrile. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods. JUAN PONCE ENRILE. Petitioner Martin Alagao. Monica Grocery in San Fernando. JARENCIO. that she . praying for the annulment of the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. L-27360 February 28. docketed as Civil Case No. with preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4. PAPA. which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code. ZALDIVAR. as Chief of Police of Manila. Pending the determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Judge from executing. PEDRO PACIS. and MARTIN ALAGAO. 1967. and Martin Alagao. alleging. RICARDO G.

denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other actuations. when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners. that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit them. Under date of November 15. 1966. and the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search. although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods. assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case. Sampaloc. that the goods. that. that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a competent court. for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. from opening the bales and examining the goods. that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs. that the release of the goods. their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction". that the members of the Manila Police Department had the power to make the seizure. the goods from said place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St. herein petitioners averred in the court below that the writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for. Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order. an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago. enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities. to wit: that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case. and that unless restrained their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. 1966. Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No. which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code. seizures and arrests in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the said Code. that the bales had not yet been opened. moral and exemplary damages in their favor.hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport.. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. on November 24. and that Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. undervalued. 67496. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case before this Court — from opening the nine bales in question. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of the restraining order. or their agents. Hence. However. Manila. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed. and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16. . and for the dismissal of the case. were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they were imported illegally. and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks. that anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined. as well as a judgment for actual. that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties and charges thereon had not been paid. ex parte. even assuming them to have been misdeclared and. the petition stated no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code. On November 10. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. 1966. respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No. and alleging special and affirmative defenses. that the seizure was not unreasonable. 1966. including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department.

Herein respondent Remedios Mago. the above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. filed an ex parte motion to release the goods. filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond. as shown in the inventory. and the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. were not declared and were. herein petitioners filed the present action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in this case.00. On December 13. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7. on his own behalf. because said Civil Case No. On February 2. 1967. with the conformity of the parties. and alleging that they had no plain. On March 13. alleging that on January 12. On January 30. (3) the Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not collecting the correct taxes. had no jurisdiction over the case. 1967 seizure proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila. In due time.772. taxes and other charges due on the goods amounted to P95. alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation. that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed goods. and on March 13. and identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the motion. and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods was grossly insufficient. 1966. upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings. 67496 was instituted long before seizure. the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40. 1967. alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case.At the hearing on December 9. A supplemental opposition was filed by herein petitioners on January 19. said respondent filed the corresponding bond. 1966. and that most of the goods. In their answer. subject to forfeiture. among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. In their petition petitioners alleged.000. ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods. (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. the same should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. 1967. for the following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila. 1967. On March 7. 1967.00. presided by respondent Judge. 1966. herein petitioner Ricardo Papa. Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration. therefore. on December 23. herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the goods. respondents alleged. the Bureau of Customs. 1967. among others. herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the estimated duties. 1967. (2) that petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid . the lower Court. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention. and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department.

presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient. Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters. and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. subject to forfeiture under Section 2530. and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. For example. 2 As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. among others. 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared. that the duties. only 100 pieces of watch bands were assessed. and another 200 dozens in bale No.772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs.and said goods had left the customs premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs. accruing under the tariff and customs laws. taxes and other charges upon the articles. but in Annex H. in Annex B. 2. 320 dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color). 7. 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared. and all other dues. as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory. 1 The goods in question were imported from Hongkong. 6. (4). e and m. (4) that the seizure of the goods was affected by members of the Manila Police Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and affected without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention. 1967 releasing the goods in question. pars. 8. 4 The record shows. as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs. 9. taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. the respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7. but in Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. taxes. and in bale No. (1). The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not. whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the "compliance") states that in bale No. charges. 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color). a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed. And this Court has held that merchandise. the importation of which is effected . at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the present action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any objection to the release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still be liable. 2. were. The Bureau of Customs has the duties. 120 dozens in bale No. fees and other charges must be in full. (3) that respondent Remedios Mago was purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors. by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimated duties. 220 dozens in bale No. 3 The payment of the duties. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties. taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to P95. in Annex B. therefore. The articles contained in the nine bales in question. it not being issued by a judge. or secured to be paid. 7. (6) that the seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in question because they are not articles of prohibited importation. (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles. (5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional. powers and jurisdiction. fees. there were in bale No. fines and penalties. 380 dozens in bale No. (3). Furthermore.

the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory injunction. were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus. decided by this Court on April 27. L-24037. valued at P117. The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya. is subject to forfeiture. On October 26. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-island vessel. and to dispose of the same according to law. et al. it appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and rags. nevertheless. 1967. arguendo. therefore." G. and upon examination the goods were found to be different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel. docketed as Civil Case No. Ricardo C. that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same. The goods in question. nor were the goods imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge. and the resolution of their motion to dismiss. the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs. acting under directions and orders of their Chief.731.. The Court of First Instance of Manila. asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods. as respondents in the mandamus case. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction. therefore. On November 12. et al. that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right to examine the goods. when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4. and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings. Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had no jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila. 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department. 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties. The Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the merits. Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to release the goods. and that the goods came from a coastwise port. is squarely applicable to the instant case. 67496. 1964. that it was not liable for duties and taxes because the transaction was not an original importation. was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9.contrary to law. and that the importation had been terminated. the customs authorities held them for further verification. 1964. 1964. 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. Hon. on October 6. . could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs. which had been imported and entered thru the port of Cebu. taxes. When the goods where about to leave the customs premises in Manila. 1964. Papa.00. that the goods were not in the hands of the importer nor subject to importer's control. v. on prayer by Francindy Commercial.000. 1964. 8 Even if it be granted. 1966. upon a bond of P20. No. Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the release of the goods. lack of cause of action. and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid. On December 3.00. In the De Joya case. the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification against the goods.R. On December 14. Gregorio Lantin. who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs.

. The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power. 1964. however. 1965.supra. the owner of the goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v. 1125. i. 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November 12. 602. on January 14. a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.00. 1964. The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. on December 23. Should they be found to have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City. To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. Customs released 22 bales thereof.) From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals. ordered them to comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction. Such law being special in nature.000. As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs custody. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. as provided in Sec. Averia. The purpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation. Nov. In resolving the question raised in that case. 1966. not to mention that the former are later enactments.e. L-22526. before Francindy Commercial sued in court. 1965.the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of the said court. while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation. however. this Court held: This petition raises two related issues: first. for the same were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu Port (Petition Annex "L").The Court of First Instance of Manila. The record shows. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).. the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities. they are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 20. 1964). 11 of Republic Act. on January 12. has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release the goods? Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance was filed (on October 26. these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. among others to collect revenues from imported articles. Hence. fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs. Averia. the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937. that the goods in question were actually seized on October 6. Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Said proceeding should be followed. and to enforce tariff and customs laws (Sec. Republic Act 1957). upon the filing by Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of P50. Said customs authorities thereupon filed with this Court.

pass through or search any land. of any cargo. In the present case. beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house. among others. therefor. or to stop and search and examine any vehicle. could not seize the goods in question without a search warrant. from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control. an officer of the Manila Police Department. Chief of Police of Manila. Martin Alagao who. This contention cannot be sustained. . search and examine any vehicle." 17 It is our considered view. 15 Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12. trunk. store or building. . even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao. it cannot be said. as respondents contend. that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house. and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws. made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. 10 And so. the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4. that petitioner Ricardo G. and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. Papa. 1967. persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. 1966. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it. not being a dwelling house. The Chief of the Manila Police Department. that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods. it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7. 1967 releasing said goods. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. with his unit. therefore. inclosure. for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws. effect searches. could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. 12 He could lawfully open and examine any box. 14 This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. and also to inspect. package. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. Papa. to the exclusion of the regular courts. and likewise to stop.It is the settled rule. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure. articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. warehouse. envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law. that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Ricardo G. the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk. . without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods. therefore. 13 It cannot be doubted. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter. for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws. or envelope or any person on board. beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law. 11 and it was his duty to make seizure. seizures. could. and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. and arrests. . having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs.

94). or automobile for contraband goods. § 5763. Indeed.231.L. 2 Fed. The Act of February 28. at L.Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. . 67. it has been held that: The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship. United States.L. 18 All that they complained of was. 1865. and in the following second and fourth Congresses. 201. they were intercepted without any search warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department. . and if they should find any goods. and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as § 3061. pp. chap. 2d ed. in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. by the 2d section of the Act of March 3. there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.. 320 Mich. 503. The substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18. at L. That while the trucks were on their way. when concealed in a dwelling house of similar place.. In the instant case. This Act was renewed April 27. at L. Thus. 540. ed. revived § 2 of the Act of 1815. 267 U. 799. 39 A. chap. a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture. 280. 215. United States. search and examine any vehicle.. 389. But even if there was a search. Stat. above described. Stat. we find in the first Congress. and the vehicle or beast as well. .. motorboat. chap. we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. 178. wherein the court. 69 L. 790. 315. 219. where they were detained. wares. for a year and expired. or merchandise thereon.. wagon. 39 A. 790. Case. Nazro. which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country. 14 Stat.R. . ed. . Jur. 190 N. 132. 1866. 541. (47 Am. 1161. considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs Code. Rep. Neither § 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as unconstitutional. Comp. 27 L. chap. p. Ct. 107 U.S. or had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law. 1815 (3 Stat. 513-514. at L. said as follows: Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment.. 441. 379. where readily they could be put out of reach of a search warrant. Again. citing Carroll v.R. whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise. 2 Sup.R. 45 S. that section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in Von Cotzhausen v. 686. for trial and forfeiture..S. where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.L. 1816 (3 Sta. 100). it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts.. People v. 543.) . and amended petition. 232. to seize and secure the same. 27 A. Anno.W. . but also to stop. and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel. Ct. 13 Stat. In their original petition. beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty.

. and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains. We do not consider it necessary. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is forbidden. all of the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.. they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.. The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum running. 27 A. The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development.In the case of People v. urging the constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. from those against morality. judgment is hereby rendered. . Same counsel contended the negative.L. The Court said: . animal-drawn vehicles. . burglary. We have thus resolved the principal and decisive issue in the present case. WHEREFORE. While a possession in the sense of private ownership. to robbery. 686). but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable. to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings. with their easily noted individuality. chastity. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees. for the purposes of this decision. . confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. . 389. as follows: (a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners. the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. they furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. and murder. are rare. Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure without a warrant. 190 N. Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises. which has multiplied by quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities." which is itself is no small matter. the question raised by defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the prohibition laws of the State. rape. . . 379.. and not a theory.W. is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition. Case (320 Mich. as is sometimes asserted. and decency. .R. .

67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. J.. enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7. (d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1967 in Civil Case No. and1äwphï1.B.L. Reyes. It is so ordered.. Remedios Mago. and from proceeding in any manner in said case. J. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.. JJ. Sanchez.P. Dizon. the order of respondent Judge Hilarion U.J. Makalintal. Jarencio. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. concur. for having been issued without jurisdiction. 1967. Castro. Concepcion. in Civil Code No. C.(b) Declaring null and void.ñët (e) Ordering the private respondent. 1967 restraining respondent Judge from executing.. Angeles and Fernando. Bengzon.1 . (c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31. dated March 7. to pay the costs.

that said petition was heard on February 16. L. that at the commencement of the trial of said criminal case No. HH. without any contradiction that. CC. L-342 May 4. R2. in which he protested against the procedure of the government in the seizure of said documents. on February 12. issued an order denying said petition.. the latter. and asked for their return to the petitioner. Albert and Albert for petitioner. ALVERO. that in concluding the presentation of its evidence and resting the case. denying the petition . which were considered. DIZON. that petitioner immediately objected to the presentation of said documents. in the petitioner's house. First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Assistant Solicitor General Alvendia for respondents. that the petition filed on December 1. due perhaps to an involuntary oversight. K. in criminal case No. Alvero has been accused of treason. 1945. P. the petitioner and his wife testified. 1946 AURELIO S. the respondent judges. as evidence. that when said petition for the return of said documents was submitted for the consideration and decision of the respondent judges. the prosecution presented. as part of its evidence. accompanied by Filipino guerrillas. Z. petitioner.: This is a petition for certiorari with injunction originally filed in this court. that in deciding the question so raised. G. No. In the petition it is alleged that petitioner Aurelio S. FF. and admitted as competent evidence the documents presented by the prosecution. marked as Exhibits A.R. in violation of his constitutional rights. H. DE JOYA. the prosecution again presented. that the respondents permitted the prosecution to present said documents as evidence. in denying said petition for bail. and set for hearing his petition for the return of said documents. the latter searched the house of the petitioner and seized. 3 of the People's Court. for the return of the documents allegedly seized illegally in petitioner's house. the documents which he had in his house. on February 26. certain documents which had been allegedly seized by soldiers of the United States Army. and called the attention of the respondent judges to the fact that he had filed a petition. respondent. R. upon the termination of the presentation of the evidence for both parties. 1945. U. and during its course. was not considered by the respondents. among other things. 3. ET AL.ALVERO VS DIZON G. when the prosecution should finish presenting its evidence. vs. R-1. stated that the prosecution might in the meanwhile continue presenting said documents. against the petitioner said documents which had been taken from his house. before the commencement of the trial of petitioner's case. and petitioner renewed his objection thereto. the petitioner again raised the question of the admissibility of said documents. without prejudice to the final resolution of said petition. C. J. in open court. 1946. on the occasion of the arrest of the petitioner by soldiers of the United States Army. 1946. and the respondent judges then ordered the substantiation of said allegations of petitioner. alleging that their seizure was illegal and that their presentation would be tantamount to compelling him to testify against himself. after offering said documents as part of its evidence. that on the same date that said order was issued. and asked for their return to him. DD. on the merits. and at said hearing. ARSENIO P. that at the hearing on his petition for bail.

constitutes a violation of the rights guaranteed in paragraphs 3 and 18 of section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. from any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war. (Petition. R-1 and R-2. on February 26. H.for the return of said documents. entitled — People of the Philippines vs. and that the acquisition of said documents was manifestly a violation of petitioner's constitutional rights and that their admission. relative to Exhibits C. respondents allege (1) that petitioner himself has admitted the legality of the seizure of the documents in question in his motion for reconsideration. other than this petition for certiorari. I.) And herein petitioner now claims that the respondent judges. would be tantamount to compelling petitioner. 3. Respondents have also expressly denied the allegations contained in the remaining three (3) paragraphs of the petition. Consequently. FF. in said criminal case No. HH and P. 1946. 1-12. petitioner asked for the reconsideration of said order. (6) that petitioner's evidence of alleged ownership. herein petitioner asks for the annulment of the order issued by the respondent judges. had expressly waived his right to object to their admissibility. as herein petitioner. at the time the search was made. as alleged in the last three (3) paragraphs of the petition. consequently. Alvero. in denying the petition for the return of said documents. which was also denied. is costly and highly prejudicial to the petitioner. is altogether insufficient. and that the seizure of certain papers in the house of the petitioner was made by soldiers of the United States Army of Liberation or its instrumentalities. K. herein respondents have substantially admitted the allegations made and contained in the first twelve (12) paragraphs of the petition. (7) and that none of the exhibits referred to in the petition has been satisfactorily . (3) that the seizure of the documents in question took place. and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. except the portions alleging that the documents in question had been obtained by means of force and intimidation or through coercion. as evidence for the prosecution. alleging that even the seizure of documents by means of a search warrant legally issued. R. Aurelio S. when their seizure cannot be justified by the corresponding search warrant. (5) that the documents in question had been properly admitted as evidence for the prosecution in criminal case No. acted without jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse in the exercise of their discretion. and petitioner himself has expressly admitted that said documents are not his personal papers but part of the files of the New Leaders' Association. — the return to him of the documents presented by the prosecution. and. . pars. in which he declared his purpose to remove alleged collaborators. dated February 26. mentioned above. for the purpose of collaborating with the enemy. as it presupposes that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused by means of legal and competent evidence. Rizal. that the petitioner has no other speedy and adequate remedy for the protection of his rights guaranteed by the Constitution. particularly Exhibits A. when apprehended. which was proven to be an organization created. And as defenses. 1946. dated December 29. P. and that certain soldiers of the American Army took certain personal properties of herein petitioner. 1945. in Pasay. to testify against himself — all of which portions have been expressly denied by the respondents. as accused. G. as accused in said case. 1946. which was then still a combat zone. 3. (2) that petitioner has not proven that said documents had been illegally seized for him. the court should order their immediate return. 1944. (4) that said seizure was effected lawfully under the terms of the proclamation of the Commander in Chief of the United States Liberation Forces. as the right of appeal granted by law to a person accused of a crime. on February 12.In their answer filed on March 21.

at the hearing on the petition for bail and at the trial of the case on the merits. 3d ed. which were admitted as part of its evidence. issued by Gen. after which. he filed a petition. herein petitioner had failed to identify satisfactorily the documents now in question. on December 1. (4) That at the trial of the case on the merits. 1939. he himself called for some of the documents in question. Douglas MacArthur. 1946. and his ownership thereof. from any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to . as well as the admissions made therein. in violation of the allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Chapter II. petitioner was accused of treason. in criminal case No. as evidence for the prosecution. filed in this court. under the provisions of article 4. and also under the proclamation. Considering the allegations made by the parties in their respective pleadings. declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of the Philippines. and said petition was denied. 1944. admitted the legality the legality of the seizure of the documents taken from his house. authorizing the seizure of military papers in the possession of prisoners of war (Wilson. having been suspected of collaboration with the enemy.524). held after they had been admitted as part of the evidence for the prosecution. and at the trial of the case on the merits. dated February 26. 3 of the People's Court. of the Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907. and at the hearing on his petition for bail. (3) That petitioner also filed a petition for bail. in the zone of military operations. The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest herein petitioner. the following facts appear to have been sufficiently established: (1) That on February 12.. as Commander in Chief of the United States of Army. and (7) That petitioner himself in his petition for reconsideration.identified by the petitioner as included among the papers allegedly wrongfully seized from his house and belonging to him. (2) That on or about October 4. (5) That herein petitioner had failed to object properly to the admission of said papers and documents at the hearing on said petition for bail. and seized and took certain papers from his house in Pasay. and to seize his personal papers. placed herein petitioner under arrest. which were admitted as part of its evidence. accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces. and were marked as exhibits. is unquestionable. p. and thus practically waived his objection to their admissibility. at the hearing of which the prosecution presented certain papers and documents. International Law. in not having insisted that the question of the legality of the search and seizure of the papers and documents taken from his house should have been litigated and finally decided first. and their supporting papers. (6) That at the hearing on his petition for the return of the papers taken from his house. demanding the return of the papers allegedly seized and taken from his house. 1945. Rizal. dated December 29. without any search warrant. who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy. when apprehended. soldiers of the United States Army. the prosecution again presented said papers and documents. as a collaborationist suspect. 1945. while the battle for Manila was raging. as described in the petition for certiorari. Section I. 1945.

Jose P... whatever is found in his possession or in his control may be seized and used in evidence against him. 47 Phil. 242 N. R. (41 Off. expressly admitted the legality of the seizure of his personal papers and documents at the time of his arrest. and the document marked as Exhibit P. 626. (Agnello vs. S. 251 U. nor satisfactorily establish his ownership thereof. United States. 269 U. in his motion for reconsideration.. but when he consented to their presentation. 232 U. S. herein petitioner filed a petition. 150 N. E. 385.) When one is legally arrested for an offense. the document marked as Exhibit HH. petitioner himself requested the production of the document marked as Exhibit A. estopped from questioning their admission. demanding the return of certain papers and documents allegedly seized and taken from his house at the time of his arrest. The right to search includes in both instances that of searching the person of him who is arrested. 132. pp. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is being committed or after its commission. 585. Y. The majority of the states have held that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. as part of the evidence for the prosecution. And with reference to Exhibits C. And he is now. And it is well established rule in this jurisdiction that in a petition for the production of papers and documents. United States. 383. G. 20.) As a matter of fact.hold them in restraint for the duration of the war. they must be sufficiently described and identified. dated February 26. United States. petitioner himself admitted that they are not his personal papers but part of the files of the New Leader's Association. Furthermore. 13. L.) At the hearing on his petition for bail. 267 U. 2. such as Exhibit C. dated December 30. Gouled vs. K. 149. otherwise the . 1946. for their return. 298. S. The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. United States. while the prosecution has sufficiently established the fact that some of the papers now in question. (Weeks vs.). 1944. one day prior to the seizure of certain papers and documents in the house of the petitioner. without having insisted that the question of the alleged illegality of the search and seizure of said papers and documents should first have been directly litigated and established by a motion. People vs. which is also guaranteed by state constitutional provisions is not violated by the use in evidence of articles obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure. Suzuki. vs. since February 11. such as Exhibit FF. and an officer has the right to make an arrest without a warrant of a person believed by the officer upon reasonable grounds to have committed a felony. 1945. 148. petitioner could not properly identify many of said documents. 630. (People vs. R-1 and R-2. since the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination may be waived. H. therefore. No.. 631.) It is true that on December 1. United States. P. Gaz. 1945.. Carlos. Defore. in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed.. S.. he was and should be deemed to have waived his objection to their admissibility as part of the evidence for the prosecution. had been received at the Office of the CIC of the United States Army in the City of Manila. which was a memorandum to Col. 255 U. made before the trial. Silverthorne Lumber Co. that is. Laurel.. S.. petitioner himself. which was a memorandum on Nippongo classes. which was a letter sent by him to Dr. (Carroll vs. at the hearing on his petition for bail and at the trial of the case on the merits.

through the Office of the CIC of the United States Army in Manila. is absolutely without merit. 585. on the ground of unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures. 275 U. . and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.. as evidence for the prosecution against herein petitioner. 67.petition cannot prosper. 256 U. and Buenaventura. (Burdeau vs. Pablo. Rules of Court. 192 U. 60. United States. S. 310. section 1. McDowell. (Liebenow vs. before the People's Court. Feria. 383. concur. Santos. at the trial of his case for treason. S. or on any other constitutional ground. New York. were not acting as agents or on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Burdeau vs.. as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in similar cases.) As the soldiers of the United States Army.) But it does not prohibit the Federal Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by a private person or under authority of state law. United States. Jaranilla. JJ. 232 U. 256 U. McDowell. Philippine Vegetable Oil Co.. filed in this case.. that took and seized certain papers and documents from the residence of herein petitioner. Santos. S. cannot now be legally attacked.) The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property. and it is. 69. therefore. by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction. Gambino vs.. (Weeks vs. JJ... and that those papers and documents came in the possession of the authorities of the Commonwealth Government. So ordered. 465. S. hereby denied and dismissed with costs. S. 465.. it is evident that the petition for certiorari with injunction. Santiago and T.. the use and presentation of said papers and documents. and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home. and Hilado.) In view of the foregoing. Rule 21. (Adams vs. 39 Phil. 1945. on February 12.

The Solicitor General for respondent. and in an open space of public property.J. Reyes. World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila. hardly two blocks away. a short program would be held. in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC). 5 It turned out that on October 19. in accordance with the recommendation of the police authorities. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly. petitioner. such permit was denied. Petitioner. all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. retired Justice JB L. reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Yorac for petitioner. 1983 was due to the fact that as of that date. starting from the Luneta. L-65366 November 9. 1983. On October 25. as Mayor of the City of Manila." 7 Respondent Mayor suggested.R.REYES VS BAGATSING G." 6 To be more specific. a public park. FERNANDO." 4 The filing of this suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on October 20. is called upon to delineate the boundaries of the protected area of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceable assembly. Lorenzo M. Montenegro. that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. the answer of respondent Mayor was filed on his behalf by Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo G.£ªwph!1 This Court. RAMON BAGATSING. to the gates of the United States Embassy. a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disbarmament. on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. C. in this case of first impression. 2 During the course of the oral argument. Once there.L. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. Tañada Jose W. 1 against an alleged intrusion by respondent Mayor Ramon Bagatsing." 8 . respondent. 3 it was stated that after the delivery of two brief speeches.:ñé+. vs. 1983 JOSE B. 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon. Diokno and Haydee B. would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. The reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for. No. REYES. however. at least as to some aspects.

17 It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect." 16 Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters Of public concern. All these rights. that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. The Court then deliberated on the matter. allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to theirviews. much less denied. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." 22 What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason. 21 2. a minute resolution was issued by the Court granting the mandatory injunction prayed for on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. 19 To paraphrase opinion of Justice Rutledge speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court Thomas v. while not Identical. the every case. the Court was unanimous. 1983. so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. of a character both grave and imminent. the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The last sentence of such minute resolution reads: "This resolution is without prejudice to a more extended opinion. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right. the utterance. 11 There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits. is the danger. as 's the case with freedom of expression. are inseparable. therefo re there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right. except on a showing. That same afternoon. 14 or contempt proceedings 15 unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent. Its value . may be Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. 1. but there was a dissent by Justice Aquino on the ground that the holding of a rally in front of the US Embassy would be violative of Ordinance No. public health. Justice Maicolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. public morals. It must always be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly. 20 it was not by accident or coincidence that the right to freedom of speech and of the press were toupled in a single guarantee with the and to petition the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. whether verbal or printed. however. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. Collins. even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. 13 or action for damages. or any other legitimate public interest. or of the press. 18 Even prior to the 1935 Constitution." 9 Hence this detailed exposition of the Court's stand on the matter. arising from the denial of a permit. the very same day the answer was filed. It is hot to be limited. resort to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten. On this point. being in a context of violence. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution. of a serious evil to public safety. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent." 10 Free speech. 12prosecution for sedition. 7295 of the City of Manila.The oral argument was heard on October 25. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. like free press.

the licensing . well-defined limits. of Justice Roberts in Hague v. the less perfect. where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality.S." 29 which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. and in consonance with peace and good order. will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. Reference was made to such plaza "being a promenade for public use. of course. and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling. To repeat. 312 U. as the statute is construed by the state courts. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest. and discussing public questions. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all. hardly two block-away at the Roxas Boulevard. Rojas. absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil. this Court categorically declared: "Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. in the guise of regulation. it is not absolute. and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience. Fugoso. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo. where. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion. There are. injury to property. And the Supreme Court of the United States. The utmost calm though is not required. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly." 24 It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked. providing that 'no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon. be abridged or denied. 4. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and. To give free rein to one's destructive urges is to call for condemnation. to the gates of the US Embassy. time out of mind. As pointed out in an early Philippine case. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values. Such use of the streets and public places has. resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided.' was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license. of 1939 vintage. That is to ensure a true ferment of Ideas. L. 3. rights. 27 Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. have been used for purposes of assembly. communicating thoughts between citizens. CIO: 25 Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest. as a rule. much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.. because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. from ancient times. on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. chap. penned in 1907 to be precise. 569. United States v. In that case. but it must not.may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. immunities. and held valid. State of New Hampshire. and acts of vandalism must be avoided. section 2. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets. in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court. 26 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. shall 'De permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be explained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee. but relative. the statute of New Hampshire P. held that 'a statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press. been a part of the privileges. There can be no legal objection. there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the or oposed march and rally starting from a public dark that is the Luneta. Apurado: 23 "It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary. riotous conduct. and liberties of citizens. 145." 28 a 1915 decision.

evil to a legitimate public interest. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. or declared ultra vires. 1983. a safe guide. and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. to a consideration of the time. as noted. Even if shown then to be applicable.. That conclusion was inevitable ill the absence of a clear and present danger of a substantive. The law declared on past occasions is. as guaranteed by the Constitution. imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. 35 The participants to such assembly. on the afternoon of the hearing. its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive. there would be a short program upon reaching the public space between the two gates of the United States Embassy at Roxas Boulevard.authorities are strictly limited. 1965 and the instrument of ratification was signed by the President on October 11. that question the confronts this Court." 33 To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. There is a novel aspect to this case. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. composed primarily of those in attendance at the International Conference for . " 30 Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. 34 That being the case." 31 5. as noted. respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. too. if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage. So it has been here. .. or disturbance of the peace of the mission. place. There was no justification then to deny the exercise of the constitutional rights of tree speech and peaceable assembly. it was binding on the Philippines. this Court issued the minute resolution granting the mandatory injunction allowing the proposed march and rally scheduled for the next day. It was concurred in by the then Philippine Senate on May 3. 1965. and manner of the parade or procession. October 25. Unless the ordinance is nullified. So. These rights are assured by our Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the AntiBases Coalition. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all. if the march would end at another park. no question. As previously mentioned though. . Hence. in the issuance of licenses. The second paragraph of the Article 22 reads: "2. " 32 The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. on the whole.. Moreover. would have arisen. "Civil liberties. in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing. As of that date then. or impairment of its dignity. If the rally were confined to Luneta.. The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961. it should be a part of the law of the land. 6. the judgment must be confined within the limits of previous decisions. and was thereafter deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15. There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel aspects of a litigation.

the public place where and the time when it will take place. but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If it were."37 7. however. that the police force is in a position to cope with such emergency should it arise That is to comply with its duty to extend protection to the participants of such peaceable assembly. proceeding through Roxas Boulevard to the gates of the United States Embassy located at the same street." 36There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. still the assumption — especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public — place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases would start from the Luneta. whether an individual or a group. It is not. In the Navarro and the Pagkakaisa decisions. It was made clear by petitioner. given all the relevant circumstances. unfettered discretion. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. especially so as to parks and streets. Western Police District. Not that it should be overlooked. Even then. only the guilty parties should be held accountable. the assurance of General Narciso Cabrera. Hence the decision reached by the Court. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur.) v. is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: "The question. another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were made. 39 called for application. While the General rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice. that no act offensive to the dignity of the United States Mission in the Philippines would take place and that. is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose. this Court was persuaded that the clear and present danger test was satisfied. In fairness to respondent Mayor. not as to The relations of the speakers. speaking for the American Supreme Court. Bagatsing. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit. It is true that the licensing official. There is no need to repeat what was pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes in Cox that precisely. The exercise of such a right. it is settled law that as to public places. is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place. It is a sufficient answer that they should stay at a discreet distance. There was in this case. through counsel. "all the necessary steps would be taken by it 'to ensure a peaceful march and rally. however. Superintendent. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. he acted on the belief that Navarro v. then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access. 8. here respondent Mayor. in the language of Justice Roberts. Metropolitan Police Force. but ever ready and alert to cope with any contingency. To repeat.General Disbarmament. if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved. If it were a private place. Villegas 38 and Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PMP. only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its . as mentioned at the outset of this opinion. it is the duty of the city authorities to provide the proper police protection to those exercising their right to peaceable assembly and freedom of expression. giving rise to an equal protection question.' " 40Assistant Solicitor General Montenegro expressed the view that the presence of policemen may in itself be a provocation. The present situation is quite different. By way of a summary The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date. there is freedom of access. Also from him came the commendable admission that there were the least five previous demonstrations at the Bayview hotel Area and Plaza Ferguson in front of the United States Embassy where no untoward event occurred.

however. it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Villegas. Free speech and peaceable assembly. Relova and Gutierrez. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied. Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. reason and moderation have prevailed. then. to grant it. of course. is on leave. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil. 10.. It is to be admitted that it finds support In the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing. Concepcion. Nonetheless. So it has been in other assemblies held elsewhere. The high estate accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less. the remedy in cases of this character is to set aside the denial or the modification of the permit sought and order the respondent official. as there was urgency in this case.JJ. granted the mandatory injunction in the resolution of October 25. . . So it was made clear in the original resolution of October 25. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. No costs. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less than 500 feet. in the exercise of its conceded authority. the proposed march and rally being scheduled for the next day after the hearing. 1983. 1983. Thus if so minded. Jr. Thereafter. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary. J. then the qualification and observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. De Castro. dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. — even more so than on the other departments — rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Escolin. enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. to the extent that there may be inconsistencies between this resolution and that of Navarro v. along with the other intellectual freedoms. the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights. concur. WHEREFORE. can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. whether favorable or adverse. his decision.. 9. Should it come. Guerrero.grant but at another public place. are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. the mandatory injunction prayed for is granted. the applicants must be heard on the matter. that case is pro tanto modified. must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Ordinarily. this Court. That is as it should be. It could be argued that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly presents itself." Nonetheless. Melencio-Herrera. the need to pass on that issue was obviated.. Clearly then. no sanctifying phrase can. It is quite reassuring such that both on the part of the national government and the citizens. Jr. It may be noted that the peaceful character of the peace march and rally on October 26 was not marred by any untoward incident. No verbal formula.

PEOPLE VS REYES G. J. passion and death of Jesus Christ. As stated by the lower court. for the purpose of reading and the life." of assembling. Acting Solicitor-General Peña for appellee. between 11 and 12 o'clock. MARCELINO MALLARI. A book known as the 'Vida. When the people attending the pabasa in the chapel and those who were eating in the yard thereof noticed what was happening. Marcelino Mallari. L-40577 August 23. carrying bolos and crowbars. POLICARPIO NACANA. and RUFINO MATIAS. they became excited and left the place hurriedly and in such confusion that dishes and saucers were broken and benches toppled over. who was chairman of the committee in charge of the pabasa. 1934 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. plaintiff-appellee. Province of Tarlac. passion and death of Jesus Christ. Offending the religious feelings. .: Appellants were convicted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac of a violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. "the term pabasa is applied to the act of the people. HULL. 1933. and the expenses incidental thereto were defrayed by different persons. refreshment and food were served in the yard adjoining the chapel. No. HERMOGENES MALLARI. The pabasa was discontinued and it was not resumed until after an investigation conducted by the chief of police on the following morning." The pabasa in Macalong used to begin on Palm Sunday and continue day and night. municipality of La Paz. "at a certain designated place. without any interruption whatsoever. until Good Friday. is used in this celebration. 133. and Rufino Matias arrived at the place. Pasion y Muerte de Jesucristo'. which contains a fun account in verse of the life. which investigation led to the filing of the complaint appearing on pages 1 and 2 of the record. PROCOPIO REYES. there is a chapel where it is customary to hold what is known in local parlance as a pabasa. Hilarion U. Jarencio for appellants. the defendants Procopio Reyes. professing the Roman Catholic faith. Alfonso Castillo. vs. While the pabasa was going on the evening of April 10. FLORENTINO CLEMENTE. As usual. Castor Alipio. in a place devoted to religious ceremony. during Lent. and started to construct a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel. which reads: ART. In the barrio of Macalong. defendantsappellants. Policarpio Nacana.—The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who. by reminding them of the fact that it was Holy Week and that it was highly improper to construct a fence at that time of the evening. Florentino Clemente. tried to persuade them to refrain from carrying out their plan. Hermogenes Mallari. A verbal altercation ensued.R. CASTOR ALIPIO.

The appellants are partisans of he Clemente family. together with the costs in both instances. namely. The disturbance or interruption of any ceremony of a religious character under the old Penal Code was denounced by article 571 and was punished by arrest from one to ten days and a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas.Many years ago the Clemente family by informal donation gave the land on which the old chapel was erected. if any was committed by the appellants.J. no matter how religious a turn of mind they might be. the present chapel was erected. even though irritating and vexatious under the circumstances to those present. When it was destroyed. JJ. is denounced in article 287 as an "unjust vexation" and punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both.." The construction of a fence. and Diaz. late at night and in such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who had gathered to celebrate the pabasa and is further shown by the fact that many of the appellants saw fit to introduce as their defense a false alibi. and there is now a dispute as to whether the new chapel is not now impinging on the land that belongs to the Clemente family. C. Vickers. The fact that this argument is a pretense only is clearly shown by the circumstances under which the fence was constructed. concur. is not such an act as can be designated as "notoriously offensive to the faithful". Appellants are therefore acquitted of a violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code but found guilty of a violation of article 287 of the Revised Penal Code and are sentenced each to a fine of P75 with subsidiary confinement in case of insolvency. Avanceña. . as normally such an act would be a matter of complete indifference to those not present. It is urged upon us that the act of building a fence was innocent and was simply to protect private property rights. But this article was omitted from the Revised Penal Code and the offense. So ordered. It is to be noted that article 133 of the Revises Penal Code punishes acts "notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. Abad Santos..

NCRPO Chief Maj. Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA. Pedrito Fadrigon. VIDAL QUEROL. Petitioners. Rasti Delizo. 169838 April 25. Jose Dizon. No. GABRIELA. PEDRO BULAONG. 169881 April 25. 169848 April 25. ANGELO REYES. and ROQUE M. vs.R. 2006 BAYAN. Manila Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA. EDUARDO ERMITA. KARAPATAN. Leody de Guzman. and Western Police District Chief Gen. ARTURO LOMIBAO. EDUARDO ERMITA. Adelaida Ramos. Roxanne Magboo. in his official capacity as the Chief. Manny Quiazon. J. Lilia dela Cruz. Froyel Yaneza. Fr. Gen. No. PEDRO BULAONG. Rendo Sabusap. No. Petitioners. PEDRO BULAONG. DECISION AZCUNA. Paul Bangay. Joseph de Jesus. Respondents. Gen. Michael Torres. in his capacity as Executive Secretary. Chief of the Philippine National Police. Mary Grace Gonzales. Ericson Dizon. SALVADOR T. Precious Balute. Magdalena Sellote. Renato Constantino. Nenita Cruzat. PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO LOMIBAO. represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. ANTONIO C. USTAREZ. and AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL. Respondents. Respondents.R. LABOG and Secretary General JOEL MAGLUNSOD. JOSELITO V. Wilson Fortaleza. ARTURO M. Djoannalyn Janier. KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP). THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. PASCUAL. in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments. Carmelita Morante. Ernie Bautista. LOMIBAO. National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO). Pedro Pinlac. vs. TAN. CARRANZA. VIDAL QUEROL. SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU).. 2006 Jess Del Prado. and Fahima Tajar. 2006 KILUSANG MAYO UNO.BAYAN VS ERMITA G. in his official capacity as the Chief.: . Petitioners. Margarita Escober. Marie Jo Ocampo. represented by its National President. Philippine National Police. Cristeta Ramos. and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT.R. in his official capacity as the Chief. Leonardo De los Reyes. FRANCISCO LASTRELLA. in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity. vs. x---------------------------------x G. Jr. x---------------------------------x G. GILDA SUMILANG. HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA.

et al." Sec.R.1 allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6. – This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985.2 who allege that they were injured. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them. 880. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. are affected by Batas Pambansa No. They were then forcibly dispersed. Declaration of policy. petitioners in G.. they claim. 880 An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And Petition The Government [And] For Other Purposes Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled: Section 1. some of them in toto and others only Sections 4. a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C. and 14(a). 13(a). 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. in G. liberty and equal protection of the law. in G. causing injuries on one of them. arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26. 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B. 12. 2005. causing injuries to several of their members.) No. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit. No. 169881. et al. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it. The first petitioners. Bayan. To this end. no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. "The Public Assembly Act of 1985. B. a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. et al. 880. and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries." provides: Batas Pambansa Blg.M. They further allege that on October 6. 2005. Jess del Prado.P. Title.. Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU). as well as the policy of CPR. 5.R.. No. a group they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which. No. The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners. the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life.. 2005.Petitioners come in three groups.4 Three other rallyists were arrested.P. put the country under an "undeclared" martial rule. They further assert that on October 5.3 allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens. et al. 2. . 6. The third group.R. 169848. No. claim that on October 4. – The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. specifically the right to peaceful assembly. 169838. 880. KMU.

Sec. 4. demonstrations. – For purposes of this Act: (a) "Public assembly" means any rally. road. and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access. parade. or in the campus of a governmentowned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political. boulevard. (b) "Public place" shall include any highway. the date. The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code. however. Permit when required and when not required. plaza. (d) "Modification of a permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly. Definition of terms. (c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military. the purpose of such public assembly. the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes. Application requirements. economic or social. street. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act. its implementing rules and regulations. march. square. and the probable number of persons participating. Sec. However. – All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines: (a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers. time and duration thereof. . public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances.Sec. or petitioning the government for redress of grievances. demonstration. bridge or other thoroughfare. police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. and place or streets to be used for the intended activity. – A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. 5. or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue. the transport and the public address systems to be used. rerouting of the parade or street march. in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. rallies. and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227. (b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of the applicant under Section 8 hereof. avenue. parades. The processions. procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause. That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed. Provided. no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property. park. 3.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit. Sec. any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. – (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order. or the Intermediate Appellate court. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory. the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. to the next in rank. public convenience. (e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit. the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed.(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held. (g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit. (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. 6. . the Regional Trial Court. (d) Upon receipt of the application. in his absence. public safety. public morals or public health. (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or. failing which. (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours. which must be duly acknowledged in writing. the Municipal Trial Court. said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. the permit shall be deemed granted. Action to be taken on the application. at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly. (h) In all cases. he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

Sec. crash helmets with visor. avenue. Towards this end. Responsibility of applicant. to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. . gas masks. These shall include but not be limited to the following: (a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit. (c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully.Sec. when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers. boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards.|avvphi|. 10. for an appreciable length of time.net (b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly. Police assistance when requested. designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade. the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may. Use of Public throroughfare. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. to adequately ensure public safety. Sec. a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times. and (e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly. 9. – It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines: (a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined. of any public highway. – It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies. Sec. 7. However. (d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit. (b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks. shields. road or street. to prevent grave public inconvenience. – Should the proposed public assembly involve the use. 8. boulevard. – Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly.

the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed. organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. ordinance or any provision of this Act. or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided. (b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants. Sec. or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence. Sec. and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse. (c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate. when an assembly becomes violent. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. the public assembly will be dispersed. (b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf. the police may disperse such public assembly as follows: (a) At the first sign of impending violence. the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists. (c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf. as amended. 12. That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly. water cannons. (d) No arrest of any leader. 11. however. . Dispersal of public assembly with permit. smoke grenades. Sec. – The following shall constitute violations of the Act: (a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned. statute. – When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required. Prohibited acts. the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance. or at any property causing damage to such property.(c) Tear gas. or deliberate destruction of property. – No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse. However. (e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a ground for dispersal. 13. the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly.

as far as practicable. and item 4. (c). (d). Sec. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle. (e). subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years. 2. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares. – Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which. Freedom parks. 3.(d) Obstructing. 1866. . item 3. its horns and loud sound systems. disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly. pillbox. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit. (b) violations of subparagraphs (b). the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm. shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit. – Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding section shall be punished as follows: (a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months. 14. bomb. Penalties. (c) violation of item 1. the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act. impeding. and the like. (f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof. (g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof: 1. 4. (f). In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like. (e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly. or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days. (d) violations of item 2. 15. Sec. 5. subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No.

. letters of instructions. 169848. 17. based on the rule of law.5 . We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a democratic society. on the other hand. is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacañang dated September 21. The President‘s call for unity and reconciliation stands. decrees. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be protected by a vigilant and proactive government. the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby. we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a "no permit. Philippines NEWS Release No. 2005 STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA On Unlawful Mass Actions In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the political situation. – All laws. CPR. ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. Repealing clause. Sec. The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force. disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations. Effectivity. Sec. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order.R. resolutions. 16. shown in Annex "A" to the Petition in G. – Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional. et al. Constitutionality. 2005. contend that Batas Pambansa No. and the peace of mind of the national community. in lieu of maximum tolerance. amended. orders. thus: Malacañang Official Manila. October 22. 1985. Approved. No.Sec. Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. 18. Petitioners Bayan. – This Act shall take effect upon its approval. sow disorder and incite people against the duly constituted authorities. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. or modified accordingly. 2 September 21. no rally" policy.

of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Gen. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Respondents in G. argue that B. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.P. Vidal Querol. No. the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. The words "lawful cause. it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. Arturo Lomibao. Pedro Bulaong. Furthermore. Gen. it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B. as Chief Vidal Querol." "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. as Executive Secretary. and Manila Police District (MPD) Chief Gen. and that no law. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right. NCRPO. argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B. No.P. et al. supervision and instruction. otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Second. the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly. No. Manila City Mayor Lito Atienza.R. MPD.P. as Chief.Angelo Reyes. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. in turn. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. as Chief. 169848 are Eduardo Ermita as Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity. 880. Petitioners Jess del Prado.P.. ordinance or executive order supports the policy. aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments. No. they argue that it is preemptive. National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) Chief. Also. petitioners KMU. it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.They argue that B. Furthermore. No. et al. Pedro Bulaong. Finally. Chief. that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act. allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. No. Thus. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. 169838 are Eduardo Ermita..P. the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. Regarding the CPR policy. PNP Maj. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.R. Arturo Lomibao. its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. . it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B. Respondents in G. and all other public officers and private individuals acting under their control. As to the CPR policy. Furthermore." "opinion. the limits provided are unreasonable: First. As a contentbased legislation.

nothing in B.P. place and manner of conduct. It does not replace the rule of maximum tolerance in B. Sangalang v. 880 authorizes the denial of a permit on the basis of a rally‘s program content or the statements of the speakers therein. except under the constitutional precept of the "clear and present danger test.6 3. No.e. Neither B. i. 880 is a content-neutral regulation of the time. Petitioners cannot honestly claim that the time. public safety.P. the interest cannot be equally well served by a means that is less intrusive of free speech interests. No. No. 13 and 15 of the law. and PNP MPD Chief Pedro Bulaong. No. Section 5 requires the statement of the public assembly‘s time. CPR is simply the responsible and judicious use of means allowed by existing laws and ordinances to protect public interest and restore public order." The status of B. Comelec. Petitioners have no standing because they have not presented evidence that they had been "injured. No. namely. Adiong v. B. and 6 (a). 5. (e). arrested or detained because of the CPR. Respondents argue that: 1. "Clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order.P. the Honorable Mayor Joselito Atienza. Comelec8 held that B. Intermediate Appellate Court9 held that a local chief executive has the authority to exercise police power to meet "the demands of the common good in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. (c).Respondents in G. public morals or public health" and "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" both express the meaning of the "clear and present danger test. The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent. regulations and ordinances to prevent chaos in the streets.P. No.R. place and manner of holding public assemblies and the law passes the test for such regulation. 880 as a content-neutral regulation has been recognized in Osmeña v. No. these regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them. to wit: (a) B.P."10 7. No.P. (b). No.. 6. (b) B. i. it is not accurate to call it a new rule but rather it is a more pro-active and dynamic enforcement of existing laws. 880 is content-neutral. 880 violates the threepronged test for such a measure.. No. (d). Thus. 169881 are the Honorable Executive Secretary.] 880 and other offenses." Furthermore. No.P. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. . 880 is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. place and manner regulation embodied in B." 2. public convenience.P. PNP Director General Arturo Lomibao. 880.7 4. and (c) B. the discretion given to the mayor is narrowly circumscribed by Sections 5 (d). 880 leaves open alternative channels for communication of the information.P. It entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. it has no reference to content of regulated speech. Furthermore." and that "those arrested stand to be charged with violating Batas Pambansa [No.e. 880 nor CPR is void on its face.P.

for his part. 5 and 6. CA. L. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B. B. the Court set the cases for oral arguments on April 4. as stated in the affidavit .13 have affirmed the constitutionality of requiring a permit. that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights. and Republic Act No. Fugoso. the following developments took place and were approved and/or noted by the Court: 1. No. withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues.P. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR): (a) Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness? (b) Is it void for lack of publication? (c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and October 4. specifically Sections 4. Petitioners. 2006. No. After the submission of all the Comments. submitted in his Comment that the petition in G. 2. 880.P. according to respondents.R. it was merely a "catchword" intended to clarify what was thought to be a misunderstanding of the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B. No. 2006. 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies. The petitions were ordered consolidated on February 14. as follows: 1. 5. particularly those raising the issue of whether B. 2005? During the course of the oral arguments.Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza. The Solicitor General agreed with the observation of the Chief Justice that CPR should no longer be used as a legal term inasmuch as. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions. Reyes v. that his denials of permits were under the "clear and present danger" rule as there was a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the lives of other people.14 stating the principal issues.P. 880. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20. 169838 should be dismissed on the ground that Republic Act No. October 4. and that B. No. 880 and that. 7160: (a) Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations? (b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness? (c) Do they constitute prior restraint? (d) Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors? (e) Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? 2. 2005. Bagatsing.P.11 Primicias v.12 and Jacinto v. 5 and 6. No. 6. that J.

the less perfect. Respondents. as follows: There is no question as to the petitioners‘ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and. and Section 3 of Article XIII. CA. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line . 880 and the maximum tolerance policy embodied in that law. particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights. it does not replace B. then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment. The Court will now proceed to address the principal issues.S. of expression. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition. No. of expression. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities. As early as the onset of this century. They have.16 already upheld the right to assembly and petition. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Petitioners‘ standing cannot be seriously challenged. in U. and of the press.15 the Court. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity. this Court in U. without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.P. Apurado. v.S.P. in fact. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the people‘s exercise of these rights.executed by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and submitted to the Ombudsman. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as to acknowledge: "It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions. the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor. Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides: Sec. or of the press. The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is. the grievance and the more intense the feeling. Apurado. purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. as guaranteed by the Constitution. on the other hand. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation‘s streets and parks. a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. 4. have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit. as early as the onset of this century. taking into account the foregoing developments. together with freedom of speech. if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. No. for that matter. Section 2(5) of Article IX. to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law. is directly affected by B. because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. and the greater. as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. As stated in Jacinto v. vs.

of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose. education. is . it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. morals. or action for damages. so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits. as follows: 1. Collins. to promote the health. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution. like free press.betweendisorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.17 the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks. while not identical. and general welfare of the people. it must be remembered that the right. is not absolute. All these rights. this Court said: The right to freedom of speech. nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. and it may be delegated to political subdivisions. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. such as towns." Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. as is the case with freedom of expression. speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. good order or safety. In every case. the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. Next. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power." Again. therefore. Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. Fugoso. It is not to be limited." which is the power to prescribe regulations. except on a showing. are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. arising from the denial of a permit. In Primicias. while sacrosanct.18 Reyes v. much less denied. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights. or contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." Free speech. peace. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge. prosecution for sedition. however. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right. and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. are inseparable. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Bagatsing19 further expounded on the right and its limits. or of the press. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights. in Primicias v. where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right.

the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. 2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution." What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers." It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to one‘s destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage, of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: "Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically affirmed

that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such plaza "being a promenade for public use," which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta. 4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared: "Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee,‘ was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that ‗a statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *. "Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection." xxx 6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: "The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects." There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be

granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." xxx 8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the other departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. x x x. B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes. The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:

Reyes v. Bagatsing (G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553, 569) 8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public placewhere and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time

B.P. No. 880 Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required.-- A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a governmentowned and operated educational institution

to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act. Sec. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines: (a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used. (b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof. (c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly. (d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application. – (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a

clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours. (e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within fortyeight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision

granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory. (g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank. (h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec,20 where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.21 A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, thus: Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 20 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. xxx

regardless of frontiers. (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public). . Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. or of public health or morals. this right shall include freedom to seek. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression. 2. 3. in the form of art. thus:23 public. procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. x x x 2a: an organized body of people x x x 3: a group of people distinguished by common interests or characteristics x x x. the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. demonstration. Neither is the law overbroad. or through any other media of his choice. in writing or in print. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions. n. receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds. parade. 3. "Public" does not have to be defined. Contrary to petitioner‘s claim. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. 1. march. everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Webster‘s Dictionary defines it. public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. 2. but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others. The law refers to "rally." So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.Article 29 1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 19. either orally.

This brings up the point. the Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued.P. No. This is stated in the Affidavit of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. Finally. however. That of Manila. the Court is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time: Sec. No. In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila.There is. or 20 years ago. however.P. no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law. Advance notices should. The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. thus: . The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that. no prior restraint. For without such alternative forum. the degree of observance of B. only Cebu City has declared a freedom park – Fuente Osmeña. to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. As stated earlier. and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments. likewise. The reference to "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. he added. be given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings. the Sunken Gardens. The matter appears to have been taken for granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful revolution of 1986. – Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which. 880‘s mandate that every city and municipality set aside a freedom park within six months from its effectivity in 1985. since it does not mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B. the law provides a precise and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. for those who cannot wait. 6(a). 716024 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings. 15. has since been converted into a golf course. would be pathetic and regrettable. If this is so. shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior