SOFTWARE PROTECTION: COPYRIGHT VS SUI GENERIS

By Sylvia Erubasa

‘The maxim “copyright does not protect ideas, only the expression of ideas” has
proved remarkably ill-adapted to resolving issues of ‘non-literal infringement’ of
copyright in computer programs in both the US and UK courts. It is high time to
abandon the attempt to force software into the copyright mould and to create a new
right for programs which rewards and protects internal and external functional
aspects of programming.’
Discuss.

1. INTRODUCTION

The question I have been asked to address in this essay essentially deals with
whether or not copyright protection is adequate for the “internal and external
functional aspects of programming” and if not, whether a new right should be
created specifically for it. Software copyright law has created considerable
controversy since its beginnings. The Courts have stretched the copyright law thin
with their interpretations in an attempt to create a viable balance between the
need to provide protection for the originator of something “new” and the need to
permit others to build on the past.

There has been a quagmire of lawsuits for copyright infringement of computer

program because the nature of protection afforded by copyright is that it
“protects the originality of expression not the underlying function.” This main
feature of copyright is expressed in the age old saying that “copyright does not
protect ideas, merely its original expression.” Simply put, in the realm of
copyright “ideas are as free as air.”

The question to be addressed at this point is whether this “non-protection of

ideas” can ensure adequate protection in relation to computer programs. In the
case of computer program, the “ideas” are made up of the program’s methodology and
algorithm, including the necessary sequence of steps adopted by the programmer and
its “expression” is the program source code (especially any stylistic or arbitrary
choices contained in it), its derived object code and any other derivative works.
It therefore follows from the “non protection of ideas” view that if after you
analyse the ideas contained in a program, you express those ideas in your own way
with maybe a completely different implementation, the new implementation belongs
to you and you have copyright in relation to it; in so far as the source code
itself wasn’t copied.

As a result of this, there are strong voices to be heard and indeed there have
been many debates as to whether or not copyright alone is adequate protection for
computer programs and whether or not a new right should not be created exclusively
for computer programs which would ensure adequate protection for the internal and
external functional aspects of programming i.e. the graphical user interface (GUI)
and other non literal aspects of a program.

In this essay, copyright will be briefly discussed in line with the “idea v
expression” dichotomy, and then a brief discourse into the nature of computer
program will follow. The US and UK governing court decisions would be examined in
an effort to determine the stand of these two in the face of protection for non-
literal infringement of computer programs and the scope of the protection thus
offered in order to assess whether or not it fits into the copyright mould or it
should be given new and different rights. Recommendations will be made based on
this and then conclusion will be drawn.

2. COPYRIGHT

Copyright protects the original expression of an idea fixed in a tangible medium

of expression. The need for protection to be had for the originator of a work is
summed by Lord Bingham in Designer Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd
(Trading as Washington DC) ;

“The law of copyright rests on a very clear principle: that anyone who by his
skill and labour creates an original work of whatever character shall, for a
limited period, enjoy an exclusive right to copy that work. No one may for a
season reap what the copyright owner has sown.”

What copyright protects is the act of authorship; the workings of the creative
mind whether expressed as a literary work (This includes a table or a compilation
expressed in words , figures or symbols, as well as computer programs or
compilation of computer programs); artistic work, dramatic work, musical work,
cinematographic films, sound recordings and broadcast signals.

Copyright is fundamentally available to protect “original” work though the work

need not be inventive and as Whitford J. said in LB (Plastics) Ltd v Swish
Products Ltd , “No originality of thought is needed to sustain a claim to
copyright.” The question then is “how much needs to be copied before infringement
occurs?” In the interest of ensuring protection and enabling usage, a balance is
part achieved by permitting the use of ideas in so far as the expression of the
ideas is not copied and it involves “skill and labour” (which is not necessarily
equal with the “sweat of the brow” doctrine).

2.1 Idea v Form of expression

The principle which was first enunciated in the US by the court in Baker v Selden
creates a dichotomy between “unprotectable” ideas and their “protectable
expression.” In practice, this dichotomy is sometimes difficult to apply.
Courts consider this “idea v expression” dichotomy to help focus on whether the
idea is capable of various modes of expression, or whether protection of the
expression would ipso facto protect the idea (“merger doctrine”). An example of
application of the “ideas v expression” point can be seen in the American case of
Sheldon v MGM Corporation where it was held that though substantial parts of the
play were lifted for the screenplay of the film, there was no infringement. The
test is always a matter of degree or extent of the copying. In Telstra
Corporation Ltd v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd it was held that the
similarity in the events was confined to “ideas and concept… rather than to their
expression.”

Flowing from the “idea v expression” divide, it therefore follows that for
copyright to subsist in a work it must exist in a material form and for there to
be infringement of the copyright, the copying must have been extensive. For
example, “Mickey mouse”, “Donald duck” and “superman” have all been held to be
copyrightable subject matter. However, while there might be protection for the
cartoon “Tom & Jerry”, it would not “preclude others from portraying struggles
between hapless cats and cheeky mice.”

3. COPYRIGHT IN COMPUTER PROGRAMS

A computer program is defined in the US copyright Act as “a set of statements or

instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result.” Computer programs, whether in a form that can be read by
programmers or in a form that can be executed by a computer, are “works… expressed
in words, numbers, or other… symbols or indicia,” and thus fall squarely within
the statutory definition of literary works.”

3.1 The nature of computer programs and the problem of infringement

Computer programs consist of text (i.e. source code and object code) and behaviour
which are inseparable for the purpose of protection. Although copyright is mostly
used as the “protection of choice” for computer programs, some aspects might pose
difficulties for traditional copyright law in relation to computer programs. Such
problems include the mode of operation of computers and the ease of copying
because “computer programs were made to be copied.” According to Karjala ,
“Programmers learn by studying existing programs… and they adapt what they have
learned to the new tasks that are placed before them.” Computer programmers are
thus more susceptible than other copyright owners to having their work copied
because there needs to be free sharing of programs and program parts among
programmers in order to “eliminate the need to reinvent the wheel with each new
program…”

It therefore follows that many aspects of a computer program may be copied; either
literal (bit for bit) or non-literal copying. It is generally easier to prove
liability where literal copying is alleged as it involves a straight line by line
copying of both the object and the source code. Non-literal copying is more
difficult to determine and the courts have developed different tests in this
regard. As Lord Pearce in Ladbroke (football) Ltd v William Hill (football) Ltd
said the question of whether the Defendant has taken a substantial part of the
Plaintiff’s work depends more on the quality than the quantity of what has been
taken.

4. NON-LITERAL INFRINGEMENT OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND THE IDEA V EXPRESSION DIVIDE

The issue of non-literal infringement are two-fold. The first is “whether non-
literal elements such as interfaces are copyrightable.” The other issue of non-
literal infringement is a situation where although the allegedly infringing work
is not an exact replica of the original, it contains the essence or the
“lifeblood” of the original a.k.a. the “look and feel.” This is a more complex
situation arising from reverse engineering whereby the second party produces a
program having the same functions thus competing (or to enable compatibility) with
the first. Protection is thus desirable for the non-literal elements of a program
because these are the factors that most likely give a program a competitive edge
over its rivals, hence the extensive debates both in the US and UK courts to
determine the extent of copyright protection in this regard.

4.1 US Position through the cases

The case of Whelan Associates Inc. v Jaslow Dental Lab Inc was the high point in
copyright protection for non-literal aspects of a computer program. In this case
Jaslow alleged that Whelan’s “Dentcom” program infringed Jaslow’s copyright on its
“Dentalab” program despite the fact that they were written in different languages
and there was no issue of any literal code being copied. The Plaintiff’s argument
was that by analogy to other literary works , copyright of computer program can be
infringed even in the absence of copying of the literal elements. In trying to
separate the idea from its expression in the program, the court devised the
“utilitarian” rule. The Court held that copyright protection may extend beyond the
programs’ literal code to their “structure, sequence, and organisation (SSO)”.
The utilitarian test was however criticised in the case of Computer Associates
International Inc. v Altai as “showing a flawed understanding of a computer
program’s method of operation.”

In the Altai case, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant’s replication of the
functionality and interface of its job scheduling program amounted to non-literal
infringement. Concurring with Whelan that copyright can still be infringed even
where no literal code is copied; the Court of appeal however laid down its three-
prong test of “Abstraction-filtration-comparison” test to determine the similarity
of two programs. The purport of this test is to first break down the infringing
program into its basic structural parts, then “sort out the elements that are not
subject to copyright” so as to limit the comparison to the core of protectable
expression which remains after the process of elimination, and then compare the
results. Applying this test to the case at hand, the Court of Appeal upheld the
district court’s ruling that Altai’s program did not infringe that of Computer
Associates. The Altai three-prong test was the basis of the decision in MiTek
Holdings Inc. v Arce Engineering Company Inc and a host of other cases.

Although the Altai case has been commended as “a significant advance in

establishing, for software copyright cases, a method for determining infringement
that is both consistent with traditional copyright law and workable” ; the
decision has however been criticised as being a “Legal Chernobyl.” The principal
criticism for Altai is that by application of its three-prong test the court may
in fact miss or eliminate protectable elements, such as the way in which various
elements are organised or combined and thus the “net effect would be to render
much of the structure of a program unprotectable.”
In Apple Computer Inc. v Microsoft Corporation , the court rejected Apple’s claim
that the overall “look and feel” of its Macintosh system, the design and use of
its icon, windows and virtual displays could be protected by copyright law. The
court held that copyright law could not give Apple a monopoly on the idea of a
Graphical User Interface (GUI) because such a monopoly would produce negative
effects by inhibiting the adoption of compatible standards. The court further held
that there was no infringement as Microsoft’s and Hewlett-Packard’s visual
displays were not “virtually identical” to Apple’s.

The first Circuit court of appeals also rejected a copyright claim on the feel of
a user interface in the case of Lotus v Borland. Lotus claimed that Borland had
infringed the copyright to its lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet by copying most of the
structure of its menu. Overturning the earlier district court’s decision, the
court of appeal held that there was no infringement because there was no copyright
in the command menu hierarchy. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court by
default after a 4-4 deadlock with the Supreme Court neither unequivocally
confirming nor rejecting this fundamental issue on copyright. One can trace an
actual decline in the protection afforded by copyright to computer programs from
these cases. There are thus notably few decisions after this case as more people
turned to patent for protection of these non-literal elements.

Thus, the position of the US courts is that only original practical expression is
under copyright and non-literal elements, ideas and program functionality fall
outside copyright protection.

4.2 UK Position through the cases

The law which governs copyright in the UK is the Copyright Designs and Patents Act
(CDPA) 1988. The UK position seems to suggest that tolerance would be extended to
parties who make a serious effort to avoid literal copying of an original work and
to this end; the courts formulated the substantial similarity and the skill,
labour and judgement tests.

The case of John Richardson Computers v Flanders and Chemtec Ltd was the first
complete decision in relation to copyright infringement of computer software in a
UK court where the Court per Ferris J “purportedly” applied the three prong test
as laid down in the Altai case. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants had
copied the “look and feel” of their program which was designed to help pharmacists
to label prescription drugs and track inventory. The court making, it clear that
non-literal copying would amount to infringement of copyright, held that though
some parts of Richardson’s program was infringed, what was copied was not a
“substantial” part of it so what Flanders had done was merely to create a program
to carry out the same function and thus compete on the same market.

The Court in Ibcos Computers Ltd v Barclays Merchantile Highland Finance Ltd per
Jacob J criticised the use of the Altai test in the Flanders case as setting a
dangerous precedent which might lead to over citation of US authorities in UK
courts especially taking into account that US legislation and jurisprudence is
inconsistent with UK copyright law. The court proposed a “home grown” approach to
the effect that where the defendant’s copying is not a literal one, a good guide
would be to gauge the extent of over-borrowing of the copyright owner’s “skill,
labour and judgement.” To this end, he set the test thus; what are the work(s) in
which the Plaintiff claims copyright? Is each such work “original”? Was there
copying from that work? If there was copying, has a substantial part of the work
been reproduced? Thus, copyright may be had for a compilation of programs where
considerable skill and labour went into its compilation. Applying this test, it
was held that there was infringement as there was substantial “similarity” in both
literal copying of certain routines and “substantial copying of structural
elements.”

The “substantial similarity” and the “skill, judgement and labour” tests were
adopted in Cantor Fitzgerald v Tradition (UK) Ltd where Pumfrey J held that the
“architecture” of a computer program is capable of protection if considerable
skill, labour and judgement were expended in its production.

Further consideration for non-literal copying was had in the case of Navitaire
Inc v EasyJet Airline Company and Bulletproof Technologies Inc. Here, although
there was no dispute that the underlying software was different; Navitaire likened
the non-textual copying to copying the plot of a book or the “business logic” of
the program. Pumfrey J threw out the analogy of the book plot as being inapt and
using instead the “chef and the pudding” example, held that “business logic” was
within the scope of unprotectable ideas; thus extending protection to a vague
concept like “business logic” would be an unjustifiable extension of copyright
protection. Although this decision was thought to signal the death knell for any
argument that copyright should subsist in ideas underlying computer programs or in
the overall “look and feel” of it, the final nail in the coffin of this argument
was hammered in by the case of Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd & Ors.

In the Nova case, the Claimant had developed “Pocket Money” a computer game based
on pool. The defendants had each developed other pool based games which the
claimant alleged infringed the copyright in its computer game. The court of appeal
per Jacob LJ confirmed that ideas behind computer games are not protected by
copyright and can be copied because if protection is extended to such general
ideas copyright would become a tool of oppression not the incentive for creation
it was meant to be. The second ground for dismissing the appeal was given in an
affirmation of the Navitaire decision to the extent that Pumfrey J was right to
say that “merely making a program which will emulate another but which in no way
involves copying of the program code or any of the program’s graphics is
legitimate.”

In the wake of the Navitaire and Nova cases the extent of protection for computer
programs i.e. the protected expression v unprotected idea boundary; has been more
clearly defined. The current position in the UK is very much like that of the US -
that copyright cannot be extended to protect a general idea and there can be no
infringement in the absence of copying of the program code or making a substantial
reproduction of the original work. What kind of protection can then be had for
these “ideas” if any?

5. COPYRIGHT ALTERNATIVES

There are different and conflicting views in this respect. Many people feel that
copyright law is not enough protection for UIs in respect of computer programs and
suggest several alternative protections to copyright such as patent, trade secret,
or even a type of new sui generis protection. Others deny that there is a problem
with the protection of UIs because it is copyrightable as audio visual works. Yet
others suggest a combination approach as, according to Delberta Storz; “No one
method will provide total protection for software products, but by effectively
combining several safeguards, software developers can be assured that their
products are protected to the fullest extent of the law.” There are yet others
who believe that copyright is adaptable and still offers the best protection.
This section will attempt an analysis of these views.

5.1 Software patents

Software patents were first considered by the UK in the Aerotel/Macrossan cases
in which the court of appeal laid down a four-step approach for the grant of a
software patent. Following this decision, the UK intellectual property office
(UKIPO) instigated a policy of refusing to grant patents for any invention
contained in software. This position led to a barrage of appeals and was
challenged in Symbian Ltd v Comptroller General of Patents. The court of appeal
re-affirming the four step approach said however that the UKIPO had construed the
patent incorrectly. The court held that “a method of accessing data in a dynamic
link library in a computing device was not excluded by reason of being a computer
program from registration as a patent as it involved a technical contribution
which would enable computers to work faster and more reliably.”

In the US however, software is not treated differently from any other medium for
the purpose of grant of a patent. The court of appeal in Re Alappat decided that
computer programs were patentable. Patent was further expanded to include business
methods in State Street Bank v Signature Financial Group.

I no doubt agree with the advocates of software patent that it can be a very
powerful economic tool and can protect elements of a program that copyright or
trade secret law cannot protect (ideas, system, methods, algorithms, and functions
embodied in a software product). As desirable as software patents may be however,
in my opinion the shortcomings far outweigh the benefits;

• Copyright exist automatically upon creation of the work, patent exists upon
grant of the patent application which takes a long time (2-3 years) by which time,
technology might have moved on.
• Patent application requires rigorous conditions to be met which mostly cause
problems for software especially the requirement that the invention be new and
non-obvious.
• Patent could stifle industrial growth and result in a monopoly.
• Patenting software as far as I’m concerned would be patenting a language
because to write software, one must use existing programming environment.

While the disadvantages are numerous, I have not however completely ruled out the
use of patent. It just seems that what patent can protect is very limited in
respect of software especially in the light of the inventiveness and non
obviousness tests.

5.2 Trade Secret

A trade secret is any business information, device, design, technique, formula or

process generally unknown to the public which gives the holder a competitive
business advantage. Compared to copyright, trade secret has the advantage of
protecting the ideas (but only as long as it is kept secret) and also that its
protection has no time limitation. Trade secret protection for software is valid
but however ineffective in the face of mass-marketed software programs. It also
provides no protection against reverse engineering and de-compilation. Trade
secret must therefore be used together with copyright or patent protection and so
cannot be ideal as it does not afford full protection on its own.

5.3 Sui generis protection

Different kinds of sui generis protections have been proposed. Stern warned that
attempts to apply ordinary principles of copyright to software would end in
unsatisfactory results and likened it to forcing the proverbial square peg into a
round hole. In recognition of its nature as an industrial property, he proposed
instead a “petty patent” type of law for computer software which “…borrows
appropriately from copyright law, patent law, and utility model law… and combines
selected features of each…”
The problem with Stern’s model is that its components are too vague and its
application whimsical. Also, he does not say how such a model should be drafted
rather he just noted that the task of creating such a system is not easy.

P. Samuelson et al proposed a “period of automatic anti-cloning protection” for

non-literal innovations to remedy what they refer to as “market-destructive
appropriations of program behaviour and industrial designs.” They however do not
specify how long this period should be. In response to this proposed period, it
is argued that the software developer will have sufficient time in the market
place to reap the rewards of his innovation before the competitors catch up
anyway. They also propose a registration system by which innovative components of
programs may become eligible, before the expiration of the automatic anti-cloning
period, for an additional period of compensation for use of their innovations on
standard terms and conditions very much like licensing.

In contrast however, Miller warns against the “false icon of sui generis
protection.” For him, the idea of replacing copyright protection with what he
termed as a “yet undefined” sui generis protection is “unnecessary and potentially
mischievous” especially in the light of the dynamism of software as “today’s
attempt to draw a bright defensive perimeter may produce tomorrow’s Maginot line.”
Warning that it is a mistake to abandon the growing experience under the present
copyright law as many of the now resolved certainties with respect to copyright
and patent protection for software would need to be readdressed by the courts,
Miller suggests that the precise scope of copyright in the computer context is
best left to the courts to apply existing copyright principles to individual
situations. Thus he concludes that as court decisions in this regard are
crystallising into an understandable and sensible doctrinal matrix, it obviates
any need for a sui generis protection. With respect to these proposed sui generis
protections, I am inclined to agree with Miller that they are too uncertain,
merely idealistic and largely unspecific.

6. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

The decision to protect computer programs as literary works under copyright was no
doubt focused on one characteristic of programs i.e. their text and copyright has
proved to be an effective and uncontroversial means for protecting program code
from exact duplication. The issue for consideration is that valuable internal
design elements such as algorithms and information necessary to permit programs to
interoperate are vulnerable to swift copying through reverse
engineering/decompilation that copyright (and even patent) cannot efficiently
remedy or prevent so long as the imitator develops a program with a different
text.

Having examined the divergent views on this matter, whilst I maintain that a new
sui generis model is not needed, it is apparent that current application of
copyright laws need a little more push for it to offer completely adequate
protection. One such push can be achieved by eradicating the umbrella of “program
copyright” and instead after eliminating the functional elements protect the
remaining ones with traditional copyright for pictorial or graphic works and the
like. Thinking along this line, Karjala suggests that UIs should be protected as
pictorial or graphic (i.e. screen displays), audiovisual, musical or similar
traditional copyrighted works for their appearance and I for one am in complete
agreement.

In essence, what I am proposing is that protection for software under copyright

should be removed from the umbrella of literary works and extending other aspects
of copyright protection to the non literal parts of the computer software i.e.
musical, graphic, pictorial works and so on. Of course in doing this, one would
still have to be careful not to apply any of these other aspects to what can be
determined as ideas. In this area the Courts have been very helpful in its
interpretations in different cases and adaptation to individual circumstances. In
my view I maintain that copyright (endorsing also the US application of patent
protection for some part of the program) still remains the best protection for
computer program especially in the light of the fact that it is an already well-
trodden ground and this is my conclusion.

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books, Journals and Articles

A.R. Miller; Copyright Protection for computer programs, data bases and computer-
generated works: Is anything new since CONTU? (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 977

Belinda Isaac; Brand Protection Matters; (Sweet & Maxwell); (2000); pg 34

David Syrowik, Software Patents -- Just Make a Good Thing Better, 2 Michigan
Telecommunication and Technology Law Review 113 (1996)
(http://www.mttlr.org/voltwo/syrowik_art.html)

Dennis S. Karjala; Recent US and international developments in software protection

(Part 2); (1994) European Intellectual Property Review 58

Dennis S. Karjala: Copyright Protection of computer software in the United States

and Japan, Part 1 (1991) 6 European Intellectual Property Review 195.

Dennis S. Karjala: The Relative roles of patent and copyright in the protection of
computer programs; (1998) 17 J. Marshall Journal of Computer & information Law 41
@ 44-48

Diane Rowland & Elizabeth Macdonald: Information Technology Law (3rd edition);
(Cavendish Publishing) pg 10.

Fitzgerald; Square pegs and round holes; (1993) 4 Law & Information science 142 @
147

M.A. Hamilton and T. Sabety; “Computer Science Concepts in Copyright Cases: The
Path to Coherent Law” (1997) 10 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 230

MacQueen, Waelde & Laurie; Contemporary Intellectual Property: Law and Policy;
(Oxford University Press) pg 133

Mikko Valimaki: The Rise of Open source Licensing- A Challenge to the Use of
Intellectual Property in the software industry; (2005).
(http://www.scribd.com/doc/260560/openbook-valimaki)

P. Samuelson, R. Davis, M.D. Kapor and J.H. Reichman; A manifesto concerning the
legal protection of computer programs; 94 Columbia Law Review 2308 (1994)
(http://cseserv.engr.scu.edu/NQuinn/COEN288/Manifesto.pdf)

R. Mark Halligan - How to Protect Intellectual Property rights in Computer

Software (available at http://tradesecretshomepage.com/computer.html)

R.H Stern; Reverse Engineering of software as copyright infringement- an update:

Sega v Accolade (1993) 2 European Intellectual Property Review

R.V. Baca; Copyright Law; Tenth Circuit application of the Abstraction-Filtration-

Comparison test to determine the scope of copyright protection for computer
programs: Autoskill v National Educational Support Systems (1992) 24 N.M.L Rev 413
@ 423

Randell M. Whitmeyer; Comment, a Plea for Due Processes: Defining the Proper Scope
of Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 North-western University Law Review
1103, 1123-25 (1991)

Stanley Lai; The copyright protection of computer software in the U.K; (Hart
Publishing 2000) pg 30

Steven R. Englund: Idea, process or Protected expression? Determining the scope of

Copyright protection of the structure of computer programs (1990) 88 Michigan Law
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William H. Press, Saul A. Teukolsky, William T. Vetterling, and Brian P. Flannery:

Numerical Recipes: The art of scientific computing (3rd Ed.) Cambridge University
press; pg xviii

Statutes

US copyright Act
Copyright Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988 chapter 48
(http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1988/UKpga_19880048_en_1.htm)

Case law

Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holding Ltd & ors; and Neal William Macrossan’s Application
(2006) EWCA Civ. 1371 (http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/1371.html)

Apple Computer Inc. v Microsoft Corporation 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994)
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_v._Microsoft)

Atari Games Corporation v Nintendo of America Inc. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992)

Baigent & Leigh v Random House Group Ltd (2006) EWHC 719 Ch.

Baker v Selden 101 U.S. 99 (1979)

Broderbund Software Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986)

Brown Bag Software v Symantec Corp 960 F.2d 1465 @ 1475 (9th Cir. 1992)

Carey v. Kearsley 4 Esp. 168, 170, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K.B. 1803)

Computer Associates International Inc. v Altai 982 F.2d 693 (2nd Cir. 1992)

Cantor Fitzgerald v Tradition (UK) Ltd (2000) RPC 95

Detective Comics v Bruns Publications, 111 F.2d 432 (2nd Cir. 1940)

Engineering Dynamics Inc. v Structural Software Inc. 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994)

Emerson v Davies et al 8 F Cas. 615 @ 619 (No 4,436) (CCD Mass. 1845)
Exxon Corporation v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd (1982) Ch. 119

Gates Rubber Company v Bando Chemical Industries Ltd 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993)

Ibcos Computers Ltd v Barclays Merchantile Highland Finance Ltd (1994) FSR 275

John Richardson Computers v Flanders and Chemtec Ltd (1993) FSR 497

Ladbroke (football) Ltd v William Hill (football) Ltd

LB (Plastics) Ltd v Swish Products Ltd (1979) RPC 551@567

Lotus v Borland 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995)

Mazer v Stein, 347 U.S 201 (1954) Available at

http://www.panix.com/~jesse/amicus/lotus_amicus_text.html

MiTek Holdings Inc. v Arce Engineering Company Inc 89 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1996)

Navitaire Inc v EasyJet Airline Company and Bulletproof Technologies Inc (2006)
RPC 3

Nichols v Universal Pictures Corporation 45 F.2d 119 @ 121 (2nd Cir. 1930)

Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd & Ors (2007) EWCA Civ. 219
(http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2007/219.html)

Re Alappat (1994) 33 F.3d 1526

Sheldon v MGM Corporation 81 F2d 4 (1936)

State Street Bank v Signature Financial Group (1998) 149 F.3d 1368

Symbian Ltd v Comptroller General of Patents (2008) EWCA Civ 1066

(http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2008/518.html)

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd (2003)57 IPR 453

Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v MCA Inc, 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983)

University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd (1916) 2 Ch. 601 @
608

Walt Disney Productions v Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978)

Whelan Associates Inc. v Jaslow Dental Lab Inc 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986)
(http://digital-law-online.info/papers/lah/mp-comparison.pdf )

Zeccola v Universal City Studios Inc. (1982) 65 ALR 319 @ 468

Weblinks

http://research.louisiana.edu/ip/eisenberg/types-of-intellectual-property.shtml

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldjudgmt/jd001123/design-2.htm
http://web.princeton.edu/sites/ogc/TheLaw.htm

http://www.panix.com/~jesse/amicus/lotus_amicus_text.html

http://www.bitlaw.com/source/cases/copyright/altai.html

http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=estelle_derclaye

http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1996_3/redding/#a5

http://www.ncmahq.org/files/Articles/07724_07_02_p44.pdf

http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~croft/archives/academic/software.html