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Evaluating U.S.

Policy Objectives and Options on the Horn of Africa Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs March 11, 2008 Testimony by Da i! "# Shinn A!$unct %rofessor, &lliott School of 'nternational Affairs (eorge )ashington *ni ersity ' than+ Chairman Feingol! for in iting me to testify on *#S# ,olicy ob$ecti es an! o,tions on the "orn of Africa# The "orn has long been one of the most conflicte! regions of the -orl! an!, as bac+ !oor to the Mi!!le &ast, is strategically im,ortant to the *#S# 't merits close attention by both the A!ministration an! Congress# The Subcommittee on African Affairs as+e! me to assess the current security situation in &thio,ia, &ritrea, an! Somalia, an! to i!entify the most serious threats to regional an! *#S# security# 't also solicite! my analysis of efforts by go ernments in the "orn an! by the A!ministration to a!!ress these threats# 't then urge! that ' offer recommen!ations on ho- the *#S# can better contribute to security, stability, gro-th, an! !emocracy in Somalia, &thio,ia, an! &ritrea# 'n ,articular, the Subcommittee as+e! -hat tools an! le erage the *#S# ,ossesses that -oul! be most effecti e in achie ing *#S# ob$ecti es in the "orn of Africa# Current Situation in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and So alia The serious challenges facing &thio,ia, &ritrea, an! Somalia are long.stan!ing an! ha e im,lications for neighboring D$ibouti, /enya, an! Su!an $ust as !e elo,ments in those countries im,act the situation for the three countries !iscusse! in this testimony# )ith a,,ro0imately 12 million ,eo,le an! locate! in the center of the "orn, &thio,ia is in many -ays +ey to ,eace an! security 3or lac+ thereof4 in the region# 5ut the cross. bor!er lin+ages are so im,ortant in the "orn that any one of the countries has the ,otential to !estabili6e or ma+e more stable the other countries in the region# Turning first to &thio,ia, the country is still reco ering from the aftermath of the 2002 general election# The run.u, to the election an! the actual balloting -ere !eeme! to be generally free an! fair# 't -as a ma$or im,ro ement o er all ,re ious elections# Charges by some o,,osition ,arties that the ruling &thio,ian %eo,le7s Re olutionary Democratic Front 3&%RDF4 stole the election !uring the ballot counting ,rocess resulte! in iolence that continue! s,ora!ically for the subse8uent si0 months# 'n some cases the o,,osition ,ro o+e! a strong reaction by go ernment security forces# 9e ertheless, the security forces clearly use! e0cessi e force in res,on!ing to a number of challenges# )ith local elections 3!istricts an! kebeles or -ar!s4 an! those for some forty acancies in the national legislature sche!ule! for A,ril 2008, the internal ,olitical

2 situation a,,roaches another ,otentially significant turning ,oint# *nfortunately, o,,osition ,olitical ,arties are !emorali6e!, arguing that the go ernment has shut !o-n most of their regional offices an! arreste! some of their su,,orters# Se eral of the o,,osition ,arties may not e en contest seats for local offices, -hich in &thio,ia are actually ery im,ortant# The current internal ,olitical !ynamic surroun!ing these elections !oes not auger -ell for enhancing !emocracy in the country# Tra!itionally, there are no international obser ers for local elections# 'n any e ent, because of the si6e of the country an! large number of contests, it -oul! be !ifficult to mobili6e a sufficient number of international obser ers# 9e ertheless, the local elections are an o,,ortunity for a! ancing !emocracy in &thio,ia# 'f they fail to achie e this goal, it -ill be an enormous lost o,,ortunity# Turning to &thio,ia7s relations -ith neighboring countries, A!!is Ababa has close relations -ith /enya an! D$ibouti, -hich no- ser es as the ,rinci,al ,ort for all &thio,ian im,orts an! e0,orts# Relations -ith Su!an ha e fluctuate! since the &%RDF too+ ,o-er in 1::1, but ha e been goo! follo-ing the outbrea+ of conflict in 1::8 bet-een &ritrea an! &thio,ia# A!!is Ababa is ,articularly ho,eful that the Com,rehensi e %eace Agreement 3C%A4 that en!e! conflict bet-een northern an! southern Su!an not colla,se# From the ,ers,ecti e of &thio,ia7s security, maintaining ,eace in southern Su!an is more im,ortant than en!ing the conflict in Darfur# 9e ertheless, &thio,ia has offere! both helico,ters an! troo,s to the *9;African *nion ,eace+ee,ing o,eration in Darfur# This has ingratiate! &thio,ia -ith the *#S# an! ,resumably -ith Su!an# &thio,ia has also earne! ,raise in )ashington for su,,orting *#S# counterterrorism efforts in the region# &thio,ia has establishe! a goo! -or+ing relationshi, -ith Somalilan!, -hich !eclare! its in!e,en!ence from Somalia in 1::1 but has not been recogni6e! by any country# &thio,ia7s military inter ention in Somalia in 200< at the re8uest of Somalia7s Transitional Fe!eral (o ernment 3TF(4 has been o,,ose! by irtually all Somalis e0ce,t those aligne! -ith the TF(# 'f &thio,ian troo,s left Somalia tomorro-, ho-e er, the TF( -oul! almost certainly colla,se# The lea!ers of most Somali grou,s o,,osing the TF( are in e0ile in Asmara, &ritrea, -here they forme! the Alliance for Re.liberation of Somalia 3ARS4 an! recei e su,,ort from &ritrea# &thio,ia7s inter ention in Somalia has also le! to increase! conflict in its Somali. inhabite! =ga!en region in the southeastern ,art of the country# There is strong e i!ence that &ritrea is su,,orting the !issi!ent =ga!en 9ational >iberation Front 3=9>F4 in the =ga!en# The -ith!ra-al of &thio,ian forces from Somalia an! the en! of &ritrean su,,ort for the =9>F -oul! re!uce, but not eliminate, conflict in the =ga!en bet-een =9>F an! &thio,ian go ernment forces# The situation in Somalia remains e0tremely olatile# The TF( has limite! su,,ort of Somalis, most of -hom see the &thio,ians as an occu,ying force# Almost ?00,000 Somalis ha e fle! the iolence in Moga!ishu since last =ctober, raising the total number -ho has left the ca,ital to about 100,000# A *9"CR re,resentati e commente! at the en! of @anuary that Somalia Ais the most ,ressing humanitarian emergency in the

? -orl! to!ayBe en -orse than Darfur#C The African *nion force is unable to ta+e control of the situation in Moga!ishu as a re,lacement for &thio,ian troo,s# The *9 is !ebating -hether the security situation e en ,ermits ,lanning to sen! a *9 ,eace+ee,ing o,eration to re,lace the African *nion force# An affirmati e *9 !ecision, -hich !oes not seem li+ely anytime soon, -oul! be follo-e! by many months of !elay before the *9 coul! mobili6e such a force# 'n the meantime, Somali animosity against the &thio,ians increases# T-o s,oiler grou,s, -hich may ha e conclu!e! it is in their interest for conflict to continue, are also benefiting from the current !ea!loc+# The al.Shabaab militia, -hich once ser e! as the muscle for the 'slamic Courts, is by most accounts gaining strength# Some +ey al.Shabaab lea!ers no- o,erate in!e,en!ently of the 'slamic Courts -hile others re,orte!ly still follo- its lea!# Moga!ishu7s -arlor!s, some of -hom no- su,,ort the TF(, are notorious for s-itching si!es or o,erating com,letely in!e,en!ently -hen that ser es their ,ur,ose# =ften bac+e! by businessmen, some of them actually benefit financially from continuing conflict# 9either they nor al.Shabaab can be counte! on to -or+ for ,eace or to ser e the broa!er interests of the Somali ,eo,le# The ,ositi e !e elo,ment in this other-ise blea+ analysis of Somalia -as the a,,ointment in 2001 of %rime Minister 9ur AA!!eC "assan "ussein by %resi!ent Ab!ullahi Dusuf# 9ur A!!e has state! that he su,,orts a broa!.base! reconciliation ,rocess that ta+es into account 'slamists an! clan.base! factions that no- o,,ose the TF(# "e sai! the TF( is Area!y to tal+ to those -ho are fighting in Moga!ishu# 9obo!y is e0em,te! from negotiations#C 'nternational en oys -ho ha e met -ith 9ur A!!e belie e he is sincere in reaching out to !isaffecte! Somali grou,s# There are still concerns, ho-e er, -hether %resi!ent Ab!ullahi Dusuf is as committe! to a reconciliation ,rocess -ith the enemies of the TF(# 9or is it clear that the ARS is ,re,are! to $oin a go ernment of national unity before the !e,arture of all &thio,ian troo,s# Such a ,recon!ition -oul! result in e en more chaos in Moga!ishu than e0ists no-# 9ur A!!e has for the first time raise! the ,ossibility of real accommo!ation -ith the TF(7s o,,onents# A se8uence! !e,arture of &thio,ian troo,s agree! u,on by both the TF( an! ARS shoul! not be rule! out# The *#S# role in Somalia is focuse! ,rimarily on countering terrorism, although it !eser es cre!it for ,ro i!ing significant amounts of emergency assistance to Somalis through international an! non.go ernmental organi6ations# So long as the *#S# effort in Somalia remains essentially to ca,ture an! +ill ba! guys, an! there are some in Somalia, the *#S# marginali6es its ability to im,act in a ,ositi e -ay any long.term solution to the Somali ,roblem# *#S# aerial attac+s against sus,ecte! high alue terrorist targets insi!e Somalia can be $ustifie! if there is a ery high ,robability they are con!ucte! on the basis of accurate, u,.to.the minute intelligence# (oing bac+ many years, ho-e er, the *#S# recor! for accurate intelligence in this ,art of the -orl! is, unfortunately, not ery goo!# The *#S# has con!ucte! four aerial attac+s insi!e Somalia since @anuary 2001# The most recent one occurre! early in March# 'f there -as any success against high alue targets as a result of these attac+s, this information has not become ,ublic +no-le!ge# Anec!otal

F e i!ence suggests the aerial attac+s accom,lishe! little# 'n the meantime, each American attac+ only increases the anger of most Somalis to-ar!s the *#S#, &thio,ia, an! the TF(# De elo,ments in &ritrea ,resent s,ecial challenges for *#S# ,olicy# The internal &ritrean situation lea es much to be !esire!# )hile &thio,ia has ha! a long series of contro ersial elections, &ritrea has not e en ha! a national election since it became in!e,en!ent in 1::?# 't is sub$ect to gro-ing criticism in the )est for a concentration of ,o-er aroun! the e0ecuti e, a lac+ of ,ress free!om, a faltering economy, su,,ort for the 'slamic Courts an! o,,osition grou,s in Somalia, an! effecti ely en!ing the ability of the *9 Mission to &thio,ia an! &ritrea 3*9M&&4 to o,erate in &ritrea# 't su,,orts a number of organi6ations that are trying to !estabili6e the go ernment in &thio,ia -hile &thio,ia ,ro i!es sanctuary to &ritrean !issi!ents -ho -ish to !o the same in &ritrea# =n the other han!, for a country that is a,,ro0imately half Christian an! half Muslim, it has manage! to ,reser e cor!ial relations bet-een these t-o ma$or religious grou,s# &ritrea has goo! relations -ith neighboring D$ibouti an! Su!an an! e en ,laye! the ,rinci,al role in bro+ering a ,eace agreement bet-een !issi!ent grou,s in eastern Su!an an! the go ernment in /hartoum# A close frien! of the *#S# until the outbrea+ of conflict -ith &thio,ia in 1::8, relations bet-een )ashington an! Asmara subse8uently stea!ily !eteriorate!# &ritrea has been ,articularly frustrate! by the inability of the *#S# to con ince &thio,ia to acce,t the 2002 ruling of the &thio,ia &ritrea 5oun!ary Commission# This !isagreement largely accounte! for a series of !ecisions by Asmara that ha e -orsene! the *#S#.&ritrea relationshi,# At one ,oint recently, there -as e en a suggestion in )ashington that &ritrea might be a!!e! to the list of states that su,,ort terrorism# This -oul! ha e been an un-ise !ecision# 't is more im,ortant to fin! -ays, as !ifficult as it -ill be, to encourage &ritrea to su,,ort initiati es that im,ro e ,eace an! stability in the region# !ost Serious "hreats to #egional and U.S. Security The most serious threats to the "orn of Africa, an! in!irectly *#S#, security are in or!er of ,riority the continuing iolence in Somalia, a brea+!o-n of the C%A in Su!an, the conflict in Darfur, an! a ,ossible but unli+ely resum,tion of conflict bet-een &thio,ia an! &ritrea# =ther issues of concern are instability in &thio,ia7s =ga!en region, ethnic conflict in /enya, o,,osition to the &%RDF by the =romo >iberation Front, continuing iolence by *gan!a7s >or!7s Resistance Army, an! a ,ossible resum,tion of conflict in eastern Su!an# The situation in Somalia is ,articularly -orrisome because the country has effecti ely not been go erne! since the early 1::0s# 't has attracte! a number of mo ements that !o not re,resent mainstream Somali thought, inclu!ing some affiliate! -ith terrorism# The humanitarian situation is -orsening# The Somali conflict either im,acts !irectly or has !ra-n in &thio,ia, /enya, &ritrea, an! D$ibouti# The *#S# treats Somalia ,rimarily as a counterterrorist threat an! is es,ecially an0ious to ca,ture or +ill three ,ersons 3all non.Somalis lin+e! to al.Eae!a an! belie e! to ha e ta+en refuge in Somalia4 -ho -ere in ol e! in the 1::8 bombings of the *#S# embassies in /enya an!

2 Tan6ania# & en if counterterrorism -ere not a +ey to the *#S# agen!a, Somalia -oul! ,ose a ma$or threat to regional stability an!, hence, American interests in the "orn# The *#S# ,laye! a significant, ,ositi e role in hel,ing to bro+er the C%A in Su!an an! bring an en! to the ci il -ar# This -as the most significant ,olitical achie ement of the 5ush A!ministration in Africa# The international community an!, at least until recently, the *#S# ha e allo-e! the conflict in Darfur to mono,oli6e their collecti e energy -hile ,aying insufficient attention to a ,ossible brea+!o-n of the C%A# As serious as the situation is in Darfur an! its negati e im,act on neighboring Cha! an! the Central African Re,ublic, the ,ossible resum,tion of ci il -ar bet-een northern an! southern Su!an -oul! ha e far greater negati e im,lications for the "orn of Africa# Conse8uently, it is critical that all ,arties, inclu!ing the *#S# refocus attention to assure the successful im,lementation of the C%A an! the a oi!ance of a return to -ar both bet-een the north an! south an! among ri al southern factions# The absence of normal relations bet-een &thio,ia an! &ritrea contributes to instability in the region# )hen these t-o countries resol e their !ifferences an! resume their im,ortant economic relationshi,, all neighboring countries -ill benefit# ' !o not subscribe to the school of thought that -ar is li+ely bet-een &thio,ia an! &ritrea because of the failure to im,lement the bor!er agreement# ' belie e both countries ha e conclu!e! that it is not in their interest to initiate conflict, although both si!es su,,ort grou,s that ha e hostile intentions against the other# Any !iminution in effecti eness of the *9M&& o,eration increases slightly the ,ossibility for conflict along the bor!er# Therefore, it is im,ortant, e en as *9M&& is force! to lea e &ritrea, that it maintain a ,resence, ho-e er mo!est, on the &thio,ian si!e of the bor!er# 'n!e,en!ent *9M&& obser ers -oul! be in a ,osition to i!entify 8uic+ly an! ,oint the finger at -hiche er ,arty might initiate a bor!er incursion# Analysis of Efforts to Address "hese "hreats &fforts by go ernments in the region to sol e the ,roblem in Somalia, +ee, the C%A on trac+, an! encourage a normali6ation of relations bet-een &thio,ia an! &ritrea are sometimes at counter ,ur,oses -ith American ob$ecti es# The *#S# see+s stability in the region an! -ants to mitigate or e en eliminate the terrorist threat# Regional go ernments !o not necessarily share these ,riorities# &ritrea an! &thio,ia su,,ort each other7s o,,osition grou,sG this !oes not encourage stability# The TF( has been more intereste! in retaining ,olitical ,o-er than encouraging reconciliation among all Somalis# 't is not e en clear ho- committe! the Su!an %eo,le7s >iberation Mo ement 3S%>M4 an! es,ecially the 5ashir go ernment in Su!an are to im,lementing the letter an! s,irit of the C%A# All go ernments in the "orn gi e li, ser ice to countering terrorism, but -ith the ,ossible e0ce,tion of &thio,ia their su,,ort for this goal is not al-ays con incing# For its ,art, the *#S# obsession -ith counterterrorism em,hasi6es short.term ob$ecti es aime! at trac+ing !o-n terrorists# 't gi es insufficient attention to -or+ing -ith regional go ernments on ameliorating the long.term root causes that lea! to su,,ort for grou,s that use terrorist tactics# 9or has there been a meeting of the min!s on -hat

< constitutes terrorism in the region# The *#S# is ,rimarily intereste! in international terrorism instigate! by al.Eae!a an! grou,s affiliate! -ith it li+e the no- moribun! al. 'ttiha! al.'slami in Somalia# 't is much less intereste! in terrorist tactics use! by local grou,s such as the >or!7s Resistance Army, -hich is not affiliate! -ith al.Eae!a# &thio,ia, for e0am,le, ascribes terrorist acts to grou,s such as the =9>F an! the =romo >iberation Front that are not on the *#S# terrorist list# 't shoul! come as no sur,rise that regional go ernments are more concerne! -ith these grou,s that ha e a !omestic ob$ecti e than they are -ith al.Eae!a# All international an! regional efforts since the early 1::0s to sol e the Somali !ilemma ha e faile!, although not for lac+ of trying# The *#S# essentially aban!one! Somalia follo-ing the !e,arture of American troo,s in 1::F an! the en! of the *9 ,eace+ee,ing o,eration in 1::2# 't reengage! s,ora!ically only after :;11 an! the in asion of Afghanistan for fear that the Taliban might mo e to Somalia# 't became much more in ol e! about t-o years ago as the 'slamic Courts began to assert authority in Moga!ishu, but again -ith an o er-helming focus on counterterrorism# The *#S# ill. a! ise!ly su,,orte! an alliance of -arlor!s in Moga!ishu that le! !irectly to a military ictory by the 'slamic Courts# &thio,ian military inter ention, at some ,oint encourage! by the *#S#, resulte! in the !efeat of the 'slamic Courts, but !i! not contribute to a solution that allo-e! Somalia to establish a go ernment that has the su,,ort of most Somalis# From the stan!,oint of regional stability, the situation in Somalia to!ay is no better, an! arguably -orse, than !uring the ,erio! of control by the 'slamic Courts# Su!an7s C%A nearly colla,se! in 2001 -hen the S%>M -ith!re- its re,resentati es from the go ernment of national unity# This occurre! at a time -hen the international community -as far more engage! in the situation in Darfur# Fortunately, the S%>M an! the 5ashir go ernment resol e! their !ifferences# The C%A is bac+ on trac+ but remains in a highly fragile state# 'n recent months, the *#S# a,,ears a,,ro,riately to be gi ing this issue greater high.le el attention# &thio,ia is also ta+ing ste,s that encourage ,eace an! stability bet-een northern an! southern Su!an# Since the outbrea+ of conflict in 1::8 bet-een &thio,ia an! &ritrea, the *#S# -or+e! har! to en! the -ar an! ma!e consi!erable effort to con ince both countries to normali6e their relations# The ma$or stumbling bloc+ has been the un-illingness of &thio,ia to im,lement the !ecision of the 5oun!ary Commission# &ritrea has not hel,e! its case by ta+ing a series of ste,s aime! at !estabili6ing &thio,ia# The international community, inclu!ing the *#S#, seems to ha e conclu!e! in the ,ast year that there is little it can !o to resol e the im,asse# U.S. $everage and #esources =f the ma$or challenges facing the *#S# in the "orn, it ,robably has the most le erage -ith Somalia7s TF(# Although total American assistance to Somalia is mo!est an! not li+ely to influence the TF(, its ,olitical le erage shoul! be enormous# The TF( is hea ily !e,en!ent on &thio,ia an! the *#S# for its ery sur i al# 'f the TF( chooses to

1 ignore a! ice from &thio,ia an! the *#S#, it !oes so at its ,eril# The *#S# has also -or+e! har! to stan! u, the African *nion force to re,lace the &thio,ians in Somalia# The *#S# has brought substantial financial resources to bear in Su!an for both im,lementing the C%A an! alle iating suffering in Darfur# 't e0,en!e! consi!erable ,olitical ca,ital in hel,ing to achie e the C%A, but has been much less successful in resol ing the conflict in Darfur# The *#S# has far better relations -ith the S%>M than it has -ith the 5ashir go ernment, -ith -hom relations are straine!# The roc+y relationshi, -ith /hartoum limits *#S# le erage to effect ,olicy change in Darfur or to ensure im,lementation of the C%A# The *#S# ,ro i!es &thio,ia substantial assistance, although most of it in recent years has been emergency ai! an! su,,ort to counter "'H;A'DS# )ashington also has a close -or+ing relationshi, -ith A!!is Ababa# 'n theory, therefore, the *#S# has consi!erable le erage -ith the Meles go ernment# At the same time, the close relations -ith &thio,ia ha e contribute! !irectly to a -orsening of relations -ith &ritrea# The 'saias go ernment accuses )ashington of fa oring &thio,ia on the bor!er 8uestion# As a conse8uence, it as+e! the *SA'D mission to lea e &ritrea# )ashington has irtually no le erage -ith &ritrea# 5ut e en in the case of &thio,ia, le erage is a relati e conce,t# The lea!ershi,s in both &thio,ia an! &ritrea since they assume! ,o-er in their res,ecti e countries in 1::1 are notably resistant to outsi!e ,ressure e en -hen large amounts of assistance are at sta+e# 5oth Meles an! 'saias -ill change ,ositions on a ,olicy only after they ha e conclu!e! it is in the long.term interest of their res,ecti e go ernments# #eco endations for the U.S#

Ta+ing the abo e analysis into account an! as re8ueste! in the in itation to testify, ' suggest the follo-ing recommen!ations for -ays the *#S# can contribute to security, stability, gro-th, an! !emocracy in Somalia, &thio,ia, an! &ritrea# ' ha e ,ur,osely omitte! many !esirable recommen!ations that are ho,elessly unrealistic or beyon! the ability of the *#S# to im,lement because of its limite! le erage in one or more of the three countries# • • • • • )or+ closely -ith &thio,ia to encourage the TF( to create a go ernment of national unity that inclu!es mo!erates from the ARS an! from sub.clans in Moga!ishu -ho currently o,,ose the TF(# Consult closely -ith the Somalia AContact (rou,C an! as+ its members to follothe same a,,roach -ith the TF(# As+ the Arab >eague an! its member go ernments to encourage the ARS to engage -ithout ,recon!itions in ,o-er sharing tal+s -ith the TF(# &ncourage go ernments that ha e goo! relations -ith &ritrea to follo- the same a,,roach -ith &ritrea is.I. is the ARS# 'f a go ernment of national unity that is -i!ely acce,te! by the Somali ,eo,le actually materiali6es, be ,re,are! 8uic+ly to mobili6e a significant amount of !e elo,ment assistance for Somalia#

8 • • • • • • >i+e-ise, ,ush the -ealthier Arab countries to ma+e ma$or contributions to Somalia7s !e elo,ment# As security im,ro es in Somalia, -or+ -ith &thio,ia an! the TF( to !esign a 8uic+, se8uence! !e,arture of &thio,ian forces from Somalia so as to encourage broa!er Somali su,,ort for a ne- go ernment of national unity# =n a contingency basis, re8uest the *9 to !ra- u, ,lans for a ,eace+ee,ing o,eration that -oul! re,lace the small African *nion ,resence an! -oul! actually +ee, the ,eace rather than try to se,arate -arring factions# 5e ,re,are! to offer substantial logistical su,,ort for stan!ing u, a *9 ,eace+ee,ing mission in Somalia# Ma+e a concerte! effort to reach out to the Somali !ias,ora in the *#S# to solicit -ays it can hel, to bring ,eace an! stability to Somalia# "el, &thio,ia an! &ritrea i!entify confi!ence buil!ing measures that may e entually lea! to &thio,ian acce,tance of the 5oun!ary Commission7s !ecision follo-e! by ,ractical a!$ustments along the bor!er that are acce,table to both countries# &ncourage both &thio,ia an! &ritrea to en! su,,ort for grou,s -hose goal is to !estabili6e the situation in the other7s country# Follo-ing the !e,arture of *9M&& from &ritrea, insist that it maintain obser ers insi!e &thio,ia along the bor!er so that it can assign blame for any military incursion across the &thio,ian.&ritrean frontier# 'f re8ueste! by the *9, assign a significant number of *#S# ,ersonnel to this effort, certainly more than the tiny number that has ,artici,ate! in *9M&&# Continue an! e en increase the high.le el attention !e ote! to ensuring im,lementation of the C%A in Su!an# 'nitiate a -or+ing grou, of go ernment an! non.go ernment e0,erts from the "orn, a fe- &uro,ean an! Arab countries, an! China to i!entify an! suggest solutions for the root causes of both !omestic an! international terrorism in the region# %ut front an! center counterterrorism ,rograms that mitigate the root causes of terrorism an! the en ironment in the "orn that sustains both !omestic terrorists an! those coming from outsi!e the region# &ngage go ernments in the region on their res,onsibility to re!uce social an! economic ine8uality an! ,olitical marginali6ation as im,ortant -ays to re!uce both conflict an! su,,ort for terrorist grou,s# &ngage go ernments an! grou,s insi!e an! outsi!e the region to en! their su,,ort for religious i!eology of -hate er ,ersuasion that e0,ressly encourages intolerance# 'ncrease su,,ort for !emocracy, goo! go ernance, an! anti.corru,tion ,rograms in &thio,ia an! be ,re,are! to initiate fun!ing for such ,rograms in Somalia an! &ritrea -hen the situation ,ermits# %ro i!e a!!itional fun!ing for basic e!ucation ,rograms, es,ecially in the Somali language, con!ucte! o er the ra!io an! -hich also contain useful ci ic lessons that inclu!e encouragement of religious an! ethnic tolerance#

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: • '!entify an!, -here !esire! by host go ernments, fun! ,rograms, e en on a ,ilot basis that hel, re!uce youth unem,loyment#