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Implications of Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa David H.

Shinn Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs Geor e !ashin ton "niversit# Paper Delivered at the Horn of Africa Conference $ %II &aith, Citi'enship, Democrac# and Peace in the Horn of Africa Cit# Hall, (und, S)eden *+,*- .cto/er 0112 The fact that I am spea3in on terrorism /efore this audience ives it more importance in a relative sense than it deserves. The sponsors as3ed me to address the su/ject and I e4pressed a )illin ness to do so. 5ut I )ant to /e ver# clear a/out its relative importance to other critical issues in the re ion. There are man# challen es in the Horn of Africa that are far more important than international or domestic terrorism. "ntil overnments in the Horn of Africa and their forei n supporters, includin the "nited States, pa# reater attention to these more pressin pro/lems, political sta/ilit# and 6ualit# of life for people in the Horn )ill not improve. Political mar inali'ation, social and economic ine6ualit#, endemic povert#, pervasive corruption, poor overnance, e4tremist ideolo #, and lac3 of tolerance are all reater threats than terrorism to political sta/ilit# and economic pro ress in the Horn of Africa. In fact, these pro/lems aid and a/et terrorism. It is the responsi/ilit# of the overnments in the Horn of Africa and their international partners to focus their efforts on solvin these critical challen es. &or the purposes of this discussion, I include East Africa as part of the re ion. International versus Domestic Terrorism (et me put the issue of terrorism and counterterrorism into its proper perspective. There is no universall# accepted a reement on the definition of terrorism. The "nited States overnment defines 7international terrorism8 as involvin citi'ens or the territor# of more than one countr#. It defines 7terrorism8 as premeditated, politicall# motivated violence perpetrated a ainst non,com/atant tar ets /# su/ national roups or clandestine a ents. These definitions of international terrorism and just plain terrorism are si nificant )hen )e loo3 at the situation in East Africa and the Horn.* The vast majorit# of terrorist attac3s in the Horn of Africa do not constitute international terrorism. The# are, rather, acts of domestic terrorism perpetrated /# roups such as the 9anja)eed in Sudan, the (ord:s ;esistance Arm# in northern " anda, and, more recentl#, al,Sha/aa/ in Somalia. .ccasionall#, terrorist acts carried out /# follo)ers )ho claim to represent one of these or ani'ations 6ualif# as international terrorism. In addition, indiscriminate attac3s a ainst non,com/atant tar ets /# overnmental armies are seen /# man# in the re ion as acts of terrorism, althou h the# do not fit the "S overnment:s definition of terrorism. The point I )ant to emphasi'e, ho)ever, is the need to distin uish /et)een domestic terrorism, )hich has /ecome fairl#

0 common in East Africa and the Horn, and the much less fre6uent international terrorism. The *--2 al,<aeda /om/in of the "S em/assies in =airo/i and Dar es Salaam and the assassination of forei n journalists and non, overnmental or ani'ation staff in Somalia, some of the attac3s alle edl# carried out /# al,Sha/aa/ follo)ers, are e4amples of international terrorism. ># remar3s )ill focus on the implications of international terrorism that have tended to drive American polic# in the re ion since the *--2 em/ass# /om/in s and the attac3s a ainst the "nited States on ** Septem/er 011*. Earl# International Terrorist Activit# in the ;e ion &irst, I )ant to revie) /riefl# earl# international terrorist activit# in the re ion. After sei'in po)er in Sudan in *-2-, the =ational Islamic &ront and its allies in the militar# invited .sama /in (aden to esta/lish a presence in the countr#. 5et)een late *-2- and late *--* al,<aeda moved most of its /est trained and e4perienced fi hters, num/erin *,111 to *,?11, to Sudan. Althou h /in (aden retained an e4tensive infrastructure in Af hanistan and Pa3istan, he joined his follo)ers in Sudan late in *--*. >ost outsiders initiall# thou ht /in (aden )as a le itimate /usinessman in Sudan. It /ecame apparent, ho)ever, that he also created terrorist trainin facilities and a confederation of terrorist or ani'ations throu hout the >uslim )orld. Sudan /ecame increasin l# concerned, ho)ever, a/out the poor state of its relations )ith the "S and accepted an American re6uest in the sprin of *--@ to force /in (aden and his follo)ers out of Sudan. Althou h /in (aden did not cut all of his ties )ith Sudan in *--@, his relations )ith the overnment re) increasin l# strained as a result of internal divisions amon the Sudanese leadership. Even /efore the -A** terrorist attac3s a ainst the "S, Sudan si naled !ashin ton that it )as read# to cooperate on counterterrorism.0 Ethiopia has e4perienced relativel# little international terrorist activit# /ut continues to /e su/ject to terrorist attac3s aimed at influencin the domestic political situation. There )ere several international attac3s in the mid,*--1s perpetrated /# al, Ittihad al,Islami##a /ased in nei h/orin Somalia. The attac3s stopped )ith the demise of the Somali or ani'ation. The E #ptian terrorist roup Gama:at al,Islami##a, )ith the help of the Sudanese overnment, tried to assassinate E #ptian President Hosni >u/ara3 durin a visit to Addis A/a/a in *--?. The Sudan,/ased Eritrean Islamic 9ihad >ovement carried out a fe) attac3s inside Eritrea in the *--1s. .nce Ethiopia and Eritrea normali'ed relations )ith Sudan in the late *--1s, Sudanese support for these terrorist roups ended.B Al,<aeda pla#ed a role in the attac3s on American and "nited =ations forces in Somalia durin the humanitarian intervention that /e an late in *--0. There is considera/le de/ate, ho)ever, concernin the si nificance of al,<aeda:s role. A num/er of al,<aeda documents have fallen into the hands of American intelli ence. The# have /een declassified and released to the pu/lic. The# clearl# sho) that Africa re ional al, <aeda leader A/u Hafs made multiple trips to Somalia from the al,<aeda /ase in Chartoum /e innin in *--0. The first al,<aeda operatives left Pa3istan for Somalia earl# in *--B. The# )or3ed closel# )ith al,Ittihad, esta/lished three trainin camps, and apparentl# too3 orders from the al,<aeda head6uarters in Chartoum. Althou h the e4perts on this earl# al,<aeda en a ement in Somalia are not in a reement, the )ei ht of the evidence su ests that al,<aeda )as not ver# successful in co,optin Somalis.D

B The Harmon# Project at the "S >ilitar# Academ# at !est Point, )hich anal#'ed all of the sei'ed al,<aeda documents, concluded that al,<aeda thou ht Somalis )ould enthusiasticall# join its ran3s. In fact, al,<aeda underestimated the cost of operatin in Somalia. Al,<aeda constantl# e4perienced e4tortion from Somali clans and unanticipated losses )hen /andits attac3ed their convo#s. Al,<aeda overestimated the de ree to )hich Somalis )ould /ecome jihadis, especiall# if there )as no financial incentive. >an# Somali clan leaders )anted the "S and "nited =ations force to leave Somalia, /ut their first oal )as the securit# of their clan a ainst others. Al,<aeda failed to understand the importance of traditional Sufi doctrine in Somali Islam and the de ree of Somali attachment to clans and su/,clans. Al,<aeda lar el# failed to overcome local lo#alties althou h it did /u# its )a# into a fe) su/,su/ clans and mana ed to recruit a num/er of #oun Somalis )ho )ere attracted to the call for jihad. Some of these earl# recruits pro/a/l# form the nucleus of toda#:s Somali jihadis. =evertheless, the Harmon# Project found that the jihadi forei ners encountered more adversit# than success.? Al,<aeda has had cells in Cen#a since !adih el,Ha e, )ho had served as /in (aden:s personal secretar# and had "S citi'enship throu h marria e, arrived in =airo/i to run the al,<aeda operation in *--D. Eventuall# arrested /# the &5I, he )as convicted in the "S on terrorism char es in 011*. A/u Hafs and other al,<aeda operatives /e an plannin in *--D for the *--2 em/ass# /om/in s. Cen#a has /een round 'ero for international terrorist attac3s. Al,<aeda /om/ed the Israeli,o)ned Paradise Hotel north of >om/asa in 0110 and, in the same attac3, tried /ut failed to shoot do)n an Israeli passen er plane )ith t)o SA,+ missiles. Cen#an and international authorities have prevented other international terrorist attac3s, includin one on the ne) "S em/ass# in =airo/i.@ Al,<aeda /e an activities in Tan'ania in *--B /# usin diamonds, tan'anite, and ru/ies as a resource to ma3e al,<aeda cells in East Africa financiall# self,sufficient. Authorities captured t)o al,<aeda operatives from Ean'i/ar )ho too3 part in the *--2 /om/in of the "S em/ass# in Dar es Salaam. .ne has /een convicted in a "S court and is servin a life term in Colorado. The other ac3no)led ed that he joined al,<aeda /ut insisted he did not 3no)in l# en a e in a terrorist act.+ In *--D, al,<aeda supported the o/scure Salafi &oundation of " anda, )hich eventuall# evolved into an anti," anda overnment roup 3no)n as the Allied Democratic &orces FAD&G. Al,<aeda helped set up trainin camps for the AD&, )hich operated out of the eastern Con o. The AD& sporadicall# appears as a meanin ful or ani'ation and then disappears. In *--2 " andan authorities detained t)ent# suspects lin3ed to al,<aeda )ho )ere /elieved to /e plannin an attac3 a ainst the "S em/ass# in Campala.2 Somalia and Al,Sha/aa/ Turnin to the current situation, the role of al,Sha/aa/ in Somalia has received a reat deal of attention in the past couple of #ears. Sti 9arle Hansen, senior researcher at the =or)e ian Institute for "r/an and ;e ional ;esearch pu/lished in Septem/er 0112 the /est anal#sis of al,Sha/aa/ as an or ani'ation. He concluded that al,Sha/aa/ is directed /# a small roup of Af hanistan veterans, former mem/ers of al,Ittihad al, Islami##a, and Somali disapora ideolo ues. Al,Sha/aa/:s most prominent ideolo ue,

D accordin to Hansen, is Shei3h &uad >uhammad <alaf, a former imam from the no) closed ;in3e/# >os6ue in S)eden. Al,Sha/aa/ identified its principal leader in a =ovem/er 011+ internet statement as Shei3h >u3htar A/u Eu/air, althou h there is some confusion a/out the /ac3 round of this individual.Hansen e4plained that al,Sha/aa/ leaders, at least until recentl#, have denied an# formal lin3 to al,<aeda, /ut have e4pressed admiration for .sama /in (aden and other jihadists. !hile Hansen is not certain )hat role is /ein pla#ed /# the small num/er of forei n al,<aeda operatives in Somalia, he said al,Sha/aa/ is clearl# influenced /# al, <aeda. Al,Sha/aa/ leaders see the Somali conflict as part of a lo/al )ar /et)een the !est and Islam. At the same time, he ar ued that most al,Sha/aa/ ran3 and file fi hters are motivated /# a desire to force the Ethiopians out of Somalia and to have sharia courts enforce la) and order. He added that al,Sha/aa/:s hard,line ideolo # led to its /rea3 in 011+ )ith the "nion of Islamic Courts and /oth su/se6uent factions of the Alliance for the ;e,li/eration of Somalia FA;SG.*1 Polic# differences /et)een the "nion of Islamic Courts and al,Sha/aa/ have increased in recent months. Al,Sha/aa/ stron l# opposed efforts /# the Dji/outi faction of the A;S, )or3in )ith the Transitional &ederal Government, to create a overnment of national unit# in Somalia. The "nion of Islamic Courts issued a statement in mid, Septem/er callin on al,Sha/aa/ to a/andon its attac3s on aircraft that use >o adishu airport, ar uin that service in and out of the airport is needed to help sustain Somalis in the capital. There are disa reements /et)een leaders of the "nion of Islamic Courts and the roup led /# Shei3h Hassan Tur3i that recentl# sei'ed po)er in Cisma#u and claims to /e lin3ed to al,Sha/aa/. &inall#, there seem to /e different positions concernin the recent attac3s on " andan and 5urundi troops )ho are servin in >o adishu as African "nion peace3eepers. A roup callin itself the ;as Cam/oni fi hters too3 credit for one of the attac3s in Septem/er 0112. Accordin to Radio HornAfrik, a spo3esperson for the "nion of Islamic Courts said the ;as Cam/oni roup )as once under the Courts /ut apparentl# had /ecome independent. The Court spo3esperson then too3 credit for the attac3 on the " andans.** Cen >en3haus, a professor at Davidson Colle e and an American )ho has /een follo)in developments in Somalia for man# #ears, made some important comments a/out al,Sha/aa/ in Septem/er 0112. After al,Sha/aa/ severed its lin3s )ith the "nion of Islamic Courts and the A;S, >en3haus e4plained that jihadist cells in >o adishu lin3ed to al,Sha/aa/ have en a ed in a campai n of threats and alle ed assassinations a ainst Somalis )ho )or3ed for )estern aid a encies or those )ho colla/orated )ith "nited =ations a encies and )estern =G.s. >en3haus emphasi'ed, ho)ever, that not all al,Sha/aa/ mem/ers em/raced this polic#. *0 Al,Sha/aa/:s spo3esperson, Shei3h >u3htar ;o/o), condemned the polic# of assassinations in 9ul# 0112, commentin that it )as un/ecomin for al,Sha/aa/ to 3ill persons )ho are tr#in to help the Somali people. 5# .cto/er 0112, ho)ever, ;o/o) )arned the International >edical Corps and Care International to stop meddlin in areas under al,Sha/aa/ control. This al,Sha/aa/ threat sent a chillin messa e to these and similar aid or ani'ations.*B 9ihadist cells in >o adishu are increasin l# fra mented and ans)er to no one. >en3haus commented that some of these cells are /elieved to have tar eted national aid )or3ers and civil societ# leaders. At the same time, he did not rule out that some of the attac3s ta3in place in >o adishu could /e the )or3 of hardliners in the Transitional

? &ederal Government. To the e4tent that al,Sha/aa/ is /ehind the attac3s a ainst aid )or3ers, he said the# are a direct response to the "S desi nation in >arch 0112 of al, Sha/aa/ as a terrorist or ani'ation and the >a# 0112 "S missile stri3e that 3illed al, Sha/aa/:s leader, Aden Hashi A#ro.*D Al,Sha/aa/:s pu/lic position concernin a lin3 to al,<aeda ma# have chan ed in recent months. Al,Sha/aa/ spo3esperson >u3htar ;o/o) is 6uoted in a Los Angeles Times stor# that 7)e )ill ta3e our orders from Shei3 .sama /in (aden /ecause )e are his students.8*? ;o/o) added that 7al,<aeda is the mother of the hol# )ar in Somalia8 and 7most of our leaders )ere trained in al,<aeda camps. !e et our tactics and uidelines from them. >an# have spent time )ith .sama /in (aden.8*@ "S Am/assador to Cen#a, >ichael ;anne/er er e4pressed some dou/ts in the same Los Angeles Times article as to the closeness of the connection /et)een al,Sha/aa/ and al,<aeda. He su ested that al,Sha/aa/ continues to run its o)n affairs and is not ta3in orders from al,<aeda.*+ In vie) of the ro)in "S pressure on al,Sha/aa/, ho)ever, it ma# )ell have concluded that it can attract financin and support /# stressin a lin3 )ith al,<aeda that, in fact, ma# not #et /e ver# si nificant. Al,Sha/aa/ released in 9ul# 0112 a 0D,minute video featurin >u3htar ;o/o) and Cen#an al,<aeda operative Saleh Ali Saleh =a/han, )ho has /een implicated in the *--2 "S em/ass# /om/in s. The video reaches out to al, <aeda. &our internet forums re ularl# used /# al,<aeda carried the video.*2 In another development, the Head of Ira6:s Investi ation and Information A enc# in the >inistr# of Interior stated in 9ul# 0112 that documents and letters found durin search operations in su/ur/s of 5a hdad prove that al,<aeda elements left Ira6 for Somalia and Sudan.*Implications of "S Counterterrorism Polic# in the Horn "S counterterrorism polic# in the Horn has included some pro rams that have contri/uted in a positive )a# to counterin terrorist activities. Assistance to overnments in the Horn for improved computeri'ed trac3in of suspect individuals /# emi ration departments and certain speciali'ed counterterrorism trainin are e4amples. At the same time, "S polic# has emphasi'ed the capturin or 3illin of persons )ho it /elieves have /een involved in international terrorist attac3s and an effort to den# Somalia as a safe haven for al,<aeda operatives. The "S has devoted an enormous amount of ener # to trac3in do)n three individualsH&a'ul A/dullah >ohammed from the Comoro Islands, Saleh Ali Saleh =a/han from Cen#a, and A/u Talha al,Sudani from SudanHall of )hom )ere implicated in the *--2 /om/in s of the "S em/assies in =airo/i and Dar es Salaam.01 =a/han ac3no)led ed in the 9ul# 0112 video that al,Sudani died more than a #ear a o in /attle, presuma/l# )ith Ethiopian forces in Somalia.0* &a'ul and =a/han remain ver# much at lar e. Cen#an police conver ed on &a'ul:s safe house in >alindi, alon the Cen#a coast, in Au ust 0112. &a'ul escaped a ain and, accordin to one account, is no) in Tan'ania.00 &a'ul and =a/han are /elieved to have moved in and out of Somalia in recent #ears. Althou h A#ro and al,Sudani, )ho are 3no)n to have /een involved in international terrorist attac3s, are no lon er a threat, it strains credulit# to ar ue that "S counterterrorism polic# in the Horn and East Africa has /een a si nificant success after ten #ears of serious effort.

@ As I stated at the /e innin , the main pro/lem )ith "S polic# is that it does not ive sufficient attention to )or3in )ith host overnments and civil societ# )ith the o/jective of amelioratin the reasons )h# so man# persons livin in the re ion provide support to committed terrorist operatives or refuse to identif# them to responsi/le authorities. >a3in the Horn a /etter and more e6uita/le place to live )ill pro/a/l# never deter the &a'uls, =a/hans, and al,Sudanis of the )orld. 5ut amelioratin the root causes of terrorism )ill almost certainl# diminish the support and sustenance terrorists continue to receive from the population enerall# and reduce the temptation to /ecome ran3 and file mem/ers of or ani'ations li3e al,Sha/aa/. Elijah Caria, the Cen#an anti, terrorism unit chief in the >alindi area, told Washington Post reporter Stephanie >cCrummen, for e4ample, that &a'ul receives the support of Cen#ans )ho live alon the coast and it is 7onl# the s#mpathi'ers )ho are 3eepin him from /ein arrested.80B Althou h man#, perhaps most, Somalis disapprove of al,Sha/aa/, >en3haus ar ued that Somali an er is no) directed at Ethiopia, the Transitional &ederal Government, and the "nited States. >en3haus added that "S polic# in Somalia has had the effect of isolatin more moderate mem/ers of the Somali opposition, enerated a hi h level of anti,Americanism, and contri/uted to the radicali'ation of the population.0D If >en3haus is correct on this point, and I am inclined to a ree )ith his anal#sis, the current "S approach to counterterrorism in Somalia )ill not )or3. It must use reater discretion in its efforts to capture andAor 3ill /ad u#s and devote more resources and effort, )or3in )ith local overnments and roups, to resolve the root causes of terrorism. .ther 3no)led ea/le o/servers have also /een critical of "S counterterrorism polic# in the Horn. ;eportin the vie)s of several human ri hts activists and a "S official familiar )ith Cen#a:s counterterrorism situation, Stephanie >cCrummen )rote that Cen#a:s anti,terrorism unit, )hich the "S helped finance throu h the East African Counterterrorism Initiative, is ineffective. Hundreds of Cen#ans have /een arrested on suspicion of terrorist activities. .nl# one has /een successfull# tried in court. Ali,Amin Cimathi, chairman of the >uslim Human ;i hts &orum in Cen#a, told >cCrummen that Cen#a:s anti,terrorism unit has cultivated a net)or3 of informants )ho often suppl# its a ents )ith names of people )ho turn out to /e /usiness enemies or others )ith )hom the# are tr#in to settle scores. 0? In an Au ust 0112 stud# of "S efforts to counter terrorism in Cen#a, 5eth !hita3er of the "niversit# of =orth Carolina )rote that the "S has repeatedl# ur ed the Cen#an parliament to pass anti,terrorism le islation. Cen#an parliamentarians have refused to do so. !hita3er ar ued that Cen#a is reluctant to cooperate in the open )ith the "S )ar on terror /ecause man# Cen#ans feel empo)ered /# its democrac# after #ears of e4periencin autocratic rule. The democrati'ation process in Cen#a has contri/uted to the mo/ili'ation of the minorit# >uslim communit#. Cen#ans enerall# vie) the concept of securit# much more /roadl# than the vie) implied /# the "S. >ost Cen#ans still see terrorism as lar el# an American or Israeli pro/lem. &inall#, Cen#an resistance to "S demands is lin3ed to similar concerns e4pressed /# Europeans. !hita3er, althou h ac3no)led in 6uiet Cen#an cooperation )ith the "S on counterterrorism, concluded that the same democratic s#stem that the "S promoted in Cen#a has no) made it difficult for the "S to o/tain complete cooperation in the )ar on terror, at least in the short term.0@

+ Sudan, )hich remains on the "S list of state sponsors of terrorism, has /een a surprisin success stor# in "S efforts to counter international terrorism in the re ion. !hile the Sudanese overnment hosted .sama /in (aden durin the first half of the *--1s, it is no) )or3in )ith the "S to defeat international terrorists. In fact, al,<aeda cells in Sudan are no) attac3in )estern interests in Sudan, includin the assassination of a "SAID officer in Chartoum in 9anuar# 0112, to /oth harm Americans and to em/arrass the same Sudanese overnment that once supported al,<aeda. An o/scure roup callin itself Ansar al,Ta)hid claimed credit for the 3illin of the American official. The overnment of Sudan captured and has put five Sudanese on trial for the assassination. In .cto/er 0112, the "S em/ass# in Chartoum pu/lici'ed a )arnin a ainst Americans in Sudan from another o/scure roup callin itself al,<aeda in the (and of the T)o =iles.0+ The State Department:s Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 stated that 7the Sudanese overnment )as a stron partner in the !ar on Terror and a ressivel# pursued terrorist operations directl# involvin threats to ".S. interests and personnel in Sudan.802 A #ear later, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 commented that 7the Sudanese overnment continued to cooperate in the !ar on Terror, pursuin terrorist operations directl# involvin threats to ".S. interests and personnel in Sudan. !hile the ".S.,Sudanese counterterrorism relationship remained solid, hard,line Sudanese officials continued to e4press resentment and distrust over actions /# the "SG and 6uestioned the /enefits of continued cooperation.80This vie) reflects the disappointment amon Sudanese officials that Sudan remains on the "S list of state sponsors of terrorism in spite of its cooperation )ith !ashin ton since the /e innin of this centur#. This frustration )ill almost certainl# increase no) that =orth Corea has /een removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list. The 011+ State Department report added that Sudan uncovered and lar el# dismantled a lar e,scale terrorist or ani'ation tar etin )estern interests in Chartoum.B1 The =e4t Administration If the "S )ants to ma3e meanin ful pro ress on counterin support for international terrorist activit# in East Africa and the Horn, it needs to reassess its entire approach to counterterrorism in the re ion. This means devotin more intellectual and financial resources to resolvin terrorism:s root causes. !hile the "S and its partners in the re ion have 3illed and captured a num/er of terrorist operatives and interrupted several terrorist plots /efore the# too3 place, there is little indication that "S polic# has decreased the )illin ness of persons livin in East Africa and the Horn to end their support for or at least toleration of individuals )ho are prepared to use terrorist tactics a ainst )estern interests and their overnmental allies in the re ion. There has /een even less pro ress in deterrin support for roups that en a e in the far more fre6uent acts of terrorism )hose oal is re ime chan e or is desi ned to em/arrass e4istin authorities or competin political roups. It is also time to reassess the decision that 3eeps Sudan, a countr# no) cooperatin )ith the "S on counterin terrorism, on the "S list of state sponsors of terrorism. This issue should /e separated from !ashin ton:s le itimate disa reements )ith Chartoum over its polic# in Darfur. !hile the "S overnment has often e4a erated the international terrorist threat in East Africa and the Horn and instituted a fla)ed polic# for copin )ith it, some

2 residents of these countries and their counterparts in the diaspora err on the side of understatin the pro/lem. I have had conversations )ith some individuals from the re ion )ho are essentiall# in denial and refuse to admit that international terrorism is an issue in spite of )ell documented terrorist attac3s and pu/lic statements /# al,<aeda and indi enous terrorist or ani'ations in the Horn that /ra a/out their responsi/ilit# for these attac3s. =either the e4a eration of the threat of international terrorism nor its denial serves the interests of the "S or the people and countries in the re ion.

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See Chapter + of the "S Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 for definitions of 3e# terms. Availa/le at ))).state. ovAsActArlsAcrtA011@A20+0@.htm. 0 David H. Shinn, 7Al,<aeda in East Africa and the Horn,8 The ournal of Confli!t "tudies, vol. 0+, no. * FSummer 011+G, pp. ?1,?0. B I/id., pp. ?B,??. D I/id., pp. ?@,?+. ? I/id., pp. ?+,?2. @ I/id., pp. @?,@+. + I/id., pp. @+,@2. 2 I/id., pp. @2,@-. Sti 9arle Hansen, 7>isspent Iouth $ Somalia:s Sha/a/ Insur ents,8 ane#s $ntelligen!e Re%ie&, * Septem/er 0112. This online anal#sis is onl# availa/le /# paid su/scription. *1 I/id. See also 7Somalia:s al,Sha/a/ ;econstitutes &i htin &orce,8 CTC "entinel, vol. *, issue B, &e/ruar# 0112, pp. *+, *-. ** 7T)o Somali Groups Claim ;esponsi/ilit# for Attac3 on Peace3eepers,8 Radio HornAfrik, 0D Septem/er 0112. >ichael A. !einstein, 7Anal#sisJ Ideolo ical Diversit# in Somalia:s Islamic Courts >ovement,8 'aro&eonline(!om, 0? Septem/er 0112. See at ))). aro)eonline.comAartman0Apu/lishASomaliaK0+AAnal#sis.shtml. *0 Cen >en3haus, 7A Countr# in Peril, a Polic# =i htmare,8 )nough "trategy Paper* Septem/er 0112, pp. D,?. Availa/le at ))).enou hproject.or . *B Sun uta !est, 7=e) Strate # of Cillin Aid !or3ers in Somalia $ 5ut !hose Strate # is itL8 Terrorism +o!us, vol. ?, issue 02 F0- 9ul# 0112G. 7Somali Islamists !arn !estern Aid A encies,8 Reuters, B .cto/er 0112. *D >en3haus, pp. ?,2. *? Edmund Sanders, 7Conditions >a# 5e ;ipe for Al <aeda in Somalia,8 Los Angeles Times, 0? Au ust 0112. *@ I/id. *+ I/id. *2 =ic3 Grace, 7The (on !ar 9ournalJ Sha/aa/ ;eaches .ut to al <aeda Senior (eaders, Announces Death of al Sudani. , The Long War ournal, 0 Septem/er 0112. See at ))).lon )arjournal.or AarchivesA0112A1-Asha/a/KreachesKoutKt, print.php. *5asil Adas, 7Al <aida Groups (eavin Ira6 for Sudan, Somalia,8 'ulf -e&s, 2 9ul# 0112. 01 7&act/oo3 $ Hunted al <aeda >ilitants in Africa,8 Reuters, D Au ust 0112. 0* Grace. 00 7Al,<aeda Plannin Stri3e on " anda in ;etaliation for Somalia Peace3eepin EffortsL8 Terrorism +o!us, vol. ?, issue BD, 0D Septem/er 0112. 7Al,<aeda >an &eared Hidin in Tan'ania,8 This .ay FDar es SalaamG, B1 Septem/er 0112. 0B Stephanie >cCrummen, 7Hunt for Suspects in Em/ass# 5om/in s Elicits An er in Cen#a,8 Washington Post, *? Au ust 0112. 0D >en3haus, p. 2. 0? >cCrummen. 0@ 5eth Elise !hita3er, 7;eluctant PartnersJ &i htin Terrorism and Promotin Democrac# in Cen#a,8 $nternational "tudies Perspe!ti%es, vol. -, issue B, Au ust 0112, pp. 0@D,0@@. 0+ 7"S !arns of Al,<aeda Threats in Sudan,8 A+P, ** .cto/er 0112. 7Alle ed Cillers of "S Diplomat in Sudan to Stand Trial,8 "udan Tri/une, @ Au ust 0112. 02 "S Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, Chapter B FSudanG. See at ))).state. ovAsActArlsAcrtA011@A20+B@.htm. 0"S Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, Chapter B FSudanG. See at ))).state. ovAsActArlsAcrtA011+A*1B+**.htm. B1 I/id.