Horn of Africa: Priorities and Recommendations Hearing before the House Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations Committee

on Appropriations 12 March 200 !estimon" of #a$id H% Shinn Ad&unct Professor' ())iott Schoo) of *nternationa) Affairs +eorge ,ashington -ni$ersit" Madame Chairperson and members of the Subcommittee' than. "ou for the opportunit" to testif" on priorities and recommendations for -%S% po)ic" in the Horn of Africa% M" name is #a$id Shinn' Ad&unct Professor' ())iott Schoo) of *nternationa) Affairs' +eorge ,ashington -ni$ersit"' and former ambassador to (thiopia and /ur.ina Faso% One0third of m" thirt"0se$en "ear career in the Foreign Ser$ice focused on the Horn of Africa% * continue to fo))o1 the region c)ose)" as an academic% !reat the Horn as a Region !he countries norma))" considered to constitute the Horn of Africa are (thiopia' (ritrea' Soma)ia' #&ibouti and Sudan% Some inc)ude 2en"a and -ganda in the Horn% * 1i)) confine m" remar.s to the first fi$e countries% !he cha))enges and the future of the Horn are inter)in.ed to an e$en greater e3tent than is the case in other regions of Africa% A prob)em or conf)ict in one countr" has negati$e imp)ications for one or more of its neighbors &ust as po)itica) and economic progress benefits neighboring countries% An" strateg" that does not ta.e into account the imp)ications for its neighbors of a po)ic" to1ards one countr" is probab)" doomed to fai)% * be)ie$e that the Horn of Africa' ta.en as a region' has been the most conf)icted corner of the 1or)d since the end of the Second ,or)d ,ar% !he on)" serious -%S% po)ic" effort that tried to dea) 1ith the countries as an integrated region occurred during the C)inton administration in the mid01 0s% *t 1as .no1n as the +reater Horn of Africa *nitiati$e% *n addition to the fi$e core countries in the Horn' it inc)uded 2en"a' -ganda' !an4ania' R1anda and /urundi% *ts t1o main goa)s 1ere to focus -%S% resources on food securit" and conf)ict pre$ention5mitigation% *t achie$ed e3ceeding)" )imited success for a $ariet" of reasons' primari)" because ne1 conf)ict in the region o$er1he)med efforts to reso)$e e3isting conf)ict% *n addition' there 1as not a tota) commitment from a)) -%S% embassies in the fie)d to embrace a concept that did not ha$e as its primar" ob&ecti$e an emphasis on bi)atera) re)ations% !he *nitiati$e 1as a good one6 it is a pit" it did not ha$e more success% *t 1ou)d be usefu) to re$ie1 the )essons )earned from that effort before embar.ing on a ne1 regiona) approach for the countries in the Horn of Africa% For e3amp)e' inc)uding !an4ania' R1anda and /urundi as part of the *nitiati$e ma" ha$e been too ambitious% On the other hand' it is essentia) to inc)ude 2en"a and -ganda as the" are critica) to man" of the issues that impact the Horn% !he -nited States and others ha$e de$oted considerab)e attention in recent "ears to the ma&or crises in the Horn: the fai)ed state of Soma)ia and especia))" its imp)ications

2 for terrorism' the ci$i) 1ar bet1een southern and northern Sudan and the crisis in #arfur' the 1ar bet1een (thiopia and (ritrea and periodic famine in se$era) of the countries% An e$en )onger )ist of second tier prob)ems such as conf)ict in (thiopia7s Ogaden' the confrontation a)ong the (ritrea5#&ibouti border and conf)ict in eastern Sudan ha$e consumed much )ess -%S% time and resources% !here is a third group that recei$es $er" )itt)e -%S% attention% !hese are )arge)" )oca) conf)icts in$o)$ing disagreements o$er issues such as pasturage' scarce 1ater sources' catt)e rust)ing and ethnic migration% *t is not surprising and' in fact' appropriate to focus on the most serious issues% On the other hand' it is a mista.e to e3c)ude the second and third tier prob)ems as the" usua))" contribute to the more serious prob)ems% *n a fe1 cases' sma))er )oca) disagreements ma" e$en )ead to ma&or conf)ict% A much o$er)oo.ed techni8ue in the ,est for dea)ing 1ith these )oca)i4ed issues is the use of traditiona) conf)ict reso)ution mechanisms% Most of these conf)icts are e3acerbated b" a re)ati$e)" high annua) popu)ation gro1th rate in spite of the negati$e effects of regu)ar conf)ict and H*95A*#S% According to ,or)d /an. figures' the popu)ation gro1th rate bet1een 1 0 and 200: for #&ibouti 1as 2%; percent' for (ritrea 2%: percent and for Sudan and (thiopia 2%2 percent% Soma)ia )agged 1e)) behind at 1%< percent% (ach "ear' (thiopia adds about 1%: mi))ion peop)e to its popu)ation% !he countr" has not produced enough food to feed its popu)ation for se$era) decades and there is no prospect that it 1i)) be ab)e to achie$e this goa) in the foreseeab)e future% Cooperating 1ith Other P)a"ers in the Horn !he -nited States can not and shou)d not be e3pected to so)$e the prob)ems of the Horn on its o1n% *t is essentia) to continue to 1or. 1ith the countries in the region and the traditiona) donor countries inc)uding the members of the (uropean -nion' =or1a"' Canada' Austra)ia and >apan% (g"pt and some of the Arab +u)f states' 1hich ha$e a direct interest in de$e)opments in the Horn' shou)d be part of efforts to so)$e prob)ems in the region% China has become the principa) non0African inf)uence in Sudan and has a gro1ing presence in (thiopia and (ritrea% China 1i)) not a)1a"s agree 1ith 1estern donors on the best approach to the region' but it has cooperated in Sudan and Soma)ia and shou)d increasing)" be brought into discussions concerning the Horn% !he ro)e of Russia is more prob)ematic as its primar" interest seems to be se))ing 1eapons to Sudan' (thiopia and (ritrea% =e$erthe)ess' it shou)d be part of the consu)tati$e process if for no other reason than to tr" to minimi4e the potentia) negati$e impact of its arms sa)es and because it has e3pressed a gro1ing interest in in$esting in countries )i.e (thiopia% !here are se$era) other countries 1ith important interests in the Horn 1hose ro)e has not recei$ed much consideration b" the -nited States% *ndia is a ma&or p)a"er' especia))" in (thiopia' 1hich is its principa) African recipient of economic assistance% *n recent "ears' !ur.e" has made a ma&or effort to increase its re)ations in the Horn' especia))" 1ith Sudan' (thiopia and #&ibouti% A)though /ra4i)7s main African focus is ,est Africa and the ?usophone countries' it is e3panding ties 1ith Sudan and (thiopia% A)) of these countries shou)d be consu)ted in an" regiona) strateg" to1ards the Horn that 1ou)d benefit from their materia) and5or po)itica) support% *n addition' the -nited =ations and its specia)i4ed agencies' ,or)d /an.' *nternationa) Monetar" Fund' African -nion' *ntergo$ernmenta) Authorit" on #e$e)opment' African #e$e)opment /an.' Arab

D #e$e)opment /an. and Arab ?eague @Sudan' Soma)ia and #&ibouti are membersA ha$e the abi)it" to inf)uence de$e)opments in the Horn% One potentia) spoi)er deser$es specia) mention% *ran is ta.ing a gro1ing interest in Africa genera))" and the Horn in particu)ar% *ran7s goa) is not c)ear' but there are concerns that it is primari)" interested in propagating its fundamenta)ist be)iefs in the region% *f this is the ob&ecti$e' it 1i)) be a tough se)) for Shi7ite *ran as $irtua))" a)) the Mus)ims in the Horn are Sunni 1ith strong Sufi be)iefs% =e$erthe)ess' *ran has an especia))" )ong0standing and c)ose re)ationship 1ith Sudan and has made significant progress recent)" in impro$ing ties 1ith (ritrea and #&ibouti% (ritrean President *saias Afe1er.i $isited !ehran in #ecember 200B' and *ranian President Mahmoud Ahmadine&ad 1ent to #&ibouti in Februar" 200 ' 1hen he signed fi$e cooperation agreements 1ith his #&iboutian counterpart% *ranian contact 1ith (thiopia has been occurring at a )o1er )e$e)% *ran has a)so engaged recent)" in high )e$e) contact 1ith the )eaders of 2en"a' -ganda' !an4ania and the Comoro *s)ands% (thiopia (thiopia has been a good a))" of the -nited States on a number of issues 1hi)e it offers cha))enges for -%S% po)ic" concerning its human rights practices and pace of democrati4ation% As a resu)t' -%S% po)ic" to1ards (thiopia since the current go$ernment too. po1er in 1 1 has a)1a"s been a de)icate ba)ancing act% !his 1i)) continue to be the case% (thiopia has been a strong supporter of -%S% counterterrorism po)ic" in the region% ($en if the tactics change under the Obama administration for dea)ing 1ith terrorism' the -nited States 1i)) continue to )oo. to (thiopia for support% (thiopia has a)so consistent)" been responsi$e to -%S% concerns about stabi)it" and peace.eeping operations in the region and be"ond% *t supported -%S% po)ic" on the Comprehensi$e Peace Agreement in Sudan and pro$ided support to the peace.eeping operation in #arfur% *t has contributed to peace.eeping efforts be"ond the Horn of Africa% A)though in m" $ie1' both the -nited States and (thiopia fo))o1ed a misguided po)ic" in Soma)ia' the" did it together% *t is &ust not possib)e to ignore the he)pfu) ro)e of (thiopia on regiona) issues that are important to the -nited States% *n addition' the Me)es Cena1i go$ernment has estab)ished a so)id economic trac. record for 1hich it does not recei$e much credit% -%S% po)ic" must 1eigh these positi$e factors against the need for significant impro$ement on human rights issues and the democrati4ation process% Since 1 1 there ha$e been periodic )arge0sca)e arrests of po)itica) dissidents' fre8uent)" among the Oromo 1ho are percei$ed right)" or 1rong)" to ha$e ties to the Oromo ?iberation Front' 1hich ca))s for the o$erthro1 of the go$ernment% A)though man" are e$entua))" re)eased' ne1 groups of po)itica) dissidents are routine)" arrested% !he go$ernment has a )ong histor" of harassment of the pri$ate press and a re)uctance to permit ci$i) societ" groups to engage in ad$ocac" 1or.% !he ne1 act co$ering charities and non0go$ernmenta) organi4ations p)aces se$ere restrictions on their abi)it" to conduct ad$ocac" 1or.% #emocrati4ation in (thiopia e3perienced a ma&or setbac. fo))o1ing the 200: nationa) e)ections% A)though the e)ection process began 1e))' it ended bad)"% !he po)itica) opposition must ta.e some responsibi)it" for the $io)ence that fo))o1ed the e)ection' but u)timate)" the go$ernment is responsib)e for pre$enting $io)ence and

< maintaining credibi)it" in the e)ectora) s"stem% !he 200B )oca) e)ections 1ere an opportunit" to put the democrati4ation process bac. on trac.% !he" did not% !he go$ernment part" 1on a)) but a handfu) of the D%; mi))ion positions% !he ne3t nationa) e)ections occur in 2010 and the out)oo. for serious competition is not good% -%S% po)ic" must continue to ba)ance the need for (thiopia7s cooperation on regiona) issues 1ith its desire to inf)uence positi$e)" the human rights7 situation and democrati4ation process in the countr"% Putting pressure on (thiopia 1i)) become increasing)" difficu)t for the -nited States and other 1estern countries as (thiopia continues to strengthen its re)ations 1ith countries such as China and Russia% (ritrea -%S% re)ations 1ith (ritrea during the past "ear reached their )o1est point since (ritrea became independent in 1 D% !he" 1ou)d ha$e fa))en e$en further if some persons in the pre$ious administration had had their 1a" and managed to p)ace (ritrea on the )ist of state sponsors of terrorism% Fortunate)"' this did not happen and the door remains a&ar for a possib)e dia)ogue 1ith the *saias go$ernment% !here is much standing in the 1a" of better re)ations 1ith (ritrea% #uring the past "ear' the rhetoric on both sides has been harsh% !here ha$e ne$er been nationa) e)ections in (ritrea and the democrati4ation process is $irtua))" non0e3istent% (ritrea be)ie$es that the -%S% has a)most sing)e0handed)" made it possib)e for (thiopia to a$oid imp)ementation of the binding arbitration agreement that de)ineates the (thiopian0 (ritrean border% (ritrea has been aiding and abetting e3tremists in Soma)ia in an effort to put pressure on (thiopia% Asmara ser$es as the head8uarters for the Oromo ?iberation Front that periodica))" )aunches attac.s across the border into (thiopia% (ritrea sent troops to the border 1ith #&ibouti' 1hich it continues to taunt for reasons that are not c)ear% (ritrea is ma.ing a ma&or effort to impro$e re)ations 1ith countries such as *ran' 1hich according to an (ritrean opposition group has dep)o"ed or intends to dep)o" *ranian troops in the (ritrean port of Assab% !here is no independent confirmation of this report% An" -%S% attempt to impro$e re)ations 1ith (ritrea faces huge cha))enges% A ne1 administration has the ad$antage' ho1e$er' in that it can )oo. at o)d prob)ems in ne1 1a"s% *t ma" not be possib)e to impro$e re)ations 1ith (ritrea' but the effort sti)) needs to be made% #&ibouti -%S% re)ations 1ith #&ibouti are good and genera))" prob)em free% #&ibouti hosts the on)" -%S% mi)itar" base in Africa' Combined >oint !as. Force0Horn of Africa @C>!F0 HOAA% *ts main purpose is to counter terrorist acti$it" throughout the region' inc)uding Eemen% #&ibouti e3tracts a renta) fee for this base6 these negotiations ha$e not a)1a"s been eas"% *t 1ou)d be usefu) to conduct an independent assessment of C>!F0HOA to determine if its costs &ustif" the benefits that it pro$ides% !he countries of greatest concern are Soma)ia and Eemen% C>!F0HOA reported)" has no in$o)$ement in Soma)ia and )imited abi)it" to conduct acti$it" in Eemen% As * understand it' -%S% mi)itar" components other than C>!F0HOA ha$e conducted the actions in Soma)ia%

: A)though there is no indication that #&ibouti desires to a)ter its c)ose re)ationship 1ith the -%S%' its recent high )e$e) contact 1ith *ran bears 1atching% #&ibouti ser$es as the port for near)" a)) of )and)oc.ed (thiopia7s e3ports and imports that depart5arri$e b" sea% (thiopia has an e$en greater interest in cordia) re)ations 1ith #&ibouti than does the -nited States% /ecause #&ibouti hosts C>!F0HOA and (thiopia is dependent on the port' #&ibouti becomes an important part of a regiona) po)ic" for the Horn of Africa% *t is a)so in the interest of the -nited States to 8uiet)" support #&ibouti in its dispute 1ith (ritrea% ($en better' the -nited States' if it is ab)e to impro$e re)ations 1ith (ritrea' might be in a position to he)p this prob)em go a1a"% Soma)ia !he -nited States essentia))" abandoned Soma)ia fo))o1ing the departure of -%S% troops from the countr" in 1 < as part of the -= peace.eeping operation% *t continued to pro$ide diminishing amounts of humanitarian aid% Fo))o1ing 511 and the subse8uent in$asion of Afghanistan' the -%S% feared that the !a)iban might mo$e to Soma)ia and )arge)" re)egated its engagement in Soma)ia to counterterrorism% !his e3cessi$e focus on terrorism )ed to poor -%S% po)ic" decisions that he)ped to ensure a ta.eo$er of most of Soma)ia b" the -nion of *s)amic Courts @-*CA% !he -nited States then supported the secu)ar !ransitiona) Federa) +o$ernment @!F+A and its (thiopian a))ies in forcib)" remo$ing the -*C from po1er on)" to 1itness in )ate 200B creation of a ne1 go$ernment of nationa) unit" that combined the !F+ and e)ements of the -*C% -%S% po)ic" to1ards Soma)ia in the past "ear has been rea)istic6 it no1 supports the ne1 unit" go$ernment% !he situation in Soma)ia is especia))" f)uid% *t is up to the ne1 go$ernment to pro$e that it can ra))" most Soma)is to its more moderate agenda% !he first priorit" is the difficu)t tas. of reestab)ishing securit"% An en)arged African -nion peace.eeping force is not the ans1er' a)though it can continue to p)a" a usefu) ro)e b" .eeping the port and airport in Mogadishu out of the contro) of radica) groups% !he African -nion does not ha$e the capacit"' funding' e3perience or 1i))ingness to defend the ne1 Soma)i go$ernment against its opponents% A -= peace.eeping force 1ou)d be some1hat more effecti$e' but on)" if there is a peace to .eep that a)) Soma)i sides endorse% For the time being' securit" 1i)) be mess" as the ne1 go$ernment uses its o1n mi)itia to dea) 1ith groups that oppose it' especia))" the e3tremist a)0Shabab and free)ancing mi)itias% !he -nited States and the internationa) communit" shou)d begin to he)p Soma)ia train a professiona)' communit"0based po)ice force that dra1s its recruits from a)) regions of Soma)ia% !he Arab countries' 1hich ha$e a sta.e in a stab)e Soma)ia' shou)d he)p finance this effort% *f it is possib)e to neutra)i4e a)0Shabab and independent mi)itias' a Soma)i po)ice force' 1hich has a )ong tradition of professiona)ism in the countr"' shou)d be ab)e to ensure securit" unti) Soma)ia creates a nationa) arm"% !he -nited States shou)d continue to support the ne1 go$ernment in spite of its imperfections' 1hi)e remaining in the bac.ground% *t shou)d gi$e the Soma)i go$ernment an opportunit" to bui)d a functioning coa)ition' neutra)i4e support for a)0Shabab and co0 opt opposing po)itica) organi4ations% Soma)ia7s ne1 prime minister has stated that he is prepared to sit do1n 1ith a)0Shabab' a)though its )eaders continue to oppose the ne1 go$ernment% As much as the -nited States disagrees 1ith a)0Shabab' it is necessar" to )et Soma)is 1or. through their differences in their o1n 1a"% !his is a)so the time for the

; -nited States to esche1 mi)itar" acti$it" in Soma)ia% !he -nited States shou)d continue to pro$ide humanitarian assistance' he)p to estab)ish a po)ice force and be prepared to step in 8uic.)" 1ith de$e)opment aid as soon as the securit" situation permits% *n the meantime' the -nited States shou)d increase de$e)opment assistance to Soma)i)and' 1hich has genera))" a$oided the instabi)it" endemic in Soma)ia% Sudan Sudan poses a serious cha))enge for -%S% po)ic"% !he -nited States has four ma&or goa)s in Sudan: ensure imp)ementation of the Comprehensi$e Peace Agreement @CPAA or at )east a$oid a return to ci$i) 1ar bet1een the north and south6 end the crisis in #arfur6 impro$e the o$era)) human rights situation6 and continue to recei$e the cooperation of Sudan on counterterrorism% Achie$ing these goa)s re8uires a combination of pressure' fran. ta). and acceptance of some unp)easant truths% !he go$ernment in 2hartoum is high)" f)a1ed% ,hi)e the -nited States has no interest in supporting the go$ernment' it must dea) 1ith it as a fact of )ife% !he -nited States shou)d continue to press both the /ashir go$ernment and the )eaders of the Sudan Peop)e7s ?iberation Mo$ement to imp)ement the CPA% *n fact' this shou)d be the highest priorit"% A resumption of the north0south ci$i) 1ar 1ou)d resu)t in more death and destruction than has occurred so far in #arfur% !he -nited States shou)d a)so continue to press the /ashir go$ernment and the #arfur rebe) groups to reach an accommodation in #arfur% !he Sudanese go$ernment is primari)" responsib)e for the situation in #arfur' but the rebe) groups ha$e increasing)" contributed to the carnage% *n the immediate future' the -nited States has minima) abi)it" to inf)uence the human rights situation in Sudan% *f the -nited States is to be ta.en serious)" b" the /ashir go$ernment' there are t1o -%S% positions that need to be reconsidered% *n $ie1 of the uni$ersa))" hosti)e attitude to1ards 2hartoum in ,ashington' * rea)i4e that * am stepping in front of a fast0 mo$ing eighteen 1hee)er b" cha))enging con$entiona) 1isdom% =e$erthe)ess' these points need to be made if the -nited States is to ha$e meaningfu) discussions 1ith Sudan% First' -%S% po)ic" is not 1e)) ser$ed 1hen it sa"s that genocide is continuing toda" in #arfur% A)e3 de ,aa)' one of the 1or)d7s )eading authorities on #arfur' recent)" made an ana)"sis of the $io)ent deaths that occurred in 200B% !he figures he 1or.ed 1ith e3c)ude an" e3cess morta)it" caused b" hunger and disease' se3ua) $io)ence and forced disp)acement' a)though he does not be)ie$e these numbers are unusua))" high% *n 200B' -=AM*# reports there 1ere about 1::0 $io)ent deaths in #arfur% ?ess than :00 1ere ci$i)ians' more than <00 1ere combatants and about ;<0 died in inter0triba) fighting% !he Sudan go$ernment armed a)) of the mi)itia in$o)$ed in inter0triba) fighting and is u)timate)" responsib)e for these deaths% !his is a dep)orab)e situation to be sure' but it is not genocide% -sing the term genocide toda" to describe the situation in #arfur adds an emotiona) 8ua)it" that distorts the discussion% *t is time to ac.no1)edge that the situation has changed in #arfur% Second' the -nited States appropriate)" put Sudan on the )ist of state sponsors of terrorism in 1 D% Again' the situation has changed% Sudan began e$en before 511 to open the door for cooperation 1ith the -nited States on counterterrorism% *t significant)" e3panded that initiati$e after 511% !he State #epartment7s Countr" Reports on

H !errorism for 200; stated that F!he Sudanese go$ernment 1as a strong partner in the ,ar on !error and aggressi$e)" pursued operations direct)" in$o)$ing threats to -%S% interests and personne) in Sudan% % % % ,ith the e3ception of HAMAS' the Sudanese go$ernment did not open)" support the presence of e3tremist e)ements in Sudan%G !he State #epartment7s Countr" Reports on !errorism for 200H' the most recent one' reaffirmed Sudan7s cooperation and added' F,hi)e the -%S%0Sudanese counterterrorism re)ationship remained so)id' hard0)ine Sudanese officia)s continued to e3press resentment and distrust o$er actions b" the -S+ and 8uestioned the benefits of continued cooperation% !heir assessment ref)ected disappointment that Sudan7s counterterrorism cooperation has not 1arranted rescission of its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism%G !he report 1ent on to note that Sudanese authorities unco$ered and )arge)" dismant)ed a )arge0sca)e terrorist organi4ation targeting 1estern interests in 2hartoum% *f there is an" hope of achie$ing a more producti$e discussion 1ith Sudan about those issues of concern to the -nited States' a good p)ace to start 1ou)d be discontinuing references to genocide in #arfur in the present tense and ta.ing steps to remo$e Sudan from the )ist of state sponsors of terrorism% Most' if not a))' -%S% sanctions against Sudan 1ou)d remain in p)ace e$en after it is remo$ed from the )ist% *t is not possib)e to .no1 if ta.ing these steps 1ou)d resu)t in more responsib)e actions b" 2hartoum in #arfur and in imp)ementing the CPA' but these steps 1ou)d send a signa) to Sudan that the -%S% is prepared to ac.no1)edge a ne1 rea)it"% Operationa) *ssues * 1ou)d )i.e to associate m"se)f 1ith testimon" b" former ambassador Prudence /ushne)) before this Subcommittee on 2: Februar" 200 concerning 1a"s the Foreign Ser$ice needs to do its &ob secure)" and effecti$e)"% Ambassador /ushne))7s comments app)" to the Horn of Africa as 1e)) as the rest of the continent% * 1ant to underscore se$era) points% Ambassador /ushne)) commented that securit" concerns ha$e trumped po)ic" ob&ecti$es% * fu))" agree% ,hi)e the bombings in 1 B of -%S% embassies in =airobi and #ar es Sa)aam necessitated changes in the structure of -%S% embassies in the region and be"ond' the fortress embass" concept has been carried to an unnecessar" e3treme% !he embass" in 2hartoum' 1here * ser$ed for three "ears in the mid01 B0s' is tota))" unsatisfactor" from a securit" standpoint and must be mo$ed% !he State #epartment is bui)ding a ne1 structure% *t 1i)) be a fortress in an iso)ated part of the cit"' effecti$e)" cutting it off from the Sudanese pub)ic% !he embass" in Addis Ababa' the same structure 1here * ser$ed from 1 ;01 ' has put securit" procedures in p)ace since the )ate 1 0s that effecti$e)" cut it off from the (thiopian pub)ic other than $isa app)icants% !he -%S% has no mission in Soma)ia and the securit" situation there no1 does not permit the assignment of American personne)% * am )ess fami)iar 1ith the current situation in #&ibouti and Asmara% *n 200H' * $isited a number of missions in Africa and 1as appa))ed at the )ac. of contact bet1een host countr" nationa)s and American embass" personne)% Much of the prob)em 1as due to the ph"sica) iso)ation of the embass" or consu)ate in cities )i.e Pretoria' Abu&a and Cape !o1n 1here terrorism is not e$en a significant threat% !he on)" antidote to fortress embassies is embass" )eadership that forces American staff regu)ar)" to get out of the fortress and mo$e around the cit" and the countr"% M" recent e3perience

B suggests that a)) too often this is not happening% Part of the prob)em is the enormous amount of time spent in some capita)s escorting $isitors to the same )ocations and too fe1 personne) comp)eting reports re8uired b" ,ashington% /ut some of the prob)em is un1i))ingness to mo$e around the countr" for securit" reasons% !he Foreign Ser$ice is a career that b" definition re8uires a reasonab)e amount of ris. ta.ing% * be)ie$e most Foreign Ser$ice personne) accept this% * fear that -%S% embassies in much of Africa and perhaps the 1or)d genera))" are becoming too ris. a$erse% !he securit" tai) is 1agging the dip)omatic dog% One 1a" to get around the fortress embass" concept is to estab)ish more American Presence Posts staffed b" one Foreign Ser$ice Officer and a coup)e of )oca) emp)o"ees% Ad$ances in communications ma.e this so)ution imminent)" feasib)e% !here are se$era) cities in (thiopia and Sudan 1here the -%S% cou)d formu)ate more en)ightened po)ic" if it had a better understanding of the situation on the ground% * understand' ho1e$er' that securit" personne) are re)uctant to e3pand significant)" these one person posts because of the possib)e ris. encountered b" the American officer% A coro))ar" to the American Presence Post is the need to increase )anguage training% Persons assigned to one person posts in the northern part of Sudan must ha$e some Arabic% An" American assigned outside Addis Ababa shou)d ha$e Amharic' Afan Oromo' Soma)i' !igrin"a' etc%' depending on the )ocation of the assignment% ,hen it becomes safe to reopen an embass" in Mogadishu' there must be at )east one American on the staff 1ho spea.s Soma)i% ,ith the huge number of Soma)is 1ho no1 ha$e -%S% citi4enship' this shou)d not be an o$er1he)ming obstac)e% !eaching these )anguages is e3pensi$e and can on)" be accomp)ished if Congress authori4es funding to increase the number of Foreign Ser$ice personne) to ta.e account of do1n time for )ong0term )anguage training% !han. "ou for "our time and consideration%