T

A. INTERP: the affirmative must have a topical text and defend a policy alternative to the
status quo with the resolution as the end point of their advocacy. The affirmative should be
resolved that the United States Federal Government should. They should defend the
implications of that theoretical action.

―Resolved expresses intent to implement the plan: (American Heritage Dictionary 2000)
“to resolve on a course of action.”

―United States Federal Government is a federal republic: (Bryan Garner [Editor-in-

chief], Black‘s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, 2006 p. 7 16) “A federal republic formed after the
War of Independence and made up of 48 conterminous states, plus the state of Alaska and
the District of Columbia in North America, plus the state of Hawaii in the Pacific.”

―Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan: (American Heritage Dictionary 2000)

“used to express probability or expectation.”

B. VIOLATION
WILL HAS NO PLAN. If you vote aff, the USFG doesn’t implement any plan, which means the
aff is violating our interpretation of both “Should” & “Resolved.”

B. REASONS TO PREFER

1. Only def in the round. Will never defines “Resolved” meaning that at this point, the only
definition of the term is coming from the neg, & you should go with our definition over no
definition.

2. Good for debate. His definition of “should” justifies whole res cases & counterwarrants.
Prefer a more narrow definition.

C. VOTERS

1. Ground: By not defending the implementation and impacts post plan, they foreclose all
uniqueness based disads. There‘s no way for the neg to predict what elements of the text
and case they will and will not defend as their advocacy is nebulous and conditional as it
endorses the resolution but spikes out of USFG and resolved to avoid disads. This doesn‘t
just leave the neg with bad ground: it leaves us with none. That’s inherently unfair.

→ AT: Rules
He says fairness isn’t an impact unless he actually violates a rule, but that’s ridiculous. The
only rules are speech & skirt length, so with his interp, he could run cases about abortion
every round and get the win because T really doesn’t matter. We need a level playing field
for both the aff and the neg, and the rules don’t guarantee that.

2. Education: The aff‘s activist turn destroys switchside debate because it eliminates taking
a position that we don‘t necessarily believe. This is the unique benefit of policy debate vs.
other activities as it allows us to better craft and articulate our positions for having taken a
position we may not agree with. It is good to simulate and defend the impacts of USFG
action even if it means we need to read a few Khalilzad cards.
K FRAMEWORK

Individual VS Govt Action

Will identifies a problem with government policy (planning resource wars) and attempts to
deal with it by changing the judge’s mindsets? What? His discursive framework means that
he only has access to impacts that the judges can bring about. Clearly, governmental reform
doesn’t fall into this category.
K LINK/IMPACT

A. TURN: Human Centered Philosophy K2 Environment

Human-centered ethics necessitate protecting the environment—change is
possible without adopting a deep eco ethic
K. Hwang (Philosophy Prof., Seoul Nat. University), 03 Kyung-sig Hwang [Professor in
the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University], “Apology for Environmental
Anthropocentrism,” Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, Published by the Asian Bioethics
Association & the Eubios Ethics Institute, 2003, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm

there is no need for a specifically ecological ethic

“The third view, which will be defended here, is that
to explain our obligations toward nature, that our moral rights and duties can satisfactorily
be explained in terms of traditional, human-centered ethical theory. In terms of this view,
ecology bears on ethics and morality in that it brings out the far-reaching, extremely important
effects of man's actions, that much that seemed simply to happen-extinction of species,
depletion of resources, pollution, over rapid growth of population, undesirable, harmful, dangerous,
and damaging uses of technology and science - is due to human actions that are
controllable, preventable, by men and hence such that men can be held accountable for
what occurs. Ecology brings out that, often acting from the best motives, however, simply from short-sighted
self- interest without regard for others living today and for those yet to be born, brings about very damaging and
often irreversible changes in the environment, changes such as the extinction of plant and animal species,
destruction of wilderness and valuable natural phenomena such as forests, lakes, rivers, seas. Many reproduce at a
rate with which their environment cannot cope, so that damage is done, to and at the same time, those who are
born are ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-sheltered, ill-educated. Moralists concerned with the environment have
pressed the need for a basic rethinking of the nature of our moral obligations in the light of the
knowledge provided by ecology on the basis of personal, social, and species prudence, as well as on general moral
grounds in terms of hitherto unrecognized and neglected duties in respect of other people,
people now living and persons yet to be born, those of the third world, and those of future
generation, and also in respect of preservation of natural species, wilderness, and valuable
natural phenomena. Hence we find ecological moralists who adopt this third approach, writing to the effect
that concern for our duties entail concern for our environment and the ecosystems it contains. Environmental
ethics is concerned with the moral relation that holds between humans and the natural
world, the ethical principles governing those relations determine our duties, obligations, and
responsibilities with regard to the earth's natural environment and all the animals and plants
inhabit it. A human-centered theory of environmental ethics holds that our moral duties with
respect to the natural world are all ultimately derived from the duties we owe to one
another as human beings. It is because we should respect the human rights, or should protect and promote
the well being of humans, that we must place certain constraints on our treatment of the earth's environment and
its non-human habitants.”

B. Impact Shifting
He’s already shifting ground here. First he has this big long impact card in the 1AC about
how shallow eco destroys the environment. Then in C-X, he says that he doesn’t really solve
the impact, he just wants to do what’s right. Without the impact, how do we decide that
deep eco is “right”? What’s the standard? If he’s going to claim that deep eco is the right
thing to do, he needs to justify that. Right now, it’s not justified b/c it doesn’t solve the
impact he’s identified.
ALT SOLVENCY

A. TURN: Stifles Public Engagement

Focusing on philosophical rather than political aspects of environmentalism
alienates potential supporters
A. De-Shalit (Fellow, Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, & Society), 2K Avner
De-Shalit [Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem & Associate
Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, & Society, Mansfield College, Oxford
University], “The Environment: Between Theory and Practice,” 2000, (p. 4-6)

environmental philosophers have moved too rapidly away

“In Chapter 1 it is claimed that in a way
from anthropocentrism—mainstream ethical discourses—towards biocentrism and
ecocentrism. My argument is that the public on the whole is not ready for this, and therefore
many activists and potential supporters of the environmental movement become alienated
from the philosophical discourse on the environment. In addition, I suggest that the reason for the
gap between on the one hand environmental philosophers and on the other activists and politicians is that
environmental philosophers have applied the wrong approach to political philosophy. I claim that all moral
reasoning involves a process of reflective equilibrium between intuitions and theory. I
distinguish between 'private', 'contextual', and 'public' modes of reflective equilibrium, arguing that environmental
philosophers use either the first or second mode of reasoning, whereas political philosophy requires the third: the
public mode of reflective equilibrium. The latter differs from the other two models in that it weighs both the
intuitions and the theories put forward by activists and the general public (and not just those of professional
philosophers). The argument for this being so is that reasoning about the environment needs to
include political and democratic philosophy. And yet, most of environmental philosophers'
efforts so far have focused on such questions of meta-ethics as 'intrinsic value theories' and
'biocentrism'.”

B. Species Hierarchy Inevitable

Situations where species interests conflict are inevitable – require species ranking
W. French (Director, Center for Ethics at Loyola University), 99 William C. French
[Associate Professor, Director, Center for Ethics, Loyola University], “Philosophical
Dialogues: Arne Naess and the Progress of Ecophilosophy,” 1999, (Pg 142-43)

“Biospherical egalitarianism, even in the hands of its most consistent proponents, breaks down when
dealing with the necessary choices that must be made under the conditions of life. In my
analysis, I have tried to chart a pattern of argument, common to many egalitarians, in which they initially
enunciate a broad principle of species equality, but later back away from it as they struggle
to account for our moral responsibilities in conflict-of-interest cases. When those who most
consistently reject notions of human superiority over nonhumans later reach for the
functional equivalent of species-ranking procedures, one must conclude that no ecological
ethic that attempts to be comprehensive can dispense with some sort of hierarchical ranking
of moral priorities based, at least in part, on critical evaluations of the different capacities,
needs, and vulnerabilities of different individuals, species, and ecosystems.”
C. Alt Links To K
Deep Ecology’s conception of the ecological Self is only expanding self-interest
C. Diehm (Philosophy Prof., University of Wisconsin), 07 Christian Diehm [Ph.D.,
Philosophy, Villanova University, Assistant Professor of Philosophy & Environmental Ethics
Coordiator, University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point], “Identification with Nature: What it is
and Why it Matters,” Ethics & The Environment, Indiana University Press, 2007, (Vol. 12,
No. 2, pp. 1-22)

“A second, related critique of deep ecology theorists’ emphasis on the expansion of the self
through identification-as-belonging is that from this viewpoint the protection of nature
appears to stem not from a desire to protect others who are worthy of moral concern, but
from a desire to protect ourselves. Often referencing the idea that for the ecological Self the
defense of nature does not involve self-sacrificing altruism but is instead a form of self-
defense, critics have said that this line of thinking remains an argument from self-interest,
even if for deep ecology supporters the meaning of the term “self” has changed Eric Katz expresses the basic
criticism here when he says that although “the interests of the individual from within the deep ecological
perspective will not be the narrow egoistic interests of ordinary human life,” it is still the case that in this
perspective nature’s preservation comes about “through our expanded notion of self-interest...”(2000, 33–34).
Simply put, the charge is that identification functions to provide an ecologically enlightened
conception of our selves, designed to issue in a similarly enlightened self-interest. Instead of
urging for an expansion of our capacity to care for others who are genuinely other, or others
who are recognized as having intrinsic value, deep ecology theorists have urged only an
expansion of our self-concern, via an expanded sense of self.”