Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

Villegas, Mayor of the City of Manila, directed respondent Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Assistant City Treasurer,' on the ground that respondent Romualdez "is not empowered to make such designation." On January 1, 1969, Mayor Villegas, appointed petitioner Manuel D. Lapid, chief of the cash division of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila, as Assistant City Treasurer. In a 1st endorsement dated February 14, 1969, respondent Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service disapproved the appointment of Lapid, basing his action, on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 19, 1968 to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by Section 2088 (A) of the Revised Administrative Code, and not by Section 4 of the Decentralization Law, Republic Act No. 5185." 5 Thereafter on February 25, 1969, to quote anew from the appealed decision: "Mayor Villegas and Manuel D. Lapid filed the instant petition for prohibition, quo warranto and mandamus, with application for writ of preliminary injunction, praying that judgment be rendered to declare illegal and void ab initio the authorization given by respondent Romualdez to respondent Gloria to assume the duties of assistant city treasurer of Manila, and that a writ of mandamus be issued to respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Subido commanding him to approve the appointment of petitioner Lapid to the said office in accordance with the civil Service Rules." 6 It was not until the filing of the petition that respondent Jose R. Gloria was nominated by the President of the Philippines to the position of Assistant City treasurer of Manila and thereafter duly confirmed. After the case was submitted for judgment on the pleadings and the documentary exhibits stipulated by the parties, the court rendered its decision on August 4, 1969 dismissing the petition. Hence this appeal by way of certiorari. With this Tribunal, as with the court below, the decisive question is the applicable law. The Charter of the City of Manila, enacted in 1949, in express terms did confer on the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the power to appoint the Assistant City Treasurer. 7 On the other hand, support for the petition is premised on the expansive interpretation that would be accorded the general provisions found in the Decentralization Act of 1967 to the effect that it is a city mayor who has the power to appoint all other employees paid out of city or local funds subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. 8 It is understandable why the choice for the lower court was not difficult to make. What has been so clearly ordained in the Charter is controlling. It survives in the face of the assertion that the additional power granted local officials to appoint employees paid out of local funds would suffice to transfer such authority to petitioner Mayor. A perusal of the words of the statute, even if far from searching would not justify such an interpretation. This is all more evident, considering the fidelity manifested by this Court to the doctrine that looks with less than favor on implied appeals. The decision now on appeal, to repeat, must be affirmed. 1. The inherent weakness of the contention of petitioner Mayor that would seize upon the vesting of the appointing power of all other "employees" except teachers paid out of local funds to justify his choice of petitioner Manuel D. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer is readily disclosed. The Revised Administrative Code distinguishes one in that category from an "officer" to designate those "whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, may be considered to involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the function of government, whether such duties are precisely defined by law or not." 9 Clearly, the Assistant and City Treasurer is an officer, not an employee. Then, too, Section 4 of the Decentralization Act relied upon by petitioner City Mayor specifically enumerates, the officials and their assistants whom he can appoint, specifically excluding therefrom city treasurers. 10 The expansive interpretation contended for is thus unwarranted. Nor is the case strengthened for petitioner City Mayor by the invocation of Pineda v. Claudio. 11 It is not to be denied that in the opinion of the Court, penned by Justice Castro, undue interference with the power and prerogatives of a local executive is sought to be avoided, considering his primary responsibility for efficient governmental administration. What is not to be ignored though is that such a principle was announced in connection with the

G.R. No. L-31711 September 30, 1971 ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS as Mayor of the City of Manila and MANUEL D. LAPID, petitioners-appellants, vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO as Civil Service Commissioner, EDUARDO Z. ROMUALDEZ as Secretary of Finance, JOSE R. GLORIA as Acting Asst. City Treasurer of Manila, and HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ as Presiding Judge of Branch V, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents-appellees. Gregorio A. Ejercito and Restituto R. Villanueva for petitioners-appellants. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for respondents-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.: Petitioner Antonio J. Villegas, in this appeal from a decision of the lower court dismissing a special civil action for prohibition, quo warranto and mandamus would lay claim as the Mayor of the City of Manila to the power of appointment of the Assistant City Treasurer to which office the other petitioner, Manuel D. Lapid, was by him named even if under its Charter 1 such a prerogative is expressly vested in the President of the Philippines. 2 He would invoke a provision in the Decentralization Act to the effect that all "other employees, except teachers, paid out of provincial, city or municipal general funds, and other local funds shall, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the provincial governor, city or municipal mayor upon recommendation of the office head concerned." 3 He is not deterred by the rather general and in explicit character of such statutory language as he contends for a construction rather generous, if not latitudinarian, in scope purportedly in consonance with the avowed purpose of the Act of enlarging boundaries of local autonomy. Respondent Abelardo Subido, who was proceeded against as Commissioner of the Civil Service, 4 takes a stand diametrically opposite not only because there is no legal basis for such a claim in the light of what is expressly ordained in the City Charter but also because such an interpretation of the provision related upon would disregard the well-settled doctrine that implied repeals are not favored. The lower court, in a well-written decision by the Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez, accepted such a view. After a careful study of the matter, we cannot discern any error. We affirm. The facts as found by the lower court follows: "In a letter dated June 3, 1968, respondent Eduardo Z. Romualdez, Secretary of Finance, authorized respondent Jose R. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer effective June 1, 1968, vice Felino Fineza who retired from the government service on May 31, 1968. In administrative Order No. 40, series of 1968, dated June 17, 1968, petitioner Antonio J.

.J.. Castro.appointment of a department head. a subsequent statute. At any rate. 12 where this Court.B. Dizon and Teehankee. not to mention the specific grant of such authority to the President. Generalia specialibus non derogant. J. 15 More specifically. concur. A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Rafferty. indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. The decision appealed from... then. The principle therein announced does not extend as far as the choice of an assistant city treasurer whose functions do not require that much degree of confidence. This principle has likewise been consistently applied in decisions of this Court from Manila Railroad Co. Thus: "From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger. It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by duplication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Subido. C. the chief of police. Makalintal. Concepcion. unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible.. Much less is reversal of the lower court decision justified on the plea that the aforesaid provision in the Decentralization Act had the effect of repealing what is specifically ordained in the city charter. took no part. JJ.. 16decided as far back as 1919.. Villamor and Makasiar. a 1908 decision. 2. Barredo. Without pronouncement as to costs. A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class. Equally unavailing then is Villegas v. is not to be impugned as a failure to abide by controlling pronouncements of this Tribunal. considered in its entirety. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. recognized that the choice of who the city legal officer should be rests solely on the city mayor. 1969 is affirmed. . such an office requiring as it does the highest degree of confidence. Reyes. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. who necessarily must enjoy the fullest confidence of the local executive. is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment. A citation from an opinion of Justice Tuason is illuminating. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal. 14 There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character.. through the then Justice Capistrano. This is so even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. It bears repeating that the situation in the case before us is of a different category. And this is true although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. the specific provision controls unless the statute. the lower court decision of August 4.L. 13 It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. . v. JJ.. one moreover whose appointment is expressly vested in the city mayor. Reyes. general in character as to its terms and application. Zaldivar. 17 WHEREFORE.

the petition is given due course and the orders of respondent judge dated August 19. RTC. Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. 1998] On January 19. (Lim vs. Comelec. Branch 46. 1993. R-2877 and R-2828. Jr. Jr. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners. with the presentation of evidence by the accused. Neither has this Court declared its unconstitutionality. and in declaring the said law as repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. 1992 and September 1. 1991. who dismissed Criminal Case Nos. dated January 18 and February 4. LEACHON. except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. Pacquing. No pronouncement as to costs. R-2877 and R-2828. 4th Judicial Region.. represented by the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro. 10. to every legislative act attaches the presumption of constitutionality. undertake. (Ty vs. states: “Sec. the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate informations for violation of P. enjoys this presumption of constitutionality. The antecedent facts that matter are. Presiding Judge.” From the aforesaid order of dismissal. 257 SCRA 727. or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner. docketed as Criminal Case Nos. respectively. if necessary and thereafter. 772.R. 181 SCRA 648. 1992 are set aside and declared null “Section 9. 261 SCRA 17) Presidential Decree No. Anti-Squatting Law. to decide the case on the basis of the evidence adduced. against Noli Hablo. as directed by the Court of Appeals. of Presiding Judge Emilio L. (Misolas vs. Leachon. otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law. to annul the orders. The State shall. 108725-26. San Jose. then the rebuttal or surrebuttal evidence. The cases proceeded to trial. 1993. brought this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus. 772. 1990. 1992. Unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this Court. September 25.. Prohibition and Mandamus. Respondent judge is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of the case. instead of conducting the trial. thus: “IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING considerations. Province of Lanao del Sur. D. No.D. intimidation or threat.Panga. On December 24. Farmers‟ Cooperative Marketing Association (FACOMA). 252 SCRA 695).petitioners. Agujetas vs. respondents. Guingona. SO ORDERED. Occidental Mindoro. the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals came out with a decision reversing the appealed Order of dismissal. the prosecution rested the cases. too. sending in a written offer of evidence on November 14. No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated. the respondent Judge issued an Order dismissing the said cases motu proprio on the ground of “lack of jurisdiction. before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro presided over by respondent judge. Any person. i.” [G. Branch 46. succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his . petitioners appealed to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari. At the time the respondent Judge rendered the questioned Decision and issued the orders of dismissal in 1993. notwithstanding the social justice provision of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.e. 250 SCRA 500. 1992. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished. almost a year after the prosecution had rested. it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored unless it is manifest that such is the legislative intent. a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. 240 SCRA 649. Eisma. and disposing. with the use of force.” Petitioners‟ Motion for Reconsideration interposed on Janua ry 29. which was referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.THIRD DIVISION and void. otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law. 1993. The issue posited here is whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing subject criminal cases for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. of the Regional Trial Court. a law will always be presumed valid and the first and fundamental duty of the court is to apply the law. opining that P. 1. was still effective. Court of Appeals. 264 SCRA 271) This doctrine is premised on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. 772 is rendered obsolete and deemed repealed by Sections 9 and 10. EMILIO L. specifically on urban land reform and housing. 772. Petitioners further pray that respondent Judge be ordered to proceed with the trial of said cases. Occidental Mindoro." Presidential Decree No. (Napocor vs. Trampe.: The People of the Philippines. and denied herein petitioners‟ motion for reconsideration. JR. Edmundo Mapindan and Diego Escala. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. On August 18.” “Sec. having been denied by the respondent Judge on February 4. THE HON. To begin with. 1993. pursuant to the Resolution of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose. San Jose. and for the common good. ordering continuation of trial of subject criminal cases. Alvarez vs. San Jose. and the private complainant. After presenting its evidence. provides: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION (FACOMA). Occidental Mindoro. the respondent judge dismissed the cases motu proprio. petitioners found their way to this court via the instant petition.. by law. on the other hand. vs. Occidental Mindoro. Frivaldo vs. 127 SCRA 419) Then. J. in cooperation with the private sector. DECISION PURISIMA. 772. which provide that “urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. National Federation of Labor vs. as follows: On August 7. once more. Presidential Decree No. Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

including a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination. director.” From the aforequoted portion of the questioned disposition below. the following requisites must first be met: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy. there is no showing that the issue of constitutionality of P. the respondent Judge dismissed subject cases motu proprio. it will run counter to the said specific constitutional provisions because the conviction and eviction will not be in a just and humane manner as the government has not yet undertaken the resettlement of urban and rural dwellers (referring to all accused in the cases at bar) and neither has the government consulted all the accused as to where they should be relocated. But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding. What is more. Under the Constitution. and those who would be evicted have not been consulted as to the place of their relocation. complainants have complied with the first requirement of due process. D. entitled “An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. that is. What is meant by “in accordance with law” and “just and humane manner” is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the landowner. Section 3 of the said Act provides that “all pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. without due process of law. threat or by the taking advantage of the absence of or tolerance by the landowners. 772 was ever posed by the accused. 772 conforms with the 1987 Constitution. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act. such an issue cannot be given due course for the simple reason that it was not raised by the proper party at the earliest opportunity. D. National Housing Authority. shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine not less than one thousand or more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the Court. and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary for the resolution of the case. manager or managing partners thereof. the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is done. what gives impetus to P. respondent Judge erred in predicating the validity or legality of eviction on the existence of a resettlement plan and area. in that it protects the rights of a property owner against unlawful and illegal intrusion. and that there be no loss of lives. If the offender is a corporation or association. Precisely. SO ORDERED. the petition cannot now prosper because on October 27. However. it can be gleaned that the reason of respondent Judge in dismissing subject cases is that the eviction of the accused was not effected in a just and humane manner as the government has not yet established a resettlement area for the accused. Furthermore. Before the court can assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question. the maximum penalty of five years and the fine of thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the president.will for residential. what makes the eviction and demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same are not done in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. intimidation. respondent Judge ratiocinated that “if all the accused in these cases were convicted and ordered evicted. The Court holds that the respondent judge did not err in so construing the aforecited constitutional provision.” Far from contravening. the opportunity for the accused to be heard and present evidence to show that his or her occupation or possession of the property is not against the will or without the consent of the landowner and is not tainted by the use of force. after the prosecution had rested the same and without giving the three accused an opportunity to present their evidence. The constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government. vs. 1997. 8368. 772 is the constitutional mandate that . SECOND DIVISION . the Petition is hereby DISMISSED. (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity. The import of the Order of dismissal under scrutiny is that.“no person shall be deprived of life. 142 SCRA 540). or property. By filing the proper informations in court. (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party. 772 Entitled „Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts‟” was enacted.should the eviction be in a just and humane manner. P.” WHEREFORE. Republic Act No. without any pronouncement as to costs. Consequently. the same shall be valid and upheld. (Board of Optometry vs Colet. that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven. 260 SCRA 88) In the case at bar. liberty. commercial or any other purposes. D.” In dismissing subject criminal cases for anti-squatting. the enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the alleged “squatters” the opportunity to present their case before a competent court where their rights will be amply protected and due process strictly observed. It should likewise be noted that a constitutional question will not be decided unless it is properly raised in appropriate cases (Tropical Homes Inc. physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties.

she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).” which affords women equal opportunities with men to ac t and to enter into contracts.75 of her collections. Republic Act No. the probationary period to cover 150 days. training. 1. [17] or the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code. contrarily argues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her employment. the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. who had already gained the status of a regular employee. private respondent volunteered the information. and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. 1991. 1994. 1991. private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T‟s policy regarding married women at the time. admission. promotion. and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.380. 1991 vice one C. before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City. Republic Act No. that is. To cite a few of the primordial ones. graduation. its branch supervisor in Baguio City. 118978.[4] In her reply letter dated January 17. In that memorandum. However. at all times. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private respondent. this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee. 1991. Section 14 of Article XIII[10] mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential. including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. 1991. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law. largely due to our country‟s commitment as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life. . and for appointment. Corollary thereto.[5] Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. J. Delia M. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its resolution of November 9.” for a fixed period from November 21. Article II[8] on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies. Likewise. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose.R.[7] All of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel. 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. the deployment of migrant workers. Republic Act No. 6955[13] which bans the “mail-order-bride” practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the rights of women workers. Republic Act No. 1991.[3] It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10. was illegally dismissed by petitioner. said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and. 442. from June 10.[G. Oficial. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1. was correspondingly ordered. including the order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with PT&T. women have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring. her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period.[1] Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company. 1997] PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY. 1990 until April 20. 1994. expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure. Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor. 1974 as Presidential Decree No. promotion and retention. her services were terminated. inter alia. specifically as a “Supernumerary Project Worker. hence this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC. the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter. In the Philippine setting. benefits. with emphasis on women. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with love and respect but. PT&T. 7192. Section 3 of Article XIII[9] (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. Section 14. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later. Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. and from July 19. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. especially on the matter of equal employment opportunities and standards.[11] Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. That employee. No.* petitioner. 7322 [15] increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private sector. only in countries where their rights are secure. 1992. private respondent‟s services as reliever were again engage d by petitioner.: LABOR On November 23. she was reminded about the company‟s policy of not accepting married women for employment. herein private respondent Grace de Guzman. Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever. 8042. On September 2. plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA. 1993. and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police.F.[6] which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal. coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA). 1992. At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith. through the ages. respondents. sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15. NATIONAL RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN. Thereafter. on May 26. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29. as well as the denial resolution of the latter. and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement. In all other respects. 1991 and July 8. which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties. Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. training. 2. May 23. 1991 to August 8.” which prescribes as a matter of policy. vs. provides a gamut of protective provisions. 6727 [12] which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment. it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer. men have responded to that injunction with indifference. private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee. the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient. 1991 to July 1. in its decision dated April 29. and Republic Act No. 7877 [16] which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the education and training environment. DECISION REGALADO. on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Similarly. [2] After August 8. 1991. and training opportunities. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. Her reinstatement. that she had failed to remit the amount of P2.[14] also known as the “Women in Development and Nation Building Act. The Constitution. petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter. the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2. 3. 1991. despite the maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which obviously it would have wanted to avoid. In the Labor Code. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code. afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. This improbable reasoning. was her violation of the company‟s policy against marriage (“and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company. with interstitial distinctions. one‟s labor being regar ded as constitutionally protected property. that while it has nothing against marriage. It was. and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds. to convincingly establish. there was no showing that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through negligence and. massage clinic. Petitioner would asseverate. the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company‟s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. That the labor arbiter would thus consider petitioner‟s submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought. had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave. which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring. her entitlement to back wages. In other words. Concededly. not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact. with the reminder. and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. as it was verbally instructed to you. That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. and as she had been dismissed without just cause. work assignments. bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article 138. what could be an act of insubordination was inconsequential. it nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that fact. [23] Verily. she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. Indeed. as she performed activities which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of PT&T. recognizes a woman‟s right against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account simply of sex. if so. is somewhat insincere and self-serving. it must be observed. Contrary to petitioner‟s assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty. that very policy alone which was the cause of private respondent‟s secretive conduct now complained of. even if the same were for fixed periods. [19] As put in a case. the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee. which shall be computed . but that is an altogether different story. however. as well as regulations on the transfer of employees. in the words of the latter. provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138 thereof. cocktail lounge. On the other hand. What it submits as unforgivable is her concealment of that marriage yet. there will be no sanction. over and on top of that. she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. If that employee confesses such fact of marriage. Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its policy against its female employees contracting marriage. For. so it is claimed. Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. just to bolster its case for dismissal. inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. [28] The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer. an employer is required.” except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. illegal. private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but. she will be dismissed. or unjustified.[20] In the case at bar. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.[24] It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer‟s caprices.[29] As an employee who had therefore gained regular status. Thus. according to his discretion and best business judgment. supervision of workers. bespeaks dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her dismissal. therefore. as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ. and the right against. which compelled private respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. as she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in concealing her status.”)[22] Parenthetically. Her concealment. albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner. and this brings us to the issue at hand. but if such employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional. Finally. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. which she did. and recall of employees. does have a hollow ring. When she was served her walking papers on January 29. all aspects of employment.” [21] Again. on the other hand. and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case. [25] Furthermore. petitioner‟s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of. this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation. private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections. and the discipline. petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women. her earlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee. Thus. For purposes of labor and social legislation. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment. This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments. petitioner‟s collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she supposedly misappropriated company funds. 1992. that “you‟re fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic).[27] On the other hand. lay-off of workers. In other words. through substantial evidence. perturbs the Court since private respondent may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around. private respondent‟s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. a woman working in a nightclub. the branch supervisor of the company. Oficial. dismissal. Finally. an employer is free to regulate. [30] However. In fact. it should not be simulated. [26] In the present controversy. as an additional ground to dismiss her from employment. “from hiring to firing. PT&T says it gives its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage. This line of reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that we are being regaled with responsible advocacy. it was merely agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to refund the same. petitioner‟s expostulations that it dismissed private respondent. working methods and assignments. it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the so-called management prerogatives.[18] women‟s rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded. declaring that marriage as a trivial matter to which it supposedly has no objection. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally justified. the threemonth suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be condoned. at the same time. Private respondent. Article 135. discrimination. in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor. is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. both on the aspects of qualification and retention. it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper.

like flight attendants. invoked a policy of the firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married women. et al. the same should be evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected by federal job discrimination laws. We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. as follows: “ART. Section 12 of Republic Act No. Philippine Air Lines. it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married women. Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in special occupations. the policy of respondent against marriage is patently illegal. such as those of flight attendants. shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her three months suspension. 3071 which became law on March 16. as no basis has been laid therefor. vs. was Act No. to repeat. Presidential Decree No. True. There.from the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto. 1976. Branding the policy of the employer as an example of “discriminatory chauvinism” tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on account of their sex. The government. or it should have categorically expressed so. to Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof. or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married. have been held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964. otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law. Actually. 1974 to take effect six (6) months later. but do not apply to married men. industrial. The standards have not yet been established as set forth in the first paragraph.[33] a decision that emanated from the Office of the President. is fair and reasonable. in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to be established. In said case. 148 and the Constitution. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it had been adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2. respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. The Labor Code states. . 1973 when Presidential Decree No. Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corporation[34] considered as void a policy of the same nature. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the supposed ill effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their employment. and just and humane conditions of work x x x.” which amended paragraph (c). respondent overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.[31] better known as the “Women and Child Labor Law. 1923 and which regulated the employment of women and children in shops. But for the timidity of those affected or their labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy. be it on special or ordinary occupations.” Moreover. respondent went as far as invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family as a basic social institution. discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage. considering the pecularities of their chosen profession.It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an oral understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married. ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex. race. 148. 679. The State shall afford protection to labor. 679. the appellate court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code. sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance from one place to another. abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T. which amended paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No.” The forerunner to Republic Act No. or to actually dismiss. 136. et al. Under American jurisprudence. the same was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. 148. in this modern world. with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code. vs. or on November 1. 679. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization. The sweeping intendment of the law. but that is precisely the factor that militates against the policy of respondent. sex. It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita. the main federal statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of. and mercantile establishments and other places of labor in the then Philippine Islands. It is logical to presume that. A close look at Section 8 of said decree. protection and welfare. which was promulgated on May 1.[35] . on the other hand. 4. In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position. Thus: “Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent‟s policy or regulation with the codal provision of law. nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight attendants. promote full employment and equality in employment. Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations. which provides: “Sec. Moreover. a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated. factories. It cannot be gainsaid that. job requirements which establish employer preference or conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as a “sex-plus” discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. safety. it knew that the controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13. agricultural. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against marriage of women engaged in extraordinary occupations.” This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. reveals that it is exactly the same provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code. Stipulation against marriage. respectively. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of married women. respondent. Further. among other things. security of tenure. all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. considering that. as bases for its policy of non-marriage. 1974. in dismissing from the service the complainant. discharge. In both instances. was promulgated.[32] entitled “An Act to Regulate the Employment of Women and Children. and regulate the relations between workers and employees. we cannot agree to the respondent‟s proposition that termination from employment of flight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own health. is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non-discrimination on the employment of women. in no uncertain terms. but rather on the consequence of marriage-pregnancy. respondent claims that its concern is not so much against the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor. and for Other Purposes. 9. a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must be single and that they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry was declared void. This finds support in Section 9 of the New Constitution. This is pure conjecture not based on actual conditions. collective bargaining. or creed. All along.

it may even be said that petitioner‟s policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage. ultimately. the same should not be contrary to law. ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES. Petitioner‟s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment. Jr. a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a “bona fide occupational qualification. but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy. or public policy. of capital and labor. terms. JJ.. [41] In the final reckoning. with double costs against petitioner. tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status. the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[40] It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other. while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements. a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants. Puno. impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common good. good customs. such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.[42] That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect. are not merely contractual. where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same. . And. was regarded as unlawful since the restriction was not related to the job performance of the flight attendants. Parenthetically. it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against married women.[37] 5.[36] Upon the other hand. the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between the parties. [39] Carried to its logical consequences. nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. the variable is sex and the discrimination is unlawful. of the family as the foundation of the nation. morals. and Torres.. where the employer discriminates against married women. Thus.Further. public order. Romero. but not on the ground of a general principle. in one case. and conditions that they may deem convenient. Mendoza. concur.” or BFOQ. but not against married men.[38] Hence. SO ORDERED. ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and. that is. disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required. the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence.

in character. of Article XIII. and in that event. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. and welfare of society. HON. According to Fernando. it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property. to advance the public good. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment. J. for short). the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq. No. and Switzerland. the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females. Series of 1988. 16 The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions. Marshall. it defeats the purpose for which it is" 6 It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. safety." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort. FRANKLIN M." 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills. 1988. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure." 11 It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number." 4 Department Order No. filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8." 10 Significantly. It is admitted that Department Order No. . United States. PASEI invokes Section 3. (PASEI. in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS. is a power coextensive with self.R. of the Constitution. Norway. It is claimed. Jordan. and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity. when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry. In its supplement to the petition. was passed in the absence of prior consultations. 13 In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause. finally. ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times. Specifically." 8 "The police power of the State . It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. to whom the expression has been credited.. It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.. 1988. Austria. provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions. the petition must be dismissed. For all its awesome consequences. the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself. purposely. as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been. provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. (3) they are not confined to existing conditions. It admits of classifications. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines. 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens. vs. the greatest of all rights. it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. 1. Canada. the Solicitor General. respondents. ACHACOSO." 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." 5 As defined. there is a clear misuse of the power. it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. petitioner. police power is not without its own limitations. Qatar. 81958 June 30. 12 In the light of the foregoing. a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers." 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. and TOMAS D. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women." the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State." in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Philippine Association of Service Exporters. 1988 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS.. even to anticipate the future where it could be done. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. good order. Italy. the presumption logically stands. (2) in order to foster the common good. Notwithstanding its extensive sweep. and welfare. veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. 1 applies only to "female contract workers. safety. There is no question that Department Order No. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law. male and female. Hongkong. and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. Otherwise. Thus. on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. it is contended. of the Department of Labor and Employment. for overseas placement. On May 25. it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace. official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. Inc. The only question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution. 1. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain. that is. "Its scope. police power being legislative." 9 SARMIENTO. INC. Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner." 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will.: The petitioner. and not executive. As a general rule.

the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. 5. of course. it is possessed of a necessary malleability. Under a republican regime.2 Hirings by Minister. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures. except perhaps for isolated instances. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for unconstitutionality. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. but it is not for them to question its wisdom. sex. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. . then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. is to recognize its validity only if the young. even rape and various forms of torture. especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. whether that policy. this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. xxx xxx xxx 2. — The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. lift the suspension in countries where there are: 1. 5. As a stop-gap measure. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers. There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. Had the ban been given universal applicability. it would seem. it provides: 9. agrees with the Constitution or the laws. and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly.) It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. that insofar as classifications are concerned. As we have furthermore indicated. In the first place. and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. 19 . in the Philippines and in the host countries . the women.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor agreements or understanding. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision of these guidelines. From scattered provisions of the Order. The Court finds. and 5. The Court cannot. For obvious reasons. our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. however. the courts decide. Rather. especially domestic servants. then. Accordingly. and stage of civilization of minority groups. confirmed by testimonies of returning workers. The same. In fulfilling that duty. there is no gainsaying the fact. it is the executive branch that enforces policy. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines. and not the contrary. the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited international organizations. would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. in the proper cases. 5. it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class." 23 In the case at bar. the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns. If such be the case. physical and personal abuse. cannot be said of our male workers. say exclusively to workers deployed by A." 18). It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B. it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. however. In the case at bar. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are exempted from the suspension. the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. As a co-equal body. it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated. the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban. We quote: 5. There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. that Department Order No. the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers. the better rule. but not to those recruited by B. The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. say the same thing as far as men are concerned. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. amid exploitative working conditions marked by. there is no evidence that. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino workers. is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. not all of them are similarly circumstanced. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS-Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served employment contract. upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency. Unquestionably. finally. depending on the circumstances of each case. For their part. executive determinations are generally final on the Court. To apply the ban.As a matter of judicial notice. it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection. are compelling motives for urgent Government action. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state. . xxx xxx xxx 7. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights. an invalid act. or the manner by which it is implemented. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy. and/or. Discrimination in this case is justified.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and Government. the Court sustains the Government's efforts. The Court. Suffice it to state. Deputy Minister and the other senior government officials. in not a few cases. the ban shall be lifted.

decent. is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. and/or. again. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise. Gancayco. the Government has evidence. As we have mentioned. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. The right granted by this provision. 24 xxx xxx xxx The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. Narvasa. and humane. an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute." "as may be provided by law. In this case. The concern of the Government. The Constitution declares that: Sec. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. personally and economically. local and overseas. Padilla. and as part of its duty. like all other freedoms. 3. lift the suspension in countries where there are: 1. Paras. The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may.9. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino workers. No costs. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines. the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection. upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)." 25 Department Order No. where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life. JJ. Bidin. more so in this jurisdiction. but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. the right itself is not absolute. 30 "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. Under these circumstances.. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Cortes and Griño-Aquino. The right to travel is subject. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for. it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment. organized and unorganized. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. 28 The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-taken. the petition is DISMISSED.J. Feliciano. . just. In the ordinary sequence of events. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all. of the lack or inadequacy of such protection. among other things. its basic policy to "afford protection to labor. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto. concur. to the requirements of "public safety. however. Cruz. WHEREFORE. while away from home. in particular. Fernan. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. is not free from restrictions. SO ORDERED.. C. and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. 27 The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel. Yap." 26pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. Melencio-Herrera. The State shall afford full protection to labor. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature. must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation. but as we have stated. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 2. invoked by the petitioner. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.

promulgated a second order. an hacendero of Davao. Justo Lukban. 1918. and of the provincial governor of Davao. which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila. Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners. L-14639 March 25. that some of the women married. Subsequently. and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila. during this period. Between October 16 and October 25. renounce the right. or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. that directed Justo Lukban. to exterminate vice. Hohmann. the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application forhabeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila. Lukban and Hohmann. and Feliciano Yñigo. at good salaries. On January 13. and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents. JUSTO LUKBAN. The court. about midnight of October 25. Before January 13. respondents. because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao. The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. after all. generally. The application set forth the salient facts. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision. and by certain unknown parties. 1919. and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts. others went to work in different capacities. for the best of all reasons. of no moment to these proceedings. further testimony including that of a number of the women. alleged to be deprived of their liberty. Anton Hohmann. the fiscal admitted. after due deliberation. and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest. hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons. in answer to question of a member of the court. No. seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. ET AL. to bring before the court the persons therein named. but which might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government. and Yñigo on January 13. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila. as the same questions concerned them all. the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO. Presumably.: The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. Mayor of the city of Manila. the application. On the day named in the order. were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. others assumed a life unknown and disappeared. the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government. 1919 it to say. In open court. Suffice . on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. vs. through stipulation of the parties. ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute. reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto. repeated the facts more comprehensively. that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands? Omitting much extraneous matter.. and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. 1919. Before the date mentioned. ET AL. Department of Mindanao and Sulu. provincial governor of Davao. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25. on December 2. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy. The writ was made returnable before the full court. 1918. and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. unless the women should. 1918. was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. which need not be repeated. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal. Mayor of the city of Manila. Justo Lukban.R. with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros. because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao. The court awarded the writ. as laborers. in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court. and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban. had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. closed. To turn back in our narrative. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings. MALCOLM. December 2nd. just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao. Anton Hohmann. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control. The fiscal appeared. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so. City Fiscal Diaz for respondents. as an independent power of such a government. Francisco Sales. were constituted. their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. J. chief of police of the city of Manila. and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation. who appear as parties in the case. acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police. none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao.. On motion of counsel for petitioners. chief of police of the city of Manila. Mindanao. Sales. and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts. 1919. 1918. of certain detectives and policemen. governor of the province of Davao. the police. and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. At any rate. was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and. and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. the application will be considered as including them. descended upon the houses. in an order of November 4. on December 10. yet. but are not essential to the disposition of this case. others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men. the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. the 170 women were destined to be laborers. petitioners.

seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails. 118 U. an hacendero of Davao. As to criminal responsibility." said Justice Miller. stat. Modesto Joaquin. even the President of the United States. members of the police force of the city of Manila. be struck from the record. Feliciano Yñigo. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken. that eighty-one women were found in Davao who. In other countries. or the means of living. were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. has the executive of a municipality. In substance. the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law. "that one man may be compelled to hold his life. no matter how high. Mayor of the city of Manila. had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives..) No official. And if any official can exercise the power. 29. compels any person to change his residence. and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands. which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. not being expressly authorized by law or regulation. then any other official can do the same. after due investigation. the attorney for the Bureau of Labor. One fact. 220. Cap. 9 Hen. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban. (2) criminal action. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. In the second order. 196. but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against. that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. in contempt of court. renounced the right through sworn statements. as being the essence of slavery itself. We will now proceed to do so.S. and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives. shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax. order. or any other wise destroyed. who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate. vs. and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly. then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right. it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides: Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile. 1225. then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. "is the only supreme power in our system of government. by their returns. Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. "The law. We will sell to no man. or imprisoned. But one can search in vain for any law. Law defines power. fiscal of the city of Manila. If these officials can take to themselves such power. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means. or free customs. The GovernorGeneral can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. is above the law. 211. this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos. if. or exiled. (Art. Act No. 1919. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action. render the liberty of the citizen so insecure.) "The very idea. 7. through their representatives and agents. the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution." said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case. chief of police of the city of Manila. who may have been convicted of vagrancy. without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights. or be disseized of his freehold. 106 U. 111. Indeed. or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony. or be outlawed.S. therefore. Much less. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a . as in Spain and Japan. or liberties. Lee [1882]. With this situation. Nevertheless. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States. or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life. and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. to the homeland. (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. and then at night. but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us. a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find — Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. Under the American constitutional system. either inherent or express. On the contrary. except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court. If the mayor and the chief of police could. 1 eng. liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Hopkins [1886]. nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country." (U.. 370. has no such arbitrary prerogative.S. The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. or regulation. and one fact only. Act No. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action. then all persons would have just as much right to do so. Anton Hohmann. at the mere will of another. is no bar to the instant proceedings.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus. it was stated that the respondents.. or establish a quarantine. and Anacleto Diaz. at Large." (Magna Charta. Attorneys for the respondents. on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila. transportation fee. delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States. these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action." (Yick Wo vs. the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. and (3) habeas corpus. who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society. it is done pursuant to some law or order.) We entertain no doubt but that. Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who. 356.

it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys. The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session. deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. at this late day. sec. Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy. chief justice. and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.. It is a general rule of good practice that. The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. and Cooley. . and Christiancy. and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus. . with whom concurred Martin. the English courts have taken a contrary view. Code of Civil which will later be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined. held that the writ should issue. (Code of Criminal Procedure. 526. it is important that it be determined without delay. and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. who handed them over to other parties. or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary. and the two original respondents with their attorney. 527. strange as it may seem. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. (Code of Criminal Procedure. they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city. respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. . J. it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty.) The law.. (Code of Criminal Procedure. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ. when called upon to defend his official action. one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers. Campbell. could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao. 434. is so easy as is claimed here. sec. after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta. (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction. whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty. If it is so. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature. this is a tenable position. At first blush. says counsel. acting under no authority of law. it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. though no application be made therefor. It was composed of Martin. while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ ofhabeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State. . as will hereafter appear. We believe the true principle should be that. it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. 15 Mich. who has been and continues to be detained in another State. and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted. until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign. and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose. . it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime. On closer examination. could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he. petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. on the subject being brought to their notice. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. J. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. the official. 78. as I can not doubt they would. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners. were free in Davao. ta be restored to his liberty." and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right. and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure. that the legislature may apply the proper remedy.. Code of Civil Procedure. When the writ was prayed for. the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint. were in Manila. bill of rights and habeas corpus acts. 79. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ. and then. justices. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.. to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience. J. only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted: I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition which was laid before us. with whom concurred Christiancy. sec. 93. it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. sec. J.. The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions. within the reach of process. Nevertheless. who deposited them in a distant region.. the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. C. It would be strange indeed if. 416. The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. Campbell. it is claimed. may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. in its zealous regard for personal liberty.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees.) Petitioners had standing in court. sec. Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. he should be compelled to do so. after its many confirmations. If the mayor and the chief of police. Cooley. On the question presented the court was equally divided. The respondents. which is the life and soul of the whole instrument. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao. and rivers of blood shed for its establishment. and since. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty. On the other hand. But this is not a hard and fast rule." (In the matter of Jackson [1867].) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. the women. . held that the writ should be quashed.

the court. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ. with the cause of their detention. It does not reach the former except through the latter. See also Robb vs. 111 U.. if he does not. and if any other means are resorted to. 57 Iowa.) A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp . said: " We thought that. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons. Church on Habeas. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief. that it was no longer in his custody or control. 1918.S. and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state. Anton Hohmann. they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. 14926. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. except as greater distance may affect it. . but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. to comply with the writ. unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. it will be recalled. 15 Mich." In other words. that it is directed to and served upon. and set the prisoner free. (In the matter of Jackson [1867]. as he believed. D. 622. sec. The important question is. and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter. The first order. he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Fed. The Queen vs. could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao. No. together with the cause of her being taken and detained. and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.. that. People [1911].. and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order. directed Justo Lukban. having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act. Davis [1839]. whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged. were appended to the return. Francisco Sales. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.. 23 Q. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao. Gossage's Case [1890]. Mitchell [1881].. if the guilty party is within reach of process. but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. at least sixty. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child. there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila. said: A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue. that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus. and.The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. where the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. Breene vs. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief. or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. and if it be found that they did not. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt.. For example.C. and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The order was dated November 4. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent. but he did not do so. at the time the return to its first order was made. both on reason and authority. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed. or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court. the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. 87. On appeal. a child had been taken out of English by the respondent.) We find. 1918. and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2. Bernardo [1889]. 50 Fed. As far as the record discloses. ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes. 5 Cranch C. they did not show impossibility of performance. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors. Law Rep. in Gossage's case. p. M. D. therefore. S. Colo. authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. Rep. some of which have since been repudiated by the signers. 305. 170. and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back. [N.. the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. the defendant had no longer power to produce the child. that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose. and Davis being present in court. R. 283. supra. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another. for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted. That the court .]. 526. they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus. . and if he fails to obey it. Ex parte Young [1892]. 12 Ir. and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes. (Code of Criminal Procedure. Statutes were not passed to give the right. 1000. three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ. not important to the relief. and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. (The Queen vs. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The respondents were thus given ample time. 193. The court. and refusing to produce them. The. through Lord Esher. that he must advertise in America. 233. Com. The place of confinement is. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women. he must take the consequences.. but to compel the observance of rights which existed. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. B. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews. that might be an answer.. stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington. 416. and even if necessary himself go after the child. but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child. and was issued on January 22.) The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. 624. but his jailor. would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court. 2nd ed. or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Barnardo. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient. Connolly [1883].. Thus. There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus. 24 Q. not the person confined. therefore. Cas. The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is. in his return to the writ. B.) The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. 117 Pac. . (Rivers vs. practically one month. (United States vs. He was found in contempt of court. Davis. That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ.

and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate. members of the police force of the city of Manila. had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila. who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary. and with judicial regard for human imperfections. JJ. and Street. and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. concur. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. it can be made the object of separatehabeas corpus proceedings. . An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so. Rodriguez. an hacenderoof Davao. chief of police of the city of Manila. and does not offer a valid excuse. the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25. would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment. It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure. to vindicate its authority. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. (Ex parte Sterns [1888]. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court. and Anacleto Diaz. C. the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation. the attorney for the Bureau of Labor. In response to the second order of the court. Ordax. Jose Rodriguez. Since the writ has already been granted. and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each. Anton Hohmann. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. and while. 99 N. who ordered the police to accomplish the same. Feliciano Yñigo. which would reach to many thousands of pesos.. nothing further in this connection remains to be done. and Moir. Respondents Hohmann. His methods were unlawful. which brings him into this undesirable position. is a contempt committed in the face of the court. 1919. it should receive an executive investigation. Anacleto Diaz. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. as far as this record discloses. the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. the Mayor of the city of Manila. this does not exonerate them entirely.. it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. JJ. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive —such an amount is P100. and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs. Mayor of the city of Manila. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. a court must. we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. In re Patterson [1888]. and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong. The city fiscal. and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. under the law of public officers. and since we find a substantial compliance with it. who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor. C. and Fernando Ordax. Fiscal of the city of Manila. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. Ordax. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao. The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban. no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. as the head of the city government. and who later. Avanceña Johnson. The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.) With all the facts and circumstances in mind. and must order him either imprisoned or fined.J. has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. So ordered. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected.. Rodriguez. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. 407. adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt. The respondents Hohmann. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao. must be granted. In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task. his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners. with the possible exception of the first named. In resume — as before stated. we cannot say that any of the respondents. Modesto Joaquin. When all is said and done. 156. Joaquin. is granted. he has purged his contempt of the first order. Yñigo. which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ.. placards were posted.forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary. Arellano.. was Justo Lukban. 77 Cal. concur in the result. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct.