1 The Push and Pull for Hydropower in Vietnam and Cambodia

THE PUSH AND PULL
for Hydropower in Vietnam and Cambodia
by Catherine Beck

This research brief is port of the China Environment Forum – Circle of Blue joint Global Choke Point initiative, investigating water-energy nexus issues in China and other countries. The initiative, for three years, has been supported by Skoll Global Threats Fund, Energy Foundation China Sustainable Energy Program, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Vermont Law School.

O

n September 7 2012, the largest of the eight dams on the Chinese side of the Upper Mekong (Lancang) River came online in Pu’er, Yunnan Province. The Nuozhadu hydroelectric station, Asia’s tallest dam, turned on the first of its nine generating units that hopes to supply 23.9 billion kilowatts of energy by 2014.1 Two months later, Laos announced that it was going ahead with the construction of the Xayaburi Dam and broke ground shortly thereafter, despite continued opposition from Cambodia and Vietnam. Indeed, like falling dominos, dams are cascading down the Mekong River. Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia together have

2 The Push and Pull for Hydropower in Vietnam and Cambodia

proposed a total of 12 dams on the mainstream of the Lower Mekong that threaten to irreparably harm the ecology of Southeast Asia’s most vital river. Together, these twenty dams—all at various stages of planning, construction, or completion— are double-edged swords: offering the benefits of renewable electricity to rapidly developing nations but also threatening populations and the environment. SNAPSHOT OF BIG HYDROPOWER IN THE MEKONG BASIN Six countries—Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam—rely upon and share responsibility for the governance of the Mekong River—the tenth largest river in the world. Approximately 65 million people depend on the resources that originate in the river’s home of Tibet, particularly those living furthest downstream—81 percent of Cambodia’s population lives in the Mekong basin and 24 percent of Vietnam’s population lives in the Mekong Delta.2 The transboundary nature of the river calls for a transnational approach to governance. Lower Mekong countries see hydropower not only as a source of their own electricity, but also an export commodity, the revenue of which can be used to reduce poverty, lower national debts, and achieve economic prosperity. But these countries face political, in addition to technical, challenges arising from this shared resource, especially as each of the involved countries have their own motives, potential gains and losses, and definitions of the needs and challenges to be addressed.3 To date, only five of the 20 mainstream dams have been completed, all within China. Apart from the mainstream dams, over 100 dams have been proposed within the Mekong basin, and only ten percent of the estimated hydroelectric potential of the Lower Mekong Basin has been developed. While China alone is financing and/or building 103 dams within Southeast Asia, the financing, construction, and maintenance of the

12 proposed, mainstream dams in the lower Mekong mainstream are set to come from a variety of sources:      Thailand (4 dams); China (3-4 dams); Vietnam (1-2 dams); Malaysia (1 dam); and, France (2 dams).4

Despite the energy that could be generated by these dams, an estimated 2.1 million people living in the Mekong region are at risk of losing their fishing or agriculture-based livelihoods if all projected dam projects are completed.5 The Thai-financed Xayaburi dam in Laos is the first Mekong mainstream dam to begin construction outside of China. It has since become a source of regional tension. While it appeared that Laos was going to halt construction in November 2011—due to regional opposition, particularly from Cambodia and Vietnam—until further environmental impact assessments were conducted, as of November 2012, it has become clear that construction has continued and abandonment of the project was likely never seriously under consideration, as its Thai financiers had already sunk large sums of capital into the project. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF HYDROPOWER Though hydropower has the potential to play an important role in the development of Southeast Asia, the environmental consequences of hydropower threaten to undo any progress that hydropower brings. One such consequence is the loss of a vital resource of the river: silt. As the Mekong River finds its source in Tibet, China wields great power over ultimate river flow to downstream countries. China’s dams regulate nearly 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of water on the Mekong; however, it only recently began providing weekly flow data to downstream countries and only in 2010 shared drought

3 The Push and Pull for Hydropower in Vietnam and Cambodia

information.6 Furthermore, China does not provide notification regarding its “filling and spilling” activities. Historically, 50 percent of the river’s nutrient-rich fine-grain sediment reached the Mekong Delta, but now Chinese dams will capture 80 percent of this sediment, significantly reducing the Mekong Delta’s fertility, upon which Vietnam is reliant for 52 percent of its rice production.7 Many of the Mekong Basin’s key ecosystems have developed as a result of seasonal flow fluctuations.8 A large difference in wet and dry season flow has meant that farmers and fishermen, particularly those in Vietnam and Cambodia, have developed a system that complements the natural flows of the river. These flows, however, will now be disrupted by the dams. Dams additionally impede the migration of 87 percent of Lower Mekong migratory fish.9 Fisheries account for nearly 12 percent of Cambodia’s GDP, while adding over $750 million annually to Vietnam’s GDP, and supply up to 60 percent of protein for local residents.10 The Mekong River Commission found that aquaculture and reservoir fisheries would be unable to compensate for the loss of wild fish production, meaning that planned hydropower development will seriously threaten food security in the region.11 Even worse, the impacts of climate change—low rainfalls and rising sea levels—will further threaten the livelihoods of farmers and fishermen while impacting the effectiveness of hydropower.12 Besides dams on the main streams, tributary dams pose significant risks in part because they do not fall under the 1995 Mekong Agreement, which requires international consultations before construction begins, thus only requiring a notification to the MRC Joint Committee. A study by the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America found that construction of all 78 tributary dams would produce less energy and pose greater environmental risk than the construction of just the northern six mainstream dams on the lower Mekong.13 The study further found that fish

productivity would drop by 51 percent if all proposed tributary dams are built, with the impacts of the Lower Sesan 2, which will soon begin construction in Cambodia by a Vietnamese SOE, likely being more serious than those posed by some of the mainstream dams.14 ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF HYDROPOWER IN VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA Vietnam and Cambodia have proven themselves to be some of the fastest-growing Asian economies over the last 20 years. Vietnam has averaged a 7.2 percent GDP growth rate over the last two decades, propelling it to the status of a middle-income country. Meanwhile Cambodia’s fast economic growth has still yet to raise it out of its low-income country status. As a consequence of their brisk pace of development, both countries’ energy demands are increasing. To meet these demands, both Vietnam and Cambodia are exploring new sources of energy, including hydropower. Vietnam’s Energy Surplus Vietnam’s energy production has consistently outpaced consumption and nearly 100 percent of Vietnam’s population has access to electricity, even though only 30 percent of its population lives in urban areas. Since 2004, following declines in its oil production, the country’s primary source of electricity has been natural gas (which supplied 43 percent of the country’s electricity in 2009). Hydropower and coal provide the majority of the remainder of Vietnam’s electricity needs (36% and 18%, respectively, in 2009); however, the proportion of electricity obtained from hydropower has steadily declined since the mid1990s. Although Vietnam may consider itself the ultimate victim of mainstream Mekong hydropower development, it has also been behind the development of multiple destructive dams. In fact, Vietnam is currently exploring involvement in one of Laos’ mainstream Mekong dams. Furthermore, more than 30 hydropower projects

4 The Push and Pull for Hydropower in Vietnam and Cambodia

are under development or at an advanced stage of planning in Vietnam, with the hope that they will help secure Vietnam’s increasing demand for energy. However, these projects are estimated to displace approximately 190,000 people and will affect thousands living downstream.15 Furthermore, the Asian Development Bank has forecasted that Vietnam’s hydro potential will be absorbed by the domestic power demand by 2025 and that Vietnam will become a net coal importer in 2012.16 The first and largest dam built in Vietnam, the Hoa Binh Dam in the north, forcibly displaced 58,000 residents, who already face extreme impoverishment and food shortages.17 Vietnam’s northern dams have also caused significant destruction to Cambodians living downstream. The Yali Falls Dam, completed in 2000 on the Sesan River, decimated fisheries downstream, causing 55,000 Cambodian villagers to become impoverished and upstream the flooding and dam construction displaced 8,500 of Vietnam’s own residents.18 Despite these impacts, four more hydropower projects have been built or are under construction on the Sesan River in Vietnam, forcing thousands downstream to be relocated. Additionally, since 2003, Vietnam has started the construction of a series of dams on the neighboring Srepok River and on Laos’ Sekong River, further endangering the livelihoods of Cambodian villagers downstream.19, 20 Energy-Starved Cambodia In contrast to Vietnam, Cambodia’s energy consumption has outpaced production since 2007 and one-quarter of the country’s consumed energy is supplied by imports, primarily from Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. Despite these imports, only 22.5 percent of Cambodian households (or 54 percent of urban households and 13 percent of rural households) have access to electricity due to the country’s lack of infrastructure to provide consistent flows of electricity, particularly to rural areas, where roughly 80 percent of its population resides.21 Moreover, Cambodia is predominantly reliant on oil for its energy needs—nearly 90 percent of

Cambodia’s power plants are fueled by imported light diesel and heavy fuel oil.22 This dependence on expensive and unreliable supplies of energy remains a key restraint on Cambodia’s development path and a major disincentive to potential investors in the country’s economy.23 In response, Cambodia appears to be increasingly turning to hydropower as the key to break free from its developmental constraints. As of 2009, only 4 percent of Cambodia’s energy was provided by hydropower. In 2003, A National Sector Review for Hydropower was established to explore the role hydropower could play in increasing electrification. This review found 60 possible sites for hydropower development, of which 13 were identified as priority projects. The review also estimated Cambodia’s total hydropower potential at 10 GW, of which 50 percent is located on the mainstream Mekong, 40 percent on its tributaries, and 10 percent in the southwestern part of the country.24 Cambodia’s Department of Energy Development formulated an electricity supply development plan in 2008 calling for the construction of eight hydro power plants and three coal power plants—together with a production potential up to 3,576 MW of electricity—to be completed by 2020.25 Since then, plans have been scaled up. The government’s Electricity Supply Development Master Plan for 2010-2020 sets the goal of expanding electricity generation capacity by an additional 3.2 GW—1.9 GW of which is to come from hydropower. To meet these goals, the government has plans for 14 large hydroelectric dams to be operational by 2020.26 Cambodia’s Power Development Plan also predicts that electricity demand will rapidly increase through 2020, and thus calls for constructing transmission lines which, in addition to electricity imports from neighboring countries, would supply electricity to all cities by 2020 70 percent of rural households by 2030. All the planning is beginning to produce results. In December 2011, Cambodia’s first large-scale dam at Kamchay came online. Additionally, four other hydropower projects are under construction

5 The Push and Pull for Hydropower in Vietnam and Cambodia

in southwestern Cambodia; all—including the one at Kamchay—are being developed by Chinese companies and estimated to have 900 MW of generating capacity. The Lower Sesan 2 dam, which has been approved but is still awaiting the start of construction, will be built by a Vietnamese state-owned power company.27 Of course, hydropower development in Cambodia has not been without setbacks. Most recently, on December 1, 2012, a tunnel collapsed at the Atay River hydropower station – a dam being built by Chinese state-owned Datang Corporation – killing at least four workers. While there have been pervasive concerns regarding displacement of local residents, lack of appropriate environmental impact assessments and consultation with other riparian countries affected by the dams, the shoddy quality and oversight of construction have been less oftencited criticism of Chinese involvement in the building of dams. THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PUSH FOR HYDROPOWER IN VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA: Internal Voices Despite the centralized decision-making processes in both countries which pays little regard to public input, experts complain of a lack of coordination between relevant departments within the governments of Vietnam and Cambodia regarding hydropower development. Provincial officials and others who wield local influence in both Cambodia and Vietnam hold considerable sway in pushing forward hydropower projects.28 Richard Cronin of the Stimson Center lays out four main factors driving official behavior with respect to hydropower projects: 1. Decision makers are focused on economic growth and export earnings, and overly influenced by the attraction of “free” income promised by prospective hydropower developers; 2. Officials have incorrect assumptions about the sustainability of the Mekong

Basin’s water resources, even after a decade of unusually severe droughts; 3. They have been unable to grasp the magnitude of anticipated negative transboundary impacts to fisheries and livelihoods; and, 4. After decades of conflict and only a comparatively short few years of peace, government officials remain suspicious of their neighbors and are too protective of national sovereignty to participate in truly cooperative water development 29 agreements. Internal hydropower projects in both Vietnam and Cambodia clearly have the support of their respective governments, as both see the potential benefits of electricity production. While the need for further hydropower development in Vietnam is less apparent, the country is nevertheless continuing to explore hydropower on smaller rivers and tributaries in addition to the possible involvement of one of Laos’ mainstream Mekong dams. The past damage of dams built in Vietnam on Cambodia is not hindering the Vietnamese government’s plans for future dams. Additionally, although Vietnamese locals have protested Laos’ plans to continue construction on the Xayaburi dam, Vietnam, too, has benefited from Laos’ development of hydropower. The 250 MW Xekaman 2 hydropower project in Laos was the first hydropower project commissioned to export electricity to Vietnam in 2011.30 Cambodia’s hunger for energy makes hydropower a much needed and desired source of electricity and its government, though aware of the potential negative impacts of some of its dams, has not found any feasible alternatives. Hun Sen, the Prime Minister of Cambodia, emphasized the importance of green energy, discussing his interest to further develop hydropower during the 2012 ASEAN meeting.31 Despite the push for hydropower, Prime Minister Hun Sen has displayed that he understands the importance and vulnerability of the Tonle Sap Lake and has, in the past, played a leading role in calling attention to environmental threats in other areas, particularly

6 The Push and Pull for Hydropower in Vietnam and Cambodia

regarding the destruction of forests and fisheries. Some feel that his plans for further hydropower development may be contingent on Laos’ plans. In other words, if Prime Minister Hun Sen feels Cambodian resources are going to be destroyed anyway by the Xayaburi and other planned dams, he may decide to go ahead and exploit the river as well.32 At present, it is not clear what other alternatives Cambodia may seek. Some have recommended solar power as a possible alternative for Cambodia; however, accessibility, awareness, and affordability remain critical challenges.33 Domestic opposition to dams has not been able to halt their construction; the political and economic drivers of hydropower development are too strong.34 However, the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Association has provided an avenue for access and legitimacy to local NGOs wishing to raise the profile of environmental challenges created by hydropower. In 2011, a roundtable organized by the Vietnam Rivers Network saw government officials actively seek advice and participation from local NGOs to raise awareness of the potential negative impacts of hydropower along the Mekong.35 Cambodian civil society groups have also been allowed to protest against the building of Mekong mainstream dams in Laos.36 External Pro-Hydropower Voices Due to the transboundary nature of dams, local governments are not the only voice on the development of hydropower projects. There are many players involved in hydropower development, ranging from big international NGOs, banks and multinational corporations, to foreign governments. For example, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam are all members of the Mekong River Commission (MRC), an organization established in 1995 to promote transparency and cooperation along the Mekong River. China, however, only possesses observer status to the organization and thus has no commitments regarding transparency or coordination with its downstream neighbors regarding river management. But despite the

MRC’s specific mandate in the region, in fact, China and the Asian Development Bank have both played much more significant roles in the development of hydropower projects in Vietnam and Cambodia. China’s Hydropower Interests China’s involvement in hydropower is widely spread throughout Southeast Asia. In Vietnam, China has been involved in three completed dams, five dams under construction, and one more still in the planning stages. None of these dams are on the Mekong mainstream.37 But this represents the second smallest investment of Chinese companies in the Mekong region’s hydropower development. While geography may be a factor, it is likely that tensions in VietnamChina relations are a political barrier to more Chinese involvement in hydropower in Vietnam. Cambodia is viewed as being one of the most China-friendly of the Southeast Asian countries, and it arguably enjoys a closer relationship with China than other ASEAN members.38 China is now Cambodia’s top aid donor and foreign investor.39 The close relationship between China and Cambodia is fueled by China’s financing of major infrastructure projects in Cambodia. Most recently, Cambodia controversially supported China’s position in South China Sea disputes at an ASEAN summit and called China “a major strategic partner” of ASEAN.40 Cambodia has shown signs that it is tired of traditional Westernstyle aid, as exemplified by the 2011 announcement by the World Bank that it was indefinitely suspending future lending to Cambodia following several years of deteriorating relations between the World Bank and the Cambodian government.41 In its early stages of hydropower development, the Cambodian government struggled to find investment for their hydropower projects, as the ADB, World Bank, and other Western donors questioned the environmental and social impacts, in addition to the economic feasibility of these projects.42 However, in the mid-2000s, China began providing loans to enable these projects,

7 The Push and Pull for Hydropower in Vietnam and Cambodia

including the Kamchay and Stung Atay dams that the U.S.-based group International Rivers note were developed with limited public consultation and have experienced serious industrial accidents. Additionally, an environmental impact assessment for the Stung Atay dam was conducted only after the project had been approved and construction had begun, violating Cambodian law.43 At present, China has proposed four dams in Cambodia, with one dam—the Kamchay Dam— is already operational with an additional four Chinese-backed dams believed to be under construction and. The Kamchay Dam, completed in 2011, was financed by China Exim Bank and was developed, built, and operated by Sinohydro Corporation. Only one of these Chinese-backed dams, the proposed Sambor dam, is planned for the Mekong mainstream.44 According to Cambodia’s Minister of Industry, Mines, and Energy, “Chinese investors have invested billions of U.S. dollars in building hydropower dams and power transmission lines in Cambodia. The investment in this sector is very vital for Cambodia’s social and economic development and poverty alleviation.”45 Asian Development Bank The Asian Development Bank has worked with Vietnam since 1993 and has assisted Vietnam with 133 loans ($10.68 billion), 311 technical assistance grant projects ($242.3 million), and 26 other grants ($150.1 million). The ADB has initiated 34 energy-related projects in Vietnam since 1998, six of which have been related to hydropower. The ADB has seen this emphasis on hydropower development—coupled with investments in thermal power generation and transmission networks—as key to addressing Vietnam’s inadequate power supply.46 The ADB works closely with Vietnam’s private sector and civil society organizations to best develop and implement its projects.47 The ADB has provided Cambodia with development assistance since 1966, and during this time, Cambodia received $1.24 billion for 58 loans. Most of this assistance was provided since

the ADB resumed operations in Cambodia in 1992, following two decades of isolation and conflict.48 Thirteen ADB projects since 1999 have focused on energy, though primarily on the development of infrastructure and power transmission, and not on hydropower. As the previous section of this paper discussed, the ADB has questioned the impact of many proposed hydropower projects in Cambodia. Instead, the ADB and the World Bank have focused on supporting environmental efforts, funding scientific research and providing risk insurance for commercial loans contingent on the proper implementation of Environment Impact Assessments related to hydropower projects.49 A key project of the ADB in the region has been the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Transmission Project. Cambodia began importing electricity through a system developed under this project in 2009.50 Some of the key outputs of the GMS program have been the development of highways and railroads that link Southeast Asia and China, in addition to an integrated regional power grid that will connect many existing and proposed hydropower plants. While China has greatly benefited from these projects, it has blocked the inclusion of the Mekong River resources in project discussions, effectively blocking the ADB from hydropower development planning.51 Despite the ADB’s lack of financing of hydropower development in Cambodia, it has named Cambodia as one of three GMS countries (the other two being Laos and Myanmar) with large hydropower potential (though Cambodia is on the lower end of this estimated potential). The ADB predicts these three countries will become key energy exporters of the GMS by 2025. Specifically for Cambodia, the ADB has projected that proposed dams will supply all of its 2025 energy demands while providing it the ability to export between 2 and 4 GW (depending on the final capacity of the Sambor dam).

8 The Push and Pull for Hydropower in Vietnam and Cambodia

PONDERING SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES In the short term, the infrastructure investment and initial power sales from hydropower projects will offer economic benefits for Cambodia and Vietnam. However, hydropower alone cannot ensure energy security in the long run, for the 12 proposed mainstream dams on the Mekong River are forecast to only provide a mere six to eight percent of the total estimated energy demand for the Lower Mekong Basin by 2030. Furthermore, studies undertaken in Cambodia and Vietnam have shown that hydropower development undertaken without proper impact assessments and public consultation disrupts ecosystems and livelihoods of surrounding communities. And

because upstream actions have downstream implications, irresponsible dam building creates a fertile field for cross-boundary disputes. So while government officials in Cambodia and Vietnam may view hydropower as a fast-track option to economic development, they must thoroughly consider the potentially irreversible economic and sociopolitical harm in the long run. Until Cambodia and Vietnam develop viable renewable energy alternatives, the pressure to use hydropower as a driver of economic growth will continue to be great. Thus, the region desperately needs leaders to exhibit political will that takes concrete action for less aggressive dam-building and more aggressive pursuit of other energy alternatives.

Catherine Beck was a CEF research intern in Spring 2013 and currently works as a Policy Analyst at AmCham China, where she monitors regulatory and legislative changes across a wide variety of industries and sectors, while promoting and executing programs, events, and policy positions relating to US trade and investment in China. She can be reached at: cbeck@amchamchina.org.

9 The Push and Pull for Hydropower in Vietnam and Cambodia

Endnotes
“Nuozhadu Dam.” HydroChina International Engineering Co., Ltd. [Online]. Available: http://hydrochina.net/businessarea6.aspx?ProductsID=624 &CaseId=82&CateId=82&pid=9. 2 Mekong River Commission. (2011). Planning Atlas of the Lower Mekong River Basin.[Online]. Available: www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/basinreports/BDP-Atlas-Final-2011.pdf. 3 Ed Grumbine. (2012). Transboundary Problems Require Transboundary Solutions. Presentation, Transboundary Environmental Security in the Mekong River Basin from The Woodrow Wilson Center China Environment Forum, Washington, DC, December 6. 4 Tu, Dao Trong. “A Vietnamese Perspective on Proposed Mainstream Mekong Dams.” The Stimson Center. [Online]. Available: http://www.stimson.org/summaries/avietnamese-perspective-on-proposed-mainstream-mekongdams/. 5 Ed Grumbine. (2012). 6 Mekong River Commission Annual Report 2010. Mekong River Commission. [Online]. Available: www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/governance/An nual-Report-2010.pdf. 7 Richard Cronin & Timothy Hamlin. (2010). Mekong Tipping Point. Stimson Center. [Online]. Available: http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/mekong-tippingpoint/. 8 “Physiography.” Mekong River Commission. [Online]. Available: http://www.mrcmekong.org/the-mekongbasin/physiography/. 9 Atlas Planning of the Lower Mekong River Basin 2011 . 10 “Physiography.” 11 “Fisheries.” Mekong River Commission. http://www.mrcmekong.org/topics/fisheries/ 12 Mekong River Commission Annual Report 2010. 13 Guy Ziv, Eric Baran, So Nam, Ignacio Rodríguez-Iturbe, and Simon Levin. “Trading-off fish biodiversity, food security, and hydropower in the Mekong River Basin.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. [Online]. Available: http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/03/09/1201423 109.full.pdf+html. 14 Cronin and Hamlin. (2010). 15 “Vietnam.” International Rivers. [Online]. Available: http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/vietnam 16 “Facilitating Regional Power Trading and Environmentally Sustainable Development of Electricity Infrastructure in the Greater Mekong Subregion.” Asian Development Bank. www.adb.org/sites/default/files/41018-reg-dpta-01.pdf. 17 “Vietnam.” International Rivers. [Online]. Available: http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/vietnam.
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“Sesan Dams.” International Rivers. [Online]. Available: http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/sesan-dams 19 “Cambodia.” International Rivers. [Online]. Available: http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/cambodia. 20 Cronin and Hamlin. Mekong Tipping Point. 21 See: http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh/investorsinformation/infrastructure/electricity.html 22 “Renewable dreams.” in Economy, Cambodia. (2012, September 20). Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist. For perspective, note: Although 96% of Cambodia’s and only 3% of Vietnam’s energy comes from oil, Vietnam has consistently produced more oil than Cambodia. 23 "Several dead after accident at Chinese dam project" in Economy, Cambodia. (2012, December 2012). Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist. 24 Diana Suhardiman, Sanjiv de Silva, and Jeremy CarewReid. “Policy Review and Institutional Analysis of the Hydropower Sector in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam.” [Online]. Available: http://mekong.waterandfood.org/wpcontent/uploads/MK1-Policy-review-and-institutionalanalysis-Report-spell-checked-23-Sep.pdf. 25 Ibid. 26 "Hydropower plans unscathed after dam collapse" in Economy, Cambodia. (2012, December 6). Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist. 27 Mark Grimsditch. “China’s Investments in Hydropower in the Mekong Region: The Kamchay Hydropower Dam, Kampot, Cambodia.”International Rivers. [Online]. Available: http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attachedfiles/case_study_china_investments_in_cambodia.pdf 28 Cronin and Hamlin. Mekong Tipping Point. 29 Cronin and Hamlin. Mekong Tipping Point. p.9. 30 “Vietnam notes huge RE potential.” Asian Power. http://asian-power.com/environment/in-focus/vietnamnotes-huge-re-potential. 31 “Cambodia Highlights” in Summary, Cambodia. (2012, November 1). Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist. 32 Cronin, Richard, and Timothy Hamlin. (2012). Mekong Turning Point: Shared River for a Shared Future. Stimson Center. www.stimson.org/images/uploads/researchpdfs/SRSF_Web_2.pdf. 33 "Renewable dreams." 34 Cronin and Hamlin. (2012). Mekong Turning Point. 35 Ibid. 36 Chheang Vannarith. “A Cambodian Perspective on Mekong River Water Security.” The Stimson Center. [Online]. Available: http://www.stimson.org/summaries/acambodian-on-mekong-river-water-security/. 37 International Rivers, see: http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/chinaoverseas-dams-list-3611 38 “Moving closer to China?” in Politics, Cambodia. (2012, May 24). Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist.
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10 The Push and Pull for Hydropower in Vietnam and Cambodia

Westad, Odd Arne. “China and Southeast Asia.” London School of Economics. [Online]. Available:www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pd f/SR015/SR015-SEAsia-Westad.pdf. 40 “Military exercises with US leave China ties unscathed ” in Politics, Cambodia. (2012, October 26). Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist. 41 Mark Grimsditch. 42 Cronin and Hamlin. Mekong Tipping Point. 43 Middleton, Carl. (2008). “Cambodia’s Hydropower Development and China’s Involvement.” International Rivers. [Online]. Available: http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attachedfiles/cambodia_hydropower_and_chinese_involvement_jan _2008.pdf. 44 International Rivers, see: http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/chinaoverseas-dams-list-3611 45 “Chinese energy investments sustaining Cambodia’s economy.” Asian Power. [Online]. Available: http://asianpower.com/power-utility/in-focus/chinese-energyinvestments-sustaining-cambodias-economy. 46 “Asian Development Bank & Viet Nam.” 47 Ibid. 48 Asian Development Bank & Cambodia. (2012). Asian Development Bank. [Online]. Available: http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2012/CAM.p df. 49 Cronin and Hamlin. Mekong Tipping Point. 50 “Hydropower in Asia—Let the rivers run.” Asian Power. [Online]. Available: http://asianpower.com/environment/commentary/hydropower-inasia-let-rivers-run. 51 Cronin and Hamlin. Mekong Tipping Point.
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