RUDOLPH AGRICOLAS DE INVENTIONE DIALECTICA (1479) AS AN

INTEGRAL AND PRAGMATICAL THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION .

PAULA OLMOS
UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE EDUCACIN A DISTANCIA
polmos@fsof.uned.es
Abstract
As a text that assumes the general standpoint of the first Humanists critique against the
Scholastic understanding of the role and scope of Logic within the educational syllabus,
Rudolph Agricolas De inventione dialectica (ca. 1479, first printed edition in Louvain,
1515), is widely considered the first positive proposal for a reorganization of the basic
principles of the discipline that aims at furthering the specifically pragmatical and
rhetorical trends already present in the Greek tradition on argumentation and reasoning,
as opposed to the formal aspects systematically attended to in the syllogistic and the
theory of demonstration of the Analytics. Agricolas 15th century text would be
extensively used in the 16th century and his ideas would influence the most innovative
educational proposals of Ramists and Philipists in a distinctly eclectic and transitional
period towards a new understanding of the organization of science and philosophy. But
before all that, Agricolas book tried to offer an allegedly Classical (and therefore
reputable) technical answer to the needs of a newly enlightened and socially useful
eloquentia by means of a broadly construed theory of argumentation. By combining
certain aspects of the rhetorical tradition with an interestingly innovative recast of the
Boethian account of the topics, De inventione dialectica tries to open a new
comprehensive theoretical field in order to support an integral art of argumentation
fundamentally based on plausible (i.e. dialectical), discourse-based (i.e. non-schematic)
and topically relevant (i.e. material vs. formal) inference. From the point of view of
modern formal logic, this typically Humanist approach to the discipline has been, in
many cases, interpreted as just a radical simplification (an embarrassing rhetorization)
and therefore a poor product in comparison with the sophisticated Medieval
developments. But our contemporary interest in the study of informal logic and
argumentation and the new insight into the extremely rich and comprehensive Classical
tradition allow us to see how Agricola recovers, in an unprejudiced way, some traits of a
wider conception of logical methodology that makes once again possible a discussion
over the definition and boundaries of logic.
The Intellectual Context of the Humanist Critique of Scholastic Logic
The 15th century was a period experienced by many as transitional, a time in which
things old and new (and Ancient) were constantly compared and in which many learned
men, men of letters, began to crave for changes and reforms, specially in the fields of

This work has benefited from the Research Project FFI 2008-00085 of the Spanish Ministry of Science
and Innovation.

religion and education, in a rather polemic way1. Logic had then become a basic part of
higher education, the initiating art by means of which students were trained in the kind
of analytic examination and conceptual dispute that presided over the current approach
to the more substantive parts of philosophy and theology. Consistently, along the 15 th
century, we can find, among certain circles, and specially (though not exclusively) in
Italy, an explicit attitude of hostile impatience directed towards the state and the
particular achievements of such discipline as was then taught in universities throughout
Europe. One of the main points of criticism held by even very early Humanist authors
against typical Scholastic education was, thus, precisely directed towards the role, the
scope and the character of the art of logic2. As a leading intellectual of the late 14th
century, Francesco Petrarca had already attacked in his work De sui ipsius et multorum
ignorantia3 the logical and formalistic emphasis of the university arts curriculum 4.
Petrarca condemned what he saw as the dialecticorum garrulitas and its effects,
specially the habit of discussing on any occasion5, for its apparent uselessness for life
and practical wisdom, its definitely ungodly and barbarous craftiness and its formalistic
indifference towards truly religious, that is ethical, issues. Good Christian piety and
morality were not to be found among sophistic cunning and much less learnt or
encouraged by such means. Instead of wasting their time and wits in endless
technicalities and speculations about semantic puzzles which, in his opinion, had never
bothered the healthy discourse of good Ancient authors or early Christian Fathers,
Petrarca and other critics thought that the students goal in learning the arts of the
trivium should be the achievement of a civil, practical and well-meaning
1

Rummel (1995, Ch. 7: 153-192).

In his classical work on Humanist logic, Vasoli (1968: 220-1) insists on the idea that, for these critics,
the worst effect of formalistic Scholastic dialectic was its contamination of the whole curriculum.
3
Begun in 1367 and completed around 1371. A recent edition (Latin-French) in Petrarca (2000).
4
For the preeminence of logic within the Medieval arts curriculum, see Delhaye (1969). Petrarcas
criticism is specially directed towards the Aristotelianism of the University of Padua.
5
consuetudo disputandi quocumque proposito, Petrarca (2000), IV, 39.
2

reasonableness, the basis of a Classical eloquence. But this kind of outsider criticism
apparently directed towards the whole current Aristotelianist way of understanding
philosophy and, specially the discipline of logic and its own technical challenges, as
were then generally understood, ran the risk of missing a common ground for discussion
with those inside the educational system itself6. Petrarca and other Humanist critics
were (not always undeservedly) accused of not understanding logic at all and of making
a show of their own ignorantia7. In any case, they were expressing the different goals
and interests dictated by a new sensibility, while a more informed technical answer, a
real alternative for the art of dialectic or logic, had to await further developments like
the renewed interest in certain theoretical sources and the advancement of a new,
unconventional, approach to certain issues.
Among these new sources, we must mention not only the well known process of
recovery and transmission of Ancient texts, like those of Quintilian or Cicero8, but also
the direct influence of the living tradition of Greek dialectical training, which, contrary
to its Western counterpart, was not so disconnected from certain aspects of its Classical
roots, i.e. had not advanced so far from an unspecialised theoretical frame in which the
arts of dialectic and rhetoric still shared some methods and goals. Many Byzantine
masters came to Italy during the 15th century and apart from their own Greek language
whose study began an unstoppable expansion9, also brought with them a very different
background for which alternative authors and rhetors of the hellenistic and late antiquity
6

The lack of connection between the first Humanist intellectuals and even the art faculties of the
universities was already stressed by Weisheipl (1969). O. Boulnois, in his introduction to Petrarcas text
(2000) while minimizing the novelty of his criticism which, in his opinion, contains points that were
already present in the 13th and 14th centuries anti-Aristotelian polemics, concludes that the main
originality of Petrarcas approach is his search for an alternative intellectual practice outside the
universities: Ptrarque voit le salut hors de lcole.
7
Petrarcas text was intended to answer the accusations of ignorance received from a group of young
visitors, some of them students at Padua.
8
Poggio Bracciolini [1380-1459] was one of the Humanists who recovered many nearly lost or neglected
texts, among which several by Cicero and Quintilians complete Institutio Oratoria.
9
Monfasani (2002: 4-5): the first great brain drain of Western history. About the Greek scholarship of
the humanists and specially of Agricola, see Ijsewijn (1988).

periods as Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd cent. b.C.), Hermogenes of Tarsos (2nd cent.
a.C.), or Aphthonius of Antioch (4th cent. a.C.), were as influential as Boethius or
Averres among Westerners.
And if we now turn to new approaches, we must pay special attention to the
proliferation of different genres in an exploration of new formats and methods of
conveying knowledge that aimed at prevailing over the typical commentaries, summae
or quaestiones of the Scholastic treatises. The issue of the new Renaissance genres is
immense10. These ranged from the over learned and erudite editions of Classical texts,
with an ever growing critical apparatus 11, to the somewhat opposite production of
practical and popular texts for the increasing interest in reading and learning that
emerged outside the established universities and that would finally lead to the
production of translations and original texts in vernacular languages in every field of
knowledge. These latter specially aimed at offering practical and ready information for
relatively well informed people; educated people who did not need to be (or expect to
be) specialists in the higher sciences of the university curriculum (theology, civil and
canon law and medicine) but could practice and enjoy scholarly and learned reading and
writing, with the basic help of the arts of language, the studia humanitatis, understood
as the basic lore that should be shared by every civilized person and not, in this case, as
the slave disciplines for a higher philosophy12. This kind of approach was specially
related to the new interests of civil life (that is, political, commercial life), concerning
itself with secular and worldly issues: history, ethics and practical philosophy13.

10

Kessler (1999) comments on the new Renaissance genres (particularly new types of commentaries) as
practiced by Jacques Lefvre dEtaples [1455-1536], who had studied in Italy with Angelo Poliziano
[1454-1494], he also mentions Agricola as a parallel figure. Perfetti (2002), makes similar comments on
the work of Giulio Cesare Scaligero [1484-1558].
11
See Bianchi (1995).
12
See Marrou (1969).
13
On the practical and popular (non-scholastic) aspects of the 15th century attention to Aristotles
Politics and Ethics (particularly in Spain but with references to Italy), see Pagden (1975).

The context in which Scholastic logic was criticized coincided, thus, with a
revival of the theoretical interest in history and ethics, springing from a certain revival
of civil life (at least in specific circles and places). That is, a revival of the very issues
and themes of Classical rhetoric (discussions about the good and the bad, the just and
the unjust, the individually or collectively preferable). And also of dialectic, in its
restricted sense, as a theory of useful, everyday argumentation (that is, plausible,
informal, unlimited), the kind of theory or method that is the alleged concern of the
Aristotelian Topics and their later tradition. Moreover, the reputable authority of Cicero,
and his own interest in methodical invention i.e., the finding of arguments, for
plausible discussion and credible discourse by topical means 14, also encouraged those
interested in changing things in the discipline of logic to look towards topical
argumentation as a suitable source for what they were searching: a widely useful
general theory and method for reasonable argumentation. Topical argumentation and
rhetorical issues became, in this way, central for the new approach to dialectic and,
accordingly, Aristotles Topics and Rhetoric, some of the main sources for those who
thought that such parts of the Organon as could provide a broader and more useful
theory of inference were being either neglected or misrepresented by current Scholastic
Aristotelianism.

A Dialectical Invention as the Basis for an Integral Theory of Argumentation

Some of the ingredients and traits of the new Humanist approach to dialectic 15 were,
therefore, present in Italian circles around the first half of the 15th century: the
widespread praise of Classical style and eloquence, the interest in the recovery of texts
and traditions on rhetoric and dialectic a new accurate translation of Aristotles
14

As exposed in Ciceros De inventione rhetorica and the Topica ad Trebantium, specially, but also in
De Oratore (II 99-177).
15
As studied by Vasoli (1968) and Jardine (1987).

Rhetoric was circulated by George of Trebisond, who also wrote original works on
rhetoric and dialectic, by 144616 and the critical approach to current philosophical
Aristotelianism, specially represented by Lorenzo Vallas Repastinatio dialecticae et
philosophiae (1439)17. In this work, Valla started a systematic attack on the technical
basis of the current approach to logic, criticising the abstract use of the concept of
essentia, reducing the Aristotelian categories to just three kinds substance, quality
and action; a classification that would influence Agricolas organization of the topics
(Laffranchi, 1999: 305) and, specially defending the relevance of Classical rhetorics
reflections on argumentation for the consideration of the justificatory aspects of any
discourse, including the scientific and academic18.
But it would be a work written by a Dutch who had studied for more than ten
years in Italy19 with Theodore Gaza and Battista Guarini, among others that would
provide the first positive proposal for a reorganization of the principles of logic,
according to such new methodological aims and uses. This achievement was reserved to
Rudolph Agricolas [1444-1485] text, De inventione dialectica (1515 [1479])20 which is
an accomplished example of all the characteristics we have been talking about. It is the
work of a man of letters a well-read Classicist containing a seminal alternative
account within the tradition of the topics but also advancing a general framework for
the study of argumentation, inference and proof the whole issue of a general-purpose
logic divided according to the two processes or phases of any argumentative
discourse: the invention or finding of arguments and their evaluation or judgement.
16

For the importance and influence of Trebizonds translation, see Lardet (1989).
Modern edition in Valla (1982).
18
Nauta (2009: x) has recently vindicated Vallas objections to scholasticism as philosophically relevant
supporting his: conviction that Vallas humanist critique of scholastic thought exemplifies a
fundamental, perennial issue about the strength and limitations of philosophical analysis.
19
On Agricolas stay in Italy, see Sottili (1988).
20
The date usually acknowledged for this work is 1479 but it was first printed in Louvain in1515, thanks
to the efforts of three of Agricolas Dutch disciples: Martin van Dorp, Gerhard Geldenhauer and Alardus
of Amsterdam. Alardus was also the editor of one of its most successful editions, Kln 1539, which is the
basis of the modern critical one by L. Mundt (Agricola, 1992 [1539]), from which all quotations.
17

This division was not new in itself, it was presented in Ciceros Topica ad Trebantium21
and was repeatedly mentioned during the Middle Ages 22, but it was Agricola who
championed the reorganization of the whole discipline of logic around it. This reference
to a general procedure, valid for any kind of reasoning, be it scientific (that is,
necessary) or plausible or even sophistic (in the Ciceronian tradition of a unique ars
disserendi), means that we are not just witnessing a change of emphasis from one part
of the Organon to another from that devoted to scientific proof, the syllogistic of the
Analytics, to the one dealing with plausible and defeasible argumentation, the dialectic
of the Topics. We are, in fact, faced with a really new approach in which arguments
based on topics are not anymore considered as a minor way of reasoning, compared to
truly formal proofs in the sense of Abelards imperfect inferences or the later
tradition of material, that is, non-formal consequences 23 but as a most general
scheme presiding over any kind of argumentation.
Agricolas unprejudiced use of the Classical sources for the reconstruction of an
integral theory of argumentation, in this sense, was presided by his own also rather
integral concept of eloquence as exposed in his 1476 piece In laudem philosophiae
et reliquarum artium oratio24. Here, Agricola adopted the traditional division of
philosophy into rational, physical and moral and characterized the first part as
pertaining language: Philosophy ascribes three disciplines to these three elements
<sc. intelligence, reasonableness, language>, of which the one related to language is
called logic by the Greeks and rational <philosophy> by us25. According to the text of
21

Topica ad Trebantium 2, 6. Boethius quotes Ciceros words at the beginning of his De differentiis
topicis (Green- Pedersen, 1984, 41).
22
See Hugo of St. Viktor, Didascalicon II, 31 (De ratione disserendi).
23
On Abelards imperfect inferences, see MacFarlane (2000: 281-292). On material consequences,
MacFarlane (2000: 292-294).
24
Written for the inauguration of the 1476 academic course at Ferrara, it was first printed in Antwerp
(1511). We quote the modern edition by van der Poel (1997). On the importance of this text for the
understanding of Agricolas philosophical standpoint, see Vanderjagt (1988).
25
Tres proinde suam cuilibet parti philosophia adhibuit disciplinas, quarum quae ad loquendum pertinet
Graeci logicem, nostri rationalem [...] nominaverunt, Agricola (1997 [1511]: 48-49)

this oratio, rational philosophy would contain the three arts of the trivium whose
particular aims were to confer a number of virtues upon our discourse so that their
united goal would be a unified concept of eloquence, identified as the capacity to
persuade:
As long as these three <sc. grammar, dialectic, rhetoric> work like one and accomplish
the body of eloquence, let me just assert that such is the power of eloquence that it not
only dominates mens fortunes and bodies, but also their affections and even governs
their will, which seems so impervious to any rule26.

The goal of training for such kind of eloquence would be, thus, shared by these three arts
whose inner limits began being reconsidered in this piece where we already find
Agricolas main proposal of unifying inventive procedures extracted from both rhetorical
and dialectical sources in order to build a single account ascribed, in his case, to dialectic27.
Rudolph Agricolas main work, composed shortly after the oratio De
inventione dialectica (ca. 1479) and often interpreted as an attempt to rhetorize the
discipline of logic aims, however, as we see, at recovering the dialectical dominion over
the Classical theories and tools of invention that is, mainly the systems for the
classification of the quaestio or point to be proved, discussed or justified and the topics,
as a suitable technique to find and asses arguments. His main point is, thus, that it
should be the dialectician and not the rhetorician who ought to take care of this
unavoidable part of argumentation28. And the way he justifies his option is by claiming,
in fact, the general applicability of both dialectic and rhetoric (apart from grammar) to
26

Verum quia tres simul unum perficiunt absolvuntque eloquentiae corpus, satis fuerit dixisse tantas esse
vires eloquentiae, ut non fortunis hominum corporibusque dominetur, sed ipsis affectibus et, quae omnis
imperii videtur impatiens, imperet voluntat, Agricola (1997 [1511]: 50-51).
27
Van der Poel, the modern editor of this work, considers the 1476 oratio as the germ of Agricolas
integral proposal for a theory of argumentation relevant for any type of discourse: Combines <the three
arts of the trivium>, elles sont dsignes par le concept d loquence , qui chez Agricola, a une
signification plus large que celle, courante, de bien parler en public. Ce concept sapplique tout fait sa
thorie universelle de largumentation, qui est utilisable pour tout sujet, dans toutes sortes de discours,
depuis la prose scientifique destine aux condisciples spcialiss de luniversit jusquau sermon de
lecclsiastique et lessai critique de lintellectuel (Agricola, 1997 [1511]: 20).
28
See specially Book II, Ch. XXV Quod nulli proprii rhetorices sunt inventionis loci, Agricola (1992
[1539]: 374-386).

language use and communication, taking each of these arts care of different aspects of
discourse:
There are three points to be observed in any speech: that it is possible to understand
what the speaker wants to say, that the hearer would be willing to listen to what she is
told, and that what is said would seem plausible and credible. Grammar teaches the first
[] the second regards rhetoric [] It seems that dialectic can claim what is left, that
is, speak in a plausible way of anything which can be dealt with in discourse 29.

It is only a pragmatic question (even a historical accident, according to Agricola 30) that
these arts should have been identified with different subject areas: logic with science,
dialectic in the restricted sense of the art of plausible reasoning with the civiles
quaestiones or rhetoric with judicial action. However, it might seem in principle that
there are some limits to what could be considered a dialectical question, since there is
not much point in arguing about what is indisputably accepted or rejected by everybody.
But Agricola does not really want to make any restrictions and, just after stating that it
is even possible to discuss, in a convincing way, opinions as incredible as those of
Heraklitus or the Sceptics, he gives a new general definition of his own idea of dialectic:
The art of talking in a plausible way about any proposed subject, to the extent to which
the nature of the issue would allow consent31.
So, for Agricola, dialectic (his dialectic, in the sense of logic) would be relevant
for any discourse (on whatever issue) as it would take care of its effective
communication and persuasion (docere), while rhetoric would specialize on the
technical means for moving and pleasing (muovere et delectare), ideally without
affecting the basic structure of discourse implemented by means of dialectical invention.
29

tresque proinde in dicendo observationes, ut percipi possit quid sibi velit qui dicit, ut cupide audiat cui
dicitur, ut probabile sit habeaturque fides ei quod dicitur. Primum grammatice docet, [] proximum
rhetorice [] Quod reliquum igitur est videbitur sibi dialectice vendicare, probabiliter dicere de qualibet
re, quae deducitur in orationem, Agricola (1992 [1539]: 208-210).
30
Agricola (1992 [1539]: 376-380).
31
ars probabiliter de qualibet re proposita disserendi, prout cuiusque natura capax esse fidei poterit
Agricola (1992 [1539]: 212).

This last point is extremely important for Agricolas purposes because it was precisely
the double tradition of the topics (with a dialectical and a rhetorical version) that had
proved specially prejudicial for their serious consideration by those dedicated to logic.
That is why he dedicates two specific chapters in Book II II.4, Quod movendi ratio a
docendo inventione non differat, and II.5, Quod item delectando non sit alia
inventionis quam in docendo ratio to support the unitary character of the rationale of
invention.
In order to implement this programme, Agricola composed a work divided into
three books, the first one of which contains some preliminary reflections and basically
an original account and innovative system of topics (loci), whose general target will be
commented in this section. Because of its own pedagogical character and possibilities
for schematization, this was, in fact, the better known and the most read of the three
parts32. Book III included certain rhetorical aspects of discourse, as the treatment of
passions (affecti), but was mainly devoted to its global order or disposition, defining
three possible strategies: a natural order, depending on the natural characteristics of the
question treated (ordo naturalis), an authors literary choice of a peculiar order (ordo
arbitrarius) and a conscious reversion of the natural order aiming at certain discursive
effects (ordo artificialis)33. But Agricolas most innovative ideas where, nevertheless,
exposed on Book II, which could have been the original beginning of his dialectical text
as it starts with some comments on the current, allegedly defective, situation of logic
(Preface, how corrupt is the current whole practice of dialectic), devotes its second
chapter to the definition of dialectic (What is dialectic?) and the third to the
disciplines end (Which is dialectics end?34), i.e. the kind of issues usually treated in

32

In 1538, moreover, Alardus published a summary (epitome) of this book that was widely circulated.
Agricola (1992 [1539]: 486-488).
34
Respectively: Prooemium, quam corruptus sit hodie omnis usus dialectices, Quid sit dialectices and
Quis sit finis dialectices.
33

the first stages of textbooks. We will talk about some aspects of the effective use of
arguments as exposed in Book II in our next section, dedicated to the specifically
pragmatic and contextual concerns of Agricolas approach. Here we want to emphasize
his integral conception of the function of logic as a general-purpose theory of
argumentation which is based on two major claims:
1)

a very broad account of the very concept of argumentation: We call

argumentation that <sc. discourse> which at the same time contains what we
want to prove and the invented <sc. grounds> on which we try to prove it35.

2)

and an informal, relevance-based, description of what is reasonable support

between assertions: Everything that can be said to support or to oppose
something, must be coherent with it and be linked to it by what we could call
a natural connection36.

With this in mind, it is not surprising that Agricola should propose, in Book I of his De
inventione dialectica, a topical system of general applicability with as many headings
(or pigeonholes) as needed with the idea that all reasoning deemed reasonable (from the
most perfect, formal and necessary to the least so) would fit into the same method:
either judgments based on what was then considered form37, based on simple
predication and extensional issues (as inclusion, co-extension or incompatibility
between concepts), or the ones based on more material relations, as causal links,
semantic features, any kind of proximity, and even analogies or comparisons related to
any possible characteristics (linguistic or others). Because, he was really convinced that
topical relations, as a classified list of understandable links between things and facts
35

Id vero, quo simul complectimur rem, quam probare volumus, et illud inventum, quo probare conamur,
eam argumentationem esse dicimus, Agricola (1992 [1539]: 314).
36
omnia quae vel pro re quaque vel contra dicuntur, cohaerere et esse cum ea quadam, ut ita dicam,
naturae societate coniuncta, Agricola (1992 [1539]: 18).
37
The relative and historically changing character of the concept of form is the main claim of
MacFarlane (2000).

could be just what was needed for a broad and generally applicable approach to
argumentation:
This method of the places proves itself useful for most human sciences [] although it
is true that it mainly belongs to those that consider what is not considered by any art
[] It provides not only the faculty of speech and abundance of things to say but also
seems to make possible a sensible intellect and correct reasoning 38.

When time comes to give his own system of topics, it is so important for Agricola to
support its general applicability, that, he criticizes Aristotles approach in Topics for
what he sees as objectionable limitations:
He wrote eight books on topics, erudite and persuasive, like the rest, but it seems that he
confined their matter within too constricted limits [] Let it be added that he did not
conceive but a very restricted aim for dialectic as he ascribed just four enquiries to it
[] in my opinion, it is very difficult and demanding to obtain the faculty of abundant
and pertinent speech from Aristotles system of topics 39.

Consequently, his basic idea would be to open the range and enlarge the list of relevant
links as much as possible (while trying to maintain the structure of a coherent system),
not accepting, in the first place, the traditional division between general and particular
(that is dialectical and rhetorical) topoi, although it is in fact the former, the dialectical
topoi, that make the backbone of his account (broadly based on Boethius De
differentiis topicis, supposedly following Themistius40). There is, however, a more
profound limit to what can be used as a suitable topic or argument. A limit that does not
impose any previous constrain on the general list, but is a contextual and
discourse-related condition:
38

Utilem autem esse hanc locorum rationem apparet cum magnae parti humanorum studiorum [] tum
vero eis praecipue confert, qui tractant illa quorum nullae traditae sunt artes [] Nec instruere solum os
facultas ista et tantum dicendi copiam subministrare, sed providentiam animi et recte consulendi quoque
aperire viam videtur, Agricola (1992 [1539]: 10-12)
39
scripsit de loci octo libros erudite et diserte, sicut omnia, sed angustius videtur eorum conclusisse
materiam [] Adde, quod videtur nimis arctos dedisse fines dialecticae, qui iis quatuor quaestionibus
terminavit eam [] opinor, difficillimum est maximique negotii ex instituta Aristotelis locorum ratione
facultatem prompte copioseque disserendi expedire, Agricola (1992 [1539]: 24-28).
40
Boethius (1978).

Not everything is acceptable as a proof for anything else [] Although it is in Aristotle

that every truth agrees with what is true and that there cannot be discrepancies between
distinct truths, it is one thing to agree with something and another to support its
credibility41.

Therefore, Agricola is not only adding possible valid (in the sense of usable) schemes
beyond previous more formal systems but also setting some limits to argumentation
from the point of view of relevance. He is closing the door to formal paradoxes and
tricks, and opening it to circumstantial, inconclusive and defeasible reasonableness. His
final list of topics (see Table I) is just one possible list among others (he himself admits
the possibility of following other authors42). It bears some interesting features, though,
which can be related to his alleged aims:
a) Unlike

other authors, it admits topics traditionally considered as rhetorical

(particular, personal topics), encouraging abundance in speech (copia

rerum). It is a comparatively long (copiosa) list.
b) It

is also a rather cumulative and therefore theoretically open 43 list with a kind of
superimposed but not very strict or justified structure. Midways between
simple enumeration (like Aristotles in Rhetoric 1397a-1400b) and a system
supposedly exhaustive and explicitly deduced from a bunch of principles
(like Aristotles in Topics 103b, or the future Ramist system).

c)

Also in opposition to the well known Ramist system, that would make
cause its central locus, it keeps the traditional central role of definition
(and related concepts) as the most intrinsic and essential feature of any

41

Nec tamen omnia probandis omnibus conveniunt [] Quanquam autem sit apud Aristotelem omne
verum vero consentire neque possint plura vera discrepantia esse, aliud tamen est consentire ipsa, aliud
fidem astruere, Agricola (1992 [1539]: 12-14). Cf. Prior Analytics 47a.
42
Agricola (1992 [1539]: 36).
43
The openess of Agricolas list of topics is also emphasized by P.Mack (1988: 265): The topics do not
possess the characteristics of a closed system.

inquiry. That seems to indicate that while both would encourage a unified
approach to argumentation, for Agricola it was descriptive and practical
issues that were central or typical, whereas for Ramus it would be
explanation and scientific account.

TABLE I
Divisio Locorum according to both Rudolph Agricola (De inventione dialectica, Louvain, 1515)
and Thomas Wilson (The Rule of Reason, conteinyng the Arte of Logique, set forth in Englishe,
London, 1551). Agricolas Latin is translated by Wilson (into brackets, modernized spelling).

I.

Interni (Inward Places)

I.a. In substantia (In the very substance)
1. Definitio (Definition)
2. Genus (General Word)
3. Species (Kind)
4. Proprium et Differentia (Property)
5. Totum (Whole)
6. Partes (Part)
7. Coniugata (Yoked words)
I.b. Circa substantia (Incident to the substance)
8. Adiacentia (Adjoined)
9. Actus horum (Deeds done or suffered to be done)
10. Subiectum horum (Subject or the thing containing)

II.

Externi (Outward Places)

II.a. Necessitate rei cohaerent (Joined to the thing necessarily)
II.a.1 Cognata (Knit with a nigh affinity)
1. Efficiens (Efficient cause)
2. Finis (End)
3. Effecta (Things which come after the cause)
4. Destinata (Things appointed for some end)
II.a.2 Applicita (Things outwardly applied)
5. Locus (Place)
6. Tempus (Time)
7. Connexa (Things annexed or knit together)
II.b. Nulla necessitate sunt rei coniuncti (Not coupled necessarily)
II.b.1 Accidentia (Accidents)
8. Contingentia (Things chancing)
9. Nomen rei (Name of the thing)
10. Pronuntiata (Authority or sentences of the sage)
11. Comparata (Things compared)
12. Similia et dissimilia (Likenesses)
II.b.2 Repugnantia (Repugnancies)
13. Opposita (Discordant)
14. Distantia seu diversa (Differing)

Pragmatical aspects of Agricolas Theory of Argumentation

As we have mentioned, Book II of De inventione dialectica develops a rather innovative
and subtle analysis of the different aspects of a discursive practice that would take due
advantage of the use of those loci or topoi already described in Book I. The idea is,
moreover, to explore the possibilities for persuasive eloquence and dialectic capability
conferred by the tools and techniques transmitted by the Classical theoretical as well as
literary tradition. A precise plan for the subject-matter of this Book is delineated in its
second chapter:
In this book, we have the intention of discussing the use of the places (topoi), or more
openly, of explaining in which way we can achieve the ability to debate that we call
dialectic. It seems that we can very easily do that by showing what is dialectics matter,
what is its instrument and its way of treating things. I call dialectics matter the thing
about which we debate, dialectics instrument, the discourse, through which we present
what we want to say about it, and dialectics treatment, the way we obtain and
accommodate to its object whatever that <sc. what we want to say> is44.

The main points of his presentation will be therefore:

a) dialectics matter, or better its starting point, the discursive item whose
existence dictates the necessity of dialectic, that is, the quaestio: what we
want to discuss or talk about,
b) dialectics instrument, what the dialectica docens teaches how to build and
the dialectica utens puts into use, that is, discourse itself (oratio): through
which we expose what we want to say about the quaestio, and

44

Statutum est igitur nobis hoc libro usum tradere locorum, hoc est, ut idem apertioribus dicamus verbis,
explicare quo pacto paranda sit disserendi facultas illa, quam dialecticen vocant. Id commodissime facturi
videmur, si ostenderimus quae sit materia eius, quod instrumentum, quis rerum tractatus. Materiam dico
rem, de qua disserimus, instrumentum orationem, qua quod dictum esse ea de re volumus explicamus,
tractatum quomodo haec paranda sint et quae cuique rei aptanda, Agricola (1992 [1539]: 206)

c) dialectics proper treatment or technique, that is the expert use of the

topics for the adequate discursive processing, with persuasive aims, of a
particular question.

In order to approach the issue of the dialectic quaestio, Agricola takes a look at
Aristotles indications in Topics (101b15ff), where he talks about the bases of
arguments as identical to the subjects of reasoning and identifies both with either
propositions (protaseis) assertions (possitive or negative), also interpreted as
yes-or-no enquiries or problems (problmata), which explicitly express two
alternatives45. For Aristotle, moreover, a dialectical question is pragmatically restricted
to what is suitable for discussion, those things for which in principle we can conceive
several plausible answers: for no man of sense would put into a proposition that which
is no ones opinion, nor into a problem that which is manifest to everyone or to most
people; for the latter raises no question, while the former no one would accept (Topics
104a5ff). But Agricola, although he appreciates Aristotles approach as a good starting
point in order to identify what usually constitutes the matter of dialectical discursive
practices, is also eager to point out that the issue of what is disputable does not admit
any absolute a priori restrictions. Even manifest things could, in some cases, be put
into question: Nobody would present an evident point as a matter for a lecture, as long
as it is evident, but it could be presented for the sake of controversy or discussion 46. In
general terms, we can say that Agricola prefers to keep open every possible
subject-matter for a dialectical approach, stating once again the integral character of his
view of the discipline:

45

Agricola (1992 [1539]: 232)

Nemo enim rem apertam, quatenus est aperta, sumit docendam, sed ut contendi de ea et ambigi possit,
Agricola (1992 [1539]: 230).
46

Still, since from time to time, even those opinions for which it seems difficult to find
any proper support, are deliberately proposed for discussion, we will rather consider
probable anything that is alleged in a correct manner and concerns the point in
question47.

Agricola will take care of the traditional issue of the classification of the quaestio in
chapters 8-14 of Book II. His views here are consistent with the open character of his
approach,

since

what

is

almost

infinite

in

possibilities,

pragmatical

and

context-dependent cannot be easily classified. He will, therefore, avoid a simple and

absolute criterion for his survey and admit that quaestiones can be identified, for
purposes of guiding the inventive process, by means of many different, useful and
relevant criteria: among which, their content (pro rerum de quibus quaeritur), manner
of enquiry (pro modo quaerendi) or subject-area (ex diverso genere artium). His
conclusion: There is no single way to classify quaestiones48.
Regarding now dialectics instrument which is, in fact, just the tool of a
dialectica utens and the object of study and analysis of a dialectica docens we see
that it is identified with the whole discourse (oratio) and not with the proposition or the
syllogism, as was usually the case in current Scholastic methodology 49. The propositio
is not considered a privileged element for dialectic analysis and the term is just
mentioned as a Latin translation for protasis as opposed to problma, in the already
mentioned discussion about the dialectical question. As for the syllogism and its types
(Agricola prefers, in any case, the Latin term ratiocinatio adopted by Cicero), these will
47

Sed quoniam consulto nonnunquam talia ad dicendum sumuntur, ut difficile sit huiusmodi quicquam
eis accomodari, in his igitur abunde nobis erit probabile quod apte consentaneaeque de re proposita
dicetur, Agricola (1992 [1539]: 210)
48
Dividuntur autem quaestiones non uno tantum modo, Agricola (1992 [1539]: 244).
49
A similar remark on Vallas dialectic is offered by Nauta (2009: 211): What is important is whether an
argument works, that is, whether it induces conviction in the hearer. Formal validity is only one way of
looking at argumentation, and a rather narrow way at that. Rejecting the formal approach of the
scholastics, Valla wants to base dialectic on real language by studying arguments in context, and what
counts as context is much broader than the single-sentence structure of the scholastic example.

be just considered after examining the different general models of discourse oratio
continens (continuous, comprehensive, as in the orators dissertation) and oratio
concisa (brief, as in a dialogue), both of which can be (and have, in fact, been)
alternatively used for the same purpose50 and the extremely gradual and subtle
contrast between the two main discursive procedures of the expositio and the
argumentatio.
Here we find what is probably the most revealing and original trait of Agricolas
methodology: his definitely informal, gradual, context-dependent and explicitly
pragmatic delimitation of the phenomenon of argumentation in relation to its twin
concept of exposition. Although there is no doubt that his approach is dictated, among
other things, by his intention to accommodate literary and eloquent practices as found in
the Classical corpus, aiming thus primarily at issues of interpretation, it is nevertheless a
radical and powerful move that takes us away from any formal and abstract approach to
the analysis of persuasive or justificatory language use. Just from the beginning of his
characterization of both concepts in chap. II.16, Agricola depends on pragmatics and on
the particular attitude of the (either already won over or doubtful) audience in order to
make his first distinction:
Now, a discourse may just aim at presenting the object, whatever it is, about which it
talks, sure of the commitment and opinion of those who listen to it, or be intended for
obtaining the persuasion of a hesitant audience. The former is done through
exposition, the latter through argumentation51.

For Agricola, moreover, this alternative procedures should not be identified with the
characteristic parts of the perfect oratio as classified by rhetorical tradition (preamble,
narration, confirmation and epilogue): narration may include arguments and confirmation,
50

Agricola (1992 [1539]: 298).

Sic et oratio aut satis habet explicare rem de qua dicit, cuiusmodi sit, secura fidei opinionisque eius qui
audit, aut talem esse pervincere etiam renitente auditore conatur. Illud expositione fit, istud
argumentatione, Agricola (1992 [1539]: 302)
51

the exposition of facts and, of course both can appear in the preamble or the epilogue.
Furthermore, the subtle distinction between what we can identify as the exposition of a
reason and the argumentative use of an explanation must, unavoidably, make use of the
effective relation between the speaker and her audience, as apparently both may easily
have the same content: the same thing [datum] can be alternatively the cause or the
explanation of something52. It is, therefore, just the actual presence of the intention to
persuade an audience of something that, in a particular context, cannot be assumed as
directly evident, that will determine there being an argumentation. For example, Agricola
claims that the following passage from the Aeneid (II, 130-1) is argumentative:
Assensere omnes et quae sibi quisque timebat,
Unius in miseri exitium conversa tulere53.

And he justifies his opinion in the following way. The poet wants to convince us of the fact
that all have sincerely assented (something about which we could be in doubt) and his
proof consist of giving us the psychological reason for this sudden agreement. It liberates
them from fear, concentrating all misery upon one individual: What could be more
convincing of their collective assent than the fact that it would offer them security? 54. The
passage, though, bears no formal sign of including an argumentation or inference. It is an
example of what Agricola calls an argumentation cast into an exposition55.
In any case, our author, tries, in principle, to distinguish between both types of
discourse: expositive and argumentative. The former presents, though, three degrees, the
last of which converges towards argumentation. Again the criteria for such distinctions are
52

cum posit id ipsum et causa rei esse et ratio, Agricola (1992 [1539]: 304).
John Drydens translation of this passage verges towards, at least, the explicative by means of
subordinating the second clause: All praised the sentence, pleased the storm should fall / On one alone,
whose fury threatend all. Theodore C. Williams version, chooses, instead to separate completely both
clauses by a stop: Nor did one voice oppose. The mortal stroke / horribly hanging oer each coward
head / was changed to one mans ruin, and their hearts / endured it well.
54
Quo magis enim potuisset probare omnes assensisse, quam quod gaudebat securitate sua?, Agricola
(1992 [1539]: 306).
55
videtur nonnunquam in expositione venire argumentatione, Agricola (1992 [1539]: 304)
53

pragmatic. A speaker, a writer, can use an exposition in order a) to please an audience, b)

to narrate some facts and c) to seek conviction through the plausibility of what is
presented. The paradigmatic cases of these three degrees correspond respectively to the
discourse of the poets, the historians and the philosophers. Such distribution could suggest
to us (or to Agricolas more conventional contemporaries) something like a gradation in
terms of necessity: a poet can talk about the unreal, about fictions; contingency would be
the realm of history and necessity that of true philosophy. But Agricolas ideas are
certainly far from these ontological considerations and turn towards the pragmatic
conditions of discourse itself56.
For Agricola, while poets can be indifferent towards both truth and verisimilitude,
it is a pre-condition of the discourse of historians that they are telling the truth, however
astonishing. Finally, dealing with truth and even necessity is not enough for a philosopher,
who must also add plausibility to his discourse in order to persuade an audience. Such a
plausibility (probabilitas), though, has nothing to do with a lesser degree of necessity or
truth in ontological terms but belongs within the criteria for a discursive translation of a
content for purposes of persuasion. According to Agricola, such probabilitas is obtained
by means of an exposition which would be rich in argumentative content (argumentosa),
consistent with phenomena (consentanea rebus) and free from contradiction (per se
consequens)57. P. Mack (1993: 191-2) has characterized these distinctions between the
different degrees of exposition as:
a matter of linguistic texture [...] the distinction depends on the presence or absence of
connections between the sentences, on the density of the material and on the vehemence of
the expression.

56

On the relation between Agricola and historical sciences, see Kessler (1988).
Probabilis fit expositio, si sit argumentosa, si consentanea rebus, si per se consequens, Agricola (1992
[1539]: 350)
57

In our opinion, though, such stylistic criteria must finally be linked with the real conditions
of discursive use, and the different positions and attitudes of speaker and audience
regarding the particular contents of a speech.
Agricola will finally present the characteristics of argumentative discourse proper
and refer very briefly to its most traditional schemes (ratiocinatio or syllogism,
enumeratione or induction, enthymema and exemplum) leaving a thorough treatment of
these to logics second part or judgement which is not dealt with in his text 58. Rejecting,
in any case, the assignment of the so called perfect and imperfect forms of argumentation
to different fields and standards of rigor, Agricola says plainly that enthymemes are not
only used by orators, but also by dialecticians, mathematicians and physicist, while all of
them, including orators, can decide to use a plena ratiocinatio59 according to their
particular, discursive and pragmatic needs.
So, for Agricola, the art of dialectic, as a general theory of argumentation, is only
one and applies to any matter of discourse and any way of using language, be it
continuous, as in a speech, or discontinuous, as in dialogue or discussion. In the same way,
dialectic will have to deal both with discourses that tend to be explicitly argumentative and
with those that seem to be mere presentations or expositions. For Agricola the dividing line
is never really neat. Therefore we do not have to look for specific schemes, as such, or
specific formulations in order to find or build the object of dialectic research, which is
argumentation. It is more or less omnipresent in any discourse. It is up to us to analyse it,
to identify and understand it (either as composers or listeners/readers) using the tools
58

There have been many discussions about the lack of a second treatise by Agricola on judgement.
Opinions range from P. Macks prudent assumption of the fact this leaves unresolved the question
whether Agricola intended to write another treatise on judgement. The judgement treatise would not fit
the approach of this book. On the other hand, intellectual space has been left for it (1993: 201) to
Ongs interpretation of Agricolas conception of the discipline as a place-logic. But Agricola did not
reject the idea of writing such a treatise. In De inventione dialectica, II. 10., for example, he brings his
discussion about pure and modal questions to a close, referring such issues to a possible second treatise:
Aliis libris, si quando de argumentationum lege, hoc est de iudicandi parte scribendi ocium dabitur,
copiosius simul et apertius ista dicemus (1992 [1539]: 268-70).
59
Agricola (1992 [1539]: 322-24).

provided by the art. And so, if there are many ways to express argumentation, even as
pretending to be no argumentation at all, and dialecticians must deal with them all (with
any linguistic means of providing reasons, explanations, making or insinuating inferences,
either leading to further knowledge or alternative viewpoints), then, we are not anymore
talking about a formal discipline based on the distinction between form and content,
between syncategorematic and categorematic terms, or between perfect and imperfect
inferences (either in the sense of complete vs. incomplete or formal vs. material).

Conclusion
De inventione dialectica was to become extremely influential in the 16th century as Peter
Macks studies on its different editions prove 60. Many of its options were then basically
accepted by dialecticians that were, more or less successfully, supporting curricular
reforms all over Europe. From the first eclectic and, so called, post-agricolan
dialecticians61

Johannes

Caesarius

[1458-1550],

Christophorus

Hegendorf

[1500-1540] or Franciscus Titelmans [1502-1537] to the very influential Philipp

Melanchthon [1497-1560] or Jean Sturm [1507-1589] who lectured in Paris around the
1530s and had young Petrus Ramus [1515-1572] as a pupil. In countries like England
or Spain, logical text-books broadly based on Agricolas approach began to appear
towards the middle of the century, in many cases, associated with the spreading use of
the vernacular. We can mention Thomas Wilsons The Rule of Reason conteinyng the
Arte of Logique (1551)62, who follows exactly Agricolas list of topics, or Ralph Levers
The Art of Reason, rightly termed Witcraft (1573)63. Their Spanish vernacular
counterpart would be Pedro Simon Abrils Primera parte de la filosofa llamada la

60

Mack (1993, cap. XIII).

Ong (1958, 123-6).
62
Modern facsimile edition, Wilson (1970).
63
Modern facsimile edition, Lever (1972).
61

lgica (First Part of Philosophy named Logic) (1589). All of them divide logic into
invention and judgement, all renounce to the Medieval theories of insolubilia,
obligationes, or suppositio, as considered extremely subtle, artificial and detached from
the common use of language and, most interestingly, renounce to the all pervading
distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic terms, pointing towards a
logical discipline no longer based on form.
In response to his own times uneasiness with current logical studies, Agricolas
work opened a methodological debate about the demarcation of logic and the limits and
definition of dialectic. He (as many other Humanists) did not agree with the boundaries
set on logic by Scholastic authors, with their agenda and interests and looked for a more
general, comprehensive and practical theory of argumentation. So he somewhat began
again, not exactly from scratch but from very basic, general things. And that is why, for
many historians of logic, this very debate seemed like a step backwards, a simplification
operated against a very advanced discipline64.
Just as it happens today, formal logic, as practised by the Scholastics, was a very
technical field, in which specific theories were being progressively refined. Agricola
stepped out of it, to take a look at its very roots, its most basic aims, principles and
distinctions, and he saw some problems within, which he tried to tackle. As MacFarlane
(2000) points out, the demarcation of logic the very sense of the concept formal
is a problem that has been repeatedly debated throughout history from the very
beginnings of the discipline. In decisive moments, moments of a progressive agenda
within formal logic, there has been a kind of illusion that such demarcation was settled.
But to identify and criticise the basic assumptions of a discipline in order to build a
64

The Kneales (1962: 300) identify Lorenzo Valla and Rudolph Agricola as the two writers who started
the corruption. Nauta (2009: 211-12) mentions this traditional standpoint of historians oflogic: Not all
modern scholars, however, have been convinced of the philosophical importance of the humanists
achievement, and some historians of logic have even accused the humanists of impeding the progress of
formal logic.

broader approach that would surmount the restrictions of those assumptions, even if it
means that we can now have less concrete results about the issue we are dealing with,
cannot be simply considered as a step backward. Within the context of his time and with
the help of the Classical tradition, Agricola was able to propose an extremely flexible
and reasonable theory of argumentation which is still appealing and which may help, as
a historical source, those who are nowadays faced with the problems of inference in its
most general sense65.

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