What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power Author(s): Jeffrey W.

Legro Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 515-534 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446501 . Accessed: 02/10/2013 21:15
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Will Want: of a Rising

The Power


W Legro Jeffrey

an issue of contentious butwhat China will do with itsnewfoundcapabilitiesremains China's nationalpower isgrowingrapidly, intentions. At the heart of theproblem is the ofdiviningfuture Two arguments difficulty debateamong scholars and policymakers. The otherhighlights Chinese revisionism. China's growinginter on power and likely have dominated thedebate.One focuses of logicand evidence. linear Both areproblematicin terms future satisfaction. projectionsthat They offer dependenceand likely on theinteraction islikely tobe contingent-especially of foreign Relative policy ideasand events. the way that China's future ignore action and are important mediated throughthedoctrinesleadersuse to justify but theirimpact is power and interdependence If this China's intentions. thoseideasareprone to change in regular argumentis right, establish authority: ways-and with them mix of thetwo (i.e.,hedging) in relations or some withChina need tobe thatadvocatecontaining, engaging, policyprescriptions



"rising China" problemisnot justaboutpower, stressed thatits butpurpose. China has consistently as amajor power will be peaceful and development United States thereis,as one non-obtrusive. Yet in the of anx U.S. DeputySecretary ofStateput it,a "cauldron Expert testimony beforethe iety" overChina's future.1 ReviewCommis U.S.-China Economic and Security toCongresson sion,a body that monitorsand reports over on uncertainty has focused heavily bilateral relations, In February 2007, Vice President China's intentions.2 test anti-satellite China's recent Cheney cautionedthat with were "notconsistent military build-up and general of rise."'3 The stomachs goalof a 'peaceful China'sstated arechurning. strategists policyissue connects sodirectly It israre when a pressing literature. Such is thecase toa critical gap in thescholarly of theriseofChina on world politics. with the impact Will growingpower lead Beijing to challenge inter generat national norms, rules, and institutions-possibly in Asia if East conflict among majorpowers ing dangerous in inter the not elsewhere? Or might China's integration increas its middle class, and nationaleconomy, growing ininternational andexchanges institutions ing participation

lead toenduring satisfaction in theexisting international
order? Today China appears to be a "status quo" power.4

so? Will itremain Existing answersto this questionlack theverything ofcontingent changein the needed:a general explanation an issue intentions ofChina.5The problemisnot simply or repression of free sincethe ofChina'ssecrecy expression of future intentions applies to democracies as problem Even if well as dictatorships.6 we had accessto theinner of the it isunlikely workings Chinesegovernment today, aims. Even if thatinformation would tell us about future worldhegemony or China today has somesecret plan for those aims will be subjectto changeby world harmony, which itunfolds. China'svery and the process by growth China's top leaders, concen Ironically even despitetheir with certainty what trated cannotknow political power, their willwant. country what thetwo the debate Indeed, that is views dominating inevitable on China argue,althoughtheysee different onChina's The first and claimsthat futures. focuses power China's desireforrevision will growas China's relative In increase whatBeijing thinks today. capabilities despite can a view all to contain this other countries mustdo they rising China becauseat somepointChina willwield its The second new-found powerto challenge globalorder. andargues W LegroisProfessor Woodrow view China'sgrowing and Chair in the interdependence highlights Jejfrey toengage of the that suchconflict can be avoided Department ofPolitics and Co-Director bycontinuing Wilson inChina that at the Miller Governing Americaina GlobalAgeProgram China,whichwill builddomesticinterests to the favor and accommodation University (legro@ Public ofVirginia politicalliberalization Center of AJfairs, Tang Ross, Ship rules of the international system. Both answers thanks Robert prevailing virginia.edu). Theauthor comments tap intodeep-seated forhelpful forces ing, Womack, andZhu Feng Brantly shaping China, but both are of the future of assistance. flawed due to theirlinear Weirforexcellent research projection andDaniel Aaron
DOI: 10.1017/Si537592707071526 September 2007 Vol. 1 5/No. 3 515

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how developments in ics to challenge that orthodoxy. with. When China espouses ideas andaction conflict sinceothercountries are prone to defendthat it thatfavor same order.Art'icles IWhat China Will Want Chinesepolicytowards international vis their domestic order-be itthe con critics. of national behavior.offer view. Whether change toa general actually China relate seeninother pattern great pow on thedistribution of replace occursdepends. much as vis-ai of prevailing 51 6 Perspectives on Politics This content downloaded from 112. Such ideasperform can have an impact." "satisfied. 13 a "hedging" advice acceptsthis byadvocating strategy that Bull called"international suchstates society. ersin their to revise. Chinawill notbe decidedby the ofothers. dangerous ofChina. refers to nationalstrategies integration. To highlight that thealternative isevenless contingency requires some desirable. first. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . in the neseexpectations I approachtheproblem about thebenefits of integrating of therise ofChina from the extantinternational aredefied with nega order byevents of international perspective relations not as an area theory. What policymakers tobehavior) and non-transparent bynurturing groups and ideasin China that havefound tostudy. dominantideasinparticular on plansfor with theinternational specifically order. Likewise. andmay do so again in thefuture. dramatic for pressure thing be saidabout what thefuture depends on-no small rapidchange isproblematic.scholars difficult more benign replacements to the less desirable Clearly offer in thecaseofChina both itsrelative powerand itseco alternatives.challenge. thinking.'2 they supportreformers The future of certain domesticinterests empower groupsoverothers. Opposed to the how power and interdependence deal with arguments economic interdependence economic intentions. The issue nomic interdependence affect itsforeign policy. meshing significant Yetwe knowfrom the Sovietexperience gear-national ideasabouthow toachieveforeign states.14 makes sensetodo as A thirdapproach is seen in statesthat cooperative integration. mentnorengagement policyisa reliable consistent choice.9 influence on a country ofChina's sizeand regime type has I arguethattheir influence depends on a third limits. ways toshapeenduring dealing pat terns In generalterms. engage change and continu mentneednot leadtoharmony.8 most need. Thus I will emphasize specialist. whenChina displays or the flictual revision expected bypowertheorists harmo consistent revisionist such ideas should be tendencies. rules. The argument here offers a somewhat and more refer toas "dissatisfied" or "revisionist. niousintegration predicted by interdependence when influential advocates. slowpatientefforts to policy thateven in authoritarian three critical functions: goals.'I includes thosestates ana that system. thedominantview todayamongpolicymakers the dominant of whatHedley andnorms principles. The articlethenexplores in but ruptures China'seconomic growth. tions allow. Naturallyin all theseareas. for tive anopportunity exists domestic crit consequences." Typically bothoptionssimultaneously with theparticular areseenas "status pursues or "conservative" quo.." pow on ersbasedon their mix of strategy vs. offers an explanation for position. or separate from however. global whether ment ideasthat critics can coordinate on a in the affects order. possibil Nixon and theopeningofChina) to emerge. future. Countriesthat undertake ity. itbehoovesthe Therefore. and explores theimplications forthefuture ofChina's havegenerated con rapidintegration intentions. attempts join.nomatter if anyparticular approach. some twists on familiar A good starting This approach offers relevance. to remove much as possibleto ensurethattheir internal or separate themselves from theorbit supporters attempt gainpositive feedback and "I toldyou so" leverage international normsand practices. frominternational over thepast twocenturies. typically the dominant ideas. The goal is topointout the current problems alternative worldview. China and Contemporary society The point isnot that is International Order poweror economicliberalization interact but rather thatthosefactors with Intentions refers to whatChina plans todo. considerable systemic China itself has displayed wide variationin its flict.7 penalized-but only opposition groups tobemore China'sdiplomatic is likely are promoting more attractive alternative ideas. however. an alternative feasible and exploreitscontem debate." different but the mean lysts view: it suggests that China proactive involve managinga rising ingisthesame:they efforts tofundamentally revise will dependnot on behavior of the international per sebut on thenature Such revision breeds system.142.204. whenChi ityfora new strategy Specifically. cooperative) (conflictual desireto work dependent within theinternational A secondcategory Chinesebehavior.87 on Wed. the most Contraryto thepower-centric intentions" meansand tooutlinethe exactly "future nature in thefuture scenario isnot the"rise" of current Chinese intentions.'0 or separate be itcooperate itself approach. The ways: integration. problem with a country like China thatisauthoritarian international community tobe proactive (notjustreactive onmany issues. actions but the which performance is actions they generate expectations against ofoutside parties have influenced China'sorienta or impedethe tion in thepast (e. and they either facilitate assessed.g. revision. thataccept Indeed.thepotentialforoutside of courseishow thetwo will do so overtime. Here I focus unimportant. states dealwith international order in In terms of policy this means that neither a contain ideal three and separation. porary what point is todefine viewofChina. Other either or interdependence how loathsome contingent than the power posi wise.

tic ofother countries. of thisstatus The wellspring of theextantsystem. aswithTibet or other por disputedterritories."20 Instead of a conservative great todayshows most of the markers of theexisting inter poweraccepting thebasicprinciples national China joined the World TradeOrgani order. America's China has a special including Europeanallies. abilityto lessinfluence-especially in the toachieveits domes use force goalsor to intervene That sentiment. fromtheviolentover goals arenot.8 percent increase September 2007 Vol. and regularly participates meetings. "You but I have neveroccupied occupiedourTaiwan Island. 5/No. in suchmattersdue to the linkbetweenits sensitivity colonialpast.16 national on increasing its iscertainly intent "comprehensive constant over Ifsuchfundamental goalsseemrelatively those about how to achieve of ideas longperiods time. in the threats and especially from external sought security has also emerged economic prosperity twentieth century.that United least great haveamore equal sayand the powers) States country) (oranyother predominant "hegemonism" in terms of the U. The second. your Long Island.S. Since thattime.to an urge to integrate over thepast twocenturies ure 1.e. issueis Taiwan. subsequent and the legiti independence. are mostly China'scurrent intentions By thistypology.'5 as a core responsibility declaredin 1997." 17 of "world revolution" and "three worlds theory" rhetoric revisionism and giveslessemphasis to itsself-proclaimed China role as "leaderof theThirdWorld. Myanmar tury.204. goals or interests. withaimsor associated isa term thatisoften Intentions to distinguish It is useful.Figure 1 China's outlook on international order Dominant Orthodoxy Qing (1800-1860) Republican (1896-1939) Era Mao (1949-1976) Deng (1978 ) Separatist Integrationist Revisionist Integrationist todo in thenineteenth cen attempted TokugawaJapan in or has done the contemporary period. other nations)throughout China'sdesiretobe a the people"dates and strong and to"enrich "rich country" China back toat least thelate nineteenth Today century. itary capabilities thisissue. U.87 on Wed. Althoughit isdifficult on these of spending due toChina's secrecy and levels issues.21 zation. the statusof Taiwan. politics ishardly unusualand is shared bymostmajor powers. within the andworking China is joining integrationist. has cooperated more fully with the United States inG-8 sincethe9/11 attacks. or whether it is shallow depthof Chinese integration China has left behind isclear. rules.China seeks "the goalof beingprosper byChinese leaders (and ous and strong"-anaim shared theages. states interests and theideasthat adopt toattain between showrelatively varia Broad interests little interests. and "democratiza "multipolarization" China favors all states (orat tion"in international relations-i.China's own history variation shows amongthese positions. fromit. 3 1 517 This content downloaded from 112.They have ranged aloof of international orderto the desireto remain throw As seen in fig within it. Unification with itself asdefender of the extant trays which a issue" over Taiwan inChina'sview isa "domestic As own internal state mustmake its decisions.however..'8 This integrative was cautiousin theearly orientation has pickedup but in thepast fifteen years Deng period. sovereign in to States have United Mao proclaimed the 1970."25 of a desirefor and reuni The combination autonomy what is also anomalous with Taiwan is fueling fication UnitedStates) for of the great powers(withtheexception in thecontemporary system-a relatively rapiddefense to fathom exact numbers buildup.Instead opted forinvolvement.23 of To suggest that China acceptsthebasic principles no international orderisnot to saythatitprefers today's China is dissatisfied Certainly changeinworld politics. and external pressureto democratize.China's continuedpromotionof "theFive or thecall for a "new Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" politicaland economicorder that is fairand rational" seemvague. ithas bumped its military spending some 15 per centa yearfrom 1990-2005with a 17. enhances Taiwan and rejects any move that reunification Since 1979 ithas advocated ese independence.'9 enmeshed-butthetrend power. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .24 however. in insignificant itself increases orientation has manifested as well as more international institutional membership with theexisting informal behavior cooperative powers.China favors and related. There is room to debate the considerable momentum. As Jiang Zemin of government. norhas itaspiredtooverturn thesystem from separation ithas increasingly This it. their Stateshave always tionbothwithin and among states.142.22 China's commitment to revising thesys seems most relevant temtobenefit countries developing when it involves toChina'sown growth measuresrelated of sovereignty to its ownhistory as or toconcerns related a target of imperialism. rules ascentto lead Deng Xiaoping's quo approachisfoundin China has not sought ershipin 1978. peaceful mil hasalsodeveloped over"liberation" reunification (but China in suitedtoTaiwan as a target). bases its Communistregime authority macyof the (which inparton successfully restoring China'sautonomy). Three important ones are nance.S. domi with someaspects.

Instead handsof the powerresides geopolitical appetite and a likely nistParty and all otherpoliticalentities must followits powerleadstoa growing lead or pay a blood price.32 Instead Beijingemphasizes that principles suchas sovereignty. religion iscontrolled by the government. Given this outlook. operations) mostlyrelated with regard to scenarios to regional challenges. and the devel tion.some have China's future intentions.31 Despite thisstanding.g. may be stigmatized nese thinking and perhaps a challenge to world order.theinternet is filtered with amazing and blocked sophistication.itisunlikely that the current scale ofChina's modernization military signals more thana desireto protectitsversion of autonomy. Myan in and supporttheexisting enmeshitself ingly of rules mar."As itsrelative power tocombat of asymmetric other increases. liberalizing albeitat a slowpace andwith reversals. integrity initsfuture. States. bolder.S.S. nese continueto facesignificant geopolitical challenges from suchas India.30 In short.Chinese military spending isexpected climbtosomewhere between $185 billionto$400 billion The Chi (i.28 butwhat itmightwant tomorrow."36 The basic thrust of these in the analyses is thatrising Commu stood.Indeed..27 Finally. This trait The Limits of Power and suggests tensions and disagreement with emergent norms Interdependence of international human and political societyregarding The debateoverChina isnot aboutwhat China wants In its international relations. China's notionof democracy is toa stronger. "China's from aweak. moving in a liberal direction) not theend state of democracy (a somewhat undefined goal). erations. which problematically includes Taiwan and raisesissues overotherdisputedareas in theEast and SouthChina Seas. China may havemost of theattributes of a in normal major power theinternational but it is system. 518 Perspectives on Politics This content downloaded from 112.87 on Wed.. Indeed even todaywhen China changetoward revisionism. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . political democra To theextent becomesa defining of democracy feature asmostwho emphasize China's growing inter tization.developing state growth "thedemocracy of dictatorship" or onewherepeople are more prosperous stateshould resultin a more assertive the"master of thestate"-Kafkaesque terms thatrefer to more demanding.142. In Mearsheimer erningthesystem. as China has partners-as seen in thestrongrelationship those who focus on power Or China could increas predict. spending excluding the $50 billion supplementfor Iraq and Afghanistan). NorthKorea. distinctfrom othercontemporary greatpowers in one important way: it is theonlynon-democracy. such might become rallying point for status resistance to thesociety that now exists. Japan. the"mostimpor tantand fundamental principlefordeveloping socialist political in democracy China" istheleadership of the Com munistParty.style ofdemoc and timing. and amphibious that are craft.despite thetension over humanrights anddemocratization.33 China doesnot rule outdemocracy itjustinsists that will follow it its ownpath. the pressistightly managed. a fraction of est. international evenundergoing society.andRussia. israre.Articles IWhat China Will Want aspiresto greater democratic reforms.China'sstatements andactions fit that itisslowly profile-asdiscussed later. submarines. international society-and countries are forced tochoose an important foresee. political competition pop of thecountryis ularpoliticalchoice forthe leadership notpermitted. For the timebeing. rigorous protection As Robert growth. Overall. beenbuilding with Iran. Gilpin onceput it. between democracies andnon-democracies-China might both arehalfblind in ignoring thecontingent nature of indeedbecome a revisionist power. a that China offers argued(andChina has not disagreed) model ofdevelopment-"the different Beijingconsensus" Power that the U. however. not to mention internal challenges and demands on publicspending. The overalllevel-withestimates ranging from $45-100 billion isstill. a rising opment forms of defense state tochangetherules attempts gov more powerful John countries(e..."35 At thepresenttime. andhumanrights accords areverbally butnot fully acknowledged implemented.204. it isnotable that China isnot advocating that states adoptsimilar political to its systems humanrights norms own.or that areillegitimate. especially involving Taiwan. announcedfor2007."34 concludesthat a globaleconomic melt extreme circumstances China'sgrowing (perhaps willmean it"would notbe a capabilities a vision a to but an aggressive state determined quo power. lessthanthecurrent U.Assumingthatthe Chinese economy to triples by2025. defense budget)..and less foreign policy . achieveregional Denny Roy expectsthat hegemony. theUnited States).26 in itscapabilities China hasmade significant progress inballistic and cruise air (including missiles. and the United neighbors Russia.S. sta and territorial shouldtrump suchconsid bility. makehayoutof relations withcountries. Both offer but dependence vision.U."29 strong government-directedPower theories expecta clearshift direc of sovereignty. The riseof today.-dominated consen challenges "Washington in a revisionist That view features sus. inclined tocooperate with the other major powersin the thatisnot democracy as it isgenerally under something region. down). China's current outlook is mostlyintegrationist.e. norm seemsto emphasize democratization (i. the international racy. China isquick to rights. that bya democ China could lead to a fundamental reorientation ofChi or less desirable racy standard. the Sudan.e. military of $440 billion (fy2007.

Thus there China has been consistently China. Chinese leaders to powerand static most important.or ignoring it.by the munists seizedcontrol ested in joininginternational of the mainland. states do not always expandtheir foreign and bide our geance. but thattellsus nothing about how theythink headof the outlawed(shadow) Germany armyis reputed they can bestachieve power-by challenging the world.Because international then we'll takebackwhatwe lost. We might. inbalance however. be conditions..the UnitedStates)used tocallingtheshots tant these are factors viewed in Asiawithoutsuchconstraints. They clearly September 2007 IVol.87 on Wed. 3 519 This content downloaded from 112. secure ourposition.48 rists.Itwould be a trueanomalyifsomeportionof of relative Mao came power-i. Hans Von Seeckt. that ing itsown powerand balancing There arealsogood reasons tobelievethat Chinese aims foreign policy ambitionsgrowwith relative power will growinsomerespects asChina'spower Chinawasmost revisionist was atone of its and influence when it weak estpointsin terms grows..Americaemerged as thedominant powerin to shift in may not be revisionist right now. weaker thanthedom step. to have declaredin the 1920s. Britainand of thedeclining but by theinsecure actions the UnitedStates did notgo to hegemon. believe its rise will be peaceful. but so too isconflict. The possibility ofeffective adjustment tointer a lowprofile. society.. Vice Commandant of the tions andpreferences. put it United collective choicefaces In "[Asforthe a variety ofhurdles.43 it should." In the first view. pay closeattention but thattrajec positionas being China is inter has been rising tory and starts) sincethecom Indeed. after to increased topower. in the but once it has gained Qing eradid notalteritsisolationist ideastodeal it is likely to wantmore and bewilling with theencroaching enoughresources. We must concealour abilities policyas power increases (nordo theylimitit as power time. Sometimes will beprovoked."50 in raise use its ful Chinamight hackles that "national satisfaction with thestatus waysthat capabilities quo" isas impor Inbothinstances as transitions. the "patient The problem with this argument however isthat power hegemon" and the "innocent giant. ofpower AndChina iscertainly focused politics. as distinct from.S.for confound sucha spare example. One notion is rightly when power thatstates higher probability of international tensions are shapednot justby rawpower. China may genuinely notexpand.47 First declines).46 States. but itsinvolvement and goalsdid thatdirection as it gainspower.power.g.is that ership. And in terms of powertrajectories. hide our capacities and bide our time.the power. isnotdestiny... of thesystem. like other countries that havehistorically feelthey gotten inantpowersof world politics since at least the late the short endof thestick.42 Qing China to integration These power arguments correctly identify keyelements contemporary China to revisionism Mao (see fig during rela ure 2). in theinterwar but contracted China period.44 And contrary China" thesis-i."37 Deng supposedly relations arecomplex and roadtesting grandstrategies is advised. There areanalytic and empirical anomalies China is like Germanyin the Weimar period. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .. Powertransitions areviewedas National strategy can rarely be understood to by reference a quintessential source ofwar in theinternational arena. Nor have ideasfollowed This isespecially thecase when nations havehistories that thebalanceof powerin lock leavethem isconcernthat aggrieved. claim lead good atmaintaining and never national demandsisfurther impeded by thefact that "the The implication. "First we'll get strong.e. Chinese foreign not shaping policy and international tions.It iseasyto imagine more that a Powertransition scholars have long noted power "intentions. United States Not only isrevisionism topowertheo Britainas thedominantinternational likely according surpassed power. affairs calmly. China'snew-found wealth werenot directed andmoremodern to Scholars haveattempted military capabilities. andnot reducible to.This view of China has twovariations.e.to theextentthat (withfits geopolitics.patiently that view.China's ideas."39 In the Historical anomalies arecommon.]fora relatively isfiltered long time itwill be absolutely short. havean interest very principles have made shifts between revisionism and on increas integration. different policies Lieutenant Gen with different constituencies. of those(e. to the"rising U.45 those Academyof into Aggregating preferences morebluntly: a coherent Military Sciences. A second viewofChina isas an "innocent giant"that WorldWar. grandstrategy domestic through politics. biding itstimeuntil it is strong enough to reconfigure assumethatstates areconcerned first and foremost with an oppressive international order. 5/No.in warwith eachother at the this case the United States. but also by transitions occur. eachwith varying percep eral Mi Zhenyu. by China. areparticularly pronetoattempt nineteenth century.142. We might viewChina's power trajectory. yet itsideas havevaried between sep to revise inRepublicanand theinternational arationin system. "Observe calmly. modifythepowerview to Likewise theorists powertransition point to the take intoconsideration such anomalies. necessary thatwe quietly nurse our sense of ven Empirically. cooperating with it. and threatening Europeanpowers to concede lessand henceput upwith less of thestatus even thoughthe security situation indicated mounting suchshifts not quo. power inAsia. of course. cope with states show laggedresponses at best to external difficult. dangers."38 after power state"isnot a single actorbut an aggregation of leaders isachieved will follow.41 external conditions alone.40 turn of thetwentieth evenas the century.but is likely international relations.204.

middleclass For example..25 - 0. that they.China CINOC 0US CINC -R ussia CINOC what states and predict imply we cannot understand that how they think aboutappropri will dowithoutknowing Yet they the keyissue of when ateaction. power-centric standards. them to inspire potentially changing dramatically voting and choiceareexpected withevenlimited is arguments The problem with these interdependence thatfeeds that a taste forliberty democratizing impulses are liketheir debating opponents.87 on Wed.55 thespread can affect relations those politics. the United States.oo CO co Coco 0O 0 01t o. government officials that number ofmechanisms. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and Russia 0.58 stateyetChinese an authoritarian licofChina remains to thefactthattheir situ citizens political will also attest ation today is vastlymore liberal and open than itwas in China realizes that it does have much at stake in the cur more so.g.4 - ~0.59 And finally the period andbecoming pre-reform more engaged. supporttheexisting First.inconsultation more to itsliking.52 in the world participation Second.China's increasing economic economyis expectedto give riseto domestic evengreater liberaliza that pressfor andpoliticalinterests its asChinamodernizes.56 overtime. 0 02 Cooo oom cJsS sa:a rl s Ajc 0 o o co0 c\J 00 0) (o ~O (O C a. there The People's may affect Repub foreign policy opinions.the withother (e.the UnitedStates) majorpowers entwined more it system and the more itgainsfrom theoverall the in major thesystem or engaging has to lose inchanging asChina partici We mightalsoanticipate that conflict. Such interaction that favor opening.142.. over diplomacy andnegotiations take partininternational in interests come todefinetheir waysmore consis time tent with thesystem. historically been a force and its resources grow (see figure 3) 54-a trend that has China iseconomically more that and socially Overall.57 it pates in thesystem will also changeit.35 Z0.51 do notaddress tochange-or not. morehappily Chinawith international will align 52!O Perspectives on Politics This content downloaded from 112. withother countries.0O 0 (O 0) (O 0) 0c 0) 0Y) 0) C\J co 0) ) 0) 0) | - .3 0. on theinternet and experiments pens inChina's foreign (seefigure and ideas 5). and agreement cer support engagement arguments that These related on Beijing'sthink an important tainly capture influence by theeconomic ingtoday. tion. significant domestic politicalinterests of theChinesemiddle class is still While thegrowth increasing wealth issomeevidence tosuggest nascent.45 C 0.60 incentives tobecome rent system-with pointsus to thefactthat world usefully This explanation Finally as China opens.204. China has becomecaptivated has accruedfromitsopennessto the inter growth that has generated more nationaleconomy.ArticIes iWhat China Will Want Figure 2 Relative power (CINC) of China. is likely such thinking Interdependence toChinesepowercomesfrom those A different response China's and social materialimprovement who believethat with the world give interdependence evolutionthrough that integration and favor risetodomestic politicalforces a This will occur through system. c\ CD0 C\j CO a) 0 0 '\j CO CO ' C) 0) C 0') CO0 C) 0') 0) 0) 0Y) 0) Year 0 (O LO cO 0) 0) C\j CO 't 0 (O .53 for political democratization. the increase in travel and edu isenacted and whathap through domestic politics of free cationabroad (see figure speech politics 4).

..00% c! 3.00%/ & 2... will ever change chanceit areexpected from or learning integration tions profiting in that direc further to snowball.. with international compatible most from China's opennessare eitherin.C. Contempo tionsunrestrained by fledgling Mr.' 1 O cm co O O O a ?8 D 0) O N M O O O ? N ?NO NO cm N } 0 8 PerCapitaDisposable Income(Indexedto1978)] onceChina has They assumethat overly deterministic.. of theinternet inChina's middle classor expansion mine how a growing will fit with politicalliberalization sectors international Those who have society.00% 1997 .204.4 XOI 0..7 0.however.. 1998 . CD 500/ 2 400 0 U I 300 X t 200 100 LO-' c' 0' ) 8 X E X0 -Urban ' )' '..00% E o I V o 8.. Great that ended in the Figure 5 Chinese Internetusers 10.142. within societies"add up" to nationalpolicy interests users what numberof internet For example.2 0.87 on Wed. LO z .64 isa precarious Democratization process-democratizing of under thepressures states areoften prone to conflict expecta stokedby exaggerated nationalism new-found institutions. Jekyll Economic may be a interdependence Deng initiated. 5/No. 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 0 Year . o) 0 11. anomalies..00% 4..00% 6.. choices.it may be thata democratic groupshave a rural peasantsand otherdisenfranchised of integra opposed to thetype say-would be distinctly tion now occurring...3 0....Figure 3 Disposable 800 700 8 600/ income of Chinese city dwellers Figure 4 Chinese students studying abroad 140000 120000 a g 100000 80000 60000 E Z 40000 20000 0 -. of theearly1900s inEurope seenin theinterdependence War. 3 521 This content downloaded from 112... and historical for how accounting time ithas a difficult Analytically.5 0...00% 0.00% Figure 6 Chinese economic 0.or benefited that rules China andpro Communist linked party to.00% 7.8 0.o a) a) a) roc'a88 0 b 0 a) a) ) 0 o) a)) cy) o) a) a) cotoN Year Abroad studying Students -Retumed Studeents]s .1 interdependence 4. tion.6 0....00% 5.65 it is not a but failsafe-as that worksagainst force conflict...C..... pushingthecountry traps also runsintoanalytical This view..... 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ...63 that attracts videsfor stability China-one where Indeed. i g8 N z sco 8 >SN g@ O 8X 8 8 8O N C%JC'J September 2007 jVol.61 is little there system beenhookedup to theinternational fac Internationalist directions.the international investment.62 that democ prefers intoa free speechsociety translates ismatching Right now theChinese government racy? own control with its of expression freedom strides toward todeter Likewiseit isdifficult and press. Hyde to threatens tobe the Chinesenationalism rary of the"reform and opening"policy that the Dr.00% 9. crn ocL o| 9crnoc'3 8co eorn9 CY) ) ?) C c CY ) .....Co.00% 1..

as seeninfigure 6.Articles IWhat China WillWant Nor doesglobalization-the of the shrinking globeand economic pressures) and to make sense ofhow they might increased density of contacts within international society conjointly cause outcomes-i. Whether tional will also be clear. on the they As organization growroots. but instead thecol Revolution.204.suchdominantideas It isuseful todistinguish caused theimpact becomeingrained wholly inpublicrhetoric by ideas. The central in emphasis what system-interms of the costs of transportation follows declining ison therole of ideas(simply becauseitistheleast andcommunication and therelative of the openness world understood) but the importance of powerand transna trade order-has been occurring fordecades. Here we might think States.142.Thus.87 on Wed. theorists pointout. bols. however. government educations procedures. but havealsobeen reversed even when power and interdepen most importantly inthe collective national memories. norms.g. as use the term "Ideas. interdependence after begantorise-especially lective beliefs of societies and how to organizations about 1978. act.69 altersignificantly. China began to recalibrate afterthedisastrous Cultural notmentalconstructs of individuals. doctrines of action rather thanactualgoals.both power and economic interdependence inparticular maypush strategy directions but such moves They areembedded not only in somehumanbrains.beliefs. powerand interdependence Suchviews Why? matter area guide tonational becausethey actionand can shape what states want to achieveover time.e.Put differ There is a large and veryinsightful literature on how ideasbecome intentions.) "matter" What isusually missing formulations policy.. how powerand inter due to technological Chinese inte advances-guarantee with ideasthrough dependence interact mech predictable gration." There areof course of domestictheories many types of Promoted by those who benefit and nurtured by habit. and rhet systems." are here. The potentialinterdependence ofChina in the anismsto causeoutcomes.71 The literature formation. sym denceconditions remain constant. playa rolein their uenciesthat benefit from them and thus areenergized to own transformation is not to argue thatoutcomesare promote and defendthem.68 derived from history that becomeaccepted in these arguments ishow ideas matterin their own trans assumptions of policy.66 Forexample. large organizations engaged in the world. In foreign such affairs. times states may stickto their of plansevenas conditions oricof statecraft. Chinese interdependence they to require ideas in guide them their in interactions therise of Mao's revisionism declinedfollowing and when the I international arena. 1776-1941) of WeimarGermany's shift under Hitler or Japan's shift * territorial expansionon the continent(Germany from Taish6 democracyto theShowa era or even the 1890-1945) retreat of the United Statesin theinterwar period. pressures China took of the advantage of interdepen potential gains dencewas at leastin part a Chinese policychoice that Foreign Policy Ideas and Intentions needstobe explained. changefor haveconstit First.g. China * isolation from extensive foreign interaction or pres itself reversed in directions moving from Qing China to ence (Japan 1640-1868) Nationalist China and thenreversed again in thetransi * integration as a normal power(Soviet Union/Russia tiontoCommunist China. but instead byChinese ideas ior.70 ently. Here.par central role of enduring (and misunderstood) foreign pol when groups have intangible ticularly goalssuchas "secu icy ideas in domesticpoliticsand subsequent national rity" or "wealth"states will focus theirefforts around behavior.strategic circumstances or cedures that make them resilient like all traditions that are 522 Perspectives on Politics This content downloaded from 112. I want to concentrate politics. These ideas maybe contested bysome within groups enactedthrough domestic politics and decision making. societies serve as a guidefor butstill the collective "nation. nations require ideas that signify to of others) abouthowmuch China shouldbe (and those their members what as they stand for. andbureaucratic pro of ideasfrom otherfactors (e. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . culture. some fairly Similarly.67 States to formulate tend broad concepts-almostopera Chinese interdependence has not beendrivensimply by tional philosophies-that orient their international behav the march of technology. collective ideas (e.they To suggest affect thatideas they change. As large societies. stateleaders Naturally actions strategically plan their The Meshing Gear: Collective Ideas but they often do so against a backdrop of certain domi Neitherpowernor interdependence directly shaped Chi nantnationalideas about what general behavior isappro nese grand strategy because such systemic factors are priate. Second.. discourses. of reasons.. ideas arewhat ErnestMay has called "axiomatic" in foreign etc. isverygood on how collective National ideas about international orderaredifficult to ideas mightkeep intentions but lessclearon how a number fixed. 1986-present) In sum. Examples of beliefs about "good policies" from the The history of nationaleconomic modernization via foreign policies of major powers include: engagement with the international arena is filled with stories of countries undertaking and thenlater integration * "non-entanglement" in European politics (United moving in theoppositedirection.

hardforindivid Statesintervened World War I it violateditslongstand ditionface significant inEurope'spolitics. it isdifficult togenerate Disintegrates VWhen Orthodoxy tum to reorient bureaucracies and altertraditions. When they become normalized not justas means toachieve policies. how ingtabooagainst entanglement The on suchpreferences. opponents ingthisinteraction September 2007 iVol. I argue.are affected believe and more likely tochallenge those dationof thenew.including attempted tohew toa traditional Qing policy. they had been a disastrous ideas breedsstrife and uncertainty becauseparticular mistake. yetdesirable groupsthat is a potent momentumtochange collective ideas when outcomes are tion is more desirable. by motivated ideas. stage. the of investiga foreign policy agreeable. ifany.It ishard togather can stalemate over which. For Middle Kingdom that continuity isthe norm example. Similarly. by claiming itthreatens tradition. Third.g. entrenched Consider."73 versusthespecial commissions that always history grows" to examineunexpectedstock The interesting are when and how? market crashes.142.Figure 7 Collapse Desirable Results Ideas on WorldOrder Events Contradict -* EventsConfirm <1 Continuity Collapse change (potential see Consolidation) -* UndesirableResults Continuity thenuse thosebaselinesto assess-and support or institutionally entrenched. depending events ofwhat thenationshould do.. pre-existing changeare of collapseinvolv of socialexpectations ersjustify policyand seta baseline Figure 7 depictsthe branching logic ofwhat should result. of itsexistence and presidents paid homageto that in That event set a race among outsiders to control China their off pop (e. quences changeis Such undesirable.for example. therefore. 5/No. In forchange(shouldthey will have any anew their tradition of "no-entanglement" and efforts exist) old ideas were suchsituations. When questions momen outcomes aredesirable. canbe expected whendeviations from It istherefore not surprising continuity in foreign Thosewhowant tochallenge tra ideasleadtoundesired outcomes.74 foreign Inmost othercircumstances. defenders of theold ideas(as the Ameri effect. situations TokugawaJapancame to be defined by itspolicyof facilitate change by giving ammunition to the opponents of thecurrent orthodoxy.Both stages. The of an extant in theabovediscussion is thefactthat events that changeis delegitimation Implicit requires orthodoxy but involves two stagesthat both contradictits logic and have undesiredconse not a single phenomenon of theold ideasand consoli individuals will bemore must be explained: collapse quences. Political withincoun of ideasand consequences. with the orthodoxy areputon the defensive. invites socialand political "toldyou so.204. mentality despiteits waningauthority. will risk Lacking results of WorldWar I brought widespread disillusion much they acting owndesire ment in the United Statesand the Americans such information. uals toknow ifothers desirechangeand ifthey do. identity). and hence thepossibilities pre-existing how lead In thecollapse ideasaffect more significant. becauseof thiseffect tries ends. continuity is likely..87 on Wed. criticism. When the policyideas. Harding in the1920s) ordertobolster in theface of China in thenineteenth and encouraged forces withinChina to challenge tradi century ularity. to domestic Likewise isevenlikely whendominant entations offer costsand benefits continuity ideas differing are ignored new direc results occur. even what it is (i. critique-existing on events. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Yet asMay pointsout. defunct. thesep to"get was distinguished by itsrefusal entangled" of the traditional ofEurope in thefirst 150 years aratist Qing Empire was finally disrupted suspect powers approach in theSino-Japanese norm by the1895 Japanese victory War. Continuity." Intervention World ori War I. tions of large stock arenonetheless vulnerable to transformation "as marketincreases that no one expected concepts seem to form andcountries "seethe pastina new light. For example.In suchcircumstances. United existing in It isoften hurdles. or contradict collective expectations and theconse but also as a standard arestarkly more likely. cannotbe sureiftheir embraced they inEurope.72 in foreign incursions tion. allowingthemto excluding foreigners and itsleaders appealed to thattra support to their side while supporters of thecurrent the UnitedStates rally ditiontosustain their position. must mount a case for They why the whichcan involve considerable andbecause can isolationists did) will be able tomake political hay effort. dearth force. for others areof a like ideas. argued. 3 523 This content downloaded from 112.e. mind.we shouldneverhave strayed ofnew from in Likewisetheformation and institutionalization our tried and truetradition.

each in turn. negative consequences result. however.79 of ideas canalsobe shaped by the degree a country isinvolved in theinternational economy.Articles IWhat China Will Want Figure 8 Consolidation Replacement Ideas None orMany -* oldideas) (of Continuity -* Continuity Undesirable Feedback One Desirable Feedback * Consolidation (change) ConditionsofNew Orthodoxy Evenwhen dominantideasare delegitimated. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . success. especially theexistence of a prominent When alternative. This content downloaded from 112. as well as on the of theideasthat nature inte might replace gration(consolidation I address factors). and somesocially viablereplacement ideaexists. hurdles Individuals may agreethat theold viewhas to go butmay not be able to agreeor coordinate onwhat neworthodoxy shouldbe theguide. thereare no developedalternatives or when thereare many equallystrong the result alternatives. change is not automatic.78 Long-term efforts thatencourage international exchange can facilitate the riseof replace ment ideas in particular Thus thesuccess societies. Consider thedeclineof the Qing-era tribute system and sinocentrism under the weightof superior European and Japanese capabilities that exposedtheir in thelate fragility nineteenth century. offered Itdependson the interaction of thedominant foreign policy ideas of states with theresults encountered. Sinocen tric from separation theencroaching international society was so dominantthatthere were virtually no groupsof with developedreplacement any import ideas to guide China's foreign policy. Prior ideasplay a rolebut of coursedo not unilaterally determine all aspects of new orthodoxies.87 on Wed. of actors.76 The sustainability of a neworthodoxy (whena promi nent replacement does exist)overa longer periodoften hingeson somedemonstration of itsefficacy.revanchists often find to theold ideas. Ideas that enduredo so because they appear to generate desirable results. Dominantconcepts that prevailing ignore 524 Perspectives on Politics relative powercan lead todisappointing results that con tribute to their delegitimation. When those notions do not.204. could be a return to theold thinking due todefaultin thefirst case and deadlockamong factions in thesecond.8' is a briefillustration follows of how someof thecentral dynamics captured by the logic might play out in the ofChina's current future and opening" "reform viewon international order above. for therole Consider.but it also existsin foreign policydisputesand debates. faces thatfeedinertia.77 democracy 8 depicts the Figure way that the distribution of replace ment ideas and their demonstrated efficacy foster or inhibit change. like collapse. whichoften power andpositive shapes negative to feedback ideas. fledgling Versailles also spawned the May Fourth Movement in China that helped discredit liberal fledgling notions. This argument features ideasas a meshing gear-one thatinteracts with otherfactors and indoing so has its own influence.For exam ple.142. covers bothdemocratic andauthoritarian What regimes. described The Contingent Path of China's Future Intentions The argument above highlights particular signposts as important for whatChinamightdo with understanding itsgrowing powerin thefuture. but also on thedistribution of replacement ideas. the policy change(and continuity) here iscontingent. inQing China in thenineteenth century. This general logicseemstohave wide application in the of great history powers.then. and though there aredifferences. Likewise.the number and nature of replacement ideasso central toconsolidation isshapedby the political activity and resources of interest groups and individuals that pro mote them. Most centrally. thelon ofChina's integrationist gevity will orthodoxy dependon the itgenerates in the arena expectations domestic and the results thatare experienced (collapseconsiderations). account of foreign Overall. Such a dynamic has been charted in thestudy of revolu tion. To stress isnot to forgo contingency expla nation. Consolidation. Economic interdependence and the promises of growthinherent in itcan indeedstrengthen thosein favor of such ideas. of therelative example. National strategies therefore area product ofmulti-causalinfluence.75 The consolidation of a new foreign policy approachdependsnot only on thecollapseof theold ideas. aswell as the distribution of replacement ideasin a particular society and their initial ifany.80 We canposit that future intentions will depend on the degree to which the ofparticular expectations dom inantideasare defiedby events. a return fertile groundtoarguefor This was thecase in WeimarGermany when theresults ofVer undermined sailles theliberal international policyof the SocialDemocraticgovernment.

Such integration thatthe the imprint ofmajor powerstatus.. powers(e. more powerful Westerncountries but an impor itself. . would Especially vis-'a-vis ifChina's govern be a deeplydisillusioning experience That is.85 accessto institu tionfacilitates sucha goal byproviding whereglobalpoliticsare decided that might tionalfora also provides affect China's autonomy. CPC legitimacy ofTaiwan to gains. tant actor for China The most concrete markerof sovereignty in todayisTaiwan.89 Social protests and disturbances appear to have September 2007 Vol. within forintegration The second major justification order is that it enhances the existing international in terms and of independence sovereignty-understood That is.82 of the Yet thelegitimacy and popularsupport nistparty. Zemin's Unite" is the national President Jiang ers Congress put thisclaim 2002 addressto the16thParty starkly: todevelopmentin forthePartytogive toppriority It isessential thecountry and open up new pros and rejuvenating governing of the modernizationdrive . theprogressiveness pects forthe must be judgedby whether and historical. justification of current andmost important. Likewise. confirming an objectmanipulatedby simply countryis no longer or Japan. "reform integration two different ways."84 based in contemporary policy is largely Chinese foreign accordingto on economicconsiderations. or unforeseen thataffect all countries downturns crises. in theabsenceof ment is somehowimplicated. 5/No. the type of thepast and the of colonialsubordination A defining of China by outsidepowers. Events related thatrepresent setbacks toChina's integration significant toeither of thoseissues would be occasionsfor China to rethink integration. integration shouldprevent territorial integrity. and it Partyisconcrete of theadvancedproductive theParty promotesthedevelopment forces. The keydifference. Economicdevelopment can of course and sovereignty withone another. infringement Communist forthe Party(CPC) leader pointof history ofhumiliation" China endured under shipis the"century of imperialist theinfluence West.87 Congressof the The FifthPlenaryof the 16th Party "theoverrid in CPC October 2005 calleddevelopment allproblems and thekeyto resolving facing ing principle orientation The dominance of theintegration China. The motivating source sucha scenario combination of surprising economicsetbacks contrasted with optimistic expectations generated by leaders seeking The decline of economic would encourage pre growth China'srapid silent that viously groups opposeintegration.87 on Wed. but instead on socialist doesnot rest government ideology.204. instead. with thegrowth major in thattrajectory thatcould put thedominant ruptures A reasonable viewon a slippery case defensive.. Integration China's rapid serves the reform and openingorthodoxy development.88 is as likely this current Chineseexpectations. touse of thecurrent will have incentive critics orthodoxy Chinese economicprospectsto rally political faltering to theinternational arounda newapproach sys authority in will be the tem. .e. The first.and Expectations justifications justify and promotethe Contemporary Chinese leaders -in andopening" dominant idea-i.142.China expectsthatitsparticipation ofworld politics theextantinstitutions and conventions will help to fulfill a desire(seemingly widespreadacross mainlandandTaiwan.it is impossible trality can play inChinesepol tounderstand therolethisissue itics and security decision-making. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . a fact that does alsobe in tension much of contemporary Chinesepoli toexplainthecomplexity on issues of can lead to deep inroads cies. membership WorldTrade sovereignty. China'sobsession withTaiwanandother territories ishardtounderstand from strictly a power per China'shistory Without knowing and thecen spective. China's Chineseleaders justify them notbasedon increasing theliving ofChinese but on bettering standard security. citizens. international withintheexisting policyis thatintegration devel the means for national economic order provides best China remains a government run bya commu opment.g. The first where theintegrationist orthodoxy situation would be vulnerableinvolves troublesinChina's eco From this nomic modernization. in the ofwhich ismajor turmoil massiveChinese least within Chinese sector andgrowing inequality agricultural society. own international itS Anticipating Events that Favor Change The durability ofChina'sintegrationist foreign policy. This content downloaded from 112. Japan). viewpoint (and incon ofChina debate) the most likely scenario trast to therise in whichChinawill alteritsintegrationist mindsetisnot of Chinese powerbut. not "Work "Well-off Society" on economic performance. tounitethe the spectrum) political efforts allows China to stymie Such participation byTai and tobuild wan toclaimsovereign international standing support.the is that it One of theCPC's main claims to authority Integra liberated China fromthatoutside influence.86 Integration in the Forexample. economic modernization and sov on may look closelylinkedto therealist focus ereignty. with ita number of significant Organization brings impli not the cationsforthe Chinese socialand political order. however. "openness" a leveling ofChineseeconomic can bemade that growth in thefuture as isChina's riseto supremacy. 3 1 525 legitimacy.83 These twothemes. gapsbetweenrichand development has led todaunting poor. isthat power and autonomy. related toeconomic growth and sovereignty. mantra. there will dependon how results match socialexpectations fore.

g.90 Involvement in the World TradeOrganization(W1TO) is puttingsignificant pres sures on poor farmers and peasants who cannotcompete."thenshifting significantly away fromreform and Chinamust takereforms to the nextlevel(e.Thinkof this as the perhaps." For thegovern approaches.92 Much. theissueisthe direction of shift and the degree from the those ment. mak parts of the bureaucracy that havean interest in integration. of course. For example.101 Althoughnot so at a faster newprivate education) business dominant as theseparatist pace-e.Articles IWhat China WillWant risensteadily in recent years. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .g.events supported by theinternational commu nitythat China seesas neo-colonial orwhichmove Tai wan towardsindependence could help to undermine China's current integration orthodoxy. someof these people can transfer toothertypes of jobsor the government can provide someform of subsidy.700 in 1993 to 87. These peoplemight advo catea nationalist realpolitik favors amore con policythat frontational with the strategy West.91 Yet ifgrowth falters ina way that makes the government seemcomplicit.000 in 2005.increasing from 8. stability and central athome. Second. He calledit"those with leftist tendencies" (distinct from theoldMarxistvariety) who critiquereform-and international involvement as contributing to social injustice and inequality.. topursue economic attempt and politicalliberalization at To theextent that a factional account ofChinesepoli an even more rapidpace at theexpense of theParty and tics is overdrawn(e.g.96 following Jiang egywill of course alwaysbe a mix of thesedifferent labeledthisthethreat from the"Right. ingheadway.99 Chinese strat the 1989 Tiananmen Square fiasco.94 The outlines of three arediscern Both offer replacements a greater difference withcurrent dominant inte able inan admittedly opaque view.142.. justas itdid inQing China. may havea hard time officials. will dependon theparticular circum stances andwhetherthey makeBeijinggovernment seem Taiwaneseefforts complicit. citizens. because the decisionmaking socialstability. platform forthe resurgence ofamodernday"Middle Kingdom"role where China would exercise within increasing Asia hegemony while perhaps itself from overallinternational distancing Replacements for "Reform and Opening" order.'00 If there is a be a voice for more forceful Think here continued political change. 526 Perspectives on Politics This content downloaded from 112. As longas the economyisbooming. thechal from lenge the Left-and theinequality ofgrowth-isof particular concern to theleadership ofHu Jintao who has emphasized the moreegalitarian goalof "harmonious soci toJiang's ety"incontrast mantraof "well-off society. whilepursuing authority a softlineand integra tionin Asia. inland cities.204. In the current this context. shared view that"isolationis the major factor of those who havebenefited most from rapidintegration explaining China's decline"and "opening China's fueled who arenowchafing but under CPC constraints or believe rise. inte men or state-owned gration todayenjoysa privileged enterprise artists or intel statusagainst executives. which coastalcityregions replacement and their or even ideaproponents lectuals. dependson a keyfactor or realpolitikers-would occupytherhetorical ground high elusivein the Chinese case: the cially nature anddistribu shouldfuture events defythe"opening" justifications of tion of replacement ideas aboutinternational within the society Chinesegovernment with clear results. disappointing China. thatisespe however.87 on Wed.93 Jiang also identified a second group withalternative pref erences for China'sforeign policy.98 If reform and opening what then? does falter.the whowould danger Rightinvolves to which one orientation dominates. the from communique the Fifth Plenary Session of the 16th Party Congressin October2005 isan indicator. Taiwaneseindependence efforts in2004-2005 weremet by a strong (and self-defeating) reaction from Hu Jintao andNationalPeople's Congress anti-secession passing leg islation which authorized China touse force against Tai wan ifitcontinued topush forindependence. would appearthatthose some sortof alternative such a new who would emphasize path.95 grationideas(Rightists want even more integration) and The first was identified Zemin as a challenge would likely byJiang be in a better positiontodrawoffthelan to his own "reform and opening"emphasisin theyears guageof nationalism to make their case. the mentality ofQing China.Anticipating withdrawal-eitherthenew Left approach. Presumably Absentbetter it information. to establish formal indepen in dencecausedeepconcern China-indeed thetype that can setthestagefor China to take efforts on an aggressive issueseen as priority evenby "reformist" governments.In foreign pol icy suchtendencies translate intosocialsupport for halting and reversing China's integration in thecurrent If order."97 A third position would comefrom those who arecritical ofglobalization andwestern butarenotnecessarily values. years not groupsfighting over on this focused and has gone togreat to effort challenge control)thenanychange in foreign will policythinking luresuccessful businessmen intotheparty andwelcome demandespecially results and could take consid negative thereturn ofChinese from abroad who mightotherwise erabletime. In recent the CPC hasbeenespecially dynamicis one of consensus. mightinclude rural farmers. opening would not happenquickly.the 1999 bombing of the inBelgradefueled Chineseembassy nationalism and strengthened opponentsof opening. thissys temlooks brittle.rule of law. andparts of the military orCommunist party who havenot shared equallyinChina'sdevelopment and couldrightly blamereform andopening orparticipation in the globalorder(think WTO) as thecause. isolationist or anti-capitalist.

Union-e. or inadequate forces support-to in ation overtime how torelate Chineseideas about tointer aChina that buthas strengthens enoughtobe dangerous.However. unfore through may lead-through two constant structural cannot accountfor the vari seenevents. future a hedgingstrategy. The effects ofpower imacy on the positive aspects of integration.87 on Wed. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . it implies that understanding acceptable toall. Consolidation of a new foreign policy authority inChina.this argument cautions againstthe another andmuch lessdesirable setof ideastoguide its main alternatives in choice thatexists among the three foreign policy. doingso suffers problems. rationale foritsactions.e. itisimpor kings. theinterdependence approach rightly highlights help softliners. A simpleresponse to behavior may enhanced approach-and hence setof intentions-is by inBeijing. Chinamaywell look to In terms of policy.The pointhere isnot topursue what has come to be isa significant and crit theperceived Understanding future intentions wisdom indealing withChina'sunknown I have icalchallenge for both scholars and policymakers. Indeed. It integration. and contacts hashelpeddevelop constituencies and liberal There isof coursea riskin supporting Chinesedevel in forces China that otherwise But these opment mightnot exist. tobe containing. or it makes sense. ence..Efforts over ofgroups manyyears bya variety and the aid to the WorldWar I Muhjahadeen in thewake of the in the United States(and inBritain)after toundercut Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan-helped the hadmuch todo withwhy internationalism of (a fusing Brezhnev "correlation of forces" that andWilsonianism)was a coherentreplace thinking arguedthat geopolitics inAmericanstrategy theexercise of Sovietpowerservedthe after USSR's interests. unnecessarily strengthen revisionist forces of a prominent Ifthe theexistence replacement idea that aligns goal istoincorporate China intotheinternational inaway that with desirable makes thesystem results.142. may making reach much toassure of Western had effort to China for payoffs bold moves penetrating geopolitical power particularly todowith tochangeits in terms of integration-or in terms of restraint why Qing China had theincentive vis-a-vis Like The point isnot simply and sinocentrism.'04 delegitimize them. 3 1 527 Influencing Intentions This content downloaded from 112. Rel Westernaction-as occurred by when the Versailles standing Treaty ative has shaped China'spast thinking towards the producedthe May Fourth Movementand a reactionary power dominant rules andnorms of theinternational The This China-would bea disaster.Likewise. ofChina. passivein of unmetexpecta on simplyreacting Situations thecombination itsdependence towhat happens in involving to facilitate China.S.S. Soviet Union helped"newthinking" (andnot someother othercountries and organizations should sanction and thinking) take shapeas a viablereplacement when the old Sovietforeign policy dogmadisintegrated. about the evolution anyeventuality and respond in dominantideasabout foreign It isoverly from two and continuity policy. September 2007 Vol. system operateina fashion If this argument is right. To dealwith thisscenario. theevent setbacks and opening.U. To theextent are tantthatlong-term efforts bemade to strengthen Beijing leaders those to build their in and legitimate their Chinese groupsand individuals who would support. theCarter and Reagan defensebuildup. policydebate:engaging. ways that foreign policyideasrelate whereinte replacement ideasthat form within China. andEuro duringthe of ideas.103 Likewise ColdWar.shouldChina pursue pean interaction moreauthoritarian withan even andclosed undermining aggressive policies thatundermineinternational order.then. separatist approach policy. Such an ap one arguedthat way (bynomeans the only way) to think proachcounselsthattheothercountries preparethem of intentions isas a product ofchange selves for inkind. itisimportant toreinforce those thefuture of a "rising China"means looking but Chineseleaders and movements beyond.Anymightbe appro hedging againsttherise proactive-topay attention to thepotential replacement inChina and their onwhat particular priate ideascirculating backers-ones that depending policy China ispur to the Chinese government's may someday be conceptual suingand how thatrelates Forexample. thecurrent U. Taiwan.. that havestaked their legit notover. ormiscalculation. the response arehistorical forsucha transformative influ precedents to theSoviet deployment taken of new SS-20 Euromissiles. attempting authority international of significant rulebased on actionsthat to reform challenge order.g. For are otherstates should replacement ideasthat more desirable than an aggres objecttoorpenalizesuchactions. U. grationist ideasareundermined. example.'02 In suchcircumstances. policies towardtheSoviet nationalist toforeign There sive. intentions-i. ment forisolationism World The dynamic was not justa balancing of powerbut an War II. longenduring tributary system to impede hardliners and how wise. doingeither mightbe desirable ofChina and growth theopenness of international trade depending on theideas andexpectations are they promoting. of thesystem. A modern-day for and interdependence are certainly under repeat of the important undermining of pro-liberalization advocates China'sattitude towards international order. To do that contingent notyetchanged enoughinternally tobe satisfied with the aswell as the norms toevents.Andmost important tions and undesired are likely consequences itisoverly onChina's focused where conceptual collapse while those expectations are behavior and not attentive enough to the ideasbehind the fulfilled or desired occurfavor continu actionand how theyrelateto thedomestic consequences politicsof ity of orthodoxy. 5/No. wemustalsoheedthe national society. mean anextra system.S. power and interdependence.however.204.

11 The National Security Strategy of theUnited States of America (March 2006) "seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for itspeople.htm. http://www. whitehouse. 18 See Kent 2002.org/ englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11 /chinai 4867. 81-102.xinhuanet. http://hrw.Articles IWhat China Will Want 15 Rosecrance 1986. http://www. 135. 1977. For exam 13 See Bull 1995. See Medeiros and Fravel 2003. http://www. 38ff. October 2005. ple. especially giventhe popu lar Chinesedesire for autonomy andnon-interference from foreigners. Shambaugh 2005." Infor mation Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. 25 As quoted in 26 Yardley and Lague 2007 and Office of the Secretary of Defense.gov/hearings/ hearingarchive. htm. Moreover.142. 19 Cf. 2 See. Beijing. 171. theHuman RightsWatch report in 2005 noted thatChina amending its constitution in March 2004 to include guarantees on private property and 528 Perspectives on Politics This content downloaded from 112. 9 The classic synthesis of power and interdependence (without ideas) isKeohane and Nye. 16-22. http:// 6 Copeland 2000a. U. Barkin 1998.cn/china/ 2007-03/03/content_818952. outsideinfluence has sometimes played a role in the evolutionof China's approach to inter national the society-from Opium Wars tothe May Fourth Movement to theearly Cold War period to thecurrent integration. which have been included in the Chinese constitution. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 2002.Hu Jintao's leadership has placed somewhat more em phasis on it. 32 Chinas respect for human rights saw a downturn in 2006 as China cracked down on dissent likely in anticipation of the 2008 Olympics. 22 The five principles. 16 Jiang Zemins Report at the 15* National Congress of theCommunist Party ofChina. http://www. for example the hearings held from the summer of 2006 up to now. Independent Task Force Report tainty about intentions and cooperative or conflic pessimistic.html 4 Johnston 2003. are 1) respect for sovereignty 2) non-aggression 3) non-interference 4) equal and mutual benefit 5) peaceful co-existence.-China Relations: An AffirmativeAgenda. Hao andWang 1978. Wolters 1966.chinadaily.November 8.uscc. Council on Foreign Relations. while we hedge against other possibilities. thelimits of outsideinfluence on a country ofChina's sizeand complexity. 2007. way China thinks about the world. 30 "Building of Political Democracy inChina. Notes 1 Zoellick2005. 3. 20 Such themes are common in speeches from the 1970s. balancing with extant norms. China's authoritar iangovernment and lack of transparency limit theability toclosely follow and shapeinternal developments. 2004a. Evangelista 1999. See Human RightsWatch. news.php 3 Vice President sRemarks to theAustralian-American Leadership Dialogue.htm Westad et al. 5 Friedberg 2005 offers a typology and contingent analysis of future relations that lacks a general expla nation to tell us whether eventswill move in one direction or another. A Responsible Course. Shangri-La Hotel Sydney. 7 Friedberg 2005 documents that there is some varia tion do not see inevitable conflict and some liberals are more in this dichotomy?some who focus on power 8 For a study that explores the link between uncer tual strategies. 21 Ross 1997.204. there was virtually no mention of this traditional role. Yet as seeninhistory. 1998. http://www. 24 Wen. World Report 2007. Centraltothis history-and China'sfuture arenot just theperils of poweror thepromises of inter but also how theyrelateto the dependence.fas. and Kahn 2007. Small advances are also sometimes made. See also Carter and Perry 2007. 2007. 27 Crane et al.gov/news/releases/2007/02/ 20070223.Wang 2000 and Johnston 2001. 1962. 23 Jiang Zemins Report to the 16th National Congress the Chinese Communist of Party. 17 Pillsbury 2000. see Edelstein 2000. Of course. 28 See Foot 2000.cn/english/features/ 49007. 1997. 12 Thomas 59 (April 2007). February 27. See for example. the keynote speeches at the Jiang's address to the 16thNational Congress of the Chinese Communist Party inNovember 2002.com.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc. 2005 and Annual Report toCongress: The Military Power of thePeoples Republic ofChina 2006. 14 See Morgenthau 2001. Payne and Samhat 2004. Johnston 2003.com/english/2005-10/19/ content_3645750." http://www.87 on Wed. Chinas recent "reassurance diplomacy" in South East Asia suggests a mode of cooperative not easily equated with domination or leadership but is nonetheless compatible behavior. 10th(1973) and 11th(1978) Party In Congresses. 10 See Snyder 1991 and Solingen 1998.china. September 12. 29 Ramos 2004.gov/nsc/nss/2006/.S.org. 2006. Australia. are significant.htm.htm. 31 Foot 2000. China's in the worldwill be largely future of its ownmaking. whitehouse.

50Walt 1987. See also Zakaria 1992. See http:// chinadataonline. See De Soysa. demo power was policy after Mao came to 46 Gilbert 1987. 64 Waldron 2004. 78 This is the thrust of Frieden and Rogowski 1996 and ties inwell with Copeland 2003. 1982 speaks to the need to power. 69 See Anderson 1983. 37 Geyer 1981.Org/english/docs/2005/01/13/ china9809. 172 (5 November 1991). Kertzer 1988.chinadataonline. 60 Building on arguments offered by scholars.142. in FBIS-CHI.Nonetheless. 59 Zhao 2000. 75 On consolidation in the literature on revolutions. Jaibao have argued thatChinas mod ernization depends on peace and thatChina's "rise" would not lead to policies that pose threats or come at the expense of other countries. 1-39. Snyder 2000.org/member/macroy/. ) andZheng 2005. 42 Waldron 1995. 16. Halbwachs 1992.cnnic. seeOrganski and Kugler 1980. and urban population." inWorld Report 2005. asp?StartYear= 1984&EndYear=2006. 1986. "the reason why we have not achieved much (relative to other countries that had opened up). Oneal.net. cited in 1995. 39 Quoted 40 See Copeland 2000b.state. Wen 2007.S.org and Singer et al. 11-12. For dif ferent strategies ofmanaging such a situation. 33 Zhang 1998. 107. 187. total popula tion. Department of State is "Create a more secure. Singer 1987. U. 53 Frieden and Rogowski. 177-193. 149-168. 63 For an argument thatChina is unlikely to liberalize in any foreseeable time frame seeMann 2007. 43 For an argument thatChina has a long strategic tradition of realpolitik thought. 52 Johnston 2001. Snyder 47 For a variety of examples. 1972. See Suettinger 2004. Zhang 1991. 5/No. 1949." 77 See Hunt 1996. available at 76 As the future revolutionary Sun Yatsen wrote to an official in 1893. Walt 1987. it is possible to explicate the conditions and mechanisms through which eventswill produce different futures.. 159-160. 67 Trade data is the total current value of imports and exports over the total currentGDP. Kupchan 1994. Johnson 2003. 2001. 551-554. Goldstone 1991. military personnel. 81 See Legro 2005.htm 57 Rosecrance http://www. Schweller 51 Lemke 2002. 402.htm. 36 Roy 1994. For data prior to 1985. outcome 61 For a synthesis of the two that overcomes some of these problems. 56 Statistical Reports on the Development ofChinese Internet. Selznick 1957. simplywill not allow it.. 41 E.g. and prosperous worldfor the benefitof the American people and the international community'? see http://www. iron& steel production. Russett and Oneal 2000.01) http://www. "Human Rights Overview: China. 65 Mansfield 2004.g. 633. 1.chinaleadershipmonitor. It also applies to social ization arguments about China as well.4 RMB. Stein and Rosecrance 1993. 185-204 In theChinese case see. Adler 2002. 70 E.g. 82 Downs and Saunders 1998/99 argue thatChina has valued economic development ahead of nationalist goals.htm.323-364.87 on Wed.Dittmer 1995. Gries 66 The Western powers of course had a say on this as well. 74 Gong 1984. 48 Most power transitions occur without conflict. 28-30 as 84-86. public opinion and entrenched ideas Mitter 2004. 77ff.Adler 1957. 1996. 49 Relative power is given as a composite of the relative share of absolute total global data on six categories: energy consumption. 69-70. 54 The index number of 100 for real disposable income in 1978 was equal to 343. No. Copeland 2000b. See http:// chinadataonline. Thomas 2001. Whiting 62 See Garrett and Lang 1996. see China Statistical Yearbook. Ruggie consider purpose as well as Capabilities Study (v3. 45 largely aimed at isolating China. ch. index/index. http://hrw. 250-259. 2 Oct 2013 21:15:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 73 May 1962. 38 Hong Kong Jing bao.204. Gilpin 1981. (http://www. 667. 80 Friedberg 2005 rightlypoints out the difficultyof predicting the futurewhen itdepends on events that we cannot foresee. See National Material 2006.gov/rn/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/ 23503.human rights "signals a growing acknowledgment of human rights.cn/en/ 79 See Keck and Sikkink 1998. 32. 603-628. and Park 1997. 20044/rs. see Schweller 1999. 6 November 1991. themission statement for theUnited States cratic.. Chinas leaders such as General SecretaryHu Jintao and September 2007 Vol. 44 Pillsbury 2000. 58 Johnston 2004b. 68 Berman 2001.pdf and Snyder 1995. see e. see Johnston 1995."Human RightsWatch.org. 55 www.org/member/yearbook/default. see Copeland 2003. Wilson 1989. 34 Gilpin 1981. 71 May 1962.correlatesof war.Qin 2001. see 1991. On the general organizational dynamic see Selznick. mili tary expenditure.org/ Premier Wen 35 Mearsheimer in Mosher 2001. Kim and Morrow 1992. 72 SeeToby 1997. 3 1 529 This content downloaded from 112.

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