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Intelligence 36 (2008) 112 – 120

The decline of the world's IQ
Richard Lynn a,⁎, John Harvey b
a b

University of Ulster, Coleraine, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom 1 Drove Cottages, Lewes, East Sussex, BN7 3HD, United Kingdom

Received 28 November 2006; received in revised form 19 March 2007; accepted 19 March 2007 Available online 27 April 2007

Abstract Dysgenic fertility means that there is a negative correlation between intelligence and number of children. Its presence during the last century has been demonstrated in several countries. We show here that there is dysgenic fertility in the world population quantified by a correlation of − 0.73 between IQ and fertility across nations. It is estimated that the effect of this has been a decline in the world's genotypic IQ of 0.86 IQ points for the years 1950–2000. A further decline of 1.28 IQ points in the world's genotypic IQ is projected for the years 2000–2050. In the period 1950–2000 this decline has been compensated for by a rise in phenotypic intelligence known as the Flynn Effect, but recent studies in four economically developed countries have found that this has now ceased or gone into reverse. It seems probable that this “negative Flynn Effect” will spread to economically developing countries and the whole world will move into a period of declining genotypic and phenotypic intelligence. It is possible that “the new eugenics” of biotechnology may evolve to counteract dysgenic fertility. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Intelligence; Decline; Dysgenics; New eugenics; Intelligence, IQ, Dysgenic fertility

1. Introduction In this paper we seek to answer four questions. These are, first, what is the world's IQ? Second, is the world's IQ declining? Third, if the world's IQ is declining, what is the rate of this decline? And fourth, what is the likely future of the world's IQ? These questions are difficult to answer, but we believe that the probability that the world's IQ is declining is a sufficiently important issue to be worth tackling. The possibility that the intelligence of the population of Britain and other economically developed nations is declining was raised by Galton (1869) and was a cause of

⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail address: Lynn540@aol.com (R. Lynn). 0160-2896/$ - see front matter © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.intell.2007.03.004

widespread concern in the first half of the twentieth century. The decline of intelligence was first inferred from the negative association between intelligence and number of siblings, shown by Lentz (1927) in the United States and by Cattell (1937) and Burt (1952) in Britain, from which it was inferred that more intelligent couples were having fewer children than the less intelligent. This inference was later confirmed by a number of studies reviewed in Lynn (1996). For instance, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) showed that in the United States women with an average IQ of 111 had 1.6 children, while women with an average IQ of 81 had 2.6 children. The negative association between IQ and number of children became known as dysgenic fertility. Since it was assumed that intelligence is to some degree inherited, it became widely believed that dysgenic fertility entailed a decline in the intelligence of the

Bureau of the Census (2006). 2. Calculations of the rate of decline were made by Lentz (1927). we also need to know the narrow heritability of intelligence in the world. In fact.57). Heritability is a population statistic and the heritability of intelligence may be expected to vary in different populations. Cattell (1937) and Burt (1952). 281) as R = h2S. Estimating the decline of the world's genotypic IQ Here we use the formula given above for calculating the decline of the genotypic value of a trait (R = h2S) and used by Retherford and Sewell (1988) to calculate the decline of genotypic intelligence in the United States. This formula is given by Plomin.81 IQ points lower than that of the parental generation). p.71 given by Jinks and Fulker (1970).e. Empirical studies were carried out to examine whether intelligence was in fact declining but these showed that. and weighting the IQs of the child generation by their proportions in the child population. 280 ff). based on 71 countries (Lynn & Vanhanen. About the same magnitude of dysgenic fertility has been found in several other economically developed nations. Lynn. to examine the question of whether the genotypic intelligence of the world has been declining.92 between two measures of national IQs obtained at different times.71 = 0.75. Retherford and Sewell (1988) calculated the IQ difference between the parental and the child generations by assuming that children have on average the same IQ as their parents. the heritability attributable to additive genes.e. h2 is the narrow heritability of the trait (i. p. Adopting the narrow heritability of intelligence of 0. To calculate the world's IQ in 1950 we have used the IQs for all the 192 nations in the world given by Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) and weighted these by the size of the populations given by the U. intelligence was increasing. whereas broad heritability includes the effects of dominants and recessives).81 (i. we obtain an IQ of 90. This assumption is justified by the demonstration that there is a correlation of 0. Phenotypic intelligence is measured intelligence and it is this that has been increasing.R.e. the IQs that would be present if environmental conditions for the development of intelligence had been the same in 1950 and 2000).S. 2006). This assumption can be questioned on the grounds that the immigration into the United States. This was reported in the United States by Tuddenham (1948). Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112–120 113 population.81 “notional IQ” points a generation in the United States calculated by Retherford and Sewell). in Scotland by the Scottish Council for Research in Education (1949). and S is the selection differential (the difference between the parental and the child generations (for a further explanation of this. 1987). To obtain this we have estimated the world's IQ in 1950 and in 2000. reviewed in Lynn (1996). however.31 (note that these figures are “notional IQs”. there has been a decline of 2. To do this we need first to obtain estimates of the world's IQ for two successive generations to calculate the selection differential. 62). Retherford and Sewell (1988) presented an estimate of the magnitude of the decline of genotypic intelligence in the United States. This is more difficult to estimate. Genotypic intelligence is the genetic component of intelligence and it is this that has been declining. contrary to the expectation that it should be declining. Applying the same method to calculate the world's IQ in 2000. These increases in intelligence subsequently became known as the Flynn Effect because of the extensive work confirming them by Flynn (1984. the narrow heritability of . see Plomin et al. These studies showing that intelligence has been increasing. where R is the response to selection (i. there is therefore a decline of genotypic intelligence of 0.44 “notional IQ” points in the world's IQ from 1950 to 2000. i.57 IQ points a generation (0. 2002.81 × 0. which in their data set was − 0. contrary to expectation. DeFries and McClearn (1990. (1990. This 50 year period represents approximately two generations.e. These calculations give the IQ of the world in 1950 as 92. This gives the selection differential. Canada and Europe of non-European peoples with lower average IQs than the indigenous peoples is likely to reduce the national IQs of these countries. These calculations assume that national IQs were the same in 1950 and 2000.73 across nations between IQ and fertility (Total Fertility Rates are given by the CIA World Factbook. led to a rethink on the problem. and in England by Cattell (1950). This is the selection differential for intelligence in the world. The solution was found by Retherford and Sewell (1988) and lies in the distinction between phenotypic and genotypic intelligence. the mean IQ of the child generation was 0. These data are given in the appendix. We accept that this is likely the case but believe that the effect is too small to have any significant effect on our calculations. The principal reason for the decline in “notional IQ” lies in the negative correlation coefficient of − 0. so the decline per generation is half this figure = 1. the change in genotypic value resulting from differential fertility). J. Thus. p. To calculate the decline of the world's genotypic intelligence.22 “notional IQ” points for one generation (notice that this is a little greater than the decline of 0. They used the formula for calculating the magnitude of the genotypic change (decline or increase) of a trait resulting from differential fertility worked out by population geneticists and applied it to the decline of genotypic intelligence.

It will be noted that this predicted decline of the world's genotypic IQ during the years 2000–2050 is 50% greater than that for the years 1950–2000. and can be projected to decline more strongly over the period 2000– 2050.114 R. In this study of 352 people aged 51–62 it was found that for men the association between intelligence measured by the Progressive Matrices and number of children was slightly positive for men (r = 0. the correlation between intelligence and fertility in Dominica is − 0. An additional factor is dysgenic fertility within countries. Lawless. The main reason for this is that total fertility rates are projected by the US Bureau of the Census to be lower in high IQ countries during 2000–2050 than between the years 1950–2000.57 IQ points a generation. 5. All that can be inferred from this study is that dysgenic fertility is present in Dominica and this may or may not be typical of other economically developing countries.183 IQ points a generation.64 “notional IQ” points by the year 2050. the decline of genotypic IQ in the world over this 50 year period is estimated at 3. Adopting this figure. There is no consensus as to what these improvements in the environment consist of. Much less is known about whether dysgenic fertility is present in economically developing countries. 1995. We recall that in the year 2000 the world IQ was 90.64 IQ points per generation.e. including increasing rates of mortality from AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. Pal. The rise and fall of the world's phenotypic intelligence While the evidence suggests that the world's genotypic IQ has declined over the period 1950–2000. . if we assume a lower heritability of 0. Shyam & Singh.35. About the same magnitude of dysgenic fertility has been found in several other economically developed nations. These estimates are based on reasonable assumptions about fertility and mortality in different countries.15. the decline of the world's genotypic IQ would be of 0. We propose as a reasonable assumption that the world heritability of intelligence is half that of the heritability within economically developed and economically developing nations. i.08 and is therefore slightly dysgenic.44× 0. A generation is typically around 25 years.67. but negative for women (r = − 0.35 = 0. education. Using the same method as for the calculation of the world's IQ in 1950 and 2000. but suggestions have included improvements in nutrition. 1997).27 IQ points. Assuming as before that this 50 year period comprises approximately two generations.61 IQ points a generation. so we estimate a decline of 3.06). If we combine the results for men and women. J. The magnitude of heritability depends on the variability in environmental conditions in the population and is therefore likely to be lower for the whole world because the variability in environmental conditions is greater across the whole world than in individual nations. If we assume a higher heritability of 0. is attributable to improvements in the environment for the development of intelligence. Lambert and Newton (2005) and is a study of the Afro-Caribbean population of Dominica.35 is a “guesstimate”. Alternatively. The greater dysgenic fertility for women than for men has typically been found in economically developed countries. 3. Estimating the future decline of the world's genotypic IQ It is possible to estimate the future rate of decline of the world's genotypic IQ for the period 2000–2050 by using the US Bureau of the Census estimates of the populations of all nations for the year 2050. It is not possible to estimate the magnitude of the decline of genotypic intelligence from the data.35.70) in a number of economically developed nations and in India reported in two studies (Nathawat & Puri. 4. there is much evidence to indicate that the world's phenotypic IQ increased over the period 1950–2000.50. reviewed in Lynn (1996). and may (or may not) continue to increase over the period 2000–2050. Assuming a narrow heritability of intelligence for the world of. Lynn. This increase over the period 1950–2000 that has become known as the Flynn Effect. the decline of the world's genotypic IQ would be of 0.64 × 0. the decline of the world's genotypic IQ over the period 1950–2000 is estimated at 2.43 IQ points a generation. If it is. this represents a decline of half this figure = 0. we calculate that the world's IQ in 2050 will be 86. Notice that this is not greatly different from the decline of 0.31. As noted in Section 1. so this represents a decline of the world's genotypic IQ of 0.57 IQ points a generation for the United States on the basis of Retherford and Sewell's data). the Retherford and Sewell (1988) study indicated a decline of genotypic intelligence in the United States of 0. The world heritability of intelligence of 0. dysgenic fertility within countries is a likely a worldwide phenomenon and is increasing the magnitude of the decline of the world's genotypic intelligence estimated in Sections 2 and 3. The only work known to us is that of Meisenberg. The decline of genotypic IQ within countries The negative association between IQ and fertility across nations is not the only factor responsible for a decline in the world's genotypic intelligence. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112–120 intelligence has been found to approximately be the same (about 0. about 0.86 IQ points.35 = 1.163).

2005). Thus. This rate of gain is comparable to the increases among adults in economically developed nations reported by Flynn (1987).. Third. These are. showing a slowing of the rate of increase. representing 2. pp. Barlaug & Torjussen. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112–120 115 and a more cognitively stimulating environment. from 1989–1998 the mean IQ of the conscripts increased by only 1. a study of the intelligence of conscripts in Norway over 50 years has reported that there were the usual gains up to the mid1990s. However. Fourth. Second.5 IQ points a generation) among school age children and 5 IQ points among adults are clearly much greater than the loss of around 0. The decline of the world's intelligence and the prospect of a continuation of this decline must surely be a cause for . and somewhat higher at around 5 IQ points a decade among military conscripts where later generations have had more years of education than earlier generations. and if dysgenic fertility continues. 2004). J. These IQ gains of around 3 IQ points a decade (about 7. There is some evidence from four recent studies that the expectation that the Flynn Effect will peter out and then be superseded by a decline in phenotypic intelligence has already occurred. phenotypic intelligence in Denmark has begun to decline at just about the same rate as its previous rate of increase. first. 6. and if dysgenic fertility continues. the IQ of 65 reported in the first study published in 1929 was barely different from the IQ of 67 in the most recent study published in 2004.7 IQ points per decade. just as it has in a number of individual countries. 31–4).3 IQ points a decade. There is. it can be predicted that both genotypic and phenotypic intelligence will decline throughout the world. as it apparently has in Norway and Australia. and then decline. as it apparently has in Denmark and Britain. plus a further loss arising from dysgenic fertility within countries that is unquantifiable. but it must be expected that in due course the impact of environmental improvements in the economically developing nations will cease.6 IQ points.. Lynn. in Australia the IQ of 6–11 year olds measured by the Colored Progressive Matrices has shown no increase from 1975–2003 (Cotton et al. There is considerable evidence for the Flynn Effect in a number of economically developed countries (Flynn. in the 16 studies of the IQs of blacks in South Africa that span the years from 1929 to 2004. This indicates that the IQ of blacks in South Africa has been increasing at just about the same rate as that of IQs in Britain. it has been found that between 1959–1989 the mean IQ of the conscripts increased by 3 IQ points per decade. has been reported by Shayer (2007). This will reduce the intelligence gap between the economically developed and the economically developing nations. The evidence of these four studies suggests that the Flynn Effect has ceased in the economically developed nations. against which the IQs in South Africa have been calibrated. confirming many other studies (Teasdale and Owen. The contribution of this to the “negative Flynn Effect” needs to be quantified. summarized in Lynn (2001. this compensation cannot be expected to continue indefinitely. the environmental improvements responsible for the Flynn Effect are likely to be subject to diminishing returns. but there is sufficient evidence to suggest that IQ increases of broadly similar magnitude have been taking place in these. The future of the world's intelligence We have suggested that over the period 1950–2000 the increase of the world's phenotypic IQ has more than compensated for the decline of the world's genotypic IQ. The magnitude of the Flynn Effect among school age children is about 3 IQ points a decade. When this happens. For instance. where a gain of 18 IQ points among the adult Afro-Caribbean population has been found over 35 years.6 IQ points. Nevertheless. however. Thus. On the contrary. the situation for the world's IQ appears to be similar to that in the United States and other economically developed countries in so far as the genotypic IQ has been declining. measured by the Progressive Matrices and representing an increase of 5. A Flynn Effect has been reported in Kenya (Daley et al. but from then until 2002 there has been no increase (Sundet. in Denmark where the IQs of all young men aged 18–19 conscripted for military service has been recorded since 1959. 1987).R. In the economically developing nations phenotypic intelligence will likely increase for some years if environmental conditions improve. phenotypic intelligence will begin to decline. 2003) and in Dominica. There is much less evidence on whether similar increases in intelligence have been taking place in economically developing countries.. and from this year to 2004 the mean IQ of the conscripts declined by 1. it seems probable that in the economically developed nations the phenotypic intelligence will first stabilize. 2005). When their impact is exhausted. The IQ peaked in 1998. a problem with these four studies that these countries have significant numbers of non-European immigrants whose mean IQs are lower than the indigenous populations and these will reduce the mean IQs of recent samples.43 IQ points a generation in the world's genotypic IQ that we have estimated for the period 1950– 2000. However. in Britain a decline in IQ among 11–12 year olds of 12 IQ points over the years 1975–2003. 2005).1 IQ points a decade (Meisenberg et al. representing a decline of 4. 1984. but the phenotypic IQ has been increasing at a greater rate as a result of environmental improvements.

The problem of arresting and if possible reversing dysgenic fertility within countries was extensively discussed by eugenicists in the first half of the twentieth century. The lesson to be drawn from the history of the eugenics movement is that it would be immensely difficult and probably impossible to halt or reverse dysgenic fertility by the methods of classical eugenics. Eventually it might spread to the economically developing nations. Intelligence is an important determinant of scientific and cultural achievement. Accounts of these ideas have been given by Kevles (1985) and Lynn (1996. 2001). All of these are likely to deteriorate as the world's intelligence declines. It would be even more difficult to reverse dysgenic fertility in the whole world. This technique is already being used to screen out embryos with the genes for genetic disorders and to implant those free of these disorders. the genetic screening of them for intelligence (as well as other desirable qualities). We should consider whether there are any plausible alternative scenarios to the projected decline of the world's intelligence. This technology would allow them to do so. If this happens it could have a considerable effect in raising intelligence. health and many aspects of the quality of life. This would raise intelligence in the economically developed nations and increase further the intelligence gap between the economically developed high IQ nations and the economically developing low IQ nations.116 R.5. . It remains possible that “the new eugenics” of biotechnology may evolve to counteract dysgenic fertility. J. Lynn. A futuristic scenario of this kind has been envisioned by Silver (1996). Through these. or perhaps by other means. The principal method proposed was the provision of financial incentives. Since the intelligence of parents is correlated with that of their children at around 0. It is not yet possible to use this technique to identify and implant embryos with high potential intelligence but it is likely that this will become possible in the future. Canada and Europe. as advocated by Cattell (1937). The eugenicists tried to find ways of reversing dysgenic fertility in individual countries and failed. but once the technique has become feasible it is likely that it will be permitted in some countries and couples will go to these for the treatment. Any attempt to do this is at present prohibited in the United States. 2004). The most promising development would be embryo selection. It seems unlikely that any attempts to introduce eugenic programs in the western democracies will be made in the foreseeable future. which they designated positive and negative eugenics. This scenario posits that eugenic fertility may evolve spontaneously in free societies through the exercise of individual choice by couples. This would entail the culture of a number of embryos by IVF. which was first introduced in Indiana in 1907 and subsequently in most of the American states and throughout most of Europe. We do not see any probability of success in achieving either of these objectives. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112–120 concern. In the second half of the twentieth century. Throughout western nations the eugenics societies for the promotion of eugenics dissolved themselves. a licensing scheme of this kind would increase the intelligence of the child generation. Negative eugenics consisted of the dissemination of knowledge of birth control and the sterilisation of the mentally retarded. the dysgenic fertility of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries could turn out to be only a temporary phase in the world's demographic development and the decline of the world's intelligence will be averted. It is likely that this technique would be used first by more intelligent and affluent couples in economically developed nations and come in time to be adopted by most of the population. and the implantation of those with the genetic potential to develop high intelligence. These programs had some success but did not arrest dysgenic fertility (Lynn & van Court. A scheme of this kind was proposed by Galton in an unpublished blueprint for his eugenic Utopia. public opinion turned against eugenics and from the 1960s onwards eugenics became virtually universally condemned. in which couples were required to obtain a certificate to have a child and were punished by fines and other penalties for having unauthorized children (White. earnings. The Chinese came close to implementing a program of this sort in the 1980s in the one-child policy. An alternative scenario is that the rulers of some authoritarian state will recognise the dangers of dysgenic fertility and declining intelligence and impose measures to reverse it. The eugenicists considered a twofold strategy to deal with the problem. To achieve this ways would have to be found to increase fertility in the high IQ nations and reduce fertility in the low IQ nations. The problem lies in the presence of dysgenic fertility worldwide and in whether this could be reversed or is likely to reverse itself spontaneously. Most couples have some alleles for high intelligence and are capable of producing children with higher intelligence than they have themselves. 2006). The most likely of these would be the requirement of licences for parenthood that would only be granted to couples with some minimum level of intelligence. an account of which is given in Lynn (2001). but it proved impossible in the western democracies to introduce any practical measures of this kind. Positive eugenics consisted of policies designed to persuade the more intelligent to have greater numbers of children.

000 430.607.409.297 5.658 148.833 562.79 1.762 826.259 48.407 3.025 4.824 10.882.552.356.36 2.74 2.983 7.840 45.221 5.677 841.38 4.170 4.818.363 10.766.617 45.052 290.03 1.000 60.441 24.336 1.122 4.175.591.575.621.666 7.869 734.575 866.216 Population 2050 81.665 19.150.204 70.393 12.376 7.000 13.579.011 81.288 3.137 130.415 9.03 6.422 146.772.734 16.69 2.263.416 430.308 14.786 22.149 1.964 62.052 973.47 6.55 3.443.466.852.412 279.853.036 51.60 3.R.31 1.155 8.819 3.520.662 228.244.797 494.939.071 (continued on next page ) .512 12.332 70.099 183.10 2.718 6176 4.68 2.042.653.268.498 114.450 1.620 8.117.011.417 8. J.669 1. Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo: Dem Rep of (Zaire) Congo: Rep of (Brazz) Cook Islands Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Fertility rates 6.497.955.16 1.39 1.122.82 1.945 43.343 3.00 1.591 14.639.005.500 4.400.89 1.961 146.24 4.728 3.800 211.37 4.556 19.273 758.534.45 6.177.000 8.30 6.771 336.403 1.162 2.579 380.028 2.033.119.161.898.656.308.423 2.697 10.406.909 34.832 3.797 1.930 5.342 6.618.481 15.83 3.22 2.369 65.891.522 4.948 64.477.404 20.60 5.332.495 11.971 2.885.46 2.278.473.935.860.83 2.91 2.147 993.41 6.76 1.62 20.982 2.201 10.61 3.50 1.722.839 41.337 6.424.540 8.740.036 31.627.267.259.556 25.400 52.933.21 1.100 2.837.779 11.35 2.166 12.7691 1.696.089.090.968 3.204 Population 2000 23.887 6.069 175.343.920.892.021.260 4.250.925.358 24.783 7.153.599 541.368 1.227.410.594 273.502.039.505.738.864.607.618 247.85 1.377.102.134.11 1.822 71.492.429.164.33 1.737 600.685.477 43.457 1.222 815.55 IQ 84 90 83 98 68 70 93 94 98 100 87 84 83 82 80 97 99 84 70 90 80 87 90 70 87 91 93 68 69 91 64 99 76 64 68 90 105 84 77 65 64 89 89 69 90 85 91 98 98 68 67 82 88 81 80 64 Population 1950 8.035.428 324.24 2.420 1.413 7.352.943.830 11.664 3.65 1.269 8.129 24.411.652 69.54 5.12 4.843 1.672.471.552 6.809.458 66.387 4.063.523 7.405 274.000 2.097 401.74 5.540.337.816 17.362.151 29.262 15.964 210.25 2.64 3.413 53.887.908.983.613 9.369.075 44.18 2.568.362 39.563.28 1.835.870 69. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112–120 117 Appendix Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 35 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 Afghanistan Albania Algeria Andorra Angola Antigua & Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bermuda Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia & Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Central African Rep.614 6.950 9.267 66.20 1.483 1.38 6.547.784.935.07 3.426.661 38.060 2.558 15.73 2.128 5.998 4651.376.579.198 3.40 1.113.955.156 8.43 1.66 1.410.700 32.075 634.316.835 30.89 4.057 13.016.816 2.515 473.355.746.102 8.955 2.655 578.645.769 6.479 4.662.088 126.94 2.710. Lynn.300 66.270.150.271.464 37.

484 1.807.63 1.031 40.806 19.615 61.136 22.735.57 5.550 83.073 4.469 63.961 1.397 815.95 2.736.92 3.447 2.443.909 19.342 6.820.449 281.561 389.59 0.643 7.364.454 7.305 2.700 65.913 144.499.494 5.34 3.73 1.777.273.84 4.995.91 4.000 561.935 87.384.50 3.34 2.79 4.607.052 832.94 3.22 2.835 64.28 6.140 30.387 438.99 1.462 2.124.043 1.80 4.293 3.04 4.938 369.137.658.121.780 5.000 1.69 4.04 4.733 2.367.293 301.741.693.097.374.95 1.738.064 2.699.800 8.270 28.122.85 2.615.215 8.654 311.801 1.654.209 82.886.381.286.122 3.835 50.025 8.555 Population 2000 4.28 2.779 5.961 2.693.18 1.278.224.610 20.447 126.382.858 1.976 2.942 11.922 1.168.564 15.357.819.356.037.784 4.163.82 5.118 Appendix (continued) Country 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hong Kong Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Lithuania Luxembourg Macedonia Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Micronesia Moldova Mongolia R.42 1.008.16 2.990.585.620 6.878.559.74 5.221.105.224 213.156 147.268 427.235.110 89.807.02 3.451.347.827 29.984 1.973.968.62 5.000 142.78 1.036 2.115.296 3.025 .85 5.86 2.816.30 1.947 53.002.509 573.628 1.08 1.754 4.720 10.048.936.89 4. Lynn.402 10.068.369 3.880.566.085.000 1.416 4.777 2.957 43.273 755.544.638.475 10.403.40 5.842.715 2.595 59.675.841 3.432 778.42 1.434 28.573 4.331 1.91 2.176.164.275 12.437 2.885.498 1.761 8.448.666 597.153 1.035.774 1.595 481.184 33.180 30.639 102.617 3.658 6.784.507.512 15.068 99.817.237.86 1.312 11. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112–120 Fertility rates 5.297.16 1.600 6.749 4.578.000 5.767 271.86 2.443 2.650 74.005.90 3.623 13.829.450 3.099.39 3.572 4.638 10.895.690.40 2.713.559.805.725 8.448 144.641.374.28 1.513.73 1.32 1.667.538 21.516.396.861 3.728 56.581 1.620 107.254 6.036 10.828.687.447.020.255 22.572 5.907.000 861.086.568 11.515.574 313.793.175.172.454 57.374.017.998.220 1.028 75.620.562 287.179.485.379.884 4.431.690 5.885 961.25 IQ 68 99 64 85 99 98 64 66 94 99 71 92 71 79 67 67 87 67 81 108 98 101 82 87 84 87 92 95 102 71 105 84 94 72 85 86 90 89 98 82 67 67 83 91 100 91 82 69 92 81 69 97 84 76 89 88 84 96 101 Population 1950 1.587 1.171 7.73 2.338.000 82.772.014.187.40 1.619 350.20 1.392 16.000 9.004.979 91.90 7.176 2.27 1.42 3.095.92 2.971 3.787.620.789 15.600.174.940.791.963.516 720.41 1.719.159 295.799 79.178 3.072.835 Population 2050 10.900 41.847 81.032.368 99.389.553.018 1.230 6.673 415.603 1.864 235.348 4.716.039 56.985 1.237.724 73.433.336.627 4. J.41 1.978.131 47.360.926.851.904 1.68 1.182 823.635.337 2.121 38.376.731 1.859 1.602 68.030 726.869 6.973 10.806 2.497.414 395.054 5.509 2.490.

419.819.117.309 617.326 4.998.084.979.597 3.852 53.767 89.151 208.66 2.750 2.350 18.49 2.91 6.101 16.463.722 79.729 8.274 54.448.678.068 277.533.271.435.908.237 6.08 1.109.016.654.628 435.013 10.817 1.00 4. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112–120 Appendix (continued) Country 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 Morocco Mozambique Myanmar (Burma) Namibia Nepal Netherlands New Caledonia New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria North Korea Northern Mariana Isles Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Puerto Rico Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda Samoa Sao Tome & Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa South Korea Spain Sri Lanka St Kitts & Nevis St Lucia St Vincent Sudan Suriname Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Timor-Leste Fertility rates 2.300.862.828 25.435 81.845.224.516.502 1.335 84.335.306.132 4.88 3.46 5.420 10.989.050 66.943.452 8.650 12.446 1.400.702.485 4.869 38.514 25.442.000 7.485 1.72 2.77 4.533.384 6.439.923.889.795.659 22.53 IQ 84 64 87 70 78 100 85 99 81 69 69 106 81 100 83 84 84 83 84 85 86 99 95 84 78 94 97 70 88 67 84 66 89 86 64 108 96 96 84 68 72 106 98 79 67 62 71 71 89 68 99 101 83 105 87 72 91 87 Population 1950 9.502 356.192.296.759 106.97 1.78 1.348 235.840 20.466 1.334.750 8.216 18.83 4.28 5.710.53 1.124.871.475.936.32 3.488.132.301.293.164 10.194 7.28 1.363.437.78 5.400 2.00 2.51 3.98 3.057 466.89 2.66 1.341 79.055 1.27 1.110.073 31.483 22.079.005 4.852 9.771 28.68 4.903 2.596.570 9.038.137 44.087.090 10.126 488.000 8.197 47.342.122 10.653.496 1.081 19.94 5.224 35.947 1.952 45.069 1.18 1.909 744.966.770.558 52.25 1.209 179.682 48.229.036.20 1.932.253.984 5.909 170.153.859.437.113.090 290.739 502.343.305.286 3.37 1.796.921 146.140 6.597 26.266.492.24 1.623 294.051.104 5.788 7.33 1.635.365 71.111 114.25 3.84 2.852 32.394 14.R.905.43 3.730 3.500 21.585.47 1.232 892.119 15.79 2.599 119 Population 2050 50.928 846.11 1.320 2.065.816 2.659 24.530.588 39.092 34.709.10 1.249 720.630.014.819 156.047 7.002.908 79.334 3.293 24.010.000 25.31 2.853 201.311.851 27.916 3.907.924 20.915 10.389 146.995.128.971 8.958 2.569 7.250.637 6.553 41.384 7.265.595.097 44.353 25.083 40.089.936 4.351.226 109.697 33.817 4. J.713 13.504 34.467.412.963 7.000 463.100 3.706.261 32.430.084.858 59.529 Population 2000 30.753 5.815.110 4.933.264 24.332.443 19.688 143.920.28 1.824.237.142 61.735 33.700 21.926.949.06 4.647.235 23.310 1.067 147.131.40 1.874 17.801 2.814 432.135 69.218.603 9.564 44.632.694.825 38.616 1.647 2.934.062.385 8.437.454 1.739.942.62 4.43 2.489 49.74 6.57 4.670.471.883 23.397 9.466 159.097.669 7.75 2.682 69.62 1.932 13.203.274.38 1.75 7.00 4.939 9.523.239.000 101.762 4.920 16.000 1.68 3.495.808.420 92.527 55.42.743 38.816 3.76 2.981.10 1.564.041.81 1.122.187.151.000 3.461 35.06 1.260 115.451.734 (continued on next page ) .64 3. Lynn.206 1.635.706 4.268.519.278.022.066.842.

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