By ULRiCH KROTZ and RiCHARD MAHER* Jeffrey T. Checkel, ed. 2007. International Institutions and Socialization in Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 292 pp. Marise Cremona, ed. 2008. Developments in EU External Relations Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 336 pp. Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte, eds. 2008. EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals. Portland, Ore.: Hart Publishing, 324 pp. Seth G. Jones. 2007. The Rise of European Security Cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 310 pp. Christoph O. Meyer. 2007. The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 232 pp. Michael E. Smith. 2004. Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 308 pp.

T least since the mid-1960s, conventional wisdom held that European integration in foreign policy, security, and defense was unlikely to amount to much very quickly or smoothly, irrespective of the often impressive achievements in other policy areas.1 However, beginning in the mid-1990s, under the auspices of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and a European security and defense policy (ESDP), European integration in these domains of traditional “high politics” has evolved and consolidated bit by bit. The old conventional wisdom, that is, no longer seems to accurately reflect political reality.
* We are grateful to the editors of World Politics and to the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. 1 Gordon 1997–98; Haas 1975; Hoffmann 1966; Hoffmann 1982; Hoffmann 2000; Zielonka 1998. An interesting early exception is Galtung 1973. World Politics 63, no. 3 ( July 2011), 548–79 Copyright © 2011 Trustees of Princeton University doi: 10.1017/S0043887111000141




Accordingly, a group of scholars of very diverse theoretical, intellectual, and disciplinary backgrounds has argued that European integration in these policy areas has gained considerable substance. Among other developments, these scholars have identified numerous signs of the changing climate:
—a growing desire in Europe for an increased ability to act autonomously in security and defense matters and to raise Europe’s profile in world politics; —the institutionalization of patterns and habits of cooperation, consensus building, and consultation in foreign and security policy; —the creation of European military forces and security institutions; —and the emergence of norms and other intersubjective understandings, including the convergence of national “strategic cultures” around a common European strategic culture.

Indeed, a growing number of scholars claim that European foreign and security policy, like Europe’s power and influence more broadly, is on the rise, and they are documenting their claims with mounting empirical evidence. One longtime observer of European politics holds that Europe today is a superpower and that world politics is once again bipolar, with the United States and the EU as the poles.2 Generally, national governments remain in firm control of the creation and implementation of foreign, security, and defense policy, such that divergence and disagreement between governments will at times be inevitable. This raises an interesting and important theoretical question: why is it that European cooperation in foreign, security, and defense policy, which has significantly expanded and consolidated over the course of the past fifteen years, seems to work and hold together in some specific instances yet not in others? As even the most casual observer of European politics knows, cooperation is uneven across both countries and individual policy issues. Some European countries, such as France, tend to strongly support Europe becoming a more cohesive and powerful actor, whereas others, such as Britain, tend to be more ambivalent. In some instances, such as peacekeeping, Europe acts as virtually a single political actor, whereas in others, such as the use of military force, the fissures and disagreements between governments often surface quickly and remain pronounced. A cluster of recent books and journal articles sheds theoretical and empirical light on half of this question, namely, why intra-European foreign and security policy cooperation has become more successful in

Moravcsik 2009; Moravcsik 2010a; Moravcsik 2010b.



recent years compared to what it was in the past. These publications place different emphases on what has changed and hold sharply differing views on what has caused the changes. There is divergence over just what constitutes cooperation, how to measure it, and how to explain its variation across time. While each author seeks to develop theoretically and conceptually well grounded explanations for the increase in the scope and intensity of cooperation, each does so from positions that span nearly the entire range of the major approaches to international relations theory and of scholarship on world politics more broadly: realism, various types of institutionalism and legal institutionalization, and social constructivism. These recent writings bring together in significant and illuminating new ways the main strands of IR and social science theory with the history and politics of European integration. Moreover, this takes place in the policy areas in which European integration had traditionally been the weakest and least developed and, correspondingly, which had received the least theoretical attention. Taking these books and articles together, one can identify three broad issues that serve to frame this emerging field of study. Considered together, these works illuminate the range of causal forces that may lead to increased cooperation and that shape its unique characteristics, the political motivations behind cooperation, and the prospects for continued or even greater cooperation in the future. First, how can we use IR theory to explain increased cooperation in European foreign and security policy? In what ways can realist variables such as international or regional distributions of power account for greater cooperation? Or is cooperation a function of decades of institutionalizing certain norms and patterns of behavior or of the increasing legalization of European foreign and security policy? Or does it derive from the gradual convergence of national strategic cultures around a distinct European strategic culture? Second, with what purpose do European states adopt common positions in foreign and security policy? Through a careful review of this collection of scholarly works, one sees how the various authors define, though sometimes only implicitly, the many different social and political purposes behind the greater European cooperation in foreign, security, and defense policy. Realists of different stripes point to the desire of many Europeans to act autonomously from the United States; to avoid a potential security dilemma in post–cold war Europe by binding Germany into European political and security institutions; or to balance against the United States in some form. Historical institutionalists and scholars focused on the expansion and deepening legal institu-

. at least in the foreseeable future. and world politics more broadly. culture. policymakers cite the need to reduce the dominance of the United States or functional necessities: to respond effectively to the many potential disruptions on Europe’s periphery. and to what extent European states cooperate with each other in foreign policy and security matters. At a minimum. 3 In addition. These works agree that European foreign policy and security cooperation have reached a scope and intensity unprecedented in the history of European integration. policies. socialization. ideas. and other ideational variables. rather than individually. European states. institutions.” Where is European integration in foreign policy. and concrete interests. the Balkans.3 The third issue concerns. Constructivists and sociological institutionalists point to the process of moving beyond the nation-state as the main source or provider of security and to the decisive importance of norms. the scope and intensity of cooperation may of necessity reach its functional and political limits. under what conditions. the starting point in the future will not be debates over the existence or nonexistence of substantive levels of cooperation but rather will be debates over (1) when. (2) the relative importance of different causal factors. European governments need to act collectively. including the structures of the international or regional systems. and norms. I R T H E O RY & E U RO P E A N F O R EI G N P O LI C Y 551 tionalization cite a desire to make foreign and security policy more rule governed or note the effects of path dependence for locking in certain norms and practices over a span of several decades. from conflict prevention and crisis management in the Balkans to the promotion of good governance and human rights in places as disparate as the Caucasus. and defense ultimately headed? Toward a fully integrated system in which foreign and security policy is defined and implemented in Brussels? Toward a system in which the national governments retain their own prerogatives over foreign and security policy but increasingly converge around common positions. and sub-Saharan Africa? Or to a decentralized system in which power and authority flow upward to supranational bodies and sideways to private actors? Absent any consensus on the finality issue among scholars or policymakers. Védrine 2001. security. the EU’s “finality. in the vernacular of European integration. See Cooper 2004. and discourse for actors’ strategies. Nonetheless. together and individually the books and articles under consideration here prompt a rethinking of a long-held assumption about European foreign and security policy: that impediments to cooperation are insurmountable and that cooperation in foreign and security policy will thus be shallow and ad hoc. and (3) the consequences for European politics.

no consensus on the exact explanandum or appropriate dependent variable. 6. The heated debates preceding the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in March 2003 or EU member states’ relations with Russia. constraints and impediments to greater cooperation—and thus perhaps to a greater role in world politics—have hardly vanished. security. There is. Buchan 2009. and social constructivism. and defense affairs as a distinct area of study. as Europe attempts to find its place in the world. the concluding section reviews the subject matter’s theoretical promise. on responding to genocide. 128–36. one realizes that. no standard definition of foreign.552 W O R L D P O LI T I C S At the same time. see Abdelal 2010. esp. various types of institutionalism. and defense. security. security. and prerogatives. When it comes to core security interests. Additionally. . illustrate the resilience of statecentered interests. For a general discussion of the factors and forces promoting and undermining Europe’s emergence as a full actor in foreign policy. and defense because those are the issues that strike at the very core of state sovereignty and state identity. as well as its political importance. and defense policy with general theorizing in international relations. This is so 4 On Iraq. see Krotz 2009. particularly over energy security. see Gordon and Shapiro 2004. In light of this article’s findings and arguments. chap. or defense policy cooperation has emerged among the growing number of scholars who study it. The next three sections consider European cooperation in foreign and security policy as seen through the lenses of some of the main theoretical and conceptual approaches to IR theory today: realism. security. This article is organized as follows. 9. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW FIELD OF STUDY Despite the advent of European foreign. The first section examines some definitional issues and sketches how. in other words. The fifth section draws a number of lessons and insights from reading these various books and articles together. note Smith 2010. security. over the past decade.4 It is questions of vital national interests and issues regarding the purpose of (pan-)Europe’s increasingly outward orientation in foreign and security policy and the direction in which Europe is heading that will continue to account for the uneven patterns of cooperation and impose limits on the scope and intensity of cooperation in the future. chap. a new field has emerged that merges the study of European foreign. Maher 2011. In no other area is the likelihood of incompatibility of basic interests and values higher than in foreign policy. European governments continue to pursue predominantly nationally defined interests and policies. on energy policy. power.

security. Jones breaks down his dependent variable—security cooperation—into four categories: security institutions. The quantitative indicators include the expansion of European Political Cooperation (EPC) actions and CFSP common positions and joint actions from 1970 to 1995. The qualitative indicators include the rationale for the expansion of EU foreign policy cooperation and the collective responses of EU member states. and military forces. the growth and complexity of EU external relations law and the extent to which governments are accountable to judicial oversight of their foreign policy actions. Foreign and security policy also includes the creation and implementation of measures of coercion. both within and outside of Europe. They can include foreign aid and humanitarian concerns.”5 This includes the imposition of sanctions and embargoes. economic sanctions. in particular. arms production.” The Cremona and Cremona and de Witte volumes document the increasing legalization of EU foreign policy.6 For example. areas in which both the European Commission and the individual national governments have long been active. Meyer’s explanandum is the degree of normative convergence around a distinct and coherent European “strategic culture. I R T H E O RY & E U RO P E A N F O R EI G N P O LI C Y 553 in part because the various scholars working in the field operate from very different theoretical orientations and are interested in explaining different aspects of cooperation. The extent of this diversity is not surprising. and deterrence—what Thomas Schelling called the “diplomacy of violence. and the expansion of the EU repertoire of foreign policy tools and instruments. While this may provide for a fruitful diversity of theoretical and empirical studies that focus on different features of European foreign and security policy. intimidation. chap. Among the books under review. The EU has conducted a number of peacekeeping missions. Foreign policy. for example. the number of functional issues with which EU foreign policy has dealt. . it also tends to hinder the accumulation of knowledge on the subject matter. Jones 2007. an area in which European countries are increasingly working through the EU. the EU (as well as individual governments) has imposed sanctions on Iran for its failure to abide by successive Security Council resolutions to 5 6 Schelling 1966. Smith parses his dependent variable—foreign and security policy cooperation—into two different categories: quantitative indicators of cooperation and qualitative ones. and defense are expansive concepts that span multiple sets of actions and practices. 4.

cooperation among European states in foreign policy. how to measure it. Furthermore. is that for the first time Europe appears to be an increasingly cohesive political unit that is looking outward. chaps. At times a “common position” among the twenty-seven member 7 On interstate cooperation and its impediments in security and defense. although this support is uneven across countries (pp. 12. security.7 Defense cooperation could include humanitarian interventions. 8 On the Congress of Vienna and Concert of Europe.8 More prosaically. The very expansiveness of these concepts underscores the multiplicity and magnitude of the European developments at the same time as it tends to obscure what precisely is meant by cooperation or integration in foreign policy. Or individual European governments may act unilaterally. and how to evaluate its change over time. The use of “European” foreign and security policy can thus be ambiguous. see Nuttall 1992. both before and after World War II. see Schroeder 1994. 13.9 Intergovernmental cooperation may encompass all EU member states or a subset of EU member states acting apart from the rest. is generally understood to encompass decisions regarding the threat or use of force as well as arms development and production. Rather than being dichotomous—absent or present—European cooperation in foreign and security policy has always existed along a continuum. The European Commission dispenses humanitarian aid and negotiates trade agreements on behalf of all member states. note Meunier 2007. . see Krotz 2011.554 W O R L D P O LI T I C S halt its uranium enrichment program. however. and defense is not a new phenomenon. beyond Europe. Thus viewed. as well as neglected aspects of regional integration in Europe in these areas from the 1970s through the first decade of the twenty-first century. Not only is there greater cooperation among national governments but there are also a multitude of different actors that must be taken into account. And the scope and intensity of cooperation is qualitatively different today as compared with what it was even in the very recent past. The nineteenth-century Concert of Europe is one type of regional security cooperation. as was EPC of the 1970s and 1980s. Defense policy. traditionally an exclusively national concern and historically the least integrated policy area. security. 9 On trade. and defense. What is new. European security today embodies greater complexity than it did in the past. referring either to supranational or to intergovernmental processes. 139–43). on EPC. for which Meyer claims there is increasing support across Europe. Europe’s very political and institutional development since the end of World War II is a form of intense foreign policy cooperation.

Starting in the 1990s. and multilateralism in pursuit of national or “European” values and interests. even if states continue to Hill and Smith 2000. European governments oscillate between different degrees of unilateralism. The EDC would have established a Europe of the “original six”—West Germany. I R T H E O RY & E U RO P E A N F O R EI G N P O LI C Y 555 states emerges on specific issues. and the Benelux countries—effectively integrated in security and defense. Subsequently. Lundestad 1998. France. involvement in continental reconstruction. The EDC’s conclusive failure in 1954 brought about two longer-term consequences: NATO and the trans-Atlantic frame decisively took over in the areas of security and defense. bilateralism. however. “A Secure Europe in a Better World. The formation of West European security arrangements after World War II was deeply intertwined with the beginning of the cold war. Katzenstein 2005. Thus. European Commission 2003. foreign and security policy received little empirical and even less theoretical attention. 10 11 . See European Council 2010. U. Italy. From the initial postwar development of European integration in the 1950s. political realities provided little reason for scholars to spend much time thinking about European integration and its causal forces in these policy domains. and ultimate authority in the domains of traditional high politics remained at the level of the nation-state. Lundestad 2003. the British-French-German “troika” in negotiations with Iran.” and it has articulated a number of areas in which it seeks to act as a single.S. In December 2003 the EU released its very first paper outlining a unique security strategy. following Europe’s failure to stem the violence in the Balkans. 2020–30) challenges facing the EU in world politics and international security. such as France-Germany or Britain with the United States. and early steps toward European integration. the EU has become more serious about matching its significant commercial and economic prowess with diplomatic and political influence.11 The time when foreign and defense policy is dictated from Brussels for all member states is still far off—if not completely unrealistic. for many decades. Trachtenberg 1999. Individual states continue to pursue special relationships with countries within or outside of Europe. and it would have created a European military. In practice. for example. However. a reflection group’s May 2010 report analyzed some of the longer-term (that is.10 The European Defense Community (EDC) was to parallel the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in binding European governments and societies more closely together. At other times different groups of states take the lead. unified actor.

Deutsch 1963. when Prime Minister Tony Blair pledged. Moravcsik 1998. Over the course of the 1990s. and multilevel governance—never produced major theoretical statements on EU foreign and security affairs. Etzioni 2001. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998. Mérand. Sandholtz. Moravcsik 1993. Britain’s readiness to see the EU become a political actor backed by military capability. federalism. Spinelli 1972.17 The books and articles considered 12 For overviews of the development and expansion of European foreign and security policy from various angles. theorizing on European integration remained fairly aloof from the main developments in general IR theory. Caporaso. Foucault. see Etzioni 1965. Katzenstein 1976. Chivvis 2010. as initially formulated by Stanley Hoffmann—agreed that the integrative pressures that characterized other policy domains would be extremely difficult if not impossible to replicate in the security and defense realms.14 The other main theoretical or analytical frameworks used to study European integration and European politics—transactionism. and intergovernmentalism. The classic theoretical positions on European integration—neofunctionalism. formulating a “liberal intergovernmentalist” approach that combined Hoffmann’s original statism with a liberal outlook that rooted national interests (or “state preferences”) in domestic and transnational societies.16 Institutionalist. EU troops took over for NATO in Bosnia and Macedonia.556 W O R L D P O LI T I C S define the basic parameters. 14 Haas 1958. Cowles.13 Less than five years later. in Deutsch’s spirit. 17 Pierson 1996. Deutsch et al. Fligstein. along with President Jacques Chirac of France. note Puchala 1970. long ambivalent over the creation of a European security and defense posture. as articulated by Ernst Haas. see Deutsch 1954. Hoffmann 1966.12 Even Britain. Moravcsik 1997. marking the EU’s first military mission. and Irondelle 2011. 16 Moravcsik 1991. social constructivist. On multilevel governance. Jachtenfuchs 2001.15 Until almost the end of the twentieth century. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008. reversed course in December 1998 at St. foreign and defense policy in Europe is no longer exclusively a matter of atomized nation-states. Rosato 2010. in March 2003. Parsons 2003. Andrew Moravcsik was among the first and most important scholars to seek direct connections between the study of European integration and general IR theory. 1957. Larat and Kohler-Koch 2009. 13 Howorth 2000. In June of that same year European troops embarked on a mission to eastern Congo. Bindi 2010. Haas 1975. the EU’s first military mission outside of Europe. see Wallace 2005. On federalist approaches. Malo. and structural realist explanations of European integration followed. and Stone Sweet 2001. see Hooghe and Marks 2001. Smith 2008. and Risse 2001. . Hoffmann 1982. 15 On Karl Deutsch’s pioneering work on transactionism and cybernetics.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union. and the creation of European military forces. realism— largely absent from the field since Hoffmann’s classic 1966 article on the durability of the nation-state in Europe20—has once again entered the theoretical debate on European integration. in precisely those policy areas in which European integration traditionally had been the weakest and least developed. many realists expected European integration. European states have increased the scope and intensity of their cooperation. as well as European integration in general. after so many failed attempts in the past. rather than reverting to a balance of power system reminiscent of the nineteenth century. the imposition of economic sanctions on a European rather than a national or transatlantic basis.19 However.18 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. and defense policy. 20 Exceptions include Grieco 1995. In The Rise of European Security Cooperation. to weaken or recede. conceptual issues. European states have been both more open to cooperation and more successful in establishing it in areas such as the creation of a European security institution (CFSP). BALANCING The increase in European security cooperation in the post–cold war era. the international Collard-Wexler 2006. I R T H E O RY & E U RO P E A N F O R EI G N P O LI C Y 557 here continue and expand this trend in applying general IR and social science theory to European politics—this time to foreign. paradoxically. European security has become more deeply institutionalized. Waltz 1993. Jones attributes the increase in intra-European security cooperation to changes in the structure of both the international system and the regional system in Europe following the end of the cold war. In response to these developments. along with NATO. Instead of viewing each other as potential competitors and sources of threat. some even anticipated power competition to return to the European continent. European states no longer faced a threat to their political and territorial integrity. Accordingly. security. collaboration on arms production. Jones asks why. Grieco 1996. and search for causal explanations. REALISM: BINDING GERMANY. Mearsheimer 1990. AUTONOMY FROM THE UNITED STATES. 18 19 . What has emerged is an increasingly distinct field of study with its own research questions. IR theory is now fully engaging with European integration studies and vice versa—and. posed a puzzle for structural realist theory.

and. . Then. catastrophically failed to stop the bloodshed in the Balkans. some feared that the inevitable withdrawal of the United States from the Continent would create a power vacuum in the heart of Europe. in the early 1990s. Europeans realized they had to develop an autonomous military capability to use when and where the United States chose not to act. a unified Germany emerged as a potential regional hegemon. motivated European states to cooperate on security issues for two main reasons.21 European governments sought to bind Germany into a European security institution to prevent it from fomenting instability. The second reason was to increase Europe’s ability to project power abroad and to decrease its reliance on the United States. First. it was inevitable that Europe and the United States would no longer define their interests with the same degree of compatibility as they had during the preceding decades. Only after it had become clear that it would take American military action to stop the killing and that the very credibility of NATO was at stake did the United States intervene. European governments. a potential security dilemma loomed. were anxious to maintain peace and stability in Europe. Glaser 1997. paralyzed by division and incoherence. Both changes were potentially highly destabilizing to the strategic equilibrium in Europe. raising concerns about its long-term commitment to European security. In particular. 21–24 et passim). the United States began to rapidly reduce its troop presence on the Continent. see Herz 1950. These simultaneous changes to the international and regional distributions of power. Following these wars. encouraged the Europeans to do the job themselves. Following the cold war. 21 On the “security dilemma” in international politics. This was successful because Germany today is a status quo rather than a revisionist power and because German political leaders also recognized and wanted to avoid a security dilemma. Two subsequent developments changed the security environment in Europe and potentially threatened its stability. according to Jones. Jervis 1978. Europe. The wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s characterized this new reality most profoundly. American unipolarity. The wars in Bosnia and Kosovo also demonstrated the vast disparity in military capabilities between the United States and Europe. First.558 W O R L D P O LI T I C S system shifted from bipolarity to unipolarity. The United States. including Germany’s. was a necessary condition for enhanced European security cooperation. Butterfield 1951. more recently. With Germany’s rise in relative power and the United States’ eventual retreat from Europe. having no immediate security interests in the region. according to Jones (pp.

American preponderance produced a dependence on American military and political power for European countries. Jones opens himself to the familiar charge that he leaves out more than 22 This “capabilities-expectations” gap is an old concern. See Hill 1993. Europe may have its own security institutions. the EU has been successful in creating a European security institution (CFSP). and European states may be imposing sanctions through the EU much more than they did during the cold war. military. What does this say about the effectiveness of this institution and about Europe’s real impact? Approaching the subject matter through structural realist precepts. After three failed attempts in the past. however. Jones provides an array of evidence demonstrating that significant increases in intra-European security cooperation have in fact materialized in certain policy areas since the cold war period. And the EU now has its own military force that it can deploy to areas of instability. European arms producers are more likely to enter partnerships with one another. Jones does not examine whether European security cooperation leads to effective outcomes. I R T H E O RY & E U RO P E A N F O R EI G N P O LI C Y 559 While insisting that the United States does not pose any kind of threat to Europe.22 For example. rather than with American firms. especially those who believe that Europe’s impressive capabilities—economic. Whereas between 1950 and 1990 European governments that imposed economic sanctions on another state did so through the EC in only two out of seventeen cases (12 percent). at the time the high representative for CFSP. . political. 97). successful in changing the behavior of the target state? And can Europe succeed in bundling its capabilities and act coherently when it really matters? On arguably the most consequential security decision since the end of the cold war—which position to take regarding the United States’ invasion of Iraq—the Europeans were hopelessly divided. but do such sanctions bring results? Are they. The book. Javier Solana. Jones holds that intra-European security cooperation would not have proceeded as quickly in the absence of American unipolarity. for example. and cultural or “soft power” appeal—have not yet translated into real influence and fall far short of Europe’s at times grand ambitions. was completely marginalized in the lead-up to the invasion. will not satisfy all skeptics. since 1991 EU member states have imposed economic sanctions on target states through the EU in twenty-one out of twenty-seven cases (78 percent) (p. It followed from this situation that a primary motivation behind recent European security cooperation was to reduce Europe’s reliance on the United States and to increase its autonomy in world politics.

their motivations. Kupchan 2002. The seminal work on balance of threat realism is Walt 1987. and several in Central and Eastern Europe have sought instead to maintain the primacy of NATO. they do not necessarily have the same strategic objectives. there is no discussion of domestic politics. as structural realists concede. motivate the increase in intraEuropean security and defense cooperation. Posen 2006. or the recognition of the importance of political leadership. his account cannot explain why there has been greater support among French and German policymakers for intra-European security cooperation. 26 Brooks and Wohlforth 2005. in Posen’s account. for both the form and the content of cooperation.26 Keir Lieber and Gerard Waltz 1986. 23 24 . For example. for example. Barry Posen. is not motivated by fear of an imminent threat from the United States. Art 2004. 25 For a contrary view. with a corresponding complete lack of agency for European policymakers.560 W O R L D P O LI T I C S he includes. Europe ensures that it will be able to act independently of the United States in areas such as crisis management and conflict prevention.24 While certain similarities abound—all place causal primacy on the structure of the international system— there are interesting differences as well. Posen 2006.23 In real life. This is somewhat curious because. For example. however. the international system simply shapes the security environment in which states operate. Instead. Kupchan 2003. whereas other European states such as Britain. the Netherlands. 343–44. and their choices matter greatly. rather than balancing ambitions. whether this balancing is of the “hard” or “soft” type. if so. attributes increased intra-European security cooperation to traditional balance of power (as opposed to balance of threat) dynamics. While the United States and Europe continue to share many values and common interests. Jones neglects many other trends in European politics. we know that political leaders. Realists also hold different views on whether Europe is balancing against the United States and. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth see no evidence of such balancing. Brooks and Wohlforth 2008. By taking advantage of economies of scale. They argue that regional security concerns. 160. 80–83. European governments are concerned about maintaining their autonomy and independent capabilities. see Howorth and Menon 2009. Poland. A number of other realists have set their sights on European security cooperation in recent years. the weight of Europe’s history on elite and public attitudes to security policy. Hyde-Price 2006. both about the causes of greater cooperation and about the motivations behind it. structure alone does not determine outcomes.25 European security cooperation.

Haftendorn. actually draws on various institutionalist approaches and combines elements of historical. For a hint of sociological institutionalism in some of Smith’s work. Smith’s explanation. I R T H E O RY & E U RO P E A N F O R EI G N P O LI C Y 561 Alexander do not view European security and defense cooperation as amounting to very much—certainly not enough to balance U.”29 One thing on which realists do seem to agree is that Europe’s increased security and defense cooperation will serve to complicate relations between the United States and Europe and lead to more frequent transatlantic disagreements. 31 In addition to the book.S. 32 Hall and Taylor 1996. preponderance. and rationalist theorizing. Krotz 2010. Keohane. Smith 2004b. Britain and France launched ESDP “to enhance their political influence within the transatlantic alliance through soft balancing. 30 Hyde-Price 2006. Jones 2007. see Ginsberg 2001. For a forerunner of this approach. Smith 2001.30 As Europe charts a more independent course in world politics and relies less on the United States for its basic security needs.28 Specifically. Art 2004. Katznelson and Weingast 2005. Kissinger 2001. but not to challenge America’s military hegemony with hard balancing. 27 28 . the United States and Europe will no longer define their interests with the same degree of commonality as they did during the cold war and in its immediate aftermath. however. 2. 199. Smith asks how EC/EU member states have been able to intensify their cooperation in foreign and security policy since 1970 while simultaneously respecting the sovereignty of the individual member states and avoiding the transfer of control over foreign and security policy to Brussels. Smith 2004a. INSTITUTIONALISM: PATH DEPENDENCE AND LEGALIZATION With a book and a number of articles over the past decade. He argues that the motive behind the EU’s effort to increase its security and defense capabilities is clearly a case of balancing the United States.32 As he says: “EU foreign policy matured from a weak intergovernmental forum inspired by instrumental Lieber and Alexander 2005. 238–43. On combining rationalist and constructivist approaches. Pierson 2004. note especially 2004a. sociological. 29 Art 2004. 231–32. chap.27 Robert Art takes issue with both of these views. and Wallander 1999. Art 2005–6.31 In Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation. see Smith 2000. 185. Michael Smith has emerged as the most visible expositor of a largely historical institutionalist approach to explaining the appearance and consolidation of European foreign and security policy cooperation. Posen 2006. see Fearon and Wendt 2002.

Nor can functional or political spillover (pp. European foreign policy and security cooperation emerged through the institutionalization of habits and patterns of cooperation. Institutions lead to greater cooperation in foreign and security policy by two mechanisms. 25–32). The first stage began with the creation of EPC Smith 2004a. External influences. See also Smith 2004a.36 The second is elite socialization. 103. for example. “although EU foreign policy was established along strict intergovernmental lines on the basis of a grand bargain. 101. does not involve bargaining between the member states over. preference outliers often adapt their positions to be more in line with the community position). 40–49). By this Smith means that institutionalization keeps European governments from unilaterally adopting fixed positions on consequential foreign and security policy issues without consulting other European governments. and does not reflect the lowest common denominator (as Smith points out.”33 According to Smith. especially compared with other policy areas). 96–98. Progress was gradual and incremental. according to Smith. This has fostered a transition from actors pursuing their own instrumental rationality “based on predetermined national positions” to a “socially constructed rationality based on collective positions. and consensus building. 33 34 . As Smith finds. side payments or issue linkages (issue-specific lobbying is virtually nonexistent. marked by both intended and unintended consequences. also cannot explain cooperation. European foreign policy cooperation is not directed by supranational institutions. and has exceeded anything planned in the first meeting of EPC in 1970.”37 Historically. 35 Smith 2004a.562 W O R L D P O LI T I C S rationality into a more institutionalized policy-making system governed by social rationality. and much of the book is devoted to examining this historical process. notably American power or American policy choices. 37 Smith 2004a. institutionalization.34 Instead. is not dominated by the largest states (the rotating six-month presidency gives small states important agenda-setting and leadership opportunities). it has become far more institutionalized than its architects had intended or even expected. is preemption. 36 Smith 2004a. The first. developed in three stages (pp. 99. especially those who work in the permanent bureaucracy in Brussels. 101–2.”35 This institutionalization has affected not only actors’ interests but their identities as well. and more important. consultation.

In EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals and Developments in EU External Relations Law. and the telex system of communication was developed. that sought to create consensus among the foreign ministers of the different EC member states. 2001. Legalization is a particular and distinctive form of institutionalization. This was a strictly intergovernmental forum. bureaucrats. and the development of the acquis politique. both informal and inexpensive (in political and other costs). EU foreign policy has also become an increasingly legalized domain. Governments at first were highly reluctant to cede any control or authority in foreign and security policy to supranational institutions. shared understandings. As Smith points out. working groups were created. The network included policy experts. which included the emergence of rules and norms. information sharing was enhanced. I R T H E O RY & E U RO P E A N F O R EI G N P O LI C Y 563 in 1970. and members of the foreign policy establishments of the EC member states. The third stage involved deepening the institutionalization process. CFSP became one of the EU’s “three pillars. The meetings became more frequent. Trust developed. With the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. including the expectation that EU governments would consult each other before taking a position on an important issue. The second stage featured the development of a transgovernmental EPC network.” together with monetary union and Justice and Home Affairs. As a result. Without the twenty years of EPC. there was little expectation that the initial meetings between foreign ministers would result in any substantive developments.38 Legalization creates obligations on governments and subjects behavior to outside scrutiny through the delegation of monitoring and related tasks to third parties. It involves decisions to impose legal constraints on governments in particular issue and policy areas. and consultation became second nature (what has been called a “coordination reflex”). The foreign policy elites in different governments got to know one another and became comfortable working with each other. The deepening of legal norms and principles in the EU’s external relations has taken place via two 38 Goldstein et al. during this phase a unique culture of cooperation emerged among the foreign ministries that included shared standards of behavior. legal scholars Cremona and de Witte document the expanding legal institutionalization of European foreign and security affairs and thereby complement and flesh out other institutional work on the subject. . CFSP would have been difficult if not impossible to achieve. and a common (political) language. Smith maintains.

that is. This. Evaluating the real impact of institutions independently from these other factors therefore remains a daunting yet critical task. institutionalization is to a certain extent endogenous to other factors—such as economic integration. the EU’s role in neighborhood conflicts (particularly covering conflict prevention). as the EU. and the EU’s neighborhood policy. “the EU’s foreign relations have grown massively in volume and complexity” (Cremona and de Witte 2008. As a result of these two developments. Kosovo. Frequently. member states have resisted full legalization in these domains.564 W O R L D P O LI T I C S pathways—through the expansion of the EU’s role in external relations in the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty. and constitutional changes states must make to be considered for EU membership. or the selfhelp policies in relations with Russia. integration in other policy and issue areas. There is an increasingly large volume of both treaty law and case law on issues ranging from trade and development policy. and through a process of judicial review: “we have seen a rapid thickening of judge-made constitutional law relating to the respective roles of the Commission. many might say. In many instances.39 This seems to be true for institutionalization in general. even as foreign and security policy has become more legalized. institutionalism can be vague on the internal dynamics leading to institutional change and evolution. the Council. questions persist over their true causal role. at both the societal and the elite levels. shifts in domestic preferences. to the intricate division of competences between the EU and Member States” (Cremona and de Witte 2008. xiii). While the literature on institutionalization and legalization illuminates important developments in EU foreign and security policy. xii). may be sobering news for institutional theorizing more generally. especially on the magnitude and speed of institutionalization. and Iraq. . should be a favorable domain for effective institutionalized security cooperation. institutional. composed of advanced Western democracies with a long history of cooperation. and normative evolution. Finally. Decades of institutionalization did not prevent the fiascoes surrounding Bosnia. and the Parliament. one has the sense that institutionalization can explain cooperation only in cases in which vital interests are not at stake. At the same time. particularly in areas of vital national interests. the political. the expansion and consolidation of democratic institutions. Smith cites three such logics: a func39 Smith 2001.

A number of scholars (and not only those studying strategic culture) and policy practitioners have claimed that European foreign policy. I R T H E O RY & E U RO P E A N F O R EI G N P O LI C Y 565 tional logic. Risse 2010. SOCIALIZATION Scholars have adopted constructivist perspectives to explain various features of European politics. beliefs. and ideas about a state’s role in the world. Research on the emergence and possible robustness of a European strategic culture is politically important. socialization of different sorts. Jørgensen. Eldredge and Gould 1972.41 But only recently have scholars used constructivism to explain European security cooperation. In many instances. Katzenstein 2005. if they are to grow beyond current roles and capabilities. he holds that institutions evolve incrementally and gradually over time. as well as agreement on Europe’s proper role in the world. its perception Krasner 1984. and various aspects of European identity. values. Europe’s regional polity within the “American imperium”. Strategic cultures “comprise deep-seated norms. Meyer analyzes the extent to which national strategic cultures in Europe have converged since the end of the cold war. will require a foundation of shared interests. Christiansen. 33). and defense. Krasner 1988. including aspects of regional integration and eastern enlargement. the idea of punctuated equilibrium might be a better analogy to explain the institutionalization of European foreign and security policy. priorities. Checkel and Katzenstein 2009. institutional development does not proceed in a constant and gradual manner. NORMATIVE CONVERGENCE. If disagreement or divergence on these issues persists. Similarly. Krotz 2007. and Wiener 2001. normative appropriateness. defense cooperation remained modest until the 1998 Franco-British agreement in St. In such cases. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM: STRATEGIC CULTURE. In The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. many academics and policymakers believe.40 Punctuated equilibrium posits long periods of stasis interrupted by relatively brief periods of major change. CFSP was dormant until France and Germany made a deal at Maastricht on political and economic union. Checkel 2007. and a sociocultural (or socialization) logic (p. McNamara 1999. Parsons 2003. So far this new focus has mostly evolved around asking whether a common European “strategic culture” is emerging or whether in fact it already exists in some form and what if any effect this has on state behavior. perceptions of threat. Malo. and legitimate means and ends for the use of military force. then cooperation in these policy areas is unlikely to develop and consolidate. 40 41 . security. As a historical institutionalist. Schimmelfennig 2003. however.

Germany. a strong role for the UN. 30). leave military alliances such as NATO. and “mediatized” crisis learning. 6). he cautions that national differences still exist: “[N]ormative convergence in these areas does not mean that national beliefs have become fully compatible. a content analysis of newspapers. a growing attachment to the EU as an actor with a general preference for using soft power. Although Meyer asks important questions and expands the theoretical debate. To assess the degree of normative convergence— and thus the extent to which a distinctly European strategic culture is emerging—Meyer uses data from public opinion polls. 2). France. This is contrasted to two other ideal types: “Helvetian Europe. a higher tolerance for risk. the need and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. Meyer specifies three causal mechanisms: changing threat perceptions due to changes in the external security environment. 185). In explaining the process of normative convergence. by which he means normative shifts within media discourse that in turn challenge existing social norms and induce learning (p. moderate to high authorization requirements [for the use of military force].” where there is convergence on “low to medium level of risk tolerance regarding the proportionate use of force. While Meyer claims there has been broad normative convergence among Britain. including the pursuit of realpolitik. institutional socialization and the role of epistemic communities as the drivers of cognitive change. and what is the purpose of foreign policy and security cooperation? Meyer sees the emergence of what he calls “Humanitarian Power Europe. Though these cultures remain distinct. Meyer finds that there is increasing convergence among European states regarding the deprioritization of territorial defense since the end of the cold war. including authorizing the use of military force. and responses to a questionnaire by think tank experts and by national parliamentarians sitting on defense committees. and support for goals regarding the use of force. and the legitimate means and ends for the use of force” (p. and a general preference for civilian rather than military policy instruments (p. and Poland (the four countries under consideration in his book). Where is Europe heading. and privilege nonalignment and neutrality. but only that differences have narrowed” (p.” in which Europe would use its aggregated power to adopt a more activist outward orientation. and lower thresholds for the authorization of force.” where Europe would limit its global commitments and profile. 11). which do not substantially transcend beyond the purposes of humanitarianism” (p.566 W O R L D P O LI T I C S of security threats. and “Global Power Europe. the issues of whether or not a common European strategic .

particularly structural realism. Another attempt at evaluating the strength of a European strategic culture suffers from conceptual and methodological challenges similar to those that characterize Meyer’s study. Kier 1997. for example. Finnemore. Even when Meyer articulates testable hypotheses. it would be astonishing (or proof of serious paranoia and poor political leadership) if these countries felt the same or an increased perception of threat to their territorial security now that the cold war is over and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are gone. and Poland have a “fading attachment” to territorial defense today as compared with their orientations during the cold war period and that a new “normative consensus” has emerged regarding perceptions of external security threats. . related problem is the absence of any consideration or explicit testing of alternative explanations. Strategic culture or related types of domestic construction have commonly been used to explain or compare the conduct of single countries. The difficulty is not unique to Meyer. Giegerich 2006. Katzenstein. Krotz forthcoming. One gets the sense that there is a general dissatisfaction with political realism. France. 42). Johnston 1998. among others. and self-consciously adopting a broadly positivist epistemology. Even Meyer confesses that only a “narrow” and “thin” strategic culture has emerged (p. the hypotheses or “testable propositions” that are advanced are often in no way unique to constructivist theorizing or clearly distinguished or distinguishable from the expectations of other theoretical perspectives in IR. Indeed. However. For example. accurate. I R T H E O RY & E U RO P E A N F O R EI G N P O LI C Y 567 culture is emerging and what effect this might have on state behavior ultimately remain inconclusive. but there is hardly any discussion of specifically why realism is unsatisfactory and why the use of strategic culture will help us arrive at more complete. Moreover. the book is surprisingly atheoretical. and rigorous explanations of these important 42 43 See. there is little attempt at explaining how all the variables and propositions hang together.43 Despite staking a claim within the “modernist” constructivist camp (p. Moreover. this can be equally and perhaps more easily explained by rationalist and materialist approaches. 5) à la Schimmelfennig. Meyer states that Britain. Germany. and Checkel.42 Conceptual and methodological difficulties arise when applying the concept to multiple countries. A second. Katzenstein 1996. measuring the existence and the causal effect of strategic culture (or normative convergence)—across four countries reflecting cultural changes within an entire region—is a conceptually and methodologically challenging task.

and Irondelle 2010. there is also an issue of tautology or circularity in the book that applies the concept of strategic culture to European foreign and security policy. as International Institutions and Socialization in Europe demonstrates. depending on one’s research objective. it remains unclear where strategic culture is located and how its impact should be measured or empirically documented. to assess the strength of normative change. offering anecdotal evidence that a normative shift emerged following the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. The volume’s basic proposition is that international institutions are social environments and that 44 For a sharp critique along such lines. respectively. One thus infers that newspaper editorials reflect strategic culture. Meyer conducts a content analysis of national newspapers. normative convergence leads to changing threat perceptions or changing attitudes about the legitimate use of military force. Mérand.” but one would then have to show specific feedback mechanisms linking strategic culture as an independent and an outcome variable. In fact.568 W O R L D P O LI T I C S developments. The result is an apparent unwillingness either to subject claims to empirical disconfirmation or to demonstrate why this framework offers a better explanation compared with the alternatives. see Foucault. Third. Strategic culture can be used as either an independent or a dependent variable. However. Exploring how institutions in Europe socialize states and state agents. This might be because what represents strategic culture is not consistent throughout Meyer’s book. . To assess changing threat perceptions in response to both the end of the cold war and the rise of Islamist terrorism. One thus infers that the degree to which institutional socialization occurs reflects the strength of strategic culture. One thus infers that public opinion represents or reflects strategic culture. Meyer uses different proxies for each of his three empirical chapters. Meyer focuses on existing public opinion surveys. In addition. To assess changing norms on the use of force (particularly in response to cases of ethnic conflict and human rights abuses) and multilateralism. To evaluate whether the rise of new security institutions acts to socialize agents operating within them.44 For example. none of these criticisms or shortcomings is inherent to constructivism as such or to applications of constructivist thought. Jeffrey Checkel and contributors provide conceptually and methodologically rigorous constructivist research. The relationship between the two is not always clear in the work considered here. Meyer uses responses to questionnaires. Meyer uses these in turn as evidence for evolving normative convergence. It is true that the two could be “co-constituted.

security. 243–51). role playing. 9–16. across theoretical perspectives. Checkel defines socialization as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (p. ESDP. institutions can have constitutive as well as constraining effects (p. according to this view. For the first time in nearly five centuries. post-national identity” (p. Second. Interestingly. and in no way can be construed as shaping a new. redefines the way in which Europeans think about the state in the twenty-first century. the results of institutionalization are largely consistent with Meyer’s findings. the actor or agent moves from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness.45 Checkel further identifies three separate causal mechanisms that induce change: strategic calculation. they provide a number of lessons and insights. including NATO. and defense that is historically unprecedented. elites and the European public no longer view defense as a fundamental part of state identity. 45 46 . a consensus has emerged that European states have succeeded in establishing a degree of cooperation in foreign policy. 19). That we find such disagreement across works rooted in different theoretical or intellectual March and Olsen 2006. Type II socialization signifies changes in values and interests or when “agents accept community or organizational norms as ‘the right thing to do’” (p. Examined together. Situated in a broader argument about state transformation. By adopting the rules of the broader community. In addition to the constructivist approaches outlined in this section. The individual chapters apply this framework to the socializing effects of several institutions in Europe. there is basic disagreement regarding which factors are driving and thus are most important for explaining the apparent consolidation of policy-making at the European level. He distinguishes between two types of socialization. The “empirical studies demonstrate that the socializing effects of European institutions are uneven and often surprisingly weak. because it cuts to the heart of state sovereignty. Unfortunately.46 WHERE THE FIELD STANDS These books and articles represent a decisive development in the literature on European foreign and security policy. political sociology has entered the field as well. 16). First. 5). Type I socialization is the movement from instrumental rationality to the conscious adoption of new roles. no chapter looked specifically at CFSP or ESDP. I R T H E O RY & E U RO P E A N F O R EI G N P O LI C Y 569 participation in them may socialize both individual policymakers and states. the Council of Europe. See Mérand 2008. 6). and normative suasion (pp. It would have been instructive to compare the findings with those of Meyer and Smith. and the OSCE.

Some realists attribute the rise in European security cooperation to a desire for enhanced autonomy from the United States and a greater profile in world politics. Institutionalists place differing emphases on the relative importance of logics of consequences versus logics of appropriateness driving cooperation. marshaling a broad range of causal factors and explanations for why this has happened. including sending an EU mission to Georgia to monitor Russia’s promise of troop withdrawal from Georgia proper. leave out balancing dynamics altogether. It is not clear how the authors would explain such variation: the starts and stops of integration or why cooperation on foreign and security policy seems to ebb and flow. . security. security. What is remarkable. 47 Wallace 2005. and defense policy has significantly expanded and consolidated over the past fifteen years.570 W O R L D P O LI T I C S traditions should not be surprising. Constructivists diverge on how deeply institutions socialize actors and over what matters most in reshaping the region’s political character: socialization through international institutions or normative convergence otherwise driven. realism in particular. EU states are still divided on recognizing Kosovo’s independence. Theorizing on these starts and stops will further strengthen the burgeoning field in the future.47 This returns us to the question raised earlier: why does European cooperation in foreign policy. marked by incremental successes building on major failures. however. as well as the role of path-dependent versus sociological processes for institutional evolution and adaptation. progress toward consolidating a more cohesive European foreign and security policy has been uneven and has moved in a number of successive phases. Others point to traditional balance of power dynamics (a response to American unipolarity). Third. Some. Yet another reason realists cite is a desire to avoid a potential regional security dilemma and to bind Germany into European institutions. Rather than moving in a linear fashion. while the EU was able to adopt a common position in response to the six-day war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. while the works discussed here demonstrate that European foreign. none of the authors addresses the question of why cooperation works at some times on some issues but not on others. For example. such as Jones. and defense seem to work and hold together in some political instances but not in others? The extant research in this new field has not yet seriously considered or even acknowledged this question. are the striking differences within the same macroperspective.

“Despite its substantial military assets. To date. perhaps by all of them. It would place less emphasis on Europe’s military capabilities and advantages and instead highlight Europe’s soft power appeal and its ability to attract others. These are questions that future scholarship in the area will likely consider. Such a liberal approach would also likely see the purpose of European cooperation in much different terms than that of a realist approach. Scholars have 48 Moravcsik 2009. A liberal IR theory might stress how domestic and transnational societal coalitions. I R T H E O RY & E U RO P E A N F O R EI G N P O LI C Y 571 Fourth. Most arguments in this new field tend to adopt a zero-sum form in which cooperation derives from international or regional pressures. There might even be an element of overdetermination. 409–10. Europe’s true geopolitical comparative advantage lies in projecting civilian influence: economic influence. The more interesting question is how these various factors interact with each other.49 CONCLUSION: THEORETICAL PROMISE AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE The past decade has witnessed the advent of a new area of research that has merged the study of European integration in the areas of traditional “high politics” with international relations theory. how and possibly in what order they combine to establish causal effect. see Moravcsik 2009. or institutionalization. . The degree to which moving beyond monocausal arguments or explanations more or less cleanly rooted in one macroperspective or paradigm and the degree to which analytic eclecticism might help to arrive at historically and politically more exhaustive explanations offer an interesting theoretical puzzle that arises from these works. As Moravcsik says. 409–10. there is no major theoretical work applying liberal IR theory to increased European foreign and security policy cooperation. or culture and identity.” see Sil and Katzenstein 2010. any sensible observer would likely agree that the increase in the scope and intensity of cooperation is probably shaped by more than one of these factors.”48 Finally. and how much each factor or variable explains individually. particularly those states on Europe’s periphery that one day hope for EU membership. For a basic outline of what a liberal IR theory of European foreign. interdependence. and perhaps values shape state preferences and make cooperation more likely. for example. In real political life. security. it is also worth noting what is currently missing in this literature. ‘smart’ and ‘soft’ power. another notable feature of this literature concerns the nature of causal explanation. Henke 2010. 49 On “analytic eclecticism. and defense policy could look like. international law. domestic institutions.

Bringing general IR theory to the study of European foreign and security policy holds clear benefits for isolating key factors that can potentially lead to greater cooperation or integration in these domains. basic approaches to regional integration. alliance politics. little by little. Will this system in security and defense further consolidate into a distinct regional polity and machinery of policy-making—and thus offer new ways of theorizing international affairs? Or will it. constructivist. and thus political leaders are accountable to their publics. nor just a new type of twentyfirst century European concert. meaningful contributions or reappraisals of some of the central features. the balance of power. It is not simply a framework of collective security. This may reflect the multiplicity of forces at work and the many dimensions that these changes in European affairs imply. Taking domestic politics more systematically into account—whether viewed through historical institutionalist. European states are democracies. and conventional wisdoms of major theories or theoretical paradigms? Since the seventeenth century European politics has provided IR with some of its core concepts and theories: the modern territorial state. In the . as well as the diversity of international relations theory and the field’s infancy. nor a conventional military alliance. and defense cooperation. turn into a cohesive pan-European actor in “high politics” that resembles classic nation-states yet on a larger scale—and thus offer new terrain for theorizing full-scale regional integration in foreign policy. The new field offers a number of promising theoretical openings in areas of great political importance. security. security. deterrence.572 W O R L D P O LI T I C S identified a wide range of factors to explain the rise of European foreign policy. concepts. the security dilemma. and defense? What is highly likely is that Europe’s role in world politics will largely be defined by Europe’s most powerful states in pursuit of their own interests. But what about the reverse? What might the study of European integration in security and defense offer to IR and social science theory? Will there be new. perhaps along with the increasing involvement of various European-level institutions and offices. both intergovernmental and supranational. offense-defense theory. Will similar theoretical or analytical breakthroughs occur by studying European foreign and security policy of the early twenty-first century? European foreign and security policy cooperation seems to be a qualitatively new form of resilient and evolving cooperation between states in these areas. major aspects of power transition theory. and nationalism and ideology. or rationalist lenses—could be one of the more significant contributions of this new field to the study of international relations.

and Bismarcks of European history (and the many minor figures alongside) may not have had to bother with trifles such as domestic pressures. Howorth 2009. and it will have to determine which might be tolerable and which unacceptable. the finality issue—where European foreign policy. security. secure. a Europe more or less cohesive in foreign policy. as well as European integration at large. Similarly. Europe is unlikely to be able to afford to avoid this issue indefinitely and will eventually have to confront it. there is its basic political importance. warring against each other. or public opinion. promises to help the field to arrive at more comprehensive and robust theoretical knowledge. and defense policy is in important ways a function of domestic politics. Beyond the theoretical promise of the subject matter. democratic constitutional arrangements. foreign. and defense cooperation. this clearly is not the case for today’s political leaders. not only among scholars operating from similar or different theoretical orientations but also among practitioners and policymakers across the political spectrum. or loosely 50 For example. and at the national and supranational levels. While the Talleyrands. European governments today face a decision similar to the one the United States faced in the 1940s: to boost their strategic means to match their expanding collective foreign policy goals or to scale down their ambitions to match their limited capabilities. Vennesson 2010. promoting their preferred vision of Europe as a political project. security. One of the most noteworthy developments in European foreign and security affairs is that longtime observers of European politics have begun to reflect on what a European grand strategy should be—and could be. The fate of European cooperation in the foreign policy. Howorth 2010. great power concert. In any case. are ultimately headed—will involve political decisions. presumably in association with regional and systemwide factors and forces. I R T H E O RY & E U RO P E A N F O R EI G N P O LI C Y 573 safe. and defense would mark a dramatic shift from what Europe has experienced over the past two centuries—whether nineteenth-century-style balancing. Europe will also have to accept that an increased role worldwide potentially involves painful costs and risks. define its role in the world. and prosperous EU. Metternichs. security. one way or another. . Systematic testing of the role of domestic politics. security. In one sense perhaps. and defense domains will be crucial if Europe is to find its place and. Castlereaghs.50 Arguments over the purpose and ends of European foreign policy and security cooperation will continue.

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Harvard University. He is the author of Equality and Transparency: A Strategic Perspective on Affirmative Action in American Law (2007).ac. He can be reached at sabbagh@ceri-sciences-po. party strategies. elections.” He can be reached at johan. and policy convergence and burden sharing in the European Union.T H E CONTRI B UTORS JOHN GERRING is a professor of political science at Boston University. 1828–1996 (1998) His research interests include examining the linkages between political parties and ordinary voters. and political institutions. He can be reached at hugh@essex. He is author of Flying Tiger: International Relations Theory and the Politics of Advanced Weapons (2011) and History . Concepts and Method: Giovanni Sartori and His Legacy (2009). His most recent book is Linking Citizens and Parties (2010). His current research interests include the relationship between trade and conflict. Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework (2001).uk.D. along with numerous articles. JULIÁN ARÉVALO received his LAWRENCE EZROW is an associate professor in the Department of Government at the University of Essex. TARIQ THACHIL is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Yale University. “Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in His work focuses on Latin American political economy and studies the interplay between ideas and the formation of political values and attitudes. ULRICH KROTZ is a fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. HUGH WARD is a professor in the Department of Government at the University of Essex.harvard. He is currently working on his dissertation. and “Democracy and Development: A Historical Perspective” (in process). A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance (2008). in political science from Boston University in May 2011. DANIEL SABBAGH is a senior research fellow at Sciences Po. He is the author of Party Ideologies in America. political representation. He is currently completing a book manuscript based on his doctoral He can be reached at hdorus@essex. DANIEL ZIBLATT is a professor of government at Harvard University. He can be reached at jgerring@bu. “Discursive Institutionalism and Political Change in the Netherlands. political parties. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (2007). ethnic and religious politics. He has written on democracy. and an assistant professor of political science at Brown University. 7050. examining how religious nationalists can win over poor communities using social services.” He can be reached at dziblatt@fas. “Global Justice: A Prioritarian Manifesto” (in process). and patterns of public spending in poor democracies. He is currently completing a book entitled. Centre d’études et de recherches internationales (CERI) UMR CNRS no.van. He is the author of Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism (2006) and coeditor of The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies (2010).thachil@yale.gorp@gmail. JOHAN VAN GORP is a fifth-year doctoral candidate in the Political Science Department at Boston He can be reached at peacekeeping operations and the governance of postconflict societies. He can be reached at tariq. HAN DORUSSEN is a professor in the Department of Government at the University of Essex. He can be reached at jarevalob@gmail . Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework (2012). His recent work applies social network theory to international cooperation and conflict.

harvard.D. His research areas include alliances. RICHARD MAHER is a Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute for the 2011–12 academic He can be reached at ukrotz@wcfia. . nuclear weapons. He is now working on two different book projects and a range of articles in the areas of European foreign and security policy and “Europe in the world”. His dissertation examines the alliance security dilemma under unipolarity. He recently completed a and shifts and continuities in contemporary world politics. He can be reached at richard_maher@brown. Franco-German relations and their impact on the history and politics of European integration. in the Political Science Department at Brown University.and Foreign Policy in France and Germany (forthcoming). and energy security.

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