NATIONAL SCHOOL OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES

STRATEGIC STUDIES READER

LECTURER RADU-SEBASTIAN UNGUREANU RADU - ALEXANDRU CUCUTĂ

BUCHAREST 2013

1. State and Sovereignty

Diplomacy
THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN STATES

ADAM WATSON

CHAPTER III Aims and Policies of States

We established in the last chapter that states or political entities which wish to retain their independence, whether within their existing boundaries or by forming a community or union with some of their neighbours, are fated to communicate with other states and unions outside their own. This negotiation between political entities which acknowledge each other’s independence is called diplomacy. What then do states (including communities and unions of states) want of one another? What, as economists say, are their demands on each other and on the system? Each independent political entity has certain goals or objectives which it—or more specifically its government —wishes to achieve, certain things which the government and perhaps the people also wish to say and do. These goals, which reflect the values of the people, may be publicly proclaimed, or they may be unspoken and perhaps only half consciously held. Sometimes a government proclaims goals which are quite different from those it actually pursues. Because this is the language of politics, much is written about the policies of leaders and political parties and governments in terms of long-term goals. But a goal is something outside you, something fixed and immovable, at the end of the road or the other side of the field. Goals certainly come into the diplomatic dialogue between states, and especially into that part of it which is conducted in public. But what almost all states ask of one another in their day-to-day relations, what they discuss and negotiate with one another about most of the time, are their more immediate needs and requirements, and their responses to pressures and circumstances. Indeed, a government’s responses to pressures, its manner of coping with problems not of its own choosing, usually go far in determining its external policy. Of course the policies of a government are modified by its long-term goals and objectives, and its responses determined by its values: though often much less than governments like to proclaim. A large number of the problems which confront a government, and most of the political goals of a ruler or a party, are inward-looking and domestic. Similarly, the day-to-day policies of a government are mainly

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concerned with the internal affairs of the state which it governs. The reason why governments value independence so highly is because they want to be able to take these internal decisions themselves. In the modern world the government is the ultimate and decisive authority inside a state; and as the power of the state (that is, the government) over all activities within it increases, so it becomes more absolute in the sense that its decisions determine what shall happen in matters that are within its control. More particularly, inside its own domain a government can make laws and issue edicts, in the expectation that they will be generally obeyed, even if sometimes grudgingly; and it has means of law enforcement to compel those who disobey. But in so far as the problems which face a government are due to causes outside its boundaries, in so far as what other states do affects its problems, and indeed its policies and its goals, and in so far as its policies affect other states, we say a government has a foreign policy. Aussenpolitik (outward policy) is the useful German term. In the field of outward policy the position of a government is entirely different from its position at home. A state is not normally strong enough, or for a number of reasons is unable or unwilling to use its strength, to coerce other states to behave as it wishes. And since if it did, the other states concerned would not be meaningfully independent, we may broadly say that by definition an independent state is compelled to negotiate and bargain with other states on all matters where the policies of other states affect its own. Sometimes negotiation fails, of course, and states resort to force. But not all the time, and not with all other states. Most of the time states further their interests, and make their demands on the system and respond to its pressures, by negotiation. There have been periods of history when the political entities in a certain area had so little contact with one another that they hardly had need of outward policies. But the more closely knitted together a system or society of states is, and the more interdependent the individual states in that society are, the more each will be affected by the outward policies of the others, and the more obliged it will be to take account of them and to enter into a dialogue with them, whether it wants to or not. The world as a whole has never been so closely knit, so interdependent, as it is today. Consequently there is today more diplomacy, and it is more complex, than ever before. It is a matter of common observation that the interests and principles, and the goals, of states differ: that each state has a distinct outward policy. Only in imaginary models designed by political scientists for the purposes of study do all the states in a system have the same policy towards each other. The main reason for these differences is that the outward policy of each state is largely determined for it by the needs of the area concerned and of the people who live there. Thus, for instance,

AIMS AND POLICIES OF STATES 23

every government of Mauritius will be concerned to sell its sugar at a good price; every government of Russia will want to ensure safe passage through the straits out of the Black Sea; every government of Britain has to ensure imports of huge quantities of food and raw materials. But there is also an area in the outward policy of any state which is not determined in this way but open to choice. This area of choice varies according to the circumstances of each state, and is usually much more limited than is often supposed; but it receives a great deal of attention precisely because it is a matter of choice, and therefore of controversy. Choices are possible about some long-term goals, but more usually they involve decisions about reactions to external events and pressures, and methods of responding to them, including ultimately involvement in war. Every state, whether comparatively insulated from others or highly interdependent, is above all concerned to preserve the right and ability to take its own decisions, that is its independence. This is not to say, of course, that every state or political entity wishes to stay exactly as it is, in composition and territorial extent. Certain small states, and especially their populations, are willing to merge into a larger, equally independent state. Sometimes quite large countries want to do this, especially where the populations feel that they belong to the same nation or group. The German and Italian states pooled their independence and their sovereignty in the nineteenth century to form two large nation-states. Perhaps the Arab states, or those of Western Europe, may do the same tomorrow, and agree to share in the decisionmaking processes of a larger state. Indeed from ancient times many groups of similar states have merged or formed unions in order to defend their collective independence more effectively. Similarly, groups or nations which are incorporated in existing states like the United Kingdom or India, may have the will and the opportunity to secede and to form smaller states on their own. In all these cases, new states emerge, and the desire to preserve independence from other states which people consider to be outside their own entity remains as before. The desire of every political entity to look after its own interests and take its own decisions arises from the fact that the interests of different states and groups differ. It is wholly false to suppose that the interests of different groups of people do not, or need not, ever conflict. If states were replaced by other structures, these conflicts of interest would remain. However, this does not mean that interests are irreconcilable. Interests can be harmonized, or reconciled, or fairly divided by consent, as well as maintained in the teeth of opposition. What this means is that, to take our first example, the people of Mauritius, who live mainly by producing sugar, want to get as many other goods as possible in exchange for their sugar. In Western economic terms they want as high

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a sugar price as they can get; whereas the foreigners who consume the sugar and export manufactured goods in return want to pay no more than they have to. Sugar may be an easier issue to settle than oil, but it is the principal export of many countries today, and a great deal of negotiation and bargaining, a great deal of diplomacy, goes into determining sugar prices and quotas. In this as in all the other issues of modern diplomacy, each state concerned wishes to take its own decisions and defend its own interests. For instance, the major practical justification of the independence of small, underdeveloped countries from colonial and neo-colonial rule is that their interests are not as well served by leaving their vital decisions in the hands of others. The principal concern of each state, then, is to preserve its own independence. In a system of states where the policy of each affects the others, many states recognize that they have a joint interest in maintaining their independence; and they come to see in the independence of their fellow members the means to preserve their own. It is not necessary that every state should attach importance to preserving the independence of every other state, nor that it should formally recognize all other states as having the same moral right to a separate existence as it claims for itself. For example, governments committed to national unification are apt to consider certain existing states to be entities which are destined to disappear, either by absorption or by partition. But even in the case of revolutionary regimes, and especially those on the defensive, the maintenance of one’s own independence is soon seen to involve some recognition of that of others (though not necessarily all others). It is clearly shortsighted of a state to concern itself with the preservation of its own independence only, while a more powerful neighbour establishes its domination over other states, for sooner or later its turn is likely to come, and it may not be strong enough to withstand alone that increasingly powerful neighbour. From this practical and vital involvement in the independence of other states, the concept develops that states have a general right to be independent, and that those which want to exercise this right have an interest in supporting each other in asserting it. So states in systems come to recognize that the mutual acceptance of the principle of independence, even with exceptions, is a necessary condition of a society of states, and that diplomatic intercourse between them must therefore be based on this acceptance. Recognition of independence, where it exists, both in practice and of right, is a prerequisite of diplomacy. For a state must recognise that other states are able and entitled to take their own decisions if it is to communicate and negotiate with them effectively about how they will act.

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The independence of all the states in a system is compatible, just as within a state the rights of political parties are compatible with one another. This concept of compatibility is important for all collective diplomacy, and it applies to other aspects of international life which most states regard as highly desirable, though they are not prerequisites of a diplomatic dialogue, as independence is. For instance, peace and security are not essential preconditions of diplomacy. Diplomacy can be very active even in wartime: within an alliance, and with neutrals, and between the warring states in order to bring the war to an end. Peace and security are not the same; and though they are bracketed together in the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the U.N.Charter, even there concepts like ‘enforcing the peace’ and ‘military sanctions’ clearly illustrate that the maintenance of security may require the capacity and the perceived will to use military force. But peace and security are like independence in that they are also compatible. Every state can work for them without denying them to other states; and diplomacy can aim to establish and maintain them on a universal and collective basis. Therefore when we say that in an international society or system of states independence, and peace, and security are compatible, we mean that broadly speaking the states which desire these conditions can all attain them at once. Similarly we may say by extension that there is a wide range of issues where the interests of states differ and indeed conflict, but where solutions can be found which both parties find it in their interest to accept. For instance, if we take again the issue of sugar, there is a price at which it is in the interest of the seller to sell and the buyer to buy. Since trade is mutually beneficial, the interests of the buyer and seller are opposed but not incompatible. If all the states in a system, all the political entities in an international society, had only compatible purposes, diplomacy would involve a great deal of hard bargaining, and perhaps some ill feeling between competitors, but there would be no serious threat to peace and order in the international community. However, in the real world not every state, and certainly not every active political entity, has peaceful and compatible aims and policies. There are at present and always have been a number of states, and of political entities that do not quite have the international position of recognized states, which consider that the world is wrongly ordered and is unjust either in general or in some particular. They do so for a number of reasons. They may have revolutionary governments, or at least governments who consider it their duty to change the way in which other states are governed (e.g., to spread communism, or democracy, or a religion like Islam). Or another state may occupy territory which they consider ought rightfully to be theirs. Or they may demand equal opportunities for trade and expansion which other states

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monopolize (this was the complaint of Japan between the two world wars). Or they may be rebel movements that wish to set up new and independent states or gain control of existing ones. All these aims and demands, and other similar ones, have been considered legitimate, and indeed heroic and praiseworthy, by different peoples at different times. So far as diplomacy is concerned, what matters is that all of them are incompatible with the interests and demands of some other state or states. There are two great difficulties about incompatible demands. The first is the ‘subjectivity’ of controversial values. Independence, and peace, and the price of sugar, are for practical purposes objectively definable. Diplomats talking about such matters have no great difficulty in agreeing what is meant, even though concepts like independence and peace are not absolutes but mean rather different things in different contexts. Some incompatible demands are equally definable, especially concrete ones like claims to territory. But a demand for justice, a plea for a wrong to be righted, are based on subjective judgements, on which there is normally no agreement. The state against which the demand is made will probably regard it as unjust, using other criteria which are also controversial. For instance, if we take the dispute between the United Kingdom and Spain about Gibraltar, both sides have criteria of their own, according to which they are in the right. A decision by the International Court that Gibraltar is legally British would not convince the Spaniards; and votes by the General Assembly of the U.N. in favour of Spain have not convinced the British. The second and even greater difficulty about incompatible demands derives from the fact that where a state or political entity feels very strongly about what it considers to be an injustice, it or at least certain of its members tend to resort to violence in order to correct the wrong. This is especially true when the criteria or values on which one state or group bases its claim are not universally accepted. The history of Palestine over the last sixty years is a good illustration of this difficulty. If peace were to be the supreme goal of all states, and there were to be no recourse to war or other forms of violence in order to right wrongs or to change the world, then only those wrongs could be righted and only those adjustments made which a state could be induced to accept without the use of force. It is true that the values of states change; and that a state may sometimes be persuaded to yield by argument, because its government and people acknowledge the justice of the case brought against it. For instance, imperial states may freely, and without the use of force, grant independence to colonies—as Britain, France, Spain and other countries have done. Or a state may be induced to give way by other member states of the international system applying pressure short of force, such as economic sanctions. But in practice such changes are

AIMS AND POLICIES OF STATES 27

limited. The renunciation in advance of the use of force in order to right a proclaimed ‘injustice’ is recognized in practice as a diplomatic formula weighted heavily in favour of the status quo. So peace, the exclusion of violence by one political entity against another, is essentially the policy of satisfied states, weak states and states which consider that the changes they really care about can be achieved by diplomacy and the help of their friends without recourse to violence. Peace, then, does not mean a condition in which there are no conflicts between the needs, demands and goals of states, for these are always present. It means—in the United Nations Charter, for instance, and in common usage—a condition where states and political entities do not use violence against one another in pursuit of their incompatible goals. War is a highly concentrated and specialized form of violence between states. It is usually on a much larger and deadlier scale than other forms of violence, and is also usually subject to certain rules and conventions, like the treatment of prisoners, which other forms of international violence do not respect. But like other forms of planned and organized violence it is a means to an end. Political entities do not resort to force for pleasure, though some individuals may enjoy the thrill and excitement of violence and war. They resort to force in order to attain a political goal: for instance, in order to correct what they consider an unjust or unfair situation, or to defend what they consider just and right against violence by others. In order to understand this crucially important aspect of international affairs, and the role which diplomacy can play in it, we must therefore next examine in more detail, first, subjective ideas of justice, and the conflicts to which incompatible ideas of justice give rise; and then the general relation of diplomacy to force.

the oxford handbook of
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POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
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Edited by

R . A . W. R H O D E S SARAH A. B INDER
and

BERT A. RO CKMAN

1

chapter 7
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T H E S TAT E A N D S TAT E - B U I L D I N G
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bob jessop

The state has been studied from many perspectives but no single theory can fully capture and explain its complexities. States and the interstate system provide a moving target because of their complex developmental logics and because there are continuing attempts to transform them. Moreover, despite tendencies to reify the state and treat it as standing outside and above society, there can be no adequate theory of the state without a wider theory of society. For the state and political system are parts of a broader ensemble of social relations and neither state projects nor state power can be adequately understood outside their embedding in this ensemble.

1

What is the State?

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This innocuous-looking question challenges anyone trying to analyze states. Some theorists deny the state’s very existence (see below) but most still accept that states are real and provide a valid research focus. Beyond this consensus, however, lies conceptual chaos. Key questions include: Is the state best deWned by its legal form,

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coercive capacities, institutional composition and boundaries, internal operations and modes of calculation, declared aims, functions for the broader society, or sovereign place in the international system? Is it a thing, a subject, a social relation, or a construct that helps to orient political action? Is stateness a variable and, if so, what are its central dimensions? What is the relationship between the state and law, the state and politics, the state and civil society, the public and the private, state power and micropower relations? Is the state best studied in isolation; only as part of the political system; or, indeed, in terms of a more general social theory? Do states have institutional, decisional, or operational autonomy and, if so, what are its sources and limits? Everyday language sometimes depicts the state as a subject—the state does, or must do, this or that; and sometimes as a thing—this economic class, social stratum, political party, or oYcial caste uses the state to pursue its projects or interests. But how could the state act as if it were a uniWed subject and what could constitute its unity as a ‘‘thing?’’ Coherent answers are hard because the state’s referents vary so much. It changes shape and appearance with the activities it undertakes, the scales on which it operates, the political forces acting towards it, the circumstances in which it and they act, and so on. When pressed, a common response is to list the institutions that comprise the state, usually with a core set of institutions with increasingly vague outer boundaries. From the political executive, legislature, judiciary, army, police, and public administration, the list may extend to education, trade unions, mass media, religion, and even the family. Such lists typically fail to specify what lends these institutions the quality of statehood. This is hard because, as Max Weber (1948) famously noted, there is no activity that states always perform and none that they have never performed. Moreover, what if, as some theorists argue, the state is inherently prone to fail? Are the typical forms of state failure properly part of its core deWnition or merely contingent, variable, and eliminable secondary features? Finally, who are the state’s agents? Do they include union leaders involved in policing incomes policies, for example, or media owners who circulate propaganda on the state’s behalf? An obvious escape route is to deWne the state in terms of means rather than ends. This approach informs Weber’s celebrated deWnition of the modern state as the ‘‘human community that successfully claims legitimate monopoly over the means of coercion in a given territorial area’’ as well as deWnitions that highlight its formal ` -vis its own population and other states. This does not mean that sovereignty vis-a modern states exercise power largely through direct and immediate coercion—this would be a sign of crisis or state failure—but rather that coercion is their last resort in enforcing binding decisions. For, where state power is regarded as legitimate, it can normally secure compliance without such recourse. Even then all states reserve the right—or claim the need—to suspend the constitution or speciWc legal provisions and many states rely heavily on force, fraud, and corruption and their subjects’ inability to organize eVective resistance.

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Building on Weber and his contemporaries, other theorists regard the essence of the state (premodern as well as modern) as the territorialization of political authority. This involves the intersection of politically organized coercive and symbolic power, a clearly demarcated core territory, and a Wxed population on which political decisions are collectively binding. Thus the key feature of the state is the historically variable ensemble of technologies and practices that produce, naturalize, and manage territorial space as a bounded container within which political power is then exercised to achieve various, more or less well integrated, and changing policy objectives. A system of formally sovereign, mutually recognizing, mutually legitimating national states exercising sovereign control over large and exclusive territorial areas is only a relatively recent institutional expression of state power. Other modes of territorializing political power have existed, some still coexist with the so-called Westphalian system (allegedly established by the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 but realized only stepwise during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries), new expressions are emerging, and yet others can be imagined. For example, is the EU a new form of state power, a rescaled ‘‘national’’ state, a revival of medieval political patterns, or a post-sovereign form of authority? And is the rapid expansion of transnational regimes indicative of the emergence of global governance or even a world state? Another inXuential theorist, the Italian Communist, Antonio Gramsci, deWned the state as ‘‘political society þ civil society;’’ and likewise analyzed state power in modern democratic societies as based on ‘‘hegemony armoured by coercion.’’ He deWned hegemony as the successful mobilization and reproduction of the ‘‘active consent’’ of dominated groups by the ruling class through the exercise of political, intellectual, and moral leadership. Force in turn involves the use of a coercive apparatus to bring the mass of the people into conformity and compliance with the requirements of a speciWc mode of production. This approach provides a salutary reminder that the state only exercises power by projecting and realizing state capacities beyond the narrow boundaries of state; and that domination and hegemony can be exercised on both sides of any oYcial public–private divide (for example, state support for paramilitary groups such as the Italian fascisti, state education in relation to hegemony) (Gramsci 1971). Building on Marx and Gramsci, a postwar Greek political theorist, Nicos Poulantzas (1978), developed a better solution. He claimed that the state is a social relation. This elliptical phrase implies that, whether regarded as a thing (or, better, an institutional ensemble) or as a subject (or, better, the repository of speciWc political capacities and resources), the state is far from a passive instrument or neutral actor. Instead it is always biased by virtue of the structural and strategic selectivity that makes state institutions, capacities, and resources more accessible to some political forces and more tractable for some purposes than others. Poulantzas interpreted this mainly in class terms and grounded it in the generic form of the capitalist state; he also argued that selectivity varies by particular political regimes.

. none of these provides a convincing general explanation......... had its ups and downs.... evolutionary institutional economics.... and the State). Feminist theorists have examined the role of patriarchy in state formation . classically.......... because the state is shot through with contradictions and class struggles and its political agents must always take account of (potential) mobilization by a wide range of forces beyond the state... 1975) work is exemplary.. Marxists focus on the emergence of economic surplus to enable development of specialized. historical materialism.. historical sociology...’’ generation. gender.... ‘‘race.. according to Poulantzas. ethnicity... political aYliation...... Others emphasize the role of a specialized priesthood and organized religion (or other forms of ideological power) in giving symbolic unity to the population governed by the state (Claessen and Skalnik 1978)..... military historians focus on the role of military conquest in state-building and/or the demands of defense of territorial integrity in the expansion of state capacities to penetrate and organize society (Hintze’s (e...... territorialization and deterritorialization... political anthropology... see also Porter 1994).. engaged in struggles to transform it.. It has been invented many times..... or regional location).. economically unproductive political apparatus concerned to secure cohesion in a (class-)divided society (see. exercise power.... Although its origins have been explained in various monocausal ways. Instead its power´ s (plural) are activated by changing sets of politicians and state oYcials located in speciWc parts of the state in speciWc conjunctures. and seen recurrent cycles of centralization and decentralization.... Private Property.... or simply resist it from afar...... comparative politics....... This is a rich Weld for political archeology........... If an overall strategic line is discernible in the exercise of these powers..................... Engels’ (1875) Origins of the Family...... This approach can be extended to include dimensions of social domination that are not directly rooted in class relations (for example..g...114 bob jessop Likewise..... religion................. and indeed cannot... it is due to strategic coordination enabled through the selectivity of the state system and the role of parallel power networks that cross-cut and unify its formal structures.. determine its policies.. State formation is not a once-and-for-all process nor did the state develop in just one place and then spread elsewhere......... since it is not a subject....... 2 The Origins of the State and State-building ............... and international relations.......... This would provide a bridge to non-Marxist analyses of the state and state power (see below on the strategic-relational approach).. the capitalist state does not.. Such unity is improbable...

. its own political rationale... work on ‘‘formal constitution’’ explores how a state acquires........... or purely ad hoc comments......... journalistic.......... universal suVrage..... the state is polymorphous—its organization and capacities can be primarily capitalist... formal bureaucracy. ad hominem. theoretical.. are liable to break down... conWgurational analyses explore the distinctive character of state–civil society relations and seek to locate state formation within wider historical developments..... and recognition by other states).. In this context...... with new capacities and functions.......... such as formal separation from other spheres of society.... the state’s ‘‘historical constitution’’ is studied in terms of path-dependent histories or genealogies of particular parts of the modern state (such as a standing army... parliament......... Third....... and distinctive constitutional legitimation.. Eisenstadt’s (1963) work on the rise and fall of bureaucratic empires. partisan. First... liberal state. And............ modus operandi.. And yet other scholars focus on the ‘‘imagined political communities’’ around which nation states have been constructed (classically Anderson 1991).. it typically takes account of other functional demands and civil society in order to promote institutional integration and social cohesion within its territorial boundaries.... its distinctive formal features as a modern state...... Modern state formation has been analyzed from four perspectives.... modern tax system.. based on adherence to its own political procedures rather than values such as divine right or natural law...state and state-building 115 and the state’s continuing role in reproducing gender divisions...... and a predisposition to new types of failure.... 3 Marxist Approaches to the State . if at all... This is reXected in . and must be rebuilt in new forms..... The best approach is multicausal and recognizes that states change continually... for example.... There is no guarantee that the modern state will always (or ever) be primarily capitalist in character and..... even where capital accumulation is deeply embedded in its organizational matrix.... Marx’s and Engels’ work on the state comprises diverse philosophical. competition state. military. fourth.. as Mann (1986) notes.. new scales of operation. or democratic in character and its dominant crystallization is liable to challenge as well as conjunctural variation............. Second......... Whether it succeeds is another matter.. Elias’s (1982) work on the state and civilization....... theocratic. agency-centered theorizations focus on state projects that give a substantive (as opposed to formal) unity to state actions and whose succession deWnes diVerent types of state... citizenship rights............. and Rokkan’s (1999) work on European state formation over the last 400–500 years are exemplary here...... welfare state....

Epiphenomenalist accounts mainly interpreted state forms and functions as more or less direct reXections of underlying economic structures and interests. Instrumentalist accounts treated the state as a simple vehicle for political class rule. The relative autonomy of the state was much debated in the 1970s and 1980s. bureaucratic state—whether authoritarian or totalitarian in form.116 bob jessop the weaknesses of later Marxist state theories. contemporary states could not really suspend capital’s contradictions and crisis-tendencies and that the state remained a key factor in class domination. relied increasingly on the mass media for its ideological power. moving as directed by those in charge. For some tendencies and organizations (notably in the social democratic movement) instrumentalism could justify a parliamentary democratic road to socialism based on the electoral conquest of power. They argued that this corresponded to the development of organized or state capitalism. Poulantzas (1973) began with the overall institutional framework of capitalist societies. notwithstanding the postwar boom. Frankfurt School critical theorists examined the interwar trends towards a strong. deWned the ideal-typical capitalist type of state (a constitutional . and had integrated the trade union movement as a political support or else smashed it as part of the consolidation of totalitarian rule. There were two main axes around which these views moved. state managers) to pursue policies that conXicted with the immediate interests of the dominant economic class(es) without becoming so autonomous that they could undermine their long-term interests too. Others argued that parliamentary democracy was essentially bourgeois and that extra-parliamentary mobilization and a new form of state were crucial to make and consolidate a proletarian revolution. respectively. This controversy generated much heat but little light because it was based as much on diVerent presentational strategies as it was on real theoretical diVerences. Thus Miliband’s (1969) work began by analyzing the social origins and current interests of economic and political elites and then proceeded to analyze more fundamental features of actually existing states in a capitalist society and the constraints on its autonomy. Marxist interest revived in the 1960s and 1970s in response to the apparent ability of the Keynesian welfare national state to manage the postwar economy in advanced capitalist societies and the alleged ‘‘end of ideology’’ that accompanied postwar economic growth. and has prompted many attempts to complete the Marxist theory of the state based on selective interpretations of these writings. Marxists initially sought to prove that. both analytically and practically. state planning. or nationalization of leading industrial sectors. better. Essentially this topic concerned the relative freedom of the state (or. These views were sometimes modiWed to take account of the changing stages of capitalism and the relative stability or crisis-prone nature of capitalism. This was one of the key themes in the notoriously diYcult Miliband–Poulantzas debate in the 1970s between an alleged instrumentalist and a purported determinist.

..... For the state’s institutional separation from the market economy. some Marxists explored how the typical form of the capitalist state actually caused problems rather than guaranteed its overall functionality for capital accumulation and political class domination.............. as noted above....state and state-building 117 democratic state based on the rule of law).... second.. This approach was especially popular in the USA and claimed that the dominant postwar approaches were too ‘‘society-centered’’ because they explained the state’s form.... This involved studies of diVerent states’ structural selectivity and the factors that shaped their strategic capacities... indeed............... this also led to more complex studies of struggles............ Marxism was accused of economic reductionism for its emphasis on base-superstructure relations and class ... Marxist theorists began to analyze state power as a complex social relation..... functions...... their organization and exercise.......... Attention was paid to the variability of these capacities.............. results in the dominance of diVerent (and potentially contradictory) institutional logics and modes of calculation in state and economy... It also prompted interest in the complex interplay of social struggles and institutions. and impact in terms of factors rooted in the organization. The best work in this period formulated two key insights with a far wider relevance... Whilst not fully abandoning his earlier approach.. 4 State-centered Theories ...... institutions...... And..... and concluded with an analysis of the relative autonomy of state managers.... As with the Wrst set of insights.......... This conclusion fuelled work on the structural contradictions....................... needs..... Poulantzas later argued that the state is a social relation (see above).... then explored the typical forms of political class struggle in bourgeois democracies (concerned with winning active consent for a national-popular project). The Xourishing of Marxist state theories in the 1970s prompted a counter-movement in the 1980s to ‘‘bring the state back in’’ as a critical explanatory variable in social analysis........ strategic dilemmas... a separation that was regarded as a necessary and deWning feature of capitalist societies.............. and historically conditioned development of speciWc state forms. and their diVerential impact on the state power and states’ capacities to project power into social realms well beyond their own institutional boundaries.... There is no certainty that political outcomes will serve the needs of capital—even if (and. First..... and political capacities (see Barrow 1993... precisely because) the state is operationally autonomous and subject to politically-mediated constraints and pressures. Jessop 2001).... or interests of society...

but wars make states. Rueschemeyer. ideas. Societal factors. political capacities. organizations (including capitalist enterprises). statists showed little interest in such thinkers.118 bob jessop struggle. territorially bounded society—and its strategic reach in relation to all other social sub-systems (including the economy). and demands beyond the state. political corruption. interest articulation. (b) the dynamic of military organization and the impact of warfare on the overall development of the state— reXected in Tilly’s claim that. the state is a force in its own right and does not just serve the economy or civil society (Evans. Although ‘‘state-centered’’ theorists emphasized diVerent factors or combinations thereof. and Skocpol (1985). For most Marxists. and their impact on state aVairs was always Wltered through the political system and the state itself. In short. group formation. In practice. Their approach leads ‘‘state-centered’’ theorists to advance a distinctive interpretation of state autonomy. ‘‘State-centered’’ theorists claimed this put the cart before the horse. when not irrelevant. and thereby endow it with a unique and irreplaceable centrality both in national life and the international order. government overload. (c) the state’s distinctive administrative powers—especially those rooted in its capacities to produce and enforce collectively binding decisions within a centrally organized. or Hintze. not only do states make war. and forces (including classes) within its domain. (e) the distinctive pathologies of government and the political system—such as bureaucratism. were certainly secondary. de Tocqueville. elected politicians. and structural-functionalism was criticized for assuming that the development and operations of the political system were determined by the functional requirements of society as a whole. They argued that state activities and their impact are easily explained in terms of its distinctive properties as an administrative or repressive organ and/or the equally distinctive properties of the broader political system encompassing the state. give it a real and important autonomy when faced with pressures and forces emerging from the wider society. and implementation. pluralism was charged with limiting its account of competition for state power to interest groups and movements rooted in civil society and ignoring the distinctive role and interests of state managers. The real focus of state-centered work is detailed case studies of state-building. the main conclusions remain that there are distinctive political pressures and processes that shape the state’s form and functions. and Skocpol 1985). the latter is primarily understood . or state failure. and so on). Clausewitz. These emphasize six themes: (a) the geopolitical position of diVerent states in the interstate system and its implications for the logic of state action. with the partial exception of Weber. (d) the state’s role as a distinctive factor in shaping institutions. In its more programmatic guise the statist approach advocated a return to classic theorists such as Machiavelli. Weber. policy-making. The classic statement of this approach is found in Evans. Rueschemeyer. and (f) the distinctive interests and capacities of ‘‘state managers’’ (career oYcials.

In particular. neostatism itself focuses one-sidedly on state and party politics at the expense of political forces outside and beyond the state. This renders absolute what are really emergent. divisions among state managers due to ties between state organs and other social spheres. political conXict for social struggle’’ (Gordon 1990). Neostatists reject such a class. elite for mass politics. It posits clear and unambiguous boundaries between the state apparatus and society. of combining state-centered and society-centered accounts to produce the complete picture. the distinction between state. This excludes hybrid logics such as corporatism or policy networks. and variable distinctions. police. by policy area. they emphasize: (a) state managers’ ability to exercise power independently of (and even in the face of resistance from) non-state forces—especially where a pluralistic universe of social forces opens signiWcant scope for maneuver. collective interests of capital even when faced with opposition—including from particular capitalist interests. and many other forms of overlap between state and society. and (b) the grounding of this ability in the state’s distinctive political resources and its ability to use these to penetrate. however. and state power and societal power. unstable. neostatism involves a fundamental theoretical fallacy. supervise. and discipline modern societies. alternatively. and most seriously. Some critics claim that it serves to defend state managers as eVective agents of economic modernization and social reform rather than highlighting the risks of authoritarianism and autocratic rule. Accordingly. First. the rationale for neostatism is based on incomplete and misleading accounts of society-centered work. control.state and state-building 119 in terms of the state’s capacity to promote the long-term.and society-centered approaches dissolves. but also lesser neostatist claims such as the heuristic value of bending the stick in the other direction or. the state can therefore be studied in isolation from society. interests. Second. Third.and capital-theoretical work. not merely the extreme claim that the state apparatus should be treated as the independent variable in explaining political and social events. Nonetheless four signiWcant lines of criticism have been advanced against neostatism. This is due partly to external limits on the scope for autonomous state action and partly to variations in state managers’ capacity and readiness to pursue a strategy independent of non-state actors. . state managers and social forces. The extensive body of statist empirical research has generally proved a fruitful counterweight to one-sided class. If this assumption is rejected. and over time. it allegedly has a hidden political agenda. partial. Only in exceptional and typically short-lived circumstances can the state secure real freedom of action. This in turn invalidates. Fourth. Neostatists also argue that state autonomy is not a Wxed structural feature of each and every governmental system but diVers across states. it substitutes ‘‘politicians for social formations (such as class or gender or race). quite distinctive.or capital-theoretical account and suggest that it is usual for the state to exercise autonomy in its own right and in pursuit of its own.

or law for power relations...... Foucault never codiWed his work and changed his views frequently.. Foucault aimed to undermine the analytical centrality of the state..... He proposed a microphysics of power concerned with actual practices of subjugation rather than with macropolitical strategies...... sovereignty... or their constitution as speciWc types of subject.. state theory is essentialist: it tries to explain the state and state power in terms of their own inherent.. strategies.......... Foucault also insisted on the need to explore the connections between these forms of micropower and mechanisms for producing knowledge—whether for surveillance.. a skilled practice in which state capacities were used reXexively to monitor the population and..... It involves the active mobilization of individuals and not just their passive targeting........ such as those coupled to the ‘‘police state’’ (Polizeistaat). He advanced three key claims in this regard...... to make it conform to speciWc state ´tat........................... And....120 bob jessop 5 Foucauldian Approaches ... and .. Second. He came to see the state as the crucial site of statecraft and ‘‘governmentality’’ (or governmental rationality).... the state itself. and then maintained by the entire state system....b)... and can be colonized and articulated into quite diVerent discourses... This in turn could be linked to diVerent modes of political calculation or state projects. It was in and through these governmental rationalities or state projects that more local or regional sites of power were colonized. monarchical sovereignty and/or a uniWed. the formation and accumulation of knowledge about individuals......... For state power is dispersed.. pre-given properties.... and institutions... What interested him was the art of government.. First...... third. Nonetheless Foucault did not reject all concern with the macrophysics of state power...... Instead it should try to explain the development and functioning of the state as the contingent outcome of speciWc practices that are not necessarily (if at all) located within... juridico-political power... But there is a tremendous dispersion and multiplicity of the institutions and practices involved in the exercise of state power and many of these are extra-juridical in nature. immanent in every social relation (see notably Foucault 1980a. or openly oriented to.... articulated into ever more general mechanisms and forms of global domination..... and the extent of the sovereign state’s reach into society......... state theory retains medieval notions of a centralized.... social government.. or the welfare state.. In short..... an autonomous political rationality. state theorists were preoccupied with the summits of the state apparatus..... Raison d’e and morality... In contrast Foucault advocated a bottom-up approach concerned with the multiple dispersed sites where power is actually exercised. with all due prudence.. If state-centered theorists hoped to bring the state back in as an independent variable and/or an autonomous actor..... set apart from religion projects........... Taking his ideas on the ubiquity of power relations... power is not concentrated in the state: it is ubiquitous... the coupling of power-knowledge......... the discourses that legitimated sovereign state power..... was the key to the rise of the modern state........

....... But his work remains vulnerable to the charge that it tends to reduce power to a set of universally applicable power technologies (whether panoptic surveillance or disciplinary normalization) and to ignore how class and patriarchal relations shape the state’s deployment of these powers as well as the more general exercise of power in the wider society............g..... More recent Foucauldian studies have tried to overcome these limitations and to address the complex strategic and structural character of the state apparatus and statecraft and the conditions that enable the state to engage in eVective action across many social domains..... 6 Feminist Approaches ...... all states are expressions of patriarchy or phallocracy... from the gendered nature of household labor in the ‘‘domestic’’ mode of production........ whatever their apparent diVerences.........state and state-building 121 governmentality together.... It also neglects the continued importance of law......... constitutionalized violence...... Other currents called for serious analysis of the state because of its centrality to women’s lives (e.................. state intervention..... and state power in ways that reproduce both capitalism and patriarchy.... The main exception in the Wrst wave of postwar state theorizing was Marxist–feminist analyses of the interaction of class and gender in structuring states..... Other feminists tried to derive the necessary form and/or functions of the patriarchal state from the imperatives of reproduction (rather than production)............. from the changing forms of patriarchal domination. While feminists have elaborated distinctive theories of the gendering of social relations and provide powerful critiques of malestream political philosophy and political theory........ and bureaucracy for the modern state........ This is reXected in various theories about diVerent aspects of the state (Knutilla and Kubik 2001 compare feminist with classical and other state theories)... he oVers an important theoretical and empirical corrective to the more one-sided and/or essentialist analyses of Marxist state theory and to the taken-for-grantedness of the state that infuses neostatism........... however.... they have generally been less interested in developing a general feminist theory of the state..... his work provided little account of the bases of resistance (bar an alleged ‘‘plebeian’’ spirit of revolt)....... MacKinnon 1989)... In part this reXects their interest in other concepts that are more appropriate to a feminist theoretical and political agenda and their concern to break with the phallocratic concerns of malestream theory (Allen 1990....... Such work denies any autonomy or ..... and so on. Some radical feminist theories simply argued that........... Moreover.... Brown 1992)............. whatever the merits of drawing attention to the ubiquity of power.....

Yet men’s independence as citizens and workers rests on women’s role in caring for them at . come to be privileged in the state’s own discourses. and their physico-cultural materialization in human bodies. which has made major contributions across a broad range of issues—including how speciWc constructions of masculinity and femininity. hides the patriarchal ordering of the state and the family. interests. inconsistent. through the reality. Second. threat. their explicit or implicit embedding in diVerent institutions and material practices. ‘‘acknowledging that gender inequality exists does not automatically imply that every capitalist state is involved in the reproduction of that inequality in the same ways or to the same extent’’ (Jenson 1986). An extensive literature on the complex and variable forms of articulation of class. and ethnicity in particular state structures and policy areas has since revealed the limits of gender essentialism. also oppress women in public spaces. Thus.’’ For. historically. the latter with the domestic sphere and women’s alleged place in the ‘‘natural’’ order of reproduction. and even openly contradictory identities for both males and females. gender. Such arguments have been taken further in recent work on masculinity and the state. Men and women are diVerentially located in the public and private spheres: indeed. and individual rights. This ‘‘intersectional’’ approach has been taken further by third wave feminists and queer theorists. it also. Thus there is growing interest in the constitution of competing.122 bob jessop contingency to the state. and bodily forms. institutions. This rules out any analysis of the state as a simple expression of patriarchal domination and questions the very utility of patriarchy as an analytical category. Whilst Marxists tend to equate the public sphere with the state and the private sphere with private property. The best work in this Weld shows that patriarchal and gender relations make a diVerence to the state but it also refuses to prejudge the form and eVects of this diVerence. This has created the theoretical space for a revival of explicit interest in gender and the state. Others again try to analyze the contingent articulation of patriarchal and capitalist forms of domination as crystallized in the state. feminists argue that men can get away with violence against women within the conWnes of the family and. roles. feminists tend to equate the former with the state and civil society. women have been excluded from the public sphere and subordinated to men in the private. not only does this distinction obfuscate class relations by distinguishing the public citizen from the private individual (as Marxists have argued). whereas the modern state is commonly said to exercise a legitimate monopoly over the means of coercion. First. who emphasize the instability and socially constructed arbitrariness of dominant views of sexual and gender identities and demonstrate the wide variability of masculine as well as feminine identities and interests. feminists critique the juridical distinction between ‘‘public’’ and ‘‘private. their grounding in discourses about masculinity and/or femininity. exchange. their associated gender identities. The best feminist scholarship challenges key assumptions of ‘‘malestream’’ state theories. and more fundamentally. and material practices. or fear of rape.

............. This apparently heretical idea has been advanced from various theoretical or analytical viewpoints. Since there is no common discourse of the state (at most there is a dominant or hegemonic discourse) and diVerent political forces orient their action at diVerent times to diVerent ideas of the state...... feminist research reveals basic Xaws in much malestream theorizing. Similarly.... Abrams (1988) recommended abandoning the idea of the state because the institutional ensemble that comprises government can be studied without the concept of the state........ their continuing oppression and subjugation in the private sphere hinders their exercise and enjoyment of these rights.. He argues that the ‘‘state idea’’ has a key role in disguising political domination............ ‘‘the state arms men and disarms women. It appears on the political scene because political forces orient their actions towards the ‘‘state...’’ This regards the state as a purely juridical concept.. Thus an adequate account of the state must include the key feminist insights into the gendered nature of the state’s structural selectivity and capacities for action as well as its key role in reproducing speciWc patterns of gender relations (for attempts to develop such an approach..’’ acting as if it existed... rather..’’ In short... an illusion—a product of political imaginaries....... Third...... Melossi (1990) called for a ‘‘stateless theory of the state............ masculinity. Moreover......... Thus belief in the existence of the state depends on the prevalence of state discourses........ see Jessop 2004)........ In general terms.. and the state..... A third area of feminist criticism focuses on the links between warfare. 7 Discourse Analysis and Stateless State Theory . as Connell (1987) notes..... This in turn requires historical analyses of the ‘‘cultural revolution’’ (or ideological shifts) involved when state systems are transformed..... and the ‘‘idea of the state’’ can be studied in turn as the distinctive collective misrepresentation of capitalist societies which serves to mask the true nature of political practice..... the state is at best a polyvalent.......... Some recent discourse-analytic work suggests that the state does not exist but is.....................state and state-building 123 home......... even where women win full citizenship rights.......... to furnish themselves and others with a convenient vocabulary of motives for their own (in)actions and to account for the unity of the state in a divided and unequal civil society..... there is an increasing interest in .............. For example.. polycontextual phenomenon which changes shape and appearance with the political forces acting towards it and the circumstances in which they do so......... an idea that enables people to do the state...

........ legislative assemblies)... An innovative approach to the state and state-building has been developed by Jessop and others in an attempt to overcome various forms of one-sidedness in the Marxist and state-centered traditions.. Policies are discursivelymediated.. Thus case studies of policy making suggest that state policies do not objectively represent the interests located in or beyond the state or objectively reXect ‘‘real’’ problems in the internal or external environments of the political system... whatever the precise origins of the diVerent components of the modern state (such as the army. some strategies..... in the case of the state. if not wholly discursively-constituted. Such discourse-theoretical work clearly diVers from state-centered theorizing and Foucauldian analyses................ some identities............... pure narrativity............ regardless of standpoint.... or self-description but. Indeed............ legal system. The impact of policy-making and implementation is therefore closely tied to their rhetorical and argumentative framing..... On the one hand...... and some actions over others... rhetorical........ bureaucracy.. their organization as a relatively coherent institutional ensemble depends crucially on the emergence of the state idea... His ‘‘strategic-relational approach’’ oVers a general account of the dialectic of structure and agency and.... Jessop argues that the exercise and eVectiveness of state power is a contingent product of a changing balance of political forces located within and beyond the state and that this balance is conditioned by the speciWc institutional structures and procedures of the state apparatus as embedded in the wider political system and environing societal relations.. self-motivation.... in which political actors (individual and/or collective) take account of this diVerential privileging by engaging in ‘‘strategic-context’’ analysis when choosing a course of action......... and..... discourses about the state have a key constitutive role in shaping the state as a complex ensemble of political relations linked to society as a whole............ This role is variously deWned as mystiWcation....... 8 The ‘‘Strategic-relational Approach’’ . or argumentative features of state power......... Thus a strategic-relational analysis would examine how a given state apparatus may privilege some actors... it highlights the critical role of narrative and rhetorical practices in creating belief in the existence of the state.. it rejects the reiWcation of the state... elaborates Poulantzas’s claim that the state is a social relation (see above). on the other... if any....... products of struggles to deWne and narrate ‘‘problems’’ which can be dealt with in and through state action..................124 bob jessop speciWc narrative.. and the ways.... The SRA ........ some spatial and temporal horizons... taxation.....

... For example...... strategic dilemmas..... Moreover. failure is an ever-present possibility....... state forms............. political regimes. This approach is intended as a heuristic and many analyses of the state can be easily reinterpreted in strategic-relational terms even if they do not explicitly adopt these or equivalent terms. it may be necessary to pursue strategies over several spatial and temporal horizons of action and to mobilize diVerent sets of social forces in diVerent contexts to eliminate or modify speciWc constraints and opportunities linked to particular state structures... see Jessop 2002)........ as such strategies are pursued... because subjects are never unitary... there is always scope for actions to overXow or circumvent structural constraints........ never fully aware of the conditions of strategic action........ but this may still collapse owing to the inherent structural contradictions... substantive research on states and state power exploded from the 1990s onwards.... the changing forms and functions of the state........... never fully equipped to realize their preferred strategies. Moreover. and retention may operate in speciWc conditions to produce relatively coherent and durable structures and strategies.... the relative strength or weakness of states.. 9 New Directions of Research . and the state.. Likewise.....state and state-building 125 also introduces a distinctive evolutionary perspective into the analysis of the state and state power in order to discover how the generic evolutionary mechanisms of selection.. Among the main themes are: the historical variability of statehood (or stateness)........................................ and particular conjunctures (for an illustration. space.... and the rise of governance and its articulation with government... ........ Over time there is a tendency for reXexively reorganized structures and recursively selected strategies and tactics to co-evolve to produce a relatively stable order... This implies that opportunities for reorganizing speciWc structures and for strategic reorientation are themselves subject to structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities and therefore have path-dependent as well as path-shaping aspects. variation..... But the development of a strategic-relational research programme will also require many detailed comparative historical analyses to work out the speciWc selectivities that operate in types of state.... and may always meet opposition from actors pursuing other strategies or tactics....... territoriality........ political forces will be more or less well-equipped to learn from their experiences and to adapt their conduct to changing conjunctures.. and discursive biases characteristic of complex social formations....... Notwithstanding declining interest in the more esoteric and abstract modes of state theorizing.......... issues of scale..... the future of the national state in an era of globalization and regionalization...... because structures are strategically selective rather than absolutely constraining.....

sovereign state) and increasing interest in the historical variability of actual states. an interventionist policy. through the urban and regional. it refers to the state’s power in the interstate system. and institutional solidity. uniWed. interest in stateness arises from growing disquiet about the abstract nature of much state theory (especially its assumption of a ubiquitous. exercise largely the despotic power of command. the state is deWned by its structural diVerentiation. Such approaches historicize the state idea and stress its great institutional variety. States have been described as strong because they have a large public sector. France is the archetypal state in a centralized society. externally. and the role of national states in coordinating the state . strong societal support. some studies run the risk of tautology insofar as strength is deWned purely in terms of outcomes. political legitimacy. This reXects the adaptability of state managers and state apparatuses. Internally. The former are essentially parasitic upon their economy and civil society. or the power to limit external interference (Lauridsen 1991). Germany has a state but no center. the wide variety of interpretations of strength (and weakness) threatens coherent analysis. and Switzerland has neither. over time. Thus some theorists focus on the state as a conceptual variable and examine the varied presence of the idea of the state. society. Third. Others examine the state’s diVerential presence as a distinctive political form. These issues have been studied on all territorial scales from the local to the international with considerable concern for meso-level variation. from the local. cohesive bureaucracies. the continued importance of national states in securing conditions for economic competitiveness. This issue is also raised by scholars interested in the proliferation of scales on which signiWcant state activities occur. For them. This concern is especially marked in recent theoretical and empirical work on predatory and/or developmental states. and in speciWc conjunctures. In addition. and the state itself. there is growing interest in factors that make for state strength. to cross-border and continental cooperation and a range of supranational entities. social cohesion. Unfortunately. autonomy. universalism. a weak and gelatinous civil society. Britain has a political center but no state. Thus Badie and Birnbaum (1983) usefully distinguish between the political center required in any complex social division of labor and the state as one possible institutional locus of this center. Developmental states also have infrastructural and network power and deploy it in allegedly market-conforming ways. authoritarian rule. Nonetheless initial predictions of the imminent demise of the national territorial state and/or the nation state have been proved wrong. this refers to a state’s capacities to command events and exercise authority over social forces in the wider society. and so on. and may eventually undermine the economy. A possible theoretical solution is to investigate the scope for variability in state capacities by policy area. Second.126 bob jessop First. recent work on globalization casts fresh doubt on the future of national territorial states in general and nation states in particular.

indeed. Shaw 2000). Other types of state. Fifth. interest has grown in the speciWc forms and functions of the capitalist type of state.state and state-building 127 activities on other scales from the local to the triad to the international and global levels. (c) managing the scalar division of labor. have been discussed in the same terms. Fourth. the current after-Fordist period is marked by the dispersion of political and policy issues across diVerent scales of organization. following a temporary decline in Marxist theoretical work. Instead they involve self-organization. This has prompted interest in the novelty of the European Union as a new state form. or local scale. the re-emergence of empire as an organizing principle. This can be studied in terms of the state’s role in: (a) securing conditions for private proWt— the Weld of economic policy. provide states with a new (or expanded) role in the meta-governance (or overall coordination) of diVerent governance regimes and . Beck and Grande 2005. Governance operates on diVerent scales of organization (ranging from the expansion of international and supranational regimes through national and regional public–private partnerships to more localized networks of power and decision-making). ‘‘governance’’ comprises forms of coordination that rely neither on imperative coordination by government nor on the anarchy of the market. including developmental states. others suggest that there has been a relativization of scale. and (d) compensating for market failure. it could well enhance its power to secure its interests and. there is interest in the changing scales of politics. For. with none of them clearly primary. the subordination of social policy to economic demands. and sideways. the relativization of scale with the movement of state powers downwards. lifetime. This in turn poses problems about securing the coherence of action across diVerent scales. Its distinctive features were an economic policy oriented to securing the conditions for full employment in a relatively closed economy. While some theorists are inclined to see the crisis of the national state as displacing the primary scale of political organization and action to the global. regional. Although this trend is often taken to imply a diminution in state capacities. and the primacy of state intervention to compensate for market failure. the primacy of the national scale of policy-making. On this basis Jessop (2002) characterizes the typical state form of postwar advanced capitalism as a Keynesian welfare national state. Its distinctive features are an economic policy oriented to innovation and competitiveness in relatively open economies. generalizing norms of mass consumption through the welfare state. for example. and intergenerational basis—the Weld of social policy broadly considered. Finally. upwards. and the prospects for a global state (see. He also describes the emerging state form in the 1980s and 1990s as a Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime. (b) reproducing wage-labor on a daily. and the increased importance of various governance mechanisms in compensating for market failure. whereas the national state provided the primary scale of political organization in the Fordist period of postwar European and North American boom.

According to some radical critics.. 10 An Emerging Agenda? ... the strategic links among state managers and other political forces................ This is reXected in substantive research into stateness and the relative strength (and weakness) of particular political regimes........ All states fail in certain respects and normal politics is an important mechanism for learning from.. The discourse of ‘‘failed states’’ is often used to stigmatize some regimes as part of interstate as well as domestic politics....... Marxists deny it is the ideal collective capitalist. and unstable system that is interdependent with other systems in a complex social order................ First. There is a remarkable theoretical convergence concerning the contingency of the state apparatus and state power.... most approaches have dethroned the state from its superordinate position in society and analyze it as one institutional order among others... Chomsky 2001)......... failure.... its structural powers and capacities can only be understood by putting the state into a broader ‘‘strategic-relational’’ context..g.. feminists have stopped interpreting it as the patriarch general........ historically speciWc........ In short...128 bob jessop mechanisms (Zeitlin and Trubek 2003 on Europe............... and discourse analysts see it as constituted through contingent discursive or communicative practices....... Foucauldians have deconstructed it..... Similarly. partial.. In contrast... and Slaughter 2004 on the world order).... ‘‘failed states’’ lack the capacity to reinvent or reorient their activities in the face of recurrent state failure in order to maintain ‘‘normal political service’’ in domestic policies. and the complex web of interdependencies and social networks linking the state and political system to its broader environment.. Their realization depends on structural ties between the state and its encompassing political system... This vast expansion in the contingency of the state and its operations requires more concrete.. however.. ‘‘rogue states’’ is used to denigrate states whose actions are considered by hegemonic or dominant states in the interstate system to threaten the prevailing international order..... and action-oriented studies................ neostatists no longer treat it as a sovereign legal subject.. its powers are always conditional or relational.. .... Interest in governance is sometimes linked to the question of ‘‘failed’’ and ‘‘rogue’’ states... institutionally sensitive... the USA itself has been the worst rogue state for many years (e..... By virtue of its structural selectivity and speciWc strategic capacities.. and adapting to. the state is seen as an emergent........... Second..........................

2001. U. The Political Systems of Empires: The Rise and Fall of Bureaucratic Societies. Oxford: Blackwell. Watson. As both part and whole of society. Many diVerences among state theories are rooted in contrary approaches to various structural and strategic moments of this paradox. On the one hand. 1991. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gender and Power: Society. P. and Grande. 1: 58 89. Connell. T. The Origins of the Family. Trying to comprehend the overall logic (or. Badie. F. W. For the state is the site of a paradox. Imagined Communities: ReXections on the Origin and Spread of Nation alism. post Marxist. Journal of Historical Sociology. and the State.. Barrow. vol. E. 1990. Elias. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 1992. 18: 7 34. Anderson. Private Property. and Skocpol. The Sociology of the State. and Skalnik. Claessen. and Birnbaum. Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World AVairs. P. it is peculiarly charged with overall responsibility for maintaining the cohesion of the formation of which it is a part. P.. London: Verso. 2nd edn. Engels. (eds. J. But this is precisely where we Wnd many of the unresolved problems of state theory.) 1985. B. Cambridge: Polity. (eds. it is just one institutional ensemble among others within a social formation. Critical Theories of the State: Marxist. 1875/1975. London: Verso. Brown. 1993. 26. perhaps. . Feminist Studies. Eisenstadt. N. Allen. J. Cosmopolitan Europe: Paths to Second Modernity.: Stanford University Press. Rueschemeyer. Does feminism need a theory of ‘‘the state?’’ In Playing the State: Australian Feminist Interventions. Chomsky. B. 129 276 in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. W. N. the Person and Sexual Politics. P. neo Marxist. it is continually asked by diverse social forces to resolve society’s problems and is equally continually doomed to generate ‘‘state failure’’ since many problems lie well beyond its control and may even be aggravated by attempted intervention. ‘‘illogic’’) of this paradox could provide a productive entry point for resolving some of these diVerences and providing a more comprehensive analysis of the strategic-relational character of the state in a polycentric social formation. Notes on the diYculty of studying the state. Stanford. R. S. 1982. ed. W. Beck. M. it is increasingly recognized that an adequate theory of the state can only be produced as part of a wider theory of society.state and state-building 129 Finally. Calif. The Civilizing Process: State Formation and Civilization. 1988. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. on the other. London: Pluto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. D. Finding the man in the state. Collected Works. References Abrams. Pp. The Early State. 2005. S. 1963. 1983. N. Evans. C. Bringing the State Back In. H. 1987. B. The Hague: Mouton. London: Lawrence and Wishart.) 1978.

N. B. 2000. London: New Left Books. 1. 1990. New York: Oxford University Press. J. and Trubek. 2004. The welfare state: towards a socialist feminist perspective.130 bob jessop Foucault. D. The gendered selectivity of the state. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Jessop. London: Zed. Nation Building and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan. Rokkan. 2001. Knutilla. L. S. Brighton: Harvester Gordon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1. Weber. Political Power and Social Classes. In Essays from Max Weber. The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. Slaughter. babies and state. S. In Development Theory and the Role of the State in Third World Countries. International Review of Sociology. The State and Social Control. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. B. State. 1948. London: Verso. R. Martinussen. J. Jenson. Lauridsen. 2004. 1978. 20: 9 46. and Kubik. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Studies in Political Economy. W. M. Global and Feminist Perspec tives. Porter. (eds. Poulantzas. Socialism. New York: Monthly Review Press. 11: 149 73. The Sources of Social Power. 2: 207 37. 1989. Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy. vol. 1986. Mass. 2001. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Miliband. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. D. MacKinnon. The Future of the Capitalist State. M. M. 1975. London: Lawrence and Wishart. C. The debate on the developmental state. War and the Rise of the State. 1994. The State in Capitalist Society. Gramsci. Power/Knowledge. L. O. M. 2002. Melossi. vol. Socialist Register 1990. A. . 1991. 1990. New York: Free Press. A New World Order. The History of Sexuality. Power. Princeton. 1971. 1980a. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. State Formation. 1980b. Cambridge: Polity. 1999. M. Cambridge: Polity. M. A.: Harvard University Press. Shaw. Gender and reproduction: or.) 2003. Cambridge. 1969. 1973. Politics as a vocation. 1986. Bringing the state back in (yet again). Towards a Feminist Theory of the State. Mann. State Theories: Classical. Zeitlin. Journal of Critical Realism. NJ: Princeton University Press. Hintze. Roskilde: Roskilde University Centre. Theory of the Global State. J. M.

Salmon and Mark F. Imber With the assistance of Trudy Fraser .ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Second Edition Edited by Trevor C.

international commitments in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 expose another crisis of the sovereignty idea. nationalism and humanitarian intervention are also related to issues of sovereignty and indirectly paint a picture of modern sovereignty. paying particular attention to the views of Immanuel Kant. probably following guilt feelings for not intervening in Rwanda. For example.and twentieth-century responses to classical theories of sovereignty. However. nineteenth. State sovereignty can be invoked to defend a people’s right to establish an identity and to protect autonomy and self-determination against external interference. This chapter will provide an explanation of sovereignty. 33 . and will analyse the implications of state sovereignty on international relations. Phenomena such as liberation movements. The contemporary relevance of sovereignty cannot be underestimated. On the other hand. and consequently to understand the meaning of sovereignty enhances any understanding of international affairs. state sovereignty can equally be responsible for enabling bad governments to commit domestic atrocities. there will be a consideration of eighteenth-. international failure to later intervene in conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia in the mid-1990s suggests a revival of the idea of inviolable state sovereignty (perhaps as a consequence of the lack of success of previous interventions). role and significance of sovereignty in the twenty-first century.CHAPTER 3 On Sovereignty Gabriella Slomp There is widespread agreement that sovereignty is a so-called master noun of international relations. and so forth. First. Second. with impunity. the works of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes will be used to explain the definition and purpose of sovereignty. there remains disagreement concerning the meaning. and even genocide. interventions in Iraq (1991) and Somalia (1993) reveal a general mistrust that state sovereignty does enough to protect state citizens.

different schools of thought. though not the word itself. Bearing in mind Aristotle’s advice. believe that sovereignty is a modern phenomenon linked to the birth and growth of the nation state in the seventeenth century and was first theorized by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. is also found in the writings of Ulpian. with the intention of providing a theoretical explanation as to why the power of the king was the only way to promote the peace and unity of the state. or the state – requires a consideration of the object’s function or purpose. being a Frenchman. there can be no argument that the formulation of state sovereignty offered by Bodin and Hobbes formed the foundations of the theory and practice of sovereignty that was endorsed during the Westphalian period. Ockham. legal and political. Bodin was concerned with the predicament of France that had suffered a four decades long civil war as a consequence of the Reformation. The concept of sovereignty. however. four years after the massacre of Huguenots. Modernists. the egg (the concept of sovereignty) or the chicken (the reality of the sovereign state) is second to understanding if there was ever a time when there was no egg and no sign of a chicken. In particular. Marsilius and Machiavelli. the definition of any object – be it a knife. Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. PURPOSE AND MEANING OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY ACCORDING TO JEAN BODIN Jean Bodin (1530–1596) witnessed the bloody religious wars that affected Europe in the sixteenth century and observed how the authority of monarchs was constantly challenged on internal and external fronts. any definition of sovereignty must first establish when and for what purpose sovereignty entered the world of politics and penetrated the political discourse. sovereignty will be considered in terms of three adjective-pairs – external and internal. Dante. but cannot be defined as such if it is made of sugar and water because it would not be able to fulfil any of the basic functions of being a knife.GABRIELLA SLOMP Third. hard and porous. The philosophical issue of what came first. Primordialists believe that the concept of sovereignty always existed with precursors in ancient writers such as Aristotle. A blade with a handle may look like a knife. a flute. On the origins of sovereignty there are. Augustine. Dionysius is noted by Jean Bodin for having ‘touched on all the principal points of sovereignty’ (Bodin [1576] 1992: 47). TOWARDS A DEFINITION According to Aristotle. Bodin was intellectually close to a group of political 34 . Bodin published Six livres de la Republique in 1576. Taking either a primordialist or modernist perspective. Why did Jean Bodin devote four chapters of Six livres de la Republique to the definition and discussion of sovereignty? Why did Thomas Hobbes provide detailed explanations of the need for state sovereignty throughout his political writings? A brief look at the historical circumstances in which Bodin and Hobbes were writing can help to explain their concern with this issue and shed light on the notion of sovereignty that they developed. as with almost everything in International Relations.

Historians such as George Sabine see the Politiques as among the first in the sixteenth century to envisage the possibility of tolerating several religions within a single state. equal. and hence sovereign power is not arbitrary. the power to appoint magistrates and officers. the power to levy taxes and so on – are all consequences of the position of the sovereign as legal head of state (Bodin [1576] 1992: 48). State sovereignty was seen by Bodin as a vehicle for internal cohesion. From George Sabine to Preston King. it is worth considering Bodin’s definitions that: ‘Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth’ (Bodin [1576] 1992: 1). or populace. the important point is that sovereignty cannot be divided between different agencies but must reside in one single place. and from M. ‘for such is our pleasure’ which serve to make it understood that the laws of a sovereign prince. Bodin ascribes to the sovereign power a long list of characteristics. or in function. whether it be king. First. order and peace and such qualities. in order to enable the sovereign power to perform all the above tasks. the sovereign power is described as absolute in the Latin sense of the word. in turn. although mostly Catholic themselves. sovereignty is indivisible.J. Finally. However. (Bodin [1576] 1992: 12–13) Second. Bodin explains that sovereignty cannot be restricted by law because the sovereign is the source of the law: [A] king cannot be subject to the laws . Bodin goes on to distinguish between the attributes and the characteristics of the sovereign power. The primary attribute of Bodinian sovereignty is the power to give laws ‘without the consent of any other. he believed that sovereignty can lie in a person or an assembly. Thus at the end of edicts and ordinances we see the words. Accountability to God prevents rulers from forgetting about their mission to promote the well-being of the commonwealth. or below him’ (Bodin [1576] 1992: 56). . whether greater. sovereignty is unconditional: ‘sovereignty given to a prince subject to obligations and conditions is properly not sovereignty or absolute power’ (Bodin [1576] 1992: 8). Bodin shared the concerns of the Politiques and pointed out that regardless of differences in religion and in customs. For Bodin. However. the unity of a political community is guaranteed by the acknowledgement of a common sovereign. Although Bodin preferred monarchy to other forms of government. ab legibus solutus (or unbound by the law). Fourth. Sabine remarks that the Politiques. Bodin does point out that God and natural law impose limits on the power of the sovereign. Third. or in length 35 . Tooley to Julian Franklin. were above all nationalists and advocated holding together French nationality even though unity of religion had been lost. even if founded on good and strong reasons. sovereignty is unaccountable just as the king is not accountable to his subjects. Additionally. generations of interpreters have argued that Bodin’s theory of sovereignty contains many ambiguities and even contradictions. . Bodinian sovereignty is humanly unlimited and irrevocable or perpetual: ‘Sovereignty is not limited either in power. assembly. Bodin explains that the other attributes of sovereignty – the power to declare war and to make peace.O N S OV E R E I G N T Y thinkers known as Politiques who were similarly concerned by the implications of religious intolerance and eager to defend French identity regardless of religious disagreement. depend solely on his own free will. were needed for a so-called just commonwealth.

solitary. no letters. BOX 3. to wage war. Bodin revealed a great historical sensitivity to the growing importance of the nation state. nasty. continuall feare. and danger of violent death. and short. unlimited. . so Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) witnessed the English civil war. (Bodin [1576] 1992: 3) and ‘the law is nothing but the command of a sovereign making use of his power’ (Bodin [1576] 1992: 38). He believed that only such a formidable and supreme power would be able to protect the commonwealth from internal and external enemies and to provide order and peace. By formulating the first theory of state sovereignty of the modern age. Bodin concludes that ‘he is absolutely sovereign who recognizes nothing. Distraught by what he saw and at times fearing for his own life. to make coins and so on) were derived from this single law-making power. Hence any limits imposed on the power to command cannot be but extra-legal. In Behemoth. no Society. no account of Time. poore. after God. Hobbes realized that without order or peace there is little much else that can function in a society. Hobbes understood that in a civil war as much as in a state of nature. there is: [N]o place for Industry. no Arts. unaccountable and irrevocable power to make. no Navigation . Bodin argued that all the sovereign’s other powers (to make peace. . unconditional.1 BODINIAN SOVEREIGNTY • • • • • • Absolute Unconditional Indivisible Unlimited Unaccountable Irrevocable Bodin defined sovereignty as the absolute. to tax. Hobbes explains that the English Civil War occurred 36 . that is greater than himself ’ (Bodin [1576] 1992: 4). indivisible. and which is worst of all. interpret and execute the law. (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 89) Bodin had observed that ‘wrong opinion leads subjects to revolt from the obedience they owe their sovereign prince’ (Bodin [1576] 1992: 19) and similarly Hobbes blames ignorance about the function of the sovereign power as the main cause of civil disobedience and civil strife. no commodious Building . . . brutish. because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth. and the life of man. PURPOSE AND MEANING OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY ACCORDING TO THOMAS HOBBES Just as Bodin had first-hand experience of the civil war in France.GABRIELLA SLOMP of time’.

In spite of this right. Moreover. For the sake of security and peace. sovereign power must be unrestricted and from a Hobbesian perspective. so Hobbes argues that a citizen only has the right to resist if the sovereign endangers his life (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 151). there is no escape from unlimited sovereign power: ‘And whosover thinking Soverign Power too great. Hobbes recommends that the ‘Sovereign Power . Hobbes attempts to offer a rational explanation for ascribing unlimited power to the sovereign. humanly unaccountable. or created by institution but that the rights and consequences and ends of sovereignty are the same in both cases. bad priests and bad parliamentarians had taken advantage of the people’s lack of understanding of the purpose of the sovereign state. in a state of nature or during a civil war. will seek to make it lesse. men may fancy many evill consequences. to the Power. In summation. as possibly men can be imagined to make it’ (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 144). Hobbes writes: ‘The End of the institution of Sovereignty [is] the peace of the subjects within themselves. unlimited. yet the consequences of the want of it. Hobbes spells out that the sovereign provides protection in exchange of obedience and that therefore absolute protection requires absolute obedience to an absolute sovereign power. our life is in constant danger. it would be irrational to impose restrictions on the sovereign as this would limit its ability to protect our survival. As the end of the sovereign power is the protection of our life and the preservation of peace. Hence. inalienable and indivisible sovereignty. We enter the political state with a view to entrusting the sovereign with our defence and security. which is perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour. Hobbes explains that sovereign power can be acquired by force. by nature. For example. to a greater’ (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 145). and their defence against a common Enemy’ (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 150). that can limit it. . Hobbes claims that bad teachers. are much worse (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 144–5) As Bodin condemned resistance and claimed that ‘it is not licit for a subject to contravene his prince’s laws on the pretext of honesty and justice’ (Bodin [1571] 1992: 33). SOVEREIGNTY AND THE PROTECTION/OBEDIENCE FUNCTION Hobbes and Bodin both agree that the purpose or function of state sovereignty is to provide protection for citizens or subjects in exchange for obedience. He points out that. we have the right to use all available means for selfdefence. that is to say. For the sake of 37 . . Hobbes echoes Bodin and argues in favour of absolute. Hobbes tries to justify in some detail each and every one of those characteristics. must subject himselfe.O N S OV E R E I G N T Y because people had false beliefs and wrong opinions about their political obligations. But whereas Bodin is happy to list the various characteristics of the sovereign power without offering a supporting argument. using a more forceful and unambiguous argument than Bodin. Hobbes ascribes to sovereign power all the attributes and characteristics listed by Bodin. irrevocable. In Leviathan. is as great. Hobbes concedes that such a power could be dangerous but never tires to highlight its advantages in terms of security and protection: And though of so unlimited a Power.

or ‘sovereign equality’ • The duty of the state to protect its citizens is shared by a wide range of contemporary political ideologies of left and right IMMANUEL KANT ON SOVEREIGNTY From the seventeenth century onwards there exist two main debates related to the Bodinian–Hobbesian concept of sovereignty. irrevocable power to the sovereign. An outstanding contributor to both debates was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). captures the identity of the individual. Christian Wolff and Emeric de Vattel addressed the issue of whether and how an international system of sovereign states could enable each state to protect its own citizens (Brown 2002: 30–3). while lawyers and jurists such as Grotius. and hence Kant’s take on sovereignty is particularly relevant.2 PROTECTION AND OBEDIENCE Hobbes and Bodin both argue that the state’s protection requires the citizen’s obedience. Indeed. Carl Schmitt famously stated in The Concept of the Political that: ‘The “protego ergo obligo” is the “cogito ergo sum” of the state’ (Schmitt [1927] 1996: 52). wealth or power. so the motto ‘I protect. inalienable. unlimited. indivisible. Realist writer Hans Morgenthau.S. Schmitt claims that as much as the Cartesian dictum ‘I think. for Hobbes. Indeed. Mill engaged with the problem of what the state ought to provide domestically in exchange of obedience. • Sovereignty provides the basis of the modern legal view that all states have equal rights in international relations. in an assembly (aristocracy) or in the populace (democracy). as well as philosophers linked with liberalism and cosmopolitanism such as Immanuel Kant have all embraced the protection/obedience principle of state sovereignty. be it located in a man (monarchy).GABRIELLA SLOMP protection from internal and external enemies. Indeed. In other words. Marxists such as Antonio Gramsci and Nationalists such as Carl Schmitt have also endorsed the Hobbesian principle. If Hobbes were placed at one end of the ideological spectrum. regardless of any differences in size. while 38 . a state that cannot provide protection cannot command obedience and hence is not a state at all. hence I oblige’ captures the essence of the sovereign state. Kant would occupy the other. From Hobbes to the modern era. John Locke and J. both Bodin and Hobbes ascribe absolute. Philosophers and political theorists such as Benedict Spinoza. all sovereign states rely on the protection/obedience principle as the formative identifier of statehood. the Salamanca School. The protection/obedience principle forms the foundation of the Bodinian and Hobbesian concept of the sovereign state. the protection/obedience principle has remained the main function of the sovereign state by political thinkers and philosophers from many different ideological backgrounds. unaccountable. therefore I am’. Furthermore. BOX 3.

or rule) can adequately protect its citizens. Additionally. For Hobbes. Indeed. Kant attempted to combine the Hobbesian notion of sovereignty with a theory of limited constitutional government. Hans Morgenthau has argued that ‘sovereignty is consistent only with a weak. He did not. Kant contends that a sovereign state ought to protect basic human rights such as freedom. Hobbes saw his own political theory as a solution to civil war and to the problem of domestic political disorder. David Held has pointed out that the greatest obstacle to the development of international democracy is the idea that states are sovereign and that international institutions may limit their sovereignty. and not a system of totally independent states. domestic politics and international politics are independent spheres. believe that there was a solution to potential international anarchy. Indeed many scholars have maintained that the doctrine of state sovereignty is inimical to the very notion of international law. First.3 IMMANUEL KANT • Kant’s writing greatly enlarges the range of citizen’s rights that the sovereign state should protect • Kant creates a strong connection between order and stability as practised internally and order and stability at the international level • For some modern authors sovereignty remains the basis of international order. In his 1784 essay Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose Kant states that ‘the problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states.O N S OV E R E I G N T Y Hobbes is associated with absolutism and realism. in Leviathan. Kant also challenges the Hobbesian claim that a state operating in an international system characterized by anarchy (derived from the Greek. as argued by Richard Tuck and Howard Williams. Hobbes promises eternal peace domestically but does not envisage the end of inter-state wars. lack of arche. In an essay entitled On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory. At the other end of the spectrum. Disagreeing with Hobbes. In the realist camp. Of course. While Kant accepts the Hobbesian principle that the function of the sovereign state is to provide protection in exchange for obedience. and cannot be solved unless the other is also solved’ (Kant 1991: 52). can offer true protection. closely linked. but it does not Apply in Practice’ Kant challenges Hobbes’s view that the state can protect only the life of its citizens. Against Hobbes. he expands the list of rights that the state is supposed to protect and argues that only a federation of republican states. BOX 3. in fact. however. Kant insists that the international and domestic political orders are. equality and independence of the individual (Kant 1991: 74). doubts have been raised about Kant’s view that Hobbesian sovereignty is compatible with liberal principles and international institutions. Kant is regarded as one of the founding fathers of liberalism and of cosmopolitanism. security and perpetual peace. for others it is an obstacle to international order 39 . non-interventionalist international legal order’ (Morgenthau 1950: 246). It follows that the stability and justice of one is dependent on the stability and justice of the other.

or whether it could be divided. 40 . In a nutshell. passion and so on. external sovereignty embodies the principle of self-determination and implies that in international relations each state is in a position of independence vis-à-vis all other states. The opening sentence of Carl Schmitt’s study of the concept of sovereignty is very well-known: ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (Schmitt [1922] 1985: 5) INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY It is often said that one of the characteristics of modernity was the creation of great dichotomies such as nature vs. it has been argued that in an emergency or the case of exceptional danger – from either inside or outside the state in the form of terrorism or any other lethal threat – the location of supreme sovereign power becomes unambiguous. Both Bodin and Hobbes suggest that domestic and external sovereignty. Simultaneously. stand and fall together – a view that can also be found in earlier writers such as Machiavelli. Internal sovereignty is the supreme power that the state has over its own citizens within its own borders or the supreme decision-making and enforcement authority in a specific territory and towards a population. These writers believe that in any state – liberal or totalitarian – we can find the true location of sovereign power by looking at the will responsible for the final decision-making. however. artifice. although distinct. External sovereignty refers to and assumes the absence of a supreme international authority. Bodin explains that internal disorder fosters external attacks. autonomy in foreign policy and exclusive competence in internal affairs’ (Evans and Newnham 1998: 504). Hobbes too stresses that a state afflicted by internal discord is vulnerable to attacks from external enemies. as Hobbes and Bodin claimed. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From Carl Schmitt to Giorgio Agamben. an assembly or the whole people. By the twentieth century. ‘the doctrine of sovereignty implies a double claim. public. It is therefore not surprising that sovereignty – regarded by many as a quintessentially modern concept – is predicated on a dichotomous inside/outside principle. a growing number of thinkers from different ideological perspectives claimed that the diffusion and fragmentation of power in pluralistic societies is superficial and that systems of checks and balances only hide the concentration of power within liberal democracies.GABRIELLA SLOMP THE LOCATION OF SOVEREIGNTY The notion of sovereignty developed by Bodin and Hobbes is often associated with the absolutist monarchies that dominated Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. private vs. the disagreement developed into a discussion of whether sovereignty was best located in a king. but the concepts exist nonetheless. Conversely. the debate shifted towards the question of whether it was possible or desirable for one such body to exist at all. reason vs. Internal and external sovereignty may not be mentioned specifically in classical international relations texts. but during this time questions were also raised regarding whether or not sovereignty must lie in a single body. Many writers pointed out that the belief that sovereignty lies in a single place or body was being increasingly undermined by the experience of pluralist societies.

events in Kosovo and Rwanda raised serious questions concerning whether or not there exists a moral duty to question the external sovereignty of states when atrocities are committed within their borders. having their weapons pointing. states) brings about confrontation. however. Indeed. (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 128) In international relations. and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours. the Servants are Equall. Hobbes famously describes international relations thus: But though there had never been any time. Garrisons. and without any honour at all. some less. yet in all times.O N S OV E R E I G N T Y similarly. and in the state and posture of Gladiators. Kings. which is a posture of War. Hobbes illustrates this inequality with the following image: As in the presence of the Master. they shine no more than the Starres in presence of the Sun. because of their Independency. that is. and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes. when they are out of his sight. can be criticized on the grounds that it can be seriously abused. in the presence of the Soveraign. its domestic sovereignty could also be challenged because the citizens may want to submit to a stronger state that is more capable of protecting them from external enemies. For example. External sovereignty. conflict and ultimately war because every agent tries to dominate every other agent. issues related to the external sovereignty of states raise not just very heated debates among scholars but also deep disagreements within the international community. In the political state the sovereign power introduces inequality between the rulers and the ruled and the resulting hierarchy ensures order and peace (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 238). (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 90) In previous centuries attention was predominantly focused on internal sovereignty. i. The external sovereignty of states is fiercely defended as the right of peoples to define their own identity and to shape their own future free from external interference. Internal sovereignty is said to go hand in hand with domestic hierarchy and vertical order. all agents remain in a state of equality and the result is a situation of potential horizontal disorder or anarchy. wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another. whereas external sovereignty implies equality and the possibility of horizontal disorder. And though they shine some more. are in continuall jealousies. when the external sovereignty of a state is in crisis. in contemporary times. 41 . and their eyes fixed on one another. The distinction between external and internal sovereignty aims at attracting attention to the issues of self-determination and to the independence of states. their Forts. and Persons of Soveraigne authority. yet in his presence. so are the Subjects. Hobbes explains that equality among agents (be they ‘natural men’ or ‘artificial men’. however. The concept of external sovereignty raises high feelings both from the supporters of nationalism and from the supporters of universal human rights and of humanitarian intervention.e. but during the twentieth century external sovereignty has occupied central stage.

Legal or de jure sovereignty is said to differ from political or de facto sovereignty as much as the concept of authority differs from the concept of power. both Hitler and Mussolini were keen to claim the legality and legitimacy of their regimes. like Bodin. political sovereignty is sometime elucidated (Heywood 1994: 91) by reference to Hobbes and his view that the sovereign has the monopoly of coercive power. Most thinkers agree that neither political nor legal sovereignty constitute a viable form of sovereignty on their own. However Bodin.GABRIELLA SLOMP BOX 3. Legal sovereignty is based on the right to command. in an elected government or the whole people (popular sovereignty) • Sovereignty has both internal and external dimensions LEGAL AND POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY In addition to the internal/external dichotomy. for example. Dicey there remains much disagreement concerning the meaning of legal and political sovereignty and their relationship. the latter has to do with force. legal sovereignty without the ability to enforce a command ‘will carry only moral weight. however. whose beginnings can in conscience be justified’ (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 486) is often cited to support the claim that he believed that sovereignty is about force. interpreters draw attention to the fact that Bodin was very keen to offer an account of sovereignty in terms of legal authority and to oppose the Machiavellian argument that princes are not bound by promises in their international dealings. legal sovereignty is sometimes exemplified (Heywood 1994: 90) with reference to Bodin.V. there exists another distinction between legal and political sovereignty. 42 . could deny that both their writings reference both legal and political sovereignty and that the difference between the two writers is mainly one of emphasis. believed that sovereignty is not just about power and force but also about authority. as the peoples of the Baltic States – Latvia. The former has much to do with the law. In particular. No careful reader of Hobbes or Bodin. political sovereignty instead is based on the power to ensure compliance. In textbooks. Conversely. pointed out that the origin and foundations of commonwealths lie in force and violence. Originally articulated by the nineteeth-century thinker A. Indeed. Hobbes’s remark that ‘there is scarce a common-wealth in the world. political sovereignty based entirely on the monopoly of coercive power is not sufficient ground for a regime to last. and legitimacy. Conversely. Estonia and Lithuania – recognized between their invasion by the Soviet Union in 1940 and their eventual achievement of independence in 1991’ (Heywood 1994: 92). legality. like Hobbes. Indeed Hobbes. This is why. the political/legal distinction does not describe two different types of sovereignty but two facets of the same phenomenon.4 THE LOCATION OF SOVEREIGNTY • Sovereignty may be vested in a monarchy. As observed by Antonio Gramsci. and as such the value of the political/legal distinction is mainly heuristic and analytical in that it highlights the multi-layered nature of the concept of sovereignty.

Globalization theory suggests that the boundaries of states are permeable.O N S OV E R E I G N T Y HARD SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS POROUS SOVEREIGNTY There is also a distinction to be made between porous and hard sovereignty. a decentralized international system will always have recourse to some such ideas. the following remark by Bodin: For if we say that to have absolute power is not to be subject to any law at all. Moreover. Consequently. and the emergence of over twenty new members of the United Nations since 1990 suggest that sovereign statehood remains a powerful goal for those who do not already possess it 43 . no prince of this world will be sovereign. the idea of state sovereignty is already anachronistic as a result of developments in human rights regimes. What is less convincing is the view that there once existed a time when sovereignty was truly impenetrable. as an example. Consider. (Evans and Newnham 1998: 505) BOX 3. since every earthly prince is subject to the laws of God and of nature and to various human laws that are common to all peoples [lex omnium gentium communis] (Bodin [1576] 1992: 10. emphasis added) Bodin repeatedly supports the idea that human laws common to all peoples (jus gentium) served to limit and restrain sovereigns in international affairs. there exists the argument that the notion of sovereignty will eventually be abandoned as a result of integrative developments such as the EU. in international norms and in international law. All such claims to the erosion of sovereignty are to some extent well grounded. Since sovereignty implies constitutional independence from other states. with the twenty-first century experiencing a very different type of sovereignty to that described by Bodin and Hobbes. For many scholars. and that the line of demarcation between the internal and external spheres of a state’s existence has also become blurred. the contention that the twenty-first century is experiencing the demise of sovereignty is exaggerated: The continued relevance of the idea of sovereignty in international affairs is testified by the fact that at the political level it remains the primary organizing principle of world politics. Twenty-first-century economic interdependence and the power of multinationals also feed into the discussion that state sovereignty is becoming a nostalgic memory.5 SOVEREIGNTY IN REVIEW • Sovereignty has both political and legal dimensions • The worst dictatorships will seek a legal justification • Claims that sovereignty is being eroded or penetrated are associated with globalization and interdependence • Claims to statehood.

(2002) Sovereignty. However. Evans. and Newnham. Giorgio (2005) State of Exception. Chicago. because it can enrich current debates on sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. In contemporary times there seems to be widespread consensus among scholars that a commitment to human rights conflicts with the principles of state sovereignty. more importantly. In other words. and a state that commits atrocities against its own citizens. David (1995) Democracy and the Global Order. edited and translated by J. Brace. A superficial reading of Bodin and Hobbes suggests that a state system predicated on their notion of unlimited. Held. both Hobbes and Bodin defended state sovereignty not for its own sake but as a vehicle to protect the life of people. (1992) On Sovereignty. that the respect of the state for sovereignty may sometimes imply the impossibility of preventing domestic injustice. Brown. Cambridge: Polity. London: Pinter.GABRIELLA SLOMP CONCLUSION Bodin and Hobbes first developed the principle of state sovereignty as a result of their experiences of war and their desire to protect states from religious interference. Neither Bodin nor Hobbes identified sovereign power with arbitrary power – for both Bodin and Hobbes the function of state sovereignty (and its justification) was the protection of the well-being of the commonwealth. and vice versa. they both maintained that state sovereignty had one specific function: the protection of citizens. C. indivisible. Bodin. Cambridge: Polity Press. J. Franklin. and Hoffman. arguably. V. and absolute sovereignty would imply that sovereign states are the ultimate judges in their own cases. Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today. does not deserve its own sovereignty. 44 . This important insight needs to be revisited not only for a fairer assessment of Bodin and Hobbes but. L. have an absolute right to go to war as they please and can treat their own citizens as they want. J. (1885) Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. A more careful reading of Bodin and Hobbes suggests that their notion of state sovereignty is much subtler than is generally acknowledged. (1997) Reclaiming Sovereignty. as well as interference from the emperor and from other potential external and internal enemies. G. A. IL: University of Chicago Press. J. REFERENCES Agamben. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. London: Penguin Books. Dicey. the founding fathers of the concept of sovereignty maintained a very different approach. Although the notion of human rights (as we currently understand it) was foreign to Bodin and Hobbes. In this respect historians and International Relations scholars such as Krasner (1999) and Brown (2002) have pointed out that states were never able to act in such a way. Indeed it is often pointed out that in order to protect human rights one has sometimes to violate state sovereignty.

Krasner.ca/politics/comninel/courses/3020pdf/ six_books. Cambridge: MIT Press. S.edu/∼rbear/hobbes/leviathan. (1991) Kant’s Political Writings.J. Walker. T. (1950) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.B. Houndmills: Macmillan. New York: Alfred A. (1996) The Concept of the Political. (1993) Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. the State and Symbolic Exchange. C.) (2003) Sovereignty in Transition.J.yorku. R. pdf For Hobbes’ Leviathan see: http://www. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. edited by H. Morgenthau. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.O N S OV E R E I G N T Y Heywood. Schmitt.arts. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Oxford: Hart. A. Hobbes. C. Reiss.D.uoregon. (1999) Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy. 2nd edn. (1995) Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention. Weber. C. USEFUL WEBSITES For Bodin see: http://www. (ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1991) Leviathan. I. H. Walker. N. Kant. (1994) Political Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (1985) Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Schmitt.html 45 . Knopf.

2. Great Powers and the Security Dilemma .

SAGE LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY VOLUME I The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen @SAGEPublications Los Angeles London New Delhi Singapore .

It indicates that the policy is designed to promote demands which are ascribed to the nation rather than to individuals. when political formulas such as "national interest" or "national security" gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with particular care. They may not have any precise meaning at all.XVII(4) (1952):48 1-502. years ."National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol Arnold Wolfers tatesman. as many d o today. it has very little meaning. While it was found hard to define what was in the interest of national welfare or to discover standards by which to measure it. It is not surprising that this should be so. S . publicists and scholars who wish to be considered realists. Source: I'olrtlc-'11 Scicnce Q~rczrterly. Depression. But beyond this. They may not mean the same thing to different people. sub-national groups or mankind as a whole. In a very vague and general way "national interest" does suggest a direction of policy which can he distinguished from several others which may present theniselves as alternatives. Today any reference to the pursuit of security is likely to ring a sympathetic chord. When Charles Beard's study of The Idea of National Interest was puhlished in the early of the New Deal and under the impact of the Great . more specifically by the national security interest. However. there could be no doubt as to what people had in mind: they desired to see national policy makers rise above the narrow and special economic interests of parts of the nation to focus their attention on the more inclusive interests of the whole. Thus. was aimed not at promoting the welfare interests of the nation as a whole but instead at satisfying the material interests of powerful sub-national interest or pressure groups. while appearing to offer g ~ ~ i d a n c and e a basis for broad consensus they may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favors with an attractive and possibly deceptive name. then largely economic in scope and motivation. are inclined to insist that the foreign policy they advocate is dictated by the national interest. It emphasizes that the policy subordinates other interests to those of the nation.I. the lines were drawn differently than they are today. The question at that time was whether American foreign policy.

Unless explicitly denied. The demand for a policy of national security is primarily normative in character. as it was a t the time of Beard's discussion. is well enough established in the political discourse of international relations to designate an objective of policy distinguishable from others. They see them sacrificing the less inclusive national community to the wider but in their opinion chimeric world community. though closer analysis will show that if used without specifications it leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford. international cooperation. is not one of transcending narrow group selfishness. therefore. it is overshadowed today by the national security interest. The change from a welfare to a security interpretation of the symbol "national interest" is understandable. like national interest.' The question is raised. the symbol suggests protection through power and therefore figures more frequently in the speech of those who believe in reliance on national power than of those who place their confidence in model behavior. Can they be expected to know what it means? Can policies be distinguished and judged on the ground that they do or d o not serve this interest? The term national security. Lawrence Seaway. or the United Nations to carry their country safely through the tempests of international conflict. As a result. spokesmen for a policy which would take the national interest as its guide can be assumed to mean that priority shall be given to measures of security. Moreover. the defenders of the project. Even in the recent debates on the St. the alternative t o a policy of the national interest to which people refer is of a different character. spoke mainly of the value of the Seaway for military defense in wartime while some opponents stressed its vulnerability to attack. We know roughly what people have in mind if they complain that their government is neglecting national security or demanding excessive sacrifices for the sake of enhancing it. For these reasons it would be an exaggeration to claim that the symbol of national security is nothing but a stimulus to semantic confusion. They fear policy makers may be unduly concerned with the "interests of all of mankind". While it would be wrong to say that the economic interest has ceased to attract attention. a term to be analyzed. Usually those who raise the cry for a policy oriented exclusively toward this interest are afraid their country underestimates the external dangers facing it or is being diverted into idealistic channels unmindful of these dangers. The issue. whether this seemingly more precise formula of national security offers statesmen a meaningful guide for action. then. the formula of the national interest has come to be practically synonymous with the formula of national security. There is another difference between the current and the earlier debate. clearly in the first instance an economic enterprise. Today we are living under the impact of cold war and threats of external aggression rather than of depression and social reform. when seeking to impress their listeners with the "national interest" involved. It is supposed to indicate what the policy of a nation should be in . but rather one of according more exclusive devotion to the narrower cause of the national self.16 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence Today.

if challenged. and power its ability t o control the actions of others.eague expressed the view that rather than t o submit t o what might be French hysterical apprehension the relative security of France should be objectively evaluated. the best o r least evil course of action."National Security" 17 order t o be either expedient . Such appeals usually assume that nations in fact have made security their goal except when idealism o r utopianism of their leaders has led them t o stray from the traditional path. in a n objective sense. differ widely in their reaction t o one and the same external situation. other Powers in the I.-' T h e possible discrepancy between the objective and subjective connotation of the term is significant in international relations despite the fact that the chance of future attack never can be measured "objectively". Security points t o some degree of protection of values previously acquired. It is a well-known fact that nations. Security is a value. a nation is secure t o the extent t o which it is not in danger of having t o sacrifice core values. it must always remain a matter of subjective evaluation and speculation.o r moral. it would he proper t o infer that a country deviating from the established pattern of conduct would risk being penalized. This is in accord with common usage of the term. the absence of tear that such values will be attacked. when the French after World War I insisted that they were entitled t o additional guarantees of security because of the exceptionally dangerous situation which France was said t o be facing. But while wealth measures the a m o u n t of a nation's material possessions. This would greatly arguments. The value judgments implicit in these normative exhortations will be discussed. Even if for n o other reasons. then. t o maintain them by victory in such a war.a rational means toward a n accepted end . In both respects a nation's security can run a wide gamut from almost complete insecurity o r sense of insecurity a t one pole. with power o r wealth. o r t o defeat it. is that the term "security" covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security. The trouble with the contention of fact. and groups within nations. and is able. t w o other values of great importance in international affairs. With hindsight it is sometimes possible t o tell exactly h o w far they deviated from a rational reaction t o the actual o r objective state of danger existing a t the time. attention should be drawn t o a n assertion of fact which is implicit if not explicit in most appeals for a policy guided hy national security. If such conformity of behavior actually existed. Some tend t o exaggerate the danger while others underestimate it. of which a nation can have more o r less and which it can aspire t o have in greater o r lesser measure. However. measures the absence of threats t o acquired values. in a subjective sense.' What this definition implies is that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation t o deter a n attack. In Walter Lippmann's words. security. Before doing so. this difference in the reaction t o similar threats suffices t o make it probable that nations will differ in their efforts t o obtain . if it wishes t o avoid war. in this respect. t o almost complete security o r absence of fear a t the other. strengthen the norn~ative however.' It has much in common.

are equally in danger of attack. or that the British had as much reason to be concerned about the French air force in the twenties as about Hitler's Luftwaffe in the thirties. alliances. nobody can reasonably contend that Canada. There have been many instances of struggles for more security taking the form of an unrestrained race for armaments. For purposes of a working hypothesis. But a generalization which leaves room both for the frantic kind of struggle for more security which characterized French policy a t times and for the neglect of security apparent in American foreign policy after the close of both World Wars throws little light on the behavior of nations. It may be worth noting in this connection that there seems to be no case in history in which a country started a preventive war on the grounds of security . however. sufficiently widespread to guarantee some uniformity in this respect. while it may be true in the living world.the great Powers particularly . Although this is not the place t o set up hypotheses on the factors which account for one or the other attitude.and wherein all. is threatened today to the same extent as countries like Iran or Yugoslavia. in part at least. investigation might confirm the hunch that those nations tend to be most sensitive to threats which have either experienced attacks in the recent past or. Even when there has been no question that armaments would mean more security. is obviously not the case. therefore. that no sovereign nation can be absolutely safe from future attack.have shown." Probably national efforts to achieve greater security would also prove. There can be no quarrel with the generalization that most nations. but one need only recall the many heated parliamentary debates on arms appropriations to realize how uncertain has been the extent to which people will consent to sacrifice for additional increments of security. strategic boundaries and the like. Some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with their modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live with these same dangers.as it could under the conditions postulated in the working hypothesis of pure power politics . Danger and the awareness of it have been. This point. should not be overstressed. most of the time . and continue t o be. to be a function of the power and opportunity which nations possess of reducing danger by their own effort^. suddenly find themselves thrust into a situation of danger. however.^ Another and even stronger reason why nations must be expected not to act uniformly is that they are not all or constantly faced with the same degree of danger. an active concern about some lack of security and have been prepared to make sacrifices for its enhancement.unless .' But. the reduction in social benefits or the sheer discomfort involved has militated effectively against further effort. for example.that nations normally subordinate all other values to the maximization of their security. which. too. the cost in taxes.18 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence more security. having passed through a prolonged period of an exceptionally high degree of security. and had reason t o show. The demand for conformity would have meaning only if it could be said . theorists may find it useful at times to postulate conditions wherein all states are enemies provided they are not allied against others .

military leaders or other particularly security-minded participants in the decision-making process believe it should be. nations or anlbitious leaders may consider no price for it too high. despite what n~anipulatorsof public opinion engaged in mustering greater security efforts may have said to the contrary. There was a time when United States policy could afford to be concerned mainly with the protection of the foreign investments or markets of its nationals. This is one of the reasons why very high security aspirations tend to make a nation suspect of hiding more aggressive aims. If nations were not concerned with the protection of values other than their survival as independent states. then. tradition. It would seem to be a fair guess that the efforts for security by a particular nation will tend to vary. together with the extent of the external threats. preferences and prejudices will influence the level of security which a nation chooses to make its target. where security serves only as a cloak for other more enticing demands. most of them.IIC~* "National Security" 19 Hitler's wanton attack on his neighbors be allowed to qualify as such although there must have been circumstances where additional security could have been obtained by war and although so many wars have been launched for the enhancement of other values. however. real or imagined. is a function not merely of the will of others. As a consequence. numerous domestic factors such as national character. national independence and territorial integrity. other things being equal. keeping them at the lowest level which will provide them with what they consider adequate protection. Of course. In respect to this range there may seem to exist a considerable degree of uniformity. to destroy the nation's independence but of national desires and ambitions to retain a wealth of other values such as rank. Some nations seek protection for more marginal values as well. What "compulsion" there is. Instead of expecting a uniform drive for enhanced or maximum security. most of the time. a glance at history will suffice to show that survival has only exceptionally been at stake. In fact. particularly for the major Powers. or when Britain was extending its national self to include large and only vaguely circumscribed . a negative value so to speak. But there is deviation in two directions. nations will be inclined to minimize these efforts. Are they not under a kind o f compulsion to spare no effort provided they wish to survive? This objection again would make sense only if the hypothesis of pure power politics were a realistic image of actual world affairs. a different hypothesis may offer a more promising lead. All over the world today peoples are making sacrifices to protect and preserve what to them appear as the minimum national core values. It might be objected that in the long run nations are not so free to choose the amount of effort they will put into security. In any case. security after all is nothing but the absence of the evil of insecurity. This level will often be lower than what statesmen. would not have had to be seriously worried about their security. its "core values" being out of danger. Efforts for security are bound to be experienced as a burden. with the range of values for which protection is being sought. respect. material possessions and special privileges.

20 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence "regions of special interest". The Czechs lifted no finger to protect their independence against the Soviet Union and many West Europeans are arguing today that rearmament has become too destructive of values they cherish to be justified even when national independence is obviously at stake. The most casual reading of history and of contemporary experience. It is understandable why it should so readily be assumed that a quest for security must necessarily translate itself into a quest for coercive power.it seems plausible at first sight that the response should consist in an accumulation of the same kind of force for the purpose of resisting an attack or of deterring a wouldbe attacker. moreover. Pushed to its logical conclusion. security zones and the like may be demanded and acquired for the purpose of protecting values acquired earlier. There is little indication that Britain is bolstering the security of Hong Kong although colonies were once considered part of the national territory. Why otherwise would so many nations which have no acquisitive designs maintain costly armaments? Why did Denmark with her state of complete disarmament remain an exception even among the small Powers? But again. The lack of uniformity does not end here. In view of the fact that security is being sought against external violence coupled perhaps with internal subversive violence . A deviation in the opposite direction of a compression of the range of core values is hardly exceptional in our days either. if two nations were both endeavoring to maximize their security but one were placing all its reliance on armaments and alliances. a policy maker seeking to emulate their behavior would be at a loss where to turn. suffices to confirm the view that such resort to "power of resistance" has been the rule with nations grappling with serious threats to their security. but they take for granted that they will be understood to mean a security policy based on power. the generalization that nations seeking security usually place great reliance on coercive power does not carry one far. such spatial extension of the range of values does not stop short of world domination. they would be hard put to prove that their government was not already doing its best for security. The issue is not whether there is regularly some such reliance but whether there are no . the other on meticulous neutrality. A policy is not characterized by its goal. the means by which the goal is pursued must be taken into account as well. Those who call for a policy guided by national security are not likely to be unaware of this fact. and they then become new national values requiring protection themselves. and on military power at that. Thus. in this case security. It is a well-known and portentous phenomenon that bases.means which in one instance may be totally ineffective or utopian but which in others may have considerable protective value. however much the specific form of this power and its extent may differ. though it was seeking to enhance it by such means as international cooperation or by the negotiation of compromise agreements . In order to become imitable. Were it not so. alone.

The choice in every instance will depend o n a multitude of variables. w h o are o u t for conquest and glory a t any price. It m a y be expedient. guided by their national security interest. While this is not the place t o decide which side was right. The first question.5 were equally convinced. may he an intermediate rather than a n ~lltimategoal. Instead. t o which we shall n o w turn o u r attention. . According t o this proposition nations are called upon t o give priority t o national security and thus t o consent t o any sacrifice of value which will provide an additional increment of security. one cannot help drawing the conclusion that. it would seem t o make n o sense t o ask whether it is expedient for nations t o be concerned with the goal of sec~rrity itself. moral o r both for nations t o d o so even if they should have failed t o heed such advice in the past and for the most part are not living up t o it today.t o promote security. does not affect the norniativc proposition. is whether some definable security policy can be said t o he generally expedient. in the matter of means. instead they seek t o acquire new values even a t the price of greater insecurity. only the means used t o this end. tend to pursue a mif form and therefore imitable policy of security. In this category must be placed not only the "mad Caesars". and inclinations of individual policy makers. like other aims. Because the choice of goals is not a matter of expediency." After all that has been said little is left of the sweeping generalization that in actual practice nations. hut also idealistic statesmen w h o would plunge their country into war for the sake of spreading the benefits of their ideology. so it would seem. which would rob him of future incentives t o renew his attack. President Wilson in 1919 and many observers in 194. Yet. expectations concerning the psychological and political developnients in the camp of the opponent. this is not so. the roads which are open may lead in diametrically opposed directions. that more hope for security lay in a conciliatory and fair treatment of the defeated enemy. of liberating enslaved peoples. with some standing close t o the pole of complete indifference t o security or coniplete reliance on nonmilitary means. for example. The controversies concerning the best road t o future security that are so typical o f coalition partners a t the close of victorious wars throw light on this question. however. can he judged as t o their fitness . there a r e numerous reasons why they should differ widely in this respect. including ideological and moral convictions."National Security" 21 c~gn~frcan d~fferences t between natrons concerning t h e ~ rover-c~ll cho~ce of the means upon which they place their trust. Security. others close t o the pole of insistence on absolute security or of complete reliance on coercive power. past and present. in which case it can be judged as a means t o these more ultimate ends. then. France in 19 19 and all the Allies in 1945 believed that protection against another German attack co~rldhe gained only by means of continued military superiority based o n German military impotence.their instrumental rationality . It should be added that there exists still another category of nations which cannot be placed within the continuum connecting these poles because they regard security of any degree as a n insufficient goal. The actual behavior o f nations.

justice. a t least by those who followed in the footsteps of Machiavelli or. The answer cannot be taken for granted. here and in Allied countries. Those who d o so today will be shocked at the mere suggestion that national security should have to be justified in terms of higher values which it is expected to serve. there is frequently disagreement among different layers of policy makers as to where the line should be drawn. When one sets out to define in terms of expediency the level of security to which a nation should aspire. in which case. not so much on the grounds that they will protect national security but that by enhancing such security they will serve to protect ultimate human values like individual liberty. if in the course of a war of defense a large part of the people were to be exterminated and most cities destroyed. opposition in Europe and Asia t o military security measures is based in part on the contention that it would help little to make national core values secure. is useless. At a certain point. however. it becomes necessary to provide such arguments whenever national security as a value in itself is being questioned. But there is a large and perhaps growing current of opinion . placed the prince. This is true particularly because absolute security is out of the question unless a country is capable of world domination. we enlist support for armaments. the prevention of Russian conquest. In the first place. the gain in security n o longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it. one might be tempted to assume that the sky is the limit. there are obvious reasons why this is not so. Because nations must "live dangerously". t o some extent.as a matter of fact influential in this country for a long time . a modicum of additional . every increment of security must be paid by additional sacrifices of other values usually of a kind more exacting than the mere expenditure of precious time on the part of policy makers. peace or individual liberty. for other reasons of political philosophy. the protection and preservation of national core values have been considered ends in themselves. if in the process the liberties and the social welfare of the people had to be sacrificed. state or nation at the pinnacle of their hierarchy of values. whatever they consent to d o about it. aside from any moral considerations which will be discussed later.22 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence Traditionally. then. As in the case of economic value comparisons and preferences. some insist. But turning away now from the expediency of security as an intermediate goal we must ask whether. the insecurities and fears would be "internalized" and probably magnified.which adheres to this idea.I0 While excellent arguments can be made to support the thesis that the preservation of the national independence of this country is worth almost any price as long as no alternative community is available which could assure the same degree of order. a specific level of security and specific means of attaining it can claim to be generally expedient. Again. by something like the economic law of diminishing returns. Is not insecurity of any kind an evil from which any rational policy maker would want to rescue his country? Yet. then. We condemn Nazis and Communists for defending their own totalitarian countries instead of helping to free their people from tyranny.

if not to replace it. What a country does to bolster its own security through power can be interpreted hy others. however. Obviously. . therefore. Whenever they do not lie beyond this realm the most effective and least costly security policy consists in inducing the opponent to give up his aggressive intentions. in practice. national security policies when based on the accumulation of power have a way of defeating themselves if the target level is set too high.4 I "National Security" 23 but only relative security may easily become unattractive to those who have to bear the chief burden. Policy makers must decide how to distribute their reliance on whatever means are available to them and. the vicious circle of what John Herz has described as the "security dilemma" sets in: the efforts of one side provoke countermeasures by the other which in turn tend to wipe out the gains of the first. Such attitude and behavior need not be beyond the realm of influence by the country seeking to bolster its security. This is due to the fact that "power of resistance" cannot be unmistakably distinguished from "power of aggression". there can be no general answer which would meet the requirements of every case." The chief way is that of keeping the target level within moderate bounds and of avoiding placing oneself in a position where it has to be raised suddenly and drastically. The answer depends on the circumstances. as a threat to their security. A weak country may have no better means at its disposal than to prove to stronger neighbors that its strict neutrality can be trusted. while in others even they may find it more expedient to supplement such a policy. The question of what means are expedient for the purpose of enhancing security raises even more thorny problems. The desire to escape from this vicious circle presupposes a security policy of much self-restraint and moderation. there are ways to convince those who might feel threatened that the accumulation of power is not intended and will never be used for attack. If this occurs. the attitude and behavior of those from whom the threat emanates are of prime importance. in the objective sense of the term at least. especially in the choice of the target levef. N o attempt can he made here to decide what the choice should be in order to be expedient. In the second place. Potentially strong countries may have a chance to deter an aggressor by creating "positions of strengthv. particularly. If security. Theoretically there seems to be no escape from this frustrating consequence. rises and falls with the presence or absence of aggressive intentions on the part of others. by a policy intended to negotiate their opponent out of his aggressive designs. The reason why "power of resistance" is not the general panacea which some believe it to be lies in the nature of security itself. Nothing renders the task of statesmen in a democracy more difficult than the reluctance of the people to follow them very far along the road to high and costly security levels. In some instances they may have no other way of saving themselves. how far to push the accumulation of coercive power." It can never be expedient to pursue a security policy which by the fact of provocation or incentive to others fails to increase the nation's relative power position and capability of resistance.

at one pole and those whom no amount of opportunity for successful attack could induce to undertake it at the other. of the other side into consideration. The paradox of this situation must be faced. It implies that national security policy. including the security interests. moreover. however. symbolized by "Munich". except when directed against a country unalterably committed to attack. while Canadian policy makers probably place the United States in its intentions toward Canada a t the second pole. . cannot be underestimated. as expedient. what position within the continuum one's opponent actually occupies. One can think of nations lined up between the two poles of maximum and minimum "attack propensity". is the more rational the more it succeeds in taking the interests. then. in practice. Such a twofold policy presents the greatest dilemmas because efforts to change the intentions of an opponent may run counter to the efforts to build up strength against him. provided it promises success. Rather than to insist. to some of the most typical political constellations. Only in doing so can it hope to minimize the willingness of the other to resort to violence. Statesmen cannot be blamed. Unfortunately it can never be known with certainty. This is only another way of saying that security policy must seek to bring opponents to occupy a position as close to the second pole as conditions and capabilities permit. even though the intention to launch it cannot be considered to have crystallized to the point where nothing could change it. The dangers of any policy of concessions. This means. If this be true. Efforts have to be made simultaneously toward the goal of removing the incentives to attack. wherever the issue of security becomes a matter of serious concern. that an attack must be feared as a possibility. with those unalterably committed to attack. While security in respect to the first group can come exclusively as a result of "positions of strength" sufficient to deter or defeat attack. then. It is fair to assume that.24 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence While there is no easy way to determine when means can and should be used which are directed not at resistance but at the prevention of the desire of others to attack. it will clarify the issue to sketch the type of hypotheses which would link specific security policies. We believe we have ample p o o f that the Soviet Union today is at or very close to the first pole. nothing could d o more to undermine security in respect to the second group than to start accumulating power of a kind which would provoke fear and countermoves. if caution and suspicion lead them to assume a closer proximity to the first pole than hindsight proves to have been justified. if security policy is to be expedient. statesmen will usually be dealing with potential opponents who occupy a position somewhere between but much closer to the first of the two poles. that under all conditions security be sought by reliance on nothing but defensive power and be pushed in a spirit of national selfishness toward the highest targets. a security policy in order to be expedient cannot avoid accumulating power of resistance and yet cannot let it go at that.

or its use . heighten their sense of self-esteem or reduce their fears.'' Nations like individuals or other groups may value things not because they consider them good or less evil than their alternative.that they are passing moral judgment when they advise a nation to pursue the goal of national security or when they insist that such means as the accumulation of coercive power . if such there be. no policy.I4 Those who advocate a policy devoted to national security are not always aware of the fact . We can now focus our attention on the moral issue. It should always be kept in mind that the ideal security policy is one which would lead to a distribution of values so satisfactory to all nations that the intention to attack and with it the problem of security would be minimized. at least to the point of rationalizing a decision favoring such a war by claiming that it would serve . he is implying. Here it becomes a matter of comparing and weighing values in order to decide which of them are deemed sufficiently good to justify the evil of sacrificing others. with the enormous evils it would carry with it. While this is a utopian goal. would not the exponents of amoralism have some moral qualms. policy makers and particularly peacemakers would d o well to remember that there are occasions when greater approximation to such a goal can be effected. they may value them because they satisfy their pride. if we should become convinced that no adequate security can be obtained except by the defeat of the Soviet Union? In this last case. provided it added an increment to our security. when ready. though principles valued highly by some were being sacrificed? Should we engage in subversive activities and risk the lives of our agents if additional security can be attained thereby? Should we perhaps go so far as to start a preventive war. Is a "deal with fascist Spain" morally justified. violates the rules of expediency. can escape becoming a subject for moral judgment . However.111 "NationalSecurity" 25 it should be stressed that in most instances efforts to satisfy legitimate demands of others are likely to promise better results in terms of security.whether by the conscience of the actor himself or by others -which calls for the sacrifice of other values. While in the face of a would-be world conqueror who is beyond the pale of external influence it is dangerous to be diverted from the accumulation of sheer defensive power." That is probably what George Kennan had in mind when he advised policy makers to use self-restraint in the pursuit of the national interest. that more security is sufficiently desirable to warrant such evils as the cut in much-needed social welfare benefits or as the extension of the period of military service. or human act in general. If someone insists that his country should d o more to build up its strength. as any security policy is bound to do. knowingly or not. I h Many vivid examples of the moral dilemma are being supplied by current controversies concerning American security policy.should be employed for this purpose.if they d o not explicitly deny it . any mistake about his true state of mind or any neglect of opportunities to influence his designs. where it has a chance of being successful.

the "too much". therefore. Somewhere a line is drawn. which in every instance he must seek to discover. then. He must further decide which level of security to make his target. of choosing first the values which deserve protection. which his choice of means implies. But he cannot consider security the supreme law as Machiavelli would have the statesman regard the ragione di stato. This will frequently be his most difficult moral task though terms such as adequacy or fair share indicate the kind of standards that may guide him. He should have n o doubts about the right of a nation to protect and preserve values to which it has a legitimate title or even about its moral duty to pursue a policy meant to serve such preservation. he must choose the means and thus by scrupulous computation of values compare the sacrifices. Clearly this implies a position that places national security at the apex of the value pyramid and assumes it t o constitute an absolute good to which all other values must be subordinated. Even Hans Morgenthau who extols the moral duty of self-preservation seems to take it for granted that naked force shall be used for security in reaction only to violent attack. with the security they promise to provide. For anyone who does not share these extreme views the moral issue raised by the quest for national security is anything but clear-cut and simple. is justified provided it contributes in any way to national security. from the realm of excess. the "too-little". Few will be found t o take this position because if they subscribed to a nationalistic ethics of this extreme type they would probably go beyond security . which places reliance on such power. The moral issue will be resolved in one of several ways depending on the ethical code upon which the decision is based. justice and peace. especially if imposed on other nations. He may also be able to make it more difficult for advisers or executors of policy to hide from themselves or others the moral value judgments and preferences which underlie whatever security policy they choose to recommend or conduct. with national independence ranking high not merely for its own sake but for the guarantee it may offer to values like liberty. Finally. that divides the realm of neglect. What he can contribute here is to point t o the ambiguities of any general normative demand that security be bought at whatever price it may cost. not for preventive war. Decision makers are faced with the moral problem. At the opposite extreme are the absolute pacifists who consider the use of coercive power a n absolute evil and condemn any security policy.26 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence to satisfy not primarily an egotistical national demand for security but an altruistic desire to liberate enslaved peoples? It is easier to argue for the amorality of politics if one does not have t o bear the responsibility of choice and decision! Far be it from a political scientist to claim any particular competence in deciding what efforts for national security are or are not morally justified. .and insist that the nation is justified in conquering whatever it can use as Lebensraum or otherwise. From one extreme point of view it is argued that every sacrifice.the mere preservation of values .

positive or negative. egotistical and provocative or for being inadequate. which without regard for the special circumstances would praise everything done for national security or more particularly everything done for the enhancement of national power of resistance. The target level falls under moral judgment for being too ambitious. . In order to be meaningful such admonitions would have to specify the degree of security which a nation shall aspire to attain and the means by which it is to be attained in a given situation. Because the pendulum of public opinion swings so easily from extreme complacency to extreme apprehension.or of a security policy relying on coercive and therefore evil power. a spirit of conciliation. that normative admonitions to conduct a foreign policy guided by the national security interest are no less ambiguous and misleading than the statement of fact concerning past behavior which was discussed earlier. and in fact meaningless.\ oiicr\ "National Security" 27 It follows that policies of national security. on "national security policy in general". however. international organization or world government. the means employed for being unnecessarily costly in other values or for being ineffective. they may instead be condemned for being inadequate to protect national values. and have influence on policy. In conclusion. it may be no less expedient and morally advisable in another instance to call for moderation and for greater reliance on means other than coercive power. then. It is this lack of moral homogeneity which in matters of security policy justifies attacks on so-called moralism. far from being all good or all evil. The exponent of such "moralism" is assumed to believe that security for all peoples can be had today by the exclusive use of such "good" and altruistic means as model behavior and persuasion. even of one that parades in the realist garb of a policy guided solely by the national security interest. it makes sense to continue to disabuse them of what can surely be proved to be dangerous illusions. that the opposite line of argument. Again. it can be said. This wide range of variety which arises out of the multitude of variables affecting the value computation would make it impossible. It may be good advice in one instance to appeal for greater effort and more armaments. The "moralistic approach" is taken to mean a wholesale condemnation either of any concern with national security . may be morally praiseworthy or condemnable depending on their specific character and the particular circumstances of the case. is no less guilty of applying simple and abstract moral principles and of failing to judge each case realistically on its merits.as being an expression of national egotism . from utopian reliance on "good will" to disillusioned faith in naked force only. it is particularly important to be wary of any simple panacea. or condemned in another because of the recklessness with which national values are risked on the altar of some chimera. They may be praised for their self-restraint and the consideration which this implies for values other than security. particularly of weaker nations. It is worth emphasizing. though not on moral evaluation. they may be praised in one instance for the consideration given to the interests of others. If there are any utopians who cling to this notion. to pass moral judgment.

instead. d e f ~ n ing security as "high value expectancy" stress the subjective and speculative character of security by using the term "expectancy". demands which make sense only in the context of a quest for security through power. it could afford to dismiss any serious preoccupation w t h security. Security and power would be synonymous terms if security could be attained only through the accumulation of power. which will be shown nor to be the case. Foreign Policy (Boston. The United States offers a good illustration and may be typical in this respect. The differences may apply.here the continued unmolested enjoyment of his possessions . France's occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 illustrates this type of behav~or. Nations may also differ in respect to the breadth of their security perspective as when American leaders at Yalta were so preoccupied with security agalnst the then enemy countries of the United States that they failed or refused to consider future American security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. For a discussion of this working hypothesis . Terms such as "degree" or "level" of security are not intended to indicate merely quantitative differences. However.as part of the "pure power" hypothesis see my article on "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference" in World Pol~tics. No. Walter Lippmann. 1. Why. 3. and specifically of security based on power. 1943). 51. S.while mdicating no definite level. 4. otherwise. U. after this happy condition had ceased to exist. the use of the term "h~gh". would seem to imply that the security-seeker aims at a position in which the events he expects . When Nicholas J. They are dissatisfied with the degree of security which they enjoy under the status quo and are out to enhance it. October 1951. there is reason to beware of the easy and often self-righteous assumption that nations which desire to preserve the status quo are necessarily "peace-loving". 1950). Spykman raised his voice in the years before World War I1 to advocate a broader security outlook than was indicated by the symbol "Western Hemisphere Defense" and a greater appreciation of the r6le of defenswe mtlitary power. he says. If Hans Morgenthau and others raise t h e ~ r warning voices today. seemmgly treading in Spykman's footsteps. For a long time this country was beyond the reach of any enemy attack that could be considered probable. is interested in three things: a unique position as a predominant Power without rival in the Western Hemisphere and the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe as well as in Asia. they are addressing a narlon which after a new relapse into wishful thinking in 1945 has been rad~callydisillusioned and may now be swinging toward excessive security apprehensions.have considerably more than an even chance of materializing. he was dealing with this lag and with the dangers implied in it. 7. government and people alike showed a lag in their awareness of the change. would some weak and exposed nations conslder themselves more secure today than does the United States? Harold D. vol. The United Stares.is also not proportionate to the relative power position of a nation. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan. During that period. to the time range for which security is sought as when the British at Versailles were ready to offer France short-run security guarantees while the French with more foresight ins~sredthat the "German danger" would not become acute for some ten years.the National Interest". it becomes clear in the few pages devoted to an exposition of this "perennial" interest that the author is thinking in terms of the national security interest. . p. The fear of attack -security in the subjective sense . IV. Power and Society (New Haven. Because the demand for more security may induce a status quo Power even to resort to the use of violence as a means of attaining more security. This explains why some nations which would seem to fall into the category of status quo Powers par excellence may nevertheless be dissatisfied and act very much like "imperialist" Powers.28 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e Notes 1. Events proved that it was n o worse off for having done so. 1951) IS the most explicit and impassioned recent plea for an American foreign policy which shall follow "but one guiding star . 5. then. 6. as Morgenthau calls nations with acquisitive goals. While Morgenthau is not equally explicit in regard t o the meaning he attaches t o the symbol "national interest". Hans Morgenthau's In Defense of the National Interest (New York. 2.

IV. On the problem of security policy (Sicl~erheitspolrt~k) with special reference t o "collective secur~ty"see the comprehensive and illuminating study of Heinrich Rogge.) rightly criticize\ H a n s Morgenthau ( a n d George t i e n t u n tor what tiennan himself wrongly believes t o he h ~ o s w n point o t view in the matter. I I. "if economlc pressures become great enough." This c a n be read t o mean that 3 less a m b ~ r ~ o milit'lry us target than overwhelming preponderance r n ~ g h t be a means o f achieving security. 19371.. 46." Introduction t o T h o m a \ Hobbes. "The search for perfect security . Raymond Dennett goes further in making the generalization that. 12. No.52. "Danger Spots In the Pattern of American Security". N o t everyone agrees that this can be done. In World Politzcs." n o imperiled nation". I. As A. especially p. vol.52. 1952. . Playing for safety 1s the most dangerous way t o live. Mcllougal ("Law a n d Peace" in the A m e r m m /o~irtznlof lntcrn~7tron~zI 1. in . 13. l 9 4 9 ) . Chicago. c vmakers divide their attention strictlv between ends a n d means a n d only after having chosen a speclf~c target level as heing morally iustified decide whether the means by which ~t can be attamed are morally acceptable. January 19. when put t o the flnal test. Lindsay puts it.. ~ ~ s u a l ~dentlfied ly with morality.~chievitigliving standards .idequate enough t o permit the reglme t o survive". of Att~cv~cm Hlstory ( N e w York.~1'1~7t/~dl2. Kennan. pp." Prmczples of Internatronal 1 . 15. /. p. But ~t i \ s u r p r ~ s l n gh o w llrrle aware McDougal appears t o be of the d~sappoinringmodesry of the c o n t r ~ h u t i o n swhich these "other means" have actually made t o the enhancement of security a n d the quite insignificant c o n t r ~ b u t ~ o n they s have made t o the promotion of ch. ~ t "each ninkes h a t e t o hegin for fe. may a t times successfully play in the pursuit of security. Reinhold Nlehuhr. a ~ Essay ~. 19451. 39). 1. claims t o speak In the n a m e of morality.111 overwhelming preponderance of military power.ln be achieved in the tnodern world through a n attempt t o estahllsh .D. XYII. will rnoder. the one. Jeremy Benrham wrote that "measures of mere self defense are naturally taken for projects of aggression" with the result t h . p. while the other. state that "it is highly q u e s t ~ o n a b l e whether securlty c. 1900-1950. George F.). O n the moral problem in international r e l a t ~ o n s see 11iy article o n "St:~tesmansh~p J I ~ M o r a l Choice" in World Politics. points specifically t o the moral problem ~nvolvedin security policy ..5. . T h e Quakers. 102 et seq. vol. pp. he writes. 4. It would he unrealistic t o assume that ~ o l i . ~ n dthe means which lead t o it. should deny "that state behavior is 1 ' fit subject for moral judgment" (Amerrcan DlpIomi7cy. 15 rr~frtr)for his failure t o appreciate the rhle which non-power methods. Theorre der natzonulerz ttnd rnternntionizlctr S~cherhcrt(Berlin. 16. w h o calls for a policy of n a t ~ o n a lselfrestraint a n d humility. p. 9. No.~7~: vol. It IS not w ~ t h o u irony t that of the t w o authors w h o have rrcently c o m e o u t tor a policy of the national interest. 14. cit. T ~ J Iro~zy L. almost any government. January 1949. see fn. "Kollektivsicherheit Buendnispolitik Voelkerhund". In o n e of h ~ most s recent statements o n the subject. p. July 19.~teo r ahandon a ool~ticalassociation" (such as the alliance svstern of the United States with its usefulness t o nation.~rof heing forestalled. 2. calling for a policy of ~ ~ n a d u l t e r ~ l t national ed egotlsm.inges of the status quo. 18. Pvlyres S. which deserves attention despite the fact that ~t was written a n d puhl~shedin N u t Germany and bean J distinctly L'revisioni~t" slant. 176 et seq. 14. 449. IOO). Moral judgment is more llkely t o be passed o n the t o t a l ~ t y of a course of action which embraces both the desired end ."National Security" 29 8. such as legal procedures and moral a p p e d s . H a n s Morgenthau (op. IV. defeats its o w n ends.d security) "if only a n alteration of policy seems t o offer the possibility of maintaining o r . N o . "is morally able t o dispense with weapons which might insure its sul-vivd" ( p . 10.I book on T b r Unrted Stntrs m d t h r Sol& Urzion: Some Quczkrr Propos'11s for Prncr ( N e w Haven. T h ~ s latter failure signif~esthat ther have heen unable t o remove the m ~ i n c~luses of t h e attacks which security-minded peoples rlghtly fear.

but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest. Because states are aware of this. anarchy encourages behavior that leaves all concerned worse off than they could be." If they cooperate to trap the stag. 30(2) (1978):167-214. even in the extreme case in which all states would like to freeze the status quo. Anarchy and the Security Dilemma T he lack of an international sovereign not only permits wars to occur. or might not be able to control his impulses if he saw a rabbit. . Thus.none of the others will get anything. Of course in this simple case . he himself will not.Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma Robert Jervis I. Because there are no institutions or authorities that can make and enforce international laws. others are more likely to fear that he will defect. thus making them more likely to defect. ( 3 ) all chase rabbits (arms competition and high risk of war). and (4) stay at the original position while another chases a rabbit (being disarmed while others are armed). they will all eat well. thus making it more rational for him to defect. This is true of the men in Rousseau's "Stag Hunt.l Unless each person thinks that the others will cooperate. (2) chase a rabbit while others remain at their posts (maintain a high level of arms while others are disarmed).there are a number of arrangements that Source: World Politics. all actors have the same preference order. or might fear that some other member of the group is unreliable.which he likes less than stag . And why might he fear that any other person would do something that would sacrifice his own first choice? The other might not understand the situation.and in many that are more realistic . the policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if others cooperate may bring disaster if they do not. and there is a solution that gives each his first choice: (1) cooperate and trap the stag (the international analogue being cooperation and disarmament). If the person voices any of these suspicions. But if one person defects to chase a rabbit .

Balfour's complaint was typical: "Every time I come to a discussion .at intervals of. expansion tends to feed on itself in order to protect what is acquired. any false or pernicious step taken by any state in its internal affairs may disturb the repose of another state. or at least to neutralize. First. even a state that would prefer the status quo to increasing its area of control may pursue the latter policy. But attempts to establish buffer zones can alarm others who have stakes there. the international case is characterized by three difficulties not present in the Stag Hunt. as was often noted by those who opposed colonial expansion.or rather. But this implies that every state must d o nothing to interfere in the internal affairs of any other. Minds can be changed. to supervise the governments of smaller states and to prevent them from taking false and pernicious steps in their internal affairs." More frequently. it may become dissatisfied later. Countries that are not self-sufficient must try to assure that the necessary supplies will continue to flow in wartime. Even when there is a solution that is everyone's first choice. and this consequent disturbance of another state's repose constitutes an interference in that state's internal affairs. states often seek to control resources or land outside their own territory. But since there is not. five years . they may not be able to reach it. new opportunities and dangers can arise. areas on their borders. When there are believed to be tight linkages between domestic and foreign policy or between the domestic politics of two states.I find there is a new sphere which we . When buffers are sought in areas empty of great powers. or who believe that their own vulnerability will be increased. Metternich's justification for supervising the politics of the Italian states has been summarized as follows: Every state is absolutely sovereign in its internal affairs. the quest for security may drive states to interfere pre-emptively in the domestic politics of others in order to provide an ideological buffer zone. in the name of the sacred right of independence of every state. every sovereign of 3 great power . Therefore. say. If there were an international authority that could guarantee access. they cannot bind themselves and their successors to the same path. However. values can shift. This was part of the explanation for Japan's drive into China and Southeast Asia before World War 11. this motive for control would disappear. who fear that ind desirable precedents will be set. states seek to control.lerv15 Security Dilemma 13 1 could permit cooperation. new leaders can come to power. But the main point remains: although actors may know that they seek a common goal. The second problem arises from a possible solution. In order to protect their possessions. In order to protect then~selves. N o matter how much decision makers are committed to the status quo. to the incentives to defect given above must be added the potent fear that even if the other state now supports the staus quo.has the duty. the concern is with direct attack. every state . Thus.

the obvious question is. The state will take many positions that are subject to challenge. The third problem present in international politics but not in the Stag Hunt is the security dilemma: many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others. too. the German Army can conquer this country. no naval victory could bring us any nearer to Berlin. Of course these measures are not convenient. and keep a distance from suspicious-looking characters. What M a k e s Cooperation M o r e Likely? Given this gloomy picture. the Foreign Secretary. Britain had needed a navy large enough to keep the shipping lanes open." The English position was half correct: Germany's navy was an anti-British instrument. " But ~ the problem was not with British desires.. German colonies and trade were . to meet them. When Germany started building a powerful navy before World War I."" Though this process is most clearly visible when it involves territorial expansion. it often operates with the increase of less tangible power and influence. there are several ways to increase the safety of one's person and property without endangering others. one state's gain in security often inadvertently threatens others. why are we not all dead? Or. cheap. but with the consequences of her policy. for however superior our Fleet was. to put it less starkly. trade that could be interdicted. and I do not know how far west they are going to be brought by the General Staff. put it to King Edward VII: "If the German Fleet ever becomes superior to ours. Britain objected that it could only be an offensive weapon aimed at her. put bars on the windows. As Sir Edward Grey. however. There is no corresponding risk of this kind to Germany. But no one save criminals need be alarmed if a person takes them. In domestic society.132 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence have got to guard. the British Navy constituted an important instrument of coer~ion. Those gateways are getting further and further away from India. In international politics. what kinds of variables ameliorate the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma? The workings of several can . or certain of success. In earlier periods. Ramsey MacDonald said that "Nobody wanted Japan to be i n ~ e c u r e ." Thus. which is supposed to protect the gateways of India. hostages for England to take.~ 11. It will be involved with a wide range of controversial issues unrelated to its core values. whether she intended it or not.. One can move to a safer neighborhood. In explaining British policy on naval disarmament in the interwar period to the Japanese. or colonies that could be isolated. avoid dark streets. But such a navy could not avoid being a menace to any other state with a coast that could be raided. still greater power is required. The expansion of power usually brings with it an expansion of responsibilities and commitments. And retreats that would be seen as normal if made by a small power would be taken as an index of weakness inviting predation if made by a large one. But the British often overlooked what the Germans knew full well: "in every quarrel with England.

~ game theory matrices for these two situations are given below.It 1 c Security Dilemma 133 be seen in terms of the Stag Hunt or repeated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma. "Sir. one of the main reasons why international life is not more nasty. the only rational response is to defect. and short is that states are not as vulnerable as men are in a state of nature. if the game is to be played only once. but as Adam Smith replied to a friend who feared that the Napoleonic Wars would ruin England. or else to be especially suspicious of others. to attack at the slightest provocation rather than wait to be . the latter characteristic no longer holds and we can analyze the game in terms similar to those applied to the Stag Hunt. The Prisoner's Dilemma differs from the Stag Hunt in that there is no solution that is in the best interests of all the participants. It would be in the interest of each actor to have others deprived f. with the numbers in the boxes being the order of the actors' preferences. brutish. But if the others are not. the cost of CD) most strongly drives the security dilemma. ( 3 ) anything that increases each side's expectation that the other will cooperate. if conditions arc favorable. (2) anything that decreases the incentives for defecting by decreasing the gains of taking advantage of the other (DC) and/or increasing the costs of mutual noncooperation (DD). the greater the reason for it either to join a larger and more secure unit. there are offensive as well as defensive incentives to defect from the coalition with the others. there is a great deal of ruin in a nation. But if the game is repeated indefinitely.""he easier it is to destroy a state. what makes it more or less likely that the players will cooperate and arrive at CC?" The chances of achieving this outcome will be increased by: ( I ) anything that increases incentives to cooperate by increasing the gains of mutual cooperation (CC) and/or decreasing the costs the actor will pay if he cooperates and the other does not (CD). and.' The fear of being exploited (that is. to require a large army. each would be willing to sacrifice this ability if others were similarly restrained. then it is in the actor's interest to retain the power to d e f e ~ tThe . STAG HUNT COOPERATE DEFECT PRISONER'S DILEMMA COOPERATE DEFECT COOPERATE R DEFECT 3 4 1 We can see the logical possibilities by rephrasing our question: "Given either of the above situations. the power to defect. People are easy to kill. and.

Others who are more vulnerable will grow apprehensive. if the costs of CD are lower.means that he will starve. this situation is approximated when it is easier for states to defend themselves than to attack others. and ambiguous.for example. they can afford to take a more relaxed view of threats. When the price a state will pay for DD is low. and still survive. it provides some protection. All other things being equal. The best situation is one in which a state will not suffer greatly if others exploit it. As we will discuss below. the costs of CD are low). margin of safety was large enough so that even if Russia managed to gain a lead in the race. and protection against sudden attack not only aid the state. America would not be endangered. for example. if agreements cease functioning or if there is a long war (that is. The program's advocates disagreed: "If we let the Russians get the super first. The state's invulnerability is then mostly passive. a world of small states will feel the effects of anarchy much more than a world of large ones. but it will pay a high long-run price if cooperation with the others breaks down . catastrophe becomes all but certain. the relatively low level of arms and relatively passive foreign policy that a status-quo power will be able to adopt are less likely to threaten others. sign of menace. a person is likely to defect in the Stag Hunt even if he really likes venison and has a high level of trust in his colleagues. but can wait to see what the other will do.) By contrast. but it cannot be used to menace others. (Defection is especially likely if the others are also starving or if they know that he is. Defensible borders. They can mobilize in the prewar period or even at the start of the war itself. Thus it is easier for status-quo states to act on their common interests if they are hard to conquer.134 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence attacked. States that can afford to be cheated in a bargain or that cannot be destroyed by a surprise attack can more easily trust others and need not act at the first. not only is security easier to attain but.be it venison or rabbit . large size."' When the costs of CD are tolerable. they need not match. which will lead them to acquire more arms and will reduce the chances of cooperation. If the failure t o eat that day .S. A relatively low cost of CD has the effect of transforming the game from one in which both players make their choices simultaneously to one in which an actor can make his choice after the other has moved. but facilitate cooperation that can benefit all states. by cheating on an arms control agreement (that is. the costs of DD are high). it leaves others with few hostages for its good behavior. those who opposed a crash program to develop the H-bomb felt that the U. or when mutual deterrence obtains because neither side can protect itself. He will not have to defect out of fear that the other will. what is even more imporant here. Of course. The differences between highly vulnerable and less vulnerable states are illustrated by the contrasting policies of Britain and Austria after the . the ~ r o b l e m from which it can exploit others. any others' arms in peacetime. For example. if one state gains invulnerability by being more powerful than will remain because its security provides a base most others. Because they have a margin of time and error. or more than match. if people are well-fed or states are resilient.

which can differ from the actual situation. For Austria and her neighbors the security dilemma was acute. Similarly. It is through the lowering of the costs of CD that the proposed Rhodesian "safety net" . regulating most disputes. her policy had to be more closely attuned to all conflicts.guaranteeing that whites who leave the country will receive fair payment for their property -would have the paradoxical effect of making it more likely that the whites will stay. whereas Britain did not. cost of CD is of course loss of sovereignty. First. for Britain it was not.or. the less the impact of the security dilemma. The British favored a less centralized system. are similar ethnically. Here is another reason why extreme differences in values and ideologies exacerbate international conflict. the guarantees make it easier for the whites to cooperate among themselves and stay."' Two dimensions are involved. In other words. Subjective Security Demands. to put it more precisely. And foreign revolutions. And revolutions within other states were no menace. The more states value their security above all else (that is. in the absence of guarantees. Then the problem is to avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy in which each person rushes to defect because he fears others are going to. Assume that all whites are willing to stay if most of the others stay. Decision makers act in terms of the vulnerability they feel. be they democratic or nationalistic. This cost can The ~~ltirnate vary from situation to situation. An adversary who was out to overthrow the system could be stopped after he had made his intentions clear. Austria would be gravely threatened. since they would not set off unrest within England. So it is not surprising that Metternich propounded the doctrine summarized earlier. we must therefore examine the decision makers' subjective security requirements. and that British leaders rejected this view. This is less puzzling when we see that the whites are in a multi-person Prisoner's Dilemma with each other.l e r ~ ~Security s Dilemma 135 Napoleonic Wars. all want to be among the first to leave (because late-leavers will get less for their property and will have more trouble finding a country to take them in). In narrowing the gap between the payoff for leaving first (DC) and leaving last (CD) by reducing the cost of the latter. but. have a common culture. even if they agree about the objective situation. Minor wars and small changes in territory or in the distribution of power did not affect her vital interests. if there is going to be a mass exodus. Austria had either to threaten or to harm others. about the price they are willing to pay to gain increments of security. would encourage groups in Austria to upset the existing order. By the time an aggressor-state had clearly shown its colors. surrounded by strong powers. or because the citizens of the losing state expect economic benefits). because the two states have compatible ideologies. was not so fortunate. Austria. see a . in order to protect herself. the greater the impact of the dilemma. Austria wanted the Congress system to be a relatively tight one. Britain's geographic isolation and political stability allowed her to take a fairly relaxed view of disturbances on the Continent. the greater the costs. The lower it is (for instance. people can differ about how much security they desire . which defended Austria's right to interfere in the internal affairs of others.

By contrast. if there were complete faith in collective security. and the costs of arms races (that is." A state that is predisposed to see either a specific other state as an adversary. The French may have paid this price in the 1920's." Throughout the period. France perceived Germany as more of a threat than England did. when a state believes that another not only is not likely to be an adversary. or others in general as a menace. The differing policies that these states followed toward Germany can be explained by their differences on both dimensions of the variable of subjective security. After the rise of Hitler. in the years immediately following World War I. but also because of the decreased chances that the status-quo states will engage in unnecessary conflict out of the quest for security. France had been more willing to forego other values in order to increase her security and had therefore followed a more belligerent policy than England. n o state would want an army. the security dilemma will not operate as strongly when pressing domestic concerns increase the opportunity costs of armaments. Britain and France felt that increases in each other's arms increased rather than decreased their own security. British and French foreign policies in the interwar years illustrate these points. In this case. the estimate of whether the other will cooperate). one cannot easily say how much subjective security a state should seek. and to demand high levels of arms. it will be especially hard for status-quo powers to cooperate. the more they are likely to be sensitive to even minimal threats. therefore the state will behave as though it were relatively invulnerable. The second aspect of subjective security is the perception of threat (that is. then it will actually welcome an increase in the other's power. Indeed. A state can be relaxed about increases in another's arms if it believes that there is a functioning collective security system. As this example shows. maintaining a larger army and moving quickly to counter German assertiveness. By contrast. Indeed. The British were more optimistic and argued that conciliation could turn Germany into a supporter of the status quo. The chances of peace are increased in a world in which the prevailing international system is valued in its own right.136 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence prohibitively high cost in CD). one aspect of DD) will be greater. And if arms are positively valued because of pressures from a military-industrial complex. High security requirements make it very difficult to capitalize on a common interest and run the danger of setting off spirals of arms races and hostility. the security dilemma is insoluble when each state fears . but run the risk of having too few arms and of trying to conciliate an aggressor. the net advantage of exploiting the other (DC) will be less. Furthermore. not only because most states restrain their ambitions and those who d o not are deterred (these are the usual claims for a Concert system). will react more strongly and more quickly than a state that sees its environment as benign. One aspect of subjective security related to the predisposition to perceive threat is the state's view of how many enemies it must be prepared to fight. but has sufficient interests in common with it to be an ally. Low security requirements avoid this trap.

they are likely to hesitate before all the uncertainties. but rather the sacrifice of the potential gains from cooperation (CC)and the increase in the dangers of needless arms races and wars (DD). and if peaceful intercourse did not provide rich benefits. And i f the battlefield often produces startling results. was setting a high security requirement when he noted: Besides the Great Powers. by some diplomatic combination. A spokesman for the Territory replied that this was not necessary: Ethiopia "already had the best possible guarantee in the railroad" that links the two countries and provides indispensable revenue for the Territory. It is sport to them. far from coming to its aid. most statesmen know that to enter a war is to set off a chain of unpredictable and uncontrollable events. Even strong states can be undermined by dissatisfaction with the way the war is run and by the necessary mobilization of men and ideas. Liberal statesmen feared that large armies would lead to despotism. The greater these costs. the domestic costs of wars must be weighed. Thus. More importantly. navies to defend their actual safety of independence.It I \ I Security Dilemma 137 that many others.if they were less risky and costly. Ethiopia recently asked for guarantees that the Territory of Afars and Issas would not join a hostile alliance against it when it gained independence. None of these powers need. it is next to impossible for all states in the system to have this capability. The state may be deserted by allies or attacked by neutrals. Winston Churchill. Wars would be much more frequent . the greater the incentives to try cooperation and wait for fairly unambiguous evidence before assuming that the other must be checked by force. They build them so as to play a part in world affairs." l 4 The basic points are well known and so we can move to elaboration. Even if everything they see points to a quick victory. It is death to us. like us. O r the postwar alignment may rob it of the fruits of victory. a state's expectation that allies will be available and that only a few others will be able to join against it is almost a necessary condition for security requirements to be compatible. The main costs of a policy of reacting quickly and severely to increases in the other's arms are not the price of one's own arms. so do the council chambers. as happened to Japan in 1895. First. Memories of such disruptions were one of the main reasons for the era of relative peace that followed the Napoleonic Wars. as First Lord of the Admiralty. Second. are likely to join in any attack. conservative leaders feared that wars would lead to revolution.even if the first choice of all states was the status quo . or by duress. be brought into the line against us. there are many small states who are buying or building great ships of war and whose vessels may by purchase. ." It takes great effort for any one state to be able to protect itself alone against an attack by several neighbors.

although being exploited (CD) is bad. and pretending not to understand the situation. Commitment. you have to cooperate because. Norman Angel1 was wrong about World War I being impossible because of economic ties among the powers. This situation may not be stable.turning to the advantages of cooperation . The same logic applies when both sides are enjoying great benefits from cooperation. are among the tactics used to reach this goal. the actor must then try to convince his adversary that he is going to stand firm (defect)and that the only way the other can avoid disaster is to back down (cooperate)." This game differs from the Stag Hunt in that each actor seeks to exploit the other. the net cost of conflict is lowered and cooperation becomes more difficult. Mutual cooperation will then have a double payoff: in addition to the direct gains. they may resist such developments more than would be expected from the theories that stress the advantages of cooperation. If the costs are high enough so that DD is the last choice for both sides. was Japan's most important trading partner. and before World War 11. the game will shift to "Chicken. Fourth. Similarly. the rationality of irrationality. the gains from cooperation can be increased. The lower these . manipulating the communications system.138 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e (The other side of this coin is that when there are domestic consequences of foreign conflict that are positively valued.but brings positive advantages by exploiting the other (DC). there will be the satisfaction of seeing the other prosper. they can create a different problem. since the frequent use of threats may be incompatible with the maintenance of a cooperative relationship. In Chicken. Gains from Exploitation fDCI Defecting not only avoids the danger that a state will be exploited (CD). it differs from Prisoner's Dilemma in that both actors share an interest in avoiding mutual non-cooperation. it is not as bad as a total breakdown (DD).'" While high costs of war and gains from cooperation will ameliorate the impact of the security dilemma.I6 Because statesmen realize that the growth of positive interdependence can provide others with new levers of influence over them. but also if each comes to value the other's well-being positively. Still. one reason for the collapse of the Franco-British entente more than a hundred years earlier was that decision makers on both sides felt confident that their own country could safely pursue a policy that was against the other's interest because the other could not afford to destroy the highly valued relationship.S. The side that can credibly threaten to disrupt the relationship unless its demands are met can exploit the other. if you think the other side is going to defect.)Third . de Gaulle's successful threats to break up the Common Market unless his partners acceded to his wishes remind us that the shared benefits of cooperation as well as the shared costs of defection can provide the basis for exploitation.for states with large and diverse economies the gains from economic exchange are rarely if ever sufficient to prevent war. not only if each side gets more of the traditional values such as wealth. the U. As the familiar logic of deterrence shows.

having more arms than the other side) cannot be translated into a political advantage (for example. Bismarck's attempts to get other powers to cooperate with him in maintaining the status quo after 1871 were made more difficult by the widely-held mistrust of him that grew out of his earlier aggressions. It can lower the other's incentives to defect by decreasing what it could gain by exploiting the state (DC) . A state can reduce the incentives that another state has to attack it. decreasing the other's vulnerability also decreases the state's ability to coerce it. would be costly to garrison. or because the political advantage itself is not highly valued. a state may try to manipulate these variables. To encourage the other to cooperate. or would be hard to assimilate without disturbing domestic politics and values. Even a relatively satisfied state can be tempted to expand by the hope of gaining major values. One way to do this is to decrease the costs the other will pay if it cooperates Thus.the details would be similar to those discussed in the previous paragraph . Thus.within the state. the greater the chances of cooperation. making them more likely to arm. It was for this reason that in the late 1950's and early 1960's some American defense analysts argued that it would be good for both sides if the Russians developed hardened missiles. Victory as well as defeat can set off undesired domestic changes . The gains may be low either because the immediate advantage provided by DC (for example. Even where the direct advantages of D C are great. To decide what to do. The temptation will be less when the state sees other ways of reaching its goals. and dangerous in the long run because the other is likely to become convinced that the state is aggressive. O r others might in the future be quicker to see the state as a menace to them. and/or places a low value on what exploitation could bring. the state could try to make the other less and the state defects (0). thus reducing the prestige of a state that engages in it. and to oppose it later. gains in territory).lcri i i Security Dilemma 139 possible gains. For instance. Of course. vulnerable. Exploitation has at times been frowned upon by the international community.and it can raise the costs of deadlock (DD).'- The variables discussed so far influence the payoffs for each of the four possible outcomes. by not being a threat to the latter and by providing goods and services that would be lost were the other to attempt exploitation. other considerations can reduce the net gain. Because such calculations involve estimating the probability that the other will cooperate. the state will have to judge how the variables discussed so far act on the other. But if the state cannot make DD the worst outcome for the other. a state may not seek to annex additional territory because the latter lacks raw materials. is inhabited by people of a different ethnic group. coercion is likely to be ineffective in the short run because the other can respond by refusing to cooperate. So the state will have to concentrate on making cooperation more attractive. and opens . the state has to go further and calculate the expected value of cooperating or defecting.

the state can increase the chances of mutually beneficial cooperation. l 8 This line of argument can be continued through the infinite regressions that game theory has made familiar.'' There is. Conflicts and wars . even an increment that accrues entirely t o the other will aid the state by increasing the likelihood that the other will cooperate. will be small. inspection devices can ameliorate the security dilemma.S. If the other is ready to cooperate when it thinks the state will. Thus.S. If the other believes these things. if the other defects. it will see that the state has strong incentives to cooperate. pre-emptive strike of its own. the state should try to reassure it that this will not happen. like high costs of war. inspection can meet a significant part of the felt need to protect oneself against future threats.. and therefore that there was no reason for the U. The state will also want to convince the other that it thinks that the other is likely t o cooperate. One point should be emphasized. Furthermore. Because the other. Similar functions are served by breaking up one large transaction into a series of smaller ones. But by sacrificing some ability to harm the other. And since what either side would gain by one defection is slight compared to the benefits of continued cooperation. may be driven t o defect by the fear that it will be exploited if it does not. If the other thinks that the state has little choice but to cooperate. and stress or exaggerate the gains it would make under mutual cooperation (CC) and the costs it would pay if there is deadlock (DD). when Khrushchev indicated his willingness to withdraw his missiles from Cuba. and its losses. When each side is ready to cooperate if it expects the other to. and so make current cooperation more feasible. Although the state will of course gain if it receives a share of any new benefits. it can credibly threaten to defect unless the state provides it with additional benefits. the state can increase the chances of CC by showing that it is planning t o cooperate. for a state t o stress how much it gains from cooperation may be to imply that it is gaining much more than the other and t o suggest that the benefits should be distributed more equitably.20 At each transaction each can see whether the other has cooperated. he simultaneously stressed to Kennedy that "we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well" that Russia could not launch a successful attack against the U.140 T h e Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence the possibility that the other will use this protection as a shield behind which to engage in actions inimical to the state. But by relieving immediate worries and providing warning of coming dangers. Great advantages of mutual cooperation. even a perfect inspection system cannot guarantee that the other will not later develop aggressive intentions and the military means to act on them. like the state. Of course. provide a lever for competitive bargaining. the prospects of cooperation are high. however. to contemplate a defensive. Thus the state should understate the gains it would make if it exploited the other (DC) and the costs it would pay if the other exploited it (CD). a danger. The state can also try to increase the gains that will accrue to the other from mutual cooperation (CC). and so it will cooperate in turn.

the following exchange between Senator Tom Connally and Secretary of State Acheson concerning the ratification of the NATO treaty: Secretary Acheson: [The treaty] is aimed solely at armed aggression. A state which thinks that the other knows that it wants only to preserve the status q ~ and ~ o that its arms are meant only for self-preservation will conclude that the other side will react to its arms by increasing its own capability only if it is aggressive itself. How a statesman interprets the other's past behavior and how he projects it into the future is influenced by his understanding of the security dilemma and his ability to place himself in the other's shoes. Since they do not . but because they fear attack from the first state. and do not see that their arms . Secretary Acheson: That is correct.' Senator Connally: That is a very apt illustration. perhaps." The other side of this coin is that part of the explanation for detente is that most American decision makers now realize that it is at least possible that Russia may fear American aggression. even 36 percent of military officers consider the Soviet Union's motivations to be primarily defensive. He wouldn't worry about the imposition of the penalties on himself.may alarm others and that others may arm. Indeed. Senator Connally: In other words. These two failures of empathy are linked. or makes plans looking toward aggression or armed attack on another nation. and it seems to me that any nation which claims that this treaty is directed against it should be reminded of the Biblical admonition that 'The guilty flee when no man pursueth. not because they are contemplating aggression. Is that not true? Secretary Acheson: The only effect [the law] would have [on an innocent person] would be for his protection. nobody but those who are burglars or getting ready to be burglars need have any fear of the Burglary Act. for instance. Thus. contemplates. Senator Connally. many think that this fear accounts for a range of Soviet actions previously seen as indicating Russian aggressiveness. This belief removes one important restraint on arms spending. against burglary.. Less than twenty years earlier. when a State or Nation passes a criminal act. therefore. The dilemma will operate much more strongly if statesmen do not understand it.sought only to secure the status quo . unless a nation . Furthermore. it has no cause to fear this treaty.. meditates. it is also likely to lead states to set their security requirements too high.I I Security Dilemma 14 1 among status-quo powers would be much more common were it not for the fact that international politics is usually a series of small transactions. by deterring someone else. there is no legitimate reason for it to object to the first state's arms. officers had been divided over whether Russia sought world conquest or only expansion. What I had in mind was. Since the other side is not menaced. objection proves that the other is aggressive." Statesmen who do not understand the security dilemma will think that the money spent is the only cost of building up their arms.

they will overestimate the amount of security that is attainable. even a status-quo Germany. The influence of military technology on this variable is the subject of the next section. Being surrounded by powerful states. although well designed to avoid the danger of creating unnecessary conflict with a status-quo Germany. coupled with the desire for an unreasonably high level of security . or developing mutual gains from cooperation can increase their state's security. On the other hand. helped destroy Europe. although it can be seen as an aspect of vulnerability and of the costs of CD. As a consequence. Geography. Commitments. a whole range of meliorative policies will be downgraded. Decision makers who do not believe that adopting a more conciliatory posture. Thus it is very likely that two states which support the status quo but do not understand the security dilemma will end up. they would allow Germany to dominate the Continent (even if that was not Germany's aim). Situations vary in the ease or difficulty with which all states can simultaneously achieve a high degree of security. If France or Russia stayed out of a war between the other state and Germany. As a result they pursued a policy which. such as before World War I. then at least in a relationship of higher conflict than is required by the objective situation. Partly because of their views about the causes of World War I. Because she could not hold off both of her enemies. she had to be prepared to defeat one quickly and then deal with the other in a more leisurely fashion. since they bind states to defend areas outside their homelands). a heightened sensitivity to the security dilemma makes it more likely that the state will treat an aggressor as though it were an insecure defender of the status quo. thus making Germany less secure. if not in a war. In the crowded continent of Europe. and Security Through Expansion A final consideration does not easily fit in the matrix we have been using. Here we want to treat the impact of beliefs.or the problem created by Germany . Germany's problem . Beliefs.142 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence understand that trying to increase one's security can actually decrease it. the British were predisposed to believe that Hitler sought only the rectification of legitimate and limited grievances and that security could best be gained by constructing an equitable international system. security requirements were hard to mesh. they will think that when in doubt they can "play it safe" by increasing their arms. geography. meeting the other's legitimate grievances.was always great and was even worse when her relations with both France and Russia were bad. Although Germany's arrogant and erratic behavior. They therefore had to deny Germany this ability. The belief that an increase in military strength always leads to an increase in security is often linked to the belief that the only route to security is through military strength. if she could not change the political situation. In that case. would almost have been forced to adopt something like the Schlieffen Plan. and commitments (many of which can be considered to be modifications of geography. will not devote much attention or effort to these possibilities.

These complications were minor compared t o those that followed World War 11.S. the Franco-German military balance could have been such that France could successfully attack Germany if the latter's armies were embroiled in Eastern Europe. Once she took India. later. but could not defeat a Germany that was free to devote all her resources to defending herself. especially because states usually calculate conservatively. the problem posed by the need to protect Europe is an exception. believed it would suffer enormous deprivation (for instance. it has not only been able to get security relatively cheaply. This problem would plague American and Japanese statesmen down to 1941 . For the United States.S. A world power cannot help but have the ability t o harm many others that is out of proportion to the others' ability to harm it. this country has been in a much more favorable position: relatively self-sufficient and secure from invasion. But since there was no way to guarantee that France might not later seek expansion.14 But ambitions and commitments have changed this situation. to the extent that Japan could protect herself. The incompatibility of these security requirements is not complete. albeit a reduced one. The need t o maintain reliable sea lanes t o India meant that no state could be allowed t o menace South Africa and. Egypt. She was committed to protecting her allies in Eastern Europe. she had to consider Russia as a neighbor. Similarly. Throughout most of its history. but by doing so. But the . But the acquisition of colonies and a dependence on foreign trade sacrificed her relative invulnerability of being an island. though t o a lesser one than the United States. compounded the problem. such a solution is not likely to be available. the latter was expanding in Central Asia. A similar situation arose for France after World War I. thus making it much more difficult for both countries t o feel secure. a France that could successfully launch an attack in response to a German move into Eastern Europe would constitute a potential danger to German core values. Therefore.IPIL I Security Dilemma 143 (which amounted t o the desire to escape from her geographic plight). from attacking unless the U. the loss of Europe) if it did not strike. did not menace others."" Furthermore. even wise German statesmen would have been hard put t o gain a high degree of security without alarming their neighbors. Britain had been able t o gain security without menacing others to a greater degree than the Continental powers. a United States credibly able to threaten retaliation with strategic nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union attacks Western Europe also constitutes a menace. But this delicate balance is very hard to achieve. Herman Kahn is correct in arguing that the United States could have Type I1 deterrence (the ability to deter a major Soviet provocation) without gaining first-strike capability because the expected Soviet retaliation following an American strike could be great enough to deter the U. After the American conquest of the Philippines. to the Soviet ability to maintain the status quo. "neither the United States nor Japan could assure protection for their territories by military and naval means without compromising the defenses of the other." Similarly. she could resist American threats to go t o war if Japan did not respect China's independence. a commitment she could meet only by taking the offensive against Germany.

for the French wanted only to protect the Republic from invasion and preserve the security and territory of the satellite regimes in Holland. they wanted only to preserve the earlier gains of the Revolution. The problem will be almost insoluble if statesmen believe that their security requires the threatening or attacking of others. she required a navy that could prevent a blockade. the directors hoped to rupture allied unity and force individual powers to seek a separate." as a French delegate to an interwar disarmament conference put it. which goes to make up the grandeur. everything in a word. A related problem is raised by the fact that defending the status quo often means protecting more than territory. By inflicting rapid and decisive defeats upon one or more members of the coalition. French leaders sought no new conquests. "That which stops growing begins to rot. for they lead the state to conclude that its security requires that others be rendered insecure."" More common is the belief that if the other is secure. Nonterritorial interests. or even of their territories beyond the seas. of the nation. it almost automatically has a competitive connotation. The resulting behavior will almost surely clash with that of others who define their security in the same way. and the structure of the international system must be maintained. once Britain needed a flow of imports during both peace and wartime. Switzerland. The Directory believed. new obligations. It involves asserting one state's will over others. that only a military offensive could enable the nation to achieve its defensive political objective.28 That was the case for France in 1799: The Directory's political objectives were essentially defensive. But the potential for conflict is great. Furthermore. the maintenance of their economic interests. the life itself. and the belief that in a war it will not be enough for the state to protect itself: it must be able to take the war to the other's homeland. showing a high degree of leadership if not dominance. As a French spokesman put it in 1930: "Security! The term signifies more indeed than the maintenance of a people's homeland.29 . and new security requirements that conflicted with those of other European nations. norms." declared a minister to Catherine the Great."26 When security is thought of in this sense. however.144 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence need t o protect these two areas brought new fears. If all status-quo powers agree on these values and interpret them in compatible ways. and Italy. These convictions make it very difficult for status-quo states to develop compatible security policies. the more likely it is that national efforts to maintain the status quo will clash. "A country engaged in a war of defense might be obliged for strategic reasons to assume the offensive. The greater the range of interests that have to be protected. It also means the maintenance of the world's respect for them. A navy sufficient for that task could not help but be a threat to any other state that had valuable trade. peace. In other cases. problems will be minimized. and the policies followed are likely to exacerbate the security dilemma. and displaying a prickly demeanor. it will be emboldened to act against one's own state's interests.

Ill. the dominance of the defense made it very hard for Britain and France to push Germany out of France in World War I. not only will the security dilemma cease to inhibit status-quo states from cooperating."' Indeed. r Security Dilemma 145 It did not matter to the surrounding states that France was not attacking because she was greedy. Unless there was some way her neighbors could provide France with an alternate route to her goal. Thus. All the variables discussed so far leave the heart of the problem untouched. Rut when defensive weapons differ from offensive ones. France had to go to war. When the defense has the advantage. they provide no direct assistance to him. And when the defense has the advantage over the offense. status-quo states can make themselves more secure without gravely endangering others. destroy. there will be quick and drastic changes in the distribution of territory and influence.that an increase in one state's security decreases the security of others . and whether the defense or the offense has the advantage. and take. if the defense has enough of an advantage and if the states are of roughly equal size. but these two variables shed a great deal of light on the question of whether status-quo powers will adopt compatible security policies. but aggression will be next to . Offense.and examines the conditions under which this proposition holds. The security dilemma is at its most vicious when commitments. and status-quo powers can all enjoy a high level of security and largely escape from the state of nature. Defense.1. it is possible for a state to make itself more secure without making others less secure. the fact that they would gladly agree to forego the opportunity for expansion in return for guarantees for their security has no implications for their behavior. it is easier to protect and to hold than it is to move forward. Status-quo powers must then act like aggressors. But when superior defenses are difficult for an aggressor to improvise on the battlefield and must be constructed during peacetime. or technology dictate that the only route to security lies through expansion. a n d the Security Dilemma Another approach starts with the central point of the security dilemma . Even if expansion is not sought as a goal in itself. and many cases are difficult to judge. a large increase in one state's security only slightly decreases the security of the others. an attacker may be able to keep territory he has taken in an initial victory. Conversely. we simply mean that it is easier to destroy the other's army and take its territory than it is to defend one's own. strategy. If effective defenses can be erected quickly. Two crucial variables are involved: whether defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensive ones. but hecause she wanted to be left In peace. When we say that the offense has the advantage. when the defense has the advantage. The definitions are not always clear.

The first has its greatest impact on arms races. Shifting from dynamics to statics. they can probably avoid an arms race. there would be fewer restraints on the use of nonmilitary instruments. If states cannot conquer each other. The second aspect . Indeed.whether it is better to attack or t o defend . does the state have to spend more or less than one dollar on defensive forces to offset each dollar spent by the other side on forces that could be used to attack? If the state has one dollar to spend on increasing its security. each side can be willing to have forces much smaller than the other's. When the offense has the advantage. if force were not usable." said that "no government. although it presents problems of collective goods in a number of areas. Two questions of the offense-defense balance can be separated."32 In another arena. and if both sides have the same defense budgets.influences short-run stability. or even attacking. a state's reaction to international tension will increase the chances of war. should it put it into offensive or defensive forces? Second. its increase will also be smaller than the stimulus that produced it. with a given inventory of forces. thus rendering international anarchy relatively unimportant. Even Bismarck. These aspects affect the security dilemma in different ways. if it regards war as inevitable even if it does not want it. the same dilemma applies to the policeman in a dark alley confronting a suspected criminal who appears to be holding a weapon. is it better to attack or to defend? Is there an incentive to strike first or to absorb the other's blow? These two aspects are often linked: if each dollar spent on offense can overcome each dollar spent on defense. these are rarely powerful enough to threaten the vital interests of a major state. and if the status-quo powers have reasonable subjective security requirements. the former's increase will be larger than the latter's decrease. Thus a stable equilibrium will be reached. who once called preventive war "committing suicide from fear of death.I46 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence impossible. the other. . the other can bring its security back up to its previous level by adding a smaller amount to its forces. The incentives for preemption and the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack" in this situation have been made clear by analyses of the dangers that exist when two countries . And if the first side reacts to this change. if the defense is much more potent than the offense. ~ ~ is no way for the state to increase its have first-strike c a p a b i l i t i e ~ There security without menacing. would be so foolish as to leave to the enemy the choice of time and occasion and to wait for the moment which is most convenient for the enemy. Though racism may indeed be present. each side can be quite secure with forces roughly equal to those of the other. So if one side increases its arms. Although an increase in one side's arms and security will still decrease the other's security. then both are likely to build offensive forces and find it attractive to attack rather than to wait for the adversary to strike. no longer forces states to devote their primary attention to self-preservation. First. If the defense has the advantage. the security dilemma can account for many of the tragic shootings of innocent people in the ghettos. Although. then the lack of sovereignty. and can be indifferent to a wide range of the other's defense policies.

It is in these periods when conquest is possible and attractive that states consolidate power internally for instance. and quick and strong reaction to the other's increases in arms. all the foregoing is reversed. There are several consequences that decrease the chance of cooperation among status-quo states. It is hard to say whether war therefore becomes more or less likely. Even large states that have faith in their economic strength cannot wait. or can deter attack by raising the costs of conquest to an unacceptable level. . Changes in the status quo are less frequent and cooperation is more common wherever the security dilemma is thereby reduced. because the war will be over before their products can reach the army. Second. states will have to recruit allies in advance. The state that fears attack does not p r e e m p t . the fear of losing could induce states to try to form stable cooperative arrangements. but the temptation of victory will make this particularly difficult. Thus. Of course. war will be profitable for the winner. More is involved than short-run dynamics. the situation will therefore be stable... there will be more cases of status-quo powers arming against each other in the incorrect belief that the other is hostile. When there are incentives to strike first." Without the opportunity for bargaining and re-alignments during the opening stages of hostilities. there will be incentives for high levels of arms. Fourth.45-caliber pistol in the American West. Relatively small and weak states can hold off larger and stronger ones. because wars are expected to be both frequent and short.but rather prepares to receive an attack. When the defense is dominant."'%e incorrectly assumes that it is always advantageous to strike first. and decisive. if wars are frequent. First. peacetime diplomacy loses a degree of the fluidity that facilitates halance-ofpower policies. a successful attack will usually so weaken the other side that victory will be relatively quick. wars are likely to become stalemates and can be won only at enormous cost. but this hipolarity increases tension between the two camps and makes it harder for status-quo states to gain the benefits of cooperation. Like the . The state cannot afford to wait until there is unambiguous evidence that the other is building new weapons. and several states can do it simultaneously. States then approach equality in what they can do to each other. When Herman Kahn argues that ultimatums "are vastly too dangerous to give because . and status-quo powers will be able to cooperate.and expand externally. .IixtiI - Security Dilemma 147 Beliefs about the course of a war in which the offense has the advantage further deepen the security dilemma. statesmen's perceptual thresholds will be adj~isted accordingly and they will be quick to perceive ambiguous evidence as indicating that others are aggressive. the international system is more likely to become bipolar. losers will suffer.since that would be a wasteful use of its military resources . they are quite likely to touch off a pre-emptive strike. by destroying the feudal barons . fortifications were the "great equalizer" in some periods. Third. The costs will be low and the benefits high. Because alliances must be secured during peacetime. bloodless. Doing so does not decrease the security of others. When the defense has the advantage. when wars are quick..

" thereby protecting her own position?39To some extent. others were not going t o repeat this mistake. Although Churchill made an ill-advised speech saying that if German ships "do not come out and fight in time of war they will be dug out like rats in a hole. relatively cheap. had both sides known the costs of the war."37 everyone knew that submarines. Both sides believed that whoever moved first could penetrate the other deep enough to disrupt mobilization and thus gain an insurmountable advantage. It is not surprising that Richardson's theory of arms races fits this period well. Third. War might have broken out anyway. there were strong pressures to pre-empt. but at least the pressures of time and the fear of allowing the other to get the first blow would-not have contributed to this end. most decision makers thought that the next European war would not cost much blood and treasure. And.I48 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence Many of these arguments can be illustrated by the major powers' policies in the periods preceding the two world wars. observers projected this pattern into the f ~ t u r e . each side knew that the other saw the situation the same way. In the early stages of the Franco-Prussian War. So at the start of the war each navy prepared to defend itself rather than attack. and by being quick. Trenches and machine guns gave the defense an overwhelming advantage. and giving each added reasons to precipitate a war if conditions seemed favorable. Because of the perceived advantage of the offense. thus increasing the perceived danger that the other would attack. there were thus both offensive and defensive incentives to strike. mines. and the short-run destabilizing forces that launched the armies toward each other did not operate. Falling into a common error. states sought semi-permanent allies. once war seemed likely. war was seen as the best route both to gaining expansion and to avoiding drastic loss of influence.36That is one reason why war was generally seen as inevitable and why mass opinion was so bellicose. Bismarck's wars surprised statesmen by showing that the offense had the advantage. In the long and the short run. First. defense budgets were high and reacted quite sharply to increases on the other side. The obvious question is why the . they would have rushed for their own trenches rather than for the enemy's territory. The fighting became deadlocked and produced horrendous casualties. this question is misleading. If they had known the power of the defense beforehand. and coastal fortifications made this impossible. Each side could have done this without increasing the other's incentives to strike. (There was no such belief about the use of naval forces. This situation casts light on the common question about German motives in 1914: "Did Germany unleash the war deliberately to become a world power or did she support Austria merely to defend a weakening ally. Fourth. It made no sense for the combatants to bleed themselves to death.)38Furthermore. Second. There seemed to be no way for Germany merely to retain and safeguard her existing position. and quite decisive. just as DD is a possible outcome of Chicken. Of course the war showed these beliefs to have been wrong on all points. Napoleon 111 had thought that there would be plenty of time to recruit Austria to his side. Now. they would have negotiated much more seriously. The ~ ' resulting expectations had several effects.

rushed to defensive positions. But part of the reason was the hope and sometimes the expectation that breakthroughs could be made and the dominance of the offensive restored.t. The British Chief of the Imperial General Staff noted. The initial stages of the war on the Western Front also contrasted with the First World War. peace should be sought. to a lesser extent. Schlieffen had said that if his plan failed."' The answer is complex. both Britain and."" Britain also felt less need to maintain tight alliance bonds. Perhaps the allies could have successfully attacked while the Germans were occupied in Poland. Of course the Germans were not content. The Allies' military posture then constituted only a slight danger to Germany. The politics of the interwar period were shaped by the memories of the previous conflict and the belief that any future war would resemble it. the French Prime Minister summed up the view held by almost everyone but Hitler: on the Western Front there is "deadlock. and largely outside of the scope of our concerns. and alert to the danger that reacting quickly and strongly to her arms could create unnecessary conflict.rt. Political and military lessons reinforced each other in ameliorating the security dilemma."43 The Allies were caught in a dilemma they never fully recognized.4L But belief in the defense was so great that this was never seriously contemplated. Three months after the start of the war. cause civilian suffering through . if at all". uncertain. there were no realistic plans or instruments for allowing the Allies to impose their will on the other side. O n the one hand. Blitzkrieg tactics were necessary if they were to use force to change the status quo. And because Britain and France expected the defense to continue to dominate. they concluded that it was safe to adopt a more relaxed and nonthreatening military posture. France were highly sensitive to the possibility that interwar Germany was not a real threat to peace. Only with the new air arm were there any incentives to strike first. ~ So ' the Allies looked to a long war that would wear the Germans down. let alone solved. "The French have no intention of carrying out an offensive for years. the political and psychological pressures to fight to a decisive victory might have been overcome. Without that hope. The armies. Two Forces of equal strength and the one that attacks seeing such enormous casualties that it cannot move without endangering the continuation of the war or of the aftermath. ~ W the n other hand. so it is not surprising that they devoted their money and attention to finding ways out of a defense-dominated stalemate. I Security Dilemma 149 states did not seek a negotiated settlement as soon as the shape of the war became clear. Because it was believed that the First World War had been a mistake that could have been avoided by skillful conciliation. the British were only slightly b ~ l d e r . and these forces were too weak to carry out the grandiose plans that had been both dreamed and feared. the British had decided from the start that the removal of Hitler was a necessary condition for p e a ~ e . although unconditional surrender had not yet been adopted. still the main instrument. it would have been easy for both sides to have felt secure behind their lines of fortifications. they had very high war aims. had the latter been content with the status quo.

inadvertently acted to make war more likely. If all states were self-sufficient islands. anarchy would be much less of a problem. the security dilemma was much less powerful after World War I than it had been before. many diplomatic notes and much intelligence activity in the late 19th century centered on this ~ubject. Impenetrable barriers would actually prevent war. Technology and geography are the two main factors that determine whether the offense or the defense has the advantage. Buffer zones slow the attacker's progress. Indeed. or impedes his progress across it. The defender has merely to stay on his side of the barrier and so can utilize all the men he can bring up to it. the Russians sought assurances that the British would refrain from building potentially menacing railroads in their sphere. and they are very vulnerable when doing so. large rivers. and discouraged them from risking war themselves. When states are separated by barriers that produce these effects. however. in reality. or makes him more vulnerable while crossing. the expected power of the defense allowed status-quo states to pursue compatible security policies and avoid arms races. the security dilemma is eased. and eventually undermine Hitler. and no railroads. since both can have forces adequate for defense without being able to attack. Technology and Geography. however. they allow defense against superior numbers. it will be impossible for Russia to make effective use of her great numerical superiority at any point immediately vital to the Empire."46 Anything that increases the amount of ground the attacker has to cross. A small investment in shore defenses and a small army would be sufficient to repel invasion.~' Oceans." The Russians valued buffers for the same reasons. and mountain ranges serve the same function as buffer zones. He characteristically fires from behind some form of shelter while his opponent crosses open ground. There was little analysis to support this view . it is not surprising that when Persia was being divided into Russian and British spheres of influence some years later. what else could the Allies do? To summarize. they thereby give the defender time to prepare. few physical factors favor the attacker but many favor the defender.I50 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e shortages. increases the advantage accruing to the defense.and indeed it probably was not supportable . and reduce the number of soldiers available for the final assault. led the Allies t o believe that no sane German leader would run the risks entailed in an attempt to dominate the Continent. high tension and fear of war did not set off short-run dynamics by which each state. "So long as it possesses few roads. and only very . The attacker's men. The expected high costs of war. increase problems of logistics. Arthur Balfour noted Afghanistan's "non-conducting" qualities. trying to increase its security.but as long as the defense was dominant and the numbers on each side relatively equal. Being hard to cross. "On the tactical level. since railroad construction radically altered the abilities of countries to defend themselves and to attack others. can cross only a few at a time. Furthermore. The defender usually has the advantage of cover. decision makers have to settle for a good deal less. Only very weak states would be vulnerable. as a rule. At the end of the 19th century. In the later period. As Brodie notes.

As a Japanese diplomat later put it. As mentioned earlier. or a t least slow down. Although geography cannot be changed to conform to borders. or if the people d o not care about their state. but takes him through unfamiliar and often devastated lands that require troops for garrison duty. men have tried to create barriers. Conquest usually becomes more difficult the deeper the attacker pushes into the other's territory. but the Russians adopted a gauge for their railroads that was broader than that of the neighboring states. Japan agreed in 1922 to accept a navy only three-fifths as large as that of the United States. Perhaps the most ambitious and at least temporarily successful attempts to construct a system that would aid the defenses of both sides were the interwar naval treaties. Attachment to one's state and its land reinforce one quasi-geographical aid to the defense. but only about being on the winning side.including Russia. Nationalism spurs the defenders to fight harder. they could have provided a secure base from which the U. their country's "fundamental principle" was to have "a strength insufficient for attack and adequate for defense. and the Washington Naval Conference agreements were designed to approach this goal. these lines constitute salient solutions to bargaining problems and. borders can and d o change to conform to geography.""' Thus. could interdict Japanese shipping between the homeland and the areas she was trying to conquer.a line of natural obstacles. ~ " Imitating geography. In such cases. advancing not only lengthens the attacker's supply lines. as they affected Japanese-American relations. Frequent wars are almost inevitable since attacking will often seem the best way to protect what one has. States living within them are likely to expand or be absorbed. the United States. Borders across which an attack is easy tend to be unstable. however.Jt. positive feedback will be at work and initial defeats will be i n ~ u r m o u n t a b l e . These stabilizing dynamics will not operate. have partly been able to escape from the state of nature because their geographical positions approximated this ideal. the problem was that the United States could not defend the Philippines without denying Japan the ability to protect her home island^.rc~h Security Dilemma 151 large ones could menace others. .) In the 1920's and early 1930's each side would have been willing to grant the other security for its possessions in return for a reciprocal grant.by expansion or contraction . to the extent that they are barriers to migration. As noted above. although such zones will rarely be deep enough to provide more than warning. thereby raising the costs and lowering the incentives for conquest. Even this was not possible in Europe. If the Philippines had been invulnerable. if the defender's war materiel is situated near its borders. when the state's borders reach . and to a lesser extent Great Britain. This process will stop. thereby complicating the logistics problems of any attacker . Furthermore.S. Treaties may provide for demilitarized zones on both sides of the border. are likely to divide ethnic groups.^' (In 1941 this dilemma became insoluble when Japan sought to extend her control to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Security without attack will then be possible.

a few attackers can storm the defenses. from the twelfth to the late thirteenth century. By and large. destroyers. and small groups of men in prepared positions can hold off large numbers of attackers. because the improvement in the strength of fortresses outran the advance in the power of destruction. however. As the erroneous views held before the two world wars show. but they might be weakened enough by their efforts to be vulnerable to counterattack. and submarines that could weaken the American fleet as it made its way across the ocean. there is no simple way to determine which is dominant.) Incentives to strike first are usually absent for naval forces that are threatened by a naval attack. with its wonderful cathedrals and fortified places.) Japan's navy would not be large enough to defeat America's anywhere other than close to the home islands.53 . with the spread of firearms at the end of the fifteenth century. (It should be noted that it is not vulnerability per se that is crucial. especially after about 1660. gained security. trenches. "[Tlhese oscillations are not smooth and predictable like those of a swinging pendulum. Some occur in the course of a single battle or campaign. Although the Japanese could still take the Philippines. old fortresses lost their power to resist. they must be employed before they are attacked. Japan was allowed unlimited numbers of cruisers. Bombers and missiles that are easy to destroy only after having been launched toward their targets d o not create destabilizing dynamics. When weapons are highly vulnerable. An age ensued during which the offense possessed.152 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence and the U. They are uneven in both extent and time." (Japan had earlier been forced to agree not to fortify the islands she had taken from Germany in World War I. An American attack was rendered more difficult because the American bases were unprotected and because.S." Longer-term oscillations can also be detected: The early Gothic age. and mobility and heavier weapons that clear the way for the attack on the other. Later. still others during a series of wars. Less frequently. the defense regained much of the ground it had lost since the great medieval fortresses had proved unable to meet the bombardment of the new and more numerous artillery. until 1930. but the location of the vulnerability. agreed not to fortify its Pacific islands. was a period during which the attackers in Europe generally met serious and increasing difficulties. and until at least the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1740. it is a contest between fortifications and supporting light weapons on the one hand. not only would they be unable to move farther. during the seventeenth century. Then. Both sides can then simultaneously be prepared to defend themselves successfully. Like missiles in hardened silos. apart from short-term setbacks. new advantages. In ground warfare under some conditions. forts. they are usually well protected when in their bases. The former characteristics are embodied in unprotected missiles and many kinds of bombers. others in the course of a war."" The other major determinant of the offense-defense balance is technology. Japan. Others can remain quite invulnerable in their bases.

Security now rests on each side's belief that the other would prefer to run high risks of total destruction rather than sacrifice its vital interests. Are weapons procurements used as an index of resolve? Must they be so used ? If one side fails to respond to the other's buildup. and related to the foregoing. Attack makes no sense. These weapons are cheap. but because the attacker will be destroyed in turn. Less than one percent of the G. First. most of it is spent on acquiring redundant systems to provide a lot of insurance against the worst conceivable contingencies. In terms of the questions under consideration here. security is relatively cheap.P. but the stalemate of World War I created the impression that the defense again had an advantage. But further examinations of the new technologies and the history of the October War cast doubt on these optimistic conclusions and leave us unable to render any firm judgment. states that care primarily about self-protection would not need to engage in arms races. not because it can be beaten off. Both sides have interests that go well beyond defense of the homeland. they are not as severe as those in the prenuclear era: there are ."'J The situation today with respect to conventional weapons is unclear. of course.N. will it appear weak and thereby invite predation? Can both sides simultaneously have images of high resolve or is there a zero-sum element involved? Although these problems are real. indicated the offensive superiority of highly mechanized armies in the field. Defense would be possible even against a large and well-equipped force. Aspects of the security dilemma thus appear in a new form. Important problems remain."' Concerning nuclear weapons. Second. but of deterrence. however. The initial analyses of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war indicated that new anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons have restored the primacy of the defense. Any spending that the other devotes to trying to achieve first-strike capability can be neutralized by the state's spending much smaller sums on protecting its second-strike capability. Furthermore. easy to use.000 missiles rather than buy a few half-million dollar tanks and multi-million dollar fighter-bombers. there are no incentives to strike first in a crisis. the shift from defense to deterrence has greatly increased the importance and perceptions of resolve. is devoted to deterring a direct attack on the United States. The protection of these interests creates conflicts even if neither side desires expansion. There is no purely military reason why each side has to react quickly and strongly to the other's increases in arms. the result is the equivalent of the primacy of the defense. second-strike capability can be maintained in the face of wide variations in the other side's military posture.\ I* Security Dilemma 1 53 Another scholar has continued the argument: "The offensive gained an advantage with new forms of heavy mobile artillery in the nineteenth century. both sides can simultaneously gain security in the form of second-strike capability. the German invasion in World War 11. and can destroy a high proportion of the attacking vehicles and planes that are sighted. Fourth.icZ.a triumph not of the offense. it is generally agreed that defense is impossible . It then would make sense for a status-quo power to buy lots of $20. Until recently it was believed that tanks and tactical air power gave the attacker an advantage. Third.

Since states are most likely to stand firm on matters which concern them most. Offense-Defense Differentiation The other major variable that affects how strongly the security dilemma operates is whether weapons and policies that protect the state also provide the capability for attack. Assuming that the defense is at least as potent as the offense. states will still have to worry that even if the other's military posture shows that it is peaceful now. First. It need not maintain a high level of defensive arms as long as its potential adversaries are adopting a peaceful posture. and therefore can only be wanted for military reasons. it may develop aggressive intentions in the future. Thus the seizure or development of transportation facilities will alarm others more if these facilities have no commercial value. status-quo powers may find it too expensive to protect themselves by defensive forces and decide to procure offensive weapons even though this will menace others. or to put pressure upon us by making us think that they intend to attack it. Thus. A state can increase its own security without decreasing that of others. and states d o not so much judge images of resolve in the abstract as ask how likely it is that the other will stand firm in a particular dispute. And if the offense's advantage is great enough. the basic postulate of the security dilemma no longer applies. If procurement of these weapons cannot be disguised and takes a fair amount of time. Such differentiation does not mean. the Japanese spokesman . If they d o not. Before a state can attack. alarm other status-quo powers. Conflicts growing out of the mistaken belief that the other side is expansionist will be less frequent. a status-quo state will have the time to take countermeasures. Furthermore. Second. with the one important exception noted below. the differentiation between them allows status-quo states to behave in ways that are clearly different from those of aggressors.) States do. In 1906. that all security problems will be abolished. in fact. as it almost always does. pay special attention to actions that they believe would not be taken by a status-quo state because they feel that states exhibiting such behavior are aggressive. status-quo states will obtain advance warning when others plan aggression. Three beneficial consequences follow. A differentiation between offensive and defensive stances comes close to abolishing it. however. it has to develop and deploy offensive weapons.154 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence many indices of resolve. conquest and aggression will still be possible. (Although being so armed should not. it is quite possible for both to demonstrate their resolve to protect their own security simultaneously. thus laying the foundations for cooperation."j6 The same inferences are drawn when a state acquires more weapons than observers feel are needed for defense. status-quo powers can identify each other. The advantage of the defense can only ameliorate the security dilemma. the British rejected a Russian protest about their activities in a district of Persia by claiming that this area was "only of [strategic] importance [to the Russians] if they wished to attack the Indian frontier. If the offense has the advantage.

the security dilemma is deepened. But the dangers of incorrect inferences should not obscure the main point: when offensive and defensive postures are different.shows either that states are not always willing to guarantee the security of others. Because the state thinks it has received notice that the other is aggressive. Indeed. no simple and unambiguous definition is possible and in many cases no judgment can be reached. the idea would exist that they were trying to keep that possibility. . when Mussolini told Chamberlain in January 1939 that Hitler's arms program was motivated by defensive considerations. its own arms building will be less restrained and the chances of cooperation will he decreased. So when America insisted on sixty percent instead of seventy percent." Some evidence for the validity of this argument is provided by the fact that much time in these unsuccessful negotiations was devoted to separating offensive from defensive weapons.the Washington naval agreements discussed above and the anti-ABM treaty can be cited as examples ." The French Foreign Minister agreed (although French ~olicy did not always follow this view): "Every arm can be employed offensively or defensively in turn. much of the ~~ncertainty about the other's intentions that contributes to the security dilemma is removed. looking at. it was possible for her to attack.l ~ r ~ iSecurity i Dilemma 155 at the 1930 London naval conference said that his country was alarmed by the American refusal to give Japan a 70 percent ratio (in place of a 60 percent ratio) in heavy cruisers: "As long as America held that ten percent advantage. or that it is hard to distinguish offensive from defensive weapons. thought not: "A weapon is either offensive or defensive according to which end of it YOLI art. . Is such a distinction possible? Salvador de Madariaga."" Similarly. the Spanish statesman active in the disarmament negotiations of the interwar years." And when they are wrong. and the frontiers and independence of every nation will become s e ~ u r e . an obvious arms control agreement is a ban on weapons that are useful for attacking. The third beneficial consequence of a difference between offensive and defensive weapons is that if all states support the status quo. Woodrow Wilson wanted to arm merchantmen only . defenses auton~atically will become impregnable. the Prime Minister replied that "German military forces were now so strong as to make it impossible for any Power or combination of Powers to attack her successfully. As President Roosevelt put it in his message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1933: "If all nations will agree wholly to eliminate from possession and use the weapons which make possihle a successful attack. .as they are especially likely to be because states underestimate the degree to which they menace others. what then did she want them for?"'8 Of course these inferences can be wrong . She could not want any further armaments for defensive purposes. The only way to discover whether arms are intended for purely defensive purposes or are held in a spirit of aggression is in all cases to enquire into the intentions of the country concerned. and the Japanese people could not accept that. " ~ The " fact that such treaties have been rare . Before the American entry into World War I.

status-quo states must worry about the possibility that if they are able to hold off an attack. for a state to wait to procure these weapons until war seems likely. a status-quo power will want offensive arms under any of three conditions. for example.^' There are several problems. (1)If the offense has a great advantage over the defense. some distinctions are possible. and they might be needed only in relatively small numbers. Nevertheless. Indeed. "Tanks . Even when they lack such commitments. It might be possible. stated that just because a fine line could not be drawn. but this expedient cannot be applied to more common forms of armament^.I56 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence with guns in the back of the ship so they could not initiate a fight. (2) Status-quo states may need offensive weapons to regain territory lost in the opening stages of a war. but if the French had disposed of a properly concentrated armored reserve. believed that "only by destroying the commerce of the opponent could the United States bring him to terms. Many American naval officers after the Civil War. As noted above. however. Sir John Simon. unless the aggressor was able to construct strong defenses quickly in the occupied areas. they will still not be able to end the war unless they move into the other's territory to damage its military forces and inflict pain. or for insurance in case the war goes badly. they must wait for the other side t o come t o them. But the Egyptian attack on Israel in 1973 would have been impossible without effective air defenses that covered the battlefield. status-quo states with extensive commitments are often forced to behave like aggressors. all these countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies. then the British Foreign Secretary. to protect one frontier while attacking another. Hitler as well as Maginot built a line of forts.to be used."63 So a state may not necessarily be reassured if its neighbor constructs strong defenses. More central difficulties are created by the fact that whether a weapon is offensive or defensive often depends on the particular situation . it would have provided the best means for their cutting off the penetration and turning into a disaster for the Germans what became instead an overwhelming victory.. "that was no reason for saying that there were not stretches . and a new constellation will develop.. Churchill reports that in 1936 the German Foreign Minister said: "As soon as our fortifications are constructed [on our western borders] and the countries in Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory. in response to the views cited earlier. Even when a differentiation is possible."64 Anti-aircraft weapons seem obviously defensive . the geographical setting and the way in which the weapon is used.for instance."62 A further complication is introduced by the fact that aggressors as well as status-quo powers require defensive forces as a prelude to acquiring offensive ones. protection through defensive forces will be too expensive. (3) The state may feel that it must be prepared to take the offensive either because the other side will make peace only if it loses territory or because the state has commitments to attack if the other makes war on a third party. spearheaded the fateful German thrust through the Ardennes in 1940. Criminals as well as policemen can use bulletproof vests.

Morocco's recent march on the Spanish Sahara approached this tactic. they can advance with the troops. More frequently. They can shelter attacking forces. but it is very hard for large numbers of people to cross the border and stage a sit-in o n another's territory. Thus. the Russian's adoption of a different railroad gauge." or movable only after long delay. A purely defensive weapon is one that can do this without being able to penetrate the enemy's land. their inability to reach deep into enemy territory does make them more useful for the defense than for the offense. fixed guns. the United States and Israel would have been more alarmed in the early 1970's had the Russians provided the Egyptians with long-range instead of short-range aircraft.. limited mobility is unfortunately ambiguous."" The essence of defense is keeping the other side out of your territory. . Aggressors could want them for protection. Anything else that can serve only as a barrier against attacking troops is similarly defensive. Noncooperation can thwart an aggressor. The most extreme example would be passive resistance. were "only capable of being used for the defense of a State's territory. and nuclear land mines that can seal off invasion routes. Naval forces are particularly difficult to classify in these terms. ~ but . whether a weapon is more useful in attack or in defense./{'IL I< Security Dilemma 157 of territory on either side which all practical men and women knew to be well o n this or that side of the line. we cannot "determine the absolute character of a weapon. [and] discover whether or not the offensive potentialities predominate. If total immobility clearly defines a system that is defensive only. guerrilla warfare is defensive to the extent to which it requires civilian support that is likely to be forthcoming only in opposition to a foreign invasion. but one in which the offense had the advantage: s o the security dilemma would operate especially strongly. hut a state that relied mostly on them could not menace others." Although there are almost n o weapons and strategies that are useful only for attacking. there are some that are almost exclusively defensive. then this weapon would not only be one which could be used as easily to attack the other's territory as to defend one's own. but [we can] make a comparison . and a small army to man them would not be much of a menace. Thus a committee of military experts in an interwar disarmament conference declared that armaments "incapable of mobility by means of self-contained power. As noted above. Any forces that for various reasons fight well only when on their own soil in effect lack mobility and therefore are defensive. unlike forts. but those that are very short-legged can be used only for coastal defense. shortrange fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles can be used to cover an attack.. Still. And. Indeed.""" The most obvious examples are fortifications. In this category are systems that provide warning of an attack. if guerrilla warfare were easily exportable and if it took ten defenders to destroy each guerrilla. especially when they are built right along the f r ~ n t i e r . A state with only a strong line of forts. they cannot occupy enemy territory. but its success depended on special circumstances. Similarly.

while needing artillery to fight off attacking troops or t o counterattack. insubordinate. Thus Castlereagh was not being entirely self-serving when in 1816 he argued that the Quadruple Alliance "could only have owed its origin to a sense of common danger.158 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence If guerrillas are unable to fight on foreign soil. But France would not have needed these weapons if Germany had not acquired them. Napoleon's France and Hitler's Germany). Mobile heavy artillery is. The defender.. a feudal force presented an assemblage of unsoldierlike qualities such as have seldom been known to coexist. all lend themselves much more to defense than to attacks on foreign territory. Primarily intended to defend its own borders from the Magyar." Weapons and strategies that depend for their effectiveness on surprise are almost always offensive. An army imbued with the idea that only defensive wars were just would fight less effectively. can usually use lighter guns since they d o not need to penetrate such massive obstacles. Although defensive coalitions are by no means easy to maintain conflicting national objectives and the free-rider problem partly explain why three of them dissolved before Napoleon was defeated . ready to melt away from its standard the moment that its short period of service was over.. the institution was utterly unadapted to take the o f f e n ~ i v e . Citizen militias may lack both the ability and the will for aggression. properly used French tanks could have halted the attack. if at all. That fact was recognized by some of the delegates to . and that coalitions among relative equals are usually found defending the status quo. and the spirit of repelling attacks on the homeland.hx Less idealistic motives can produce the same result.the common interest of seeing that no state dominates provides a strong incentive for solidarity. the time required for mobilization. the short term of service. So it is not surprising that one of the few things that most nations at the interwar disarmament conferences were able to agree on was that heavy tanks and mobile heavy guns were particularly valuable t o a state planning an attack. " Some ~ ~ political groupings can be similarly described. other kinds of armies may be unwilling to do so. unable to maneuver. similarly. it cannot threaten either the security or the liberties of other States. Most gains from conquest are too uncertain and raise too many questions of future squabbles among the victors to hold an alliance together for long. The weapons employed. if the goal were conquest. in its very nature it must be conservative. or the Saracen . the Northman. especially useful in destroying fortifications. Weapons that are particularly effective in reducing fortifications and barriers are of great value to the offense. International coalitions are more readily held together by fear than by hope of gain.. Germany could not have foregone them since they provided the only chance of breaking through the French lines. This is not to deny that a defensive power will want some of those weapons if the other side has them: Brodie is certainly correct to argue that while their tanks allowed the Germans to conquer France."'O It is no accident that most of the major campaigns of expansion have been waged by one dominant nation (for example. whereas even if France had no tanks. A leading student of medieval warfare has described the armies of that period as follows: "Assembled with difficulty.

offensive weapons are those that provide defense. not always possible to distinguish between forces that are most effective for holding territory and forces optimally designed for taking it.for . it explains why some arms controllers opposed building ABM's to protect cities. would be able to alter the status quo. Such a distinction could not have been made for the strategies and weapons in Europe during most of the period between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I. Some arms controllers argue that this is also true of cruise missiles. 'But ~ when neither side can protect its civilians. would create a severe security dilemma. but favored sites that covered ICBM fields. They are fit only for attack. Such an effort. The former are more useful than single warheads for penetrating city defenses. Whoever carries such a weapon has prepared himself for homicide. and all such attacks are of murderous character. most statesmen held the reasonable position that weapons that threatened civilians were o f f e n s i ~ e . either by active or passive defense or by destroying the other's strategic weapons on the ground. and therefore do not want them to be deployed either. But the point here is that when such a distinction is possible.for instance. An earlier representative of this widespread view was the mid-19th-century Philadelphia newspaper that argued: "As a measure of defense. even if not inspired by aggressive designs. There is some evidence that the Russians are not satisfied with deterrence and are seeking to regain the capability for defense. but oppose multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's). but when both sides rely on Polaris-type systems (SLBM's). MIRV's enhance counterforce capabilities. and one of the most troublesome consequences of anarchy is removed. many analysts want to limit warhead accuracy and favor n~ultiplere-entry vehicles (MRV's).are purely defensive. dirks. The desire to prevent such a situation was one of the rationales for the anti-ABM agreements. In the interwar period. ICBM's can be used either to destroy the other's cities in retaliation or to initiate hostilities by attacking the other's strategic missiles."" I t is. Neither naval forces nor tactical air forces can be readily classified in these terms. hardening of missile sites and warning systems . Similarly. What is most important for the argument here is that land-based ICBM's are both offensive and defensive. since they do not make a first strike easier. a counter-city posture is defensive because the state can credibly threaten to retaliate only in response to an attack on itself or its closest allies. Others are predominantly offensive . In the now familiar reversal of common sense. the state that could take its population out of hostage.I C I L I ~ Security Dilemma 159 the interwar disarmament conferences and is the principle behind the common national ban on concealed weapons. of course. In the context of deterrence. Some measures . Offinse-Defense Differentiation and Strategic Nuclear Weapons. the central characteristic of the security dilemma no longer holds. The costs of this strike are so high that the state could not threaten to use it for the less-than-vital interest of compelling the other to abandon an established position. knives. and sword canes are entirely useless. and ensure that the state has a secondstrike capability. offense and defense use different weapons.

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instance, passive or active city defenses, and highly accurate warheads. But ICBM's themselves are useful for both purposes. And because states seek a high level of insurance, the desire for protection as well as the contemplation of a counterforce strike can explain the acquisition of extremely large numbers of missiles. So it is very difficult to infer the other's intentions from its military posture. Each side's efforts to increase its own security by procuring more missiles decreases, to an extent determined by the relative efficacy of the offense and the defense, the other side's security. That is not the case when both sides use SLBM's. The point is not that sea-based systems are less vulnerable than land-based ones (this bears on the offense-defense ratio) but that SLBM's are defensive, retaliatory weapons. First, they are probably not accurate enough to destroy many military target^.'^ Second, and more important, SLBM's are not the main instrument of attack against other SLBM's. The hardest problem confronting a state that wants to take its cities out of hostage is to locate the other's SLBM's, a job that requires not SLBM's but anti-submarine weapons. A state might use SLBM's to attack the other's submarines (although other weapons would probably be more efficient), but without anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability the task cannot be performed. A status-quo state that wanted to forego offensive capability could simply forego ASW research and procurement. There are two difficulties with this argument, however. First, since the state's SLBM's are potentially threatened by the other's ASW capabilities, the state may want to pursue ASW research in order to know what the other might be able to do and to design defenses. Unless it does this, it cannot be confident that its submarines are safe. Second, because some submarines are designed to attack surface ships, not launch missiles, ASW forces have missions other than taking cities out of hostage. Some U.S. officials plan for a long war in Europe which would require keeping the sea lanes open against Russian submarines. Designing an ASW force and strategy that would meet this threat without endangering Soviet SLBM's would be difficult but not impossible, since the two missions are somewhat different.'"urthermore, the Russians do not need ASW forces to combat submarines carrying out conventional missions; it might be in America's interest to sacrifice the ability to meet a threat that is not likely to materialize in order to reassure the Russians that we are not menacing their retaliatory capability. When both sides rely on ICBM's, one side's missiles can attack the other's, and so the state cannot be indifferent to the other's building program. But because one side's SLBM's do not menace the other's, each side can build as many as it wants and the other need not respond. Each side's decision on the size of its force depends on technical questions, its judgment about how much destruction is enough to deter, and the amount of insurance it is willing to pay for - and these considerations are independent of the size of the other's strategic force. Thus the crucial nexus in the arms race is severed. Here two objections not only can be raised but have been, by those who feel that even if American second-strike capability is in no danger, the United States must respond to a Soviet buildup. First, the relative numbers of missiles and warheads may be used as an index of each side's power and will.

It I:

I.

Security Dilemma

16 1

Even i f there is no military need to increase American arms as the Russians increase theirs, a failure to respond may lead third parties to think that the U.S. has abandoned the competition with the U.S.S.R. and is no longer willing to pay the price of world leadership. Furthermore, if either side believes that nuclear "superiority" matters, then, through the bargaining logic, it will matter. The side with "superiority" will be more likely to stand firm in a confrontation if it thinks its "stronger" military position helps it, or if it thinks that the other thinks its own "weaker" military position is a handicap. To allow the other side to have more SLBM's - even if one's own secondstrike capability is unimpaired - will give the other an advantage that can be translated into political gains. The second objection is that superiority does matter, and not only because of mistaken beliefs. If nuclear weapons are used in an all-ornone fashion, then all that is needed is second-strike capability. But limited, gradual, and controlled strikes are possible. If the other side has superiority, it can reduce the state's forces by a slow-motion war of attrition. For the state to strike at the other's cities would invite retaliation; for it to reply with a limited counterforce attack would further deplete its supply of missiles. Alternatively, the other could employ demonstration attacks - such as taking out an isolated military base or exploding a warhead high over a city - in order to demonstrate its resolve. In either of these scenarios, the state will suffer unless it matches the other's arms p o ~ t u r e . ' ~ These two objections, if valid, mean that even with SLBM's one cannot distinguish offensive from defensive strategic nuclear weapons. Compellence may be more difficult than deterrence," but if decision makers believe that numbers of missiles or of warheads influence outcomes, or if these weapons can be used in limited manner, then the posture and policy that would be needed for self-protection is similar to that useful for aggression. If the second objection has merit, security would require the ability to hit selected targets on the other side, enough ammunition to wage a controlled counterforce war, and the willingness to absorb limited countervalue strikes. Secretary Schlesinger was correct in arguing that this capability would not constitute a first-strike capability. But because the "Schlesinger Doctrine" could be used not only to cope with a parallel Russian policy, but also to support an American attempt to change the status quo, the new American stance would decrease Russian security. Even if the U.S.S.R. were reassured that the present U.S. Government lacked the desire or courage to do this, there could be no guarantee that future governments would not use the new instruments for expansion. Once we move away from the simple idea that nuclear weapons can only be used for all-out strikes, half the advantage of having both sides rely on a sea-based force would disappear because of the lack of an offensivedefensive differentiation. To the extent that military policy affects political relations, it would be harder for the United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate even if both supported the status quo. Although a full exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that the objections rest on decision makers' beliefs - beliefs, furthermore, that can be strongly influenced by American

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policy and American statements. The perceptions of third nations of whether the details of the nuclear balance affect political conflicts - and, to a lesser extent, Russian beliefs about whether superiority is meaningful - are largely derived from the American strategic debate. If most American spokesmen were t o take the position that a secure second-strike capability was sufficient and that increments over that (short of a first-strike capability) would only be a waste of money, it is doubtful whether America's allies or the neutrals would judge the superpowers' useful military might or political will by the size of their stockpiles. Although the Russians stress war-fighting ability, they have not contended that marginal increases in strategic forces bring political gains; any attempt to do so could be rendered less effective by an American assertion that this is nonsense. The bargaining advantages of possessing nuclear "superiority" work best when both sides acknowledge them. If the "weaker" side convinces the other that it does not believe there is any meaningful difference in strength, then the "stronger" side cannot safely stand firm because there is no increased chance that the other will back down. This kind of argument applies at least as strongly to the second objection. Neither side can employ limited nuclear options unless it is quite confident that the other accepts the rules of the game. For if the other believes that nuclear war cannot be controlled, it will either refrain from responding - which would be fine - or launch all-out retaliation. Although a state might be ready to engage in limited nuclear war without acknowledging this possibility - and indeed, that would be a reasonable policy for the United States - it is not likely that the other would have sufficient faith in that prospect to initiate limited strikes unless the state had openly avowed its willingness to fight this kind of war. So the United States, by patiently and consistently explaining that it considers such ideas to be mad and that any nuclear wars will inevitably get out of control, could gain a large measure of protection against the danger that the Soviet Union might seek to employ a "Schlesinger Doctrine" against an America that lacked the military ability or political will to respond in kind. Such a position is made more convincing by the inherent implausibility of the arguments for the possibility of a limited nuclear war. In summary, as long as states believe that all that is needed is secondstrike capability, then the differentiation between offensive and defensive forces that is provided by reliance on SLBM's allows each side to increase its security without menacing the other, permits some inferences about intentions to be drawn from military posture, and removes the main incentive for status-quo powers to engage in arms races.

IV. Four W o r l d s

The two variables we have been discussing - whether the offense or the defense has the advantage, and whether offensive postures can be distinguished from defensive ones - can be combined to yield four possible worlds.

Ierwi
OFFENSE HAS T H E ADVANTAGE

Security Dilemma
L)EFENSE H A S T H E ADVANTAGE

163

OFFENSIVE POSI'IJKE N O T IIISTINGIJ1SHABI.E F R O M DEFENSIVE ONE
3 N o securlty d~lernrna,hut aggression poss~hle. Status-quo states can follow different policy than aggressors. W'lrning given.

Security d~lcmrna,h u t security requirements n i a y hr cornpat~hle.
4

OFFENSIVE POSTURE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM LIEFENSIVF. O N E

Doubly st<~ble

The first world is the worst for status-quo states. There is no way to get security without menacing others, and security through defense is terribly difficult to obtain. Because offensive and defensive postures are the same, status-quo states acquire the same kind of arms that are sought by aggressors. And because the offense has the advantage over the defense, attacking is the best route to protecting what you have; status-quo states will therefore hehave like aggressors. The situation will be unstable. Arms races are likely. Incentives to strike first will turn crises into wars. Decisive victories and conquests will be common. States will grow and shrink rapidly, and it will be hard for any state to maintain its size and influence without trying to increase them. Cooperation among status-quo powers will be extremely hard to achieve. There are no cases that totally fit this picture, but it bears more than a passing resemblance to Europe before World War I. Britain and Germany, although in many respects natural allies, ended up as enemies. Of course much of the explanation lies in Germany's ill-chosen policy. And from the perspective of our theory, the powers' ability to avoid war in a series of earlier crises cannot be easily explained. Nevertheless, much of the behavior in this period was the product of technology and beliefs that magnified the security dilemma. Decision makers thought that the offense had a big advantage and saw little difference between offensive and defensive military postures. The era was characterized by arms races. And once war seemed likely, mobilization races created powerful incentives to strike first. In the nuclear era, the first world would be one in which each side relied on vulnerable weapons that were aimed at similar forces and each side understood the situation. In this case, the incentives to strike first would be very high - so high that status-quo powers as well as aggressors would be sorely tempted to pre-empt. And since the forces could be used to change the status quo as well as to preserve it, there would be no way for both sides to increase their security simultaneously. Now the familiar logic of deterrence leads both sides to see the dangers in this world. Indeed, the new understanding of this situation was one reason why vulnerable bombers

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and missiles were replaced. Ironically, the 1950's would have been more hazardous if the decision makers had been aware of the dangers of their posture and had therefore felt greater pressure to strike first. This situation could be recreated if both sides were to rely on MIRVed ICBM's.

In the second world, the security dilemma operates because offensive and defensive postures cannot be distinguished; but it does not operate as strongly as in the first world because the defense has the advantage, and so an increment in one side's strength increases its security more than it decreases the other's. So, if both sides have reasonable subjective security requirements, are of roughly equal power, and the variables discussed earlier are favorable, it is quite likely that status-quo states can adopt compatible security policies. Although a state will not be able to judge the other's intentions from the kinds of weapons it procures, the level of arms spending will give important evidence. Of course a state that seeks a high level of arms might be not an aggressor but merely an insecure state, which if conciliated will reduce its arms, and if confronted will reply in kind. To assume that the apparently excessive level of arms indicates aggressiveness could therefore lead to a response that would deepen the dilemma and create needless conflict. But empathy and skillful statesmanship can reduce this danger. Furthermore, the advantageous position of the defense means that a statusquo state can often maintain a high degree of security with a level of arms lower than that of its expected adversary. Such a state demonstrates that it lacks the ability or desire to alter the status quo, at least at the present time. The strength of the defense also allows states to react slowly and with restraint when they fear that others are menacing them. So, although statusquo powers will to some extent be threatening to others, that extent will be limited. This world is the one that comes closest to matching most periods in history. Attacking is usually harder than defending because of the strength of fortifications and obstacles. But purely defensive postures are rarely possible because fortifications are usually supplemented by armies and mobile guns which can support an attack. In the nuclear era, this world would be one in which both sides relied on relatively invulnerable ICBM's and believed that limited nuclear war was impossible. Assuming no MIRV's, it would take more than one attacking missile to destroy one of the adversary's. Pre-emption is therefore unattractive. If both sides have large inventories, they can ignore all but drastic increases on the other side. A world of either ICBM's or SLBM's in which both sides adopted the "Schlesinger Doctrine" would probably fit in this category too. The means of preserving the status quo would also be the means of changing it, as we discussed earlier. And the defense usually would have the advantage, because compellence is more difficult than deterrence. Although a state might succeed in changing the status quo on issues that matter much more to it than to others, status-quo powers could deter major provocations under most circumstances.

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Security Dilemma

I65

In the third world there may be no security dilemma, but there are security problems. Because states can procure defensive systems that do not threaten others, the dilemma need not operate. But because the offense has the advantage, aggression is possible, and perhaps easy. If the offense has enough of an advantage, even a status-quo state may take the initiative rather than risk being attacked and defeated. If the offense has less of an advantage, stability and cooperation are likely because the status-quo states will procure defensive forces. They need not react to others who are similarly armed, but can wait for the warning they would receive if others started to deploy offensive weapons. But each state will have to watch the others carefully, and there is room for false suspicions. The costliness of the defense and the allure of the offense can lead to unnecessary mistrust, hostility, and war, unless some of the variables discussed earlier are operating to restrain defection. A hypothetical nuclear world that would fit this description would be one in which both sides relied on SLBM's, but in which ASW techniques were very effective. Offense and defense would be different, but the former would have the advantage. This situation is not likely to occur; but if it did, a status-quo state could show its lack of desire to exploit the other by refraining from threatening its submarines. The desire to have more protecting you than merely the other side's fear of retaliation is a strong one, however, and a state that knows that it would not expand even if its cities were safe is likely to believe that the other would not feel threatened by its ASW program. It is easy to see how such a world could become unstable, and how spirals of tensions and conflict could develop.

The fourth world is doubly safe. The differentiation between offensive and defensive systems permits a way out of the security dilemma; the advantage of the defense disposes of the problems discussed in the previous paragraphs. There is no reason for a status-quo power to be tempted to procure offensive forces, and aggressors give notice of their intentions by the posture they adopt. Indeed, if the advantage of the defense is great enough, there are n o security problems. The loss of the ultimate form of the power to alter the status quo would allow greater scope for the exercise of nonmilitary means and probably would tend to freeze the distribution of values. This world would have existed in the first decade of the 20th century if the decision makers had understood the available technology. In that case, the European powers would have followed different policies both in the long run and in the summer of 1914. Even Germany, facing powerful enemies on both sides, could have made herself secure by developing strong defenses. France could also have made her frontier almost impregnable. Furthermore, when crises arose, no one would have had incentives to strike first. There would have been no competitive mobilization races reducing the time available for negotiations. In the nuclear era, this world would be one in which the superpowers relied on SL.BM's, ASW technology was not up to its task, and limited

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nuclear options were not taken seriously. We have discussed this situation earlier; here we need only add that, even if our analysis is correct and even if the policies and postures of both sides were to move in this direction, the problem of violence below the nuclear threshold would remain. On issues other than defense of the homeland, there would still be security dilemmas and security problems. But the world would nevertheless be safer than it has usually been.

Author's N o t e
I am grateful to Robert Art, Bernard Brodie, and Glenn Snyder for comments, and to the Committee on Research of the UCLA Academic Senate for financial support. An earlier version of this essay appeared as Working Paper No. 5, UCLA Program in Arms Control and International Security.

Notes
1. This kind of rank-ordering is not entirely an analyst's invention, as is shown by the following section of a British army memo of 1903 deal~ng with British and Russian railroad construction near the Persia-Afghanistan border: The conditions of the problem may ... be briefly summarized as follows: a ) IF we make a railway t o Seistan while Russia remains inactive, we gain a considerable defensive advantage at considerable financial cost; she gains a considerable b) If Russia makes a railway to Seistan, while we remain inact~ve, offensive advantage at considerable financial cost; and offensive advantages c) If both we and Russia make railways to Seistan, the defens~ve may be held t o neutralize each other; in other words, we shall have spent a good deal of money and be n o better off than we are at present. O n the other hand, we shall be no worse off, whereas under alternative ( b ) we shall be much worse off. Consequently, the theoretical balance of advantage lies with the proposed radway extension from Quetta to Selstan. W.G. Nicholson, "Memorandum on Seistan and Other Points Raised in the Discussion on the Defence of India," (Committee of Imperial Defence, March 20, 1903). It should be noted that the possibility of neither side building railways was nor mentioned, thus strongly biasing the analysis. 2. Paul Schroeder, Metternlch's D~plomacy a t Its Zenith, 1820-182.3 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press 1969), 126. 3. Quoted in Michael Howard, The Continental Commrtment (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin 19741, 67. 4. Quoted in Gerald Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor (Columbia: University of M m o u r i Press 1963), 167. 5. Quoted in Leonard Wainstein, "The Dreadnought Gap," in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, eds., The Use of Force (Boston: Little, Brown 1971), 155; Raymond Sontag, European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1933), 147. The French had made a similar argument 50 years earlier; see James Phinney Baxter 111, The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1933), 149. For a more detailed discussion of the security ddemma, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press 19761, 62-76. 6. Experimental evidence for this proposition is summarized in James Tedeschi, Barry Schlenker, and Thomas Bonoma, Conflict, Power, and Games (Chicago: Aldine 1973), 135-41.

l c i v ~ s Security Dilemma

I67

7. T h e results of Prisoner's Dilemma games played in the laboratory support this argument. See Anarol Kapoport a n d Albert C h a m m a h , Prisoner's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan I'ress I 9 6 5 ) , 33-50. Also see Kohert Axelrod, Conflict of lnterest (Chicago: M a r k h a m l 9 7 0 ) , 60-70. 8. Q u o t e d in Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University I'ress 195Y), 6 . 9. Herbert York, The Aduisors: Oppenhernrer, Teller, and the Superbonrb (San Franc~sco: Freeman 19 7 6 ) , 56-60. 10. For the development of the concept of suhject~ve security, see Arnold Wolfers, Drscorti illid Collirboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1962), chap. 10. In the present section we assume that the state believes that ~ t security s can he hest served by increasing its arms; later we will d ~ s c u s s some o f the conditions under which this s s u m p t l o n does not hold. 11. T h e question of when a n actor will see another as a threat is important m d understudied. For a valuahle treatment (although o n e marred by serious methodologic,~l fl,~ws), see Raymond Cohen, "Threat Perception in International Kelations," Ph.1). d ~ s s .( H e l m \ \ University 1974). Among the important factors, touched o n below, are the lessons from the previous war. 12. Still the hest treatment is Arnold Wolfers, Hrztairr and France Bettiwn TILVJ Wlrs (New York: Harcourt, Br,~ce1 9 4 0 ) . 13. Quoted in I'eter Gretton, Former N a l d Person (London: Cassell 1968), 15 1. 14. Michael Kaufman, "Tension Increases in French Colon!;" New York Tntrrs. July I I, 1976. 15. Experimental support f o r thls argument is summarized in M o r t o n L)eut\cii, T h , Kcsr~lrrtroriof Conf1ic.t ( N e w Haven: Yale University Press 1973). 18 1-95, 16. R o g u Bullen, Pn/nierstotr Guizot, and tlw Collapsr of the E r r t ~ n t(:ordral~ ~ (1.01idon: Athlonc 1'1-e\s 19741, 81, 88, 9.3, 2 12. For 3 different vlew of this case, w e Stanley Mellon, "Fnrenre, Il~plomacy, and tanrasy," Rez~irws in European Hzstory, 1 1 (September 19761, 7 6 - 8 0 . 17. S~tnll.lrly, a Ft-ench diplomat h,ts argued that "the worst result o f Loui\ XIV's ,lh,~ndonrnenr of o u r t r a d ~ t i o n a lpolicy w a s rhe distrust it aroused towards us ahro,ld." Jules L l m b o n , "The Perni,~nenr B ~ s c sof French Foreign Pol~cp," F i ~ r e i pAffinrs. Vlll ( J a n u a r y I Y 30), 1-9. 18. Thi\ a\umec, however, that these benefits t o the other w ~ l nor l s o Improve the othet-'\ power posltlon that ~t will be more able t o menace the state in the future. 19. W',ilter I.aFeher, ed., T l ~ c 1)ynanrics of World Power; A llocarnrrrrtn~Hrstory o/ Clrirtcd StLrtesFor~lgllPolrry 194 5-1 97.3, 11: Eastern Ertrope and t l ~ c Sorwt IJn~on( N C U York: Chelsea House in association w ~ t h hlcGraw-Hill 197.3), 700. 2 0 . T h o m a s Schelling, T h e Strategy of C:onflrct ( N e w York: O x t o r d U r i ~ v c r \ ~ t Press y IL)h3), 134-35. 2 I. (1.5. (:ongres\, Senate, Committee o n Foreign Relations, Hearin,qs, k'r)rt/~ Atl~7trtli lkwt): 8 l st Cong., I at sess. ( 19491, 17. 22. B r ~ ~ c Kussett e a n d Elizabeth Hanson, Interest m d Idrolog)! (San Fra~iclsco:F r e e m m I 9 7 i ) , 260; Morris l a n o w i t r , The Professional Soldrrr ( N e w York: Free Press 1 9 6 0 ) , chap. 13. 2.1. tiahti, O n T/~erwronrt~lear Wilr (Princeton: P r ~ n c e t o nUniversity Press I9hO), 138-60. It should he noted t h ~ the t French example is largely hypothetical because Fr'lnce had n o intelltlon of tulhlling her obligations once Germany became strong. 24. Wolfers (fn. 9 ) , chap. 1.5; C. Vann Woodward, "The Age o f Keinterpret,ir~ot~," A111~rict771 Historical Rer&ri? Vol. 6 7 (October 1960), 1-1 9. 2.5. W ~ l l i a ~ Braisted, n The United States N a l y rtr the P'~cific. 1897-1909 (Austin: Ilnivers~ty of Teuas Press 19581, 240. 26. Carnhon (fn. 171, 18.5. 27. Quoted in Adam IJlatn, Exparrsrorr and Co-/-krstence ( N e w h r k : I'r,ieger I %8), 5. In 1920 the US. Navy's General Board similarly declared "A nation must advance o r retrocede I I I world position." Quoted in W ~ l l i m iBraisted, T ~ J Unrtrd C States N ' Z ~In I ~thr I'~7crfic-. 1909-1922 (Austin: University o f Texas I'ress 1971), 488. 28. Quoted in M a r ~ o nBoggs, Attempts to Define and Lnnlt "Aggressi~v"Arnrnnrrrit 171 Diplowrilcy mzd Strntcgy (Columbia: [Jniversity of Missouri Studies, XVI, No. 1, 194 1 ) 4 1 .

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The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence

29. Steven Ross, European Diplomatic History, 1789-181.5 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1969), 194. 30. Thus, when Wolfers (fn. l o ) , 126, argues that a status-quo state that settles for rough equality of power with its adversary, rather than seeking preponderance, may be able to convince the other t o reciprocate by showing rhat it wants only to protect itself, not menace the other, he assumes that the defense has an advantage. 31. Schelling (fn. 20), chap. 9. 32. Quoted in First Fischer, War of illusions (New York: Norton 19751, 377, 461. 33. George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: John Wiley 1977), 105-06; Sontag (fn. 5), 4-5. 34. Kahn (fn. 23), 21 1 (also see 144). 35. For a general discussion of such mistaken learning from the past, see Jervis (fn. 5 ) , chap. 6. The important and still not completely understood question of why this belief formed and was maintained throughout the war is examined in Bernard Brodie, War and Polrtrcs (New York: Macmillan 1973), 262-70; Brodie, "Technological Change, Strategic Doctrme, and Political Outcomes," in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1976), 290-92; and Douglas Porch, "The French Army and the Spirit of the Offensive, 1900-14," in Brian Bond and Ian Roy, eds., War and Society (New York: Holmes & Meier 197.5), 117-43. 36. Some were not so optimistic. Gray's remark is well-known: "The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our life-time." The German Prime Minister, Bethmann Hollweg, also feared the consequences of the war. But the controlling view was rhat it would certainly pay for the winner. 37. Quoted in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, 111, The Challenge of War, 1916-1 9 16 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1971), 84. 38. Quester (fn. 33), 98-99. Robert Art, The Influence of Foreign Policy on Seapouw, I1 (Beverly Hills: Sage Professional Papers in International Studies Series, 1973), 14-1 8, 26-28. 39. Konard Jarausch, "The ILlusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History, 11 (March 1969), 50. 40. Brodie (fn. 8), 58. 41. President Roosevelt and the American delegates to the League of Nat~ons Disarmament Conference maintained that the tank and mobile heavy artillery had re-established the dominance of the offensive, thus making disarmament more urgent (Boggs, fn. 28, pp. 3 1, 108), but this was a minority position and may not even have been believed by the Americans. The reduced prestige and influence of the military, and the high pressures to cut government spending throughout this period also contributed to the lowering of defense budgets. 42. Jon Kimche, The Unfought Battle (New York: Stein 1968); Nicholas William Bethell, The War Hitler Won: The Fall of Poland, September 1939 (New York: Holt 1972); Alan Alexandroff and Richard Rosecrance, "Deterrence in 1939," World Politics, XXIX (April 1977), 4 0 4 2 4 . 43. Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly, eds., Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries, 1937-1940 (New York: McKay 1962), 173. 44. For a short time, as France was falling, the British Cabinet d ~ discuss d reaching a negotiated peace with Hitler. The officlal history ignores this, but it 1s covered in P.M.H. Bell, A Certain Eventuality (Farnborough, England: Saxon House 1974), 4 0 4 8 . 45. Macleod and Kelly (fn. 43), 174. In flat contrad~ction to common sense and almost everything they believed about modern warfare, the Allies planned an expedition to against the Russians. Scandinavia to cut the supply of iron ore to Germany and to aid F~nland But the dominant mood was the one described above. 46. Brodie (fn. 8), 179. 47. Arthur Balfour, "Memorandum," Committee on Imperial Defence, April 30, 1903, pp. 2-3; see the telegrams by Sir Arthur Nicolson, in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, Vol. 4 (London: H.M.S.O. 1929), 429, 524. These barriers d o not prevent the passage of long-range aircraft; but even in the air, distance usually aids the defender.

Icn I . Security Dilemma

I69

48. See for example, the discussion of warfare among Ch~nese warlords in Hsi-Sheng Chi, "The Chinese Warlord System as a n International System," in Morton Kaplan, ed., N e w Apprr~dchest o Internatrond Relat~ons(New York: St. Martin's 1968), 405-25. 49. Some American decision makers, including military officers, thought that the best way out of the dilemma was t o abandon the Philippines. SO. Quoted in Eking Morrison, Turmod and Tradition: A Study of the Lrfe awd Tinzes of Henry 1.. Stirnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1960), 326. 5 1. The U S . "refused to consider limitations on Hawaiian defenses, rmce these works posed n o threat to Japan." Braisted (fn. 27), 612. 52. That is part of the reason why the Japanese admirals strongly objected when the civ~lIan leaders decided to accept J seven-to-ten ratio in lighter craft in 1930. Stephen I'elz, Rnc-e ro Pearl Harbor (Cambridge: Harvard Univers~tyPress 1974), 3. 53. John Nef, War a i ~ d Human Progress (New York: Norton 1963), 185. Also see ihid., 2.17, 242-43, and 323; C. W. Oman, T / JArt ~ of War in the Middle Ages (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell LJnivers~tyPress 19.531, 70-72; J o h n Beeler, Warfare in Feudal Europe, 730-1200 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell IJniversity Press 1971), 212-14; Michael Howard, War in ~k~cropcwn History (1.ondon: Oxford University Press 1976), 33-37. 54. Q ~ ~ i c Wright, y A Study of War (abridged ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964), 142. Also see 63-70, 74-75. There are important exceptions to these general~zationsthe American Civil War, for instance, falls in the middle of the period Wright says is dominated by the offense. 55. Geoffrey Kemp, Robert Pfaltzgraff, and Uri Ka'anan, eds., T h e Othcr Arms Race (i.exington, Mass.: D. C. Heath 1975); James Foster, "The Future of Conventional Arnis Control," Policy Scrcnces, No. 8 (Spring 1977), 1-19. 56. Richard Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Polrcy, 1898-2 914 (Princeton: Pr~ncetonUniversity Press 1973), 273; Grey to Nicolson, in Gooch and Ternperley ( t n . 47), 4 14. 57. Quoted in James Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autononzy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1966), 49. American naval officers agreed with the Japanese that a ten-to-six r,ltlo would endmger Japan's supremxy in her home waters. 58. E.1.. Woodward and R. Butler, eds., Doc~tments on Brrtish Foreign Polrry, I9IC)-l9?9, Th~rd series, 111 (London: H.M.S.O. 1950), 526. 59. Jervis (fn. 5 ) , 69-72, 3.52-55. 60. Quoted in Merze Tatc, T h e United States m d A r n ~ a n ~ e n t(Cambridge: s Harvard Univcrs~tyPress 1948), 108. 6 1 . Koggs (fn. 28), 1.5, 40. 62. Kenneth Hagan, American Gunhoat lliplonzacy rrnd the Old Navy 1877-1889 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press 1973), 20. 6.3. Winston Churchill, T h e G a t l ~ e r ~ n Storm g (Boston: Houghron 19481, 206. 64. Brodie, War and Politics (fn. 35), 325. 65. Boggs (fn. 28), 42, 83. For a good argument about the possible different~~lt~on hetween offens~veand defensive weapons in the 1930's. see Basil Liddell Hart, "Aggression and the Prohle~nof Weapons," English Review, Vol. 5.5 (July 1932). 71-78. 66. Quoted in Boggs (fn. 28), 39. 67. On these grounds, the Germans claimed in 1932 that the French forts were offensive (ibid.. 49). Si~nilarly,fortified forward naval bases can he necess'lry for 1,lunching a n attack; see Rrai\ted (fn. 27), 643. 68. The French made this argument 111 the interwar period; see Rlchard Challener, Thc k r m c h Theory of the Nation rn Arms (New York: C;olumbia IJniversity Press 1955), 181-82. The Germ.lns disagreed; see Boggs (fn. 281, 44-45. 69. Oman (fn. 531, 57-58. Foreign Policy of Castlerc~zgh.1 I, 18 1.F-1822 [L.ondon: 70. Quoted in Charles Wehster, G. Bell and Sons 196.31, .5 50. 71. Koggs (in. 28), 14-15, 4 7 4 8 , 60.

170

T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence

72. Quoted In Philip Jordan, Frontter Law and Order (Lmcoln: Un~versityof Nebraska Press 1970), 7; also see 16-17. 73. Boggs (fn. 28), 20, 28. 74. See, however, Desmond Ball, "The Counterforce Potential of American SLBM Systems," Journal of Peace Research, XIV (No. 1, 1977), 23-40. 75. Richard Garwin, "Anti-Submarine Warfare and National Security," Scientific American, Vol. 2 2 7 (July 1972), 14-25. 76. The latter scenario, however, does not require that the state closely match the number of missiles the other deploys. 77. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 69-78. Schelling's arguments are not entirely convincing, however. For further d~scussion, see Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Re-Visited," Working Paper No. 14, UCLA Program in Arms Control and International Security.

3. Collective Security and Concerts of Power

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The Balance of Power .4.

forfinancialsupportand officespace.JackSnyder. i67-2 I4.120. SNYDER* THE SECURITY DILEMMA relationstheory. Robert Osgood. I The best recenttreatment is RobertJervis. into threesubgames: the armamentsgame.THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN ALLIANCE POLITICS By GLENN H. Typically. the adversary game.each must assume accumulation of othersis defensively that it might be intended for attack. Since no state can know that the power motivatedonly. David Goldfischer." World Politics 30 (January I978).and all wind up with no more security than when the vicious cyclebegan.as in explanationsthat ascribe the cold war to the United States and the Soviet Union misperceiving each other's "defensive" actions in Europe as "aggressive.discussionsofthe security dilemma are illustratedby the armamentsgame: the arms race is seen as the epitome of competitionfor illusorysecurity.and alliance formation. The presentessay is intendedto fillthisgap.none can be sure that others' intentionsare peaceful.each party'spower incrementsare matched by the others. The conceptof thesecurity dilemma was originated by JohnHerz. territorial aggrandizement. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . along withthe costsincurred in having acquired and having to maintain theirpower."' The term is generallyused to denote the self-defeating of the quest for securityin an anarchic system. for analyticalpurposes.The theorysays that even when no state has any desire to attack others. in his PoliticalRealismand PoliticalIdealism(Chicago: University of Chicago Press. and to explore some * I wish to thank Robert Art.at least the security implicitly. dilemma is seen operatingin the adversarygame (competitionother than armaments).and the Woodrow Wilson InternationalCenter for Scholars and the Instituteof War and Peace Studies. A This content downloaded from 86. hence each must accumulate power for defense. forhelpfulcomments. but stillone CENTRAL concept in international of the most under-studiedempirically.or will remain so.250.and Kenneth Waltz. the most prominentmethods are by armament. Robert Jervis. Columbia University. Dean Pruitt. States accumulate power in many ways. "Cooperation under the SecurityDilemma. Consequently.Sometimes. The "supergame" of internationalsecuritymay thus be divided. and thealliance game.125 on Thu. is that of the "securitydiaspect lemma." Little attention has so far been paid to the securitydilemma dynamics of the alliance game. I95I).

thealliance thatforms againstit is not "self-defeating" (security dilemma) model. the second B's. and theycan increaseit substantially by allyingifothersabstain.theirmotivesto ally will be different of the prisoner'sdilemma. (2) the states that: (i) no state is aggressive. Although it is cast in two-person form. The eventual resultis the divisionof the systeminto two rival coalitions. If a state clearly reveals itselfas expansionist.commitments to defend the interestsof others. the primaryalliance dilemma among the major states follows the logic of an N-person prisoner'sdilemma. the secondaryone afteralliances have formed.such as reduced freedomof action. a counter-alliance necessarily follows. ranked from 4 (best) to I (worst). the compulsion to ally in peacetime was much weaker than suggestedby the model. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . dilemma as in the prisoners' however. fromtime to time.and so forth."and vice versa.however. Each state has two options: seek allies or abstain from alliances. multipolaralliance formation 2 This content downloaded from 86. The logical This is.250.The primaryphase occurs during the processof alliance formation.while alliances involve various costs.but none can know the intentions is such that thereis no and (3) military are roughlyequal in military strength. for two reasons: (I) some states may not be satisfiedwith only moderate security.Alliances will form. Or. Before then (when the pace of warfare was slower). The first number in each cell representsA's payoff. The basic assumptionsare of others.2 Figure I portraysthe primaryalliance securitydilemma. The numbers in the cells are ordinal. Uncertainty others is inherentin structuralanarchy.it is understood that for player A. of course. if some statesare weaker than others. all are fairly well offif all abstain. Despite and possiblyothers.the model does capturesome essentialdynamicsof these qualifications between i870 and I939.120.462 WORLD POLITICS interactions between the alliance game and the adversarygame in multipolar and bipolar systems.will ally in order to avoid isolation or to preclude the partner from allying against them. If all states are about equally strongand are interested only in security. The thirdassumptionhas fromthe incentives been valid since about i870.since there is no way of knowing thatthe first alliance is intendedonly fordefensive purposes.B. This outcome is worse than all-around abstention because each state has incurred the risks and burdens of alliance with little improvementin its security. technology about the aims of time to forma successfuldefensealliance afterwar begins.fearingthat otherswill not abstain. Once an alliance forms.since each has moderate securityagainst individual others. (2) some states. an idealized model based on certain assumptionsfrom which the empirical world will deviate more or less. the other player. ALLIANCE FORMATION THE PRIMARY IN A MULTIPOLAR ALLIANCE DILEMMA SYSTEM: The securitydilemma in the alliance game has two phases: primary and secondary. means "all otherplayers.125 on Thu. In a multipolarsystem(such as the one thatexisted before I945).

outcome. is the second-worst two rivalcoalitions.forming becauseofuncertainty primarily be obtained.125 on Thu. cannot aroundabstention." See Kenneth N. I979). because this gives them leverage to bargain for a maximum share of the alliance's payoff.3 itsshareofthealliance's and to maximize coalition. This content downloaded from 86. who will align withwhom.ALLIANCE SECURITY FIGURE I DILEMMA 463 THE PRIMARY ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA B ABSTAIN ALLY ABSTAIN All-around abstention 3. of the statein the alliancegame. If thesewere the are the "interests" processwould be comat stake." of alliance's shares the attractive each other offering to be in the mostpowerful aims in the bargaining: has two principal These netbenefits. each statewould be equallyeligibleas pletely otherstate.or how thebenefits.250. 2 A ALLY The forall players.120.: Addison Wesley.Indeed. allsecond-best. theywill more likelyjoin the weaker one which then becomes the most powerful as a consequence of their joining. In therealworld. It does notpredict onlythatallianceswill form. Theory ofInternational Politics (Reading. theoretically These matters alliancewillbe dividedamongitsmembers. competein in whichthe states are decidedby a processof bargaining Each state "payoff. alliance game from the whichexistapart eliminated. Thus the logic of N-person game theoryis consistent with Waltz's argumentthat states "balance" ratherthan "bandwagon.the alliancebargaining onlyinterests indeterminatethatis.1 B's coalition forms A isolated "4 Two rival coalitions 2. byotherinterests. the do not. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . of every theallyor theadversary not though is reduced.3 A's coalition forms B isolated 4. Waltz. Mass.and an alliancewhileothers best. This modelpredicts and costsof an risks. need to guard of othersand the overwhelming about the intentions thatof isolation. theindeterminacy however. othersand against statesto align with certain and which predispose 3 "Being in" the most powerfulcoalition does not necessarily mean that statesjoin the most powerfulcoalition that is already in existence. I25-26. againsttheworstoutcome.

but no significant with any of the other major powers. Russia.Since theyare valued chiefly I will occasionally referto them as "strategic" interests. but were ideologically antagonistictoward the three Western democracies.That is. The and affinities were: (i) on grounds alignmentsimplied by these conflicts of territorialinterest: England and Austria versus Russia.These conflicts or theymay stem fromideological. Germany had a serious conflicts conflictwith France over Alsace-Lorraine.464 WORLD POLITICS others. and withEngland over theStraitsquestion and colonial issues fromthe Middle East to China. which bring them into conflictor affinity and commonalitiesmay have some power content states.in preservinga balance of power in the system. They include. The autocratic governmentsof Germany.or in expansion to enhance its security.Such general strategicinterests introduceonly a modest amount of determinacyinto the basic N-person model.or even more generally. England.prior to or apart fromany overt alliance negotiations. comers.and Italy.but was in conflict conflicts with Austria in Europe over colonial issues.Austria. England was on good termswith with Russia and France Germany.economic. Germany.Such interests are "general" because they do not involve conflicts over specificissues with specificother states.Austria. Russia had conflicts with Austria over the Balkans. or affinities Particular conflicts of interest establisha tacit patternof alignment. The Franco-English conflictsover Egypt in the i9th centuryand the Austro-German ethnic affinity are examples.but will be defended or acted upon against all fortheirpower and security content. and Russia versus England. (2) on ideological grounds: Germany.120. and Austria stood on ideological common ground. stateswill expect to be supportedin some degree by those with whom and to be opposed by those with whom theyare in theyshare interests conflict. for instance. France.125 on Thu.Typical examples of general interests would be England's in preserving traditionalinterest the independenceof the Low Countries and in maintaininga balance of power on the Continent. ethnic. and Italy. of is further The indeterminacy reduced by the "particular" interests with specific other states. and France and Russia versus England. Here we must distinguishbetween "general" and "particular" of the system interests.or prestigevalues. Such conflictsand alignments of interestand ideology establish a This content downloaded from 86.250.and Italy versus France. Italy had territorial and with France in Africa.a state'sinterest in defendinga close neighbor. To illustrate:in the decade of the i870s. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . General interests stemfromtheanarchicstructure and the geographic position of the state.

" ofcertain alliances.120. of compromised incurring costsin theform was not Thus. Naturalpartners mayfailto allybecauseone of themoverestimates the other'sconflicts with thirdpartiesand triesto drive too hard a bargain. thusreducing or increasing the likelihoodthattheywill form.a comtoo muchcompared thatwould have costone or bothparties promise to the deals theycould negotiate Francecould get Russia withothers.thelatter wouldrequire a prior of theconflict. dilemma.a state in withwhichone has a conflict will appearas a morelikely opponent war than otherstates. as a partner someideological at theminor costofswallowing repugnance. The indeterminacy is reduced. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . of and England did in I904.in othercases. To summarize: in a multipolar is a general to there incentive system allywithsomeotherstateor states. in Egyptthatwas and she could get England by givingup a position for valuableonlyforprestige reasonsand could hardly be maintained long. thatis generated bythestructureof the system. althoughan alliancebetweenFrance and Germany logically out of the questionbetweeni870 and I9I4. if the Radical rather soon intoa quasi-alliance than theImperialist wingof theBritish Liberalparty had been in chargeof theforeign policymakingpostsin theCabinet. Who alignswithwhom results froma bargaining that is theoretically process indeterminate.the Anglo-French Entente of I904 probably would not have occurred. interests. theseconflicts and thaneliminate affinities will narrowtherangeof indeterminacy rather it.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 465 alliancebargaining background of relationships against whichtheovert processtakesplace. For example. as Germany did in negotiations withEnglandin i899 and i9oi. The choiceof alliesis also influenced bytheinternal political configurationsof statesapart fromthe generalideologicalpreferences just mentioned. it was extremely it requireda settlement of theAlsace-Lorraine unlikely: issue. relationships may foreclose some combinations if the conflict is severe enough. and certainly would not have developedso againstGermany.and whichaffect thatprocess considerably.125 on Thu.however. Technically.hence. More likely. and commonalities conflicts particular interest enterinto the bargaining processby reducingor increasing thetotalvalue. predisThese posingthe system towardcertainalliancesand againstothers. And natural as France opponents maybe able toovercome their conflicts. This content downloaded from 86.an allianceagainstit will yieldgreater settlement valuethanan alliancewith it. For example. following thelogicof theN-person or security prisoner's dilemma.250.theabsenceof conflict between somepairsmay make them naturalallies.or "payoff.

I believe. (In both of the lattertwo variants. and defectionmeans a weak commitmentand no supportin conflicts with the adversary.250. between states and their internalpolitical make-up. 5The conceptsof abandonmentand entrapment were first posited. where cooperation means a stronggeneral commitment and full support in specificadversaryconflicts.The horns of this secondary dilemma may be described by the traditionallabels "cooperate" (C) and "defect" (D).466 WORLD POLITICS conflicts.5 In a multipolar system.or he may fail to provide supportin contingencieswhere supportis expected.the terms"alliance game" and "dilemma" will referto the secondarygame ratherthan the primaryone. alliances are never absolutelyfirm. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .this reference will be the only one in this and space limitations. the alliance securitydilemma takes on a different character. (Henceforthin thisdiscussion."and the principal "goods" are a reduction in the risks of being abandoned or entrapped by the ally. in general. he may merelyde-align. states move into the second phase of the alliance dilemma.120. he may fail to make good on his explicitcommitments. the principal "bads" are "abandonment" and "entrapment. having already "defected" in the primarydilemma by choosing to make alliances. in The Nuclear Revolution:International PoliticsBeforeand After Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press.) Suspicion that the ally is 4Despite the importanceof internalpolitics. 6." the popular academic terminology actors being states.) Each horn of the dilemma has both prospectivegood and prospective bad consequences.by Michael Mandelbaum.therefore. but theexpectations of support which underlie it are weakened. and affinities though not eliminated.The secondary alliance dilemma may or may not be a prisoner'sdilemma.abrogatingthe alliance contract. in which their choices are no longer whetherto ally or not. is "defection. and the "goods" and "bads" foreach alternativetend to be the obverse of those of the other. but it may take a varietyof specificforms: the ally may realign with the opponent. Abandonment.125 on Thu. by the prior interests." by one's ally is ever-present.4 AFTER THE ALIGNMENTS ALLIANCE FORM: DILEMMA SECONDARY Once alliances have begun to form. This content downloaded from 86.thealliance remainsintact.whatever the textof the written the fearof being abandoned agreement.For reasonsof theoretical theanalysisis based entirely parsimony on what in recently is called the "rationalactor model. essay. chap.That is.In the alliance security dilemma. i98i). but how firmly to commit themselvesto the proto-partner and how much supportto give thatpartnerin specific conflictinteractionswith the adversary.

Conversely.bargainingpower over the ally is enhanced to the extenthe doubts one's commitmentbecause one can then make credible threats of nonsupport.The interests of allies are generallynot identical. Thus. to the extenttheyare shared.It is more likely to occur if the ally becomes intransigent in in one's support.Thus.Thus a "C" strategy commitmentto an ally reduces the risk of abandonment by reducing his fear of abandonment.If he knows he can counton being supported. hence devaluing the alliance for the ally.125 on Thu. Conversely. the resolutionof the alliance security dilemma the a comparisonand trade-off between choice of strategy requires chiefly the costs and risks of abandonment and entrapment. he is discouraged fromdefectingby his confidence in one's support. one to the risk of a war that one would not wish to fight. The risks of abandonment and entrapmenttend to vary inversely: of strong reducing one tends to increase the other.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 467 considering realignment maygenerate an incentive to realign preemptively. But this very support may encourage him to thus exposing excessiveboldness in disputesor criseswith the adversary. A strategyof strong commitmentand support will have the undesired effect of reducingone's bargainingleverage over the ally.but it also increases the risk of abandonment by castingdoubt on one's loyalty. he is less influenceable.) Another negative effectof strong commitmentis that it tends to forecloseone's own options of realignment. Entrapmentoccurs when one values the preservationof the alliance more than the cost of fighting for the ally's interests.250. tends to restrainthe ally and to reduce the risk of entrapment. disputeswithopponentsbecause of his confidence the greater one's dependence on the alliance and the strongerone's commitmentto the ally.The risk also varies with the ally's inherentdegree of recklessness or aggressiveness. (Note that the opposite is the case in the adversarygame where firmcommitmentsto defend one's intereststend to strengthen bargaining power vis-a-visthe opponent. the higher the risk of entrapment.Alliance bargaining considerationsthus tend to favor a strategyof weak or ambiguous commitment-a "D" strategyin the alliance game. or shares only partially.120.Despite the general com- This content downloaded from 86. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . a "D" strategy of weak or vague commitment. or a record of failingto support the ally in specificconflicts.theymay be valued in different degree. There are certainother"goods" and "bads" thatenterinto thealliance securitydilemma. Entrapment means being dragged into a conflictover an ally's intereststhat one does not share.

if he is basically oriented toward the status quo. Finally. But allies are dealing with theiradversariesat the same time theyare dealing with each other. increase tension. of the status quo. Strategychoices in either game must therefore take account of both kinds of effects.468 WORLD POLITICS pulsion to align in a multipolarsystem. a tough stance may provoke him.is interested essentially in the preservation. like itself. I have been discussing the alliance game or dilemma more or less independentlyof adversaries. INTERACTION BETWEEN ALLIANCE AND ADVERSARY GAMES Up to now.250.125 on Thu.A strategyof weak commitment has the desirableeffect of keeping alignmentoptionsopen. However.a strongcommitment to theally tendsto solidify theadversary alliance by increasing the degree of threat to it. Each of the strategy pairs.120. A weak or tentative commitmentreduces this effectand may even weaken or divide the opposing alliance by preserving. (The togetherwith its complementary strategy "D" strategies are shorthand cooperative"C" strategies and thedefecting for a wide range of empirical variationsthat cannot be explored here. the apparent option of realigningwith oneself. statesusually want to keep their commitmentstentativeor vague as long as possible-both to preserve opportunitiesfor shifting partnersin case the presentone turnsout to be unsatisfactory and to maximize bargainingleverage over the current partner by showing that they have alternatives. I and II. but also side-effects game-and vice versa. or limitedmodification. The securitydilemma arises from the state's uncertainty its adversaryhas far-reaching expansionistaims or. The column labeled "alliance game" simplysummarizes the previous discussion. Table I presentsa compositesecurity dilemma thatcombinesthe two games.The alliance and adversarygames proceed simultaneouslyand complement each other in various ways.a policy of firmnesspromises the of deterringhim and enhancing one's own reputation desirable effects for resolve. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . in the adversarygame.) The two columns show the possible directconsequences of alliance and adversarystrategiesin their respectivegames. shows an alliance strategy. The column labeled "adversary game" shows the possible "good" and "bad" effects of either conciliationor firmnesstoward an adversarywhen one is interested only in maintainingthe general status whether quo. Strategiesand tacticsin the alliance game will have directeffects in the adversary in thatgame. If the opponent is expansionist. for statesin that alliance.and induce an "in- This content downloaded from 86.

a vicious circle of "unnecessary"power competitionbecause the adversaryinterprets one's own firmness as aggressiveness toward him. insecurity spiral GOODS I. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Solidifyadversary's alliance I. a conciliatorypolicy may have the desirable effectof resolving conflictand reducing tension with an essentiallynonaggressiveadversary. Reduce bargaining power over ally 3. GOODS I. increasetension.250.ALLIANCE SECURITY TABLE I DILEMMA 469 THE COMPOSITE SECURITY DILEMMA IN A MULTIPOLAR SYSTEM PossibleConsequences Strategies Alliancegame GOODS I. Preserverealignment option 2. reduce tension II ALLIANCE D: Increase bargaining power over ally 3. Increase risk of abandonment Reduce reputation forloyalty Encourage adversary to stand firmer Reduce reputation forresolve securityspiral" that is. weaken commitment ADVERSARY 4. on the other hand. adversary Enhance reputation for resolve BADS 2. Support. Reassure ally. I ALLIANCE C: 2. Increase risk of entrapment 2. reduce risk of entrapment Resolve conflict. Provoke adversary. Restrainally. strengthenpcommitment ADVERSARY D: Stand firm. 2. Conciliate C: I.125 on Thu. Adversary game GOODS I. Divide adversary's alliance BADS BADS I. I.or prevail over. if the opponent This content downloaded from 86. reduce risk of abandonment Enhance reputation forloyalty BADS Deter. Conversely. 2. Foreclose realignment option 4. Withhold support.120.

" Some of these may be prisoner'sdilemmas. This content downloaded from 86. chap. conciliationmay encourage him to make further demands in the belief that one lacks resolve.120.A tough stance toward the adversaryalso tends to close off the option of realignment with him. theyare implicitly "Stag Hunt" (when the opponent prefers the statusquo) and a variantof "Chicken" (when the opponent is expansionistbut preferspeace over expansion by war).then. 3. which in turnstemsfromitsuncertainty about theadversary's preferences.as the structural basis of the spiral model. Choosing the beststrategy thusrequiresan estimateof the opponent'spreference rankingsforpossibleoutcomes.In making choices. the side effects on the alliance game of strategies of firmness. Jervismakes the point that the choice between deterrenceand spiral-modelaxiomsbetweenfirmness and accommodation-depends essentially on one's estimateof the adversary'sultimateaims.6 Strategiesin each game can have desirable or undesirableside effects in the other. although presumablyit knows its own. For a comprehensive treatment. In both cases. An adversary"D" strategy resistance. chap.Space forbidsa discussionof the various possiblesub-games:in Table i.or coercion will tend to reassure an ally who doubts one's loyalty.but some may be othergames thatare eithermoreor less conflictual thantheprisoner's dilemma. That is. Toughness will also cause the adversaryto move closer to his own allies. analogous to the secondaryalliance dilemma. Snyder and Paul Diesing. I977).The dilemma for the state." Once adversariesare in this cell they may be able to reduce their conflict. I976).250. Jervis does not apply the term"security dilemma" to thisbroad choice. having protectedthemselves against the worst. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . The adversarydilemma in Table I simply assumes theextremes-the opponentis eitherstatus-quo-oriented or expansionisteven thoughhe may have mixed motivesor be expansionist in different degree in different situations. the primarysecurity dilemma. That is. and omit the obverseside effects. has already been resolvedby mutual defection..Firmnessin the adversary game reducesbargainingpower over theallyin thealliance game because it reduces the credibility of a threatto withholdsupport. 6 The adversarydilemma presentedhere is a secondarysecurity dilemma. as the ally becomes intransigentthroughhis confidencein one's support. adversariesplay a series of sub-games within the general contextof supergame "DD.a statemust therefore calculate the sum of directeffects and side effects. I will discuss here only in the adversarygame.e.theyare now able to consider whetherthey might not improve their situationby conciliatingthe opponent-although they must also guard against exploitationof such cooperation.arises fromits uncertainty as to what game is being played.and reduce the risk of the ally's defectionor realignment.Formally speaking. Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press.470 WORLD POLITICS has expansionistgoals. The secondaryadversarydilemma is similar to the dichotomybetween the axioms of deterrence theory and thoseof the "spiral model" as describedby RobertJervis in Perception and Misperception in International Politics(Princeton:Princeton University Press. but uses it in its traditionalsense as an explanationof why the search for security among status-quostatesmay be self-defeating-i. which is a prisoner'sdilemma.on the other hand.Opposed to this "good" are several "bads. alliances have formedand adversaries have adopted a general posture of power/security rivalryin the "DD" cell of the primarygame. theymay sink deeper into conflict and competition. 2. which we mightalso call the international "supergame.125 on Thu.Whether conciliationor continued (or greater)firmness is the betterpolicy for any state will depend on its adversary'spreferences-which the state does not know." Firmness toward the adversary increases the risk of entrapmentby the ally. To save space. thus solidifying his alliance. see Glenn H.

he may then become more amenable in order to discourage one's defection. but to realign or at least move closer to the opponent.125 on Thu. In the alliance game.as suggestedabove. strengthening one's commitment to the ally tends to forecloseone's alternative alliance options.he will be more cautious in his own dealings with the improved relationswith the the opponent. A strategy of conciliationin the adversarygame may produce a "fallingdomino" effect: the opponent one's overtureas weakness and pushes harderon both presentand futureissues.120. The most undesirable side effect of conciliatingthe adversaryis that it entails the risk of abandonment by the ally. He may even interpret adversary as a sign that one is consideringrealignment. as his partners begin to doubt his loyaltyand seek alternativepartners. the various benefits. Thus. firming up one's commitment against the opponentmay foreclosecompromisesettlement options.The alliance analogue to deterrence of the opponentis restraint of the ally. leverage over the adversaryis strengthened by a firm. and/orthe less dependent the ally appears to be. What determineschoices in the alliance security we have suggested only a superficialanswer to this question: choice involves estimatesof. His fear that one is contemplatingrealignmentmay induce him. which is desirable forits own sake as well as forthe enhancement of one's bargaining leverage over the presentpartner. the more dependent a state is.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 471 A "C" strategyof conciliatingthe adversarywill have the desirable of restraining the ally.7 THE DETERMINANTS OF CHOICE dilemma? Thus far. As an opponentmay be emboldened if he is appeased. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . consequently. This content downloaded from 86.possibly offsettingthe benefitsfromgreatercooperationin the adversarygame. and trade-offs among. But what determinesthe magnitude of these values and consequentlythe severity of the dilemma? Probably the most importantdeterminantis the relativedependence of the partnerson the alliance-how much theyneed each other'saidand their perceptionsof each other's dependence. thus reducing the risk of entrapment. not to try to discourage thisby becomingmore accommodative. and riskslisted in Table I. observing one's improving relationswith the opponent. ambiguous commitment.Conciliating the opponent also keeps open one's option of realignmentwith him. in the adversary game. interprets The alliance analogue is the entrapment effect. the ally may become more intransigent and aggressiveif he is supported. Bargainingpower over the ally is enhanced by a weak. the 7 There are some interesting analogies betweenthe dynamicsof the two games. will have less confidencethat one will stand four-squarebehind him in a crisis.Accommodating an adversarymay also weaken his alliance. explicitone. This risk is an preemptively importantconstrainton conciliationbetween adversaries.250. Deterrenceinvolves a threatof forceagainst an adversary.restraint may be accomplishedby threatening not to use forcein supportof the ally. costs. side effect The ally.

" Most alliances in a multipolarworld involveboth kinds of dependence.since it refersnot to the need foraid in case one is attacked. The most importantcauses of such asymmetriesare of power betweenallies.but to the need to block an increase in the adversary'spower. The twoarelinked herebecause oftheir similar is alsopossible. the less the dependence on the presentpartner). up to the point where the combined strength provides sufficient security). is different from dependence as just defined. by I9I4 the increased militarystrength of France and Russia (especially the latter) had reduced theirdependence on England.Dependence is compounded of (i) a state's need for assistance in war as a functionof the extent to which its militarycapability falls short of its potential adversary'scapability. This content downloaded from 86." and need for the ally's assistancemightbe labeled "directdependence.120. and the more satisfactory theyare. minimized Britain's direct dependence on her continentalallies. but she was indirectlydependent on them because domination of the Continentby a single power would have neutralized the protection of the Channel. Also. the more one is dependent on him. for instance.the two are closely linked since the ally's independent existence is a prerequisite to receiving his aid. lesslikely.472 WORLD POLITICS more likely it is that the costs and risksof abandonment will outweigh the costs and risks of entrapment.the more likely one will have to call on the partnerfor help). opposite though on alliance effect dependence. For example. The English and disparity geographical factors Channel. Analytically. In the pre-I9I4 decade.Strategicinterest this the ally's power resourcesout of the opponent's hands.but theyshould be kept separate because allies may be dependent in different degree on each dimension. but had little operational strategic 8 "Conflict" ofinterest. some may change in opposite directions. the factors with the adversary are not entirely independent. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . France was directlydependent on British aid. In practice. Strategicinterest might be termed"indirectdependence. interest that the parties Another determinantis the degree of strategic is an interest in keeping have in defendingeach other.125 on Thu.Thus. and "tension" areanalytically Conflict is incompatibility separable. willproduce war in tension likelihood that theconflict maybe defined crudely as thefelt the theimmediate future. (2) its partner's capacityto supplythe assistance(the greaterthe partner's strength.250. increasedconflict will reduce realignmentalternativesby tending to close offthe option of realigningwith him.8 and (4) the state's realignment alternatives(the more numerous the alternatives. but this was partiallyoffset by theirincreased conflictwith Germany and Austria.These factorswill of course change over time.(3) the state's degree of conflictand tension with the adversary (the greater the conflictand tension. A highdegree of conflict maybe accompanied bylow tension.

but the U. feltcompelled 9 Austria also had a strategicinterest in Germany's not being absorbed by Russia.120.S. but Germany was indiin preventingAustria rectlydependent because of her strategicinterest frombeing absorbed by Russia. dependentthan its partnerbut more indirectly stronger ally will be less directly of this kind is especiallypronounced in a bipolar world because of the wide Asymmetry of power between the superpowersand theirallies. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .Thus.entrapmentmay be a less worrisomepossibilitywith a vague agreement since the partnerscan assert that they are not committed.9 Asymmetriesin indirectdependence chieflyaffectthe partners'relstrategic ative fearsof abandonment. A vague or ambiguous agreement tends to maximize fears of abandonment. provided Russia had not previously conquered Austria.S. in the directsense.250. they may find it quite easy to dissociate themselvesfrom the ally in contingenciesnot mentioned because they in theultimatecontingency. but thisinterest was abstract-i. can be fairly of each other'sloyalty confident But when the agreement is ambiguous. however. with little damage to the alliance. the first interestin its partner may be offset abandonment than the second. the The general point is that the situationwas analogous to the Franco-Britishrelationship. they may find it necessary to stand by the ally in all situationsto prove their loyalty.. bound by a quite specificagreementlimited to the continattack.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 473 interestin defending England because England could defend herself of power disparitymay against direct attack by Germany. the U. is indirectly of its strategicinterest in containingSoviet power. non-operational-sinceGermanywas quite capable ofholding her own against Russia.125 on Thu. when one statehas a stronger will worry more about than vice versa. although this differential if the second state is more dependent in the directsense. dependent. is not similarly dependenton its allies because dependenton them.S. The effects be seen in the German-Austrianalliance of I879.e.were each able to withgencies of German or Austrian military hold support in several crises in the pre-I9I4 decade where only the partner's interestswere at stake. is that while states explicitlyallied may be entrapped over the partner'sintereststhat are covered in the agreement.tied onlylooselyto France and Russia. on the otherhand. an explicit one minimizes such worries. Because of her relative weakness. Austria was much more dependent in a directsense on German assistance against Russia than vice versa. France and Russia. in the alliance agreeis the degree of explicitness A thirddeterminant ment. Differencesin strategicinteresthelp to explain why the most powerful state in an alliance often has little leverage over its partners: when the stronger state's strategicinterestis well known.The flip side of this. Conversely. it cannot crediblythreatendefectionor realignment. This content downloaded from 86.Thus. however. England. Thus.but it does not eliminate them. Thus the European members disparity of NATO are highlydependenton the U.

The Frenchbythistimewere convinced thata war was virtually inevitable: it was desirablethatit in the Balkans. factors. When France had littleinterest Russian hercommitment toRussiain I9I2. will be affected behavior in the recent by one's own and others' rather thanbehavioral. Beforethe War: Studiesin Diplomacy (London: Longmans. forthe sucha contract willmakeit harder explicit contract. 2. chap.thereby fracas ensuring beginwitha Russian-Austrian forcurrent and disincentives strategy options Finally. bothrisks willbe aboutequally bothparties.io all confrontations lestthey to support them is onlya modifier of the theexplicitness factor At bottom. sheencouraged strengthened But herown dangerof beingentrapped. Green.125 on Thu." other's chestnuts but each will also fearthattheother in the For instance.beginningwith Morocco (I905) is still that Press.the incentives past. and interest Vagueness effects of the more basic dependence theireffects. butthisanxiety allyto fearabandonment. suchas thecosts they yieldonlygeneral and uncertain and about such other about theirlikelihood judgments about itemsas one's own or the ally'sloyalty Expectations reputation. and A fourth affecting boththe riskof abandonment determinant. maystandaside ifhisown interests intrinsic alliancebefore WorldWar I. out of thefire.iftheir into"pulling the each partner willworry aboutbeingtrapped different. obligation. Francehad little Franco-Russian withAustriain the Balkans. Vol. Conversely. Gooch. in at leaston issuesspecified less dependent ally to escapeentrapment. for willbe minimized and valuedwithaboutequal intensity.250.explicitness byitself willcausethemoredependent Thus. sincepresumably they (ceteris paribus) interests are quite readyto fight overthem. This content downloaded from 86. i938). P.while Russia interest in Russia'sconflicts in France's conflicts with Germany. is the degreeto whichthe allies' interests that the riskof entrapment. are fairly good indicators Although they ofabandonment or entrapment.asymmetrical dependence will be reducedbya formal. ofRussia's abandonment this wasmorethanoffset bythereduced danger of thealliancein a Franco-German war. thusincreasing aggressiveness. alliance on one's specific * The term"abandonment"is used here in the senseof reneging or de-alignment. ofthe Warof 1914 (London: Oxford University The Origins of Luigi Albertini. are threatened. commitment.120. --The best treatment of this series of crises.On theotherhand. I. If these interests are similar are in conflict withtheadversary are shared. are situational The determinants justdescribed of someitemsin thecalculus. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .not as realignment of the French between I9I2 and I9I4 and the strengthening On Franco-Russianrelations see G. Russian participation.474 WORLD POLITICS in nearly doubtherfidelity. however. theagreement. tendsto inhibit allows thesefactors fullplay. I952).

Thus.support him in specific confrontations with the opponent.250. and the behavioral record are the principal determinantsof the values and likelihoods that the parties impute to the various possible consequences of strategyoptions as listed in Table i. the ally's recentbehaviormay be in responseto one s own priorbehavior.and avoid conciliatingthe opponent. because of her strategicinterest in a continentalbalance of power and her derivativeinterestin preventinga German conquest of France or a German-French alliance.however.The pointis thatthecontinuing sequence of strategic choicesbyall actorsyieldsa streamof behavioralevidencewhich interacts with estimatesof the general situationalfactorswhen the parties assess the probable consequences of currentstrategy options.120. if it perceives the ally as less dependent."and so on. if the alliance commitmentis vague. Britain was not dependent on French aid in case of a direct German attack the navy could handle that.disparityof interestsin conflictwith the opponent.the state will fear abandonment more than entrapment. Behavioral evidence supplements the situational elements to yield more specificand confident expectations. and if the ally's recent behavior suggests doubtful loyalty. explicitnessof commitment. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . though imperfectly. by certain differences between Britishand French behaviortoward each otherand toward Germany from approximately I905 to 1909. Britainand France were generallyconcernedabout Russian defection throughout the pre-I9I4 decade because of their knowledge of Russia's ratherlow dependence on the Triple Entente mostlybecause her option of realigningwith Germany was open until late in theperiod. These propositionsmay be illustrated. eitherof which would make the British Isles vulnerable. The reverseconditions will tend to induce opposite strategies. They became more specifically and intensely concerned when Russia negotiateda settlement of certaindisputes with Germany in i910. Of course. She was indirectly dependent on the Entente. ifa statefeelshighlydependenton itsally.It will therefore tend to reassure the ally of its commitment.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 475 allies' future behavior and their probable expectationsof one's own behavior cannot be very preciselyarrived at from guesses about the others' "dependence. Thus. These values and likelihoods.directly or indirectly.are the proximatedeterminants of strategy choice itself." "interest. in turn.The vague language of the Entente Cordiale of I904 placed little constrainton French realignment. France was perceived as less dependent because she already had an alliance with Russia in addition to an apparent option of realignmentor rapprochement with Germany while England had no alliance alternatives. These factors direct and indirectdependence.125 on Thu.The British did This content downloaded from 86.

of course." in F.she exploitedBritish loyalty in orderto avoid abandonment. provoking Germany an insecurity spiral if she were not.she adopted a forconconciliation of Germany.476 WORLD POLITICS in a Franco-German war overspeworry somewhat aboutentrapment than their cificFrenchinterests.120.125 on Thu.ed. 1905-1911. These incentives produced British conover Moroccoin i909.12 12On relationsduring this period. the University This content downloaded from 86. ifshewereaggressively deter butitrisked inclined. W. 1977). France had some fearof entrapment in a war resulting from the Anglo-German naval race. ofreassurance The result of theseconsiderations was a policy toward This reducedthe riskof abanFranceand firmness towardGermany. chaps. Otherincentives policyof moderate ciliation camefrom theFranco-German adversary game. Sir Edward Grey. butchosefirmness with in the adversary game. I905Britain and France. Sweet. thanEngland not becauseshe would not need help in a war against much Englandcouldprovide Germany.the Foreign as a prudent Minister. in orderto get a firmer British commitanxieties aboutFrenchloyalty talksand an implicit ment principally in theform ofjointmilitary staff in case forceto theContinent British pledgeto send an expeditionary of war. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . on it she was less dependent Although France valued the Entente. A. entertained bothpossibilities. "Great Britain and Germany. British ForeignPolicy UnderSir Edward Grey(Cambridge. bothto forFrenchand Russianmilitary weaknessand to secure compensate in the Near and colonialbenefits commercial by deals withGermany an agreement withGermany East and Africa. Hamilton. it was also consistent worst-case strategy his alliancegame strategy of reassuring France. Therefore.the latter ofFrench knowledge leverage forrestraining Francein anycasebecause would of British The firm stancetowardGermany strategic interests. butbecauseshe did notbelieve thestrong British strategic perceived helpin a land war.Francecorrectly a Franco-German rein defending interest France and in preventing in the British She was also reassured byunqualified support alignment." I9II. "Great Anglo-French-German and D.:At Press.. at thecostof someincreased riskof entrapmentin case the donment of toward Germany in their confidence Frenchbecametoo intransigent cost was small: Britainhad little British support. see K.Powerful groups in Francewanteda rapprochement withGermany at thistime. further increased cernsabouta possible Frenchrealignment.250. France had littlereasonto doubt Moroccocrisisof I905. Hinsley. partlyfor this reason. the British of her own and feltlittleneed to reassure British loyalty Instead. H. which. but thisconcernwas less important anxieties aboutFrenchdefection. However. 5 and ii.

.since the spiral is an outcomeof both adversaries' choosing one of the options in the security dilemma. Britain stood firmlybehind France.The of choosingbetween two options. I spiral is sometimesreferred believe this is a mislabeling.125 on Thu. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . the two spirals are mutually reinforcing. produce an "insecurity spiral" i. theyfurther attemptto reduce the partner'sanxieties by standing firm against the opponent. The tighteningof the Entente set in motion an insecurity spiral in 3 What I call the insecurity to as the securitydilemma. The Entente had not initiallybeen intended as a quasi-alliance against Gerand as a hedge against involvemany. when they do.each of definingfeatureof any dilemma is the difficulty which will have more or less unsatisfactory consequences. alliance further solidifies.however.The spiral in the adversary integrativespiral interlockswith the insecurity Thus.120.. a spiral of power/security competition that feeds on each party's fears that the An analogous spiral other'sdefensivemoves are aggressively motivated.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 477 Thus."in which allies in the alliance security dilemma is an "integrative move progressively closer out of theirmutual fearof abandonment. in reaction.moves and so on.the first of to it and the German reaction The Anglo-French Entente I904 set in motion an alliance integrative adversary spiraland an interlocking insecurity spiral that continued until the outbreak of war in I9I4. not theproblemof choice itself.and the behavioral record combined to produce different strategiesby France and Britain in both the alliance and adversarygames. the result of the Germans' coercion was a self-confirmation of theirown hypothesis: the Entente was transformedinto a quasi-alliance against the newly revealed German threat. and his hostile response increases the allies' incentive to close ranks. This content downloaded from 86. the pendlence.&3 spiral.but only as a colonial settlement ment in the impendingwar betweenthe parties'respective allies Japan and Russia. played dilemma.and. ON SPIRALS In the adversarysecurity of firmness. closer to them. the adversary becomes more fearful and hostile. actual and perceived asymmetriesof direct and indirect dethe opponent. the opponent then feels threatenedand encircled. However. differences in particularinterests vis-at-vis vagueness and fragility of the Entente.250. "D" strategies between adversarieswho believe each other to be potentially aggressive but who really are not. feelingmore dependenton his own allies. But Germany did see it as a threatand challenged it in the Morocco crisisof I905 in an attemptto break it up by exposing British infidelity. reciprocal"C" strategiesout of fear that the partnermay defectif they do not show support.e. allies play game i.e.

The Agadir Crisis(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. and to increase between thetwo. chap. feelingmore dependenton France as evidenceof German hostility carefully mounted (especially via theAnglo-German navalcompetition) movestowardGermany that avoided. 5 the Bosnian crisisof i908-i909. and.250. thepoint Britain also supported Russiaduring although of offering of thecrisis was thusto conmilitary assistance. i6 Ima C. fearing increasingly dependent on Austria.or limited. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .120.i6 and a and extension of commitments between Franceand England. The Anglo-Russian agreement.478 WORLD POLITICS theadversary game. any accommodative and thus mightraise doubts in French minds about British loyalty possibly trigger a French realignment with Germany. I 2.125 on Thu. she forced Russiato back down. of I907 and These spirals continued withtheAnglo-Russian Entente earlier ofvarious colonial Anglo-French one.The Annexation of Bosnia (Cambridge: At the UniversityPress. of labor in which on a naval division was tightened by an agreement and the British fleet the Frenchfleetwas to guard the Mediterranean In return forthis was to guard the Atlantic coastsof bothcountries. she supported her ally completely an ultimatum. now assuredAustria Germany not to thecrisis. but forBritainit was also (unlikethe FrenchEntente)conto strengthen intended thebalanceof poweragainstGermany.During the Bosniancrisis.increased thecohesion of theotheralliance. I937). mallycalledformutualsupport against of fullsupport evenin an offensive war. of Ententehostility now seemedto be even Germany. Barlow.The latter. by issuing Austrian defection. Thus.'5 thelevelof tension The integrative on the Ententeside withBritish processcontinued supportof France duringthe second Morocco crisis(I9 II). to Austria. She also expandedthe to Austria. trianone. sciously and felt Germanyperceivedit as anotherstep in her encirclement. I 940). I963).was on itsfacea settlement conflicts. the hypothesis of the morestrongly confirmed by theBritish reserve and thespectacle partners moving closertogether. This content downloaded from 86. Whereastheallianceforscopeof heralliancecommitment Russiaonlyin a defensive war. BernadotteSchmitt. The End of Isolation(London: Nelson. firming in I9I2.chiefly between Germany and England.like the '4George Monger. The result to extendthescopeof theGerman-Aussolidatebothalliancesystems. The French-British connection and between Franceand Russia. Germany stepped up hership-building and drewcloser in one alliance.theincreased solidarity interacting withan insecurity spiralin the adversary game.'4 Shealsoincreased For hercommitment to Francebyinitiating military staff conversations.

In other words.. This was the German commitment to Austria after analogous to the extension-of I8 the Bosnian crisis. and Germany managed to fashion a detente based on collaborative restraint of theirallies. composite securitydilemma in which the alliance and adversarycomponents are closely linked. implicitly case of a German (or German-Austrian)attack on Russia (as per the termsof the treaty)but also in case Russia was forcedto attack Austria because of an Austrian militaryinitiative in the Balkans. She dealt with the problem by extendingthe promisingaid not just in scope of her commitmentto Russia. ing stateshave a good deal to gain by cooperating-in keeping the peace and avoiding entrapment-but theyare also motivatedagainstcooperation by the desire to avoid alienating their allies. is that the "balance of dependence" from England. i969).ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 479 arrangement.120. France enjoyed more bargainingpower over England than over Russia. France successfully demanded an exchange of notes that strengthened the Britishdiplomatic commitment. The best outcome (Cambridge: Harvard Uni'7Samuel R. i i and I 2. The explanation for the difference betweenFrance and Russia favoredRussia. THE RESTRAINING THE BALKAN ALLIES WARS DILEMMA: INTERLUDE When members of opposite alliances become involved in a crisis theirallies may find themselvesin a special formof the confrontation. France became worried that Russia mightbe induced to remain neutral in a Franco-German war. Williamson. x8 It is interesting that France tightenedher alliance with Russia by increasingher own but strengthened her Britishconnectionby extracting commitment a firmer commitment. she had demonstratedsome independence by failingto supportFrance during the I9II Morocco crisis and by settlingsome minor conflicts with Germany in the Near East.The Politicsof Grand Strategy negotiations.whereasbetweenFrance and England. it favored France. but whether to support the ally or to collaborate with the noninvolved state on the opposite side in restrainingboth As in the classic prisoner'sdilemma. The dilemma is not just whetherto support or restrainthe ally.125 on Thu. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . The integrative/insecurity spiral was partially-but only temporarwhen England ily interruptedduring the Balkan Wars (1912-I9I3).Jr.see versity Press. This content downloaded from 86.Moreover.'7 The bolstering of theFrench-Russianalliance occurredmainlybecause of France's increasinganxietyabout possible Russian defection.Russian dependence on France was declining because of Russia's steadily increasing militarystrength. the opposite restrainprotagonists.250. providesan excellentaccount of these French-British chaps.

mutualentrap"DD" outcome ment.the payofffor collaborationwith England was illusorilymagnifiedby the vain hope that it would lead to an Anglo-German neutrality pact.125 on Thu. supported opposite sides among the Balkan states who firststripped Turkey of most of her European territory and then foughtanother war among themselves over thedivisionof the spoils. The collaborationworked initially. and Russia and France were less likely to realign if theybegan to doubt Britishloyalty. England and Germany both played "C" in the adversarygame and "D" in the alliance game.Apparently. The BalkanWars of I9I2-I9I3 engaged Britainand Germany in this This content downloaded from 86. its success generatedforcesthatmade its repetitionunlikely.250. Russia and Austria respectively. the Britishbalance of incentiveshad shiftedsomewhat fromdeterrenceto conciliation. but if bothpartiespursuethisstrategy (perhaps is thetypical thattheother is doublecrossing) theresult out of suspicion of theprisoner's dilemma in thiscase. Germany to restrainAustria. This cooperative achievement. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .and in the alliance game her balance of worries had shifted from fears of abandonmentto fearsof entrapment. she was now more willing than before to take a chance on Russian defectionbecause her had declined. risking the loss of their allies in order to avoid entrapment in a conflict over issues in which neitherhad much intrinsic interest. the two peacemakers did restrain their allies and enforced compromise settlements.however. being approached. by virtueof a substantialincreasein Russian military strengthand the growing solidarityof the Russian-Frenchalliance.the integrative/insecurity spiral of the preceding years had been stopped. Acting througha conferenceof all the great powers. A British commitmentwas thereforeless necessary to deter the central powers.120.In the adversarygame. The Britishpayoff in collaborating with Germany was furtherincreased by Sir Edward Grey's desire to dampen the insecurityspiral by easing German fears of encirclement. one's own ally while the admay be obtainedby secretly supporting versary restrains his. This hope outweighed the risk of alienating Austria. which Germany had been seeking for years.based on her strategicinterest a continental such an equilibriumwas at least equilibrium.480 WORLD POLITICS sortof dilemma. England's dependence on the Russian and French ententes in dependence had always been indirect.In I9I2-I9I3. Their allies. As forEngland.England and Germanyreached an informal agreement:England was to restrain Russia fromintervening. a risk thatwas low because the government in Vienna was itself divided about riskinga confrontation with Russia. ironically. Formally.For Germany. was due to a special combinationof factors and.

and France repeatedly avowed her unflinching loyalty.120. the initiation of Anglo-Russian naval conversations.since she had resolvedit on the side of definite supportof her ally and firmness toward her opponents. Sir Edward Grey's dilemma was as severe as ever: his incentivesfor eitheroption in both the alliance and adversary games were about evenlybalanced. This content downloaded from 86. Germany's feelingthatwar was inevitableled to the thoughtthat it had betterbe now than later. Her incentiveto cooperate with England had declined with the evaporation of the dream of a neutralitypact.The same was trueof France and Russia: Russia.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 481 and by the desireto gain more leverageover Russia in the persistent cost in restraining squabbleswith her over Persia. Finally.I979). although German leaders continued to believe that England might well stand aside in a war in which Russia could be made to appear the aggressor. In England. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ." strictly Germany was no longerin a security speaking. I938).The growthof Russian military power. Prior Publishers. thiswas largely the resultof the apparent equilibriumof power on the continent. which lessened Britain's need to stand by her allies.250.Crampton. combined with Austria's reproaches for her weak support during the Balkan Wars. This. of Britain'sallies were at Thus Grey's worries about the intransigence 19The classic studyof the Balkan Wars is E. C. they were less likely to defect out of fear of British defection. like Austria.By Julyof I9I4.'9 THE SIR STRADDLE GREY STRATEGY: IN JULY I9I4 EDWARD The Anglo-German cooperation of the Balkan Wars did not carry over into the crisis of JulyI9I4.In the adversarygame. chieflybecause Germany's balance of incentiveshad changed sharplyby then. In the alliance game. when Russia would be even stronger. however.The Diplomacyof theBalkan emPress. For a more recentinterpretation Wars (Cambridge: Harvard University TheHollow Detente(London: George see R. If they could hold their own against the central powers. increased German fears of Austrian defection: Austria must not be restrained again. "dilemma.Britain's Russiawas minimized by thefactthattheRussiangovernment was as war as the Austrian dividedand vacillating about risking government was. J. Grey hoped to keep alive the detentewith Germanythathad been nourishedby theamicable settlement of certaincolonial disputesin the springand summerof I9I4. Helmreich.125 on Thu. was determinednot to back down again.and the increasingtensionbetween the continentalalliances had increased Germany's sense of dependence on Austria. phasizingAnglo-Germanrelations.

thata straddle in the composite security strategy dilemma cannot work. But England was the only major power that still had both polar options available.he had declared his firmsupportof Russia and France and warned Germany unequivocally. German decision making-indicates that these constraints This content downloaded from 86. 514). In the overall straddle.or if he had clearly declared to France and Russia that Britain would not fight. This strategy failed because France-Russia and Austria-Germany. is that he could have. and he was as eager to avoidprovoking Germany as todeter her. Germany and France because of theirhigh dependence upon and firmcommitments to their Historiansare divided as to whetherGreycould have avertedthe war by takinga clear stance one way or the other.J. He issueda fewmild warnings to Austriaand Germany. He gave vague reassurances to France and Russia. Grey got the worst. thatthecontinental powers were firmlylocked into a collision course: Austria and Russia via theirdeep conflictof interestin the Balkans. These circumstances were.250. to Germany that England could not remain neutral-although it came too late to affect were not absolute.the war This is not to argue that Grey's ambiguity might have been averted. she gave up a chance to preventthe war. Eckstein. 10. Vol.The latter effort failed becauseGreydid notappreciate theextent towhich German payoffs had changed sinceI9I2-I9I3. I954).P. 525.125 on Thu. however. Greytherefore adopted a straddle a mixed "C-D" strategy in boththe allianceand the adversary games. in failingto exerciseeitherone.482 WORLD POLITICS least as strong as his fearsof theirdesertion.Special circumstances in I9I4 made it virtually inevitablethatthe continental powers would interpret British intentions wishfully.The twohorns ofthedilemma appeared aboutequally attractive (orunattractive). drew oppositeconclusionsfromit. all thinkingwishfully. The Strugglefor University Press. i 8. thatone must firmly grasp one horn or the other. it was Grey's hope that Russia would be restrained without being alienated while Germany would be deterredwithoutbeing provoked. but concentratedon reviving the joint Anglo-German mediation of the Balkan Wars. see A.Albertini'sopinion (fn.20 was a centralcause of the outbreak of World War I. see Michael J. I 2). 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . in strivingfor the best of all worlds. France and Russia counted on Britishsupport while Germany and Austria expected Britishneutrality until the very last moment. "Great Britain and the Triple Entente on the Eve of the Sarajevo Crisis. chap. Germany agreed to collaborate in joint restraint of Austria and Russia. If. For a discussionof Grey's dilemma. Mastery in Europe (London: Oxford For a contrary view. II. Taylor.first. but defected by goading Austria on. Thus.rejectingtheirpleas foran unambiguous declaration of armed support." in Hinsley (fn. early in the crisis.120.2' We should not conclude fromthissinglecase. considerations constrained by domesticand constitutional from 21It is true thatGrey felt The factthateventuallyhe did issue a clear warning issuing an unequivocal commitment.

Anotheraspect could assume thattheywill be interpreted is the necessaryambiguityof one's messages. and doing so without unduly antagonizing eitherparty. ofone's own intentions.and the opponent to think one probablywill.250. than outcome outcome.125 on Thu.ratherthan wishful(and opposite) ones. froma mistakenprediction (and defeat)resulting of both non-supportof the A mixed past record containing instances ally and strongresistanceto the opponent would also be helpful.g. Second.One 22These remarkscan no more than suggestthe complexity to optimize among four objectives: restrain is that one is trying aspect of this complexity the ally. were unwilling to gamble with the uncertainty both sides on the Continent had grounds for optimisticexpectations with her. about England. Grey would have had to choose one of his extreme options. or supporting conciliating to be misread. The ambiguityof a straddleis mostlikelyto be interpreted cautiously in circumstancesmore or less opposite to those of 1914: the conflictof interestbetween ally and adversaryis relativelymild. those conditions whenthebackground approach This content downloaded from 86. With different Success means instillingcautious (and.are less likely the adversary.or of acceptinga comprowould be low compared to the expected cost of a war mise settlement. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Such conditionswere approximatedin relationsbetween Russia.and Germany in the i870s and i88os. and one's own military power is expected to determinethe outcome of a war.The possibleporosity interpreted with limitsthe extentto which signals sent to the ally and adversarycan be inconsistent and messagesto the opponent each other-e. opposite) expectationsin the ally and the adversary. but theyrisk alienatingthe ally or these latter a mixed theopponent's strategy promrisks. especially isesa better in I9I4.22 option successfully THE ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA IN A BIPOLAR SYSTEM The alliance securitydilemma is sharplytruncatedin today's bipolar system because one of the central "bads" that of abandonment is of the straddleproblem. Third.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 483 spiral within and between the contiallies. The integrative/insecurity so tightly wound by the summer of I9I4 nental alliances had become that. Justwhat to estimate.but avoid alienatinghim.120.even if one mixtureof communicationsis likely to optimize will be difficult as desired by both other parties. Austria. Byminimizing hostility.and eitherone may well keep the peace.. they are not firmlycommitted against each other. when Bismarck played the straddle on several occasions. which makes it unlikelythat they will be channels of diplomaticcommunication exactlyas desired. hence. backgroundconditions. generated by recentinteractions a straddlemightbe successful. strategies the ally while warningthe opponent. increasing a worse butalso risks either ofthepureones.in order to have any chance of reversingit. Then the other parties' costs of being restrainedor deterred. signalsto the ally thatlean toward restraint of restraining the ally while The "pure" and consistent thatemphasize firmness.One wants the ally to think one probably will not fight. deterthe opponentbut avoid provokinghim. British power was not considered so decisive for the outcome of a war that the other states of its being used.

Although some of my theoreticalstatements in Europe in general. perpowers the risk of abandonment and the risk of entrapment-reducing one tendsto increase theother-the dilemmais weak in a bipolaralliance. involvement of theWestGerman in The smaller alliesmustworry armyin an East Germanrevolution. trapment. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and their in Europe by alliescould be pulledunwillingly intoa conflict one partner's initiative forinstance. as my examplesclearlyindicate. however. hence theirde-alignment is irrational.alignmentwith the of structural compulsion. boththesuperpowers Entrapment Conceivably. is possible.even though there has been some movementtoward multipolarity. The superpower ally may defect may exerteconomic or simply withhold from pressure support theally'sadventures (as the 23 Jbelieve the presentsystem should stillbe classifiedas bipolar. would be dictatedby theirsecurity interests.The European allies theoretically could shift sidesifleftto their own devices. becauseonlyone of theserisksis significantly That risk.S. The West Europeanstates have no motive to realign. since theirprotector will defendthemno matter whatpolitical posture they assume.125 on Thu. will be limited. not beqause out of culturaland ideologicalaffinities (and disaffinities did not exist.However.250. the suand becausethe allies' capacity is muchsmaller thanvice versa.120.484 WORLD POLITICS At leastthatis so fortheEuropeancentral arenaof the highly unlikely.which cannot be explored here. even if theseaffinities U. havea muchgreater fortaking initiatives superpowers capacity (notably to restrain nuclearinitiatives). they are much more relevantto in this section apply to bipolarity NATO than to the Warsaw Pact.without concern thatthe in consequence. totheir security and theUnitedStates is their natural protector. entrapment seriousconcernforthe lesserallies thanforthe superpowers because because the theyshare only a portionof the latter's global interests. simply becausethere powerfulenough to providea motive.Bipolar alliances outside Europe have somewhatdifferent dynamics.and about nuclear conflict originating in Europe in the nuclearwarfare entrapment (a superpower initiating In general. 24 Some mightargue that the West European countries are allied with the United States withthe Soviet Union). to defendtheir powersare solidlycommitted by theirown interests with each allies. bydissociation or by variousmeans of restraining the ally.enpresent. However. Since the alliance dilemma is mostlya functionof tensionbetween This content downloaded from 86. Realignment other is no other state is logically impossible. is a more be confined hope thatit might there). additionabout extraregional intoEurope of entrapment (the spillover a superpower in otherareas).23 The superto whichthefollowing discussion system.thesuperpowers ifnechavepowerful incentives to prevent their realignment byforce essary as the Sovietshave demonstrated. sincetheSovietUnionis theprincipal threat Finally. from can be dealtwithsimply theally'spolicy.24 simplede-alignment by the smallerstatesis ultimately illusory.

Indeed. The weaker allies may also fail to support.In so doing. That dilemma can be dealt with by each with littleconcernforalliance partneraccording to its own preferences.theyare inhibitedfromconciliatingthe adversary forfear the ally will take it as a prelude to realignment. dilemmas are roughly co-equal. they do not risk losing the superpower's protection.120. not because they fear the partnermight otherwise leave the fold. theymay also be able to exercisesome restraining by appealing to consensusnormsor by exploitingthe superpower'sneed for collective legitimization. Theory argument. This content downloaded from 86. in a bipolar degree of policy solidarityand the stability alliance that link is tenuous at best. they may even pursue contradictory policies. the superpower's actions (as the Europeans did during the Yom Kippur War and on the recent gas leverage pipeline issue).250. esp.125 on Thu.it is chiefly because the allies share each other's interests and perceptionsin the adversarygame. But they need have little fear that their own association is therebyendangered. In particular. structure theyare unstable and vulnerable to policy disagreement.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 485 United States did during the Suez crisisof I956). and. When support is provided against the adversary. but are formedby choice among severaloptions." The superpowersand theirallies may disagreeabout policy toward the adversary. I979). "side effects. in a multipolarsystemwhere the alliance and adversary By contrast.the allies are free to disagree.25 25 For a similar Politics(Reading. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . The alliance is stable because it is essentiallya product of the structureof the system and of the common security and those interests interests So long as thatstructure generated thereby. as in NATO at present. or even hinder. This essay has been considerably Waltz's impressivework. Finally. allies are much more constrained in their play of the adversary game by the possible consequences to the alliance. the adverBecause of the weakness of the alliance security sary dilemma dominates. neitherthe greaternor the smaller allies are inhibitedfromconciliating the adversaryby the worry-typical of multipolaralliances-that such conciliationmight precipitatethe ally's realignment. Waltz. persist. dilemma. ofInternational see KennethN.: Addison Wesley. it is largelybecause the alliance itselfis fundamentally stable that such policy divergencesmay develop and persist.Since multipolar alignmentsare not determinedby the of the system. i69-70. influencedby Mass.Neither the superpower nor its protegesneed accept increased feel any compulsion to supporteach other (and thereby risksof entrapment) solelyto insureagainst the alliance's collapse. In a mulitpolaralliance there is a close link between the of the alliance. and will realign preemptively.Worries about of policy toward alliance disintegrationthus tend to induce similarity the opponent.

At the political level.125 on Thu. Logically. and is not inconsistent with a continued intentionto defend allies against actual attack.250.S. some influenceby the adversary. Although it is possible that some European NATO members might driftin these directionsout of fear of being abandoned by the United States or. the alliance holds-whatever postures the smaller states may strike. both are illusions.Condominium means a high degree of collaboration by the superpowers to maintain order in the system. however. like any bipolar alliance. Within these extremes-that is. of course. retainedits intention to defend them. If West Germany. Finlandization or neutralizationare also just barely conceivable. as long as the guarantee holds. In an ultimate sense.and subordination of their competitiveinterestsand the interests of theirallies to thisgoal. However. by either the superpowers or theirproteges. Thus. much as fearsof realignmentin the multipolarworld are quite disproportionate to the real possibilities-states are notoriously paranoid -but. the allies might still have reason to worry about not being supported over less-than-ultimate issues. and the Western alliance would be entailed. such stanceswould amount only to "pseudo-abandonment" so long as the U. may generatefearsthatfurther moves thatwould weaken alliance obligations are impending. of being entrappedin a conflict betweenthe superpowers. the most extreme conceivable approaches to abandonment are "condominium" for the superpowers and "finlandization" or "neutralization"forthe lesser states. conversely. NATO.This does not mean. the fears exceed what is likely to happen. even if the alliance per se remained intact. Differenttypes can be discerned at the political and militarylevels. Typically.condominiumis more akin to multipolar"concert"than to realignment.S.Specific moves toward detente. is essentiallya guarantee of the lesser states by the superpower. in the truncated This content downloaded from 86. were to come under significant Soviet influence. each involvingsome degree of cooperative benefitsand some dependence on the adversary for continuance of the benefits. it is not entirely absent.486 WORLD POLITICS Although the alliance securitydilemma is weak in a bipolar system. within the realm of the possibleare various degrees of "detente"with the adversary.120. it is the subjective fears ratherthan the objective possibilitiesthat influencetheirbehavior.and about losing whateverpoliticalinfluence theycurrently enjoy as a consequence of superpower rivalry.thatthe degree of West European accommodation with the Soviets is unimportant. and hence. importantcosts forthe U. There are partialsurrogates forabandonment various degrees of movementaway fromtheally or toward the opponent that give rise to truncatedformsof the dilemma. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .say.

retreatto the American "fortress. thus moderatingthe overall alliance stance and reducing the risk of provoking the Soviets. belligerence." The alliance dilemma forthe U. This would cause themto multiply withtheU.the West Europeans tend to oscillate between fearsof collusion and fearsof collision betweentheUnited Statesand theSoviet Union.S.S. haps (3) to offset U.26 Their motivesforthisresponse to superpower collusion presumablyare (i) to hedge against a possible weakening of the American will to protecttheirinterests. (2) to preserve some bargainingpower vis-a-visthe United States. the overall problem is one of optimizing between two optimums. forthe United States. An obvious militarysurrogatefor abandonment would be a partial U. the problem Thus. becametooimpetuous theEuropeannations wouldgrowfearful .their incentivesto conciliate the Soviet Union may be (i) to restrainU. commitmentto Europe.S.or its possibility. When theyfear collision (entrapment).S.thealliance dilemma presents of findingthe optimum blend of firmness and accommodation toward the Soviets-that which generates the least incentivefor the allies to "neutralize" or "finlandize.. will have its independent preferencesin the adversary game.S.R.125 on Thu.S. it would certainly stimulateever-lurking European worries about a U. This content downloaded from 86.or (3) simplyto share in the benefits of betterrelationswith the Soviet Union..) Although this would not seriouslyimpair the U.250.S. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . rathera balancing between two kinds of incentivesfor partial "abandonment" by the smaller states.Unlike themultipolarversion.S.S. (A completewithdrawal is hardly conceivable. troop withdrawal fromEurope.it does not involve a trade-off but between risksof abandonmentand risksof entrapment. remained But paradoxically.As Henry Kissingerhas noted. is functionally equivalent to potentialdefectionor realignmentas a source of abandonment anxiety.simply the reduction of tension between adversaries. 26 Kissinger." Since the U.120. Henry Kissingerstatedtheproblemclearlywhen he warned President Nixon in I973: We had to remainsoberin our dealingswiththe SovietUnion.S. intransigence. at the politicallevel is a by-product of the adversarydilemma-of the choice between conciliatingor confronting the adversary. 382. own arrangements to protect their themselves. and theirresponse to bothfearsis to conciliatethe Soviets. bymaking in the the same would happenif the U. (2) to insulate theirown good and perrelationswith the Soviets fromthe superpowerconfrontation. which might point to a different optimum stance in that game. own initiatives their Sovietdeal.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 487 alliance game of bipolarity.Brown.The White House Years(Boston: Little. 1979). If we ofa U.S.

": This uneasinessabout the drift of Brandt'spolicieswas sharedby his principal partners in the Western alliance.S. Nixon and Kissinger worried in the early seventiesthat the West German Ostpolitik might go too far. I977). In thissense. Kissinger reportsthat he dreaded the moment "when no German chancellorcan affordthe hostility of the Soviet Union .27 This strategyis appropriate when a superpower is most concerned about the effects of its own strategy upon that of the allies. When the concern is that the ally is "defecting"on its own initiative. I980).Yearsof Upheaval(Boston: Little. the European states felt impelled to deepen their own thatWashington's comdetentein order to hedge against the possibility mitment to its allies was weakening.. 229.Mass.the bogeyof "condominium" was raised in Europe.. the most importantmotives for detente on both sides of the Atlanticwere autonomous ones stemmingfromthe adversarygame. this stimulated them to move ahead with theirown negotiations lest Germany be left alone in the Soviet embrace. farbeyond Ostpolitik to Moscowand overtimeheightened mutualsuspicion amongtheallies. and the reduced cohesion of NATO was more the resultof the reduced Soviet threat than of mutual fears of defectionamong the allies. To forestall [independent betweenEast and West].or perhapsoutflank Germanmaneuvering it. each of Brandt's Gercolleagues-including Nixon-sought to pre-empt an activedetentepolicyof its own.-Soviet detente negotiationswere well underway.125 on Thu. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .250.S. . The U. I976). which seemed to imply jointSoviet-U. Kissinger. In that caseEuropeanleaders wouldbe tempted to appearbefore their publics as "mediators" between bellicose superpowers. or Europe-despite Kissinger's warning. 27 28 This content downloaded from 86. Die Jahreig60-i975 (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe.For example.S.Brown. Nor did fearsof the partners'defectionseriouslyinhibitthe detente policies of either the U. however. managementof crisesand disputesbetweenotherstates.. Americaand Western Europe: Problems and Prospects (Lexington. sufsufficiently strong flexible to prevent ficiently our alliesfromracingto Moscow. . cited in Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz. 382.120.488 WORLD POLITICS trenches oftheCold War.29 However. Willy Brandt noted that one of his motives for Ostpolitik was his belief that only a part of U. There is no bipolar parallel to the integrative spiral that occurred in Ibid.S. forces would still be in Europe at the end of the seventies. manyby conducting It contributed to a race had effects thoseintended.S.28 When the U. a betterstrategy mightbe to preempt.. 29 Willy Brandt.: Lexington Books. I45-46.notablyaftertheagreement on Prevention of Nuclear War in I973. At that point.Begegnungen und Einsichten. 348. had to conducta careful policytowards theSovietUnion: to maintain the interest in the commondefense.

tendenciesthat at the same time generate and are reinforced by an insecurityspiral between adversaries.S.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 489 the pre-I9I4 alliances. nuclear policies. tendenciesto make detentea hostageto Soviet behaviorin the third world. and the Soviet Union do not have a similar problem. The United States perceivesitselfas increasing its support for its allies by building up its capabilityfordeterrenceand defense.This is not to say that it is easy to escape fromor weaken insecurity easierbecause theattempt involves spiralsin a bipolarsystem-it is merely significant risks in the adversarygame only. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . The United States prefers the Europeans generallya moderate "C" toughnessand confrontation. Each side of the alliance prefersa different strategytoward the Soviet Union. he realized that the steadytightening of the Entente was provokingher.theyalso resist U. In a bipolar alliance such as NATO.S. Some of the reasons forthis divergenceare extraneousto the present 3 Conversely.S.S.it ought to be easier for the bipolar superpowers than for multipolar adversariesto dampen or avoid insecurity spirals by conciliatingeach other. but mostly skeptical about U.The U.and thereis hence no integrative spiral. They resist U.120. in Europe as well as in peripheral areas where it perceives European interests to be at least as great as its own. The Europeans are divided. An insecurity in the adversarygame.30 THE CURRENT NATO CRISIS AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA The presentconflict between the United Statesand itsEuropean allies is chiefly a disagreementabout how to deal with the adversarysecurity dilemma. but he could do littleabout it because he fearedabandonmentby Russia and France if he tried. theirfavored strategies in the adversarygame. there is little scope or incentiveto strengthen by acts of policy. Such a spiral may occur in a multipolar system are always somewhat in doubt. though more or less incidental to.and theyobstruct Washington'sattempts to apply economic sanctions against the Soviets.125 on Thu.In the pre-I9I4 decade. Sir Edward GreyempathizedwithGermany'sinsecurities and fearsof encirclement. the basic alliance commitmentis not in doubt since it is it structurally ordained. Their strategiesin the alliance game are consistentwith. pressuresto increase theirown conventionalforces. strategyof conciliation.250.but these processesare not additionallydriven by fearsof desertionby allies. since their conciliationis so much less constrainedby alliance concerns. and each either advocates or independentlypursues of a "D" strategy its own preferred strategy. and NATO's spiral may develop independently policy cohesion may increase in response to common perceptionsof a risingexternalthreat. hencebecause alliance commitments especially during periods of rising tension-there are tendencies to and expand commitmentsin order to guard against abanstrengthen donment. This content downloaded from 86.

dilemma. changedin theopposite ViewingSovietbehavior 3 The terms to theapparently dominant "European" and "American"are intendedto refer views among European and Americanelites. See.125 on Thu. valuations European perceptions of a declining credibility (3) oftheU. thecenterpiece prospects dilemma have Americanperceptions and values in the adversary and detente direction.S. in the security as well as theeconomic and a declining faith in America's leadfields). deterrent inlight oftheSoviet Union'sachievement ofnuclear ofSovietaggressive and (4) a shift adventures to thethird parity.The European becausethey states see no "resolve costsin conciliation reputation" perbecausetheSoceiveSovietintentions as essentially defensive.120.thereis a wide spectrumof opinion on both sides of the Atlantic.S. (2) different ofdetente. mayprovide a further explanation. Also.Germany's Aimsin theFirstWorldWar (New York: W. itself. W. dermine forarmscontrol. 32 The I9I4 analogyis poorly peculiarto a multipolar taken."For theEuropeans. of the which has precipitated a conflict betweenthe global interests of theEuropeanallies. spiral excessive firmness has increased. i967). Ndrton. too tough a stance might un- of detente. for example. The reasons fallintofour somewhat overlapping categories: (i) divergent images of the motivesand intentions of the adversary.490 WORLD POLITICS theme-notably. havealso changed witha netincrease the deterrent value of firmness has declinedbecause of theirpacific whilethedangerofprovoking an insecurity imageof theSoviets.sincethatspiralfedon factors among allies.31 changed sharply of course. Fritz Fischer.the rise in Europe's economicstrength (which has generated a new spirit of assertiveness againsttheU. produce a "war that nobody wanted.Obviously. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . through Europe is disposedto invoke the "I9I4 analogy":the greatest dangerarisesnot fromthe powerful thedynamics ofconflict whichmight butfrom adversary. seventies. A roughassessment of the weightsthatthe parties ershipcapacities."32Finally. world.250. recenthistoriography system-notably high and equal interdependence has suggestedthat World War I was a war that"somebody" (Germany) did want. UnitedStatesand themorelimited perspectives haveaffected boththealliance and theadversary These changes dilemma butmostly thelatter. This content downloaded from 86. detente have substanthepolitical and economic gainsfrom to conciliate tiallyincreasedthe incentive the Soviets.supported bythebenefits detente. to the"goods"and "bads" ofthecomposite and attach security dilemma of whytheseweights have changed. and value loadingson theadversary dilemmahave The perceptions forEuropesincetheearly Mostimportantly. possibly in Europe formorethan two decades. vietshave not been aggressive from This imagemaybe partly a wishful one. toward theSovietUnion The "goods"and "bads" ofa toughstrategy forthe"bads.

S. over-reaction toSoviet advances Talk byU.S.125 on Thu.120.) The alliance dilemmaforthe European allies is how to escape or ofentrapment someform minimize theserisks without seriously risking of partialU. (Europeanconcern about "nuclearentrapment" specialcase whichwill be discussed below.S. any as weakness.thefearprobably area as it is thattensions actualwar begunin someperipheral generated detentein Europe. potential has beensubstituted forthe former of inducing strategy Sovietaccommodation by weaving theU.R. of troopwithThe lattermightconsist ofEuropeandefense in American of thepriority drawals. economic side. in such areas mightbecomegeneraland destroy of the Soviet hold on the East Anothercost would be a tightening Europeancountries. while the riskof stimulating Sovietinsecurity and a if not ignored. In thealliancegame.a strategy of economic to weaken deprivation.S.or a further unilateralism. endingthe dreamof at leasta partialintegration is a of all of Europe. dilemmadiscussedearlier. deterrence are valued morehighly. intoa web of economic interdependence. and virtually wroteit offafterthe invasionof Afghanistan. plannersof "horizontal is notso muchone of beingpulledintoan However.250. THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION I have chosento treat theissueof nuclearstrategy separately because it poses the risksof abandonment and entrapment (and consequently thealliancedilemma itself) in different forms.A more specific concernis thatof extraregional entrapconflict causedbyan American ment-being caught up in a superpower in thethird world.nuclear aban- This content downloaded from 86. conciliation and firmness Accordingly. designed theSovietUnion'smilitary and economy.S.theEuropeansworry aboutentrapprincipally ment.S. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Althoughthe European alliancedilemmais somewhat it is stillnot severe sharperthan the U.They fearthatexcessive U. military escalation"has no doubt fueledthis anxiety. abandonment.On the spiralof risingtensionhas been downgraded. The Reagan Administration perceives theSovietUnionas an inherently aggressive statethat and will interpret will seize every opportunity to expandby force. Simply put. bellicosity mightset offa severe insecurity spiralwiththeSovietUnion. becauseany such partialabandonment by theUnitedStateswould fall of totalwithdrawal or itsnuclear well short of thelatter's commitment deterrent.whichcould explodeintocrisis or violence. downgrading driftto favorof otherareas such as the PersianGulf. the UnitedStatesbegan to devaluedetente in'thelateseventies after Soviet advances in thethird world.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 491 froma global perspective.

and greater degree."over Europe's head". 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . to Europe nuclear abandonmentmeans eithera withdrawalof Nuclear the U.the latterdefinedas war-fighting.S. nuclear deterrentor an evaporation of its credibility.250. thereis a trade-off ment and entrapment.especiallyin a way thatmakes Europe the principalbattleground.S. strategicnuclear forcesare no longer effective in deterringthe Soviets. entrapmentmeans the actual use of nuclear weapons in case deterrence fails. Europe than a strategy at least some possibilityof a nuclear war being conducted intercontinentally. fighting a nuclear war "rationally.125 on Thu. to initiatenuclear war too casually in the event of conventionalattack or to take excessive risks in a crisis. nuclear abandonment as theyare worries that U.S. of devastation in which seems to hold out of assured destruction. Nuclear war-fighting vored by the United States are resisted for at least three reasons: (i) they imply a greater likelihood. As on the political between the risks of abandonside of the dilemma. at the risk of greater destructionin Europe if some dedeterrencefails. more precisely.and it is the issue about which Europe is most amthe dilemma is whetherto supportAmerbivalentor divided. deterrencedrops below the level required to deter the Soviets.including intermediate ican efforts nuclear forces (INF). Thus.The nuclear dilemma links up to the broader securitydilemma throughthe risk of alienating the United States if its This content downloaded from 86.S.but no retaliationat all if the threat is faand limited nuclear war strategies ineffective.S.492 WORLD POLITICS donment means the loss of U. The nuclear issue presentsthe alliance dilemma to the Europeans in its severestform.Of course.120. that the credibility defense of Western Europe. to strengthen extended deterrence. (2) they might encourage the U. probably (if deterrenceover war-fighting of pure nuclear bluff:deterrenceby a secretly)would prefera strategy threat of massive retaliation. Europe has had reason to worry about this since the Soviet Union achieved a or earlysixties:therecentadvent second-strike capabilityin thelate fifties of full parityapparentlyoperates as a kind of perceptualthresholdthat has greatlyheightenedEuropean anxiety.S. Some. and (3) they are provocative to the Soviet Union. American proposals for a policy of no firstuse do raise fearsof deliberatenuclear abandonment."Europeans have always favoredpure postures. By itself. the tension between nuclear abandonment and entrapmentis virtuallyequivalent to the familiartension between deterrenceand deor a capabilityand doctrinefor fense. or to resistthese efforts. if not most.European concerns about such "decoupling" are not so much fears of actual U. Thus. both politicallyand militarily. will to use its strategicweapons in of U. therebysacrificing terrencein the hope of limitingdamage to Europe.

could at least hope the Soviets would limit theircounter-retaliation to Europe.at thiswriting. This is not the place to rehearse all the arguments. (Indeed.But both of these deterrent arguments lead straightto the point made by the European Left that INF means greaterdamage to Europe in case deterrencefails. European governments have tentatively resolvedthe nuclear dilemma by a contingentacceptance of INF. deterrent strategic to Europe and to balance offtheSoviet SS-20. since the U.33 Probably INF would shore up deterrence marginally. They tacitly.The package is roundedout bypoliticalassurances to the Soviets-or "reinsurance. strategicarsenal. intended both to recouple the U.S. Art in "Fixing AtlanticBridges. the Soviets probablywould perceive a greaterlikelihood of U.125 on Thu.and the first argument supports the view that it makes the United States more 33 A similarpoint is made by RobertJ. retaliationagainst their homeland with nuclear weapons based in Europe than with intercontinental ones. It is of interestfor our presenttheme in that it presentsEurope's nuclear alliance dilemma in quintessentialform:it is seen simultaneously (or by different groups) as insurance against American nuclear abandonment and as a source of European nuclear entrapment. war-fighting doctrine. In contemplatinga conventionalattack.) Alternatively.theyhope.perhaps the U. if reluctantly. have broken down and deploymentis underway. Moscow would have a strongincentiveto so limit it to act as if the physicallocation of the weapons rather than the nationalityof the triggerfingerdictated the offthe whole directionof theirresponse in the hope of avoiding setting U.paradoxes. and of damaging the Europe-Soviet detenteif link is providedby theoptionof conciliating theyare accepted."as formerchancellor Schmidt called it-presumably against eitherlower deterrencecredibility if INF is not deployed or against Soviet ire if it is.S. Deployment was made contingent on a prioreffort at arms control. with only American fingerson the triggers. but whetherit will be completed as planned is uncertain.thesetalks.'s incentivesto attack can be weakened by increasingits stake in economic intercoursewith Western Europe-even if this means increasing Europe's vulnerability to Soviet influence. Damage to the European detentewill be minimized.S.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 493 preferences are opposed. This content downloaded from 86. A further the Soviets: if deterrenceis weakened by parity.S. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . the Soviet Union might feel that an attack on Europe would have to startwith a preemptiveassault on INF.S.120.S. No. 77. accept the U. 46 (Spring 1982).S."ForeignPolicy.S.R. and would shrink from that for fear that so provocativean act would triggerfull-scale U.250. and political currentsgenerated by the INF issue. retaliation.

But attemptsto insure against abandonment by supportingthe ally and avoiding accommodation with the opponent increase the risk of entrapment.250.Although the disagreements 34 These remarksare.125 on Thu. by fearsof abandonment.strategychoices in the adversarygame-conciliation or firmness-are constrainedby fears of abandonment or entrapmentby allies. No doubt the moderates feel the dilemma most intensely. bipolarity promotesflexibility This content downloaded from 86.34 It follows that those who see NATO's currentcrisisas heralding its collapse tend to confuse cause and effect.And theirpersistence threatenthe existenceof the alliance. Thus.or weakening one's support of the ally to are bothconstrained guard againstentrapment. abandonment worries outweigh entrapmentfears. The Left in the European political spectrumtendsto focuson the danger of nuclear entrapment thatINF poses.In a multipolarsystem. policies toward the opponent with littlefearthatthe partnerwill defectin consequence. The alliance dilemma is more severe in a multipolarthan in a bipolar systembecause high mutual dependence coexistswith plausible realignment options. Waltz (fn. Choices in each dilemma are constrainednot onlyby predictedor feared in the other dilemma.494 WORLD POLITICS willing to initiate nuclear war. The mutual fear of abandonment tends to promote convergenceof policy-typically convergenceon mutual support and firmness toward the adversary. On the whole. An ally's defectionis a calamity. 25). whereas the Right emphasizes its reductionof the risk of nuclear abandonment.yet distinctly possible. the tendency is toward divergence rather than convergence of policy.but also by side effects In particular. dilemma are not much constrainedby side effects The allies may adopt independent. dilemmas are of roughlyequal importanceand are closelyintertwined. strategychoices in that in the alliance game.indeed contradictory. effectsinternal to itself.120. CONCLUSION The securitydilemma occurs in relations between allies as well as the alliance and adversary between adversaries.hence the dilemma. while rigidity produces rigidity of alignmentin of strategy. however.major differences tend to persistbecause thereis littlestructural does not seriously pressuretoward theirresolution. an elaborationof Kenneth Waltz's axiom that flexibility of alignmentin multipolarity of strategy. The adversary dilemma dominates.Although minor policydifferences may be resolvedby consensus norms. Conciliating the adversary. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . The alliance securitydilemma is less severe in a bipolar systembecause-although fears of entrapmentexist-the risks of abandonment are low. in effect.

250. Policyconflicts may not be resolved becausethe costof not resolving themdoes notincludea riskto theallianceitself. It is conceivable thattheU.. 35RobertW.S.tended bility alliances-the factthatthey to promote conflict resolution and policy consistency amongtheir members. a radical revision conception of its interests such thatit is no longersubjectto structural compulsion.S. rendering The likelihoodof eitherof theseeventsin the foreseeable future is will low.S. The alliancewill survive. and other valuesthathave economic.120.eds.. interests theUnited elsewhere. nonsecurity It is also conceivable thatWestern motivated the U. mightrelapseinto hemispheric isolation.ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA 495 have arisen froma variety of proximate causes. theinternational thealliance irrelevant system. whileitsinternal conflicts extremely continue to produce butlittle resolution untiltheSoviet muchargument Union once again appearsthreatening to to Europe or nonthreatening or untilpolitical U. disillusioned withEuropean obstinacy. 6. changesin either Statesor Europe (or in both)generate more harmonious policypreferences towardtheadversary. foritsown defense and Europemight uniteand takefullresponsibility of nucleardeterrence. because the alliance cannot break up. I983).35 thatAmerica's in thenuclear Western physical security age is notdependent on keeping Europe out of Soviethands.S.125 on Thu. The Atlantic Allianceand Its Critics(New York: Praeger. Since NATO is a product of the This content downloaded from 86. This would amountto a changein thestructure orunnecessary.This structural and inhibits gration encourages unilateralism compromise. bipolarstructure it cannotcollapseor changebasically untilthatstructure guarantee againstdisintechanges. This would mean as Robert recognizing. chap. thestructural instaof multipolar couldcollapse.it would also indicate a substantial devaluationofthecultural. In contrast. commitment.theypersist largely of the system. The onlywayin whichintra-NATOconflict might conceivably bring about the alliance'sdemise is through of the U. 17 Oct 2013 11:48:15 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Tuckerand others haveargued. Tucker and Linda Wrigley.

2008 .THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY VOLUME XI MATERIAL PROGRESS AND WORLD-WIDE PROBLEMS 1870-1898 EDITED BY F. H. HINSLEY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE LONDON • NEW YORK • MELBOURNE Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press.

and the war which had begun in the cabinets became a war of peoples. The ostensible reason for this was military security. instead it freed Europe from the shadow of French predominance without putting German predominance in its place. These calculations came to an abrupt stop as the campaign developed. and the equally irreconcilable. and the powers turned their energies outwards to 'imperialist' expansion. none strong enough to dominate the others. It began as a French attempt to arrest the progress of German unity. On 3 September the main French army was defeated and compelled to surrender at Sedan. and the Republic proclaimed in Paris. created this exceptional balance. Thiers toured Europe. Germany was free to arrange her own destinies. each able to maintain its independence. All acquired empires. The new Germany should get off to a good start by recovering the lands of the old Reich. Sedan ended the war as a struggle for mastery in Europe. prevented the creation of any preponderant combination. The war was prolonged by the German demand for Alsace and Lorraine. Russia first talked vaguely of threatening Austria-Hungary into neutrality. 2008 T . planned to compete with her for French favour. the deeper cause was a desire to satisfy national feeling. the others overseas. then. though only after French victories. The French raised the standard of national defence. seeking allies. The Franco-Prussian War. though less persistent. In vain. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Russia feared a German victory. with equal vagueness. This was unexpected. It was the last war fought solely in Europe and confined to European great powers. Napoleon III became a prisoner. Great Britain was genuinely neutral once Belgium was secured. The French empire was overthrown. Europe enjoyed the longest period of peace known in modern times. The first battles on the frontier went against France. The long centuries of French predominance were over. The balance of power took on the appearance of a natural law. The Austrians hoped for German backing in the Near East. some at their own backdoor.CHAPTER XX INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HE last thirty years of the nineteenth century saw the European balance of power at its most perfect: five great powers (with a doubtful sixth). self-operating and selfadjusting. antagonism between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans. But Austria-Hungary prepared to intervene on the French side. The irreconcilable antagonism between France and Germany. which broke out in July 1870. the Russians calculated that a resentful France would keep 542 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press. It was indeed confined to two powers.

Gambetta sounded the Jacobin appeal of 1793—the levee en masse. and Russia together in the League of the Three Emperors—ostensibly a conservative Holy Alliance against the moribund socialist international which Karl Marx had just shipped off 543 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press. and he received no support from his cabinet. Bismarck did not want a situation which might provide France with allies or at least enable her to air her case before an international meeting. The French had therefore to rely on their own strength. confined to the Black Sea clauses and pledged in advance to their abolition. and had to support a German army of occupation until the indemnity was paid. Besides. under the leadership of Thiers. She could not do so. they also introduced universal military service on the German model. Few contemporaries appreciated this. these could not defeat the Germans nor prevent the fall of Paris. Sedan and its outcome did not so much change the balance of power in Europe as symbolise that it had changed. Only Gladstone. France lost Alsace and Lorraine. The British threatened war or. 2008 . imposed by the Treaty of Paris in 1856. which met in London in January 1871. The Treaty of Frankfurt did not limit her armed forces or control her foreign policy. Bismarck made isolation of France the mainspring of his foreign policy. In 1873 he brought Austria-Hungary. They expected an early war of revenge. At the end of January 1871 the French had to accept the German terms. the Russians twisted international relations eastwards by denouncing the neutralisation of the Black Sea. though retaining Belfort at the last moment. The path of revenge was open if she wished to take it. not of power. Though he brought new armies into the field. This was certainly a victor's peace on the Napoleonic model. the British Prime Minister. a revival of 'the Crimean coalition'. This was not enough to reverse the verdict of Sedan. France remained a great power. and Bismarck was rewarded by a general promise that the conference. and the country in danger. the British vindicated the principle that treaties could be changed only by international agreement. wished to protest against the transfer of Alsace and Lorraine without consulting the inhabitants. paid an indemnity of five milliard francs (a sum exactly proportioned to the indemnity which Napoleon I had imposed on Prussia in 1807). followed a policy of 'fulfilment'.INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Germany in check. should not mention the war between France and Germany. He solved the crisis neatly by paying Russia and Great Britain with the same cheque. on grounds of morality. Yet Bismarck did not attempt to bind the future. He proposed a conference. Though the French. Germany continued to increase in population and economic resources. and the balance went on turning against France. Germany. Thus Russia got freedom from her servitude. France remained almost static. and reorganised their armed forces. and these became the definitive peace of Frankfurt on 10 May. at any rate.

In July 1875 they burst into flames. The crisis died away. The League carried within itself the germs of a mortal sickness: Austria-Hungary and Russia did not renounce their rival ambitions in the Balkans. neither would support a French attack on Germany.MATERIAL PROGRESS AND WORLD-WIDE PROBLEMS to an early death in New York. this seems to be the most reasonable explanation of the 'war-in-sight' crisis which he unleashed in April 1875. Simulating alarm. The Balkans were however still quiet. exploited the crisis to his own profit. Instead. they would not allow the conflict 'to overshadow the considerations of a higher order which they have at heart'. Like the Holy Alliance. Great Britain and Russia had combined to protect France and save the peace. Hence the 'war-in-sight' crisis paradoxically determined that there would be no war in Europe for more than a generation. With relations between France and Germany thus stabilised. Both opposed a German attack on France. Both were satisfied with the existing balance. though of a peculiar kind. even when they fell into dispute there. Both tried to observe the pledge which they had given in the League of the Three Emperors. the French Foreign Minister. and they responded. such a course was against his deepest instincts. The Turkish province of Bosnia broke into revolt. But he hoped to frighten the French out of their clericalism and perhaps out of their rearmament. Though Austria-Hungary remained silent. only to ensure that it should not be repeated. Decazes. AustriaHungary dared not let them succeed. Instead. 2008 . he appealed for protection to the other powers. detected—or so he claimed—the hand of international clericalism. Bismarck. Neither Russia nor Austria-Hungary wished to open the Eastern Question. Neither wished to reverse Sedan. only the Balkans remained as a topic of conflict. the Austro544 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press. At least. Then. and France the likely stormcentre. In 1873 Thiers was driven from office. and his monarchist successors wished to restore French prestige by an active foreign policy. but the peace they saved was the peace of Frankfurt. Dreaming nostalgically of a Catholic League. they first patronised the pope—prisoner in the Vatican since the Italian occupation of Rome on 20 September 1870. they flew at higher game and patronised the German Roman Catholics in the Kulturkampf. both Russia and Great Britain expostulated at Berlin. It had been a score for France. Russia could not abandon the Balkan Slavs. It is unlikely that Bismarck actually planned a preventive war. They sought to avert the crisis by a programme of Balkan reforms. the League of the Three Emperors was a fair-weather system. but once it was opened. in fact no more than mutual abstention from a French alliance. always ready to perceive widespread conspiracies against himself. Andrassy. their agreement contained the strange provision that. which would be blown away in a Balkan gale. Bismarck shammed surprise and repudiated all aggressive intention. abandoning this course in 1874.

Next. more massacres. There was deadlock in the Balkans: more revolts. if the Russians in 545 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press. was driven on by the groundswell of Slav sentiment within Russia. given to Turkey by the Three Emperors. he produced the Berlin Memorandum of 13 May 1876. This the Turks were always willing to do. in 1898 against France. They rejected the memorandum and sent the fleet to Besika Bay. His hope was disappointed. or they appealed to force. 2008 . All these schemes broke on the obstinacy of the Turkish government which held. and the Turks answered with the 'Bulgarian horrors'—the worst atrocities of the nineteenth century. The British government had swallowed the consular mission and the Andrassy note. he reached agreement with Andrassy that they would allow this to happen. and this inevitably brought in Great Britain also. Isolation was the keystone of British policy. until eclipsed by the Armenian massacres twenty years later. that reform would lead to the disintegration of the Ottoman empire. though still shrinking from war. but. the Russian Chancellor. Gorchakov wished to impose reforms in the name of the Concert of Europe. Then he devised the note of 30 December 1875. In June revolt spread to Bulgaria. Andrassy would not go beyond advice. though principally in order to guard Turkish interests. The British had once been the great proponents of the Concert of Europe. At first Gorchakov hoped that the Ottoman empire would collapse of itself. He claimed later that he would have gone with Russia 'through thick and thin'. He brought France into the negotiations. Gorchakov was desperately anxious to save Russia from repeating the isolation and failure of the Crimean War. since their failure over Schleswig in 1864. He called on Bismarck to repay the supposed Russian service in 1870 by holding Austria-Hungary neutral. at a meeting with Bismarck and Gorchakov. which contained not only reforms but a grudging hint of' sanctions' to enforce them. the British had only the choice: all or nothing. Alexander II himself foreshadowing it publicly in November. with some justification. and the counterpart of isolation is isolated action. Lacking allies and repudiating diplomacy. but no collapse. they had withdrawn from European affairs.INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Hungarian Foreign Minister. and at Zakupy (Reichstadt) in July. thus encouraging the Turks to defy the powers. The suppression of the revolt was beyond their strength. The Russian government. There was no middle course. Either they turned their backs on a problem. first proposed that the consuls of the powers should settle the Bosnian revolt on the spot. Bismarck refused. and it is no accident that between 1871 and 1904 Great Britain was alone in using the formal threat of war against another great power—in 1878 and 1885 against Russia. containing reforms which the powers should recommend to Turkey. Russian intervention drew nearer. Russia and Austria-Hungary were drifting apart. The Berlin memorandum was too much for them—particularly as it reached London at the weekend.

Gorchakov tried France. He had no desire to see Russia saddled with responsibility for Constantinople. almost as much by victory as by defeat. She needed a firm promise of neutrality if her armies were to pass safely through the bottleneck of Roumania. they could not object when Russia set out to do so. too. once more the Turks evaded them—this time by the ingenious trick of first proclaiming a constitution and then insisting that all changes must be referred to a constituent assembly which never met. 2008 . In the last resort. Gorchakov replied sympathetically. But if Turkey collapsed. both at home and abroad. and so set the pattern for the future. this must be in agreement with Austria-Hungary. he was disappointed. They also declared that they would not tolerate a Russian occupation of Constantinople. and this did not altogether fail them. while he had no objection to Russia's success in the Balkans. Though the powers would not impose the reforms which the conference had devised. 546 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press. Yet the conference served Russia's purpose. This was a red herring. he preferred a limited Russian success against Turkey to a great European war which would shatter the existing set-up in the Habsburg monarchy. Failing Germany. The French pleaded that they had not recovered from the defeats of 1870—a convenient. and the Conservative government had to favour the reform of Turkey. who could guarantee the outcome? And Gorchakov left it open whether he would then cheat the British or the victorious Russian generals. cool towards Pan-Slav ambitions. the only one to meet on the spot. From Austria-Hungary Russia needed something more positive than tolerance. From refusing to support Russia against Austria-Hungary it was a short step to supporting Austria-Hungary against Russia. though genuine. excuse which enabled them to sidestep the Eastern crisis without offending Russia. Even Great Britain moved towards the Concert. signed on 15 January 1877. was ready to limit Russia's prospective gains. would not now protect her. Bismarck's 'great refusal' was a decisive moment in European relations. Even the British were now willing to stand aside. having failed to reform Turkey.MATERIAL PROGRESS AND WORLD-WIDE PROBLEMS return had guaranteed Germany's tenure of Alsace and Lorraine. The survival of Austria-Hungary as a great power was an essential part of Bismarck's system. and Gorchakov on his side. Andrassy was ready for a bargain. 'even temporary'. and. too. laid down that there should be 'no great compact state. In December 1876 a conference of the great powers met at Constantinople—of all the many gatherings which wrestled with the Eastern Question. Here. In 1879 Bismarck took this step. The Budapest conventions. The last Russian resource was the Concert of Europe. They insisted that nothing must be done to disturb Egypt—a remote speculation where Gorchakov at once met their wishes. The Concert. not achieved against her. The Bulgarian horrors had produced a passionate campaign of protest in England under Gladstone's leadership. Here. Once more sweeping reforms were devised.

and battered themselves into exhaustion against it before it fell on 11 December. Russia was free—as never before in the nineteenth century—to settle the Eastern Question by her own armed strength. ostensibly to enforce the recommendations of the Constantinople conference. with every confidence that it would soon be overthrown. In return Austria-Hungary promised to observe benevolent neutrality in a war between Russia and Turkey. and therefore accepted the peace of San Stefano. They first thought of demanding the opening of the Straits. It only needed first the rumour and then the reality of the British fleet before Constantinople to bring the war to an end. A national state seemed the only alternative to Turkish rule. Though the Turkish armies had almost melted away. Turkey-in-Europe seemed doomed. They therefore fell back on inflating the principal proposal of the Constantinople conference and demanded autonomy for a 'Big Bulgaria'. The Russians had assumed that the Ottoman empire would fall of itself. it changed the course of history. and Andrassy in fact kept his promise of neutrality right up to the Congress of Berlin. The Crimean coalition was dissolved. but the Ottoman empire did not collapse. who could tell what would happen in the Balkans if Turkey really fell to pieces? Here too Gorchakov could decide whether to cheat Andrassy or the Pan-Slavs. British opinion had swung round. 2008 . this—though a theoretical gain—would be a practical disadvantage. It had not done so. equally important. and to disregard the triple guarantee of Turkey in which she had joined after the Crimean War. The heroic defence of Plevna obliterated the Bulgarian horrors. signed on 3 March. and. but. The British kept 547 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press. There they were arrested by the fortress of Plevna. Besides. Thanks to Gorchakov's diplomacy. once war started. when the Russians first ran against Plevna. This was a great stroke by Gorchakov despite the restriction. and the Russian peacemakers drew the frontier according to the best ethnographical knowledge of the time. Russian armed strength proved inadequate for the purpose. In June. By December the Russian armies were worn down. The prolonged engagement of Plevna—battle rather than siege—foreshadowed the grinding trench-warfare of the First World War. the Russians could not give the final push. and the Russians were now stuck for peace terms. and the Conservative government could revert to its original policy of supporting Turkey. But unlike those battles. Here was the great surprise. if Turkey fell to pieces. since Russia had no Black Sea fleet. The Russian armies staggered to the gates of Constantinople by the end of January 1878. But the Turks realised that Big Bulgaria would provoke opposition from other powers. On 24 April Russia declared war against Turkey. Russian armies advanced through Roumania and crossed the Danube.INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Slav or other'. This had no Machiavellian intent. The immediate gain was what mattered. A general war seemed in the ofiing.

this was largely because the great powers were busy elsewhere and shrank from the turmoil which would follow its overthrow. War had been averted long before the Congress met—in fact when the Russian armies faltered in front of Constantinople. and the British won. where the revolts had started. who had become British Foreign Secretary at the beginning of April. The Congress of Berlin which met on 13 June 1878 was a grandiose assembly of European statesmen—the German and Russian Chancellors. Hence they claimed to be free to pass the Straits whenever it suited them. The British were ready to face war without allies and even in fact without armed forces of any size. Andrassy. The events of 1875-8 ended its real strength. On the other hand. and a remnant called' Macedonia'. rounded off his achievement with two other agreements. But the Russians dared not risk a renewal of war without firm assurance of Austro-Hungarian neutrality. an autonomous province of eastern Roumelia. In British eyes the sultan was independent only when he was pro-British. Salisbury. Salisbury announced that henceforth Great Britain would only regard herself as bound to respect 'the independent decisions' of the sultan in regard to the closing of the Straits. Unexpectedly. and demonstratively moved Indian troops to Malta. The Congress claimed to have averted a great war and to have settled the Eastern Question. Austria-Hungary undertook the administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina. which was probably unknown to himself. It was a contest of nerve. with the understanding that Big Bulgaria should disappear. No one has divined his real intent. Big Bulgaria dissolved into three: a quasi-independent principality. which was pushed back under Ottoman rule. the Congress also produced a grave challenge to the rule of the Straits. On 30 May the Russians agreed to submit the Treaty of San Stefano to an international Congress. There was not much in either claim. He guaranteed Turkey-in-Asia. and though it tottered on for another thirty-odd years. but British opinion was outraged when this became known. though evading British requests for an alliance. To calm opinion at home. nor perhaps even with it. and the spectre of a British fleet in the Black Sea haunted Russian policy for almost twenty years. 2008 . The practical results of the Conference were of little effect. and the Foreign Ministers of the great powers. the Congress could not revive the Ottoman empire as an independent great power. receiving a lease of Cyprus in exchange. This was a terrifying prospect for Russia. the Prime Minister of Great Britain (the first ever to attend an international meeting). and he secured the belated backing of Austria-Hungary against Big Bulgaria. also evaded Russian requests for a promise of neutrality in a further war. The British fleet never entered the Black Sea until after the collapse of the 548 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press. Salisbury had agreed on 30 May that the Black Sea port of Batum should go to Russia.MATERIAL PROGRESS AND WORLD-WIDE PROBLEMS their fleet at Constantinople.

The Russians. and a worse when it put Bosnia under Austria-Hungary. possession is the actual guarantee of the bargain. The working of the balance checked any activity. Cynical radicals retorted that nothing happened because nothing serious was at stake and that the Eastern Question was kept going to provide 'out-door relief' for members of the foreign services. the British merely wanted to exclude the Russians from Constantinople. Yet all they could find to discuss was the fate of a few Balkan villages. if they ever knew. It shaped the alliances which shot up like mushrooms after summer-rain. The Congress did a bad day's work when it put Macedonia back under the Turks. Soon Africa was to be partitioned. the empire of China was to be disputed between the powers. and the Eastern Question had indeed become a question of habit. Italy and Germany had been united. however. assembled in unparalleled number and encompassed by these events. The deeper puzzle is why the Congress made such a fuss about the Balkans at all. the pope had lost his temporal power. When two powers have rival ambitions. In the first case. There was something in these explanations. but each of them interpreted this to mean that Turkey should be subservient to itself. Here were all the greatest statesmen of the age. Yet nothing happened. and two out of the three parts into which Bulgaria had been divided were united within a few years. the second demands reliance on the other's good faith—and in the Eastern Question this was lacking. Men had regarded it as of vital importance for so long that they had forgotten why it was important. Similarly the Austrians merely wished to prevent any hostile power from controlling the route to Salonika. Every foreign minister revolved his policy around it. the second exploded the world war of 1914. But each was convinced of the aggressive designs of the other. The first act caused the Balkan war of 1912. A modicum of mutual trust or even of indifference. where great skill was displayed and everyone went home unhurt in the evening. is that the Eastern Question had become essentially a negative affair. 2008 . Such blunders occur at the best-ordered gathering. still more gigantic were to happen outside it. merely wanted to keep the British navy out of the Black Sea. and the French wished to preserve their investments in the Ottoman empire. Why did it all go on? The diplomatists pointed to the deadlock as evidence of their sustained skill. to the applause of the powers which had insisted on their separation in 1878. The interminable Eastern crises seemed so many manoeuvres. All of them in fact wanted an independent Turkey. apart from a few Pan-Slav hot-heads. France had lost her primacy and two provinces. Perhaps the decisive reason. and the 549 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press. A deal is more difficult when each merely wants to keep the other out.INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Russian empire. a compromise between them is often possible. What is more the Eastern Question continued to dominate international relations for many years after the Congress of Berlin. Gigantic changes had taken place on the continent of Europe.

This was certainly true so far as material gain was concerned. Since the other powers too had this negative aim. It is merely a geographic expression. if they would not. The powers did not welcome his advice. always advocated this course. they acquiesced —with some grumbles—in Bismarck's direction. This was the age when the anarchy of sovereign states was at its height. but in Bismarck's time her only object was negative—to prevent war. as the British did four years later in Egypt. This was a noble aim. Hence his advice to Salisbury during the Congress: 'Take Egypt. Gladstone alone preached the Concert of Europe. In the months after the Congress this agree550 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press. None of them wanted the trouble which partitioning the Near East would involve. 2008 . the negative nature of their aims stood in the way. to share it out—Constantinople with the east Balkans to Russia. as in economic relations between individuals. to disaster. For one thing. This end was peace. but how can there be a Concert unless the players follow the same score? No great principle or belief held Europe together. the wisest diplomatic head of the day. but was confident that he could control it for his own end.' Bismarck accepted the international anarchy. Instead there was only a universal confidence that each power could stand on its own feet without bringing European civilisation. There was not even a common fear—whether of revolution or of some infidel invader. and Great Britain in control of Egypt and the Suez Canal. Bismarck constantly urged the other powers to ignore the Near East. More deeply. Bismarck. each hoped to acquire its share without yielding anything to others. the solidarity of peoples had not taken its place. or even itself. or. and when men believed that in international affairs. Before the Congress of Berlin Bismarck had helped Russia and Great Britain towards agreement. let alone a Pomeranian.' And again: 'I only hear a statesman use the word "Europe" when he wants something for himself. Salonika with the west to Austria-Hungary. unchecked liberty for each automatically produced the best results for all. He described the inhabitants of the Balkans as 'sheep-stealers'. and held that the Balkans were not worth the bones of any grenadier. This happened some twenty years later when all the powers turned their backs on the Balkans.' Hence his encouragement to the French that they should find their share of the bargain in Tunis. not to make gains. Bismarck himself judged the Concert contemptuously: 'Whoever speaks of Europe is wrong. Monarchical solidarity had ended. but these count for more than profit. the powers lacked a common interest or loyalty. though less consciously.MATERIAL PROGRESS AND WORLD-WIDE PROBLEMS Eastern Question would vanish from the international agenda. Certainly Germany directed the 'system' so far as there was one. and have remained so to the present day. Only prestige and strategy were at stake. More deeply still. The Balkans were a miserable prize. compared to almost any other part of the world. much to their own astonishment.

and then there would have followed a new war or else—more likely— such a humiliation of Russia as would upset the balance of power. British agents harassed the sultan with advice which he usually disregarded. Salisbury planned to revive the Ottoman empire under British protection. As it was. The Crimean coalition was as unwelcome to him as it had been to the rulers of Prussia during the Crimean War itself. He gave a variety of explanations then and thereafter. both German and foreign. Austria-Hungary and France supported what they took to be the winning side. On the other hand the prospect of co-operating with Russia against it was equally unwelcome. defined in writing. 551 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press. it would have pressed harder against Russia. which he succeeded in doing some two years later. thrust towards new achievements. grew cool towards the British. The Russian empire was exhausted by the war. Historians. he concluded on 5 October 1879 a defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary against Russia. The Austro-German Alliance makes sense as the temporary answer to an immediate difficulty. Sometimes he alleged that Germany was in imminent danger of attack from Russia and needed Austro-Hungarian backing. the two powers whom Germany had defeated. and affairs in the Balkans drifted towards oblivion. and this time he responded.' He made it even clearer when he went on from the Austro-German alliance to revive the League of the Three Emperors. But why did Bismarck give it such a rigid permanent form? Precise alliances. secured by Germany's support. It is fairly easy to solve the problem of why Bismarck acted as he did in October 1879 by asking: what was the alternative? The Crimean coalition would have grown stronger. There are deeper problems not so easily solved. except as the early prelude to war. At one time he proposed making the alliance a fundamental law of the German Reich. and after Russia. it would have been Germany's turn. Instead of supporting Russia against Great Britain. had gone out with the anden regime. invigorated by success. They appealed to Bismarck for support. sometimes he claimed that he was restoring the old greater German union of the Holy Roman Empire. Austria-Hungary. have added theories of their own. at another he advised his successors to get rid of it at a convenient opportunity. British military consuls swarmed in Asia Minor. In the Balkans. The Crimean coalition which had disappeared during the recent crisis seemed to be resurrected. would have recovered prestige. No great power had a fixed commitment of this kind between the Congress of Vienna and the Congress of Berlin. Austria-Hungary and France. Its rulers were exasperated and alarmed by these new threats.INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ment seemed farther off than ever. Bismarck made this clear himself when he said to the Russian ambassador concerning Austria-Hungary: 'I wanted to dig a ditch between her and the western powers. 2008 . Bismarck's solution—though also anticipated by Prussian policy during the Crimean War—was at first sight surprising. The British.

Bismarck meant precisely this. The Austrians resisted obstinately. with their reservations and restrictions. except Great Britain. as it often did. were short-lived in their effect. whenever this broke. had an unwritten clause: rebus sic stantibus. Bismarck had meant to preserve his freedom of manoeuvre when he made the Austro-German alliance. but assumed that he could make them do so. He would not allow the destruction of AustriaHungary as a great power. There began a tug-of-war between Vienna and Berlin which lasted until the Austrians pulled Germany into war in 1914. including Germany. but between nations. The great names of Triple Alliance and Franco-Russian Alliance shaped men's minds. His unrivalled skill enabled him to perform these conjuring tricks with success. 2008 . Every alliance. The new alliances were absorbed by public opinion even though their precise terms were unknown—except for those of the AustroGerman Alliance which were published in 1888. The simplest way out in his eyes was to reconcile Austria-Hungary and Russia. gave formal pledges of action to support some other. The British Liberal party. he said. In April 1880 the bottom fell out of this policy. The contrast between the precise terms of an alliance and its general significance was shown as soon as the Austro-German Alliance was signed and throughout its history. but he would not support her activities in the Balkans. The Austrians never took the reservation seriously: they always assumed that Germany was now committed to them ' through thick and thin'. 552 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press. and determined the pattern of events. their policy was 'the permanent blocking of Russia' with British assistance. Indeed Bismarck's own rule worked against himself. and no more. The alliances of the eighteenth century were family compacts. All Bismarck's diplomacy from October 1879 until his fall was an answering tug: an attempt to escape the inevitable consequences of an alliance which he had himself brought into existence. was taken prisoner by the system of alliances which he inaugurated. private bargains between kings and emperors. not only wanted things to remain the same. and the Balkan states left in harmless independence. on Austrian reluctance. Perhaps Bismarck. They were eager to revive the League of the Three Emperors. The elaborate clauses. too.MATERIAL PROGRESS AND WORLD-WIDE PROBLEMS Now the Austro-German alliance began an era in which every power. he overlooked that alliances by this time were made not between monarchs. Perhaps. but none of them would have been necessary if the Austro-German Alliance had not existed. They asked only for security in the Near East—the Straits closed to British ships of war. The Russians presented no difficulties. and Bismarck agreed with them once the AustroGerman Alliance was signed. Its essential clause was the promise by the two powers to resist any Russian attack. Yet Bismarck was himself contemptuous of such attempts to bind the future. Instead every great power. having now become a conservative statesman. he sought to provide other allies for her so that Germany need not be involved.

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under Gladstone's leadership, defeated the Conservatives at the general election. Gladstone hoped to inaugurate a new age in international relations, based on the Concert of Europe instead of individual action. He succeeded only in negation. He abandoned Salisbury's Turkish policy; withdrew the military consuls from Asia Minor; and disregarded the guarantee to Turkey, though he did not return Cyprus, which had been its quid pro quo. But the Concert of Europe never came to life. The statesmen of Europe, apart from Gladstone, lacked a common conscience. They relied on the balance of power and thought only of their national interests. Still, Gladstone's acts left the Austrians high and dry. They were driven into the League of the Three Emperors, for lack of anything better. The new League took another year to come into formal existence. First, the Austrians resisted; then the assassination of Alexander II provoked further delays. The League was finally signed on 18 June 1881. Its predecessor of eight years before had been a declaration of monarchical solidarity; this was a practical bargain with nothing sentimental about it except its name. The three emperors promised each other neutrality; they also asserted' the European and mutually obligatory character' of the rule of the Straits—a double repudiation, in fact, of the policy of working with Great Britain which Austria-Hungary had previously favoured. Germany was freed from having to choose between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Russia got security at the Straits, short of an isolated action by Great Britain in defiance of all the continental powers. But where was the gain for Austria-Hungary? The Austrians refused to trust Russia's word and grumbled ceaselessly at the position into which Bismarck had forced them. He found an odd way of satisfying them. Italy had been beating about on the fringe of great-power status ever since her unification in 1861. Her quest for alliances was really a quest of recognition as an equal; and this recognition had been rarely obtained. At the Congress of Berlin Italy had ranked rather below Turkey and slightly above Greece. She had come away empty-handed; and in angry resentment ran after predominance in Tunis. This provoked French competition. The French would have much rather left Tunis alone; but they could not tolerate an Italian outpost on the frontier of Algeria. On 12 May 1881 Tunis became a French protectorate. The Italians were more humiliated than ever; and the monarchy itself seemed threatened. The house of Savoy, once the ally of revolution, now sought conservative respectability. In October 1881 King Humbert went on a begging mission to Vienna. The Austrians refused his proposal for a mutual guarantee. Early in 1882 the Italians had a stroke of luck. There was a short-lived revival of Pan-Slav feeling in Russia. Bismarck feared that Russia might not remain faithful to the League of the Three Emperors. He took up the negotiations with Italy as a precautionary measure. The outcome was the Triple Alliance, concluded on 20 May 553
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1882. The only clause of practical importance in this was Italy's promise to remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, hence freeing four Austro-Hungarian army corps for the front in Galicia. The Austrians got this benefit for nothing. Germany paid the price by agreeing to defend Italy against France. This was on paper a considerable liability for Germany, though less—in Bismarck's eyes—than the alternative of supporting Austro-Hungarian expansion in the Balkans. In any case, he always assumed, in true Napoleonic fashion, that whatever he wanted to do he would succeed in doing. He would somehow keep the peace between France and Italy; and thus never be called on to discharge his liability. Bismarck's calculation proved correct. Triple Alliance and Emperors' League between them so tied up the European powers that none could move without his permission; and this was always withheld. Changes took place only outside Europe, the greatest of them in Egypt. Here Great Britain and France had been wrestling for years, in an uneasy condominium, with the chaotic finances of a spendthrift khedive. In 1882 nationalist disturbances broke out against the Europeans in Egypt. Joint intervention was planned. At the last moment the French government drew back, because of opposition in the Chamber. The British intervened alone; and in September 1882 established a protectorate over Egypt (at first unavowed) which was to last for seventy years. This was a great event; indeed the only real event in international relations between the battle of Sedan and the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. All the rest were manoeuvres which left the combatants at the close of day exactly where they had started. The British occupation of Egypt altered the balance of power. It not only gave the British security for their route to India; it made them masters of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East; it made it unnecessary for them to stand in the front line against Russia at the Straits—ultimately indeed unnecessary to stand against her at all. It also, as a more temporary though still important consequence, disrupted the 'liberal alliance' between Great Britain and France; and thus prepared the way for the Franco-Russian Alliance ten years later. This however was not the immediate consequence. Instead Bismarck, playing on the French resentment over Egypt, attempted to round off his 'system' by a reconciliation between France and Germany. In the long run the attempt came to nothing; and it is therefore impossible to decide how seriously the attempt was taken by either party—the failures in history have no memorial. Certainly there were reserves on both sides. The French, because of Alsace and Lorraine, could never follow Bismarck's prompting 'to forgive Sedan as after 1815 they came to forgive Waterloo'. Nor would Germany's partners in the Triple Alliance turn wholeheartedly against Great Britain, whose support they might one day need—the Austrians against Russia, the Italians against France. More554
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over the colonial disputes which blew up in Africa between France and Germany on the one side, and Great Britain on the other, have led most historians to suppose that the Franco-German co-operation was an accidental product of these disputes, not the other way round. This was probably true so far as France was concerned; but Bismarck, as he himself said, was never 'a man for colonies', and his sudden claim for African colonies seems to fall into place as a move in his European policy—not, of course, that he repudiated the popularity which these claims brought him in Germany. At any rate, the result is beyond doubt, whatever the cause. Not only was Great Britain isolated—this was her own choice—but her two principal rivals for empire, France and Russia, were for once unhampered by anxieties for their European security; and, more than that, could often count on backing from the other powers. This backing was of a limited kind. No power, except possibly Russia, ever seriously contemplated war against Great Britain. The great disputes which raged from Egypt to the Far East were fought in diplomatic terms, with loans, notes, and railway concessions as the instruments. Armed power receded into the background, an ultimate sanction that was almost forgotten. Egypt illustrates this. The British army controlled Egypt; the British navy dominated the Mediterranean. The British could have annexed Egypt at a moment's notice; and the French could have done nothing to stop them. But the British claimed to administer Egypt in the interests of the bondholders; and the Egyptian question was disputed at the caisse de la dette, not between armies and navies. As a result international relations ran on two levels. On one were the formal alliances, which gave promises of support in some hypothetical war which never happened; on the other were the combinations of bankers and committees. On the first level Great Britain was the most isolated of the powers; on the second, the most involved. She had no alliances; but, as the power with the most world-wide interests, innumerable ententes and, of course, innumerable quarrels. Even on this diplomatic plane, Great Britain had a rough time during 1884 and the early part of 1885. French and German colonial advances against her ran together, for whatever reason. In July 1884 a conference to settle the Egyptian question broke up without result. Bismarck held out to the French the prospect of a maritime league directed against England. To others he boasted that he had revived the continental system of Napoleon I, though this time with Berlin as centre. The high point of this continental solidarity came in September 1884 when the three emperors met at Skierniewice—the last such meeting ever to take place. Later in the autumn an international conference met at Berlin to settle the affairs of central Africa, and particularly of the Congo basin. Again the Franco-German partnership against Great Britain was displayed, in principle if not in achievement. The Berlin Act was a great stroke in 555
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international affairs. It laid down the rules for 'effective occupation' of uncivilised lands; and so ensured that the partition of Africa should take place without armed conflict between the powers. The Berlin conference has another incidental point of interest; it was the last international conference on any concrete subject for more than twenty years—telling evidence indeed that the Concert of Europe was dissolved. Each power served the common good by pursuing its individual aims, and peace seemed secure without any conscious effort. The worst moment of British isolation came in April 1885. On 30 March a Russian force defeated the Afghans at Pendjeh on their northern frontier; and so seemed to threaten Afghanistan, India's bufferstate. The British, lacking allies, could rely only on force; and on 21 April the pacific Gladstone secured a vote of credit from the House of Commons as the preliminary to war. The British planned to operate Salisbury's doctrine of 1878 and to send an expeditionary force through the Straits. Bismarck's system worked, as he had intended, for Russia's protection. Every great power—not only Germany and Austria-Hungary but France and Italy also—warned the sultan to keep the Straits closed against the British. It was the most formidable display of continental solidarity on an anti-British basis between Napoleon I's time and Hitler's. Its very success dissolved it. The Russians had felt insecure at the Straits and had therefore sought in Afghanistan a counter-threat against the British. Once convinced that the Straits would remain closed, they lost interest in Penjdeh and agreed to send the dispute to arbitration—quite a score in its way for Gladstone's high principles. Afghanistan remained a buffer-state, as it is to this day: one of the few countries that has always preserved its independence from the competing great powers. The peaceful outcome of the Penjdeh affair was not the only improvement for the British. The Franco-German entente gradually crumbled during the summer of 1885, rather from a French revulsion against colonial expansion than from a pronounced hostility towards Germany. Moreover the Eastern Question caught fire again in September; and Bismarck had to treat the British with more consideration for the sake of Austria-Hungary. The new Eastern crisis centred, like its predecessor, on Bulgaria. But the positions were now reversed. In 1878 Russia had set up a Big Bulgaria which Great Britain and Austria-Hungary insisted on dismembering. In 1885 two out of the three parts of Bulgaria came together—eastern Roumelia joined the existing principality. Russia sought to dismember Bulgaria or, at the very least, to force it back into subordination. Austria-Hungary and Great Britain defended Bulgaria's unity and independence. The crisis lasted in various forms from September 1885 until March 1888. First, Russia tried to undo the unification that had taken place; next to impose a Russian general as governor; finally to prevent the election of an anti-Russian prince. All these moves failed. 556
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The Russians received a barren satisfaction in March 1888 when the sultan, theoretical overlord of Bulgaria, declared the election of Ferdinand of Coburg illegal. But nothing happened. The crisis died away without war. In retrospect it is tempting to say that nothing vital was at stake. Though it was no doubt humiliating to Russia that Bulgaria had repudiated her patronage, there was no fundamental change in the Near Eastern situation. Was it really worth Russia's while to fight a great war merely for the pleasure of appointing the prince of Bulgaria? In any case, Russia had not the strength to fight a great war even if she wished to do so. All this was less obvious to contemporaries; and the Bulgarian crisis caused an upheaval in international affairs. The League of the Three Emperors was an immediate casualty. The Austrians were determined to resist Russia, despite Bismarck's promptings to the opposite course; and they called for German support. Bismarck referred them to London, where Salisbury, once more in power, was equally reluctant. The two competed in reserves and evasions: both anxious to avoid war or even commitment, both doubtful—in the last resort—whether war was really imminent. Bismarck had a stroke of luck during 1886 when there was a febrile revival of nationalism in France under the nominal leadership of General Boulanger. Bismarck could make out that Germany was too menaced by France to have any forces to spare for the support of AustriaHungary. This was an adroit and unanswerable excuse. In Bismarck's own words: 'I could not invent Boulanger, but he happened very conveniently for me.' Salisbury, though caring little about Bulgaria, dared not altogether estrange Austria-Hungary and Italy because of the Egyptian question. The result was the first Mediterranean agreement of March 1887 by which Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy promised each other diplomatic support—certainly a gain for Austria-Hungary so far as Bulgaria was concerned, but more immediately an end of the isolation over Egypt with which the British had previously been threatened. The competition between Bismarck and Salisbury was not yet resolved. The British promise of diplomatic co-operation was almost as noncommittal as any promise could be; and Bismarck was himself somewhat compromised by having to agree to the renewal of the Triple Alliance. Both men sought to recover their freedom. Salisbury tried to settle the Egyptian question; and he actually concluded a convention with the sultan (Egypt's nominal overlord) for British withdrawal on conditions. Then Russian and French protests frightened the sultan; and he withdrew his consent. It is easy to understand Russian objections. But the principal French motive was to secure Russian backing in Egypt; yet this would have been unnecessary to them if the British had withdrawn. Such are the confusions of international policy. At all events, the failure of the convention had decisive effects. Salisbury was pushed farther on the path of 557
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co-operation with Austria-Hungary and Italy. The French had no alternative to Russia's friendship; and the Franco-Russian Alliance was now only a matter of time. Bismarck did better. He rescued the Russians from isolation in the Near East at little cost to himself. On 18 June, when the League of the Three Emperors technically expired, he concluded with the Russians a new agreement—the Reinsurance Treaty. This renewed the promise of neutrality with two significant exceptions: it would not apply in case of a Russian attack on Austria-Hungary, nor in case of a German attack on France. Neither signatory projected such an attack; and these two reserves had always existed by implication. The other part of the treaty had more practical application: Germany would give Russia diplomatic support in Bulgaria and at the Straits. Russia was still in a minority, but at least she was not alone; and this moral satisfaction perhaps helped to keep her on the peaceful track. The Reinsurance Treaty contained nothing new. It merely formalised policies which Bismarck, and for that matter the Russians, had defined again and again. Its terms would not have surprised or offended the other powers, if they had become known; but they would have outraged German opinion. It was for this reason that Bismarck kept it secret: he was conducting a policy which ran counter to German sentiment. Germany had no conflict of interest with Russia; yet German feeling was more antagonistic towards her than to any other power. Most Germans wished to be 'western' and liberal; while the threat of cheap Russian grain estranged the Junker landowners who had been the one pro-Russian group. Moreover, Russia was the one continental power which remained obstinately independent even at her moments of greatest weakness; and unconsciously the Germans resented this. Bismarck knew how to moderate his mastery; other Germans were less controlled. Bismarck got his way for the time being. The autumn of 1887 saw the Bulgarian crisis apparently at its height. Bismarck's reserve once more forced Salisbury's hand; and in December Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, and Italy concluded the second Mediterranean agreement. This went beyond diplomatic co-operation and envisaged common action against any 'illegal enterprise' in the Near East. It was more nearly an alliance with other powers than any agreement that Great Britain had made in peacetime, certainly more binding than the ententes made with France and Russia twenty years later. But nothing dramatic happened. The Russians did not attempt any 'illegal enterprise'; and the crisis died away. This peaceful outcome was the greatest success ever achieved by the balance of power; but perhaps it was the general wish for peace which made the balance of power work. Bismarck would, no doubt, have liked to make his 'system' permanent—Russia checked by the three 'Mediterranean' powers, yet appeased 558
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by the Reinsurance Treaty, and France thus safely isolated; and in fact the system ran on until his fall, over domestic issues, in March 1890. Then a general shake-up seemed to follow. Bismarck's successors, the men of 'the new course', were impatient with his complicated pattern of checks and balances. Far from recognising that German reserve pushed Great Britain forward, they believed that she would become a full member of the Triple Alliance if Germany too backed Austria-Hungary without restrictions. They therefore refused to renew the Reinsurance Treaty, and promised to back Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. They sought British favour by renouncing any German attempt to reach the head-waters of the Nile. In their zest for resolute action, they even promised to back Italian ambitions in Tripoli against the French. Things worked out just as Bismarck had expected. The British, far from being tempted into the Triple Alliance, were delighted to see the Germans shouldering their responsibilities and withdrew towards isolation. The Balkans were fortunately quiet; and the German promises to Austria-Hungary therefore had no practical result. But the Italians boasted of their strong diplomatic position; and this alarmed the French. Reluctantly they turned to Russia for support and alliance. Reluctance was indeed the keyword of the Franco-Russian Alliance on both sides. Not only were republic and despotic monarchy antipathetic; neither had the slightest sympathy with the other's practical concern. Russia had no desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine for France; and France, on her side, was—of all the powers—the most anxious to maintain the independence of Turkey. Their only common interest was security from any German threat, so that each could pursue aims elsewhere. But here again there was no coincidence of policy. Though each was the rival of Great Britain, the rivalries did not overlap. France wanted to get the British out of Egypt; the Russians wanted the Egyptian conflict to continue, so that France and Great Britain should remain estranged. Russia's ambitions centred on north China, where the French had nothing to gain. The Russians had no serious resentment against Germany, despite the failure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty, and thought of the alliance as a general anti-British combination all over the world. The French hoped ultimately to be reconciled with Great Britain, so as to strengthen their position against Germany. There was conflict even over the military objectives of the two prospective allies. The French wanted to ensure that a considerable part of the Russian army would march against Germany in the event of a general war; the Russians wanted to defeat Austria-Hungary, and were inclined to think that even a German capture of Paris would not be a disaster if they themselves took Budapest and Vienna. Not surprisingly, therefore, the negotiations took long to reach a conclusion: first a general entente in August 1891; then a military convention in August 1892; and finally 559
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confirmation of this convention by the political heads in January 1894. The French President was allowed to refer to 'the alliance' only in 1895; and the tsar waited until 1897 before acknowledging it in public. Technically the Franco-Russian Alliance was never more than a pledge for common action in case of a war against Germany. This made it impossible for Germany to threaten first one, then the other, and so forced on her the peace which she had kept willingly in Bismarck's time. Ostensibly the alliance was a great defeat for Bismarck's successors. Its practical result was to restore his system in a different form. His overriding object had been to prevent a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Now the French, being committed to support Russia, had the same object. The Balkan conflict was dying away in any case; the influence of both France and Germany accelerated the process. The new balance of power offered only the choice between general war and general peace; and all the continental powers chose peace for many years to come. Triple Alliance and Franco-Russian Alliance alike became defensive combinations; and any power that was tempted towards adventure was restrained as much by its allies as by its opponents. This restraint applied only in Europe; and the very security there made it easier for the European powers to pursue 'imperialist' aims elsewhere. The European stalemate and the expansion outside Europe were two different aspects of the same situation: each produced the other. The loser was Great Britain with her world-wide interests; and the Franco-Russian Alliance began the period of true British 'isolation'. Previously the British had assumed that others were more in need of help than they were. As Salisbury said: 'Great Britain does not solicit alliances; she grants them.' Now however a continental power would endanger its security, instead of increasing it, by an alliance with Great Britain. The British had assumed, too, that their overseas rivals—particularly France and Russia— would always be distracted by anxiety for their European frontiers. Now these frontiers were secure. France challenged the British in West Africa and Egypt; Russia moved ruthlessly forward in the Far East; and the Germans too entered the imperialist competition. Yet this competition had an unavowed limit. All the European powers had chosen peace in continental affairs; therefore they would make imperialist gains, too, only so long as these could be achieved peacefully. If the French would not fight for Alsace and Lorraine, how much less would they fight for Egypt or Siam? And similarly with the others. The British were the one exception: having nothing to lose (or gain) in Europe, they were prepared to fight for their imperial position and, with the steady expansion of the British fleet, could fight successfully. Isolation began as an embarrassment; later, freedom from European commitments left the British untrammelled elsewhere. The new balance of power took some little time to display its effects. It 560
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seemed at first that the Near East might again become a centre of conflict, particularly when the Armenian massacres of 1894 and 1895 raised new demands for the reform, or for the partition, of the Turkish empire. The Russians supposed that they had improved their position in the Near East by making an alliance with France. So they had, but only in a negative way. That alliance certainly made it impossible for the British to act on the old assumption of the Mediterranean agreement, that France would remain neutral while the British resisted Russia at Constantinople. Now that France was Russia's ally, the British dared not pass the Straits with a potentially hostile French fleet behind them. The British proposed that Germany should impose neutrality on France. This, in its turn, asked too much; for a German threat to France would bring her Russian ally into action. Germany and Great Britain demanded the impossible of each other. The British threatened to withdraw into isolation; the Germans answered by threatening Great Britain, as Bismarck had done, with a continental league. The British threat was the more effective of the two. The Straits ceased to be important to them as their control of Egypt hardened; and in November 1895 the British fleet finally withdrew from Aegean waters. A month later, the Germans used the excuse of the Jameson raid to demonstrate their support of the Boer republics by a patronising telegram to President Kruger; and implied that German, Russian, and French challenges to the British empire would be knit together. This was empty show. Bismarck had no ambitions outside Europe and no objections to those of France or Russia; his continental league therefore had perhaps some sense. Now the Germans expected support from France and Russia without allowing them much gain in return. Yet the two were not even supporting each other in their imperial enterprises; how much less would they support Germany? Besides, the British navy was now a more formidable force than it had been ten years before; and the British answered the Kruger telegram by setting up a 'flying squadron' to show that they could take on all comers. Yet just at this moment, when Germany and Great Britain had reached deadlock, the Russian danger at the Straits—so far as it had ever existed— was dispelled; not by Austria-Hungary or Great Britain, but by France. The French had tried to avoid this; but, failing anyone else, they had to act. For, just as Russia offered France security on the basis of the Treaty of Frankfurt, so the French offered Russia security within the framework of the Treaty of Berlin. When the Russians talked in December 1895 of seizing Constantinople, the French replied: 'only if the question of Alsace and Lorraine is opened as well'. This price was too high for the Russians to pay. Moreover, their concern for the Straits was essentially defensive; and, as it gradually became clear to them that the British had abandoned any idea of passing the Straits, the Russians too were prepared to leave

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well alone. The Austrians would still have liked to follow an anti-Russian course; but, failing support from Germany or Great Britain, they also had no choice. In May 1897 the League of the Three Emperors was renewed in weaker form. Russia and Austria-Hungary agreed to freeze the Near East; and 'on ice' it remained for the next ten years. Every European question had thus reached a temporary stability, so much so that even in the early days of 1914 one good judge held that the existing states and frontiers were fixed 'for ever'. Every great power behaved as though it enjoyed the geographic security which had enabled the British to build their empire in' splendid isolation'. This had another curious consequence. The opinion long held by English radicals, on an isolationist basis, that foreign policy was unnecessary and wars caused by the wickedness of the governing class, spread to continental countries. In earlier times revolutionary socialists, for instance, had condemned the existing international order and had denounced Metternich or Tsar Nicholas I as peace-mongers, upholding an unjust status quo. The new socialist international, revived in 1889, taught that the working classes had no country and proposed to organise a general strike against war, assuming that any war could have only a selfish' governing-class' motive. Even the governing class had twinges of conscience against war; and the first Hague conference, held in 1899, aired projects of international disarmament, though the only practical outcome was the Hague court on a voluntary basis. This court could only settle casual disputes. It could not handle such questions as Poland or the future of the Ottoman or Habsburg empires; and the creation of the Hague court was, in fact, evidence that men had forgotten the existence of such questions. The delusive stalemate in Europe opened the short-lived era of 'worldpolicy'. Men supposed that the powers had abandoned their disputes in Europe because the prizes elsewhere were so much greater, whereas the truth was the other way round. The powers had dropped their disputes in Europe because they were too hot to handle. Russia and France had always tried to combine Europe and empire. Germany was the new entrant into the field. Her economic strength now put her in the front rank of the powers, ahead of any except Great Britain and the United States. It seemed reasonable that like them she should become a worldpower. But there was also a political cause for this development. Bismarck had held that Germany's central position in Europe debarred her from expansion overseas. He said to an enthusiast for expansion in Africa: 'Here is France; and here is Russia. That is my map of Africa.' His successors assumed that the danger from France and Russia had ceased to exist. Indeed, these two powers were regarded as a positive advantage by Germany. For, given their fierce competition with the British, Germany could safely pursue world-aims without arousing British, or for that matter Franco-Russian, hostility. Where Germany had 562
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once been the pivot in a system of alliance, she now became the exponent of 'the free hand'; rejoicing at the conflicts of others, and collecting rewards from both sides. The calculation was correct. Germany never had colonial disputes with France. Her project for a railway to Baghdad was less of a menace to Russia than was the world-wide opposition from Great Britain. Most of all, Germany was a lesser danger to the British empire than was France or Russia, at any rate until the plans for a great German navy came to fruition—and realisation of that had to wait until 1909. Though there were colonial disputes between Germany and Great Britain—over a hypothetical partition of the Portuguese colonies and over Samoa—these were relatively trivial; and all were easily settled, even without the fraudulent hope held out by the Germans that they might, if appeased, become Great Britain's ally. The decisive centre of conflict in the era of world-policy was the Far East. Here too, as in the Near East, a decrepit empire was breaking up under European penetration. Unlike the Near East, however, there was no question of security—no Russian fear for the Black Sea or British anxiety for the route to India. The sole prize was trade, or rather the expectation of trade with a vast hypothetical China market which, in fact, never became real. The British had long held a near-monopoly of what trade there was; but they had no grave objection to sharing this trade with others so long as these others maintained the open door. Hence they did not complain seriously when the Germans entered the Far East by seizing Kiao-Chow in 1897; and they were positively delighted when the United States, in a short burst of imperialism, conquered the Philippines from Spain in 1898. British antagonism was against Russia; for the Russians, being weaker economically, used their military power to close the Chinese door, not to open it. The Far East was a tougher problem for the British than the Near East had been. Sea-power was less effective, and allies harder to find. The Russians could approach northern China by land; and, with the French in Indo-China, the British could risk their fleet in the China seas even less than at Constantinople. Even worse, there seemed no Far Eastern equivalent of Austria-Hungary: no power whose need to resist Russia was as great as the British. In the early days of 1898 there was an alarm that the partition of China had begun; and the Russians indeed acquired a long lease of Port Arthur, dominating the Yellow Sea. The British beat about for allies. They tried Japan, who had herself staked out an abortive claim to Port Arthur in 1895; they tried the United States. Both evaded entanglement. Most of all the British tried Germany, proposing an alliance which would call a halt to Russian expansion. The proposal was plausible from the British point of view. Great Britain and Germany were modern industrial powers. Both wanted to preserve the Chinese empire and the
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open door. The scheme broke on the fact, so easily ignored, that Germany—unlike Great Britain—was still in Europe. A Far Eastern war would be for the British a war in the Far East; for the Germans it would be a continental war for survival. This price was too high to pay for the China market. The Germans had to stand aside, and consoled themselves that they were bound to gain from the inevitable war between Great Britain and Russia. The British were forced back on their own resources. Since they could not resist Russia, they played for time; and of this the Russians were always generous. As usual, the Russians planned more ambitiously than they performed. They were short of money; their railway across Siberia was not completed; their energy was exhausted once they had acquired Port Arthur. Meanwhile, the British improved their position elsewhere. In 1896 they had begun the reconquest of the Sudan. In September 1898 they destroyed the dervish army at Omdurman. At almost the same moment a French expedition under Marchand arrived at Fashoda, farther up the Nile. It arrived two years late. The expedition had been designed as a move in diplomacy. Its object was to reopen the Egyptian question and to bring the British to the conference table. Once the British army advanced up the Nile, diplomacy ended; armed strength took its place. The British refused to negotiate. They demanded Marchand's unconditional withdrawal. The French had no choice but surrender. The British army could destroy Marchand's tiny force; the British navy controlled the Mediterranean. Neither Germany nor Russia would aid France. Fashoda was a triumph for 'splendid isolation'. The British established their domination of the Nile valley entirely by their own strength—indeed with allies they would have had to share. Moreover Fashoda made British isolation still more secure. The British no longer needed the votes of associates now that their hold over Egypt rested on military strength; and the British navy at Alexandria could forget about the Straits. British self-confidence was at its height, and overreached itself. The British, having routed the French on the Nile without war, thought that they could do the same with the Boers in South Africa; and the triumph of Fashoda led straight to the outbreak of the Boer War a year later. This turned out to be a tougher affair than the British had expected; and the war absorbed all their resources for three years instead of finding them in Pretoria by Christmas. Yet the Boer War too displayed the virtues of splendid isolation. All the continental powers sympathised with a small nation struggling rightly to be free, as powers usually do when the small nation is not struggling against themselves. All of them would have liked to humiliate Great Britain, and to exploit her embarrassment. Yet the talk of a continental league came to nothing. The underlying European conflicts reasserted themselves. The Russians proposed mediation in the Boer War by the powers. The French tactfully replied that they would 564
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agree to anything which the Germans agreed to. The Germans, however, would co-operate only if the powers' mutually guaranteed their European possessions for a long period of years'—in other words, a French renunciation of Alsace and Lorraine, but (given the restriction to Europe) no backing for Russia in the Far East. The negotiations collapsed. In any case, they were futile. The British navy dominated the seas—so much so that the entire army could be sent to South Africa without any fear that the British Isles would be invaded. If all the armies of Europe had mobilised, not a single soldier would have reached the Boers. The Far East continued to be Great Britain's one weak spot; and the Boer War offered Russia the chance of easy success. The British were saved unexpectedly by the Chinese themselves. The Boxer rising of June 1900 was the greatest repudiation of the West by a non-European civilisation since the Indian Mutiny. The legations at Peking were besieged, the German minister killed. This humiliation forced Germany into the lead. An international force was sent out under the German field-marshal Waldersee: the only time in history when troops of all the great European powers served under a single commander. Intelligent observers had some excuse when they expected that European unity would be achieved in a 'consortium' for the exploitation of China. Of more practical importance, the Germans concluded with Great Britain an agreement (16 October 1900) to maintain the integrity of the Chinese empire. The Germans were only concerned to prevent the British grabbing a 'sphere' for themselves; the British, however, thought that the agreement could be turned against Russia. For a few months, the British seemed to have turned the corner and to have manufactured a Far Eastern equivalent for the Mediterranean Agreements. The Anglo-German agreement was however a bluff against Russia and the bluff was soon called. The Japanese were eager to resist further Russian expansion; but, if they were to fight a war overseas, they must be secure from the French navy. In March 1901 they asked the British to keep France neutral. The British were still at war in South Africa; they had no ships to spare for the Far East, and passed the Japanese inquiry to Germany. The Germans equivocated. They offered' benevolent neutrality'; then explained that this meant 'strict and correct neutrality', no more. The myth of Anglo-German co-operation in the Far East was exploded. The British tried to resurrect it by offering to Germany a formal alliance; but no offer could be high enough to involve Germany in a great European war. There was no formal estrangement between Great Britain and Germany. Politicians in both countries continued to talk of the 'natural alliance'; but after March 1901 it was clear that this alliance could not be translated into effective action so long as France and Russia remained independent powers. The British continued to rely on time. The Japanese were less patient.
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They resolved to clear their position one way or the other: either a pact with Russia to share the Far East and exclude all others, or an alliance with Great Britain to keep France neutral. They opened both negotiations in November 1901. The Russians were generous of words; they offered nothing. Their only serious proposal was that Japan should be excluded from the Far East like everyone else. The British were more forthcoming, particularly when threatened with the alternative of a Russo-Japanese combination. The war in South Africa was ending. The British had now ships to spare for the Far East. On 30 January 1902 Japan and Great Britain reached agreement on mutual aid if either were attacked in the Far East by two powers. In practical terms, this meant that Japan could stand up to Russia without fear of being taken in the rear by the French navy. The alliance did not necessarily imply war with Russia. Indeed both parties to it hoped that it would make compromise with Russia easier, now that they could not be played off against each other. Nor did the Anglo-Japanese agreement imply any British estrangement from Germany. On the contrary, the British assumed relations would be more cordial now that they did not have to plague the Germans with requests for help. Indeed the alliance strengthened British isolation from a European point of view. Previously they had often sought the help of one member or other of the Triple Alliance against the Franco-Russian Alliance, though always in vain. Now they could rejoice, like every other power, that the two alliances cancelled out. Yet, against all expectations, the Anglo-Japanese agreement ultimately turned international relations upside down. Not only did it eliminate the inevitable war between Great Britain and Russia on which the Germans had counted. Assisted by fantastic Russian blunders, it led to a great war in the Far East which shook the balance of power in Europe and so ended the deadlock which had given Europe a peace of unparalleled duration.

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Order in IR.5. Security Regimes .

The Anarchical Society A Study of Order in World Politics Third Edition Hedley Bull Forewords by Stanley Hoffmann and Andrew Hurrell pal grave .

The maintenance of order in any society presupposes that among its members. Or in some cases it may express the ability of the individuals or groups concerned to 51 . it has been argued.3 How is Order Maintained World Politics? Ill • We have n o w explained what is meant by order in world p o l i tics . The facts o f human al tru ism l e a d them t o recognise common interests in stabilising possessi o n . and sho w n that in some measure it exists in the m o dern system of states. O rder in this sense i s maintained by a sen se of common in terests i n tho se elemen tary or primary goals. The fact of human i n terdependence fo r materi a l n eeds l i m i ted a bundance a n d limited leads them to perce i ve a common i n terest in ensuring respect for agreements . Thus the facts of human vulner­ ability to v i olence and proneness to resort to it lead men to the sense of com m o n interests in res tricting vi olence . The questi on to which we shall n ow turn is: how is it maintained? The Maintenance of Order in Social Life In all societies. or at least among those of i ts members w ho are poli tical ly active. I t may derive from a rational calculation that the limitations necessary to sustain elementary goals of social life must be reciproca l . there should be a sense of common interests i n the elementary goals of social life . and by institutions which make these rules effective. o rder is a pattern o f behaviour that sustains the elementary o r primary goals of social l i fe. This sense o f common in terests may b e the consequence of fear. by rules which prescri be the pat tern of behavi o u r that sustains them .

Rules are general imperative princip les which req u i re or authorise prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways. such as families or clans. These rules may have the status of law. conceivable. public or private. in such a way that men wo uld act consistently with e l em e n tary social as they are t o w a r d s g u i d i n g men ' s c h o i ces amo n g It is o bj ectives simply by vi rtue of a reflex action. to define o rder in social life in terms of obedience to rules prescribing behaviour that is consistent with eiemen:tary social goals would be to mistake an apparent l y universal cause of order w i th the thing itself (see Chapter 1 ) . It is conceivable. that is to s a y . o r simply of operating procedures or 'rules of the game' . for example. W e need also t o take account of the Marxist view that rules serve as the instruments. For these reasons we need to distinguish conceptually between order in social life and the rules which help to create and maintain it. As noted above. rules might be dispensed with by an authority which relied solely upo n the enforcement of singular commands req uiring or auth orising particular person s to do particular things. of custom or etiquette . it may exp ress a sense of common val ues rather th an This sense of com mon in teres t s in achieving the elementary goa ls of social l i fe may be vague and inchoate. The con tribution of rules is to provide this k i nd o f guidance . of morality. should be respected.52 The Nature of O rder in World Politics identify w i th each o t her to the extent of trea ting each other's interests a s ends in themselves and not merely as means to an end . that in very small societies. Order might i n principle b e provided i n social life without the help of rules . In this case rules. Thus the goal of security against violence i s upheld by rules restricting the use of violence. that orderly patterns of behaviour might be inculcated by means of condi tioning. and does not in i tself provide any precise guidance as to what behaviour is consistent with these goals. and avoiding resort to any general imperative pri ncipte. but by rules which spell out the kind of b ehaviour that i s orderly . and the goal of stability of possession by the rule that rights of property. Order in any society is maintained not merely by a sense of comm on in terests in creating o rder or avoiding disorder. the goal o f the s tability of agreements by the rule that they should be kept. also. not of the common interests of members of a . comm o n inte rests . d i rected alter n a t i v e courses o f actio n . and what behaviour is not. w o u l d n o t be necessary.

but rather to change the terms o f these rules in such a way that they cease to serve the special interests of the presently dominant elements. any effective rule o f conduct is normally violated from time to time. an expectation in general that agreements will be carried out . will bear the stamp of those dominant e lement s . But t h a t t here should b e lim i ts o f some kind on resort t o violence . The obj ective of th ose elements in any society which seek to change the existing order is not to have a society in which there are no restrictions on violence . and if there were no possibility that actual behaviour would differ from prescribed beh aviour. i s not a special interest of some members of a society but a general interest of all of them . They p lay a part in social life only to the extent that they are effective. But rules by themselves are mere intellectual constructs . must be o beyed to some degree. and no rights of property. Thus the particular kinds of limitations that are imposed o n resort to violence . but rather o f the speci al interests o f i ts ruling o r d o m i nant members . But a rule. I t is o f co urse the case t h a t all actual systems o f social rul es are imbued with the special i nterests and values o f those who make them . While i t is important to take account of this insig h t in s t u dying the role o f rules.Ho w is Order Main tained in World Polit ics? 53 society . The special interests o f the dominant elements in a society are reflected in the way in which the rules are defined. on the contrary. Where rules are not mere intellectual constructs but are socially effective in this sense. to be effective in s ociety. Si nce the infl uence exe rted by members o f a society in the process of making the rules is likely always to be uneq ual . and rules of p roperty of some kind . or the kinds of rights of property that are enfo rced . no rules req uiring agreements to be kept. The effectiveness of a rule does n ot consist in i ts being carried out by all those persons or groups to which it applies in every instance. the kind of agreements whose binding character is upheld. This is an importan t i n s ight into the social function of all rules. any historical s ystem of rules will be found to serve the interes ts of the rul ing or dominant elements of the society m o re adequately than i t serves the interests o f t h e o thers. even those who elect to violate it. and i s especially val i d i n relati on to the fu nct ion of rules o f law. this is i n part at least because there are . and must be reckoned as a factor in the calculations o f those to whom i t applies. in international society as in o ther societies . there would be no point in having the rule. it does not inval i date the present analysi s .

but for w hich the system of niles w ould be bound to break down . and not all of them may be But ( i ) The rules m u s t b e made. in the broadest possible sense. or embrace the val ues implied or presupposed by the rule s . and the existence or non-existence of breaches of a rule. have t o be settled if rules are to provide guidance for actual behavio ur.below may not be exhau stive. not guaranteed by t he rules themselves. may require for their efficacy that steps be taken to establish and maintain police fo rces.54 The Nature of O rder in World Politics institu tions which carry out the fo llo wing functions. (v) The rules need to be. whether this penalty takes the form of coerci on any societ y the maintenance of effect ive rules will depe n d on conditions. (vi) The rules need to be legit im ised in the eyes of the persons or groups to which they apply. listed . for exa m p le. (iv) The rules must be interpreted . enf orced ­ if rules are to be effective.questions arising abo ut the - they must be stated or advertised in such a way that their content is known to those to meaning of a rule. or merely that of reciproca l non­ compliance by other persons or gro ups bound by the rule. (vii) The rules m u s t be capable of adaptation to changing needs and circumstances . prisons. the relati onship between rules in cases of conflict. must be carried out if th e rules are to be observed . courts. Rules are legitimised to the extent that members of the society accept them as valid. To the extent that the rules are legitimised they do n o t depend for their effectiveness on sanctions or enforcement. In (viii) The rules must be 'protected' agai nst developments in the to non-comp liance. a department of j ustice . (ii) The rules must be communicated whom they apply . something l ike th e fo llowing must obtai n . and so on. 1 . society likely to undermine the effective operation of the rule s . The rules prohibi ting or restricting violence in the m o dern state.there m ust be ways of rescinding or modifying old rules and replacing them with new ones. (iii) The rules must be administered in cases where acts. anci l l ary to what is prescribed in the rules themselves. there needs to be some penalty attached or some o ther kind of sanction. The functions esse n tial for the effectiveness of a rule in any given case. that is t o say they m ust b e form ulated and promulgated as rules for this socie ty.

to use fo rce. only the governmen t is able to employ force while being regarded by membe rs of the society at large as within its rights in doing so. A government is distinguished from o t h e r . Insurgent gro ups show that they understand this inte rconnection when they devote as much attention to undermining the government's right. whose formal functi o n i s t h e interpretation of laws rather than t h e making of them . The government helps to make elementary social rules effective within the modern state by carrying out all the functions that were outlined in the last sectio n . But the role of the government in prom oting the effectiveness of elementary social rules i s a central one . (i) The government makes rules . i t possesses a near mono p oly o f the legi timate use of force: apart from certain residual rights of se lf­ defence that are accorded to the individual. whose formal function is the tran s l a­ tion of law into ord ers. I t is just as important to a government that its use of force should be legitimate as tha t i t should b e overwhelming. i t possesses actual force at its disposal that is overwhelming i n relation to that which is commanded by any other group. and judicial bodies.not always in the sense that it invents them or first states theiJl . While the making of rules in the modern state is formally the function of the legislature . o r set of c o n necte d i nstitutions. in the eyes of the population. as to combating that fo rce with force of their own . individuals and g roups other than the s tate also undertake them. institutions with i n t h e modern state b y i t s ability t o call on physical force .but in the sense that it fixes upon them society's imprimatur or stamp of approvaL In the modern state this process of rule-making results in a special set of rules which we refer to as ' the law ' . On the one hand .Ho w is Order Maintained in World Order i n the Modern State Politics? 55 W i t h i n t h e m od e r n s t a t e an i nsti tut i o n . is avai lable to help make elementary s ocia l r u l es effective: governme nt. It is not only by the government that these functions are carried out. On the other hand . These two aspects o f a govern m e n t ' s coercive p o w e r a r e c o n nected inasm uch a s t h e coll apse o f a government's legitimacy may make possible a combination o f fo rce against it such that its fo rce is no longer overwhelming. it is familiar that the rule­ making or legislative function is carried out not only by legislatures but by administrative bodies.

(v) The government is also able to enforce the law through the use . of the police and armed forces and through the sanctions imposed by the courts. The publica tion o f statutes and co u rt records. and the threat o f the use. (iii) T h e government a l s o administers or gives effect to t h e rules. t o remove social or economic grievances . (vii) The governmen t may also adapt the rules to changing circumsta nces and demands by havi ng its legislature repeal or amend old laws and enact new ones. by the infl uence it has over education and public information. (viii) T h e government carries o ut the function o f 'protection' o f the rules th rough the political act ions it takes to set the social scene in such a way that the rules will continue to operate. and its ability to project itself as the symbolic embodiment of the values of the society and to mould the political cul ture in a manner favourable to acceptance of the rules a s l e gitimate. to suppress irreconcilable agi tators or to heal social cleavages or bridge antagonisms that threaten to bring about the b reakdown of society . This is fo rmally the function of the executive branch . the w ork of the pol ice in apprehending. the powers of persuasion of its own leaders. The invocation of a rmed forces to crush a rising or expel a foreign invader exemplifies this 'pro tection' . So do measures taken by the government to appease poli tica l dissatisfaction . (vi) The government can contribute to the legitimisation of the rules . (ii) The government helps to communicate the rules to those who translating them from general pri nciples into requirements that particular persons do o r refrain from doing particular things. but the legal system as a whole is underpinned by the governmen t ' s coercive power. the acceptance of them as valuable in themselves. all contribute to the spread i n g of an awareness of what r u l es are treated by society as rules of l a w . the act ual enforcement of the rules by the p ro secu tion of offenders. deterri ng or punishing o ffe n d e r s . their meani ng or their relationship to one another . and by having its adminis­ trators execute the law and its judges i n terpret it in such a way as to change its content . (iv) T h e government i s a b l e t o interpret t h e rules . which is in fact normally carried out by o ther arms of the government as wel l .56 The Nature of Order in World Polit ics are bo und by them .t o reso lve uncertainties about the validity of rules . .principally through its jud icial arm. but a speciali sed b ranch is not necessarily presupposed by this function. Particular legal ru les may not be backed up by explicit sanct ions.

the local . not by d i rectly upholding or implementing the rules. the Bwamba of Uganda. b u t wh ich their operation nevertheless presupposes . the kinship o r the rit ualistic roles of these persons or gro ups may have n o mea ning in the cul ture of t h e societies themselve s . the L ugb ara of Uganda and Congo and the Konkomba of Togoland . that fulfil political roles. order among sta tes cannot be. of government. Apart from the attention given by political theorists to notional s tateless societies. A l l o f these societies a re witho u t a or government in the sense de fined above a n d a re . the Western Dinka and the Mand ari of southern Sudan.Ho w is Order Main tained in World Politics? 57 What these miscellaneous poli tical acts have i n common is that they are all directed towards the preservation of o rder. wi thout central political insti tutions . But primitive stateless societies also present this spectacle o f ' o rdered anarchy' . and the largely speculative accoun ts of them given by historians such as M aine and M a i tland. T h e distinctions wh ich a v i l lage. primitive stateless societies were not subject to empirical obse rvation and system atic analysis until they attracted the a tten tion o f twentieth-centur y anthropologists? Pri m itive societies tha t have been iden tified as sta teless by the latter include the Nuer. m o u lding or m anaging the socia l en vironment in which the rules operate in such a way that they have the o p p ortuni t y of continuing to d o so . while there are persons o r b odies within them. a society without govern­ ment. They belong to a sphere of action which the rules themselves may not regulate and may even impede. fo r interna­ t i onal society is an anarchical society. i t is said of some of them that they con tain no specialised political roles at all. the Tallensi of Northern Nigeria. Order in Primitive Stateless Societies O rder within the modern state is the conseq uence. . among other t h i n gs. in additi o n . such as heads of a family or lineage group or distinguished from t h e other roles they have . b u t by shap ing. Indeed . these roles are not fo rmal l y outside o bservers d raw between the political.of any kind . and i t i s worth considering t h e resem blances a nd d i fferences between the ways in which o r d e r is c re a ted and maintained in the one case and in the other. execu tive j udicial .legislativ e .

legi timising. based on both sides on the exercise of subjectively legi timate self-help . these functions are carried out solely by gro ups . may develop. I n the absence of any central authority. h owever. the enforcement of the rules is . In the shaping of this conduct rules play a vital part. such as cursing by the elders of a that conduct with i n them conforms to elementary goals of social by m o ral and religious belief. and a sustained conflict. become embodied i n ·custom' and are confi rmed course also a familiar source of rules in centralised political systems. especially if they are small societies. i n primitive stateless societies it is the only source of rules. the legitimacy of the retaliation may be accepted on both sides and the matter brought to an end. adm ini st ering. and of attempting to enforce them . on their own behalf (or on behalf of one of their members) their j udgemen t is likely t o be imperfect. and thei r effectiveness depends o n the carrying out of the order­ m a i n tai n i n g functi o n s of mak i n g th ese rules. com m u n i c a t i n g . But in others the legi timacy of the act may be disputed . The killing of a member of a lineage or locality group. adap ting and •protecti ng' them . Since.s uch as lineage groups and locality groups . Wh ere s uch s a n c t i o n s are i n s u ffi c i e n t to deter or p u nish violations of rules. and by ritual or supernatural sanctions. Since both groups will be interpreting the rules. by 'moral' sanctions such as public ridicule and rep ro ba­ tion. In societies that a re culturally homogeneous. there m a y b e a res o rt t o •self-help' on t h e part of groups within the society which take upon their own sho ulders the responsibi lity of determining that there has been a breach of the rules. interpreting. and the fact s of the case. sanctions such as these will often be s ufficient in themselves. enforcing.i n to which these stateless societies are d ivided . I n circumstances in which the bonds between the groups are very strong. Custom or established practice is of tribe. their ability actually to enforce the rules will depend on the amount of force at their com mand and their will to use it. for example. may lead that group to undertake a retaliatory killing of the guilty party or another member of his group .58 The Na ture o f Order in World Polit ics At the same time these societies clearly exh i bi t o rder in the sense coexis tence. Rules d o n o t emanate from any cen tral rule-making authority but arise out of the practice of lineage o r local ity groups i n their relations w i th o ne another. Conformity to these rules is bro ught about by conditioning and inertia . moreover.

Prim i tive anarch ical socie ties clearly have important resem­ blances to international society in respect of the mai ntenance of o rder. in additi o n t o p roviding rules w i t h a coercive sanction . for exampl e b y t h e principle t h a t re taliation m ust proportionate to the offence. The fo rce which they employ. o rder depe n d s constitutional p rinciple. they are also. be In primi t i ve anarchical society . i s limited. politically .help doe s n o t repre se n t disregard o f the rules and the descent of the groups conce rned into a Hobbesian state of na ture . the government (but not the government excl usively) carries out in mak i n g rules effective. avail a ble to a ny i ndivid u a l or group within the society. I n both cases. sovereign states in international society . in addi tion t o being an attt!mp t to enfo rc e a rule against this par ticular violation. 3 Not only do they help. to maintain its cohesion. if it is legitimate.lineage and l ocal ity groups i n primitive stateless socie ties. to which Roger Masters has d rawn attention: they 'serve to unite social groups and to maintain legal and moral cri teria of right and wrong' . M o reover. also serve two further functions.respo nse to what they j ud ge to be a violation of the rules is accepted throughout these societies as legiti m a te . a means of restating the rule itself. app lying and enforcing the rules. in do i n g so they a re confined by rules limiting the activ i ty of sel f-help i ts e l f. which singles out cer tain groups as the sole bodies competent to discharge these political functions.Ho w is Order Main tained in World Polit ics ? 59 bo und t o b e uncertai n . in a modem state. There is not a general right to self-he lp. The nature of the force emp loyed. Y e t the reco urse t o self. Reso rt to force by these groups in. Acts of self-help in primitive stateless societies. of underlining its continued validi ty and enduring importance . I n both cases some element of order is maintained des p i t e the absence of a central authority commanding overwhelming force and a monopoly of the legitimate use of i t . stated o r implied . while individ uals and groups other than these m ust look to the privileged. i t represen ts the oper­ ation of a sys tem i n which these group s a re assum i ng the functions of i n terpre t i ng. only those groups th a t are enti tled to reso rt to violence may do s o . as i n upon a fundamental or i n terna t i o n a l society . t h i s is achieved through the assumption by particular groups . by galvanising a group in support of violent action against an outside group. moreo ver. may only be used in respo nse to a violation of rights.of the functions which . also . In both societies the politically competent groups m�y It::g itimately use force in defence o f their rights.

on the one hand . Politically competent units in primitive anarchical societies are so related that while any two of t hem are in conflict for certai n purposes they are com bined fo r certain other purposes. A given lineage group does not necessarily exerci se exclusive stateless societies lineage groups are divided into segments. p rimitive stateless societies are also remarkable . These include fo rce in the factors of mutual deterrence or fear of unlimited conflict. p rim itive society) in preserving a system of co llabora t i o n . The state in international and its H o wever.el merge i n to larger segments at others . the d i fferences b etween intern a t i o n a l society a n d t here are crucial differences between the units that ate poli tically s ociety is sovereign in that it has supreme jurisdiction over its ci tizens p o litical powers in primi tive society . each unit . for the structure of rules to break warring tri bes or states are better descri bed as a number in relati ons be tween t hese poli tically competent groups are themselves In pri m i t i ve anarchical societies. The l ineage or locality groups which exercise s uch exclusive rights in relatio n to the persons that make them up. by contrast. Whereas at one level these units may parts of a larger segment. fo r protect i o n . Segments of a lineage which are units at one lev. the o f habit or inerti a . outside the structure of rules itself. B u t in b o t h there is a tendency . In some and merging . and intuitively felt whateve r their short-term interest in destroying i t . I n the first place com petent in the two sorts of society . of primitive anarchical society a n d modern in ternational society there the p o l i t ically competent groups to confo rm to them . circumscri bed by a struc t u re of acknow ledged n o rm ative pri n c i p l e s . rather than resort to fo rce e v e n at t imes o f v i o l e n t struggle . the l o n g-term i n terests they h ave are factors operating. both c o n tending societies than as a single society . and there is a constant process of segmen tation it is composed . t he down. as in internati onal society. at higher levels they are united as subordinate illustrate wha t has been called ' the principle of complementary opposition' in primitive stateless societies. inducing (consci o usly rationalised in the modern world. authori t y over within them the perso ns o f which territory . These shifting combinations and divisions be in competition . d uring t hese periods of struggle.60 The Nat ure of Order i n World Polit ics compete n t gro u ps themselves . do not have any and usually have a less clearly defined relationship to territory. Thus. and the society to fall apart to such an extent that the Final l y .

but o n the other hand there is no relationship o f conflict between units that is not overlaid with some element of co-operation also. stateless societies appear to depend up o n it to a special degree . where it figures as a system of sacred values . system'. as fabric that embraces the whole of mankind society that is culturally heterogeneous. they appear to have a less self­ sufficient existence· and to be less in troverted or self-regarding than are the members of the society of states . is cultura lly heterogeneous . removed to a mystical plane. on the basis of the African systems they s tudied. the inclusive society. Nor d o societies politically compe tent u n i ts in p r i m i ti ve a n a r ch i c a l defi ned p o ssess exclusive j u risdict i o n o v e r p recise l y territorie s . that a high degree of common culture was a necessary condition of anarchical s tructures . as it were . while only heterogeneous culture. but are related less exclusively than is the modern s ta te to the persons that belong to them and to areas of land . By a society's culture we mean its basic system of values. out order-maintaining functions in the stateless societies that have been considered do not have exclusive rights to tracts of territory defined by precise. who contend that primitive societies are 4 But the lineage groups that based on both blood and territory. carry . especially at the present time. the premises from which its thought and action derive. The view o f Sir Henry Maine t hat in primi tive societies political solidari ty arose only out of ties of b lood and never ou t of comm on possession of a tract of territory has been rejected by modern anthropologists. accepted boundaries. primitive stateless societies are marked by a high degree of cultural homogenei ty .Ho w is Order Main tained in World Politics? 61 engages i n confl ict sufficient to generate a sense o f identity and maintain its i nternal cohesi on. 'is. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard wrote. All primitive societies appear to depend upon a commo n culture. Fortes and Evans-Pri tchard came to the tentative conclusion. today a politica l - is par excellence a A third point of contrast is that primi tive stateless societies rest 'The social not simply on a cul ture that is homogeneous but also o n one that includes the element of magical or religious belief.or. Because the politically competent groups in primitive stateless societies are not sovereign over persons and territory . a central authority could weld toge ther peoples of it has sometimes been called. 5 But the society of sovereign states . A second point of contrast is that whereas modern international society.

the natural law. the secular world that emerged from the and s u b s t i t u tes t h a t h a v e been bro ught forward religi o u s aut h o rity . more able to absorb new intellec tual challenges and p reserve some measure of continuity .000 square miles . Order in International Society The maintenance of order in world politics depends. numbered mankind and all the earth . the underpi nning of their rules by magical and religious belief. on certain contingent facts which would make for order . there are gross differences in size between international society and primitive stateless societies . . their cultural homogenei ty. and their small and in timate nature. The maintenance of order in in ternati onal society has to take place not only in the absence of government but also in the absence of social solidarity of this sort . what is shown by these poi n ts of contrast is that the forces making for social cohesion and solidari ty are very much s tronger i n primitive a narchical societies than in international socie ty. The vari o u s in t h e last th ree centuries in the attempt to validate or authen ticate the rules of i n ternational society . The Nuer. the interests o r ' n eeds' of states.are all inferior to religious authority in terms of their power to produce social cohesi o n because they are all subject to question and debate .000 in an area of 26. by contras t .62 The Nature of Order in World Politics bey o n d cri t icism or r ev i s i o n . The society of s tates embraces all Together. all i ndicate that though government is lacking in these systems. But they d o not approach a magical or religious system of values in­ terms of their social impact. Finally. The moral bases o f international society may be less brittle than those of primitive societies. . the l a w common t o 'civi l i sed states' . The less exclusive and self-regarding nature of the political units of which primi tive s tateless societies are composed. in the first instance. not subject to the shattering impact that was made by Christian and I slamic civilisations on sub­ Saharan African and Oceanic systems. ' Internati onal society. hence the wars o r feuds be twee n seg�ents of a soci e ty l i ke the N uer or the Tallensi are kept within collapse o f ecclesias t i c a l 6 bouruls by m ystical sa nctions . an impressive degree of socia l solidarity is not. the cust omary practice o f states. the largest-scale society s tudied by Fortes and Evans-Pri tchard . 300. is p a r t of the modern w o r l d .

internati onal system q ui te fortui tously. Within international society . However. i n the sense of being independent of the way state ends or purposes are perceived by particular decision-makers. prosperity. for example. and institutions that help t o make these rules effective. Whether or not B u t whether or not x x does serve as a means to any particular end is a matter of o bjective fac t . a s i n other societies. the conception of national interest or i nterest of state does have some meaning i n a situation in which national o r state . rules prescribing behaviour that sustains these goals. Thus the criterion of ' national interest' . i d e o l ogical o bjectives or Still less does i t provide us with a cri terion that is o bjective. i t may help to limit violence. To provide such a guide we need to know what ends he does o r should p ursue . common rules or common institutions . A balance of power. to render undertak ings credible o r to safeguard governments from challenges to thei r local s upremacy . and the conception of interest in i tself tells us nothing about either. or 'interest of state' . but of a sense o f common in terests in the elementary goals o f social life. or any attempt t o regul ate or institutionalise i t . however. is i n h i s i nterest will depend n o t o n l y o n this but also on what ends he is actually pursuing. they formed an internati onal system o n l y .Ho w is Order Main tained in World Politics? 63 even i f states were without any concep ti o n o f common interests. securi ty. in the a bsence of any belief that it serves common interests. may arise in an Common Interests To say that x is in someone's i nterest is merely to say that it serves as a means to some end that he is pursuing. in i tself provides us with n o specific guidance ether i n interpreting the behaviour o f states or in p rescri bing h ow they should behave unless we are told what concrete· ends or o bjectives states do or should p u rsue: whatever. both as to what a person d oes do and as to what he should d o . It does n o t e v e n provi d e a basis for dis tinguishi ng m oral o r ideol ogical considerations in a country's foreign policy from non-mo ral or non-ideol ogical ones: for x can be in a country's interes t i f it serves as a means to a moral or ideological objective that the country has. o rder i s the consequence n o t merely of contingent facts such as this. and not also an interna­ tional society. in other word s . I t fol lows from this that the concepti on of interest is an empty or vacuous guide. If i t does arise.even if.

an approach to foreign policy based on the national i nterest may thus be cont ras ted with one consisting simply of the uncritical pursui t of some established policy. of moral rules. as in o ther societies. or they may be merely operational rules or 'rules of the game' . as against those of some other group. It may have its origins in rational calculation that the wil lingness of s tates to accept restrictions on their freedom of action i s reciprocal. Or it may be based also on the treatment of these goals as valuable in themselves and not merely as a means to a n end . of custom or established practice. or one based on the i nterests of some group wider than the state . such as an alliance or international organisation to which it belongs . the sense of commo n interests in elementary goals of social life does not in itself provide precise gui dance as to what behavi our is consistent with these goals.64 The Nature of Order in World Polit ics ends are defined and agreed .u t verbal an operational rule. may be contrasted with one based on a sectional i n terest. narrower or wider. they are uni ted in viewing these goals as i n strumental to them . and the question at issue is by what means they can be promoted. These rules may have the status of internati onal law. worked out witho u t formal agreement o r even witho.i t may express a sense of common values as well as of common interests . The maintenance of o rder in international society has as its starti ng-point the development among states of a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life. then to become established practice . It is not uncommo n for a rule to emerge first as . A p olicy based on the idea of the national interest. or one consisting simply of unconsidered reactions to events. to do this is the function of rules. moreover. To speak o f the national interest as the cri terion at least directs our attention to the ends or objectives of the n ation or state. then to attain the status of a moral principle and fi nally to be incorporated communicatio n . should be based on pursui t of the n a ti onal interest is to insist that Rules In international society. To say that a state's foreign policy whatever s teps are taken should be p art of some rationa l plan of actio n . However different and con flicting their obj ectives may be. Their sense of comm o n interests may derive from fear o f unrestricted violence. of the ins tability of agreements or of the insecurity of their independence or sovereignty.

The daily actions of states . though t and action. Here we shall men tion only three complexes o f rules that play a part i n the maintenance o f international o rder . and t he law of the sea . in resisting the claims of supra-state or sub-state groups to wrest these rights and competences from them . it now . such basic rules effective. as op}>osed to such alternative idea s as human beings. the idea of international society identifies the relation­ common rules and committed to common institutions. or a Hobbesian state of nature or state of war. fo r example. of many of the rules now embodied in multilateral treaties status. does require that one or what is incompatible with order on a wo rld scale is a discord of O n the o ne hand. First. I t i s emphasised elsewhere i n this study that there i s nothing historically inevitable or morally sacrosanct about the idea of a society of states. this appears to have been the genesi s. dipl omatic and consular The range of these rules is vast. a cosmopolitan community o f individual s up reme n o rmative pri nciple o f the p o l i tical organisation the fundamental or constitutional normative princi ple o f world idea of a society o f states. the idea o f international society identifies states as members o f this society and the units competent to carry out political tasks within it. competing principles of universal political organisation. ship between the states as that of members of a society bound by excludes the conception o f world poli tics as a mere arena or state This fundamental or constitutional p rinciple of internati onal it thus order is presupposed in ordinary state conduct. of war.display this . and in combining wi th each o ther to this end. and over much of this range they are in a state o f flux. or conventions concerning the laws of war. it thus excludes conceptions which assign this as universal authorities above it o r sectional groups within it. and d oes so ano ther of these basic ideas should be clearly in the ascendancy. there is the complex of rules t h a t states what may b e called poli tics in the present era .How is Order Main tained in Wo rld Politics? 65 in a legal convention . even in the present phase. as the mankind.in arrogating to themselves the rights or competences of principal actors in world politics. on the contrary. This is the principle that iden tifies the that of a universal empire . O rder on a world scale however. Nor does this idea in fact monopolise human of has always had to do battle with competing principles. including the tasks necessary to make its poli tical competence to groups other than the state. On the o ther hand.

In addition. particular formulation of international law. The or to any is p r i o r interna t i o n a l l a w . moral. the s o v er e i g n s o v e re i g n and by treating war as violence that purposes for which a legitimate violence to s tates and to deny i t to other agents by co nfi nin g a p a r ti c u l ar kind of violence called 'war' . · These rules seek to confine the le gi t i m a te use o f violence to all.le ga l . Given the guidance Second. it had to meet the of groups other than t he state to a place in universal political not a sta t i c principle. . Furthermore. o r so as to em pl oy no more violence than necessary. It is challenge of doctri nes t he formative stages of i n tern at i on a l society .66 The Na t ure of Order in World Politics principle and provide evi dence of its central role. expressed in c u s tom to or has been the predominant doctri ne that states are the o n ly or the treaty . as m a nn e r th e L eag u e o f N a t i on s . or in such a way as to i nsist i n g that war be con d uc t ed w h ich s o v ere ign states conduct war. who are the members of in te rn a tio nal society . but is s ubj ect to constant development. The basic ru le pacta sunt servanda. by establishing the ri gh t s and duties of neutrals an d be ll i gerent s in relation to one a n ot h e r . for a j u s t cause. They include. that they alone have the right to use fo rce to uphold it. as insisted by the Covenant o f s y s tem . the rules seek to limit the ca u s es or is wa ge d on the authority of a sovereign for e x a m p l e by requ i r i ng that it be b egu n state can l egiti m a tel y beg i n mai ntai n ed states o ther pr oce d ure s had been tried fi rst. and at the present time it faces a similar challenge. pursued. these rules set out the minimum conditions of their c o existence. The principle i s contained in a num ber of b asic r u le s of international l aw . Thus it principal be a rer s of righ ts and duties in i n ternational law . in by or by requiring that i t be begun only after certain th e natural-law doctrines of t he formative era of the a war. The ru l es also have sought to in a wa y p ro p ort i on a t e to the end s p are non-combatants. and that its source lies i n the c o n se n t o f states . the rule s h a v e s o ugh t to restrict the geographical s p rea d of a war. customary and ope rationa l . t here are what may be called 'the rules of coexistence' . it is manifest i n a whole complex of rules . first of su ppl ied b y the con s t i t uti o nal principle a s to c o m pl ex of rules which restrict th e pl a ce of v io l e nc e in world p o l it i cs . state. In w h ic h pr o cla i med th e righ t of i nd i v i d u a l s and o rga n i s a ti o n . for ex a m p le by restrict the p re s c ri be s the behaviour a pp ro p ri a te to sustain the go a l of the ca rry i n g There is a fu rther c o m p l e x of rules of coexistence which out of unde}:"takings . h owever. principle.

Ho w is Order Main tained in World Politics ? 67 so me times seen as a p resupposition of the law of n a tion s .whether on universal or on a more limited scale . Su bordinate or q ualifying rules concern whether or not good fai th need be kept with heretics or infide l s . At the heart o f this complex of rules is the principle that each state accep ts the duty to respect the sovereignty o r supreme j urisdiction o f every other state over its own citizens and domain. whether or not a n d i n what sense agreements are valid that are imposed by force . not merely of a political and strategic. This includes the rules that facilitate co-operation. but also of The growth in this century of legal rules concerned with co­ a social and economic nature . Third. whether or not agreeme n t s remain valid i n changing circums tances a n d who i s t h e jud ge as t o whether or n o t they have changed. social. The rules o f coexistence also i nclude those which prescribe behaviour that sustains the goal o f the stabilisation o f each state's control or jurisdiction over its own persons and territory . in return for the right A corollary or near-corollary o f this central rule is the rule that to expect similar respect for its own sovereignty from other states. Another is the rule establishing the 'equality' of all the sense of their lik e enj oyment of l i k e rights o f sovereignty. established the presumptio n o n whic h alone there can be point in entering into agreements a t all . states will not intervene forcibly o r dictatorially in o ne ano ther' s states in internal affairs . what the circumstances are i n which a party to an agreement ca n be re leased from i t . Nevertheless . operation between states in economic. whether o r not and to what extent a new government succeeds to the obligations of its predecessors . . but rather to those more advanced or secondary goals that flre a feature of an international society in which a consensus has been reached about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence. and so m etime s as a firs t principle o f i t. 6). and s o on. what are the principles according to which agree m ents should be interpreted.above and beyond what i s necessary for mere coexistence . there is the complex o f rules concerned to regulate co­ operation among states . these niles may be said to play a role in rel a tion to international order. communications and environmental matters exemplifies the place of rules o f co-operation and will be considered later (see Chapter Rules of this kind prescribe behavi our that is appropri ate n o t to the elementary or primary goals of international life.

which t he status of moral rules. Rules of general application. like the rules of coexistence. Institutions In in ternational society it is the mem bers of the society themselves ­ sovereign states .which are chiefly responsible for performing the functions of helping to make the rules effective. and sometimes back again . Nor i s i t appropriate here to consider which of them has the status o f law. provide the means whereby interna tional society moves from the vague perception of a commo n interest to a clear conception of the kind of conduct it requires. as when they sta te that they· respect the l egal principle o f the sovereignty of s tates. which should be seen as custom ary o r as operational rules. or the operational rule that great powers should . States com m unicate the rules through their official words. and are in some cases confirmed by multi­ l ateral conventions. nor to trace the histo rical evolution through which these rules have passed from o n e of these em bodiments to another.68 The Na ture of O rder in World Politics inasmuch as the development of co-operation and con sensus am o ng stat-es about these wider goals may be expected to strengthe n the framework of coexistence. by signifying their conse n t to them. Thus states undertake the function of making the rules. or legislating. Rules that apply only to particular groups of states m ay also arise out of custom and established practice .as do the operational rules of crisis avoidance and management now being evolved by the great powers . This i s not the place to expound t hese three complexes of rules i n ful l . o r the moral p rinciple of national self­ determination. they do so in the a bsence of either a supreme government. In this sense i l is s tates themselves that are the principal insti tutions of the society of states. or the degree of s olidarity among themselves that characterises the performance o f these function s by politically competent groups in primitive stateless societies . It is sufficient to note that the vast and changing corpus of rules and quasi-rules.but they may also be the subj ect o f explicit agreements o r treaties. which is able to undertake these functions in the modern state. or to examine t h e pro b lems o f i n terpreting them o r reconc i l i ng the conflicts between them . arise out of custom and established practice. of which t hose ci ted are part of the central core.

Ho w is Order Main tained in World Politics? 69 not i n terfere in each other's spheres o f influence . on its own legal advisers.it . States undertake the task of changing or adapting operati onal. of them . But the y a lso such a way as to indicate that they accept or do not accept t h a t a communicate the rules through their actions. i n the absence of a central authority. or a host o f other matters). Because states a re frequently not in a posi tion to carry out effective acti on in defence of their rights. or the guarantors of a neutralisation are designated as the States administer the rules of interna tional society inasmuch as arrangement. when they beh a v e in particular rule is valid . which may resort to acts of self-help. or the arbi ters of a d i spute) o r by internati o nal organisations which are responsi ble to them (as when organisa­ post and telecommunications. the enforcement of the rules is uncertain. Because the com munication of the rules is i n the hands o f states themselves . a n d n o t o f an authority i ndepende n t favour of t h e interests o f particular states . is carried out by states. and there is n o conclusive way in which dent authority. but have to d o so in the absence of a universal legislative authority competen t to . The enforcement Each state provides its own interpretation of the rules . the advertisement of t h e rules is commonly disto rted i n executive acts ancillary to the rules themselves are performed e i t h er by themselves (as w hen particu lar states depository states for a treaty. of consensus or solidarity among states.legal. moral or legal rules. tions are set up to implement agreements concerning international moral or operational. by employing their powers of persuasion and propaganda to mobilise an important means to the legitimisation of rules is to have them support for them in world politics as a whole. Even in the case of legal rules . a state relies disagreements about interpretation can be settled by an indepen­ is even more uncertain . The interpretation of moral or of operational rules of t h e rules. At the present time endorsed by international assemblies and international organ isa­ tions. acti ons which the state fre­ p romoting the acceptance of them as valuable in their own rigl. including acts of force. in the sense of moral and legal rules to changing circumstances. States undertake the task of legitimising the rules. in defence of their rights under operati onal. Because of the low degree committing them sees as self-help or rule-enforcement a re quen tly not viewed as such by international society at large .

guide to conduct. The rules which Finally. that they are withdrawing thei r co nsent from old rules and bes t ow ing it upon new ones.the rule that s tates should b e nation­ enactment of any legislative authority. has been called 'protection' of the rules. I n the changing of legal s t a te s . for want of a better interests among states.came to d isp lace that o f dynas tic legi timacy not or limiting conditions as having changed. i t is i tself often accompanied by disorde r. and opera t i onal rules o bserved by great powers. states undertake the task which. The function of 'protection' of m a i n tain that state or condition of the system in which respect for · The ' protection' o f the rules encompasses. The o r say that they no longer accept them. to resolve or m oderate conflicts of state interest. In rules a part is sometimes played by circumstances is part of the process whereby order is maintained. first and foremost. they c a n operate o n l y i f t h a t sense of comm o n obtain in the international political system that enable them to d o term. a n d with the handicap that should be changed . the rules t h ro u gh their words or their actions. preserve a general balance of power in the international system (and today a relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence among contend­ i n g nuclear powers). while the adap ta t i o n of the rules demonstrate that they have withd rawn their consent to them . which they seek to translate into a precise the rules compri ses all those things which states may do to create or the r ules can flourish. but by war and revolution. a re rescinded or changed when these powers show by what they do thus altering the content of custom or establ ished p ractice . w hereby they respec t one ano thers' spheres of in fluence in particular parts of the w orld . to changed sustain o rder in international society can operate only if conditions s o . and to perceived in international security. The moral principle o f by multilateral conventions o r treaties.70 The Nature of O rder in World Politics rescind old rules and devise new ones. but here also states change the old rules by violating or ignoring them systematically enough to other w o rd s . to limit o r control armaments and armed forces in relation to interests dissatisfied states for what they regard as just change. to appease the demands of . t h ere is often no consensus as to whe the r or n o t . continues to exist . States change the rules by demonstra ting. to accom modate or c o ntain co nflicts of tho se classical acts of diplomacy and war whereby states seek to ideology. o r how. or regard their boundaries natio nal self-determination . I n particular.

that they are among the necessary and sufficient conditions of its occurrence. interests. These insti tutions do not deprive states of their central role in states i n d i scharging their political functions . These institutions serve to as a surrogate central authority in the international system . o r serve a re rather an expression of the element of collaboration among a means of sustaining this collaboration. to give substance and permanence to their society. such as those which regulate the powers . The contribution of these institutions to international Functional and Causal Explanations A central theme in this study is that the rules and institutions to in relation to international order. the an habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of comm on of carrying out the political functions of international society. and to moderate their tendency to lose sight of common order. in varying degrees. o r by international law. the managerial system of the great powers. In th is study what is meant by part of the efficient causation of international order. The activities that go to another. By an institution we do not necessarily but rather a set imply of interna tional society: the balance of power.and at the same time symbolise the existence of an international society that is more than collaboration in carrying out the political functions of international the sum of its members. They goals. war. some of the measures which states take i n the course of 'pro tecti ng' the rules m ay bring make up 'protection' of the rules o f coexistence a re themselves the subject of further bodies of rules . diplomacy and the special position of the great carrying out these functio n s . in what may be called the institutions diplomatic mechanism. in which some of the rules of coexistence are st ated . international la w . and organi sation or administrative machinery.Ho w is Order Main tained in World Politics? 71 secure and maintain the acquiescence o f the smaller powers in the as s u m p t i o n by great powe rs o f speci a l righ ts and re�ponsibili ties . in the past and at present. In balance of p ower. These measures of ' p rotect ion' of the rules are n o t prescribed by the rules o f coexistence . states colla b o rate with o ne them into conflict with internati onal law . The which reference has been made carl"y out positive functions or roles statements of this kind is simply that these rules and institutions are . are considered i n Part 2. Indeed .

and that the rules and add i tional assumptions that ful filment of these needs is essential to the survi val of i nternational society. An explanation of the rules and inst i t u tions of international society that dealt o n l y with the functions they served in relation to international soc iety as a whole would overlook the extent to which international politics is better described as a state of war . the p ossi bility of describing the nature and purpose of each part in terms of what i t contributes to the ' needs' of the whole. ­ tion is that of the wholeness or unity of the society being explained . in which terms such as ' function' and ' role' have a differen t meaning . doubts m a y be The unde rlying assumption o f the ' s tructural function a list exp lana ' en tertained about its validity when applied to the society o f states. I f we can make the ·and institutions fulfil these functions is tantamount to endorsing them. In ' structural-functionalist' explanation the statement that these rules and institutions fulfil 'functions' in relation to i nternat ional order m i gh t be taken to imply that international socie t y for its own . and that fulfilment o f them can not be carried out in any other way. whatever meri ts m a y lie in the application o f ' structural-functionalist' reasoning to o ther societies.72 The Nature of Order in World Politics present study is not an attempt to app ly 's truct ural-functionalist' explanation. o r j us ti fication of. the p ri m acy of the whole over its parts in acc ounting for what occurs w ithin it. In t h e second p lace. The p resen t study is not intended to provide a rationale for. ' structura l-functionalist' explanation were accepte<l to the effect that the present rules and instituti ons of internatio nal society are essen tial to the preservation of order in it. has certain ' need s ' . Internati onal society does not display the kind of wholeness or unity that would give poi nt t o explanations of this sort. nor is it necessarily an overriding one. the descr i ption of i t as a society at all conveys only part of the tru th . the rules of coexistence in international society o r t h e instit utions that help to make them effective. survival or maintenance. indeed . I t is emphasised in this study that society is only one of a num ber of competing elements in internati onal po l itics . Thus even if a . In t h e first place i t is emphasised here that order is not the on ly value in international politics . it would not follow from this that they were to be endorsed . then to say that these rules institutions in question are fulfilling those needs .

like modern natio n-states or prim i t i ve societies marked by a high degree of social consen s us and solidarity. cannot be readi ly enco mpassed in a theory w hich seeks to rela te a l l . even when this is societies disp laying more unity than does the society of states. o r a s a political field in which individ u als and groups o ther than the In the third place there is room for doubt abou t the basic validi ty app lied to o f ' struct ural-functio n a l ' a n alysis. Even i n those socie ties. there are forces mak i n g for anti-social or non-social behaviour which social events to t h e w o r k i n g o f the social framewo rk a s a who le.Ho w is Order Maintained in World Polit ics ? 73 state are the princi pal actors .

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The Cold War .6.

Security and International Relations Edward A. Kolodziej .

Generalizations can be validated by reference to the thinking. like states and international organizations. These insights are a good start toward the study of security. Clausewitz. and methods of studying security also evidences the formidable obstacles to progress in this vital field. as a duel between two rivals to the death or the subjugation of one to the other. and political purpose in directing the use or threat of violence. there is no reason why we can’t. If they can do that. state and non-state. Their work has stood the test of time. competing actors are induced to submit to its logic. political and socioeconomic interests and moral aims. Whether it can be directed to human purposes depends on the ability of actors to discipline force to their strategic.3 Testing security theories: explaining the rise and demise of the Cold War Hobbes. too. They compressed space and time in explaining security. can threaten each other by force since these theorists first posed the possibility of a science of security. and build on the foundations they laid to fit our times and needs. and actions of humans and their agents. Absent meaning. This triumvirate has also shown that force and coercion have a distinctive logic. These new dimensions of security must inform our security theories. understanding. The inability of the seven prevailing security schools of thought to reconcile their rival explanations. decisions. unmixed and unconstrained by any other humanly created limit. They demonstrated that humans could step out of their own time and look beyond their own particular historically defined security problems to generalize about the security behavior of actors across different societies and eras. and Thucydides laid the foundation for security studies. They are led rationally toward Hobbes’ endgame or a war of all against all or toward Clausewitz’s more narrowly conceived conception of pure war. value. There have been profound changes in warfare and in the many ways that actors. How do we distinguish and discriminate between the contradictory claims of these schools? 77 . Security can be subject to systematic study. They are scarcely enough to address the complex problems raised by international security today under conditions of growing globalization.

The typical approach of each theorist. If the test incorporates the assumptions of the school of thought that it is testing. including our triumvirate. for example.78 Introduction How do we know which school and paradigm to follow? Which merits our support? Is one more apt to be useful than another for some circumstances than others? Devising a test of security theories: the Cold War What we need is a test to evaluate the claims of these schools. the test should not favor one school over another and evaluate each equally. to resolve their differences peacefully or are incapable of constructing institutions to ensure their collective security. This failing is hardly confined to the non-expert. explained the tendency of humans either toward conflict or toward cooperation showed persuasively that they all made certain assumptions about the inherent goodness or evil of humans and about the impact of their socio-economic and political institutions on their behavior. Yet we want a test that exploits our own 1 Waltz (1959). Nor. Showing that states and peoples have been engaged in seemingly ceaseless war.1 We want to design a test that in some way captures the rival assumptions made by competing security schools of thought and their expectations about actor behavior. These first moves or “priors” were stipulated. Especially to be resisted is the seductive incentive to cite biased examples or skewed and incomplete evidence to support a particular view about the tendency of humans and their societies toward conflict and cooperation. does evidence that some states and peoples have learned to live in harmony prove that they will not fall out at a later time. does not necessarily demonstrate that they are unable. It clearly must not depend on the assumptions and expected behavior of the paradigm or approach that is being evaluated. . it could scarcely challenge that school to which it would be implicitly captive. much less conflict free. while ignoring or suppressing dissonant and dissenting fact and informed opinion. was to provide selective evidence to support a preferred “image” of human conduct and its implications for international security. A test has to meet stringent criteria if it is to be accepted as valid and reliable. implicitly or explicitly. but never conclusively validated by these theorists in terms of their presumed consequences. as some theorists contend. To minimize circular reasoning. conversely. as described by Kenneth Waltz in this analysis of social thought. A much celebrated analysis of how important thinkers through the centuries. Devising such a test will not be easy.

Our aim. Moscow and Washington constructed three mutually reinforcing military systems. The aim.2 We will need a series of competing tests conducted by many researchers over time to strengthen or weaken support for one security theory over another. a currently elusive objective. reflected in the alternative explanations of security advanced in chapters 4–7. These two competitors for hegemony. The struggle for global dominance between these two superpowers and their allies.Testing security theories 79 observations and interpretations of the “facts” as involved and active participants in defining the scope and significance of security challenges in our lives. Tests of validity are no less open to question and criticism than the propositions they test. . As one proceeds in security studies. as an eminent British cosmologist argues: Rees (2003). 2 3 Lakatos (1970. again. each capable of annihilating its rival in less than a hour – and of potentially destroying much of human life on the planet. Kahn (1960). and not a definitive method to determine conclusively which point of view to adopt or reject. and satellites generated incentives for the development of state military capabilities unprecedented in human history. The threat posed by these systems. much of the history of the Cold War would appear to initially conform to the assumptions of our first group of theorists.3 Linked to these Doomsday Machines was the creation of enormous conventional and regional nuclear forces in the center of Europe. clients. still threaten the life of the species. So the test we devise in this chapter should be understood as an introduction to the complex problem of testing our generalizations about the security behavior of actors. Central was what Herman Kahn darkly characterized as two superpower nuclear Doomsday Machines. is not to develop an infallible test of security paradigms. The evolution of the rise and collapse of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union from the end of World War II in 1945 to the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 has several properties. where Western democratic armies met those of the Soviet Union to defeat Nazi Germany. 1978) and Lakatos and Musgrave (1970). it is useful to recall Imre Lakatos’ prudent advice that one test does not necessarily disprove a theory. aside from those covered in the Introduction. First. even in diminished size since the end of the Cold War. that recommend it as a test of currently contending security theories. is to acquire the requisite conceptual skills and tools and sufficient historical knowledge and sensitivity to empirical evidence to enter debates over security as an informed participant and evaluator of knowledge and methods of learning in this vital area and as a credible evaluator or arbitrageur of rival claims. it becomes readily apparent that even the tests constructed to validate propositions are themselves sharply contested matters. rather. In this connection.

These superpower military systems. the battlefields of the Cold War extended well beyond the real or possible clash of arms to the creation of self-sustaining and enlarging techno-scientific and economic systems to furnish the military capabilities.80 Introduction much like Athens and Sparta in their struggle for leadership of the Greek peninsula. the Cold War was a contest between two models for sustained global economic development. Somehow states have to reconcile the competing demands of order and security and the violent capabilities on which they depend with policies that also respond to the expectations and demands of populations for rising and sustainable standards of living. The Western coalition offered an open. . Dominance at each level of armed conflict was conceived as mutually contingent to produce overall strategic superiority. state ownership and control of the means of production. determination of investment priorities and what goods and services would be available to consumers in allocating scarce human and material resources. interdependent military responses to their global struggle were rationalized by both states as mutually reinforcing to support their defense. trained manpower. The Soviet Union and its coalition rested their fate on centralized. and coercively enforced governmental 4 Rostow (1971). States are expected to create the conditions both for security and welfare. the scientific knowledge.4 The Cold War became then a struggle for military dominance as well as a test of two competing solutions to solve the welfare demands of the peoples of two competing coalitions. also enlisted or coercively induced other states and peoples into their global alliance structures. Domestic populations of the twentieth century have sought not only security but also increased material welfare. these taxing requirements were made even more complex by yet another requirement for success in the Cold War. and logistical infrastructure to ensure the competitiveness of these superpower military machines. liberal economic system propelled by global markets and ceaseless innovation as its solution to security and welfare. In its fullest dimensions. a product of modernization driven successively by the Industrial and Information Revolutions. bureaucratic. not market. On the one hand. These three. On the other hand. and war-fighting strategies. Second. These dimensions of the Cold War transformed the struggle in at least two fundamental ways. if unleashed in a spasm. the synergism was widely believed by decision-makers on both sides to be indispensable to win or prevail in the global competition. deterrent. would have moved rapidly toward the Clausewitz notion of pure war. and economic resources mobilized to sustain these superpower systems exposed the shortcomings of classic models of security. technological innovation.

Diamond (1992). is the historical overview of the evolution of the international system since the end of World War II to the present in Keylor (2003). since its emergence out of Africa over a million years ago. the conflict put into question the very future of the human species.Testing security theories 81 regulations.”6 The West did likewise in marginalizing the role of Communist parties in democratic coalitions and in undermining Communist or Communist-leaning governments around the world. communal interests of the peoples and states striving for ascendancy. dating back in Christian times to the Crusades and to secular ideological struggles commencing with the French Revolution. States. and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). the system of state relations. It cannot be otherwise. It was also a struggle over legitimacy before the courts of national and world public opinion. The determination of conquering armies to impose their values and way of life on others was not especially unique to the Cold War. covering all economic activities. They also had to validate the principles of legitimacy that purportedly conferred on them the authority to rule other peoples and their own populations. the Cold War went well beyond the material dimensions sketched in these security and welfare imperatives. It is characteristic of religious wars through the centuries. ranging from monetary flows and trade to consumer choices and employment. This was the first instance in the evolution of the species.5 Third. if viewed as a set of all conceivable interactions between and among relevant actors engaged in 5 6 7 Kornai (1992) provides the most comprehensive treatment of command economies and their shortcomings. too. the Cold War was truly global. . non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The entire Lebow volume should be consulted for incisive critiques of the failure of international relations theory to anticipate the collapse of the Cold War. and most of the world’s populations – all were implicated by choice or necessity in the Cold War struggle. whether by choice or necessity. even more extensive in reach and impact than World Wars I and II. ethnic. quite apart from the localized national. Joseph Stalin. Legitimacy as a Cold War imperative compelled the superpowers to justify their conflicting solutions to global security and welfare imperatives and their self-assumed roles as leaders of their competing coalitions. the Soviet leader during World War II. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. For the first time. global markets. Useful. Fourth. The Cold War. too. multinational corporations. The scope of the Cold War engaged all of the actors and principal factors identified (albeit differentially) by the security theories to be evaluated in succeeding chapters. Engaged and ensnared were all humans.7 that all the populations of the world had been drawn into the vortex of a global struggle. whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. told Milovan Djilas in 1945: “This war is not as in the past. Quoted in Koslowski (1994: 140).

cascading effects and synergisms of human exchanges across the globe over an increasing number of domains of vital interest to humans. in the brief space available to this discussion. then we will have to look farther afield than traditional thought to capture these processes of change and their implications for using. however inclusive like the Cold War. the best and brightest minds mobilized for the conflict. the advanced scientific and technological know-how committed. A security theory should be able to provide some plausible explanation for the rise and demise of the Cold War. Clearly. and the state as well as the very existence of the many and diverse societies of this global society which are largely the pre-global products of their particular histories and social evolution. offers a sufficiently inclusive set of data to test the security claims of contending schools of thought. all of these actors and factors bearing on security cannot be exhaustively addressed. then it loses ground in the competition of ideas about what explains the security behavior of actors.8 Under these new and revolutionary conditions. 8 The diversity of human societies despite the converging biological evolution of humans around the globe is addressed with remarkable clarity and force in the work of Jared Diamond (1997. If a theory of security cannot furnish insights about this pervasive confrontation of the world’s peoples and states. When applied to seven theories or approaches to security in chapters 4–7. threatening or desisting from violence in getting what actors want from each other. What appears new to the human condition is the widening scope.82 Introduction security relations in international relations. intensity. and the tens of millions who served as combatants in the Cold War struggle and in the many local hot wars associated with the conflict. the strengths and weaknesses of each perspective is exposed to analysis and evaluation. . property. If a security paradigm cannot explain the Cold War. What is important for our purposes is establishing the claim that the Cold War seriously challenges prevailing security paradigms and approaches to explain the Cold War. can it be relied upon to help us explain the dramatic and sweeping changes affecting humans today as they are increasingly entangled in what appears to be inexorable processes of globalization? If the central issue of human security is increasingly enmeshed in these processes of widening and deepening interdependence. real-time speed and impact. the billions of actors engaged. The latter pointedly concern the security of persons. The Cold War test putatively provides a level playing field on which these contesting models can compete for our assent and support to understand and explain security today. 1992). This challenge is warranted given the global scope of this struggle. accumulating density. a single test of a security paradigm. the trillions of dollars expended.

. If we should be mindful of Imre Lakatos’ prudent warning that one test is insufficient to reject a theory. Organization of the discussion The discussion is divided into two sections.Testing security theories 83 is the beginning. we should also be skeptical of any theory that fails to address the Cold War.).1. technological innovation. It is particularly critical to understand why fundamental changes in Soviet security policy were initiated as a precondition for integrating the Soviet Union into Western-dominated global institutions dedicated to scientific discovery. the fourth level of analysis. The next section broadens the analysis to describe and explain the transnational and domestic pressures bearing on superpower security decisions and actions. The break-up of the Soviet Union and its empire pivots critically on the linkage between these domestic pressures and the external forces exerted by Western institutions and practices possessed of global scope and impact. is suspect. of the search for validity and reliability. not the end. too. noted in table 1. global markets. These levels of analysis and the forces and factors associated with them were particularly pronounced in the Soviet Union. Included as a third level of analysis will be the impact of continuing scientific discovery. but enough – as the justification just outlined claims – to warrant its use for the purposes of this volume. not always with desired results. in their struggle for world hegemony. The domestic pressures on state leaders to solve welfare and popular demands for a say in their government. An explanation of the security behavior of actors risks rejection unless it can generate a research program to compensate for this shortfall in its explanatory power. The first outlines the evolution of superpower military forces at nuclear and conventional levels and the complex global alliances each superpower fashioned.9 This level of analysis will be important in explaining the security behavior of the superpowers. Since the major actors in security matters remain states. When security is viewed from these 9 Schumpeter (1954: 1026ff. Not so much is claimed for this test of validity that it. the focus is on interstate security relations as well as on the pressures exerted on states by the Cold War bipolar system – on the superpowers and on other states of the system. The Cold War serves as a plausible starting point for testing. technological innovation – what Joseph Schumpeter termed “creative destruction” – and global markets. and democratically determined social change. The factors and actors captured by the Cold War test encompass all of the levels of actor behavior with which this volume is concerned. will also be shown to play a decisive role in shaping and shoving the security behavior of states.

A generation later. they would have essentially gained control over most of the world’s populations and their resources. Keylor (2001) develops this argument at length. The latter’s late entry into the war in 1917 tipped the balance against the Central powers of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires.84 Introduction four perspectives or levels of analysis. See.) and his extensive bibliographic references (568–87). the principal elements of which are cited throughout the text of this chapter.12 The two superpowers which emerged from the war were unable to reconcile their profoundly conflicting differences. The Soviet 10 11 12 13 The history of the Cold War has spawned an enormous and growing literature. the works of Raymond Garthoff. replacing Europe’s empires by its dominating rule over a defeated United States. For the Soviet Union. France. which created the Soviet Union. The winning World War II coalition was fundamentally flawed. and the United States. Garthoff (1995). Had the latter won World War II. Russia as an Entente power in alliance with the Western democracies withdrew from the war in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917. Useful for US policy up to the Reagan administration of 1980 is Gaddis (1982). See Keylor (2001: 251ff. who chronicles the Cold War from that perspective. the Soviet Union joined the Western democracies to defeat Nazi Germany and Japan as challengers for global hegemony. principally the United Kingdom.13 Also at issue was the seizure of power by local Communist parties throughout Eastern Europe with the complicity of Soviet occupying forces. These initially revolved around the question of Germany’s political future and whether it would be aligned with one or the other of the superpowers. explaining the central decision of security behavior – whether to use force or not in pursuit of security interests – both enlarges the study of security and yet nests this sub-set of human concerns within broader ambit of international relations theory and practice.11 The German imperial bid in World War I for European and world dominance was defeated by a coalition of democratic states. The analogy of the Thirty Years War and the interwar global conflict is drawn from Keylor. particularly with respect to Moscow’s geo-political policies. . Kennan (1984a) makes this point. McCallister (2002). Britain and Soviet Union. These disputes were further complicated by differences between the United States and the Soviet Union over the civil war in Greece and Soviet pressures on Iran and Turkey for territorial concessions and increased political influence. I. are relevant. The rise and demise of the Cold War: struggle for hegemony10 The Cold War continued the Thirty Years War among the big powers for global hegemony bracketed by World Wars I and II from 1914 to 1945. for example. The brief presented here is drawn from many sources.

Superiority was defined by a competitor’s capacity to ultimately win a nuclear war if deterrence of a rival’s attack on one’s vital national interests failed. The Soviet Union’s nuclear forces jumped from 84 nuclear warheads in 1956 after a late start to over 10. Hammond. They also cooperated. Ball (1980). As for the military components of this struggle. 1. . Given space limits. it may be helpful to start at the end rather than the beginning of the superpower nuclear arms race.14 These discrete conflicts can be understood and rationalized as parts of the superpower struggle for global dominion. Central was their nuclear arms competition.Testing security theories 85 explosion of a nuclear device in late August of 1949. missile launchers and bombers also increased in number from 462 to over 1.000. the loss of China to Communist forces the following December. to place mutually agreed controls on their nuclear competition. military dominance in Europe. Freedman (1989).900. and Nolan (1989). Herken (1985). Each side sought nuclear superiority. they evolved simultaneously. launchers also increased from 22 long-range systems 14 15 These events and their implications for militarizing the Cold War are developed in Kolodziej (1966: 33–178) and in Schilling. and hegemony over the developing world. These fleeting and fragile controls did not appreciably inhibit either side from seeking a nuclear breakthrough. and the June 1950 attack of Communist North Korea on South Korea – a protectorate of the United States – prompted the militarization of American containment policy and of the Cold War conflict. on three interrelated battlefields: competition for nuclear superiority. if not in synchronous lockstep. Table 3. Neither succeeded in this quest. Kaplan (1999). as sketched below.15 Only highlights can be presented here. Tracing the evolution of US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces during the Cold War is a very complex undertaking. and Snyder (1966). the United States arsenal grew from 400 strategic nuclear warheads to over 12.1 outlines the seemingly inexorable expansion of the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Between 1950 and 1990. Both sides also assumed that political and psychological leverage in their deadly bargaining for advantage would ensue if a dominant nuclear posture could be achieved. evidenced by the ever-expanding war-fighting nuclear weapon systems they constructed. The military or coercive limits of the Cold War were defined by the ceaseless and enlarging superpower arms race from the end of World War II in 1945 until the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991.000 four decades later. The global nuclearization of the security dilemma The Cold War pivots around the efforts of the superpowers to gain ascendancy by force and coercive threats and to impose their preferred solution to global order and governance on their adversary.

985 2.612 3.361 1.559 2.477 7.127 5.216 7. Arms Control Association.616 12 1.885 1.407 400 3.500 1. US – USSR Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces (Washington.896 5.152 3.804 2.022 1.024 4 1.002 6.144 2.361 5.398 750 4 1.Table 3.054 1.000 659 12 1.1 US and Soviet nuclear strategic forces: 1950–2000 UNITED STATES Year ICBMs Warheads SLBMs Warheads Bombers Warheads Totals Launchers Totals Warheads 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 32 656 592 592 448 32 656 4.325 462 1.083 3. 1990).515 390 376 311 300 400 3.903 1. . Fact Sheets (2001).519 SOVIET UNION (to 1990) RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2000)∗ Year ICBMs Warheads SLBMs Warheads Bombers Warheads Totals Launchers Totals Warheads 1956 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 30 317 990 940 436 30 287 1.480 10.545 2.440 2. DC.444 22 104 157 157 162 80 84 320 568 568 855 626 22 144 1.244 2.398 1.094 ∗ excludes 22 launchers and 208 warheads in the Ukraine.271 6.266 84 354 2.910 2.054 1.578 462 1.568 4. Source: Natural Resources Defense Council.608 12.393 3.100 2.239 10.

The logic of “pure war. strategic forces are those capable of defeating an opponent’s military forces. They were no less aware of the difficulty of achieving superiority sufficient to disarm an adversary to dictate the terms of surrender. political aims and moral purposes would have been sacrificed to a final and decisive nuclear exchange. These were supplemented by more slowly reacting bomber forces. aims.Testing security theories 87 to 2. Warhead explosive power is measured in megatons or millions of tons of TNT. Military planners on both sides relentlessly pursued this elusive objective. each side had constructed 2. These limitations.16 They were not calibrated means to achieve defined political objectives. In the case of nuclear weapons. by implication.500 long-range launchers – ground. controlling or eliminating an opponent’s military forces. all human material interests. Even a few surviving weapons would be sufficient to visit so much death and destruction on an aggressor that no conceivable rational political or moral purpose would be served by using these weapons. . but a substitute for those aims and the moral claims underlying them. From the Cold War’s constrained perspective.500 in 1990. This restrictive sense of the term “strategic” contrasts with this volume’s broader understanding of security and. Table 3. containing.and submarine-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and bombers – capable of reaching targets around the globe in a matter of minutes. this would require nothing less than disarming a rival’s nuclear forces before he could annihilate all or most of one’s own population and territory. acted more as 16 Brodie (1946). or values. What hath humans wrought – both by authoritarian command and popular consent? The space potentially occupied by all real or conceivable human exchanges between Americans and Soviets and between their respective states was virtually enveloped by the violent forces aimed by each superpower at each other.1 traces the technological advances in launchers and warheads that comprised the evolving and expanding strategic nuclear forces of both sides. of strategy as policies calculated to achieve defined political objectives by deliberately choosing to use or not to use force. The term “strategic” is often used in security studies.000–2. assigned the mission of destroying targets otherwise missed by a full-scale missile attack. During the Cold War it was typically associated with superpower policies designed to achieve defined military objectives by countering. overwhelmed all restraining or disciplining moral or political interests. paradoxically. By the end of the Cold War.” depicted by Clausewitz. If these had been unleashed. Military planners and political leaders understood early on that nuclear weapons were weapons of terror and mass destruction.

18 Craig and Jungermann (1986) and Lewis (1979). In contrast to the announced claims of both sides that they were reconciled to a minimum deterrent posture of surviving a nuclear attack and of having 17 Enthoven and Smith (1971). These interests were viewed to extend to the territory and population of a state as well as to the protection of its principal allies.1 recounts. defined by the military plans and nuclear capabilities they developed. Such a force was defined by American strategists as the ability of the nation’s nuclear forces to survive a surprise attack and retain enough nuclear striking power to destroy one-quarter to one-third of an adversary’s population and at least 50 to 66 percent of his economic infrastructure in the prompt and delayed effects of nuclear weapons. Radioactive fallout would subsequently make much of an adversary’s territory unfit for habitation for a long period of time. critical elements of which are still shrouded in secret government documents. both far exceeded the limits of a MAD strategy and the nuclear forces it required.” Submarine-launched missiles. For almost half a century.88 Introduction a stimulus for the arms race than as an invitation to find a non-violent escape from the nuclear security dilemma. Invulnerable forces were those which could not be destroyed by an enemy attack. eventually possessed by both sides. . As table 3.” The political and practical obstacles that precluded the realization of pure war during Clausewitz’s lifetime in the early nineteenth century until the first atomic attack on Hiroshima in 1945 were essentially surmounted by the destructive capacity and long-range striking power possessed by each side. Neither superpower accepted these constraints in designing and building its strategic nuclear forces.17 On one side were those who contended that a small. that mapped well with the expectations of behavior of the Hobbesian endgame or Clausewitz’s conceptualization of “pure war. Surviving forces under this theory of deterrence would be sufficient to inflict losses on an adversary that would far outweigh any conceivable rational gain from attacking a state or its vital interests. or MAD. Since both the Soviet Union and the United States were able to build such systems. the evolution of nuclear capabilities by each side was decided by sliding and shifting answers that decision-makers gave to the question of “How much is enough?” in the way of military capabilities to ensure an effective deterrent and defense posture.18 The initial blast and heat generated by a nuclear explosion would largely achieve this level of devastation in the prompt effects of nuclear weapons. both were said to have the capacity for mutual assured destruction. both sides pursued policies. were especially suited for this purpose. even a so-called “bolt from the blue. invulnerable force of nuclear weapons was enough to deter an adversary from attacking a state’s vital interests. At the risk of simplifying an extremely complex history.

Nuclear dominance putatively enhanced the likelihood of bringing a war to a quick conclusion on terms favorable to the stronger nuclear power. The credibility of an adversary’s nuclear deterrent forces was argued to depend finally on its possible use. Holloway (1984). MAD was criticized for indiscriminately targeting urban populations. Finally. respectively. The principal targets of a war-fighting posture were the adversary’s nuclear capabilities. for a critique based. and Laird and Herspring (1984). Most decisively for partisans of a war-fighting strategy were its purported implications for deterrence. a war-fighting nuclear strategy was supposed to underwrite a superpower’s extension of deterrence protection to allies. For a critique of this position based on historical analysis. In policy circles. they argued.21 The Soviet Union no less strove for superiority. The accent is on the tendencies of Soviet and American military nuclear systems.22 Like the United States. and Stein (1985). However much Soviet and American strategists differed.20 An adversary was expected to cheat and defect from attempts at cooperation to slow or stabilize the nuclear arms race when opportunity and gain commanded such a move. see George and Smoke (1974). on political and psychological weaknesses of then prevailing deterrence theory and practice. 1990. see Morgan (1983) and Jervis. see Garthoff (1966. . The evolution of Soviet nuclear strategy is far more complex and subtle than can be presented here. An adversary. if possible. warheads. Kokoshin (1995). comprising delivery vehicles. Lebow. the balance of nuclear power was not stable. their actual behavior in constructing and rationalizing strategic nuclear systems can reasonably be argued. would limit damage to one’s cities and military forces. to move toward a Clausewitz pure war model. A 1960 study of the RAND Corporation for the Air Force estimated that a spasm attack by the United States or the Soviet Union would result in 110–150 million US and 40–75 million Soviet deaths. but fragile and delicate. Both 19 21 22 Schwartz (1983: 138–9). 20 Wohlstetter (1959). For more comprehensive and exhaustive discussion of the complexities of evolving and necessarily changing Soviet strategy. notably in their conception of the relation of political and moral objectives and the military forces needed to sustain them. paralleling the surveys of American nuclear doctrine and policies. as traced here. Nuclear superiority would also presumably contribute to the control of escalation if hostilities erupted at a non-nuclear level. Their swift and sure elimination. since it communicated its determination to any would-be adversary that it would risk its own survival to defend the security interests of its partners. Vulnerability invited attack. had little incentive to avoid striking its rival’s cities under MAD.19 Small nuclear forces on which MAD strategy depended were alleged to be vulnerable to a disarming attack.Testing security theories 89 abandoned the search for a force capable of disarming their rival. The stipulation of this assumption forced thinking about actually using these weapons. For many throughout the Cold War. it sought to develop capabilities to disarm its rival. and command and control mechanisms. each worked relentlessly to achieve this daunting strategic objective. 1995). to move toward a pure war model.

The pressures to act quickly.000 targets were identified by American military planners. ground. and concealment. As American and Soviet strategists recognized. Only a small percentage of US nuclear forces were needed to destroy Soviet cities. to ride out an attack. In a crisis deterrence might break down when it was most needed. mobility.and air-based nuclear weapons. dispersion. . It proved impossible to design or raise sufficient nuclear forces that could fully and definitively disarm an enemy’s nuclear weapons. they were also concerned about preventing a nuclear war neither wished. almost instantaneously. might prove overpowering in a selfdefeating attempt to decrease damage to one’s forces and population 23 See Ball (1980). total warhead firepower on both sides progressively increased as well as the speed of launching these weapons and the number of multiple independently targeted warheads that each launcher could carry. These concerns generated a seemingly paradoxical incentive to cooperate with an untrustworthy adversary.90 Introduction constructed invulnerable weapon systems. There were even fewer population centers in the United States. The risks of this counter-force strategy were manifest.000. Any abandonment or wavering of resolve in pursuing this objective was itself viewed as a weakening of the deterrent regime to preclude an enemy attack.23 Upwards of 40. They both created nuclear triads to increase the targeting problems of their enemy by sea-. an unregulated nuclear arms race would result in the expansion of nuclear weapons and delivery systems on both sides at great cost without any corresponding increase in security or strategic advantage. Acknowledgment of this dilemma did not preclude an obsessive pursuit by both superpowers of a disarming nuclear capability. notably submarine-launched missiles. Notwithstanding these daunting obstacles to achieving a winning first-strike. Pringle and Arkin (1983). Even as the superpowers were unable to resist the logic of pure nuclear war. Speed in launching warheads and their accuracy on target – in distances measured by the length of football fields over thousands of miles of travel – added to the target capability of these weapons. Superpower nuclear triads were centrally controlled to prevent their inadvertent or unintended use and to ensure that the coordinated use of these complicated and widely dispersed weapon systems could be achieved to ensure maximum efficiency in delivering these weapons on target under the disrupting conditions of an enemy nuclear strike. since less than a thousand Soviet cities had populations greater than 25. because of their sheer number. and Rosenberg (1983) for descriptions of US nuclear targeting plans. concrete-reinforced targets. primarily against fixed.

was still desirable and mutually advantageous. determined to win or prevail in a nuclear exchange. 1946). to cooperate with an untrustworthy foe to avoid an unwanted war. dedicated to winning a nuclear war if it erupted or at least to cutting losses to tolerable levels of deaths and destruction.25 Arms control negotiations crystallized in several treaties and accords. arising from the so-called Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. These mutually understood constraints prompted the contradictory development of arms control and disarmament negotiations to cut the costs and risks of nuclear weapons and to lower the risks of unintended. reached in the 1960s. yet to continue to defect in developing a war-fighting posture. . resulted in agreements to end testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty limited each superpower to two (later amended to one) ABM site. in a word.Testing security theories 91 centers. It identified an elaborate set of restrictions on the development and deployment of long-range nuclear launchers. 24 25 Morgan (1983. These problematic aspirations proved well beyond the capacity of either superpower to realize. strategists reasoned that cooperation with an adversary. however contradictory in practice. The most important was the SALT I treaty. groundor space-based ABM systems. inadvertent. an influential policy-maker in successive Republican administrations since the 1980s in Fitzgerald (2000) passim.250 launchers by the end of 1981. to create a hotline useful during crises to prevent an unwanted war. particularly partisans of counterforce theory that strove to dominate the Soviet Union by overwhelming military force. Schelling (1960. it was “rational” for both sides. The SALT II treaty signed in June 1979 reinforced this agreement. or deployment of sea-. This set of launchers was further refined to include no more that 1. The earliest. A second set of treaties and understandings was reached in the 1970s. for example. 2003). A much narrower rational choice framework for cooperation was developed by Thomas Schelling over several works. These constraints were designed to assure both sides that their mutual destructive capabilities would survive an adversary’s surprise attack. including one with Morton Halperin: Schelling and Halperin (1958). Gray (1984) and the position of Richard Perle. See. or pre-emptive attacks.200 could be ballistic missiles and of these no more than 820 could be on ground-based ICBMs. and to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons or know-how to third states. Within the narrow band of these overlapping interests. air-. The theoretical rationale for cooperating with a nuclear adversary on political grounds was laid early in Brodie (1973. Signed in June 1972. Each side was restricted to 2. accidental. testing. It also prohibited the development. Not everyone agreed. This treaty was never ratified.24 “Use them or lose them” was the strategic-planning aphorism of the time. 1966).320 launchers with MIRVed warheads (Multiple Independently Targeted Vehicle) of which no more than 1.

”27 However. Arms control negotiations shifted then from cutting launchers to limiting the number and destructive force of warheads. Western critics and their Soviet counterparts viewed SDI as a bid for nuclear supremacy.000 warheads. The Europeanization of the security dilemma The second battlefield of the Cold War was Europe. Meanwhile. it is important to underline that this brief overview suggests greater coherence and consistency in superpower and allied policy-making than a careful and painstaking tracing of the actual historical evolution would 26 27 28 These elaborate arms control negotiations in the 1970s and early 1980s are covered in Talbott (1984. and highly educated human resources were concentrated. The Soviet Union was accused of breaking its promise to observe SALT II limits. notably its MIRVed systems. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 moved the arms race to a new level of competition. if war erupted. so-called Star Wars. The focus in strategic planning shifted toward building invulnerable yet fast-reacting. In sketching the evolution of the strategic and military capabilities deployed by the superpowers and their allies in this region. As the strategic offensive nuclear arms race accelerated. controversy and its impact on the Cold War and the evolution of the US and Soviet nuclear arms race. it would not have satisfied many strategists on either side. SDI generated compelling incentives to increase offensive nuclear arms to overwhelm an ABM system. and accurate systems that could reduce Soviet nuclear capabilities. of potentially destroying US ground-based systems in a surprise attack.26 Even if the treaty had been ratified. Fears were expressed that Soviet ICBMs had the nuclear throw weight. it was given increased impulse by the Reagan administration’s announcement of its determination to develop a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Garthoff (1995). These concerns transformed the SALT talks into the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks or START. Rather than slow the arms race.28 2. . The President presented the plan as a way of rendering nuclear weapons “obsolete and impotent. the two sides increased their strategic warhead totals over the 1980s by approximately 2. See ibid. reliable. modernized. 1979). These languished until the eve of the Soviet Union’s collapse. where a large percentage of the world’s technologically advanced. for a detailed exposition of the SDI. or what was derisively termed a Star Wars project. measured by the number of warheads and their destructive power. Which superpower could command these resources would tilt the balance of power in their global struggle decisively in its favor.92 Introduction President Jimmy Carter withdrew the treaty from the Senate in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

30 Their local disputes were ipso facto globalized. An “Iron Curtain. their profoundly conflicting political interests and values could not be resolved after the war. Other.29 It is well to be reminded that the aim of this modeling exercise of superpower security strategies is to identify the direction of that behavior within the conceptual framework of an ideal or pure model. The military build-up of the superpower coalitions in Europe can be divided roughly into seven periods. not just European. hegemony.31 While the alliance of a Communist Soviet Union and the Western democracies was strong enough to defeat Germany and Japan as challengers for world hegemony. Taylor (1954) and other prominent historians also adopt this narrower view of the scope of World War I than this discussion that portrays the field of battle in Europe as just the cockpit of what was by any measure a war for global. . This division was subsequently militarized and hardened by the unprecedented build-up of conventional and nuclear armaments in Europe. As background to describing this theatre of the Cold War. as if the decisions of relevant actors were not constrained or compromised in moving along the path rationally dictated by a pure model of armed conflict. The story of European security during the Cold War is a story of the efforts of the coalitions on both sides. it is useful to remember that. respectively under American and Soviet hegemony.” as British Prime Minister Winston Churchill proclaimed. as limits toward the realization of a pure model of war. The European theatre of military conflict was fused to the evolving nuclear superpower struggle. and cultural identity politics. split Europe and Germany into two segments. that is. while identified below. as two world wars and a Cold War made abundantly clear. from the fifteenth century. are given less weight in this explanation of the superpower conflict in Europe to pivot the discussion around the key question of using or not using force to advance a state’s security interests. competing political and socio-economic aims and interests. 1992).Testing security theories 93 support. deterrent. notably the superpowers. The coalition broke down almost immediately after the close of hostilities. European states relentlessly expanded their imperial reach around the globe to impose their rule on other peoples. 30 McNeill (1963) and Watson (1984. Each constitutes a distinct adaptation 29 31 DePorte (1986). ethnic. Europe was rapidly divided into two armed camps. however much leaders and peoples may have believed that they were struggling for ascendancy only in Europe or however much they may have tried or believed they were limiting their objectives to the European theatre. to harmonize and rationalize their military defense. This focus will be enlarged in the second section to include economic and national. as factors bearing on political legitimacy – central concerns of the Cold War confrontation. and war-fighting strategies in Europe as integral elements of a global pursuit for dominance.

a multilateral military organization under American leadership. The initial twelve NATO states also agreed to rapidly enlarge their conventional forces in Europe to counter what was perceived as Soviet military superiority in the region. This pledge was particularly important for the United States. American divisions were permanently stationed in Europe. which had initiated two world wars were eventually overcome. Whereas America’s belated intervention in two world wars served to free its allies after their homelands had been destroyed. These efforts were critically supported by American Marshall Plan assistance and by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. In light of the rapid demobilization of US forces after World War II. The treaty committed its members to assist each other in meeting threats to their security.94 Introduction between the competing security pressures exerted by the global nuclear and European arms races. the United States committed itself to come to the defense of another state before the outbreak of war. linked to the Soviet explosion of an atomic device eleven months earlier. The North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950. The Soviet Union’s hold over Eastern Europe tightened during this period. West Germany joined the NATO alliance and placed . most imminently in France and Italy. and an American military commander was appointed to head NATO. opened the second phase of Cold War in Europe. the American commitment rested almost exclusively on its nuclear guarantee at the time that the Atlantic Alliance was formed. the United States pressed for the remilitarization of West Germany and the incorporation of its 12 projected divisions into an integrated NATO command. To reach those ambitious goals. military assistance replaced economic aid to defend Europe. an attack on one was considered an attack on all. The first period extended from the end of World War II to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The fall of one country after the other to Communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Sovietization of its occupied segment of Germany spurred the Western liberal states to eliminate national Communist parties from entering their governments and to concentrate on rehabilitating their wardevastated economies and societies to blunt Communist influence at the polls. Profound allied reservations about rearming a state. This pledge was designed to deter an attack on Europe’s democracies. For the first time.000 aircraft by 1954 was agreed upon. the American guarantee was supposed to preclude the outbreak of war. since the Franco-American security treaty of 1778. These shocks militarized the Atlantic Alliance and transformed a guarantee pact into NATO. A plan to raise and equip 96 NATO divisions and to field 9. The threat to the West was largely perceived as more political than military.

The third phase from 1953 to 1960 is marked by the rapid nuclearization of the European theatre. Warsaw Pact conventional forces were no less dependent on nuclear power. The principal constraint was economic. instantly.000 tactical nuclear weapons and hundreds of complementary theatre nuclear arms were deployed in Europe.Testing security theories 95 its national military forces under multinational command. NATO and American planning for Europe shifted from conventional forces to a nuclear posture. 32 33 Kolodziej (1966).”33 From the 1950s until the end of the Cold War. European states faced the same problem of reconciling military and economic imperatives. . Remarks of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1954. At their height. the United States and NATO would rely on nuclear deterrence to counter the Warsaw Pact threat to Europe. The Eisenhower administration announced a new doctrine of “Massive Retaliation” to rationalize this shift.” The issue of credibility – whether the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend its NATO allies at the risk of its own survival – became a central concern of NATO military planning in light of growing Soviet nuclear parity. The credibility of NATO deterrence in Europe pivoted on the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella. United States and NATO strategy relied on nuclear forces to balance what was perceived in official circles to be Soviet military conventional superiority. The Soviet Union responded by hurriedly organizing the Warsaw Pact to counterbalance the Western move. The nuclearization of Europe was essentially melded with superpower strategic nuclear policies.32 President Eisenhower and his chief advisors were convinced that the United States economy could not sustain a massive conventional build-up in Europe. some 7. Tactical nuclear weapons and rocket and missile launchers carrying nuclear warheads were introduced into NATO forces. Under this doctrine. That fusion was one of the principal driving forces in the development of the American strategic arsenal to provide what war-fighting advocates insisted were the nuclear requirements of “extended deterrence. NATO rapidly abandoned the goal of building overwhelming conventional forces to match Soviet forces. US nuclear strategy would “depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate. The Warsaw Pact followed suit to meet the NATO challenge. by means and at places of (America’s) choosing. As American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proclaimed. By 1955 not only was Europe divided politically but its security was framed by the creation of two opposed military blocs and driven by the conventional and nuclear arms competition of these alliances. quoted in Osgood (1962: 103).

34 To address the problem of credibility. Osgood (1962). the Kennedy administration ushered in the fourth phase of NATO planning from 1960 to 1972. strove to maximize their influence over their superior ally’s announced and operational nuclear policies. and to bring the conflict to a quick close on terms favorable to the West. For the nuclear hegemons. Schwartz (1983). The European states resisted not only the burdensome costs of conventional defense but also what they perceived was the greater risk they ran than their superpower protector in limiting a conventional war to Europe. Gaddis (1982). It is useful to pause briefly at this point to identify the fundamental differences of interest of allied nation-states in light of the conventional and nuclear challenges facing them. the United States or the Soviet Union. their allies. Yost (1998). The following are useful surveys of different periods. dependent on superpower nuclear forces for their security. including the expansion of NATO to former Warsaw Pact states. Their homelands would be devastated while the superpowers. to defend against an attack if hostilities erupted. would insulate their territories from nuclear attack.” Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed a major expansion of NATO’s conventional forces to counter Warsaw Pact forces at this level of strategic engagement.35 The doctrine of “Flexible Response” replaced “Massive Retaliation. if necessary. Driven by the same security imperatives confronting their patrons. For a discussion of the origins and evolution of Flexible Response. whether the United States and NATO had the capability and will to use nuclear weapons to defend Europe. and Kolodziej (2002a). The aim of this build up was to create an escalation ladder on which NATO could achieve superiority at each rung: to deter an attack. see Daalder (1991). and the creation of a long-range bomber and missile force in the 1950s joined this issue. and Stromseth (1988). to preclude a rapid escalation to a superpower nuclear war. less than a year after the United States. through tacit complicity.96 Introduction Moscow’s explosion of a hydrogen bomb in 1953. they were not prepared to relinquish control over their security interests to another power. See Kaplan (1999). to defeat an attack if NATO’s conventional forces were overwhelmed. Kaufman (1964). it was imperative that each dictate to its rival – and to its allies – the decision of whether to escalate a conflict or not. Kolodziej (1966). Flexible Response also envisioned a sufficiently prolonged conventional exchange. The strategy implied that the United States would use nuclear weapons first. thereby controlling each rung of the escalatory ladder. Conversely. The European states were no less concerned than the superpowers about the conditions under which 34 35 There is no comprehensive history of NATO military policies. longer than the “Trip Wire” strategy of Massive Retaliation. .

While France reacted by disengaging from NATO’s military organization (but not the Atlantic Alliance). 38 Pierre (1972). and closely associated with incentives for defection. France sought leverage over US nuclear strategy by developing its own nuclear forces and by withdrawing from the NATO organization.000 troops and their dependants. a burden falling principally on West Germany. First. France sought not only to have a greater impact on US operational policies than it might otherwise have had but also to disengage from alliance policies when it suited its perceived interests. were never raised to a level to exclude the possibility of nuclear weapons being introduced into the battle. .Testing security theories 97 nuclear weapons might be used in Europe or the prospects of possible escalation to a superpower confrontation in Europe as a consequence of superpower conflicts outside the region. was the development of independent nuclear forces by other NATO states and by the efforts of all of these states to gain influence over US strategic policies on which their differing security interests pivoted. the British 36 Osgood (1962). 37 Kohl (1971) and Kolodziej (1974. In response to American pressures. The Soviet Union was largely spared these tensions. while enlarged.38 British leaders convinced their US counterparts to furnish crucial submarine-launched missiles to the United Kingdom to underwrite its submarine nuclear forces. these commitments were hostage to the US nuclear guarantee. 1987). and operational policies. The credibility of US use of its nuclear forces to defend Europe at the risk of exposing its own territory was reinforced by the deployment of over 400. A second consequence of the dilemmas posed by nuclear forces.37 By remaining out of military planning and war preparations. most of the NATO allies reluctantly accepted Flexible Response as the price of ensuring US protection despite its increased costs and risks for the protection of their security interests. It tied its nuclear policies directly to the United States in an effort not only to revive the close wartime collaboration between the two states but also. the United States was compelled to negotiate alliance consensus among the democratic nation-states of the alliance which were at liberty to defect from alliance strategy. to have some say over American military planning. Britain pursued an opposed strategy. nuclear targeting. the Europeans increased their conventional forces. and more immediately. Whereas it could impose its strategic doctrine and practices on its allies. NATO forces.36 Three strategies were pursued. First. Except in the most dire and extreme of circumstances. The tensions generated by nuclear weapons and their incorporation in the posture of Flexible Response had two distinguishable results over the course of the Cold War. much like Athens on Melos.

On the other hand. . For a brief period. and ideas across state borders. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 stalled strategic nuclear arms talks and arms control negotiations between the two European pacts. The 1970s ushered in a temporary respite in the Cold War struggle for Europe. A series of arms control agreements was reached with the West. Europe became a zone of peace. both sides agreed to recognize two sovereign German states and to sponsor their membership in the United Nations. This temporary respite was broken in the late 1970s. those states without nuclear weapons – notably West Germany. capped by an agreement to withdraw intermediate-range nuclear weapons from Europe. These accords. however temporarily. 39 Kelleher (1975). NATO decided to deploy 108 long-range and faster-firing Pershing missiles and 464 cruise missiles in Europe to counter Soviet deployment of MIRVed SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers in the European theatre.98 Introduction nuclear deterrent was essentially appended to US forces and planning. which was precluded by treaty from acquiring them39 – pressed for consultations on nuclear planning within NATO to inflect American nuclear policies in ways favorable to its security interests. These actions set off mass demonstrations throughout Europe and the United States against the deployment of new and more powerful US theater nuclear systems in Europe. the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies reached agreement on several key issues. Also created was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). No sooner had the crisis passed than the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev launched a radical reorientation of Soviet strategic policy. goods. southern Africa. Its objective was to promote the exchange of peoples. The latter years of the Brezhnev regime were marked by increased US–Soviet discord over this issue. Europe was increasingly drawn into the conflicts between the superpowers in the developing world. the privileged sphere of influence of the superpowers in their respective halves of Europe. The Helsinki accords of 1975 essentially recognized and implicitly legitimated. In this sixth phase. Pressed by European states. Reflecting realist assumptions about the possibility of reaching such a balanced compromise. the fruits of a d´ etente process initiated by Gorbachev’s Soviet Union. Its members included the states from both pacts. constituted the seventh and final phase of the European Cold War. principally in the Middle East. opening the fifth phase of the Cold War in Europe. and central Asia. Soviet modernization of European nuclear forces pressured the European states to seek increased assurances from the United States to honor its guarantee to Europe by modernizing its European-based nuclear forces.

The seeming simplicity of these balanced military struggles bore little resemblance to the incoherence and complexity of the shifting alignments and alliances between the superpowers and their allies. as objects of serious study. clients. Each was also defeated in battle by vastly weaker forces on this inhospitable terrain. retainers. The globalization of the security dilemma The superpower struggle in the developing world was the third and. 3. see Kolodziej and Harkavy (1982). The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) has been one of the leaders in developing this literature in its journal.Testing security theories 99 The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended the superpower struggle for European dominance. Vietnam and Afghanistan as prime illustrations. Alone as hegemon within this coalition is the United States. Where their interests clashed. The superpowers were never able to count on the reliability of their changing partners in their fruitless and failed efforts to gain ascendancy over these continents and their warring peoples. Survival. 40 The geo-political and military strategies of developing states. the world’s sole military superpower. in retrospect. the decisive strategic battleground of the Cold War. market democracies. neither superpower was able to tame the peoples and states of the developing world. The nuclear and European theatres map well with the Clausewitzian notion of a tendency toward pure war in which two actors engaged in a duel to the death – the United States and its NATO allies vs. Each was compelled to search for ways to reduce the burdens of imperial expansion in response to domestic political and economic demands for disengagement. The Cold War order in Europe. The patterns of armed conflicts in the developing world. Despite the expenditure of enormous human and material resources and at great cost to their prestige and reputations as big powers.40 The latter pursued their own political interests. contrasted with the anarchy of the developing world whose disputatious and contentious peoples and states resisted superpower pressures and blandishments. . more closely approximated the more robust Hobbesian model of war of all against all than planning for a decisive battle. these were sharply at odds with their superpower partner of the moment. imposed by the superpowers and sanctioned briefly by the Helsinki accords. and in its Adelphi series. For an early attempt to fill this gap. have tended to lag behind those of the major powers. As often as not. either a global nuclear Armageddon or a clash of Titans in Europe. and surrogates. On this vast and forbidding terrain the superpowers experienced unrelenting and formidable opposition to their hegemonial aspirations. Ascendant in what is now an emergent global society is the coalition of Western liberal. the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

applicable to some degree to superpower behavior in the nuclear strategic and European theaters we have been describing. Valkenier (1983). developing states worked the superpowers for their advantage. .41 In turn. they sought allies in the developing world – or sought to deny them to their rival – to gain political influence. and legitimacy. The ironic legacy of the European states was to impart their principles of national self-determination. See also Kolodziej and Kanet (1989). Dunlop (1993). World Wars I and II sapped the resources and will of the European states to retain their hold over non-European peoples. Much like Athens and Sparta. inter alia. the power vacuum left by the dissolution of the Eurocentric system. Its final chapter may be dated with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of white minority rule in South Africa a year later. which provides an extensive bibliography. By the end of the twentieth century. but not fully. The superpowers plunged into this anarchic setting. as well as Kolodziej and Kanet (1991). seeking to control its evolution to suit their rival interests. the superpowers unwittingly became the midwives of a global system of nation-states that would fill. Rowen and Wolf (1987). military commitments and intelligence assistance. has to be enlarged to encompass the much larger and more dense and complex webs of conflicts of states in the developing world. A Hobbesian model generally applies to many segments of the developing world. There is no definitive treatment of American Cold War strategies toward the developing world. The realism of our triumvirate theorists. bases. See Keylor (2001) for extensive citations to specific studies. and Rubenstein (1988). Korbonski and Fukuyama (1987). see. For probing discussions of Soviet policy toward the Third World. diplomatic cover. While Israel and Egypt 41 The superpower struggle over four decades in the developing world is obviously too complex and varied to summarize in a few pages. The context of the superpower struggle should also be viewed from the perspective of the gradual erosion and subsequent collapse of the European empires in the twentieth century. The dissolution of Europe’s empires and the competition of the superpowers to sponsor statehood for these developing peoples produced multiple centers of power and conflict.. and state sovereignty to their non-European subjects. These emerging states resisted subordination to superpower interests and control even as they strove to manipulate their more powerful ally for their own devices. autonomy. In their attempts to enlist alien peoples into their struggle. The decolonization process required much of the twentieth century to accomplish. logistical support. the nation-state won out as the principal unit of political organization for a fragmented and fractious world society of six billion people.100 Introduction the weaker partner could generally be expected to resist subordinating its security aims to those of its more powerful ally. The accent here is on the struggle insofar as it reflects Clausewitz’s theory of pure warfare. Nogee and Donaldson (1992).

American politics and US military intervention in Vietnam impeded Washington’s exploitation of this split for a generation. respectively.Testing security theories 101 readily accepted. See Morgenthau (1951a) for a prescient understanding of nationalism and national interests trumping ideology. These dilemmas of power and alignment confronted both superpowers with nettling choices. Similarly. the Soviet Union was confronted by the dilemma of supporting a Marxist regime in Ethiopia against Marxist-inspired rebels in Eritrea opposed to Ethiopian rule. Bilateral accords were also reached between the United States and the Philippines. and the Republic of China on Taiwan. Both had to be concerned that a regional conflict not get out of hand and escalate to threaten their nuclear strategic and European interests. Washington entered into a multilateral security treaty with the principal countries of Latin and Central America. potentially upsetting to the balances of power in northeast Asia. Pakistan and India used the aid and military equipment they received from Washington and Moscow to conduct their wars over Kashmir. The United States signed mutual security pacts with forty-three states around the globe.43 Both intervened repeatedly in conflicts in the Middle East and south Asia to restrain their clients. Ethiopia and Somalia switched superpower sides when it suited their interests. American and Soviet economic and military assistance. The Soviet Union prevailed on Cuba and the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua to avoid provoking the United States in its sphere of interest. Besides NATO. Meanwhile. and the United States discouraged both Taiwan and South Korea from developing nuclear capabilities. . both used this assistance against each other rather than serve their superpower benefactor.42 Strategic imperatives and domestic political exigencies trumped ideological affinity. Two mutual assistance pacts with which the United States 42 43 Hans Morgenthau was among the first to predict this break as early as 1951. In the Horn of Africa. Despite their global competition the two nuclear giants were induced to cooperate with each other to control their clients to preclude worse happening. the Republic of Korea. Client states could not be counted on to support their superpower patron if their regional position were weakened by mortgaging their interests to Washington or Moscow. It was most pronounced in the fallout between Communist China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s and the reversal of alignments between Beijing and Washington against Moscow twenty years later. Kolodziej and Kanet (1991) describes US and Soviet Cold War strategic behavior and cooperation in the developing world largely along regional lines. Surface alignment between a superpower and its client scarcely concealed a broader and deeper pattern of chronic regional defection by an allied state when its interests clashed with those of a superpower – a pattern discernible in differential measure across every region of the world.

It intervened covertly in support of anti-democratic factions in Argentina. the Soviet Union and the United States accounted for 65 percent of the total value of arms transfers. President Harry Truman announced the Truman Doctrine to justify $400 million in assistance to Greece and Turkey to support “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. between 1984 and 1988. or 41 percent. Of these the Soviet Union supplied $101 billion. $60 billion. undermine(d) the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States. . In 1947. not strategic power. perceived strategic advantage in aligning with regimes and states opposed to them.102 Introduction was associated – the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact – collapsed under the pressure of decolonization and the Cold War. It also intervened in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Grenada 44 45 See the annual publications of the US Arms Control Agency for the relevant years until publication of this document was discontinued: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1973). the United States. estimated at $248 billion. from radically different perspectives. At the end of the Cold War. and human rights. Graebner (1964: 731). 47 Kolko (1988) and Waltz (1979). He argued that “totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples. Arms transfers and military assistance were the principal policy instruments relied upon by both superpowers to create a network of client states. It sustained Rightist Contra rebels in Nicaragua against the Leftist Sandinista regime and supported the military throughout Central America. successive American administrations. In Latin America. Washington supported authoritarian regimes and military juntas over Left or Communist-leaning governments. by direct or indirect aggression.47 In the Middle East. when forced to choose between supporting these ideological values vs. or 24 percent. Brazil and Chile and cooperated with plotters who overturned the government of Guatemala in 1954. The Soviet Union similarly entered into multiple defense treaties in what proved eventually in the course of the Cold War to be more a burden than a boon to enhance its power around the globe. 46 Ibid.”46 The reality was less than met the eye.44 Both superpowers rationalized their intervention in the developing world in ideological. repeatedly chose the latter – as realist and Marxist theorists.”45 Truman directly tied the security of these nations to those of the United States and international security. The United States insisted that its intervention in the Third World was to defend free markets. terms. As critics charged throughout the Cold War. oil and strategic interests aligned the United States with conservative Arab states. liberal democracy. explained and predicted.

the Soviet Union appeared to support Communist elements throughout the globe over nationalist revolutionary forces. The Soviet Union learned the same hard lesson. The Soviet Union’s ideological justification for the extension of its power in the developing world was no more convincing than that of the United States. setting the stage for the complete takeover of the country by the Communist North in 1975. do justice to the tortuous shifts and turns of Soviet foreign policy in the developing world. The Soviet Union would therefore support national revolutionary bourgeois movements as a stepping-stone to ultimate Communist victory. The United States. The developing states were as relentless as the superpowers in pursuing their national interests and in asserting their sovereign rights. was forced to withdraw in 1973. like the Mobutu (a. see Korbonski and Fukuyama (1987). but with more devastating consequences in intervening in Afghanistan in December 1979. however much at odds with the ideological preferences of either superpower. the prestige and influence of the Soviet Union among these emerging states. No less did the United States support authoritarian governments widely considered to be predatory states. of course. No American administration could politically afford the creation of another Communist Cuba in the Caribbean. after decades of intervention in Vietnam. almost overnight. . Viewed as a laboratory. Sese Seko) regime in Zaire and anti-democratic rebel forces in central and southern Africa. Moscow tolerated crackdowns on Communist parties and partisans to advance its position among these states. proclaimed that there were many roads to socialism. independence. 48 This summary cannot. and self-determination. In the first decade of the Cold War until the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. the Vietnam experiment revealed the impotence of external rule over foreign populations. This ideological shift to exploit new opportunities for strategic advantage increased. including the minority white government of South Africa and its Apartheid policies. Nikita Khrushchev.48 The frustrations and mounting costs of superpower intervention reached their height in the 1970s and 1980s. For more thorough and in-depth commentary.Testing security theories 103 in 1982 to prevent what were viewed as Leftist or Marxist regimes from gaining power.k. especially the first three essays. It profited from their repudiation of Western imperial rule and their lingering antipathy toward their former oppressors. which masterfully survey Soviet Third World policy.a. Like the United States it was prepared to sacrifice ideological purity and commitment to the Communist international movement for the sake of its national security interests. Stalin’s successor. Stalin’s death opened the way for a fundamental reformulation of Communist doctrine. determined to create their own state and own political regimes.

scope. Angola. Its quest for military dominance balanced the might of the United States and the Western coalition for over four decades. Mason (1992). Explaining the rise and demise of the Cold War There is no simple explanation for the unexpected destruction of a superpower and the abrupt end of the Cold War. Moscow’s power and influence was unprecedented in the history of the Soviet Union or that of Imperial Russia. The weakness and poverty of these allies served only to mire Moscow in costly conflicts that it could ill afford as its economy deteriorated. . The break-up of the Soviet Union should be understood as a process of crises accumulating in number.104 Introduction After a decade of frustrating warfare. Among the poorest nations in the world. these clients accelerated the decline of the Soviet economy and undermined its ability to keep pace with the West. The following chapters will interpret these results in light of the competing theories of security vying for our support to explain them and for our adoption of their particular conceptual filter to explain security more generally. are Carr` ere d’Encausse (1993). These events are all the more surprising since they marked a momentous transformation of world politics and international security whose repercussions have yet to be fully felt or understood. They need to be explained. Relevant. Since then. Dallin (1992). 300 books and articles had already appeared to explain these events. these events are not easily ignored. it abandoned Afghanistan and its clients who were eventually defeated by local opponents.49 Unlike past rivalries for hegemony. Its collapse ipso facto ended the Cold War? Why? II. too. the Soviet Union had still been able to create a formidable and fearsome military system during the Cold War. Gaddis (1992–3). Mozambique. The apparent successes of the Soviet Union in Ethiopia. Remnick (1993). They are a test of the security theories covered in this volume. Miller (1993). Notwithstanding these setbacks and burdens. and Valkenier (1983). Cuba. See Edelheit and Edelheit (1992) for a listing. Let’s briefly establish some widely accepted facts and events about what happened to create a playing field – a data commons if you will – on which rival theory and approaches to explain the end of the Cold War can contest for our support. and Nicaragua in the 1980s were actually disasters in thin disguise. and density rather than 49 As early as 1992. the Soviet Union did not implode as a consequence of war. Yet it imploded at the height of its material power. including extensive bibliographic citations. Kaiser (1994). Like an elephant in the living room. cascades of studies have been published to explain outcomes unforeseen by most observers. Vietnam.

Only highlights can be touched upon here. Hayek (1944.Testing security theories 105 as a single event. deepened. Reforms. market states as the dominant nexus of power of the post-Cold War global system. The historical mission of capitalism was to eliminate the 50 51 52 Cited in Lebow (1995: 1). Among the most powerful systemic forces working to undermine the Soviet state and command economy was the Western alternative of a free. Efforts to cure this malaise set in motion irresistible pressures for reform that. Marxist ideology viewed capitalism as a necessary stage in the historical evolution of the world economy that would eventually be replaced by world socialism. the reforms instituted by Premier Mikhail Gorbachev enlarged. . was neither able to transform international relations and world politics to its liking nor to adapt to the West’s best political and economic practices – at home and abroad – short of its self-destruction. See Morgan (2000) for a start.50 At the core of these mounting crises was the failure of the Soviet Union to sustain economic growth and technological innovation.51 How and why did the Soviet Union fall so far and so fast? The roots of its demise go deep into its history as the product of the Russian revolution. calculated to save the Soviet state and the Communist revolution at home and abroad. How this impasse occurred is a long story which unfolded over most of the twentieth century. as a revolutionary state. The Soviet Union rejected. Similarly. and accelerated the cascading crises besetting the Soviet experiment. in principle.52 Whatever the merit of what are called essentialist critiques of a socialist system. the imperial systems of the great powers and the market institutions on which their economies were based. global open exchange system. Rather than arrest the decline of the Soviet Union. it is clear in retrospect that the Soviet Union. prerequisites to compete with the West and indispensable to respond to the demands of its own population. This system unleashed formidable forces of technoscientific innovation and human ingenuity that not only afforded the West greater wealth and welfare but also created an irresistible magnetic field that would prompt Soviet reformers to emulate Western institutions at the unwitting expense of their own authority and power. Some scholars argue that it was doomed from the start. 1988). the impact of these factors on the foreign and security policies of the superpowers require re-evaluation. resulted instead in confirming the ascendancy of the Western coalition of liberal. Until recently the domestic factors pressing internal reform have been largely underestimated by analysts. ultimately destroyed Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as well as the Soviet state. as some prominent theorists would prefer to view its passing. in adapting to the Western model of an open political system and global market competition.

leading to imperial rule and global war. according to Communist doctrine. the relative cost both of inputs for the supply of goods and services and the price of output commodities and services in free markets determined the allocation of scarce resources available to a society. see Schumpeter (1955).53 The Russian Revolution was justified then as the rejection of the capitalist system and its exploitation of the world’s wretched and underprivileged. a socialist economic system had several key characteristics that were inimical to the workings of capitalist 53 Lenin (1977) For a critique that has held up over the years. ideally. Under capitalism. The latter. Capitalist expansion. capitalism substituted private property and market forces to determine how the world economy would be organized and whose interests would be privileged. were necessarily compelled to exploit an increasingly enlarging and deprived working class to increase their profits and power relative to each other. would eventually destroy the capitalist system. established by the free play of supply and demand. Marxist ideology predicted the eventual self-destruction of the capitalist system.106 Introduction feudal system. In short. more broadly. capitalist competition explained World War I as a struggle among capitalists in control of nation-states for the dominance of world markets. . possessed of most of the world’s wealth and controlling its principal commercial. This expansion would. paving the way for a socialized world. the world economy as a whole. What would be offered for sale would presumably be determined by what buyers – individuals. and financial institutions. corporations. industrial. global competition led capitalists to the search for empires abroad to dispose of their excess capital. The competition among capitalists for profits and power compelled them to search for markets beyond their national borders. The free play of supply and demand would determine the balance between consumption and investment within a national and. who extended Marxist dogma. For inherited property rights based on family and blood relations. economic priorities were. Projected was the inevitable expansion of capitalist markets around the globe. According to Lenin. In Lenin’s mind. The Soviet Union legitimated its revolutionary role in world politics as the vanguard of a global socialist system and as the champion of what were depicted within Marxist-Leninist doctrine as the oppressed masses of capitalist exploitation. and governments – would be willing to purchase at prices that suppliers would be willing to furnish. eventually divide the peoples of the world into two warring classes: a working class or proletariat into which the world’s masses would be consigned and an ever smaller and dwindling class of capitalists or bourgeoisie. As practiced by the Soviet Union.

the Soviet experiment could claim solid economic gains. only if the state under party control possessed the power and authority to allocate land. to reduce most of humanity to subsistence levels. state. .54 The state. The conflict claimed over twenty million lives. Urbanization grew apace. Scarce resources would be allocated to hit the economic targets set by the Communist party and executed by the state through its industrial. and party directives. Soviet citizens were assured a considerable and. universal education was instituted. Hewett (1988). working through multinational corporations.” but what was “real” proved fatal to the Soviet state. the rate of increase steadily declined. The Soviet Union succeeded in sustaining growth despite the determined opposition of Western capitalist states. While growth continued between the l950s and early 1980s. allegedly. by the extension of the capitalist competition to the world economy. and to control prices by central dictation. The United 54 55 These are developed in detail in Ericson (1987). the state was charged with planning and directing all phases of the economy through five-year plans.4–6. and professional sectors.Testing security theories 107 markets.55 It also surmounted the massive losses to property and life of World War II. agricultural. the Soviet Union’s achievements were impressive in the early decades of its existence: economic growth rates were high. and labor. This was justified to prevent capitalist monopolists. That historic role could be played. 1984b). Kornai (1992). a greater level of material security than that provided by the Western states. agricultural society into an industrial giant. not individuals or corporations. as seen by many people around the world. The superior moral status and equity of a socialist economy would eventually triumph over capitalism and imperialism.3 percent per annum between 1928 and 1955. 56 Hewett (1988: 37–93). To ensure that the economy responded to worker interests. Such was the “ideal. What would be produced for the populace would be determined by bureaucratic.56 Experts estimate Soviet growth in Gross National Product (GNP) in the range of 4. from using their control over a nation’s economy to force wages down and. The state under domination of the Communist party was assumed to always act in the interests of the working classes of the world. and Lockwood (2000). For several decades after the Russian Revolution. and income inequality between workers and managers was narrower and more egalitarian than in prevailing Western patterns. The substitution of a socialist system for capitalist markets ipso facto eliminated their exploitation of the world’s masses. Transformed was a semi-feudal. Kennan (1961. owned the means of production. and gender equality in the workplace was fostered. capital. By any measure. ministerial.

with the developing states accounting for an increasingly larger share of the remainder. like market prices. Berliner (1988). Given the rigidity of Soviet industries – tied to planned. Capital stock was aging. the Asian Tigers include Taiwan. the gains from transforming an agricultural economy to an industrial base had been largely exhausted. to convey their priorities to planners. the Western portion rose to almost 75 percent. This included growth in GNP. and Malaysia. too numerous to cite here. . and labor and capital productivity.59 By the mid-1970s. The insulation of the Soviet economy from the competitive discipline of world markets and its relatively small size compared to global output hindered the accumulation or acquisition of investment capital and the creation and absorption of advances in Western science and technology. although they may well have been inflated in light of the unreliable data available for measurement. Western sources generally estimated these indicators as having positive valences. The complexities of estimating Soviet economic data are explored in Hewett (1988) and Kornai (1992). Their personal incomes and status were 57 58 59 Communist China announced its intention to adopt capitalist market reforms in 1978. These were unrelated to the real preferences of consumers who had no effective mechanisms. while the Warsaw Pact was half the 1960 level. as the Cold War progressed. the Warsaw Pact accounted for approximately 14 percent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product. The gap between command and free markets widened. Ericson (1987) and Lockwood (2000) present data for these declines. South Korea. not narrowed.5 times over this thirty-year period. while the Western states claimed 61 percent. The hierarchical decision-making structure of a rigidly state-controlled economy fostered inefficient practices and waste in meeting production targets. help explain this decline and their relation to the structural weaknesses of the Soviet economy and its lagging technological development. personal income. The special problems associated with spending for defense are covered in Firth and Noreen (1998). The trend lines of all significant economic indicators pointed downward.108 Introduction States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reckoned that the Soviet GNP rose about 4. Singapore. See also Aslund (1991. dictated production targets – even outdated technology could not be effectively incorporated into the economy. 1995). 1991). It was also below what Communist China’s economic reforms and those of the so-called Asian Tigers were able to achieve.58 These grim statistics could be predicated of the entire Warsaw bloc. and Goldman (1983. In 1960. What Western technology could be imported was already obsolete. Thirty years later. Many factors. industrial and agricultural production.57 These growth rates could not be sustained in the last decade of the Soviet Union’s existence. There were few incentives for managers under the Soviet system to incur the risks of innovation. although the quantitative increase was less than that of the United States and most of the other Western states.

Four interdependent reforms were initiated and pursued throughout Gorbachev’s tenure in office. and the defense industries. bewildering. Except for selective sectors. The resulting distortion in balanced economic development ensured continued waste and inefficiency and a continuing devolution of the Soviet economy in the absence of pervasive reform. calling simultaneously for increases in consumer goods production and. These averaged about 17 percent of GNP vs. Worker discipline was addressed in a national campaign against alcoholism and absenteeism. Since the cost of inputs could not be reliably assessed by the simple device of comparing the relative prices of scarce resources – what markets do automatically on a global scale – industrial managers had every incentive to demand limitless resources to meet planned production goals. the leading technological edge of the system. for greater investment to spur capital formation and technological innovation. On assuming office as the head of the Communist party in 1984. income differentials were introduced to provide incentives for greater productivity and innovation. which might have been used to increase investment and foster innovation. and improved economic performance to meet the Western challenge and preserve the Soviet Union’s claim as the vanguard of a socialist revolution. a strengthened economy to underwrite Communist party legitimacy. Five-year plans were self-defeating. especially . Defense spending was also gradually reduced. not by qualitative gains for developing new products and technologies. were induced to redeploy some of their resources from arms to consumer goods. were tapped instead to import a greater range of consumer products to meet pent-up demand. what Soviet industry produced for foreign sale almost invariably fell below global quality standards. Scarce foreign reserves. This term covers a wide. and often contradictory number of initiatives introduced between 1985 and 1991 to restructure the economy to equal Western rates of growth. managers were directed to develop strategies to make their sectors self-sustaining with no material assistance from central planners. They formed no coherent pattern nor did they admit to any cogent design – symptoms of the mounting crisis and the desperation of the Communist leadership to energize the economy. He identified three aims to be fostered by increased and sustained economic growth: a more effective response to rising consumer demands and Soviet expectations to match Western growth. and spending priorities were redefined to advance these aims. 6–7 percent for the United States with an economy at least twice as large as the Soviet Union. notably those associated with military technology. Mikhail Gorbachev sought to reform the economy and the Soviet state.Testing security theories 109 measured by their ability to meet planning goals. Heavy annual defense spending added to these fundamental weaknesses of the Soviet economy. unrealistically. The most important was economic restructuring or perestroika.

which would be responsible for the dayto-day conduct of governmental business. certainly not to undermine the power and legitimacy of the Communist regime or its top leaders – precisely what greater openness did. 20 percent of the membership of the new Congress was elected from non-party members. Paradoxically. They were expected to expose corrupt and inefficient officials and set in motion efforts to replace them. Information about advances in Western economic growth. The poor showing of Communist candidates. or their shoddiness and unreliability. the long-standing rubber-stamp Soviet parliament. since most of its seats were reserved for party members. As with glasnost. openness was closely linked to a contrived and selfdestructive attempt both to democratize the system and to strengthen the authoritarian rule of the Communist party and the Soviet state. elect a smaller body. like Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov. To these domestic reforms Gorbachev added a fourth. In June 1988. or openness. To strengthen Gorbachev and his team of reformers in their struggle against entrenched conservative elements within the party. Soviet Premier . Wages were increased. and managers of industrial units. were released from exile or prison. and deepening the economic crisis. foreign dimension – “new thinking” about security. but with the perverse result of outpacing lagging productivity. and replace it with a Congress of People’s Deputies of 2.110 Introduction of the ruling elite. signaled the beginning of the end of Communist party dominance and of the Soviet Union. and much to the surprise of the reformers. fueling inflation. The Communist party still controlled the Congress. A generation earlier. open political practices elsewhere. ministries. Glasnost was designed to strengthen the Soviet system. Citizens were encouraged to criticize the failures and weaknesses of state bureaucracies and operatives. This body would also elect a President of the Soviet Union. not to discredit the Soviet experiment.250 members. once put to an electoral test. and technological development were circulated to the general population and to professionals eager to incorporate this knowledge into their work. not to undermine its capacity to rule at home or to compete with the West abroad. Gorbachev proposed a major reform of Soviet state institutions. in turn. institutional reform was calculated to bolster Communist party rule and the Soviet system. To mobilize the work force to support perestroika and to overcome the resistance of managers and ministries to reform. the 19th Party Conference voted to abolish the Supreme Soviet. the lack of adequate goods. the Gorbachev regime instituted a program of glasnost. The Deputies would. In the spring election of 1989. The media were permitted to report breakdowns in the delivery of state services. Former dissidents.

61 To relax East–West tensions and to establish a new foundation for superpower security relations. In largely insulating itself from the ceaseless pursuit of scientific knowledge and know-how driving Western economic expansion. Pursued was an active policy of d´ etente and peaceful engagement. the Soviet system necessarily resisted adaptation to these Western institutions. Gorbachev abandoned both positions in favor of cooperation with the West and adaptation to Western best practices. 61 Smith (1937). the Gorbachev regime announced a unilateral ban on nuclear testing in August 1985. As chapter 5 suggests.Testing security theories 111 Nikita Khrushchev rejected the Leninist thesis of the inevitable armed clash between capitalism and socialism. As an alternative model for economic organization. and markets had become globalized by the end of the twentieth century. Six months later the 60 Berliner (1988: 212–13). Adam Smith. The Soviet system stagnated and the gap between the economic and technological development of the West and East widened. As Joseph Berliner explained: “Because of the international nature of technological advance.”60 Science. A key explanation for these radical shifts in Soviet security policy from past positions was their political down payment to the West to gain access to Western technology and investments as a spur to the Soviet economy. The Soviet Union and its dependencies had excluded themselves for seventy years from these dynamic processes at the expense of their technological and economic development. The evolutionary trajectory of these sources of power pivoted around a global division of labor. the intellectual architect of global markets. For the struggle for Europe. technology. any country that does not participate fully in that international intercourse suffers a disadvantage in the promotion of technological progress. . The decentralization of decision-making and power as well as the acceleration of freely chosen transnational economic and techno-scientific exchanges between Western peoples and societies could not be tolerated by centralized Soviet institutions. the Soviet Premier promoted the notion of “reasonable sufficiency” as the basis for European security. He heralded the creation of a common European home to surmount the Cold War and the division of the continent into two warring camps. was a better prophet than Karl Marx in defining the forces that would produce The Wealth of Nations. the Soviet Union and its satellites implicitly opted for internal political control of these processes rather than for technological development and sustained economic growth. The struggle between capitalism and Communism was supposed to continue by other means as a competition between two models for designing world order and welfare.

In spring 1990 Moscow agreed to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Gorbachev recoiled from implementing the Brezhnev Doctrine. the Soviet Union withdrew the last remaining elements of its troops from Afghanistan in February 1989. The doctrine was specifically renounced in a Warsaw Pact communiqu´ e on October 27. The remaining Communist states of the Warsaw Pact. ten percent of its total strength in Eastern Europe. and withdraw 10. Parallel with these accords. it justified Moscow’s right to intervene to preclude political change in Warsaw Pact states. 1989. although it was implacably opposed to the Communist party’s monopoly of power. defensespending cuts were announced as early as 1987.112 Introduction Soviet Union agreed to an American demand to separate strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons negotiations. Even more fundamental than these concessions to the West. These initiatives opened the way for a solution to decades-long negotiations over conventional arms reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The capstone of these initiatives was the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9. with varying degrees of resistance from the Communist party. Gorbachev approved the entry of Poland’s Solidarity movement into a coalition Warsaw government. . In November 1990. To foster these efforts among satellite states and to assure the West of the credibility of Moscow’s d´ etente policies. Moscow set in motion the complete unraveling of the Warsaw Pact and its East European empire. To encourage its East European dependencies to follow its reformist lead and to allay the suspicions of Western skeptics. Fashioned in 1968 in the wake of Soviet armed intervention to reverse a threat to Communist party rule in Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile. 1989. Little but a shell was left of the Communist bloc.000 troops. These breakthroughs in nuclear talks were crowned by the July 1991 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their stock of strategic nuclear forces by 30 percent. These moves were followed by Gorbachev’s dramatic announcement in February 1988 before the United Nations that the Soviet Union would unilaterally cut 500.62 Communist parties in East Europe were expected to follow Moscow’s reformist lead. broke free of its yolk. members of the two military pacts agreed to the Charter of Paris that essentially declared the end of the Cold War. the 62 For an overview of this process of Warsaw Pact dissolution consult Chafetz (1993). Diplomatic talks throughout 1986 and 1987 yielded an agreement in December 1987 to eliminate land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe. In 1991 the Warsaw Pact.000 tanks from the region. and the subsequent integration of the two Germanys into NATO with the victory of the Christian Democratic Party in all-German elections in 1990.

From its inception. a move aborted by the refusal of Boris Yeltsin. six republics boycotted the referendum. The Congress also elected Gorbachev President of the Soviet Union. and Belarus announced the formation of a Commonwealth of Independent States. Gorbachev’s archrival Boris Yeltsin was elected as the President of the Russian Republic over Gorbachev’s handpicked candidate. the unraveling of the Soviet empire in East Europe reinforced the demise of the Communist party rule and the dissolution of the Soviet state.63 These fueled the self-destructive effects of glasnost and democratization. In March 1991. The East European example of national self-assertion emboldened the Soviet republics to assert their authority and independence from the Soviet state and ruling Communist party. Ukraine voted for independence. perestroika plunged the Soviet economy into deeper crisis. Ukraine. and communal composition. Conservatives within the party and state bureaucracy launched a coup in August 1991. The Russian Republic. the other republics of the Soviet Union pressed for greater autonomy from Moscow control. In early 1990 the Congress of People’s Deputies repealed the monopoly of the Communist party. the Soviet Union was internally flawed by the conflicts embedded in its diverse national. In counterpoint. an embattled Gorbachev regime held a referendum on the question of “Whether the Soviet Union should continue to exist as a united country?” While 75 percent of respondents answered yes. Unable to fully embrace market reforms of free exchange. to submit to the plotters. Led by Lithuania. composed of the former republics of the Soviet Union. which had never been reconciled to Soviet conquest of these Baltic states in World War II. . On December 1. A month later the independence of the three Baltic states was recognized by what remained of the Soviet state. President of the Russian Republic. was formally dissolved. Gorbachev’s reforms were fatal for the monopoly of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. the first such election of a Russian head of state in a millennium. ethnic. Soviet economic planners were paralyzed in responding to the clashing cues of a command and open economy. Latvia. and Estonia. Yeltsin was directly elected as President. At the height of his formal powers as party and state leader. Through blowback. These reforms conspired to complete the job of unraveling the Soviet state. Rather than spur Soviet economic reform and growth. The devolution of the Soviet economy further eroded the legitimacy of Communist party rule. Gorbachev’s real power was at its nadir.Testing security theories 113 military guarantor of Communist party rule throughout the region. A year later. The iron fists of the Soviet secret police and military had held 63 Kuran (1991).

Their reforms were supposed to strengthen their power and influence and to ensure their continued authority over the military. and political institutions they created and over which they presided. market states as the dominant power centers of international relations and a world society of six billion diverse and divided peoples. economic. perestroika. and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet army. see Conquest (1986). or the dissolution of the Soviet state. typical of other studies. The Soviet leaders did not intend their own demise. In its wake arose a coalition of liberal Western democratic. What explains the implosion of the Soviet Union. and the rise of the Western coalition? Clearly no simple response to such seismic events is possible.64 On December 25. the end of the Cold War. caution against making rash and sweeping generalizations about the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War. we have constructed a “laboratory” to identify and evaluate which actors appear to have been key players and what factors and key events seem to have been decisive in producing these revolutionary results. the end of Communist monopoly rule. which the Soviet experiment had opposed since its inception? Few had a clue – certainly not Gorbachev and his partisan reformers and most observers in the West – that Soviet reforms were ushering in a tectonic shift in power in global politics with entirely new and daunting security issues for states with socially divided populations. the preceding collapse of the Warsaw Pact. like those in the Balkans. the state’s coercive hold on its population relaxed enough for these tribal divisions to overwhelm the Soviet state. democratization. How could they have not foreseen their own political suicide by exposing themselves to global forces in adapting the Soviet Union to the West’s economic and political institutions. set against two world wars to decide which states and peoples would dominate international relations and the world society.114 Introduction these centrifugal forces together by brute force. . For earlier treatment of the nationality problem in the Soviet Union which. the 64 Kaiser (1994) does a masterful job in explaining the fissiparous force of identity politics in the Soviet Union. already effectively dissolved into its component republics. Once glasnost. the Cold War abruptly ended. Let’s concede from the outset that the complexity and duration of the Cold War. Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as President of a now non-existent Soviet Union. did not foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union into its national republics. With the implosion of the Soviet Union. In briefly recounting a half-century of global conflict and its transformation into what is now a post-Cold War era. and new strategic thinking were introduced. 1991.

To set the stage for this evaluation. if not fully comprehensive. and actor initiative. international organizations. Clausewitz. . any that might be devised or designed in light of the unsettled state of international relations and security theory and the turbulent crosscurrents of behavior of the multiple actors impacting on international security. These cover people-to-people relations as well as the transactions of socially constructed actors. test of how reliable these schools of thought may be in helping us to understand and solve the formidable security problems confronting the world’s populations and states today. No one test of these theories or approaches is sufficient to disprove a particular school of thought. That is well beyond the scope of this discussion or. it is important to be clear about what criteria we are applying. Following the lead of Hobbes. In the next four chapters. for that matter. The latter include those between diverse societies. Guidelines for testing security theories and approaches What is the purpose of testing a theory or approach? Our aim is not to confirm or reject definitively one theory or approach over another. the outbreaks of World Wars I and II. but serviceable. Security studies. and Africa. Yet the global scope of the Cold War and the fundamental changes in international security introduced by the abrupt and unexpected implosion of the Soviet Union provide an important. We want to make sensible and reliable choices about what set of conceptual lenses we wish to wear to explain the bewildering reality of international relations and security. What set of lenses we choose will depend on how we assess the political conditions and context we confront – choices which themselves are not self-revealing and unproblematic. or the American counter-attack. We want to have some reasonable basis for relying on one or more of the theories we will be evaluating to explain important events like the end of the Cold War. and Thucydides. Our aim is more modest.Testing security theories 115 Middle East. The next section outlines guidelines for testing security theories and approaches. resulting in the overthrow of political regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. states. the end of Europe’s empires. regional conflicts today. the suicidal attacks on the World Trade Center. decision. we want to say something not only about how such security problems arose and evolved but also about human behavior more generally. while a sub-field of international relations is almost as wide and deep in scope as the set of actor relations of this larger field of thought. we will try to evaluate seven theories or approaches to international relations and their explanatory power with respect to international security. and for the states of the international system in the post-Cold War era.

we are obliged to assess whether our observations of their behavior and the conditioning physical and social environment framing their thinking. three considerations should be kept in mind. We can ignore the dissonance. .116 Introduction multinational corporations. we can either look to other theories that explain what we see more coherently and comprehensively or continue to rely on familiar but misleading conceptual maps about the real world.g. As we observe the world and the behavior of different actors. decisions. and actions conform to our expectations. is never satisfied. Within this capacious set of real and potential security moves by multiple actors. we are particularly interested in explaining the disposition of humans to use or threaten force – or to resist or reject this option – to get their way in their interdependent. Failing these moves. while ignoring data that cast our knowledge in a dimmer or questionable light. a disciplined. 65 Popper (1963). the Catholic Church or the Red Cross – of a global reach. Falsifying our theories is a tougher test than that of selectively assembling evidence that supports our theory. we can deny that our theory is flawed. that the balance of power between states encourages peace and war. a disconnect inevitably arises between what we expect and what they do. scientific mind. mutually contingent exchanges with others. If they act other than in predictable ways. This can be done either by re-evaluating our facts to determine whether they check out or by revising our theories to explain these discordant observations. as chapter 1 insists. It will take some tall explaining to reconcile the claim that the same cause (balance of power) can have two diametrically opposed effects (war and peace). or we can try to reconcile what we see that is at odds with our theory or expectations. including states.. but intellectually untenable and potentially mischievous and self-defeating if acted upon. Testing theories of international relations and security is a never-ending process. In testing a theory. First. This theoretical knowledge is a precondition for guiding personal and public policies and strategies in coping with force and redirecting appeals to coercion in human exchanges to less destructive and more productive pursuits. and non-governmental associations – e. but relentlessly strives to disprove the theory relied upon. If some proponents of a school of thought propose. a psychologically comforting strategy perhaps. We also want to be alert to logical inconsistencies in the expectations of behavior advanced by the theory that don’t add up. say. we can readily see that we have a puzzle to resolve.65 There is a greater probability that a theory we use to account for the behavior of actors around us is valid and reliable if we insist on subjecting it to hard facts and events at odds with the theory.

for example. Boundaries have to be set that make sense to limit our search for understanding and explaining a phenomenon – security behavior in our case – if we expect to acquire rough but reliable knowledge. we should try to develop our own theories to suit our purposes and needs. We can’t reasonably have a theory for everything. As we will shortly see with respect to realist theory. some critics argue. We are interested in knowing why states and other actors. Theories cannot be confirmed or rejected either because they succeed or fail to explain a particular set of facts or events. In evaluating the relative explanatory power of competing theories of security. Specifically. Trying to keep up with the object of study today is difficult compared to the past since change is endemic to the world society humans have fashioned – and continue to reform and reformulate – to meet their competing needs and wants. or as additional observations and novel propositions are formulated to test and validate actor behavior. more generally. a theory can work in practice. Conventional notions of the theory might not be adequate to determine the actual limits of the theory’s explanatory power. of realism itself as a progressive theory. too! These theories mutate and evolve as new security issues arise. it is not enough that. They also reflect deep commitments of researchers. Finally. pragmatically. we need to assure ourselves that the theory excludes expansion and reinterpretation to explain new facts that we discover. We have to be clear about what we want to know. as responsive to the creativity and seemingly limitless capacity of humans – the object of study of international relations and security – to change their ways or adapt to new circumstances in their physical and social environments.Testing security theories 117 Second. The theories we will be evaluating are not a static set of explanations of certain forms of actor behavior. and policy-makers who have staked their professional careers on these theories and their reliability in practice. They are research projects with lives of their own. For them. in the search for reliable security theory. use or don’t use force and threats. to be fair to each theory that we evaluate in light of the Cold War experience. say war and peace. like global terrorism. It must work well in theory. these questions and the criteria they imply should be kept in mind. if alive and well. Does the theory . it is important to determine whether the dissonance we detect between facts and theory is simply a failure to connect the two correctly from the perspective of the theory under scrutiny. social scientists have been ingenious in reformulating this paradigm to adapt it to new facts and events at the cost. analysts. This question is embedded within a larger concern of the proper scope of international relations as a discipline and the identification of the key actors and factors at work in this more encompassing domain of human conduct. They have to be viewed.

68 66 67 These questions are. Each attempts to identify key actors populating international relations and world politics. etc. (2) the rationales advanced by each for the key choices made by actors in response to what factors drive their behavior. and security. international relations refer. By simplifying reality. the latter become more accessible. classical liberalism. These causal elements presumably play central roles in any theory of security. and (3) the level(s) of analysis at which actor behavior is being observed.118 Introduction we are proposing explain what other theories are able to do? Does it also explain facts and events they do not address. . We have been speaking about international relations and security as if they were interchangeable terms.. behaviorism. if the observer misses the actors and factors identified by the theorists to be driving actor conduct. the principal factors animating their behavior. Marxism and neo-Marxism. What is of central importance in choosing between these seven contenders are (1) the assumptions each school of thought makes about the make-up and motivation of key actors – individuals. and their relative salience and significance. global politics. Paradoxically. Baldwin (1995) and Kolodziej (2000b). liberal institutionalism. does our theory explain and even predict new facts and events falling within the ambit of its claims?66 How then should we compare the strengths and weaknesses of our seven schools of thought to international relations theory: realism. to relations among states. less has more explanatory power. states. as chapter 1 describes. or even reject as amenable to explanation? And. 68 Morgenthau (1985). They focus on what the theorist believes are most important and necessary for our understanding. and social circumstance. according to the theorists. Partisans of a particular theory or approach are saying that. as the term suggests. Details and nuance are lost or blurred. Each abstracts from the buzzing confusion of the world those actors and factors that each believes are central to a theory of international relations and security. finally. they are essentially missing what’s happening. They are not. space. and constructivism? Each purports to be more than just an image of how the world works. groups. Parsimony simplifies rich and thick explanations of particular events to produce knowledge of the underlying forces shaping international relations over time.67 Typically. What we will try to sort out is the validity of the rival claims of these conflicting positions by assessing their explanation of the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. neorealism. a rephrasing of those advanced by Imre Lakatos (1970) as pertinent in testing theories. What appears to hold over time and space as true is accented. These theories do not pretend to explain all facts and events falling within the set of things relevant to international relations.

Hans Morgenthau’s text explaining state relations from a classical realist perspective has the title Politics among Nations. indicating a sensitivity to nationalism as a force impelling state behavior and shaping its value system and interests. . rational entities inured to popular impulse or compulsions. like international corporations. cite the constraints of global markets. Morgenthau distinguishes between the special aims and interests of states and the wide range of means and resources at their disposal to influence each other’s behavior in favorable ways from other forms of politics. are portrayed as more important than states in explaining the latter’s decisions and actions. who implicitly transform Morgenthau’s pre-rational. Others. may influence what states do. like Kenneth Waltz (1979). Our classical triumvirate is particularly helpful in attempting to theorize about this dimension of actor behavior. like constructivists. Examples abound – American or French domestic politics.Testing security theories 119 That image is captured by one of the founding fathers of post-World War II realism.69 Other actors. Other theorists. family and gender politics. Politics among Nations. For these theorists. believe that their behavior cannot be explained by reference to the states alone or to the condition of anarchy underlying their relations. Now we want to compare how each of our seven contestants for hegemony in security studies portrays their understanding of international relations and their particular explanation of the tendency of actors to use or not use force. emotion-driven nation-states into cold-blooded. The scope of Morgenthau’s concern is limited to the particular aims of states as he defines them. pre-national. a point lost to many theorists. in the title of his widely circulating textbook. The litmus test of security for this volume is the decision of the actor to use or not use force to get its way. like liberal economic theorists. This leads to an interest in the means and resources relied upon by states to influence each other’s behavior and their environment in favorable ways. inspired by 69 Interestingly enough. or bureaucratic and office politics – to name just a few at random. These are alleged to be the primary forces in international politics. while conceding the surface importance of states. Security is a sub-set of concerns within a larger set of objectives and actions that actors might take in getting others to do what they want. contend that there are more elemental cultural and widely shared ideas and values informing state behavior. actors. with their own agendas and power capabilities. We made this distinction between all the things an actor might do – say be a patron of the arts or build a road – and those within this set of possibilities that specifically raised the question of whether to use force or not to ensure a desirable outcome in exchanges with other actors. Some. Hans Morgenthau. These responses are grist for our mill which seeks to advance thinking in a way. Each of these seven positions evaluated in successive chapters purports to be a theory or approach to international relations.

their natural freedom and equality were forgotten and subsequently subverted by the political regimes imposed on them without their consent and opposed and unresponsive to their will and preferences.2 will become clearer as the discussion proceeds in more concrete detail. It is one in which the principles of freedom and equality are privileged. As Rousseau stipulates. Others. in addressing their security problems. free and equal individuals as an empirical fact that could be observed. Rousseau argued that notions of virtues and vices were created as human attributes when free and equal humans entered into society – i. surmount these social chains. .”70 Only by asserting their will to rule – a General Will embracing the will of each citizen – can humans. humans are neither good nor bad. we can compare these schools of thought along six dimensions. systemic. and approximate the “ideal” state of self-possession they previously (and purportedly) enjoyed in nature. assume self-government. These include their particular view with respect to (1) the key or central actor(s) in international relations. In Rousseau’s imagined state of nature. (4) the level of analysis at which these exchanges or transactions take place. Other dimensions might well be suggested. in their transactions and their inclination to use force or threats to get their way. for example. (5) the preferred method(s) employed by the theorist in making observations to test theorists against facts or reality. or domestic and the mutual impact of these levels on each other. The differences captured by table 3. suggests that individuals and states are selfish and disposed to violence. This might include what each theorist considers “real” about actors – what philosophers would term their ontological composition. As should be clear already.120 Introduction our triumvirate. transnational. honored and pursued. Rousseau’s General Will or popular rule within a democracy encapsulates 70 Rousseau (1950: 3). sustained. What Rousseau is positing is a normative standard to answer the classical question of what is the best society for humans.e. whether interstate. “Man is born free. repeated. and everywhere he is in chains. now as citizens of their chosen societies. Once socialized. there never was such a pure state of isolated. neither selfish nor selfless. whether to cooperate or to conflict with others. that enables us to make generalizations about security across time and space. As table 3.2 summarizes. like Jean-Jacques Rousseau. and replicable social exchanges – to ensure their security and property. (2) the key factor(s) driving actor behavior in their exchanges with other actors. dispute this claim. and (6) the policy and normative implications of the theory for actors. (3) the expected behavior of actors. principally for states. Hobbes.

but managed by balances of power and mutual restraints on force armed conflict endemic. Methodological and Social Critiques of Security Theories constructivist actor as a social ideas/values construct exchanges socially constructed social and social psychological scientific bias for modeling & measurement behavioral research dependent research dependent conflict/cooperation all levels/research dependent armed conflict can be eliminated by will directing reason purportedly value free .Table 3. Substantive Theories realism state violence/military force neorealism system of states violence/military force liberal institutional state bounded by other actors historical/ scientific/ analytic/ behavioral armed conflict endemic. but not likely cooperation state-to-state/ transnational domestic system historical/analytic state-to-state historical/ analytical PRINCIPAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS PREFERRED METHOD(S) NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS SCHOOL OF THOUGHT KEY ACTOR(S) KEY VARIABLES I.2 Comparing security paradigms EXPECTED BEHAVIOR OF ACTOR(S) conflict/ cooperation with rival(s) possible conflict/ cooperation possible. but managed by balances of power cooperation is likely but armed conflict possible classical liberal violence/military force and economic ideas/values marginalized technological/ economic cooperation individual conflict system/markets armed conflict is potentially resolvable armed conflict eliminated with end of capitalism neo-Marxist individual (personal/ corporate) corporations technological/ economic cooperation/ (conflict?) methodological individualism/ scientific historical/analytic II.

as one sharp critic of a draft of this manuscript was keen to point out. what impact did this shift in Soviet foreign and strategic . Constructivists covered in chapter 7 are particularly concerned about what they argue are the narrow boundaries defined for security studies by most observers. including the limits I have adopted for this volume. Far from it. and democratization as key dimensions of this reform program. 5. Discussion questions 1. However important these philosophical and moral considerations might be to an understanding of security behavior – and many more can be identified as the chapters below suggest – they fall beyond the scope of this discussion. In what ways did Soviet d´ etente policy toward the West differ from previous Cold War periods of relaxed tensions between East and West? Specifically. perestroika. and demise – qualify as an appropriate test of the explanatory power of a theory of security? 2. possible points of comparison are noted to underscore that there is a lot more work to be done to develop reliable theories of security than this overview can hope to cover. Describe the three-tiered globalization of the superpower struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. enjoy as their birthrights and in society continue to possess and exercise through their participation in creating the General Will. but it is a start – an arguably plausible move in making some progress in assessing theories of security along the dimensions examined by this study. 3. What were the factors that drove Soviet leadership to embark on an ambitious domestic reform program? Explain glasnost. What is meant by Herman Kahn’s observation that the two superpowers built two “Doomsday Machines?” Do you think that this outcome of the strategic nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union has any relation to Clausewitz’s notion of “pure war?” 4. now transformed as citizens. evolution. Why are tests needed to validate competing theories of security? Does the Cold War – its rise. and developing world dimensions. covering its nuclear. These other. European. Evaluate the proposition that the superpower conflict threatened the security not only of the populations of these states but hundreds of millions of peoples around the world. These reservations are again noted in the interests of transparency to disclaim that this discussion has exhausted either the subject or ways of thinking about it.122 Introduction the freedom and equality that individuals.

New York: Basic Books.Testing security theories 123 military policy have on its capacity to control the East European members of the Warsaw Pact? 6. and religious divisions within the Soviet state and explains how and why these domestic conflicts proved decisive in the break-up of the Soviet state and system. New York: Oxford University Press. Norton. New York: W. Identify relevant criteria by which to compare and evaluate theories and approaches to international relations theory and explain why they are important in deciding which should be adopted to explain the security behavior of actors. John Lewis Gaddis (1992–93). Which of the four major changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy appears to be the most important in explaining the break-up of the Soviet Union? Why do you believe so? 7. notably with respect to their national. It is a useful supplement to the scholarly analysis of J´ anos Kornoi. “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War. A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945. Robert J. ethnic. Kaiser (1994). This volume details the failure of the Soviet Union to surmount the national. cited below. What Went Wrong with Perestroika. This is a good place to . The End of the Soviet Empire: Triumph of the Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Suggestions for further reading H´ el` ene Carr` ere d’Encausse (1993). ethnic. and religious divisions. Goldman (1991). This is an accessible diagnosis of why Soviet economic reforms failed by an accomplished observer of Soviet and Russian economic policies. This volume provides a comprehensive survey of the evolution of superpower nuclear doctrines and the evolution of the nuclear arms race. Keylor (2003). written by an eminent historian of the Cold War. This is a trenchant critique of the failure of international relations theory to anticipate the end of the Cold War. This work caps decades of scholarly publications signaling the decline of the Soviet Union as a consequence of these internal splits. W.” International Security 17: 5–58. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR. London: Macmillan. Marshall I. Lawrence Freedman (1989). William R. This French scholar has an international reputation as one of the most perceptive interpreters of Soviet and Russian politics.

The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism.124 Introduction begin to gain a firm. International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War. viewed principally from political and moral perspectives. . See extensive bibliographical citations in each volume. This is among the most thoroughgoing critiques of the failure of the Soviet system of economic development. This lively collection of essays provides a still relevant set of explanations for the implosion of the Soviet Union and its empire.) (1995). Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds. New York: Columbia University Press. Princeton: Princeton University Press. It complements the Keylor volume cited in chapter 1. J´ anos Kornai (1992). introductory knowledge of the evolution of the Cold War and the post-Cold War era.

theState and War A rHEORETICAL ANALTSIS JV.Mm.Waln I{enneth w ITT PftESS COLUMBIA UNIT/ERS \frrk Jtfew .

This. Thucydides implied it when he wrote that it was "the growth of the Athenian power. it is not a new idea. 1909.with no system of law enforceable among them. the relative efficiency of which must be its constant concern. History of the PeloponnesianWar. and reprinted in the program for the visit of William Howard Taft. is to be examined in the present chapter. To achieve a favorable outcome from such conflict a state has to rely on its own devices. sometimes leading to war. Jowett. Virginia. Book I. Ya. is bound to occur." r John Adams implied it when he wrote to the citizens of Petersburg.CHAPTER VI. /lu lzners to Hi Frimdt wITH many sovereign states. .which no Nation ought ever to feel towards another. 1798. par."t There is an obvious relation between the concern over r Thucydides. the idea of the third image. if just and necessary. May Ig. might wean us from fond and blind affections. 23.dated June 6. which terrified the Lacedaemoniansand forced them into war. Petersbutg. tr. as our experience in more than one instance abundantly testifies. It is not an esoteric idea.. 2 Letter of John Adams to the citizens of the town of Petersburg. that "a war with France. with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire-conflict. THE THIRD IMAGE Intenmtional Conflictand International Anarchy For what can be done against force without force? clcERo.

and honest illusion entertained by patriots sincerely interested in the safety of their stares. entirely overlook the other two. p.160 The Third Image relative power position expressed by Thucydides and the admonition of John Adams that love affairs between states are inappropriate and dangerous. and possibly even peace. In a manner of speaking. all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness. armament makers. Because any state rl]'ay aL any time use force. The requirements of state action are. This relation is made explicit in Frederick Dunn's statement that "so long as the notion of self-help persists. for example. after assessingthe prospects for success. It is. A state will use force to attain its goals i[. to recall one of the manv who have tDunn. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause. The three preceding statements reflect this fact. the aim of maintaining the porver position of the nation is paramount to all other considerations. Cobden. Still. however wedded to one image. emphasis on one image may distort one's interpretation of the others. not uncommon to find those inclined to see the world in terms of either the first or the second image countering the oft-made argument that arms breed not war but security." 3 In anarchy there is no automatic harmony. in this view. . imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist. Peaceful Change. by pointing out that the argument is a compound of dishonest myth. and the state system in any attempt to understand international relations that seldom does an analyst. and others. it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace. any state may at any time use force to implement its policies. 13. to cover the interests of politicians. To dispel the illusion. the state. all three images are a part of nature. So fundamental are man.

together with peace. In emphasizing the interdependenceof the policies of all srates. the result of ignoring some inherent difficulties. The result?-disarmament. if everyonedoesit.a Putting aside the thought that the arithmetic is not necessarilyan accurate reflection of what the situation would be. If some states display a willingness to pare down their military establishments. 135. 50 percent.in making comparisonswith the first and secondimages.we shall refer most often to two philosophers who closely followed thosepatterns-Spinoza for the first image. for all states. For the same pair of reasons.the argument paysheed to the third image. by developing and examining the third image in detail. a condition is sought in which the lesson here adumbrated becomes the basis for the policies of states. we shall focus primarily upon the political thoughr of one man. that none would be endangered if all military establishments were simultaneously reduced by. The optimism is. In this and the following chapter. other stateswill be able to pursue similar policies. especially his Speeches on Peacc. and thus economy. and Other Subjects Deliuered iluring 1t49. this argument illustrates a supposedlypractical application of the first and second images. In the present chapter. once pointed out that doubling armaments.International Anarchy 161 argued this way. however. say. Jean JacquesRousseau. similarly. Colonial Relorm. . Whether by educating citizens and leaders of the separatestatesor by improving the organization of each of them. we artempr ro make clear what these difficulties are. and thus security. Financial Reform. for the sake of varying the treatment and becausepolitical philosophy provides insufficiently exploited clues to the understanding of international politics. makes no state more secureand. 4 Cobden. p. In preceding chapters we examined the reasoning of a number of men whosethoughts on international relations conform to either the first or second image.

"overagainst their own clppression. on the national level only. States. sec. and Theologico-Political Treatise. Though both have been mentioned before. sec.162 The Third Image Kant for the second.3. in explaining the behavior of states he uses both an organismic and a corporate-trust analogy. states. ch. Logically. often by diseaseor mental infirmity. must combine. the is the sole cause of conflict. 208). come daily by sleep. are not subject to a similar necessity. The defectiveness cause.. however. Individuals. see ibid. sec. iii. Spinoza nevertheless solved the problem.he assumes. is both more complex and more suggestive. if this end of conflict must depend on the reform of men. ch.o Wars among statesare then as inevitable as are defectsin the nature of man. Spinoza moved from the individual and the nation to the stateamong statesby adding one to the number of his original assumptions. can provide whereas individuals. Men he de6 Though for Spinoza the unity of the state rests ultimately on the ability of the supreme authority to enforce his will. who out o[ self-interest another in perfect harmony. ch. ch.are like men. a summary of the reasoningon which they bared their views of international relations will make the comparisonsmore useful. they display both an urge to live and an inability consistently to order their affairs according to the dictates o[ reason. Political Treatise. 6Spinoza. iii.and consequently with one ought to cooPerate men. 14. iii. Passiondisplacesreason. engageendlesslyin quarrels of man is the and physical violence. . ll." cannot. to survive. ch.2. For the former.6 States. xvi (I. and in the end by old age. ii. For the latter. and the saving This was at once the great inconsistency grace of his system. sec. Spinozaexplained violence by referenceto human imperfections. while on somepoints similar to Spinoza's. see Political Treatise. by their very constitution. not by manipulating the supposedlycausal factor but by altering the environment in which it operates. Kant's analysis.

A number of men acting upon empirical "and therefore merely contingent" knowledge must have a judge among them. The other possibility open to him is that all statesso improve that they will act on maxims that can be universalized without conflict. The civil state. they would always act according to universally valid. Instead he attempts to combine the two. he is too cautious and roo intelligently critical to hope for the latter. It . But this bit of analysisdoes not lead Kant to the conclusion that a world state is the answer.uncertainty and violence make this impossible.International Anarchy 163 fines as being members of both the world of senseand the world of understanding. stifle liberty. he must cast about for another solution. Peaceamong as well as within statesis essentialto the. however. But since they are members of the former as well. self-imposedmaxims.men have some chance of behaving morally. and a judge who can enforce his decisions. Before the state is established. is not enough. eonsequently conflict and violence among them are inevitable. though actually he could not enjoy them.development of uniquely human capacities. They woul{ follow the categorical imperative. and the categorical imperative is so seldom followed that in the state of nature conflict and violence reign.if violence is to be avoided. Statesin the world are like individuals in the stare of nature. They are neither perfectly good nor are they controlled by law. and in the end lapse into anarchy. Men need the security of law before improvement in their moral lives is possible. The civil state appearsas a necessary constraint. After the state is established. Fearing that a world state would become a terrible despotism. kill initiative. The civil state makes possible the ethical life of the individual by protecting the rights that were logically his in the state of nature. impulse and inclination overcome reason. lVhile Kant fears the former solution. If they were wholly of the latter.

see "The Natural Principle of the Political Order Considered in Connection with the Idea of a Univcrsal Cosmopolitical History. Hastie. see "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals.) Republics. on occasions of need. in ibid. a comparably adequatesystemis not attainable internationally. 61. tr. must maintain itself by right alone. the form of the state that Kant labels good.though Kant's own analysis leadsone to question his conclusion.an adequate political systempermits individuals to behaveethically. 2 and 3. is completely dependent on the perfection with which the first is realized. see "The Principle of Progress Considered in Connection with the Relation of Theory to Practice in International Law. Abbott. see The Philosopy ol Lau. and it may hope on real glounds that the others being constituted like itself will then come. Image is the aim of his political philosophy to establish the hope that. 42. But the second. that is by the improvement of the separatestates... The "power" to enforce the law is derived not from external sanction but from internal perfection. On the characteristics of the international federation. At the level of the state. 64.8 This is a solution according to the secondimage. On the dependence of morality on a condition of peace among states." secs. states may improve enough and learn enough from the suffering and devastationof war to make possiblea rule of law among them that is not backed by power but is voluntarily observed. The inconsistency is apparent. Still we are to hope for peace among states. secs. will act in accordance with the categorical imperative.T The first factor is the internal improvement of states. tr. 9. "unable to injure any other by violence. 62-65. and. "Eternal Peace. sec. 8 Each republic. Hastie. pp. 8. Hastie." in Eternal Peace and Other International Essdls. Hastie. in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Worhs on the Theory ol Ethics. Kant musr assume.the external rule of law. The Philosophy ol Lau. to its aid. in Eternal Peace and Other International Essays. though its glare is somewhatdimmed by Kant's confession that he has not the "inevitability" of perpetual peacebut established ? For the above comments on man and morality. tr.being voluntary. 41. p." ("The Principle of Progress Considered in Connection with the Relation of Theory to Practice in International Law. tr. 44." in ibiil." Eighth Proposition." First and Second Definitive Articles. On the natural and civil states. the second. . tr.164 The Third.

Nugent. The Spirit of the Laus. pp.o In Rousseau's philosophy. Men before the establishment developedthe vicesof pride and envy. contrasts with that found in Friedrich's book on Kant.he will attack another only if driven by hunger to do so. ii. 11 Montesquieu. Discourses. consciousness and impotencydissuades them from attackingone another. Cole. considered in this chapter as a theory of international relations. 221-23. like him. Montesquieu saysof Hobbes that of sohe "attributes to mankind before the establishment of this estabciety what can happen but in consequence Iishment. Rousseau. which contains The Social Contract. Book I. iii. Inevitable Peace. Sincenone knows either pride or envy. were both moved to make the samecritical comment. Cf. Nugent. Inequality. ch. Whenever of weakness chance brings them together. tr. Rousseau. pp. Inequality.International Anarchy 165 only that the existenceof such a condition is not unthinkable. supported by considering Kant's political thought in the context of his moral philosophy.upon looking at attempts of other philosophers to understand a real or hypothetical state of nature. Indeed they could not. 1oMontesquieu. Page references are to The Social Contract and. tr. for they see very little of one another.1r I This interpretation. Rousseau." 10 Both Montesquieu and Rousseaumaintain that the state of nature of Hobbes-and the same applies to Spinoza-is a fiction constructed by assuming that men in nature possess all of the characteristicsand habits they acquire in society but without the constraints imposed by of societyhave not society. sumptions JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU Montesquieu and. and. f97. Book I. A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences. A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. The Spirit of the Laus. tr. impossible. ch. thrift or greed. emphasison the framework of state action makes some of the assumptions of it makes other of their asSpinoza and Kant unnecessary. A Discourse on Political Economy. . 227-33.

pp." to this end. they emphasize an important point. did man ever leave it? (2) Why does conflicr arise in social situations? (3) How is rhe conrrol of conflict related to its cause? 12 Rousseau.la The very difficulty of the undertaking and the uncertainty of the result emphasizethe error involved in taking the social man as the natural man.12becausethe human nature we do know reflects both man's nature and the influence of his environment. 16 Montesquieu. 234 tr. Book IX. and then commencesthe state of war. pp.' v Inequality. equality ceases. in Oeuares complites de I." 16 This estimate of the causesof conflict Rousseau takes up and develops. Montesquieu argues that conflict arises from the social situation: "As soon as man enrers into a state of society he loses the senseof his weakness. The Spirit of thc Laws.. 190. Becauseof the difficulty of knowing such a thing as a pure human nature.ls definitions of human nature such as those of Spinozaand Hobbes are arbitrary and can lead to no valid social or political conclusions. Theoretically at least one can strip away environmentally acquired characteristicsand arrive at a view of human nature itself. .lo It raisesthree questions:(l) Why. In doing so. Montesquieu and Rousseau arrive at a different conclusion simply by starting one step further back in their imaginary prehistory than did either Spinoza or Hobbes. as Hobbes and Spinozahave done. 16 See especially Inequality.166 The Third. tr. Image From one point of view this criticism of Hobbes is mere quibbling. I. p. VIII. Inequality. And instead of deriving social conclusions directly from assumed human traits.sone of relative peapeand quiet. and risked some conjectures. 189-91. however. Rousseau himself has advanced "certain arguments. 289: "Aucun peuple ne seroit jamais que ce que la nature de son gouvernement le feroit €tre. Nugent. Italics added. Book I. Rousseau. iii. if the original state of nature wa. 13 Les Confessiozs. ch.

habit. nevertheless. The hunger of each will be satisfiedby the fifth part of a stag. the second.. Similarly Rousseau at gimes. i. perceived interest. iv). and necessity. as a hare comeswithin reach. Rousseaudescribesthe establishment of the srate as the culmination of a long historical evolution containing elements of experience. necessary to have true ideas. Rousseau illustrates the Iine of reasoning with the simplest example. and probably never :::.a hypothetical reconstructionof those processes. seems to assume the purely willful employment of art and contrivance. But finally the combination of increasednumbers and the usual natural hazardsposed. The seemingcontradiction is eliminated by the fact that Rousseauconsiders the first a philosophical explanation of what happened by historical processes. the formation of state and society was an ac[ of will that served as a means of escape from an intolerable situation. e. But also the hunger of any one of them will be satisfiedby a hare.I n terna ti onal A nar ch^y r67 For Spinoza and Hobbes. so..a *fti. pp. for it is the point of departure for the establishmentof government and contains the basis for his explanation of conflict in international relations as well. and of which it is.p. tradition.the proposition: cooperate or die.9.h ng lo-rg:r... chs.l? At other times. 198. in his explanation of the establishment of rhe state. pp.he refers to the state of nature as . will exist. u See. so they "agree" to cooperate in a project to trap one. exists. the second to the explanation found in A Discourseon the Origin of Inequality. Social Contract. Cf.in a variety of situations. The first line of thought leads to the Social Conrracr. dbdd. rSln Inequality.ls In the early state of nature.t'.i (Book I.. . men were sufficiently dispersed to make any pattern of cooperation unnecessary. fg0-9f.. perhaps never did exist. 4. The example is worth reproducing. Assume that five men who have acquired a rudimentary ability to speakand to understand each other happen to come together at a time when all of them suffer from hunger.

He imagines how men must have behaved as they began to depend on one another to meet their daily needs.le The story is simple. As long as each provided for his own wants. Thus in the rs lbid. whenever the combination of natural obstaclesand growth in population made cooperation necessary. the implications are tremendous. necessarilylive always in harmony one with another. "we should need neither government nor laws. Ethics. 34 (Book II. . 238. The defector obtains the means of satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to escape. proof. Political Economy.. In cooperativeaction." 20 This corresponds to Spinoza'sproposition that "men in so far as they live in obedience to reason. prop. 20 Social Contract. their perfection would be reflected in all of their calculations and actions. cf. even where all agreeon the goal and have an equal interest in the project. p. vi). Pert IV. ch." zr The idea is a truism. 21Spinoza. conflict arose. p. there could be no conflict. Montesquieu and Rousseaucounter Spinoza's analysis with the proposition that the sourcesof conflict are not so much in the minds of men as they are in the nature of social activity. Rousseau faces the same problem. p. If men were perfect.. one cannot rely on others. xxxv. Each could rely on the behavior of others and all decisions would be made on principles that would preservea true harmony of interests. Rousseaugrants that if we knew how to receive the true justice that comes from God. Spinoza not the difficulties inherent in mediating conemphasizes flicting interests but the defectiveness of man's reason that prevents their consistentlymaking decisionsthat would be in the interest of each and for the good of all. His immediate interest prevails over consideration for his fellows. 296. The difficulty is to some extent verbal. Spinoza linked conflict causally to man's imperfect reason.168 The Third Image one of them grabs it.

his act is one of passion. 135-36 (Book IV. . Italics added. If harmony is to exist in anarchy. Reason would have told him that his long-run interest dependson establishing. not only must. the conviction that cooperative action will benefit all of the participants. The latter argument is reflectedin Rousseau's comments on the proposition that "a people of true Christians would form the most perfect society imaginable. To the extent that he was motivated by a feeling of hunger. he says. through experience. viii)." 2z If we define cooperativeaction as rational and any deviation from it irrational. . The problem is now posed in more significant terms.International Anarchy t69 stag-hunt example the tension between one man's immediate interest and the general interest of the group is resolved by the unilateral action of the one man. ch. the man next to him might leave his post to chase it. if by ill hap there should be a single self-seeker or hypocrite . But reason also tells him that if he foregoesthe hare. To allow in my calculation for the irrational acts of others can lead to no determinate solutions. pp. The word "equally" is necessary for an accurate rendering of the French text but does not appear in the translation cited. Otherwise there is no basisfor rational calculation. we must agree with Spinoza that conflict results from the irrationality of men. But if we 22Social Contract. . leaving the first man with nothing but food for thought on the folly of being loyal." Moreover. he would certainly get the better of his pious compatriots. aII the citizens without exception would have to be [equally] good Christians. but to attempt to act on a rational calculation without making such an allowance may lead to my own undoing. I be perfectly rational but I must be able to assumethat everyone else is too." In the first place he points out that such a society "would not be a society of men."For the state to be peaceable and for harmony to be maintained.

which will be discussed in ch. While by no means ignoring the part that avarice and ambition analRousseau's play in the birth and growth of conflict. Vaughan. as Rousseauimplies. viii. 9l Rousseau refers to men as "unjust." This raises the question of the relation of the third image to the first.he alsorefusesto label it either rational or irrational. that all will agree instantly on the action required by any chanceincidentsthat raise the question of altering the original plan. is. that each will draw the same conclusion as to the methods appropriate to meet the original situation. He has noticed that the difficulty is not only in the actors but also in the situations they face. the very real problem of how to achieve an approximation to harmony in cooperative and competitive activity is always with us and. and that each can rely completely on the of purpose of all the others. it is a problem that cannot be solved simply by changing men. On p. below . unlike Spinoza.23 ysis makes clear the extent to which conflict appears inevitably in the social aftairs of men. grasping and setting their own interest above all things.170 The Third Image examine the requirements of rational action. p. we find that even in an example as simple as the stag hunt we have to assumethat the reasonof each leads to an identical definition of interest. In short. in the sense that a world of and perfectly rational men would know no disagreements no conflicts. Already Rousseau has made it possible to 28 A Lasting Peace. 72. Perfectly rasteadfastness tional action requires not only the perception that our welfare is tied up with the welfare of others but also a perfect appraisal of details so that we can answer the question: Just how in each situation is it tied up with everyone else's? Rousseau agreeswith Spinoza in refusing to label the act of the rabbit-snatcher either good or bad. as true as it is irrelevant. Since the world cannot be defined in terms of perfection. lacking the possibility of perfection. tr. the proposition that irrationality is the cause of all the world's troubles.

pp." Agreementscannot bind. But to be provident is desirable. for conflict results from the seekingof any goal-even if in the seeking one attempts to act according to Kant's categorical imperative.then it is unnecessary to assume self-preservation as man's sole motivation." "physicalimpulses. 212. pp.for who. . The dialectical development. is bounded only by the strength of the individual."would be so absurd as to take the trouble of cultivating a field. p.cannot stand up against the efficiency of a group united and enjoying the benefits of a social division of labor. and property of others. unable to cooperateeftectively.rights.for it makes life easier." and "right of appetite". which might be stripped of its crop by the first comer?" To be provident is impossible.International Anarchy 17| dispense with two of the assumptions of Spinozaand Kant. in which each step toward the social state produces difficulties and near disasters.the laws of justice are ineffective among men. . and "liberty . Others are forced to follow the new pattern. 2a Inequality. Somemen unite. ch. men are governedby "instinct. for Rousseauas for Spinoza and Kant. is especially interesting.for population begins to press on the amount of food available under a given mode of production.and organizethe meansof enforcing them. set up rules governing cooperative and competitive situations. 249-52. for "in default of natural sanctions. or even necessary. vi). If conflict is the by-product of competition and attempts at cooperationin society.26 It is clear that in moving from the state of nature to 2lSocial Contract.34 (Book II. Rousseauasks. 18-19 (Book I." 2a Without the protection of civil law. even agriculture is impossible. ch. FROM NATURE TO STATE In the state of nature. . viii). for those outside the organized society. for without socialregulation there can be no obligation to respect the interests.

somewhat in the manner of Plato and Aristotle. for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery. But there are more makes this clear than material gains involved." 26 THE STATE AMONG STATES For Rousseauas for Kant the civil state contributes to the possibility of the moral life. viii). and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. This natural liberty he abandons "civil when he entersthe civil state." Man prior to the establishnatural liberty.moral liberty. though Rousseauconceives of the contribution asa more positiveone. . but Rousseau'sis the more consistentand complete. 26Social Contract. Hobbes. Kant too reverted to his analysisof the original conflict among men. ch. which Kant from the state of nalater followed closely. conflict had resulted from the defectivereasonof man. "The passage ture to the civil state. In return he receives liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses.172 The Third Image the civil state man gains materially. which alone makes him truly master of himself. by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct."Natcivil liberty. But what of the condition among the civil statesthemselves? At this point. The explanations of Rousseauand Kant are similar." Rousseau says. The social contract theorist. And in state. possession becomes proural liberty becomes "man in addition acquires the civil prietorship. but in his casethe explanation included both the nature of the conflicting units and their environment. while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty. he has a ment of the civil state possesses right to all he can get. he thought. "produces a very remarkable changein man. Spinoza reverted to the analysishe had applied to individuals in the state of nature where. Rousseau in a brief chapter ot The Social Contract. 18-19 (Book I. pp. be he Spinoza.

pp. Book X. Rousseau." however. resembling that of man. The latter has a right to kill in case of natural defense: the former have a right to wage war for their own preservation. Of the first. ix). 28 (Book II. he makes clear. The Spirit of the Laus.289: Social Contract. Nugent.International Anarchy 173 Locke. p. By defining the stateof nature as a condition in which acting units. may be considered as an organized. 2sPolitical Economy. iv). but can they be described as acting units? This question we must examine before considering Rousseau'sschematic description of the behavior of the state among states. like Spinoza. The first is implied in his statement that the sovereigncannor do anything derogatoryto the continued existence of the state."2? The organismic analogy is reffectedin his statement that "the body politic. ch. ch. not. The identity of individual and state motivation is a possiblecoincidence. as in Spinoza. care of its own preservation. 83 (Book III. whether men or states. ii. In this respect. ch. p. Cf. comparesthe behavior of states in the world to that of men in the state of nature. the plrrasecan be applied to states in the modjust ern world asto men living outsidea civil state. vii). taken individually.occasionally usescorporate-trust and organismicanalogies. The end of the state is "the preservation and prosperity of its members.. Montesquieu. "the most important of its caresis the 28 Rousseau." As a living being. there can be no presumption that the interest of the stateand the action of the sovereigncoincide. p. or Kant. Clearly statesrecognizeno common superior.Rousseaucan be consideredas distinguishing two cases: statesas we find them and statesthat are constitutedas they ought to be. "The life of governments is like that of man. Rousseau. ch. And he defines u'ith considerablecare what he means when he describesthe state as a unit completewith will and purpose. Indeed in 27 lbid. tr. 16-17 (Book I.a necessary assumption." . coexistwithout an authority abovethem. living body.cautions that the analogy is loosely used.

economic interdependence and pressure from outside produced group solidarity. Amid the greater complexities of the eighteenth century. .so long as he retains sufficient Power. Rousseau argues that under certain conditions a state will actualize the general will in its decisions. is seldom moved but by personal vanity and greed. Spaniards. The unity of the state is achievedwhen there for the actualization of the exist the conditions necessary general will. "There are today. the general will being defined as the decision of the state to do what is "best" for its members considered collectively." he writes. reveals that the state may become a unit. Even to such states organismic and corPorate analogies have a limited application. carries out his will as though it were the will of the state. he says. Germans. Public spirit or patriotism. From this abstract formulation one can scarcely derive an answer to the question that interests Rousseau: Under what conditions will the state achieve the unity that he desiresfor it? Fortunately it is quite easyto make Rousseau'sformulation concrete. that in interThis parallels Spinoza. "no longer Frenchmen. there are only Europeans. a distinctive shaping of his character from his national in- . Rousseau fears that the spirit of solidarity found in the social or political groups of a simpler era has been lost. who simply assumes national affairs the state must be considered as acting on behalf of all its members. in a deeper sensethan the philosophy of Spinoza can comprehend. which. The sovereign.t74 The Third Image most states it would be strange if they did. for in one way the state is still a unit.. Rousseauadds to this an analysis.is the necessarybasis of the good state. supplemented and borne out by the subsequent history of nationalism.passions. for the sovereign. far from caring for the interests of his state." All have Englishmen and morals becausenone receives the same tastes. In the primitive tribe.

in Vaughan. if they are taught to respect these above all things. in danger of being lost in a welter of counterpassionsarising from sub. Proiet de Constitution pout la Corse.2o Patriotism is. !t1On the importance of equality see Considirations sur Ie Goutetne' ment de Pologne. and Political Econotny. equality prevents the development of those partial interests so fatal to the unity of the state. among so many other interests. p. if they are imbued with the laws of the State and the precepts of the general will. it does violence to one's common senseto speak of the state.457. On the imPortance of building patriotism see ConsidCrationssur le Gouvcrnement de Polognc.8l The will of the state is the general will. E09.so In such a state. are also cited from this work: Projet ile Constitution pour la Corse and.. p. we cannot doubt that they will learn to cherish one another mutually as brothers. 337-38. 3oPolitical Economy.can patriotism grow? This is the question Rousseau asks. How. of the inestimable benefits they receive from her. In studying international politics it is convenient to think of statesas the acting units. and of the return they owe her. if they are surrounded by examples and objects which constantly re' mind them of the tender mother who nourishes them. . and to become in time defenders and fathers of the country of which they will have been so long the children. ed. At the same time. ll. 306. 436.from a negative point of view. 456. from a positive point of view.or transnational interests. to will nothing con' trary to the will of society.ll. which is after all an abstraction and consequently inani2s ConsiilCrations sur Ie Gouuernement de Pologne. to substitute the actions of men and citizens for the futile and vain babbling of sophists.International Anarchy t75 stitudons. especiallyll. of the love she bears them. he thinks. used below. He answers: If children are brought up in common in the bosom of equality.conflict is eliminated and unity is achieved because. the inculcation of public feeling imparts to the citizen a spirit of devotion to the welfare of the whole. The following. especially II. The Political Writings of Jean JacquesRousseau.432.extracts fuom Emile. there is no problem of disunity and conflict.

H. Prior to the eighteenth century the sentiment was either confined to a small part of a population spread over a relatively large area or it was confined to a larger percentageof those living in a relatively small area. and especially for the third image. ?1. I. . as acting. 82 Partridge.ss That the Greeks applied the same idea to themselves is a commonplace of Hellenic literature. p. Hayes says. The feeling here expressedis the sentiment of group or local patriotism." appellations implying that they are better than. This is an important point for any theory of international relacions. as C. as well as distinct from.' 'The Only Men.a2 Herodotus found that the Persiansregarded themselvesas a greatly superior people who rated the merit of other peoples according to their geographic nearnessto the Persians. nobility. Image mate. the rest are something else. "War. Rawlinson. and clergy united in regarding as domestic. There. 16-20. Then we have the immensely imporrant fact of modern nationalism. The existenceof group patriotism has no special meaning for our analysis until. Wo are men. War and Other Essays. other similar groups." ss The Hktory of Herodotus.'or . and Euerywhere. that is. Cf. ed. J." in Sumner.it becomes fused with the idea of nationality. and the Jews were certain that they were the chosen people of God.r76 The Third. tr. 12: "Perhaps nine-tenths of all the names given by savage tribes to themselves mean 'Men. Keller." in Here.Men of Men'. "We Are The People. An example of the first condition is found in the resistancein France ro the interference of Pope Boniface VIII in questions that king. How generally applicable are the thoughts of Rousseauto this problem? The philologist Eric Partridge has commented on the widespreadtendency of primitive peoplesto refer ro themselvesas "the men" or "the people. An example of the second is found in the civic feeling in the Greek city-states and in some of the medieval towns. pp.

To base one's whole analysis on this point is.3s With the development of modern technology. it has become possible for the interests of individuals ro be thought of as tightly complementary. that the growth of nationalism is synonymous with the integration oi the masses into a common political form. Men once felt a loyalty to church that made them willing to sacrificetheir lives in war for it. tion is the ideal of Rousseau's like Plato. ll. in modern times. that most people feel a loyalty to the state that overrides their loyalty to almost any other group.International Anarchy r77 Hans Kohn points out that nationalism is impossible without the idea of popular sovereignty. Rousseauhas made it clear that his analysiswill apply in 34 Hayes. felt a similar loyalty to the national state. The mass of men have. but the exceptions have seldom resulted in numerous denials of the primary claim of the nation on the loyalties of its citizens. however.Crations sur Ie Gouvernement de Pologne. The scale of activity has changed. si vous voulez r€former votre Gouvernement.H' 35 Cf. It has been increasingly true in recent centuries. The ldea ol Nationalism." . the advice he gives in Consid. the idea has not. over areas larger than Rousseau ever visualized. however. Essays on Nationalism. The idea of nationalism does not imply that allegiance to the nation is the sole allegiance. thought it possible only within a narrowly circumscribed area-the city-state. but he. 29. especially as applied to the means of transportation and communication.even without the use of devices Rousseauthought necessary. Kohn. The centripetal force of nationalism may itself explain why states can be thought of as units. Modern nationalism admits of exception. PP. unnecessary.sa Such an integrapolitical writings. p. 442: "Commencez par resserrer vos limites.

the general will of the state. has becomethe casein many statesthat in most other respectsfall far short of his ideal. Dissenters within the state are carried along by two considerations: their inability to bring force to bear to change the decision. and in the ultimate case the unity of the state is simply the naked power of the de facto sovereign. their conviction. although Rousseaudid not foreseeit. the better the state. since it would also cease to be a state. that in the long run it is to their advantageto go along with the national decision and work in the prescribed and acceptedways for its change. by Rousseau's standards. based on perceived interest and customary loyalty. we can now add. the more nationalistic. In any actual state the situation can be describedas follows. On the other hand. Some questions become questions of foreign policy.the more important the first consideration.or. and in the ultimate case the agreement of the citizens with the governr{rent's formulation of foreign policy is complete.t7B The Third Image (l) If the state is a unit that can with either of two cases: some appropriateness take the adjective "organismic. the more the secondconsideration is sufficient.this doesnot complicate our problem. some questions of foreign policy cail for single choices. (2) If the state is a unit only in the sense that some power in the state has so establisheditself that its decisionsare acceptedas the decisionsof the state. In eirher ease. Any "state" falling outside the terms of the preceding descriptions could no longer be considered a unit for purposes of international political analysis.but. to use Rousseau's terminology. some of thesechoicesmust be supported by the state as a whole or the state disappears-and with it the problem of state ." This. The lessgood the state. In the name of the state a policy is formulated and presented to other countries as though it were. the state appears to other states as a unit.

This is the position of Rousseauwho arguesthat "if war is possibleonly between such 'moral beings' [states]." One state makes war on ar.other stete.International Anarchy t79 unity. The object of the war is to destroy . It is enforced by pressures from within society: the outrage of the chorus in Aristophanes' The Acharnians in reaction to Dicaeopolis' defenseof the enemies of Athens is reflected in the wartime experience of every society. is fed not only by indigenous factors but also by the antagonisms that frequently occur in international relations. we have a foreign policy. The unity of a nation. There is a further consideration. and sentiments behind a war policy. attempts to achieve a nearly unanimous backing for foreign policy are most likely to be successful. If we have a state. which causesthe nation to act more consistently as a unit than the preceding analysis suggests.it follows that the belligerents have no quarrel with individual enemies. Such antagonisms become important not when they result in feelings of hatred between individuals in difierent countries but when the state mobilizes resources. The united front is enforced by the feelings of individuals. in short. But the war is prosecuted even though the infantryman on the line might rather be anywhere else doing anything other than shooting at the enemy. In moments of crisis and especiallyin the crisis of war. interests. by their conviction that their own security dependson the security of their state. Individuals participate in war because they are members of states. Previously inculcated feelings of enmity may make a war policy more likely and may increaseits chancesof success. and in foreign policy the state must on occasionspeak with a single voice. It is enforced by actions of the state that punish the traitors and reward those who are most effectively or most spectacularlypatriotic.

for to be prudent is useless"when everything is s6 A Lasting Peace. who would not fail to forestall the attack in his turn at any moment favourable to himself. Montesquiet. 78-79. Social Contract. everyone. But so long as there is no security for this. g-10 (Book I. Vaughan. Nugent. Of the role of the international environment. The fact that we opposed not individuals but statesmade possible a rapid realignment of statesfollowing the war. Vaughan. pp. those dictates are liable to prove fatal to the man who persists in obcerving them with all the world when no one thinks of observing them towards him. flowever salutary it may be in theory to obey the dictates of public spirit. ch. cf. ch. 123. tr. sr A Lasting Peace. The Spirit ol the Laus. iii. ii. politically and even morally. We fought against Germany in the Second World War because as a whole it followed the lead of Hitler and not becauseso many people in the United Statesfelt a personal enmity for the people of Germany. The Spirit of the Laws. We can now return to Rousseau's theory of international relations paying special attention to the points that primarily concern him. so that many wars. are rather in the nature of unjust precautions for the protection of the assailant'sown possessions than a device for seizing those of others. . pp. which is now spectacularlydemonstrated by the cooperation of the United States with the leaders and people of states that were a short time ago our mortal enemies. is anxious to begin it at the moment which suits his own interest and so forestall a neighbour. Nugent. Rousseausaysthis: It is quite true that it would be much better for all men to remain always at peace. that instant the war would end. tr. Book X. Book X." 36 One need not look far for confirmation of the hypothesis. namely the political environment and qualities of states. And if the opposing state "could be dissolvedat a single stroke. having no guarantee that he can avoid war. tr. p. even oftensive wars. and Montesquieu. Cf. it is certain that. tr. iv). ch.3? The framework within which narions acr makes prudence futile.180 The Third Image or alter the opposing state.

to Ibid. Just as the will of an association within the state.. Rousseau has said nothing that is not also found in Spinoza and Kant."a0 If in such a world prudence is futile."38 The characterof those who act makes the situation more hopelessstill.so the will of a state. though in most caseshe says it better. add up to a world at peace? To this question Kant answered. for "to be sane in a world of madmen is in itself a kind of al madness. "Thus it is not impossible. 95. or merely a pretext for attaining therp.of throwing him into difficultiesfrom which he cannor escape withour their aid.should 38A Lasting Peace. p." Rousseausays." re As for their ministers "on wbom they shuffieofi their duty" whenever possible. Vaughan. Any other purposethey may have is either subservientto one of theseaims. may be wrong in relation to the world. But would the existenceof a number of good states." Of the relations among statesas we find them. asa meansof making themselvesindispensable to their master.International Anarchy l8l left to chance. "that a Republic.whether defined according ro rhe juridical standardof Kant or rhe more inclusive criteria of Rousseau.. p. though equitable for itself. then sanity is downright dangerous.yes. ss lbid.. of ruining the State.they "are in perpetual need of war. The will of the state. 88." Rousseausays. if things come ro the worst. while general for itself."is devoted solely to rwo objects: to extend their rule beyond their frontiers and to make it more absolutewithin them.Lr. .. as the price of keeping their own office. p. may be wrong when considered from the standpoint of the welfare of the state. p. though in itself well governed. t0O. "The whole life of kings. 9t.which in its perfection is general for each of the citizens.no.is only a particular will when consideredin relation to the rest of the world. 4r Ibid. Rousseau says.

324.ag Since this is the case. of which the above thoughts are an extension. in Oeuvres complites de I. Le bon. just as Rousseauinsists the parmust.but." a2 To achieve a will general for the world. be lost in the state. is simply another way of saying that in anarchy there is no automatic harmony." {a This parallels Hegel's formulation: "It is to what is by nature accidental that accidents happen. is accurately though somewhat abstractly summarized in the following statement: That among particularities accidentswill occur is not accidental but necessary. to define the good state as so perfect that it will no longer be particular. each country's formulation of its goals will be of particular rather than of general validity. le beau. I. sec. la vertu. qui ne sont point admis ailleurs. . le laid.whom on this point Kant failed to follow. 290-91. then there are only two possible solutions: (l) to impose an efiective control on the separate and imperfect states. ses jugemens. and mean. and the fate whereby they happen ir thus a necessity. ticularity of private associations The nation may proclaim. Rousseau.44And this.Rousseau. If anarchy is the problem. Rousseau'sconclusion. Part II. (2) to remove states from the sphere of the accidental. 49 On the subject of local variations in standards of conduct. emphasizesthe particular nature of even the good a2Political Economy. Kant tried to compromise by making statesgood enough to obey a set of laws to which they have volunteered their assent." Philosophy ol Right. in turn. Letter xiv.the absenceof an authority above statesto prevent and adjust the conflicts inevitably arising from particular wills means that war is inevitable. tr.182 The Third Image enter upon an unjust war. 160: "Chaque coterie a ses rtgles. despite the intent. n'ont qu'une existence locale et circonscrite. IV. L'honn€te homme d'une maison est un fripon dans la maison voisine. la vCrit€. which is also the heart of his theory of international relations. that is. pp. ses principes. Knox. that its aspirations are legitimate from the point of view of all states. le mauvais. consider La Nouaelle Hiloise. the particularity of the separatestateswould have to be sublimated.

in every caseof doubt.whether good or bad.International Anarch^t r83 state and. in so doing. makes aPParent the futility of the solution Kant suggests. a will perfectly good for itself may provoke the violent resistanceof other states. ao This is not.asHe also makes possiblea theory of international relations that in general terms explains the behavior of all states. viii. reason is that in the absence bound." And if we ask why they must "inevitably" clash. Rousseau answers: becausetheir union is "formed and maintained by nothing better than chance.ao In the stag-hunt example. 45 Kant is more willing to admit the force of this criticism than is generally realized. the will of the rabbit-snatcher was rational and predictable from his own point of view.a?The application of Rousseau's theory to international politics is stated with eloquence and clarity in his commentaries on Saint-Pierre and in a short work entitled The State of War. their variances are all the more deadly. t7 Political Economy. which will be discussed in ch. The public law of Europe is but "a mass of contradictory rules which nothing but the right of the stronger can reduce to order: so of any sure clue to guide her. pp. On this point. His application bears out the preceding analysis. From the point of view of the rest of the grouP. below. This point raises the question of the relation of the third image to the second." They "must inevitably fall into quarels and dissensionsat the first changes that come about. "touch each other at so many points that no one of them can move without giving a jar to all the rest. The states of Europe he writes." The nations of Europe are willful units in close juxtaposition with rules neither clear nor enforceable to guide them. pp. of course. see above. 29G-91. to obey the promptings of self-interest-which in itself would make war inevitable. . it was arbitrary and capricious. 164{5. as their ties are more closely woven. to say that no difierences in state behavior follow from the different constitutions and situations of states. So of any individual state.

that eirhi:r tendency may be changed or modified by a thousand accidents. pp. Inequatity.bo But to emphasizethe importance of political srrucrure is not to say that the acts that bring about conflict and lead to the use of force are of no importance.. pp." re The argumenr is clear.184 The Third Image even if all parties desired to be just. p. and therefore that. Vaughan. so lbid. Rousseau distinguishes between the "state of war." which always exists among states. 49... Vaughan. it is foolhardy to expect.ao What then is cause: the capricious acts of the separate statesor the system within which they exist? Rousseau emphasizes the latter: Every one can see that what unites any form of society is community of interests." but "the imperfectionsof this association make the state of those who belong to it worse than it would be if they formed no community at all. The late stage of the state of nature is necessarilya state of rvar.There have been known States so constituted that the necessity of making conquests entered into . 157-58. For individuals the bloodiest stageof history was the period just prior ro rhe establishment of society. and what disintegrates [it] is their conflict. 4G42. At that point they had lost the virtues of the savage without having acquired those of the citizen. It is the specific acts that are the immediate causesof war. 46-48.auromaric harmony of interest and automatic agreement and acquiescence in rights and duties. Rousseau presents his exhaustive list of such causes. 252-53." In this condirion. Cf. The nations of Europe are precisely in that stage. and war proper. 38. which manifests iaelf in the settled intention to destrov the enemy state. p. and Emile. 46 (Book II.6r the general 48 A Lasting Peace. as soon as a society is founded. 58-59. ch. l2l. p. 69. In a real sense there is a "union of the nations o[ Europe. On p. ix): . Cf. tr. 6rln ibid. some coercive power must be provided to co-ordinate the actions of its members and give to their common interests and mutual obligations that firmness and consistency which they could never acquire of themselves. tr. lI. 4e A Lasting Peace. pp. Social Contract.

he says. Nugent. and place the one no lessthan the other under the authority of the Law. The most vulnerable point is revealed by the questheir very constitutions. Rousseaudoes not modify his principle. tr.. 38-39. 62 A Lasting Peace. ii." Cf. of the What alteration of structure is required? The idea that a voluntary federation. . also Political Economy. every point of which is a contradiction of Kant's program for the pacific federation: The Federation [that is to replace the "free and voluntary association which now unites the States of Europe"] must embrace all the important Powers in its membership. 5S60. and that in order to maintain themselves. To eliminate every vestige of selfishness. as is made clear in the following quotation. cally. finally." 62 only to amend them out of Kant made similar statements existence once he came to consider the reality of such a federation. it must be strong and firm enough to make it impossible for any member to withdraw at his own pleasure the moment he conceiveshis private interest to clash with that of the whole bodY. 6s lbid. Montesquieu. such as Kant later proposed. rejectsemphatiRousseau could keep peaceamong states.the remedy for war among states "is to be found only in such a form of federal Government as shall unite nations by bonds similar to those which already unite their individual members. pp. Book IX. with powers to pass laws and ordinances binding upon all its members. ch. pp. it must have a coercive force capable of compelling every State to obey its common resolves whether in the way of command or of prohibition. 318. Perversity. Vaughan. and stupidity in nations would serve to establish perpetual peace.rB It is easyto poke holes in the solution offered by Rousseau. The Spirit of the Laus.but to try directly to eliminate all the 'immediatecauses of lvar without altering the structure of "union Europe" is utopian. they were forced to expand ceaselessly. Instead. it must have a Legislative Body.Internalional Anarch"t 185 structure that permits them to exist and wreak their disasters. tt. p.

First." both of which were put forth in this chapter. The arguments are convincing. and how likely is it that the efiective force will always be on the side of the federation? To answer these questions Rousseauargues that the statesof Europe are in a condition of balance sufficiently fine to prevent any one state or combination of statesfrom prevailing over the others. The next chapter will attempt to make clear their relation to each other and to the third image. This problem will be considered in Chapter VIII. we have not systematicallyconsidered the problem of interrelating them. but they need not be reviewed here. although it has by now become apparent that there is a considerableinterdependenceamong the three images. the necessary margin of force will always rest with the federation itself. For this reason. The practical weaknessof Rousseau'srecommended solution does not obscure the merit of his theoretical analysis of war as a consequence of international anarchv. . That there is still important ground to cover is made clear by two points. Second. there is no obvious logical relation between the proposition that "in anarchy there is no automatic harmony" and the proposition that "among autonomous states war is inevitable. The best critical consideration of the inherent weaknessof a federation of states in which the law of the federation has to be enforced on the stateswho are its members is contained in the Federalist Papers. CONCLUSION The present chapter provides a basic explanation of the third image of international relations.r86 The Third Image tions: How could the federation enforce its law on the states that comprise it without waging war against them.

for all its popularity. Discussion of stability and its possible requirements is in fact a discussion of deterrence theory. these concepts have been widely understood and approved (in the West) since at least 19h0. 109(4) (1980): 135-54. and deficiencies of the still dominant theories of stability and. . it endeavors. electronic. there is no useful consensus about the meaning of stability. Most commentators. meaning. instruments of war (mechanical. Gray I n an important article published in 1978. and certainly the government of the United States (and NATO).Strategic Stability Reconsidered Colin S. acknowledge the value in the twin concepts of arms race stability and crisis stability. it is the condition wherein neither party to an arms competition will press military developments or deployments in quest of major advantage. At this level of generality. organizational) should not be the immediate cause of war. first. No useful. over the particular policy Source: Dadalz~s:Iouynal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences."' This essay will focus on whether the theories of stability most widely held in the West may not be gravely deficient and whether the integrity of the concept of strategic stability may not itself be questionable. Crisis stability is a quality of strategic relations: during periods of acute crisis. to explain the roots. second. because such advantage is judged to be unattainable. which in reality is a debate about the operational merits of different postures and doctrines.2 Consensus breaks down. As arms race stability is commonly understood. however desirable. and the asserted conceptual consensus seems to be organized around that objective. The discussion that follows makes no pretense of neutrality. John Steinbruner claimed: "As the United States force posture has evolved over the past 1 5 years. doctrineneutral exploration of the idea of stability is possible. to suggest a theory that has much greater internal and external integrity. the idea of stability has emerged as the central strategic objective. instead. It is important to recognize that. however. objective.

As its first priority. It rests on the proposition that forces that do not lend themselves to politically intelligent employment in war are probably insufficient to deter . officials. that a MAD posture. It must be observed. an adequate theory of deterrence must determine the military (and relevant civilian) requirements of war itself. have (mis)led Western policymakers into neglecting the operational dimensions of strategy. how is arms race stability to be achieved and maintained. the leitmotiv of Western strategic preparation.at least at those rare times when an adversary may seek a military solution to his problems.' that the call for a war-survival capability would hardly be likely to encourage Western governments down the path of military adventure. policy with respect to the requirement for the defeat of the enemy? and is not incompatible with the more familiar connotation of (arms race and crisis) stability." given the full dimensions of Western strategic security problems in the context of the military consequences of the unique "cultural thoughtways"bf a particular major adversary. in principle. I believe that the ideas of arms race and crisis stability. From an operational perspective. and so many of the weapon systems on both sides lack realistic field tests. and also confident that a large number of its strategic offensive weapons are invulnerable prior to launch and during mission e x e c ~ t i o nThis . It is essential to recognize that both Western ideas of stability and the Soviet approach to the determination of principles that will guide their defense preparation and war planning have deep cultural roots . and analysts seem to believe that nuclear strategy cannot really have any operational dimensions. By way of providing an initial point of doctrinal reference for this essay. For much of this essay.they are not accidents of history. ~ condition of mutual assured vulnerability has been identified for many years as a mutual assured destruction (MAD) posture. and how is crisis stability enforced. it is my belief that the strategic balance would be stable if Western governments were allowed to enjoy not-implausible prospects of both defeating their enemy (on his own terms) and ensuring Western political-social survival and recovery.224 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence implications. however. As a working hypothesis. This admittedly close parallel to the known Soviet approach to defense planning is already U. and the theory of deterrence to which they usually make (often implicit) reference. Orthodox stability theory in the West even today is based in good part on the assumption that mutual societal vulnerability is desirable.S. Deterrence theory.6 The costs of major war today are anticipated to be so high. is compatible with a wide variety of strategic targeting plans. Indeed. In this essay I will argue that the West requires a concept of stability appropriate for giving a theoretical underpinning to the determination of . "stable deterrence theory" will refer to the proposition that stability in arms competition and in time of crisis is maximized when each side is unambiguously vulnerable at home. vis-a-vis a Soviet adversary? This quest seeks a theory of stability that will work "well enough. because it would not be intelligently usable in practice. many politicians. is fully consistent with a strategic force posture that has n o credibility as a threat.

S. Strategic situations are measured by the degree of their stability. T h e United Stares The concept of strategic stability took firm hold as an American strategic desideratum long before it was substantially field tested in the SovietAmerican military competition or before there was a directly relevant formal arms control process. it should facilitate more accurate comprehension of Soviet deeds and words. it should help U. A gifted Israeli commentator o n the U. A situation is stable.S.S." Jack Snyder has defined strategic culture "as the sum total of ideas. arms debate wrote in 1964 that stability has become a fundamental concept in nuclear strategy. Third. The stability theory dominant in the 1960s and 1970s was addressed at root to a relationship between two supposedly like-minded and ultimately (after detente had done its work) like-intending adversary-partners. First. and a magic formula.' Recognition. therefore. the burden of obsolescent strategic theories o f stability remains. . policymakers to identify programs and doctrines that. American theoreticians reasoned that the multitier arms competition between East and West could be stabilized through cooperative management effected through tacit agreement or formal bargaining. . (and NATO) appreciation of Soviet habits and motives."# The insertion of "nuclear" precludes too much. if not uncritical acceptance. it might help to explain how and why the concept of strategic stability took such firm root in the U. the literature of the early and mid-1960s shows clearly that the U. it is a . when there is no temptation to force the issue. Second.8 I . of this working hypothesis is important for the following reasons. while broadly compatible with American values.S. Once a situation of stability has been achieved. and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.S. Concepts and Culture There is much to recommend the working hypothesis that Soviet and American strategic concepts reflect the character and content of their divergent and distinctive "strategic cultures. Although a sea-change is evident in this new decade in official U. Moreover. the initiation of war by surprise no longer assures any gain or advantage. defense and arms control community. ." stressing the pervasiveness of all arms thinking in Soviet military preparation. conditioned emotional responses.i Strategic Stability Reconsidered 225 the military requirements that will enable it to defend its vital interests. are adequately responsive to Soviet developments. John Erickson wrote recently on Soviet "style. defense community knew what strategic stability was and how it could best be forwarded.

but technology surely has a logic that the Soviets must. mutual vulnerability was seen as an opportunity to establish more stable Soviet-American strategic relations. rests on the premise that the United States is benefited if the Soviet Union maintains a strategic deterrent capability comparable in overall strength to our own. should be compatible with the support of U. Thus.S. not a matter for choice . in good part. In a book that perhaps merits description as the fullest and most mature statement of 1960s-style stability (through mutual vulnerability) theory. modern defense technology determines to a large extent the kind of strategic doctrines and policies that will be adopted by the superpowers. Far from being a problem. technology seems to have a levelling effect which subsumes political. A stable military balance. from discouraging analyses of the future promise of damagelimiting strategies. because of its technological inevitability and near-evident desirability."" The United States seemed to know what it wanted and to believe that what was good for the United States would come to be seen by the Soviet Union as good for it also.S. "If.226 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence situation of mutual neutralization in which both the householder and the burglar know that even if one slays the other. Military-technological prediction .that is. and should eventually find favor with the Soviet Union. then. . it is possible to establish a relatively effective U. a Soviet convergence with the American concept of a stable . In 1970 Roman Kolkowicz expressed the then popular. foreign policy interests (though it is unclear whether very careful analysis was performed on this subject).10 The U.S.that future societal vulnerability will be a fact. The Soviet Union might prefer to compete for "useful advantage" so long as that was believed to be attainable.was transformed into normative terms.. ideological and social differences in various political systems. was one in which each side's military forces looked roughly comparable and neither side believed it could gain a significant military advantage by striking first.12 The convergence of strategic ideas hoped for in the late 1960s and early 1970s . view that Soviet strategic doctrine and capabilities appear to have lagged behind those of the United States by about five years . respect." A little earlier he had written. in the broadest sense. it is an acceptance of both the mutual assured destruction relationship and numerical parity. policy of mutual stability. and will. in American perspective. defense community.. and perhaps even plausible. the USSR's strategic doctrine is largely understandable and somewhat comparable to ours. because neither side would be able to protect its domestic assets against retaliation. decided that a stable military balance would mean a safer world with fewer resources expended on defense than would be the case with an unstable military balance. Jerome Kahan wrote: "A mutual stability approach. with very few exceptions. the latter will manage to retaliate posthumously. These elements of stability derived initially.

escalation control. what loosely can be called "strategic theory." is distinguished by its rarity. defense community has to grapple with the implications of the hypothesis that Soviet military ideas and activities are deeply rooted in local soil and hence are very likely to endure. of course. There are no functional Soviet equivalents to the Western theories of deterrence." By the early 1970s the SALT process appeared to carry promise for the cooperative management of strategic relations. if possible. or perhaps how. . bargaining. just as the key Western concepts spawned by those theories . though should not have been. which shows no evidence of endorsing a recognizable or attractive concept of strategic stability. The distinctiveness blurs markedly." The American military establishment prepares to fight and. and arms control.stability. to win wars. that the Soviet General Staff is extremely well acquainted with Western ideas on stability . Indeed.generically operational matters . By 1979-80 most American commentators o n Soviet-American strategic policy issues accepted as a very probable fact the existence of a "conceptual gap" between Soviet and American thinking on strategic issues that appeared t o be enduring.that the Soviet Union would not wish to engage in genuinely "reciprocal measures for arms stabilization" . sufficiencyladequacy.lh Yet it is only in the Soviet Union that those preferences are fully expressed in postural terms. limited war. when American arms control theory was being forged. Through the 1960s and at least part of the 1970s such a troublesome question could be. ignored or deferred. and probably would prefer to support a military doctrine as traditional in its concerns as that espoused by the Soviet Union. because each side's thought was rooted in what has come to be termed "strategic culture. the U. a major question that should be posed is whether. as Robert Jervis has observed. Soviet thought on the military dimensions of statecraft. if somewhat belated.did not occur. if Soviet military thinking is compared with American professional military thinking."" The important difference between 1980 and 1970 (or 1960) is that what was then plainly recognized as a possibility . It was recognized that the Soviet Union still had to catch up in some important military respects and that program momentum reflecting pre-SALT I thinking and practices would take some time to be amended to be compatible with the new relationship. and that there are no important apparent strains between the policy preferences of the Soviet military and the Soviet political leadership. uncooperative Soviet ideas and practices could plausibly be interpreted as reflections of a relatively backward technology or of a policy1 intellectual "lag. In the late 1950s and early 1960s. highly politicized topics.or on grand-strategic.Cra) Strategic Stability Reconsidered 227 military balance .Soviet military thinking is not crude and "uneducated". Western recognition of the strategic cultural distinctiveness of the Soviet Union. the United States can conduct serious arms control business with the Soviet Union. Today.I4 It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this very widespread.S.has now become plausible fact." Soviet writings tend to focus on efficient force preparation and implementation .

stable deterrence prose. values. The complex military balance is stable if the Soviet urban-industrial target set is adequately covered and if the United States looks.S. The existence of very large and diverse strategic nuclear arsenals solves the problem of possible premeditated war between nuclear-armed states. Western commentators continue to deny. It is possible that the Soviet military (and political) establishment is seeking the unattainable in its evident pursuit of a war-waginglwar-winning capability. Using this logic.with conclusions that cast grave doubts on the merits of the society destruction bedrock of the theory that identifies stability with mutual vulnerability . explicitly or implicitly. and that the United States would be ill-advised to compete very vigorously with military programs designed to improve war-waging performance. "Stability. The ideas that comprise the concept of a stable military balance reflect fairly faithfully the world view. because the war initiator will know that he cannot deny the enemy the . American strategic theorists have tended to argue. that the development of nuclear weapons has imposed a "technological peace. and even answered of lateI9 . resolute in its willingness to retaliate.S.22 The United States is a satisfied world power with a fundamentally defensive strategic mission as its international responsibility.appear to play no identifiable role in guiding Soviet military planning. ~ " the ~ present day.but the covering of the urban-industrial target set still is accorded pride of place in official U. What kind of damage would most likely be judged acceptable by a Soviet leadership? This question has been posed. that stability is a condition describing a military-political relationship.ls In the half-light of the growing appreciation of the alien character of Soviet strategic culture. if not always war-planning) sway for the past fifteen years. From 1946.S. and prudence. and theorists who have articulated American strategic culture. Despite the evidence accumulating on RussianISoviet strategic culture and the military-program momentum implications of that culture. It tends to lack a sense of competition. implicitly." as it pervades much of American theorizing about deterrence questions. the United States has a deterrence problem of finite physical dimensions. However. ~ and ' as the Soviet military competitive position continues to improve across the board. is essentially static and absolute. and preferably is. when The Absolute Weapon was p ~ b l i s h e d .20 It may be that this society punishment oriented theory can provide a robust basis for a stable military balance. U. policymakers have to reassess the relevance. now that it is generally recognized that the Soviet military effort marches to the beat of a distinctly non-American d r ~ m m e r . and pertinent education of those commentators. policymakers. tendency to define conditions as problems to be solved. there should be no serious resistance to consideration of the possibility that the consequences of mainstream Western stability theory may lead to under-recognized dangers.228 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence and the rest ." The mainstream concept of stability speaks eloquently to the long-recognized U. even in an adversary relationship with an alien Soviet strategic culture. of the strategic ideas that have held intellectual and declaratory (policy.

an endeavor to retain the credibility of the ultimate sanction of the very large countersociety strike. rests heavily on nuclear threat.24However. even if that decision is taken at the lowest possible level of nuclear escalation. What beliefs.'" Even if some stable balance theorists are prepared to admit that nuclear war could have quite a wide range of outcomes. unlike Soviet political culture. in its potential need for military support. foreign policy. of its citizens. let alone to invest large resources in a capability to prevail in. political culture. strategic commentators have focused so heavily on deterrence. Moreover.S. the United States sought to retain o r restore the credibility of strategic deterrence through the advertisement of more flexible targeting designs (the socalled Schlesinger doctrine). But U.S.attacks on at least some of the overseas vital interests of the United States. The balance of terror is thus massively indelicate." Second. but also . as opposed to military operational questions. the prospect of losing tens of millions of people. or debate coolly. if only because nuclear arsenals mean . Michael Howard was close to the mark when he wrote recently: But such credibility [of nuclear response] depends not simply on a perceived balance.S. I\ Strategic Stability Reconsidered 229 capability of destroying his society in retaliation. and quality of life. but American society and even the defense community have shown little inclination to think beyond prewar deterrence. the United States has been highly dependent on latent nuclear threat. U. at bottom. no operational nuclear strategy is compatible with U. An important reason US.r. is that they realized American society is profoundly unwilling to contemplate. but on perceptions of the nature of the society whose leaders are threatening such retaliation. of weapons systems.that the United States should design a policy and posture to minimize the prospective damage in war. this ability to destroy a society in a second strike can deter not only attacks on the U. societal values. does not take an instrumental view of the value of the lives. Peoples who are not prepared to make the effort necessary for operational defense are even less likely to support a decision to initiate a nuclear exchange from which they will themselves suffer almost inconceivable destruction.S. stable balance theory reflects a conviction that an enduring EastWest political modus vivendi is possible. homeland. The assumed certainty of unrestrained escalation and mutual destruction leads easily to the conclusion that there can be n o intelligent way of preparing for or waging nuclear war. it is important to note that 1970s-style strategic flexibility was. As Soviet strategic capabilities improved relative to those of the United States over the decade 1965-7. and perspectives are reflected in this simple theory? First. and recover from a nuclear war. attitudes.:. However.5.with only a modest loss of credibility . survive. For the better part of two decades. or imbalance. they tend to reject the possible policy implication . it reflects a belief that nuclear war would mean the end of history.

but a plateau of stable deterrence resting on total societal vulnerability and sufficient weapon invulnerability. An insular strategic culture. stable deterrence. should . It supports substantial armed forces in peacetime only because such forces are. such as that of the United States. stable balance theory was believed t o reflect inescapable technological those truths were t o be codified.S.S. via the SALT process.27 Stability could be enforced through expensive competitive effort.so the argument goes . and it is not responsive to the fact that deterrent calculations are not always relevant in the sequence . Major defense program initiatives often are taken belatedly and reluctantly. In short. and have to be justified very specifically in terms of identifiable or very plausible threats. Third. For example: as Henry Kissinger has argued forcefully. at least in part. at best. stable deterrence theory. because it is likely that the United States would be under the most pressure to lead an escalation process). Stable deterrence plus the parity principle appeared to reduce the stress and strain of unwelcome and unfamiliar strategic thought to a fairly simple problem of efficient management."29 U. strategic culture is oriented toward problem-solving. They assumed instead that American strategic vigilance would deny the Soviet Union any militarily meaningful future advantage and that Soviet leaders would rein in their programs appropriately. with its logical implication of a finite need for weapons. in policy practice it constitutes "a revolution in NATO doctrine"" (which was not noticed. its associated first-strike alarms. The U. Even on its own terms it is legitimate t o question the validity of mainstream U. Fourth. or was simply disregarded. The relationship between intense arms competition. it has nothing to say on the problem of self-deterrence (which is not a trivial deficiency. and the SALT process was t o be both the centerpiece and the beneficiary of a multichannel and increasingly entangling dttente venture. tends generally to view as inherently wasteful the allocation of scarce resources for defense functions. and political tension remains ill understood. appeals to the Western belief that peacetime defense preparation has an almost wholly negative social impact. defense and arms control community has extreme difficulty accommodating the idea that it is condemned to an endless competition with the Soviet Union.calm many of the anxieties that the arms competition can foster. regrettable necessities. but the case for attempting t o encourage stability through negotiated joint management of the strategic balance had to be attractive. The more reasonable supporters of SALT I tended t o avoid asserting that the Soviet political leadership and General Staff had been educated to accept American-style stable deterrence thinking. by its proponents). it was widely assumed that the fiveyear "Interim Agreement" on strategic offensive arms would be superceded by a permanent treaty regime that would greatly assist stability. owing to the survivability for offensive forces and the predictability for defense planning it would provide.230 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence that neither superpower would dare intrude into regions well understood to be of vital interest to the other. In addition. stable deterrence theory indicated "how much is enough.S.

" was dramatically different from the revolution in strategic thinking caused by nuclear weapons in the West. or might pose. but that the necessary basis is not.all are enduring features of Russian1 Soviet strategic culture." as evidenced in Soviet military programs and discussed in detail in the Penkovskiy "Special Collection. and scientifically incorrect.is the story of near-continuous struggle against actual or potential enemies who posed. is viewed as dangerous. Quite aside from any ideological imperative. irresponsible. the Soviet Union cannot endorse a concept of stability in the relations between socialist and nonsocialist states. "The revolution in military affairs. accepted as being sufficient. indeed. allied to "progressive forces" everywhere." The Soviet Union recognizes that equivalence and parity are the necessary basis for East-West security relations. The legitimacy of Communist party rule in the Soviet imperium resides in its claim to be the sole authoritative interpreter of the scientifically correct theory of historical change . that the outcomes could range between victory and defeat. a strategic culture that is. and the practices that they legitimized."' The important point is that obligatory Soviet ideology and Russian historical impulses both drive Soviet military thinking in the same direction. by this argument. is influenced by. Leaving such reservations aside. the need for eternal vigilance." The Soviet Union cannot endorse a Westernstyle concept of military stability. the fundamental distrust of independent power centers (domestic and foreign) . the militarized character of society. at root. The commitment to permanent struggle. a threat to the - . Since 1956 the Soviet Union has rejected Lenin's "inevitability of war" thesis.31the most troublesome aspect of main-stream stable mutual deterrence theory is that it does not speak to Soviet reality. The Western nonoperational focus on deterrence as opposed to defense is totally alien to Soviet strategic culture and.Cray Strategic Stability Reconsidered 23 1 of events that lead to war. Save as a tactical ploy. and what may best be termed "strategic logic. and cannot be. fit so well a Russian national political character marked by cunning. Soviet geopolitics .and the peoples and the physical resources of that imperium. and submissiveness. and that more military power cannot fail to pay political dividend~. are the instruments for effecting that process of historical change." The ~ notion of having enough military power is alien to Soviet thought and appears to be contrary to the Soviet reading of their history and the histories of other states. brutality. Richard Pipes almost certainly is correct when he argues that Marxism-Leninism became the state ideology in Russia because the grosser features of that ideology. Russian rather than Marxist-Leninist. T h e Soviet Union Soviet thinking on the preferred character of the complex East-West military balance is easily identified as a product of the lessons perceived in Russian and Soviet history.like Russian geopolitics in times past . the nature and rationale of the Soviet state. but it has continued to believe that war is possible." Soviet military thinking today. and expresses.

and intelligence (C31)assets. is the cumulative product of a bureaucraticindustrial system that rarely changes a course once set (there is no evidence to suggest any official Soviet desire to change military direction) and that is steadily providing the military means needed for preponderance . it has no real plans for timely industrial mobilization or for postwar recovery. it lacks survivable command. communications. and generally focusing on doing what one knows one can d o . The implications of this strategic cultural theme could be very grim for Western security. that stability can only be enforced. Alarmed Western observers see clear evidence that the Soviet Union is building more military power than it needs for defense (a totally alien formulation in Soviet perspective) and rejecting the Western concept of a stable military balance. The ideas and military program details associated with the dominant Western concept of stability amount to a posture.36 Russian and Soviet history teach the lesson that "those who fall behind. and it has no convincing story to tell vis-a-vis war aims and the political character of a postwar international order. it has no homeland defense.the Soviet vision of a desirable military relationship with potential enemies. military and civilian.j9 These criticisms are leveled in the context of attempts to provide adequately in those areas by a Soviet adversary. Even discarding cultural and geopolitical explanations. get beaten. What we see. control. and moved by a prudence that has expansive military requirement implications. innovation is possible in the Soviet Union. The strategic cultural attitudes that flow from its history make it unlikely that the Soviet Union will join the United States in managing a stable military balance.in a society that is nearobsessed with the fear of disruptive change and that seeks to avoid risks. eschewing of potentially dangerous initiatives. that is not serious about the actual conduct of war. though it generally is ordered and even organized from above. But much of it reflects a mindless movement that flows from habitual "safe-siding" through minimal decisionmaking. it has no vision of how all parts of the military posture should cooperate in a global war. the Soviet Union could come to believe that in East-West crises it will be the United States that will back down. Of course. 'There behind the Soviet military establishment. rather."37 The Soviet Union is improving its security condition by increasing its control over its external environment. The Soviet commitment to compete for relative advantage (real or illusory) is so fundamental. By dint of fairly steady effort. and so rational in Soviet terms.40That some weapons and . some of which can be explained in Western military-rational ways.232 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e (mu1ti)national existence. To itemize: the United States has a very limited hard-target counterforce and countercontrol capability. the detail of Soviet military activity drives one to recognition of the deeper imperatives ~ is an enormous inertia that have molded Soviet strategic c u l t ~ r e . it has made only the most feeble preparation for strategic-force reconstitution. The Soviet military buildup and modernization programs of the past fifteen years (in particular) speak to forces very deep within the character of the Soviet system.

strategic systems and NATO's posture in Europe. for their strategic and combined armed forces to threaten successful surprise attacks against U. and hence would be motivated to offset. in great detail." Thus a stable arms competition is one wherein neither side invests in programs that the other would view as a challenge to its assured destruction capability. For ~ ' many years the Soviet Union has attended. This kind of logic was elaborated in some detail in the late 1960s. the Soviet Union seems either unwilling or unable to take a systemic approach to what Western analysts identify as stability problems." Similarly. to what in Western perspective might be called the unilateral crisis stability of her military posture: missile silos have been superhardened. Whether for reasons of political-cultural insensitivity or cold military calculation. in Soviet perspective. Soviet military thinkers see nothing unstable about a strategic context wherein Soviet society is afforded some useful measure of protection via civil defense and air defense and American society has none. and to employ Western terminology. political and military command and control facilities have been proliferated and superhardened. Stability Dissected The concept of stability is used in a wide variety of senses. Just as the superpowers could stimulate each other to build increasingly capable weapons. through . among which two merit individual analytic attention: arms race stability and crisis stability. both sides might falsely project the perspective of their strategic culture onto the other. I~ r i Strategic Stability Reconsidered 233 operating practices promote stability and that others promote instability is an idea that is alien to Soviet strategic ~ u l t u r e . it is stabilizing. The idea of arms race stability holds that the basic engine of competition is the first-strike fear encouraged by defense programs designed to threaten at least part of the opponent's ability to wreak massive societal damage in a second strike. It was argued that the arms race was driven not so much by the reality of first-strike danger as by the fears that flowed from anticipation of such danger.S. In short. some missiles are truly mobile (SS-20s and stockpiled SS-16s). Judging by the evidence of Soviet deeds. and so on. so should they be able.44 "Sympathetic parallelism" in armament programs was the logical corollary of the arms race "spiral" theory.S. with very dangerous consequences. administration could believe the Soviet Union to be deterred by the assumed short fuse from provocative (Soviet) military action to nuclear holocaust . There is a distinct possibility that a future U.s .a belief that projects stable deterrence reasoning onto Soviet decision-making processes while a Soviet leadership could believe it had a very good prospect o f winning a war and that the United States should appreciate its own weak political position and back down.

.~"he stability theory of the 1960s posited an abstract and very simple model of arms competition. was best maintained through unrestrained omp petition. arms race stability could pertain simply to the pace and degree of rival postural change. Arms race stability could obtain where one side maintains a permanent. regardless of the character of that change. yet where a tolerable balance of military power is maintained albeit almost exclusively through competition. The concept of arms race stability carries with it the stable deterrence ideas that incorporate the desideratum of mutual assured destruction capabilities. In its loosest. It is possible that Soviet offensive force deployments in the 1970s would have been greater than actually was the case had the United States. and industrial position to deter most arms race challenges. Nonetheless. But were they true.given human frailty in strategic prediction. and may be fully compatible with some important definitions of a stable situation. later. though most easily defensible. and so on) were. and how might they be validated or invalidated? This argument applies. but such linkage is not inevitable. as Bernard Brodie observed in assessing the complex naval competition of the later decades of the nineteenth century.e. in the absence of the ABM treaty. However. With some qualifications.g. An unusually rapid succession of deployed weapon generations on both sides would appear to many people to constitute an unstable situation. defense debate. The banner-carriers for arms race stability in the late 1960s leapt from abstract propositions to defense policy claims and arms control proposals (e. rapid postural change might very likely breed fears abroad that militarily significant. d o not deploy BMD or MIRV because they will be destabilizing).. Stability can also obtain when there is a rapid change in technological generations and considerable unpredictability concerning the building programs of rivals.S. financial. such rapid change may reflect a particularly fecund period of parallel defense research activity rather than unusual hostility. by any reasonable definition.234 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence deliberate restraint and perhaps explicit cooperative management. ultimately "stabilizing") as the right (i. sense.e. if transitory. breakthroughs were a distinct possibility. The arms race (and crisis) instability claims used t o challenge BMD and MIRV (and. variably substantial lead and is in a political. by and large. the M k 12A RV and MX. to all sides in the ongoing U. this kind of arms race stability characterized Great Britain's naval relations with her actual and potential rivals from the 1840s until 1914. to remove much of the anxiety that drives reactive armament programs. interesting and internally consistent. of course... Indeed. ultimately "destabilizing") defense technologies . deployed Safeguard or Site Defense BMD.^^ Arms control processes are as likely to constrain the wrong (i. Perhaps the major problem with the concept of arms race stability is that it rests on a theory of arms race dynamics that is easily ~hallenged. breakthroughs that might facilitate or enable disarming first strikes to be planned with some confidence. there were periods in strategic history when stability.

defense and arms control community should now consider the proposition that Soviet arms programs are driven not by a determination to (over)compensate for American programs that could threaten Soviet maintenance of an adequate capability to destroy American society. but they should not be such as to call into serious question the overall quality of deterrent effect purchased by the United States through its military investment. However. rather. communications.L I ! . The concept of crisis stability refers to a strategic condition wherein the very character. readiness.4' .S.S. intelligence. To impute this influence to "weaponry" is t o focus too narrowly on technology. A crisis instability charge is fragile in that the very survivability of a system such as the MX should remove the Soviet incentive to go first in a "use them or lose them" spirit. For example. warning systems. and mobilization procedures of armed forces in co11frontation should not themselves comprise the proximate cause of war. "Gaps" might occur between some elements of superpower postures. geography. Many people who debate arms race stability/instability charges are really concerned that continuous competitive military-technological innovation might open temporary windows of opportunity for possible exploitation. The kind of Soviet offensive-force deployments that lack a strong strategic rationale in the absence of U. Very often crisis stability/instability is deemed to inhere in particular kinds of weapons. plans. have occurred anyway. by some combination of a doctrinal imperative to improve Soviet war-waging/ war-winning ability and bureaucratic defense-industrial momentum. the U. This proposition suggests that for many years our arms control physicians may have diagnosed falsely (and hence sought to cure inappropriately) the causes of the arms race disease. On the basis of the often ambiguous and incomplete evidence available. to focus on weapon technology is to miss a good part of the potential problem. Deterrence stability is compatible with a formidable rate of change in conipeting postures. the charge that the MX will be destabilizing can be sustained only if arms race instability is equated with a significant change in posture that may provide a substantial incentive for postural change on the Soviet side. The point is that this complex of military factors is not neutral in the process by which war may come about. BMD deployment. as Thomas Schelling has argued persuasively. opponents would very likely have attributed the pace and much of the character of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM programs to alleged Soviet BMD-offset motivations. organizations. and even beliefs and doctrines about the conduct of war that together have this influence. ~ Strategic Stability Reconsidered 235 However. assuming there is a mutual assured destruction framework to Soviet thinking. It is weapons. BMD. but. in the presence of U.S.

in the minor addendum of flexible targeting. defense effort. The real test for crisis stability would be the one occasion in forty or fifty years when nearly everything appeared to be at stake and one or both leadership groups could not see any nonmilitary solutions to its. The reason for the disagreement lies in the range of political crises that each is willing to consider as relevant to the sizing and nature of the U. the stability of those balances is not tested day-by-day. Crisis stability is fully compatible with a U. military postures are sufficiently crisis-stable. yet disagree on whether particular U.meaning. as opposed to a strategic. nor even by the kinds of crises such as those over Berlin. if need be. However. Hungary.236 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e Schelling draws a particularly valuable distinction between the static and dynamic dimensions of (crisis) stability: The static dimension reflects the expected outcome. compete for escalation dominance.S. by alert. that considerations of crisis stability. at any given moment. and. Some interpretations of the military implications of crisis stability have a potentially dangerous managerial. problems. Anyone inclined to believe that U.S. A force posture and strategic doctrine that is good enough for one crisis may not be for another. crisis stability very often is considered narrowly in the context either of a rigid application of mutual assured destruction reasoning or. quite rightly. strategic force posture that could take the initiative. Typically. the more pessimistic argument might lead to the conclusion that at some point in the future the Soviet Union might be so desperate as to be "beyond deterrence" . if either side launches war. The only question remaining would be: How well would the West fare in the war? Analysts may agree on the general characteristics of a crisis-stable military balance and even on the character of Soviet strategic culture. The dynamic dimension reflects what happens to that calculation if either side or both sides should move in the direction of war. fight the war through to a military decision. mobilization. Robert Jervis has argued. would be irrelevant. perspective on security issues. however rigorous.48 It is easy to slip into self-congratulation concerning the apparent stability of the military standoff in Europe and the central nuclear relationship. and NATO forces are broadly resilient to crisis stress should ask himself what it might take t o dissuade a very desperate Soviet leadership. demonstration. and Czechoslovakia. In none of those cases is it very plausible to argue that either the Soviet Union or NATO was strongly motivated to launch a theater or general war. Cuba. that rival schools of thought over the requirements of deterrence differ over how much deterring it is prudent to assume the Soviet Union might need: "Thus there is a disagreement over 'how much credibility is enough': two policy analysts therefore might agree on how likely the Russians thought it was that a limited war would escalate and disagree over whether they could be deterred.S. and other actions that unfold over time. any capability . However.S. again logically."49 Taken to its logical extreme. or their. beyond that in sophistication.

it is necessary to classify strategic systems as either stabilizing or destabilizing and to avoid the latter. Kahan claims that weapons threatening to the (countervalue) mission performance of strategic offensive forces are destabilizing. prelaunch or during mission execution. to view programs intended to provide active and passive defense of the American homeland as anything other than common sense.S. very l~ttleattentlon to the The small strategic theory community has p a ~ d peace and security. "Destabilizing" weapons include accurate MIRVs. and missile site (or bomber base) BMD. cannot be credible in the event. For reason of extended deterrence duties. Crisis stability properly understood does not lend its conceptual authority to such judgments. it can be argued. it would be d ~ f f ~ c u l t States requlres h~gh-qual~ty C'I. "since they can directly negate an opponent's deterrent capability. as noted above. However. and area air defense. let alone the details. to generate a debate over whether the Un~ted Noncontrovers~alsubjects tend to escape attentlon. If. for example. MRVs. strategies and tactics that in the West tend to be judged as destabilizing almost certainly have no such implications in Soviet thinking. everyone. the mechanistic ying-yang envisaged in some simpleminded defense-offenselaction-reaction theories of the arms race is the stuff of the (American) seminar room."" Following classical mutual vulnerability theory. L ~ k e every school of thought. for example. is held to be an affront to crisis stability. the United States cannot afford a crisis stability that precludes first use of strategic nuclear weapons.S. This simple classification is only as useful as are its doctrinal premises. the Soviet Union does not equate the quality of its deterrent with its ability to devastate urban-industrial America. unless a president of the United States was confident that damage to the U. Given the Soviet traditional military approach to nuclear war planning. of C z l . Nicholas Spykman writes: "There is no possibility of action if one's strength is fully checked. or inaccurate MIRVs. not of the real world of Soviet defense decision-making. Soviet political and military thinkers would he most unlikely.'' To the extent that those programs threatened the success of Soviet plans for the military conduct of the war. defense of the urbanindustrial U. homeland would not threaten the Soviet deterrent. manned bombers. there is a chance for a positive foreign policy only if there is a margin of force which can be freely used. from place. homeland could be limited severely."" Examples of "stabilizing" weapons include SLBMs. 1s f o v good C31. that overall stability in the East-West militarypolitical relationship requires that the United States be able to initiate strategic nuclear use in defense of forward-located allies.Understandably. and that such central war initiation. longrange cruise missiles. Moreover. strategic ASW systems. no matter how selective. area BMD.i Strategic Stability Reconsidered 237 that threatens Soviet strategic forces.""' Jerome Kahan has written that "in order to establish a mutual stability policy. John Ste~nbrunerhas . they would be candidates for some Soviet response.

the preferred force structure (given classic stability themes) might alter markedly. armed forces the ability to wage war in a militarily intelligent fashion.""" Those theorists who believe that deterrence is a function of mutual societal vulnerability should be concerned lest command instability results in unintended armed conflict or in essentially uncontrolled escalation in the course of a war. Those theorists who believe that deterrence flows from the promise of proficient military conduct should be concerned lest command instability denies the U. the physical and organizational arrangements for exercising deliberate command of strategic forces. Where the mainstream . arms race and crisis stability are. of course. promoted a relaxed climate concerning the many details of actually managing a central war campaign. A dominant belief that nuclear forces have failed if they are ever used is hardly likely to stimulate officials to think very realistically about command stability problems in a nuclear war environment. At a general conceptual level. N o one favors frenetic arms race activity per se or military postures that could precipitate war: so much is well-nigh axiomatic.S. and Soviet). the privileged chronicler of the NSC perspective on the SALT I negotiations. asserted that stability was "a truly divine goal. but I suspect that most of the targeting schemes that envisaged the protracted and progressive unfolding of a deliberate design of destruction (for carefully calculated military and political effect) failed to take adequate note of likely or ~ossible command instability phenomena (U.238 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence written that "the most severe problems with the concept of stability result from the fact that its technical definition has not included a critical dimension of strategic capability: namely. Stability and U. For example: "The submarine-based strategic force which is clearly the most stable under the conventional definition is just as clearly the worst in terms of command stability.S.S. Steinbruner's persuasive advocacy of the need to place command stability at the center of nuclear (and other) planning concerns fails to recognize that the relative neglect of command stability issues flows in good part from the widespread acceptance of a classic stability theory (based on the assumption of the desirability of mutual societal vulnerability) that he approves. approach to SALT I were either wrong or misleading. Strategy John Newhouse. (and NATO) C31 assets. There is ample evidence suggesting that classic stability theory. There was much weaving of interesting strategic targeting tapestries in the 1970s."s4 Steinbruner argues that when the concept of stability is expanded to accommodate C31 desiderata.S. unexceptionable. which encourages the belief that nuclear war would be the end of history.S."'6 Today it is apparent that the theories of arms race and crisis stability that permeated the U. A good fraction of the strategic debate of recent years rested on quite unrealistic assumptions concerning the quality and survivability of U.

the principle of sufficiency supported by the idea of assured destruction (let alone mutual assured destruction) clearly was not prominent among them. However. is a recognition of the pervasiveness and longevity of competition and a positive approach to the functions of strategic nuclear forces. the theoretical revolution remains incomplete. Harold Brown treats both arms race and crisis stability . "useful advantage" through whatever degree of preponderance the United States permits. strategic theorizing erred was in tying the multifold concept of stability to a particular theory of deterrence that did not match the burgeoning evidence. and are continuing to seek. Many of the elements of a new theory of strategic stability already have been expressed in official prose and action over the past five years. However. the 1970s have not provided a field test. That theory held that each superpower had an assured destruction (countervalue) requirement vis-a-vis the other and that an enduring stable deterrence relationship could be constructed only on such a basis. certainly. it is sensible to argue that it would be undesirable for the superpowers to deploy forces that lend themselves to first-strike destruction. is not likely to stem from mechanistic instabilities within the superpower military relationship. above ail else. administrations.on the basis of which particular weapons and doctrines are praised or vilified . BMD (in research and development).Ci r d) Strategic Stability Reconsidered 239 of U. It overemphasizes the roba able role of mechanistic instabilities in an acute East-West crisis while taking a wholly apolitical approach to an inherently political phenomenon. They have sought." j8 In principle. and civil defense programs the Soviets have provided persuasive evidence that their systemic view of the arms competition is dramatically different from the view adhered to by succeeding U.'? The "classical" theory of crisis stability may o r may not be correct. It is a matter of historical record that the Soviet Union since 1972 has worked hard to undermine whatever degree of strategic stability (based on mutual societal vulnerability) there may have been at that time. ASW. air defense. Richard Burt expressed this skepticism when he wrote: "Central strategic war. "mechanistic" fantasy. However. Whatever mix of motives and institutional forces drove Soviet weapon procurement.S.S. the Soviet perspective on strategic matters suggests that the explanatory power of the theory may be poor.S. for example.it could not explain the course of the strategic arms competition in the 1970s (under the aegis of SALT I or in the shadow of SALT 11). This is not to endorse a total indifference to Burt's "mechanistic instabilities.needs considerable amendment." but to suggest that the traditional theory of crisis stability . fortunately. it is no less sensible to argue that "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack"" as the principal proximate cause of war merits probable identification as a U. according to Soviet literature. In their ICBM. What is missing. but rather from real and enduring differences between competing political systems and national interests. and it is inimical to the extended deterrence requirement that the United States be capable and willing to take the strategic initiative. This theory of arms race stability was wrong . On this last point.

or counterescalation. Crisis stability would be enforced through the Soviet perception of the United States as a very tough wartime adversary indeed. It might be objected that a U.240 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence in negative terms. if possible.-Soviet strategic d e t e r r e n ~ eIf .S. policy goal. by a potent threat posed to the most vital assets of the Soviet state and by the ability of the United States to limit damage to itself6' A Soviet Union confronting a United States with military and civilian programs appropriately supportive of the above objectives would have very little incentive either to effect a military "breakout" from a regional crisis or to engage very persistently in a competition in risk-taking at very high levels of violence. crisis (in)stability would be policy-appropriate only in a condition of such intense antipathy that overall central war campaign analyses would dominate decision processes.S. Crisis stability. Department of Defense acknowledges this but it does not recognize that the United States is most unlikely to be able to enforce stability if damage to the U. homeland cannot be limited severely. The United States cannot afford a master strategic concept that implies thoroughgoing mutual U.S. it must be weighed against the greater danger . or technical. it must ensure that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would feel itself under pressure to initiate an exchange in a crisis. would flow from a Soviet belief that any escalation of the military conflict would produce negative military and ultimately political returns. first trike.66 However.^' any more than would the United States should the situation be reversed.S. A stable strategic balance. even if such a concern is valid (which is extremely dubious). Crisis stability should be approached in terms of the calculations of probable war-waging prowess made by the parties involved. but they do not approach the heart of what stable deterrent ideas should indicate vis-a-vis U. An adequate concept of stability has to be anchored in a prospectively effective theory of deterrence a t the highest levels of violence.~ strategic ~ stability is to retain its preeminence as a U./NATO perspective.S. it should be redefined for compatibility with the extended deterrent duties that the geopolitics of the Western Alliance place on the U. is one that would permit the United States to: Initiate central strategic nuclear employment in expectation of gain (a requirement of NATO strategy) Seize and hold a position of "escalation dominance" Deter Soviet escalation. strategic force posture. Concern about mechanistic.S.S. For arms race stability. the United States must ensure "that the balance is not capable of being overturned by a sudden Soviet technological break-through". The U. The Soviet Union would not "go to war" because a large fraction of its ICBM force was theoretically vulnerable to a U. for crisis stability.S.S.63 Strategic stability should not be equated with strategic stalemate.60 Brown's concerns are appropriate. force planning. in U. president should not be entrusted with the capabilities suggested above.

S. Single Integrated Operational Plan . Execution of such a threat would be the negation of strategy: in and of itself it would solve no military or political problems.i I 1 Strategic Stability Reconsidered 24 1 of a president not having recourse to such capabilities.it is far more likely that stability has to be enforced through competition. and it is intended. tens of millions of American casualties would most likely result from central war." that "limited nuclear options" have little promise unless the United States has a good theory of escalation dominance (and the forces to match). government recognizes that Soviet military and political assets should be the primary focus for U. of necessity. recovery. the United States has a deterrence theory that probably is fundamentally unsound. As stated earlier. The "ultimate threat" posed by the United States would not be credible because it would never be in the U. while it may be insufficiently unacceptable to Soviet politicians. It is virtually self-evident that Soviet strategic culture precludes the negotiation route to enhanced stability.S. the United States would have a guiding concept from which military requirements could be derived in support of militarily and politically intelligent strategic targeting plans. The U. except in the context of very vigorous U. strategic offensive attention.S. The concept of strategic stability envisaged here is the only one that speaks persuasively to Soviet strategic culture. possibly.S. This concept relates robustness in crisis regimes to anticipation of success or defeat in war and to a judiciously competitive program of peacet~me armament.S.S. there is growing agreement within the Western defense community that stability cannot rest intelligently on the threat of massive societal destruction (save. If the U. However. as an ultimate threat).S. concept of a stable military balance in extremis makes more or less formal reference to the assured destruction threat. interest actually to implement it. Washington does not yet recognize that crisis and intrawar stability cannot rest on intelligent strategic offensive ~ l a n n i n g alone. Nonetheless. the identifiable Soviet approach to arms competition is the steady acquisition of a more and more formidable war-fightinglwarsurvival capability. strategic effort. It is highly improbable that the Soviet Union can be dissuaded trom pursuing this a p p r ~ a c h ." The U. while it would near-guarantee a Soviet retaliation that would preclude a U. as defined here. ~ The ' evidence of the 1970s suggests that although in principle stability might be encouraged through negotiated SALT restraints . only to minimize that self-deterrence element that is the most crippling deficiency in existing U. Self-deterrence cannot be removed altogether because the United States would know that even under the aegis of a stable military balance. The strategic nuclear targeting review of the late 1970s has prepared the way for serious discussion of the concept of stability suggested in this essay. Moreover.S.whereby both sides agree to forgo those capabilities that the mutual vulnerability theory of stability holds to be undesirable . and that Soviet economic "recovery" targets are both difficult to identify and are probably of relatively little interest. Such damage is unacceptable to the United States. official strategic thought.

Department of Defense Annual Report. Jerome Kahan. . 1979). there is good reason to believe that the technology of air and with substantial civil missile defense for the late 1980s and b e y ~ n d . p. Author's Note This paper represents my views alone. p." World Politics.'" in S o ~ i e t Military Power and Performance. "Who Controls Whom In Moscow. 30. "It is not the 'balance' . Adelpbi Papers no.S." Foreign Policy. 14. 9. 11. 94(4) (Winter 1979-80): 630. pp. For example. 3. 8. Roman Kolkowicz et al. See Harold Brown. "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine." Ian Smart. II(1) (October 1979): 90-1 10. "Hostages must remain unambiguously vulnerable and retaliatory forces must remain unambiguously invulnerable. in striking first. 22(3) (September 1978): 413. and a useful meaning to the concept of stability. Erickson and E. Jack Snyder. D. Harkabi. 10. p. See Fritz Ermarth. Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom. December 1969).: Harvard University Press. 13.t h e sheer equality or symmetry in the situation . The balance is stable only when neither. Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace (Jerusalem: Israeli Program for Scientific Translations." Political Science Quarterly. 7. "National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability. John Erickson. Gray and Keith B. 272. 3 ( 2 ) (Fall 1978): 138-55. D. Helm. 8. o r its contracting agencies. 67. Mass. its staff. no. Calif. John Steinbruner. 4. pp. no.that constitutes mutual deterrence. Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington. R-2154-AF (Santa Monica. "Observations on the Impact of Uncertainty in Strategic Analysis. ' ~ defense assistance. it is the stability of the balance. 232. 15. Odom. 6. 1 8 4 3 . pp. January 29. The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operatrons. 39 (Summer 1980): 14-27. Schelling.. 19661. "Victory Is Possible. 14. Y. 63 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. Advanced Strategic Missiles: A Short Guide. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington. 2. see Thomas C. Payne. its Members. See William E. 19801. The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge. 35-57. 5. could restore a much more even relationship between offense and defense.: Brookings Institution." Foreign Policy.) (Hamden. The Soviet Union and Arms Control .A Superpower Dilemma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Feuchtwanger (eds. See Colin S. 1970).242 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence (SIOP) can have integrity only in the context of active and passive defense. See Stanley Sienkiewicz. p. September 1977). N o opinions." The]ournal o f Conflict Resolution. "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought." International Security. Robert Jervis. I am very grateful to Keith Payne of the Hudson Institute professional staff for his valuable assistance with this article. 19 (Summer 1975): 109-23.: U.: Archon. References 1. 12. J. 48. statements of fact. 28. 65. Conn. p. 1960). o r conclusions can properly be attributed to the Institute. It has had only limited circulation among the Hudson Institute staff and n o formal review procedure. Government Printing Office. "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter. Fortunately.C.C. can destroy the other's ability to strike back" p. Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U S . Technology and 'Style.: RAND. 1975). 19791. Ken Booth.

"The SS-19 problem. "A Reply.3-21. "The Political Potential of Sov~et Equivalence". 1946). Pipe's reply is o n pp.T I and SA1. May 1979).lvid S. 4.Lhuglass. chapters 5-6.<:.C. "Formulating Strategic Doctrine. E4292. p. See I." Nau'11 War (:allege Reiww. 52( I ) (October 1973): 109-1 8. I a m 'ltrracted t o the r n e r ~ t of the follow~ng judgment offered by Benjamin 1. the historical record shows quite ~ ~ n s r n h i p ously that SALT I w x advertised. See D. Michael Howard.amheth: "It would probably not be overly facetious t o suggest that for Sov~etm~litaryplanners. Leon Sigal. S p i e h l n n . 1979). p. pp. that "they 1SAl. 1975). p. "The Mutual Hostage Relationship between A n ~ e r i c ~ and i Russ1. Spielmann.: U. 1978). I b r a very d ~ f terent.S." Comnzentary. see K x l F. Bernard Krodie.. "A Strategy for All Seasons: Targeting Doctrme and Strategic Arms Control. as linpos~ng important constraints o n Soviet "l~ght"missile programs.ire developed In Gray and Payne. Sovret Strategy for N~tcleirr War (Stanford. 1972).S. ." h r e ~ g n Affairs. "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could F ~ g h and t Win a Nuclear W'ir. "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy. ' T / ISA1. nuclear targeting policy is almost pathetically t h ~ n M recent contributions include "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory.Lid) Strategic Stability Reconsidered 243 See Kenjamin S. entailed some mix of 11. Wayne Smith. 82-3. 2d session [Washington.7' I k e p t i o n (Boston: The Coal~tionfor Peace Through Strength. 1-35.T ~ 11 Treirty. and "American Strategy: The Myths Revisited.. Jr. Appendix K (Washington.: U. See Alain Enthoven and K. no. and cowardice. off~clalincompetence. Calif. I97 I). 64( 1 ) (July 1977): 21-34." Forergn Policy. "Anti-Sowet or Ant]-Russ~an?" F. H o w Much Is E~zough?Shilping the L)efensc Progrmr. 33(1) (J'inuary-iebruary 1980): .S. 159). I>. Tile P o h i i z l IDA Utility of Strategrc Superiorlty: A Preliminary Investigation into the Sovict Vieu~. "Sovict Attitudes towards Nuclear War: D o They Really Think They <:an Win?" The /ournal of Strategic Studies.) (New York: Harper and Row. Government Printing Oftice. S ~ ~ i e t SA1.ln. Paper 1'1349 (Arlington.ooks at Future of NATO." as it is known. Va. Sulliv." in C. w ~ t hstrict accuracy. 5 7 ( 5 ) (Summer 197')): 983. 72-75." S u r v i ~ u l . and "Targeting Problems for Centrill War. Lkpnrtrnent of Defense Annual Report. See Wolfgang K. n 1979).H. 65. "Victory Is I'ossible. These ideas . D. 5 4 ( 4 ) (April 1980): 67-72. See Booth: Strategy and Ethnocentrrsm. 212) (September 1979): 172-9 I. 4 ( l ) (Summer 1979): 54-87. dishonesty. Kratnow. perspective. 1-3. "The Political Potential of Soviet Equ~valence. See Richard Pipes. Senate Committee o n Foreign Relations. pp. The Al~soluteWeapon ( N e w York: Harcourt. Notwithstanding the retrospective wisdom that claims. September 6 ." in Aniericarr Thinking ahout Peace and Wilr. Hoeber." to Wladislaw G.S. Gallagher and Karl F. 219-34. "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence. pp." Richdrd Pipes.: Hoover lnst~tut~o Press.ove~-nrnent Prmtlng Office.. FY 1981. the . officially. y The ~~clclass~fied literature o n U.T 111 did not create the problem ot Minutem'ln s u r v ~ v a b i l i tand ~ cannot be expected to cure it" (Secretary Brown.amheth." Internationid Srmrity." Corrgressioniil Record. See Brown. 19791. Lambeth.orntnission o n the O ~ g ~ ~ t i i z ~ t i o ~ i fir t / ~ Conduct e of Forergn Policy. Panofsky. <. For a usefully skeptical view. Part I. 3 4 (Spring 1979): 39. and Amoretta M.egvold In "Strategic 'Doctrine' m d SALT: Soviet and American Views. Kincade. Arnett. see William H. Sollret L)ecrsron-Makrng for Defense: A Criticlire of U. Brace." Foreign AffLirs. and Joseph 1). 3 4 ( 5 ) (May 1978): 14-20. 4 ( 2 ) (Fall 1979): 22-39. Also ~ ~ s e f is u l M'itthew P. 96th Congress.: Institute for Defense Analyses. An evcellent pre5entation of this important pomt is given by Robert 1. Ihid. hut usetul." Biilletin of the Atomic Scientists." passim. "Rethinking The Unthinkable.4. 1979. "Kissinger I.1."Intrrwationnl Srr-rrvrty.nrounter. See Henry S. Booth and Moorhead Wright (eds. pp.21 ( 1 ) (Jan~~arylFehruar!:~:~ry 1979): 8-1 3. 1961-1 960 (New York: Harper and Row. vol. Still more skeptical is Robert I. Rowen. in 1972. in U S . Hearings. Perspcrtilm o n t h t Arms Race (New York: Praeger. See 1-ambeth.

Alexander. 43. 48. By way of contrast. p.h i s t h e ~ rstrategic forces have never approached the day-in. passim.. Russak lfor the N a t ~ o n a l Strategy Information Center]. "National Security and the Concept of Strareg~c Stability. Brown. Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington.e/ disarming blow. 52. 37. Ibid. p. Ibid. 236. 252-46. 62. 1978). 1941). 22.. Ibid. Department of Defense Annual Report. 61. 9. 50. February 2.T (New York: Holt. 41. quoted in Arthur J.S." pp.: . 56. 622. 422. Colo. February 19781. See Lawrence Freedman. 57. Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War. See Jerome Wiesner. Russra under the Old Regrme (New York: Scribner's.. p." See Douglass and Hoeber. RAND. 28-29." Brrll~trn of the Atomic Scientists. England: Saxon House. pp. P-5939 (Santa M o n ~ c aCalif. 58. 1942). Government Printing Office. 19661. but the Arms Race Rumbles On. 1974). Thomas C. 1970. p. John Newhouse. l ( 1 ) (January 1978): p. Conn. 51. pp. The Strategy of Confiict. 982-3. The title of chapter 9 in Schelling. p. 1969). See also Karl F. Winter 1978/9). 45. This is a modest expansion of Brodieis point but is faithful to his plaln meaning.: Westview. I have challenged that theory at some length in The Sovret-American Arms R x e (Farmborough. Rrnzlands. 417.S. Schelling. "The Soviet Military System. Department of Defense Annual Report. FY 1981. Rathjens. p. Rinehart and Winston. 42. Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: Princeton Universiry Press. 1978). 985-6. 53. "Victory Is Possible. 54. Bernard Brodie. U S . 2. Adelphi Papers nos. 63.: Archon. These allegations are presented and defended in detail in Gray. 1973). chapter I . 55. Nicholar Spykman. 65-68. Note the judgment on this point in Howard. passim. 21. Kahan. See Brown. and Colin S. Analyzing Souret Strategic Arms Decisrons (Boulder.Matter.) (New York: Pergamon. 47." in Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategrc Threat (London: Macmillan 1977). 38. Ibid. p." The Washington Revrew of Strategic and International Studies. 7.244 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e favored measure of strategic sufficiency is the notion that 'too much I S not enough. The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heirrtland. first pub. Hoist. 234. Cold Dawn: The Story of SA1." p.. America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (Hamden.: U. "Arms Control and Soviet Strategic Forces: The Risks of Ask~ng SA1. 59.T to Do Too Much.C. See Richard Pipes. 273. (eds. chapter 3. 69. p. and the Technological Reuolzrtion (New York: Crane. Notwithstanding the enormous significance that the Soviets attach to the surprise disrupt~\. . D. Gray. 19771." p. See Johan J. SSBN force. 39. Robert Jervis. "The Dynamics of the Arms Race. 44. "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't . their operational practices v l s . 40. 65. Spielmann. "Strategic Arms Control and Stabil~ty: A Retrospective Look. Joseph Stalin (speech in 1931). "The Cold War is Dead. 1976). 147-148 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory". Damage limitation on a major scale is very far indeed from the desiderata of Harold Brown's Department of Defense. a very useful discussion of the Sower approach to damage limitation IS 36." pp. and George W. chapter 12. Hoist and Wllliam Schneider.'" H o u ~ To Think Ahout Souret Milrtary Doctrine. 46. day-out instant readiness ethos of SAC and the U. FY 1981. Such capabilities discourage adventure on the part of the imperialists. p. 49. p. Department of Defense Annual Report. p. 272. See Erickson. and Gray and Payne. Securrty in the Nuclear Age. 60." Scientific American. "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy. Hampshire. John Steinbruner. Decrsron-Making in Sotiet Weapons Procurement. Arms and Inpuence (New Haven: Yale University Press. 85-88. 220(4) (Aprd 1969): 15-25. Jr. 2 3 ( 6 ) (June 1967): 6-9.

Drporttnctrt of Dcfetrse Anmtal Kcport. See Pipes. I.e b r ~ u r y1." in Str'rtcgic T~J~octght rtr t l ~ e Nuclear Agr. 69. in ." 66.prew-iprions herween the United States and the Soviet Union.-Sowet Bnlmcr. see (:orrgrcssr~~rzill Record. k Y 1981. 86. Gray.~urenceMartin (ed.Sec. Rowcn.) ( h l t i m o r e : l o h n s Hopkins Univers~ryPress.5. 67. tor exnmplc. See Calm S. "Why the Sov~er Union Thinks It Could F g h t a n d Win a Nucle. "Ballistic Missile Defense: A New llehate for n New Decxie. For . 1978.I speech before the American Institute of Aeronautics .I strong statement t o this effect from a highly cred~hlesourcr. ~ n d Astronautic In Monterc). pp. pp. 64.S. C ~ l ~ f o r n iF a . 24( l ) (Spring 1980): 103-27." lrrtc'rr~atrot~~rl ." 6. 1979). coninientators believe rhat they should he evenhanded 111 theil. argued to the effect t h ~ the t IJn~tcdStates could not he trusted not to ahuse a strategically superlor pos~rion. V~ctor IJtgofi of the NSC statt.lr W'lr. Sonle US. 66. 70. "Soviet Stratesic Defense: The Neglected Di~nens~o of n the IJ.lr. 67.unty. . "K~ssingerLooks at Future of NATO.Strategic Stability Reconsidered 245 I l a n ~ e l Goure and Gordon H.ll W. 1 have explored t h ~ thesis s in some detail in "Ti~rgetlngProblems for Centr." Orhis. liseful background is provided in Henry C . 131-." 6 8 . McCorm~c. "The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Iloctrine.56. forthcoming.

7. Security and Securitization .

States.I People. Deparrment of Imernational Studies Uni>•ersity of War�<'ick A MEMBER OF THE HARVESTER PRESS GROUP . and Fear The National Security Problem in International Relations Barry Buzan ! i l l ! l i I l ! f .

the threats from Germany and R ussia would be less serious than they have been. and does not need to be repeated here. and they provide the link which connects security policy between levels 2 and 3. Insecurity reflects a combination of threats and vulnerabilities. particularly the great powers of the day. If Poland is thought to be historically insecure.pabilities commanded by other states in the system. If Germany and Russia were empty lands. namely that units can seek to reduce their insecurity either by reducing their vulnerability or by preventing or lessening threats. i ! . 44.i te spectrum :ed on p. the distinction between threats and vulnerabilities points to a key divide in security policy. These alternatives underlie. · s 'category lnped states. and require little elaboration. poor resources and indefensible boundaries be taken into account. and possessed defensible mountain borders. Weak powers are a well u nderstood phenomenon. then not only must its vulnerabilities in terms of limited population. It is clear that vulnerability connects intimately with both weak states and weak powers. Poland's vulnerabilities would be of little consequence. And if Poland were stronger. expansionist neighbours on either side. but also the threats posed to it by powerful. Only when we have established a reasonable idea of both the nature of threats and the vulnerabilities of the objects towards which they are directed. . ·and although it uncovered some aspects of threat. 3 l•Jt confined rm l much of its 'nation- 127. then the ·nal conflict nal security . Their weakness is relative to the c�. refers Nati onal Insecurity and the Nature of Threats y feature of :ct. respectively. we now need to look at threats in their own right. This was a largely static exercise. et a/. and the two cannot meaningfully be separated. . o posal is to nprehensive 1. Much of what was said in the previous chapter about the components of the state was to do with their vulnerability.. tlie ideas of national and international se­ curity. ibid. can we begin to make sense of national security as a policy problem. and frequently 73 . Threats and Vulnerabilities In the previous chapter we began our inquiry into level 2 by examining the state as an object of security. Nevertheless.

as in Zaire. as in Ethiopia. Military concerns. Even Israel can only deploy its formidable military machine for short periods before the strain on the national fabric becomes too great. But it is to argue that their vulnerabilities are neither numerous nor easy to exploit and. and this almost by definition produces a host of Vulnerabilities. skill and willpower can compensate for smallness to some extent. suffer far fewer vulnerabilities. for the oil squeeze and the threat of major war stand as obvious refutations to any such contention. What constitutes a threat to national security? Invasions and blockades clearly fall within the category. Although wealth. that they are neither excessively tempting nor particularly cheap to threaten. additionally. France and Japan. its vulnerability is almost unlimited. however. If.74 People.a natural resource like Zaire. States and Fear stems from the fact that they are. for example. a vital waterway like Turkey. the question of threats is rather more difficult. Sir defer for t look first < on any Jl' which go come in a military. \Veak states. and/or unstable institutions. it possesses some attribute of importance to others. Weak powers may be able to muster themselves to considerable effect in a single sector. as illustrated in different ways by the histories of Prussia. is cleaily more vulnerable to military threats than is France or Japan. While vulnerabilities are fairly obvious. open the state to domestic disruption and foreign intervention. West Germany. and consequently is able to adapt to. geostrategic factors do make a considerable di!Terence. absorb or deter many threats which would present overwhelming challenges to countries like Tanzania and Jamaica. therefore. but they cannot make more than a short-term impact in military terms. Mil basic pre through · and are r we have : physical rule by c t all these undesire1 accordec action c� social se1 protect � unfair pi activitie! other wr were ere is a maj Images ! of Polat World \ That drastic threats . Even with such states. This is not to say that such states are invulnerable. or the promulgation of unpopular political views? Un cannot est policy. Their internal political struc­ tures have sufficient mass. The state com­ mands ample resources in many sectors. like ihe United States. When a state has the misfortune to be both a small power and a weak state. like Chad. By contrast. whether or not they are also weak powers.relatively small. ponents c and dism institutio· ·state. states which are strong both as states and as powers.1 Weak powers can usually only prosper by specialising their econo­ mies. 1 each briel Types . An · underdeveloped idea of the state. be it . like many of the smaller European states have done. Israel and the Gulf oil-states. momentum and stability to be able to withstand anything but a large-scale intervention. or a strategic position like Poland. the Nether­ lands. then external pressure on these vulnerabilities is bound to occur. are vulnerable for the political reasons explored in the last chapter. they caonot compensate in the long run for the lack of a broader physical base. but there is a broad grey area between these obvious threats and the normal difficulties of international relations. Should threats to fish stocks or weak industries be considered threats to national security? Or should illegal immigration.

2 Types of Threat by Sector Military threats occupy the traditional heart of national security concerns. we cannot establish a firm basis on which to assess national security policy. · . and the need to prevent such threats from being realised is a major underpinning of the state's military protection function. the Nazi occupation of Poland. and look first at the general types and forms of threat as they might bear on . but erms. as we have argued. subvert or obliterate the idea of the . Human achievements. Military action can. and are more permanent than. economic and social sectors . Since we are still confining this analysis to level 2. answer these questions with some clarity. and as such stimulates not only a powerful concern to protect achievements in these sectors. but also threaten damage deep down through the layers of' social and individual interest which underlie. It subjects the physical base to strain.. eeze such . the state is more a social entity. 1 cono­ d t)Jis . military threats come in many types.above. art and all human activities can be undone by the use of force. any particular state. are threatened in terms other than those in which they were created. and the devastation likely to result from a nuclear Third World War. It can result in the distortion or destruction of institutions. An · . state. not all quite as drastic as the picture sketche<i. the use of force threatens to overthrow a self-created rule by consent. or 1uld ical ts is views? Unless we can. �nt. and usually does. as ether­ i n the 1ay be )f. damage and dismemberment. That said. military threats have normally been accorded the highest priority in national security concerns. political. than it is a physical being. we shall defer for the time being the whole issue of what causes threats. The ditTerent character of the components which go to make up the state suggests that threats to the state can come in a variety of types. and replace it with an imposed rule by coercion. are r. economic and ecological. These types can be classified by sector as military. and it can repress. but also a sense of outrage at · unfair play.ther ther with able le to ity? · is a mal :. At the most extreme end are threats of invasion and oCcupation aimed at obliterating the state. Since. short reat. threaten all the com­ ponents of the state. and we shall examine each brieRy. in other words.National Insecurity and the Nature of Threats 75 •ealth. Military actions not only strike at the very essence of the state's ' basic protective functions. the state's superstructures. Military action can wreck the work of centuries in the political. and also because the use of force can wreak major undesired changes very swiftly. For all these reasons. all support the high concern attached to military threats. Images like the Roman destruction of Carthage..table 1 and oth a most lance 1 like re on b are ' and tru c­ l e to :om­ ] :: to :sent aica. an ideri. Difficult accomplishments in politics.

Military threats usually have political objectives (seizure of territory. ln such cases the state is not d estroyed. most recently in 1 939. economic and social sectors from the much less restrained competition of war. . but rather being directed at external interests. manipulation of policy or behaviour). rather than to seize territory or t o overturn institu�ions. each ot ideas di ideas a1 the ide. Threats to allies. change of government of institutions. Military threats can also be indirect. Invasion and occupation may have less drastic objectives. The existence of this threshold goes a long way towards explaining the disproportionate emphasis given to military security at a time when threats in ·other sectors appear to otTer greater and more immediate danger. or threat. The level of threat thus varies greatly. a politi· an opp rotten < would would tervent define I hard to Americ the gen intensi1 politicc religior the stal or ovei even I disrup1 threats as pror from tl up to t aid to : from d . but some political objectives can also be pursued by political means. Arne ric anti�im cultival which I episod< The This fa< . ln that sense. Objectives can range from the specific.as in the case of 'Finlandisation' where military su­ periority provides the backdrop to the broad spectrum conditioning of the policies of Jess powerful neighbours. particularly its organising ideology. States and Fear Poland is the classic case here. the objective here usually being to force a change in government policy. Vietnam offer examples of attempts to apply the idea on a con­ ventional level. and the institutions which express it. and both American and Chinese attacks on .76 People . may not be severely attacked. This is particularly so where the ideas and institutions are internally · contestt politie<. or strategically-placed territories would all come under·this heading. The idea of the state. Since the state is an essentially political entity. and although its institutions. or both.l powerf1 like Fr< are all � cases p< changer battle c justificc liberal. and the current western concern over the security of oil supplies is a good illustration. for threats of damage can be of nuclear obliteration at one end of t he spectrum. as in the Allied occupations of Germany and Japan in 1 945. or the harassment of fishing boats at the other. it involves the crossing of an important threshold which separates the normal interplay of political._cupation of Norway in 1 940. its national identity. in the sense of not being applied to the state itself. are the normal target of political threats. as in the American use of warships sailing into coastal waters to indicate non-recognition of expansive territorial sea claims. The range of possible effects here is great. Nuclear deterrence is built on this principle. The use. of force implies a breach of normal peaceful relations. Military threats occupy a special category precisely because they involve the use of force. organising ideology and territory may be altered. to the general. or a change in idea and institutions as in the German 01. it may fear political threats'It s much as military ones. Military threats may also be in the form of punishment. shipping lanes. involving merely loss of some territory as between France and Germany in 1 870. in the strict sense.

r. Italy and Japan are all strong on national grounds. I f the local culture is weak or small. even the interplay of ideas and communication can produce politically significant social and cultural threats. democratic. Cultivating an anti-ideology. but are all significantly divided in terms of organising ideology. would require an interminable military crusade. Because the contradictions in the ideas are basic. The i n g the e when _1ediate ure of ion of !so be trly its Jre the ntially y · ones. ge · rrom coastal claims. liberal. even the unintended side-effects of casual contact �ould prove disruptive and politically charged.' Unintended cultural-political threats blend upwards into more intentional political meddling. Even when the state is both strong and powerful.threats �ectrum. The competition among ideologies is extraordinarily complex. Matters o f language. > bjective her than Tence is acks on a con­ . such as propaganda support for political groups of similar persuasion. as the Americans have done with anti-communism and the Soviets with anti-imperialism. In the twentieth century. as in the case of the McCarthy episode in the United States. states. iS _one answer. �rnally contested. information and traditions which is the underlying justification for the international anarchy. This fact makes it difficult to define exactly what should be considered a political threat. and from there into the funding and creation of such groups. e l f. rary su­ itioning �un also . In such cases political interference might win substantial rewards in terms of changed policy and alignment. however. and may need to be defended or protected against seductive or overbearing cultural imports.all the way up to the quasi-military activities of political assassination and arms aid to rebels. or I n that which social . its t tacked. of one persuasion may well feel threatened by the ideas represented by others. To take this seriously. Stmes like France. but even here the boundaries are hard to draw. fascist and communist political ideas contradict each other in practice just as much as monarchical and republican ideas did in the nineteenth century. More specific political in­ terventions by one state in the domestic affairs of another might define the category more usefully. the mere existence of a state espousing an opposing ideology constitutes a threat on the grounds of the ·one rotten apple in the basket' principle. religion and local cultural tradition all play their part in the idea of the state. or as part of the general interplay o f ideas and information? At the lower levels of intensity. but it carries the cost that the cultivation of negatives might begin to override the positive values which they are supposed to protect.National Jnsecuril_V and the Nature of Threats 77 sion and lv loss of L! change xway in Japan in ough its ered. In one sense. but hipping Jenhis 1 of oil special use. Should propaganda of the Radio M oscow and Voice of America kind be considered a threat t o national security. the costs of which would far outweigh the objectives. Such activity cap be exceedingly difficult to distinguish from domestically-generated dissent. for in such cases the state is likely to be highly vulnerable to political penetratiOn. Political threats stem from the great battle of ideas. as anyone who follows Islamic . political threats might still be a source of concern.

like th9se emanating in many directions from Colonel Qadhafi's Libya. India is constituted on secular. geographic and cultural ties do not allow them to ignore each other. naturally enough.rds another. those posed by the Soviet Union under the B rezhnev Doctrine. a threat amplified by the fact that both states are politically vulnerable. Because of this d ifficulty. Guatemala and elsewhere.r Pakist a betwce1 Kashm Islam . federative lines and can only exist by cultivating harmony among the various large religious groups within its borders. which is to say that they result more from the nature of. including more than 60 million Moslems. as do ideological relations between China and the Soviet Union. and the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. In more specific terms. and so stands for the definition of the state along exclusively theological Jines. and this often leads. structural political threats arise when the organising principles of two states contradict each other in a context where the states cannot simply ignore each other's existence.the situation than from the particular intentions of one actor t ow8. The Shah of Iran was but the latest in a long line of such rulerS to be swept away by mass-based political movements of various persuasions. or in E< ratio A reuse prac . in the long run. ideological and national relations between the two Koreas. virtually impossible. and those mounted by Castro's Cuba against a variety of right-wing governments in Latin America. The principle of India tht)s threatens Pakistan's major raison d'erre. for example. India and Pakistan offer a particuliuly tragic case of structural political threal. Their political systems thus play a zero-sum game with each other whether politics among the Arab states can testify. t tha n instit some to it. In a broad sense. Chile. States a11d Fear Political threats can be intentional. Relations between apartheid and black-ruled states in Southern Africa have this charac1er. those directed by the United States against radical regimes in Cuba. tural. Trying to make such a government secure from political threats must be. \ absorpt likewise breakd• single. The mystery is how such anachron­ istic forms of government manage to survive at a� I when the entire pOlitical environment of the times acts to corrode their legitimacy. integrit Pakist' proble1 conrus they will it or not.78 People. to more intentional forms of political threat. They can also be struc. although they may cause considerable surprise. Pakistan is organised on the principle of Islamic unity.. political threats will almost always involve the confusion between domestic and national security outlined in the previous chapter. Such events cause no puzzlement. but their organising principles pose a permanent threat to each other. one might argue that the whole Zeitgeist of the twentieth century has posed a political threat to monarchical rule. and provides grounds for Pakistan to fear I than n actors uncerl condit acquir the sta its res� us the: more 1 agains milita1 the ec· sector threat levels and-tl sense conne dynar dram neith this. The achievements and successes of one automatically erode the political stature of the other. Their historical.

like oil emba rgoes or inflated prices. the state is often only one among many levels of economic actor. and neither reliably predictable nor effectively controllable. import restrictioris�. both states view their claims t o it in the light of their national Pakistan clearly define a central element in the national security problem of each of them. If insecurity· in the economic domain is the normal confusion between internal politics a n d national security. Secondary political and military consequences may occur from a threat im plemented against as they d. default on debts. A huge n u m ber and variety of economic threats exist which cannot i ' ' ' . Economic threats are and·turnble of economil: practice. untext Their hether t.locate the boundarY at which issues acquire special status as threats to national security. and its responsibilities and in terests are not a s dear in the economic sector imacy.-�. Its dynamics are extremely complicated. as we shall see. The national economy is in one 1d this �tural }QSe a n the o not d ramatic fluctuations i n performance is only poorly understood.than military and political ones. successor states.the target state.re in the political and military ones. raising the spectre of a breakdown or the Indian Union into a number or independent. The tension lik ewise threatens Indht's basic raison d'Jtre. because the normal condition of actors in the economic domain is one of risk.the integrity. and illustrate the extensi\·e ground for ow3rds hat the hreat to ! line of Economic threats are more _dilftcult t o relate to national security .! tions tiona! en the cesses litical states the economy. g the state rational energy policies and technologies over the longer run. the economy presents a much more ambiguous target for threats than do more concrete elements like territory and government connected with the organising ideology and institu tional elements. absorption by an .omnivorous I ndia. Furthermore. Such a breakdown would solve Pakistan' . Export practices.Nmiona/ lnsecurity and the Narure oj Threats l i lficulty. but it is also strongly 1 that institutions. This meuns that economic levels may easily become indistinguishable from t h e normal rough­ threats tend to be neither swift nor precise in their ell'ec t. in many by the 79 sint!le-reJigion. then it is hard to calculate what actions might pose threats to i t . and at lower more narrmvl'y bound than military ones.price manipulations. tents of gh they tehran· : entire ts must 1en the condition. might turn out to be a boon in stimulating more :ular. Since the population of that province mostly adheres to Islam. then it is d i llicult to. between apter. in that they operate only against the economy of. Because of this. The political threats posed to each other by India and between them is neatly institutionalised in their dispute over Kashmir. permanent inferiority to a much larger India. competition and uncertainty. a n d its susceptibility to quite sense part of the physical base of the state. but there is no dii·ecr threat to other sectors as there is with military threats. The principle or Pakistan 1ala and rezhnev 1e strucc 1riety of of. What might seem a t h reat in the short term. If one cannot determine the normal condition of something. u�n 's than fear ! reasonably be construed a� threats t o national security.

but two cases do stand out. and a host of other actions may have serious effects on the economies of other states. The first involves the traditional link between economic factors and military capability. but this level is too broad to deal with in terms of economic threats. I n a general sense. as suggested above. so the United States feared the prospect of Soviet economic success providing the Soviet Union with a power base large enough to overawe American influence. For seJf-reJiant great powers. A sustained and drastic economic decline. threats to security of supply can be classified as a national �ecurity concern. Slates and Fear currency controls. and depend on sales of their products. military capability rests on the supply of key strategic materials. I n this sense. \ m anY state Concern o· such vulne to depend < be underm externa l fa Under s material i i i of which h where ecor on an as p natio nal st: fro m Thir• InternaJiol that the e< into a posi them fro m both as s t svstem is < e�entuall y is. and where these must be obtained outside the state. Similarly. the Royal Navy became dependent on supplies of various kinds of ship timber from overseas when domestic forests ceased to be able to cope with demand in the later days of sail. J the forme r latte r. while others become industrial centres. More specifically. however.80 People. is not normally seen in national security terms even when it cuts deeply into the state's military capability. Inability to compete or adapt is a risk of the game. like that of Britain. in the h and to th e Althoug national s� considerat the dilem nationa l s· state. military capability rests on economic performance. and decline may result as much from internal as from external causes. Thus American military industries depend on supplies of manganese and nickel.e later nineteenth century until the Second World War. and depend bot products. Some countries become specialised as raw materia) producers. Just as Britain and France feared the rapid economic expansion of Germany from th.' Concern over the reliability of supply underlies American interest in developing technology to obtain these minerals from the deep seabed. ·These range from loss of income to the destruction of whole industries. Over time. Specific economic threats to national security. The second case is of more recent concern. and involves what might loosely be called economic threats to domestic stability. such policies result in high levels of dependence on trade in order to sustain the social structures that have grown up with increasing prosperity. neither of which is produced in the U nited States in significant quantities. i n th materia l I< parallel " because w peacefu l a Aggressiv are part oppor tun be self-inf pattern of M ilitar . These occur when states pursue economic strategies based on maximisation of welfare through extensive trade. Ever the United of trade. Threats to such supplies feed quite quickly through into military capability. are hard to distinguish from the pitfalls of normal economic competition. economic perfor� rna nee is the crucial foundation on which their relative status in the system rests. and can thus almost be seen in the same light as military threats. the eConomic expansion of a rival power might be seen as a broad spectrum threat to the whole national security position. but they all fall within the merciless norms of competitive economic activity.

above. Singapore and Belgium exemplify the latter. of key ide the a tiona! :nd on j in the iability logy to Royal timber )e with :l quite Je seen · might occur ion of sult in social Some epend :s. so preventing them from solving the numerous problems \vhich make them weak both as states and as powers. an economic 'attack' does not. anomie ves the ility. interruption to the supply of a crucial material like oil could cause economic havoc in countries the welfare of which has come to depend on oil-powered production. the whole system is a threat to their national security. with considerable force. and depend both on supp. it must be treated with considerable caution. however. I n mance. Although the case for economic threats to be counted as threats to national security is superficially plausible. because while a military attack crosses a clear boundary between peaceful and aggressive behaviour. domestic political stability may be undermined by a drop in economic performance resulting from external factors. while Japan. From this perspective. This lihe of argument eventually blends into the Marxist critique that capitalism as a system is. They claim. From their perspective. Under such conditions. because socio-political structures have come to depend on sustained growth rates. can become significantly locked into the structure of trade. Especially where economic manipulations occur for political reaSons. like the United States. Gabon and Zaire are fairly extreme examples of the former type. Aggressive behaviour is normal in economic affairs. threats.hin the >ility to as much drastic 1ational military perfor­ lS i n the anomie mtil the fSoviet se large anomie 1 threat 81 . many states will be vulnerable to disruptions in the pattern of trade. Where such complex patterns of interdependence exist. The problem with it is that it raises once again the dilemmas of distinguishing between domestic politics and national security. and in strain on various institutions of the state. economic threats can be self-inflicted in as much as a choice is made to participate in a pattern of production and exclrpnge in which such risks are endemic. and risks ofloss are part of the price that has to be paid to gain access to opportunities for gain. The parallel with a military attack cannot be sustained. Economic threats do resemble an attack on the state. that the economic system or complex interdependence locks them into a position of permanent economic disadvantage. Even countries with large domestic resources and markets. M i litary threats cannofnormally be described in these terms. 0 Concern over the supply of oil is only the most manifest example of such vulnerability and.National Insecurity and the Nature of Threats 1s effects come to . in the long run. and to those who try to remain outside. Australia. The other side of this coin is the set of complaints from Third World countries which underlies their call for a New Interna_tional Economic Order.Ues of raw materials and on markets for their products. in the sense that conscious external actions by others results in material loss. a threat both to everyone who participates in it. and . they take on an aspect which fits easily into the framework of threats to national security.

While there is a real danger that vested interests will usurp the idea of economic security for their own ends. external sour but non·statt rations migh for example. a much clearer case can be made for economic threats to national security. but also they can render meaningless for weaker actors the assumptions of choice and responsibility in domestic economic policy discussed above.1 Threats to national security might also come in ecological forms. this hazard should not be allowed to obscure the real economic threats which are part of the national security problem. as in Bangladesh in ! 970.82 People. eco this might be the organisa threat by lsr states might bodies. or whether they are in some way themselves basically flawed. there would appear to be both ample incentive and ample opportunity.tt Earthquakes. the day·to·day inconveniences and disruptions of complex economic relations should be viewed as a normal cost of such activity. perhaps to a sufficient extent to threaten its idea and institutions. Attempts to elevate particular economic issues onto the national security agenda should be treated with suspicion as a matter of routine. not only is the question ofdamage hard to assess. and may become do not tie directly into domestic affairs in the same way. plai ues. States and Fear N against nat ur increases in tl ecological th activi'ties wit example. All of these things. can damage the physical base of the state. Only occasionally will specific economic threats deserve to be ranked as a national security problem. the late 196( played an ac conceivable political. storms. Economic threats might · thus be seen not so much as emanating from the iniquitous acts of foreigners. The make econm . but these were seen as part of the struggle of man There is a Sl polluting act from externa relatively lov discussed abc effec ts and m ocean poisoi command atl about how r terms and ir whether or n consider sue: discuss level Other Th and Histc Threats can sions than th1 suggested in They may co movements. droughts. are essentially domestic political matters. For the most part. including the continued testing. Such a view drives inquiry inexorably towards basic questions ofdomestic politics like '\Vho governs?'. At level 3 . and such-like might inflict war·scale dama-ge on a state. Since the economic domain has no necessary fixed form. and raises grounds for asking whether organising ideologies are being improperly implemented. Traditionally. however. like military and economic ones. These system-levet economic threats will \le analysed in more detail in chapter 5. for sub-national actors to appropriate national security in defence of their own vested interests. but also responsibility for creating vulnerabilities may well lie largely within t{le realm of domestic politics. but as stemming from inept play on the part of those responsible for managing the nation's economic affairs. As with the overlap between national security and the security of governments. On the broader level of the overall structure of economic relations. the pattern of economic relations has major implications for the stability of the system. Not only can these larger patterns threaten the peace of states. floods. and therefore not part of national security concerns. ecological threats have been seen as natural. in the sense that environmental events. questioning and modification of organising ideologies.

they may come from one of a variety of external sources. Other states are the most common external source. more likely. :ntially ational r to be actors vested 1e idea not be of the �nomic :or the mplex :tivity.and ' being nselves testing. economic or even military threat to some states. and the European Common M arket is seen . and many non-democratic states might see a political threat in the norms espoused by U N bodies. diminution of oxygen supply through ocean poisoning and deforestation).in ones. They also raise questions as to whether or not the state is the most appropriate level on which to consider such threats. Trans-rr � ntier pollution is an obvious example. have been seen as a source qf threat by many states since the late 1 960s. however. but some oft he more extreme scenarios (greenhouse e!Tects and melting polar caps. both in temporal terms and in terms of priorities.?'. diversity and pace of human activity. South Africa and China. ecological threats to one state might well stem identifiably from activi'ties within another. and ITT ( International Telephone and Telegraph) played an active part in threatening Chile in the early I 970s. and attempts at weather modification is an example which may become of greater importance in the not too distant future. Threats can vary as to source. With increases in the scale. Monetary Fund) has t h e power to make economic threats. Palestinian terrorist organisations. Intensity and Historical Change Threats can also be differentiated along a number o f other dimen­ sions than the sector in which they come. and not in terms of competition among men. and some of these have been suggested in the preceding discussion. lcient Jgical ional 1ghts. Ecological threats may appear to deserve a relatively low priority compared with the other forms of threat discussed above. or. and we shall pick up this theme when we discuss level 3. for example. 1tional ter of nomic nomic nomic 1. although this might be hard to disentangle from state threats working through the organisation. but this can usually be distinguished from external threats.f Threats National insecurity and the Nawre o nee the ' is the :reating omestic 1 1 tCh as :mming ing the <orably . like terrorist groups or transnational corpo­ rations might also play this role. but non-state entities. as in the case of secessionist movements. The I M F ( International . It is conceivable that international organisations might be a source of political. The United Nations has been seen as a source of threat by Israel. There is a substantial domestic side to this problem in the self­ polluting activities of states. Not t also ns of :ussed more ms. as in man 83 against nature. Other Threat Variables : Source. have enough plausibility to command attention. They raise jnteresting and important questions about how national security should be viewed. They may come from an internal source.

espec ially those great powers who view their security in global terms. Thus. however. The first is range : Is the . or I worse. source of threat close at hand. they gt and immediaq The third fa< any given thre probability ust measure ot sen threut is carri{ North Vietnarr If they con tim would be the what would be counter-escala probability of was quite lo\V. have two tempo ral characteristics. as when the threat is seen to arise from some proces s. i n I 938. are tem porall y comp lex. thoug h this consideration has declin ed in importance with the develo pment of long-r ange strike weapo ns. a t the same time as it placed one fronti er of its own security o n the H imalayas. as Germ any was to France after 1 870? Is it at some middle distan ce. The first is precise. the con and assessme1 access to Wes as a threat by count ries like New Zeala nd. Perhaps the most famou s examp le here is the mobil isation timeta bles which played such a large part in the secur ity percep tions of the Europ ean great power s before I 9 I 4 9 Other kinds of threat . and the Gulf states in relation to the politically charged religio us regime which succeeded the Shah in Iran. Is the threa t an imme diate one. like that which the British saw in the German navy between the turn of the century and the First World War. or like that whi�h the strategic n uclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union have posed to each other since the 1960s. or as comm unism in Vietna m seemed to many Americans durin g the 1960s ? Rang e applie s most easily to military threats. they can be very diffuse . pol tend to be. for examp le. Sources of threat may be very specifi c. both weapo ns and civil power technology. in that it is . notoriously la1 tions for a she of the risk fror war in Vietna Jack of progr< Most actior ones. or wiJJ it take some time to develop or be imple ment ed" Some threa ts are fairly easy to assess in this way. as Japan was for the Unite d States during the 1930s. though the cor in fact resort higher. whose exports suffer because of it. range exists as a comm onsen se geographical factor.84 People. saw Czech oslov akia as · a faraway country'. though strong arguments to the contrary might come from those located close to centres of econo mic and politic al power. could calcul ate the timing of the naval threat from Germ any before I 9 I 4 by worki ng out construction rates for dreadnoughts in the Germ an shipyards. the Soviet Union can usuall y obtain quite reliab le infor­ matio n on the timing of Amer ican militar y deployment programmes. the spread of comm unism {or capitalism). Since th threats. because closeness correlates strong ly with ability to u nder­ take effective milita ry action . especia certainties. Many . and the arms race are all exam ples of broad processes which are freque ntly identifi ed as threats. States and Fear Nat! known how rna decision is takei threat may rem< at what time. Threats can also vary enorm ously in what might be called intensily. The Britis h. like in Vietnamese ca li<ht of their 1: the heart of S< probabilities. It is much less relevant to politic al and econo mic threats in general. and some are not. and several factors operate to deter mine this. for exam ple. For most states. range can reflect other priori ties as well. like the t !l' reat of a nuclear strike . encount direct ou tcom if informatior subjective per to do. like Canada in relation to the United States. Britai n. nuclea r prolif eratio n. i f supplies fi t this threats. But for some. Conversely. Thu arms race. The second factor is range in the temporal rather than in the spatia l sense. Similarly. rather than from a particular object or policy.

and what would be the consequent damage inflicted on the North if such counrer-escalatior1 occurred'! They 'm ust have calculated that -the probability of a major escalation.patial 1me to �ess i n culate )fking yards. display few temporal certainties. Since there is no reliable way of assessing the risk from these threats. over-population. pollution. If they continued. T I States ! 870? ) many Tii!itary under­ ec!ined )OOS. they generate endless argument about the level of priority und immediacy they should be accorded.trike. Threats by OPEC to cut oil' oil supplies fit this pattern. the North Vietnamese had to m11ke calculations of this kind all the time. for example to nuclear \veapons. e : J s t he . their campaign in the South. Even if information was not limited and distorted. Threat assessments of this type lie at . Where the probabilities were higher. In trying to assess threats. widely-feared threats. what would be the probability of an American counter4escalation. the arms race. it will be used. Most actions in the international arena. . The u n i versal prepara4 tions for a short. 1 those =anada 1 to the n Iran. factor. Objectively minpr events. British and French assessments of the risk from Hitler before 1939.S it is. i nfor­ nmes. like increased levels of conventional bombing. tend to be. in fact. however. of threats is the probability that ahy given threat will. known how many mint)_tes the threat will take to implement once a decision is taken to do so. the North Vietnamese calculuted that the consequences were acceptable in the light of their larger objectives. t" bles Ji the �'ever. like nuclear proliferation.l. The third factor in the intensity. \Vas quite lov. the complexities of events would still defy uccurate prediction and assessment. as do most threats of military attack. or to be seen as being. Accurate assessment of either risks or probabilities. H mV serious will the cOnsequences be if the threat is carried out'! During the Vietnam war. encounter hosts o f complex factors which make both their direct outcome and their broad consequences highly uncertain. can [issume major symbolil· dimensions in the . It �enerai. requires an ability to predict which is notoriously lacking in international relations. i n .·. and therefore that the risk was worth running even though the consequences would be catastrophic if the Americans did in fact resort to nuclear weapons. for example. occur. or escalated. at t h e m the . l. t it is the heart of se-:: u rity policy. like Soviet restrictions on access to West Berlin. in that the threat may remain in being indefinitely.National Insecurity and the Nature o f Threats ts suffer century nuclear 85 d ! which as when from a :ism (or I power rocesses I to each ttensity. and the American conduct of the war in Vietnam. sharp war in \ 9 . especially those of a process kind. in a constant state of becoming worse. The second is highly uncertain. and particularly military ones. their me11sure of seriousness.1rity i n <lin. and even if subjective perceptions accorded with reality. and there is no way of telling at what time. Many threats. probability usually has to be weighed against a fourth factor. if ever. which they usually fail to do. Thus. illustrate both the weakness of prediction and the lack of progress towards improvement. and economic stagnation.

Threats also have an historical dimension which adds rurther to the complexities of assessment.but also of creating a strong position in the domestic struggle for allocation of resources.86 People. States and Fear driven varie ing of most air defence Taken toge threat and scale of m remarkably conscriptio hopelessly i much mon By the Ia force to th< f orces coul German vi' in the spee transport ' erosion in continued during the trend brou nuClear-an tr�nd has defensive little value been trans wars durin longer pre military th continuou quires cor uncertain 1939. Fortified castles and cities provided a good measure or military security berore the introduction or gunpowder and cannon. but changes in response to both new developments in the means of threats. and. this causes serious problems ror national security policy-making. which he defines as being that ' the military. The American military establish­ ment. only a madman would have considered venturing out in a wooden-hulled. and to evolutions in states which alter the nature or their vulnerabilities. Changes or this t ype aOect the whole system. r . military security deteriorates rapidly. but not the only. 1 ° For all these reasons the intensity or threats is extraordinarily dillkult to de­ termine with any certainty. Worst-case analyses have the advantage not only of reflecting a prudent distrust of other actors in the system � a position easily justified by reference to history . like that or nuclear war in Europe. and their imp difficulty · r cnlculus or Soviet1American ri. By 1 870. demographic or economic value of a territory varies with the techniques of combat and production. as we shall see.valry. Additional t o thse problems is the natural propensity of those responsi ble�for national security to hedge their bets by thinking in worst-case terms. Raymond A ron rerers to this phenomenon as the "Jaw or change '.. Unless derences are continually evolved to meet new capabilities. The character of threats. is without doubt the roremost advocate or the strength and effectiveness of the Soviet armed forces. while objecti

ely enormous threats. and sequences The cha time in re units mak threats to nationalis thereby r situation eighteen t l fluid. relatively thin walls which served well against the pre-gunpowder techniques or siege provided ideal targets for the gunners. but the high. sail-powered ship to alTer serious battle to enemy naval forces. Britain remained secure behind the wooden walls of its ships or the line ror several centuries. the introduction or Dreadnought battleships hy Britain in f. with human relations and institutions'. in other words. 1 1 Military technology provides the easi­ est. Jet fighters made propeller. but by the middle or the nineteenth century. metal construction and artillery began to make such vessels obsolete. illustration of this point. a host or developments in steam power. because the fi rst to introduce a new military technology holds a decisive advantage over all those who rail to adapt to it. ror example. get subordinated to more politically defined security priorities.9 06 greatly reduced the military utility of all existing battleships. Thus. and the particular capabilities or these weapons largely defines the nature or military security problems which states face at that time. Similarly. Weapons of a certain type are characteristic of any given historical period. does not remain constant over time.

ln many parts of the world. \smel"s difficulty in establishing the legitimacy of its territorial conquests. By the late nineteenth century. industrial technique had added its force to the cause of military mobilisation. and nuclear weapons required the rethink­ ing of most elements of conventional military wisdom ranging from air defence. a process which has continued to the present day.National Insecurity and the Nature o f Threats 87 normous to more Jblems is curity to an alyses of other renee to :lomestic stab\ish­ te of the all these t to de­ s serious I er to the r words. often on the basis of skimpy and uncertain evidence. certain tnd the 1ture of Unless . for example. 1ents in :e such sidered serious �e over first to ion of ed the •peller- driven varieties obsol�. Britain ceased to be a sanctuary from continental wars during the 1930s. and whole concepts of defence and vulnerability have been transformed. Note. but the continuous and rapid transformation of military instruments re­ quires constant reassessment. As demonstrated by the Polish cavalry charges in 1939.te. a tre�d brought to global reality during the 1960s by the deployment of nuclear-armed intercoptinental missiles. when boundaries were much more fluid.nilitary vided a tion of . One implication of this trend has been the squeezing of time both for diplomacy and defensive preparation. and the outflanking of the Maginot line in \ 940.i>[ power. to both in states m refers as being erritory human he easi ­ . thereby reducing the political acceptability of annexations. lt signalled an erosion in warning tiffies against attack. which rovided secure nturies. through battlefield tactics. The relatively leisurely pace and modest scale of military activity in eighteenth-century Europe escalated remarkably during the Napoleonic wars under the influence of mass conscription.. The advent of long-range bombers during the 1 9 30s opened the prospect of almost immediate attack. to amphibious landings.trlier centuries. Taken together. Defences not in permanent readiness have little value. and the main significance or territorial transfers derived from their impact on the balance . Forces and tactics de�igned for the earlier age proved hopelessly inadequate. and this meant that huge forces could be transported quickly and supplied abundantly. The calculation of military threats would be hard enough without such change. 1 2 The character of political and economic threats also changes over time in response to developments in the interr\nl structures of the units making up the system. . This situation contrasts markedly with that prevailing in the nineteenth. and by the 1960s even the U nited States was no longer protected from strategic bombardment. The German victory over France in 1870 is generaHy taken as a landmark in the speeding up of warfare through the use of both mechanised transport and pre-organis_ed mobilisation schemes. threats to territory have declined because the historical trend of nationalism has increased the identity between land and people. for exam ple. and the threat of complete occupation became much more immediate and widespread than i t had been before. such developments change the entire condition of threat and vulnerability. the con­ sequences of miscalculation can be catastrophic. eighteenth and e<.

Brita in. ' The threa t has broadened from fear of foreign interference in the a ffairs of the ruling famil y to fears of exter nal corru ption of mass politics. are vulne rable to price mani pulat ions. produ ce a dynam ic patte r·n of interests and vulne rabili ties which requi res contin uous updat es and revisi ons in the assessment of economic threats. weapons and textile s have retained a conti nuing importance. While the range of possi ble econo mic threa ts is large . T which cann< which cann< bt!CllUSe kn< making is r monitoring criteria for c: become of s found every some cut�ol inconsequeJ The poss one's resou· security.