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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-45742 April 12, 1939

TIBURCIO MAMUYAC, petitioner-appellant, vs. PEDRO ABENA (alias Indong), respondent-appellee. Nicanor Tavora for petitioner. Pedro C. Quinto for respondent. LAUREL, J.: This is a petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 30, 1937 in CA-G. R. No. 43446. Gregoria Pimentel was the owner of the two parcels of land which she sold and conveyed on June 1, 1926, to Pedro Abena, the respondent-appellee herein. On January 27, 1927, Gregoria Pimentel again sold and conveyed the same parcels to Tiburcio Mamuyac, the petitionerappellant herein. The document of sale, Exhibit 1, in favor of Abena was duly inscribed in the registry of property of the province on January 31, 1927, and from April, 1927, said parcels of land were declared for taxation in the name said Abena. The document executed in favor of the petitioner on January 27, 1927, was neither inscribed in the registry of property nor were the parcels of the land declared for taxation in the name of the latter. To determine the conflict, petitioner-appellant instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of La Union against the respondent-appellee for the recovery of the two controverted parcels of land. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, respondentappellee here. From this judgment, the petitioner-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. This latter court, with one member dissenting, affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of La Union. The dispositive part of the majority decision of the appellate court is: Either way considered the question, and under the theory of the plaintiff on the possession, and under Article 1473 of the Civil Code which has exact application to the present case, the court did not commit any error in sentencing for the defendant, which confirmed in its entirety, with costs to the appellant in this instance.Plaintiff, petitioner-appellant here, elevated the case to this court by writ of certiorari as adverted to in the beginning of this opinion. The first assignment of error of the petitioner-appellant challenges the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. This cannot be done.

The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law incurred by the latter, the findings of fact of said Court of Appeals being final as to the former. (Guico vs. Mayuga and Heirs of Mayuga [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 861.) Review of judgments and decrees of the Court of Appeals is limited to "cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved." (Sec 2, Commonwealth Act No. 3, amending section 138 of the Administrative Code, in relation to sec. 2, Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines.) (Mateo vs. Collector of Customs and Court of Appeals [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 915.) The petitioner-appellant under his under his second and third assignments of error contends that he has a better right over the two parcels of land involved because of possession claimed by him in virtue of an alleged private contract of mortgaged executed in his favor on January 4, 1935 (Exhibit B.) It is sufficient answer to this contention that "in order that a mortgage may be deemed to be legally constituted, it is undispensable that the instrument in which it appears be a public document and be recorded in the property register. Therefore, a mortgage in legal form was not constituted by said private document." (Tuason vs. Goduco, 23 Phil., 342, 347.) Even were we to accord validity to the mortgage, Exhibit B, article 1473 of the Civil Code, invoked by him, applies only to the determination of presence between sale and sale: The provision recorded just comes to identifying preferred when the same thing shall have been sold to two or more persons, cases that already occupy the Law 15, tit. 32, lib. 3. Romano of the Code, and the Law 50, tit. 5. º part. 5. a (4 Bonel, Civil Code, p 483) and the same can not be availed of in case of conflict Between a sale and a mortgage. Do apply the provision of Article 1473 of the Civil Code to resolve the resolve the dispute between the buyer of a property and the seller's lender, a mortgage on the same property sold? The Supreme Court did not declare the appeal. Whereas it is inapplicable to the case of Article 1473 of the Civil Code, which is violated in the first plea, it has not been addressed in this litigation case referred to that article, nor the appellant had entered the property of the property in question when it instructed the record possessory or possessed with the good faith that requires the last paragraph of that article, being, as it were, knowing that Godinez and the burdens weighing on this, which places under conditions that n is the third referred to in Article 606 of the Code, alleged to be infringed in the second reason for not having applied, when it really is not the case. (Judgment of 7 July 1896, 15 Civil Code, Martinez Ruiz 2. Ed., 330, 332.) Upon the other hand, even if we were to accept the contention of the petitioner-appellant that he had been in possession of said properties by reason of the alleged contract of mortgage executed in his favor, on January 4, 1925, and were to accord legal effect to the document of

616. Ramos.) The contention of the appellant that respondent's ownership and preference over the property over the property in question is not complete because of lack of material delivery of the possession to him by the vendor is not well taken. The petitioner is hereby dismissed with costs against the petitioner. still his right cannot prevail over that of Abena who had duly registered his deed of sale. for the reason that the execution of the public document of sale in favor of the respondent-appellee is equivalent to the delivery of the realty sold. So ordered.).. Phil. Concepcion and Moran. 614. C. (Sanchez vs. which was not recorded in the registry of property..sale of January 27. Imperial. . Villa-Real. 40. JJ. (Exhibit 1.J.. Avanceña. 1927. concur.

1961. Magno L. GIMENEZ. approved in principle the acquisition by the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation of the unoccupied portion of the Sapang Palay Estate in Sta. 1960. Cavite for those who desire to settle south of Manila. vs. Bulacan for relocating the squatters who desire to settle north of Manila. First Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Sumilang V. of then Auditor General Pedro M. acting on the reports of the Committee created to survey suitable lots for relocating squatters in Manila and suburbs. Gimenez.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. ANTONIO. On June 10.90 paid to the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan. L-19545 April 18. respondent. and of the Social Welfare Administrator together with the recommendation of the Manager of the Government Service Insurance System. The project was to be financed through the flotation of bonds under the charter of the PHHC in the amount of P4. The President. through the Executive Secretary.5 million.R. the same to be absorbed by the Government Service Insurance System. Rizal. J. disallowing the request of petitioner for the refund of real estate tax in the amount of P30. Bernardo for respondent.: Appeal by certiorari from the decision dated December 11. or Bacoor. THE AUDITOR GENERAL. PEDRO M. the President of the Philippines. 1960. Dajao for petitioner.460. petitioner. informed the PHHC of such approval by letter bearing the same date (Annex "B"). at a meeting with the Cabinet. 700 (Annex "C") authorizing the purchase of the unoccupied portion of the Sapang Palay Estate at P0. 1975 PHILIPPINE SUBURBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.45 per square meter "subject to the following conditions precedent: . No. and of another area either in Las Piñas or Parañaque. Maria. The facts of the case are as follows: On June 8. the Board of Directors of the PHHC passed Resolution No.

under the following terms and conditions. its successors. T-23807 and T-23808). entered into a contract embodied in a public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale" (Annex "F") whereby the former conveyed unto the latter the two parcels of land abovementioned.5 million bond issue to be absorbed by the GSIS. Petitioner Philippine Suburban Development Corporation.500.000.223. Suburban Dev.1. V. m. the above described two (2) parcels of land. 1960. 1957. 3. transfer and convey by way of absolute sale unto the VENDEE. and the GOVERNMENT ." On July 13. Philippine currency.00 to be absorbed by the GSIS. Corp. meter. a loan for the purchase of the above described two (2) parcels of land in anticipation of the purchase by the said GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM of the bonds to be floated by the National Government to enable the VENDEE to make this purchase. 2. after an exchange of communications.00) PESOS.1960. T-23807 and T-23808. together with all the improvements existing thereon. among others: 1. pursuant to OEC Memorandum Circular No. the VENDOR by these presents does hereby sell. On December 29. Q-3332 C. as owner of the unoccupied portion of the Sapang Palay Estate (specifically two parcels covered by TCT Nos.45 per sq. said payment to be made directly to the MORTGAGEES and the difference shall be paid to the VENDOR. administrators or assigns. 4.000. and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. That the confirmation by the OEC and the President of the purchase price of P0. That the payment of the consideration mentioned in paragraph 1 above shall be made as follows: (a) The vendee is presently negotiating or securing from the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM. the President authorized the floating of bonds under Republic Act Nos. That the President of the Philippines shall first provide the PHHC with the necessary funds to effect the purchase and development of this property from the proposed P4.00) PESOS and the VENDOR is hereby constituted as Attorney-in-fact and authorized to receive from. 1959. ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND (P1.710.I. That the contract of sale shall first be approved by the Auditor General pursuant to Executive Order dated February 3. 2. That for and in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY THREE (P3. The vendor shall agree to the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case No. entitled "Phil. dated May 6. by virtue of a directive of the President of the Philippines. and from whatever amount may be granted as loan by the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM to the VENDEE. et al. to be paid by the VENDEE to the herein VENDOR in the manner outlined hereinbelow.F. in order to finance the acquisition by the PHHC of the entire Sapang Palay Estate at a price not to exceed P0. provided that this first payment shall not be less than ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND (P1. Quezon City.00) PESOS shall be retained by the said VENDEE for the purpose of paying and clearing the existing lien annotated at the back of the aforesaid Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1000 and 1322 in the amount of P7.710. Ortiz.000. That the portion of the estate to be acquired shall first be defined and delineated. shall first be secured.45 per sq. 5. 114.386.

Philippine Currency. to whom a copy of the contract had been submitted for approval in conformity with Executive Order No. (b) That out of the sum of P1. Said objections were embodied in a letter to the President. or whatever amount is not paid by virtue of the first payment mentioned in paragraph (a) above. That registration and issuance of certificates of title in the name of the VENDEE shall be for the account of the VENDEE.00 unto the successful party involved in said Notice of Lis Pendens." (Annex "F") The above document was not registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds until March 14. 1960. registration.00.676. however. dated January 9.710.590. provided.SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM is directed to pay the balance of the loan direct to the herein VENDOR chargeable against VENDEE's loan from the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM. the VENDEE shall deduct and further retain or keep as a trust fund the amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40. and other expenses for the cancellation of said mortgage lien shall be for the account of the VENDOR and shall be advanced by the VENDEE to the VENDOR. the VENDEE shall pay the difference to the VENDOR. T-23807 and T-23808 until such lien shall have been discharged or cancelled. Philippine Currency. however.) That all expenses for the preparation and notarization of this document shall be for the account of the VENDOR. 290. and the costs of suit. due to the fact. and provided. That should this amount be more than sufficient to cover the said mortgage lien.00 to be retained by the VENDEE mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph 2(a) for the purpose of discharging the said mortgage lien.00. that the PHHC could not at once advance the money needed for registration expenses. provided. for the collection of any amounts due from the VENDEE in favor of the VENDOR. provided.000) PESOS. the VENDEE binding itself to deliver forthwith the said amount of P40.000. however. In the meantime. the VENDEE binds itself to pay unto the VENDOR a sum equivalent to twenty-five (25%) per centum of the total balance due from the. and provided. to answer for the remaining Notice of Lis Pendens annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. further. further. including documentary stamps. (c) The remaining balance of the total consideration in the amount of ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-THREE PESOS (P1.223. the entire hacienda was assessed at P131. That full and complete payment of the balance mentioned in this particular paragraph 2(c) shall be made or paid by the VENDEE within a period of sixty (60) days from date of delivery of title by the VENDOR in the name of the VENDEE. 3. shall be paid by the VENDEE unto the VENDOR immediately upon the VENDEE's obtaining sufficient funds from proceeds of bonds floated by the VENDEE or the Government for the purchase of the properties subject of this transaction. . expressed objections thereto and requested a re-examination of the contract. That the VENDOR shall take charge of the preparation and registration of the documents necessary in clearing the above referred to mortgage lien. however. in view of the fact that from 1948 to December 20.000. 1960 in the greatly increased amount of P4. with the understanding that the expenses for preparation. notarization. and reassessed beginning December 21. petitioner claims. Should there be instituted any legal action. 1961. That the VENDOR hereby warrants to defend the title and ownership of the VENDEE to the two (2) parcels of land above described from any claim or claims of third parties whomsoever.898.110. (4. That this sixty (60) days period may be extended for another period of sixty (60) days upon written request by the VENDEE at least five (5) days prior to the expiration of the said sixty (60) days period. VENDEE in favor of the VENDOR as and by way of attorney's fees.00). the Auditor General.

Petitioner. said request was denied by the Secretary of Finance in a letter-decision dated August 22.. 1961 only and that said instrument of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on March 14.099. was approved by the President upon favorable recommendation of the Cabinet and the Committee created for the purpose of surveying suitable lots which may be acquired for relocating squatters in Manila on February 1. by the . or on June 13. 1960 it ceased to be the owner of the property involved and that consequently it was under no obligation to pay the real property tax thereon effective January 1. through the PHHC.1961.. That Corporation. 1961. 1960. On April 12. but this notwithstanding. through the Executive Secretary. Petitioner claimed that it ceased to be the owner of the land in question upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on December 29. 1961. the records show that the deed of sale executed on December 29. maintains that in view of the execution of the deed of sale on December 29. the Provincial Treasurer contends that. In support of its stand. 496) the Philippine Suburban Development Corporation is still the owner of the property until the deed of sale covering the same has been actually registered. with the consent of petitioner. to enable the said PHHC to proceed immediately with the construction of roads in the new settlement and to resettle the squatters and flood victims in Manila who were rendered homeless by the floods or ejected from the lots which they were then occupying (Annexes "D" and "D-1").. 1961. by letter. the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan requested the PHHC to withhold the amount of P30. 1960 . the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract.. 1960. the PHHC acquired possession of the property. as under the Land Registration Act (Act No. approved the Deed of Absolute Sale on February 1.460. as vendor. prior to the signing of the deed by the parties. 1961. Upon recommendation of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan. therefore.. 1961. that Corporation cites Article 1498 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that "when the sale is made through a public instrument. if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred" and Article 1496 of the same Code which states that "the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501. paid under protest the abovementioned amount to the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and thereafter. the possession of the property was actually delivered to the vendee prior to the sale. the vendor is still liable to the payment of real property tax for the calendar year 1961.90 because aside from the presumptive delivery of the property by the execution of the deed of sale on December 29. 1960. 1961. or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. Said amount represented the realty tax due on the property involved for the calendar year 1961 (Annex "G").79 from the purchase price to be paid by it to the Philippine Suburban Development Corporation. It is now claimed in this appeal that the Auditor General erred in disallowing the refund of the real estate tax in the amount of P30. and." On the other hand. It appears that as early as the first week of June. Pertinent portions of this decision are quoted hereunder: . requested then Secretary of Finance Dominador Aytona to order a refund of the amount so paid. the President.

1959. at his Cabinet meeting. pursuant to the Executive Order dated February 3. Considering the aforementioned approval and authorization by the President of the Philippines of the specific transaction in question. under no obligation to pay the real property tax for the year 1961. 496). and. the PHHC. petitioner has ceased to be the owner of the property involved.4940 hectares. and the fact that the contract here involved — which is for a special purpose to meet a special situation — was entered into precisely to implement the Presidential directive. 700 approving and authorizing the purchase of the unoccupied portion of said property.transmission of ownership to the vendee. of the unoccupied portion of the property of petitioner.223. ordinarily entered into by government offices and government-owned or controlled corporations. to meet a special situation and entered into in implementation of a Presidential directive to solve and emergency. Respondent. and. passed its Resolution No. Respondent further contends that since the property involved is a land registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. the President of the Philippines at his Cabinet meeting on June 13. dated February 3. and not to a contract for a special purpose. argues that the presumptive delivery of the property under Article 1498 of the Civil Code does not apply because of the requirement in the contract that the sale shall first be approved by the Auditor General. the action of the Auditor General would no longer be necessary because under the said Administrative Order. the vendor remains as the owner of the said property. 290 dated February 3. that on June 10. I. would therefore. . National Marketing Corporation. 1960 to use it as a resettlement area for squatters and flood victims from Manila and suburbs. where the contract already bears the approval of the President. In other words. It cannot be denied that the President of the Philippines. not be necessary. and that the petitioner should register the deed and secure a new title in the name of the vendee before the government can be compelled to pay the balance of P1. approved and authorized the purchase by the PHHC of the entire property consisting of 752.676. and that after the PHHC took possession of the aforementioned property on the first week of June. at any rate. the President has. instead of only the unoccupied portion thereof as was previously authorized. the prior approval by the Auditor General envisioned by Administrative Order No. therefore. until the deed of sale has been actually registered. on June 8. 1 the approval by the Auditor General contemplated by Administrative Order No. We find the petition meritorious. the final say. As We held in Federation of the United NAMARCO Distributors v. 1960. through the PHHC. however. consequently.00 of the purchase price. 1959 and later by the President. 290. refers to contracts in general. acting pursuant to the aforecited approval of the President. approved and authorized the purchase by the national government. liable for the payment of real property tax. 1959. 1960. 1960.

because the land sold is registered under the Torrens System. for instance. the payment of the purchase price of the good is not a condition. registration is not necessary to make it valid and effective. refers to a case involving conflicting rights over registered property and those of innocent transferees who relied on the clean titles of the properties in question. l960. or where. Tancioco. for actual notice is equivalent to registration. or by clear inference therefrom. the constant doctrine has been that. 8 The case of Vargas v. the execution thereof is equivalent to the delivery of the thing object of the contract. 7 Indeed. did not preclude the transmission of ownership.II Under the civil law. if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. In the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary. there is no question that the vendor had actually placed the vendee in possession and control over the thing sold. it is stipulated that until the last installment is made. 5 In the case at bar. in case of sale by installments. . but title passes by the delivery of the goods. its material delivery could not have been made. as between the parties to a contract of sale. not relevant to the case at bar. or when the vendor reserves the right to use and enjoy the properties until the gathering of the pending crops. 3 In other words. 9 cited by respondent. The registration is intended to protect the buyer against claims of third persons arising from subsequent alienations by the vendor. the title to the property should remain with the vendor. a deed purporting to convey or affect registered land shall operate as a contract between the parties. therefore. therefore. It is. Section 50 of the Land Registration Act provides that. as between the parties to the contract. precedent to the transfer of title to the buyer. although possession was transferred to the vendee and the deed of sale was executed in a public instrument on December 29. there is symbolic delivery of the property subject of the sale by the execution of the public instrument. delivery (tradition) as a mode of transmission of ownership maybe actual (real tradition) or constructive (constructive tradition). We fail to see the merit in respondent's insistence that. 4 or where the vendor has no control over the thing sold at the moment of the sale. unless from the express terms of the instrument. 2 When the sale of real property is made in a public instrument. Such would be the case. and is certainly not necessary to give effect to the deed of sale. when a certain date is fixed for the purchaser to take possession of the property subject of the conveyance. In a long line of cases already decided by this Court. this was not the intention of the parties. even without the act of registration. 6 III . the vendor still remains as owner of the property until the deed of sale is actually registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. even before the date of the sale. and. The condition that petitioner should first register the deed of sale and secure a new title in the name of the vendee before the latter shall pay the balance of the purchase price.

Makalintal.90. concur . hold that the payment of the real estate tax after such transfer is the responsibility of the purchaser. is hereby ordered refunded. 1960. had consummated the sale and transferred the title to the purchaser. 11 WHEREFORE. C. in the case at bar. the appealed decision is hereby reversed. It is undisputed that the property is in the possession of the vendee. However. Fernando.J. Since the delivery of possession.. Without any pronouncement as to costs. much less is there any subsequent alienation of the same property. and the real property tax paid under protest to the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan by petitioner Philippine Suburban Development Corporation. 10 We. therefore. coupled with the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale.460. even as early as the first week of June. in the amount of P30. Barredo and Aquino. no rights of third persons are involved. JJ. or six (6) months prior to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on December 29. the purchaser PHHC is a government entity not subject to real property tax.In the case at bar. 1960..

Vicente J. and 13397. The deed of sale was presented for registration.500.R. J.: On January 21.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. vol. FRANCISCO on behalf of DOMINGO CABANTOG.. Maxima Caballes et al. through the Chief of the General Land Registration Office. made a notation thereon to the effect that the same was presented at 12. Against the refusal of the register of deeds to register the deed of sale in favor of Domingo Cabantog. vs. L-45192 April 10. The undersigned is of the opinion that it is the duty of the register of deeds to aid the courts. 6600 instituted by Apolonia Coronado et al. his counsel elevated a consulta to the judge of the Fourth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Pending the appeal of Maxima Caballes to this court from the decision in civil case No. Sumulong.000.000). 1936. 13395. and the senior clerk in the office of the register of deeds of Laguna. LAUREL. in which the latter has been condemned to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P1. 1936. and also to protect the interest of the winning party by preventing the multiplicity of litigations. Lavides and Sumulong for appellant. II of the day book. — The inscription of the proceeding deed of sale is hereby suspended until after the resolution to be rendered by the Supreme Court on the appeal intended to be presented by Maxima Caballes against the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Civil Case No. avoiding that their decisions may be effective due to transfers of properties made by the party losing in a case after same have been handled down. the spouses Francisco Vicuña and Maxima Caballes made an absolute sale of three parcels of land.15 o'clock on January 25. No.000. in favor of Domingo Cabantog for the sum of P2. the latter secured an attachment of the three parcels of land sold by Maxima Caballes to Domingo Cabantog. Francisco for appellee. On his return to duty on January 27.000 (should be P100. 1936. covered by transfer certificates of title Nos. 1936. requesting answer to the following: . as per entry number 18624. the register of deeds had the aforesaid notation cancelled and substituted by the following: 18624. which attachment was entered in the day book of the register of deeds of Laguna on January 27. 6600 sentencing her to pay Apolonia Coronado the sum of P100. in the absence of the latter official. 13396. 1939 In re Consulta filed by Attorney VICENTE J.

is based on such bill of sale is a transfer made in fraud of the creditor Apolonia Coronado. especially when. The undersigned sincerely believes that it is his duty to deny or at least suspend the registration of fraudulent conveyances. 000. with the corresponding owners' duplicate certificates of title. 1936. as in this case the person is taken. and prepare and issue the proper transfer certificates of title in the name of the vendee. and also to protect the interest of the winning party by preventing the multiplicity of litigations'. there is a damning court ruling prior to execution of the deed for which registration is requested. This is a prudent step to avoid not only the damage that can irrogar seller's creditors but also the government for any legal disputes claiming another innocent after being buyers. plaintiff in Civil Case No. while the sale of which is here and whose registration is requested by Domingo Cabantog Maxima has been granted by Caballes on January 21. Does the register of deeds of Laguna have the authority to deny issuance of the proper transfer certificates of title in favor of the vendee on the ground alleged by him that. upon presentation to him of the absolute deed of sale in favor of Domingo Cabantog of the three (3) parcels of land in question. ie.QUESTIONS 1. "it is the duty of the register of deeds to aid the courts. cancel said outstanding certificates in the name of the vendors. among others: The resolution of the undersigned to suspend the registration of the deed of sale granted by Maxima Caballes in favor of the appellant Sunday Cabantog refusal thereof and to issue new certificates of clear title to the purchaser Cabantog Sunday. as these hardly worth P30. in which the seller Caballes Maxima has been ordered to pay that sum of Apolonia Coronado P100. the latter filed his answer thereto justifying his action upon the following grounds. the proper registration fees having been tendered and accepted and there being no judicial order suspending such action? 2. Is it not the ministerial duty of the register of deeds of Laguna. It also notes that the value of all real property Maxima registered to Caballes can cover not even half the amount of the judgment against it. . or should the register of deeds leave this question to the determination of the proper court in case the same is submitted to it for determination by any interested party? A copy of the consulta having been served on the register of deeds. avoiding that their decision may be effective (or ineffective) due to transfers of properties made by the party losing in case after same have been handed down. 1935. 000 selling them at the current price. In support of this assertion. more than a month after having borne the judicial pronouncement of sentence. it is stated that the judgment against such vendor is dated December 14. to register said deed of sale. This prevents itself that a judgment be ineffective and precipitated by reckless acts submitted by a Registrar of Titles in the registration of documents of dubious legality. while or until a competent court can decide the true nature of this transfer. 6600 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

that Maxima Caballes is now insolvent and that the deed of sale under consideration was really made in fraud of creditors. and even pending trial of civil case No. strictly as a matter of procedure. this ruling does not in any manner touch upon the nature. It should be understood. this court rules that the register of deeds of the Province of Laguna should have registered the deed executed by Maxima Caballes and Francisco Vicuna in favor of Domingo Cabantog. entered a resolution setting out the controlling facts and closing with the following conclusion: After carefully studying the case. Without doubting the good faith of the register of deeds and even commending his civic spirit and his desire to help the courts. namely the registration of instruments presented to him for recording. Furthermore. that this ruling is without prejudice to any action that may be taken be Apolonia Coronado in the proper court to guide or control the action of the register of deeds with respect to the deed in question. 1936. in the performance of his official duties as register of deeds. if the defendant Maxima Caballes received copy of the decision in civil case No. Judge Montemayor presiding. Apolonia would be losing and be deprived of all under her remedies against the said parcels of land. it is reasonable to presume that Apolonia Coronado must have received copy of the same about the same time. 1936. however. there is no evidence to show. without considering the merits of the contention of Apolonia Coronado as to the alleged fraud in the transfer of the three parcels of land. the court agrees with Attorney Francisco and Fiscal Villanueva that. the register of deeds should have given due course to the registration of the deed of sale in favor of Cabantog. . Francisco for Domingo Cabantog. Again. The undersigned does not understand why long before the deed of sale presented for registration. and yet we find that attachment of the three parcels of land was not presented for recording or registration with the register of deeds until January 27. 6600. propriety or validity of the transfer of the three parcels of land to Cabantog. that is. 6600 of the Court of First Instance is now pending appeal in the Supreme Court. Fiscal Villanueva for the register of deeds. 6600 on January 17. There is no showing either that by authorizing and directing the register of deeds to admit the deed of sale of registration in his office. at which attorney Vicente J. two days after the presentation of deed of sale. as far as the present consulta is concerned. Apolonia did not take the steps necessary to protect her interests and insure the satisfaction of the judgment which she expected from the court. His Honor. It should also be borne in mind that civil case No. it is believed that in the present case the law did not expect.The case came up to the oral hearing. the Fourth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Moreover. much less require him to make use of his personal knowledge of the facts or of what he believed to be the intention of the parties. In view of the foregoing. The parties interested are supposed and expected by the law to take the steps necessary to protect their own interests and take the necessary precautions. and Attorney Lorenzo Sumulong for Apolonia Coronado extensively argued their respective sides of the controversy. After hearing. if not earlier.

and to the case of Betco vs." Notwithstanding divergence of facts between these cases and the present case. in which it was said that the duties of a registrar of property when he is acting under the Mortgage Law. (2) prepare and deliver to the grantee an owner's duplicate certificate of title. of that law. in accordance with the rules and instructions of the court. upon presentation of a deed of conveyance of a registered land.. La Flor de Intal (43 Phil. The grantor's duplicate certificate shall be surrendered. the present appeal calls for a determination of the nature of the function of a register of deeds with reference to the registration of a deed of sale of a registered land. in referring to the "general functions of register of deeds" provides that "it is the duty of a register of deeds to record in proper form all instruments relative to such lands. which the grantor or grantee may present to the register of deeds in the province where the land lies. make out in the registration book a new certificate of title to the grantee. The original certificate shall also be stamped `canceled'. as indicated in articles 18. The deed of conveyance shall be filed and endorsed with the number and place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed. and the word "canceled" stamped upon it. 496) provides: SEC. the register of deeds shall (1) make out in the registration book new certificate of title. the recording whereof shall be required or allowed by law. are to a large extent judicial. the volume and page of the registration book where the new certificate is registered. According to this provision of the law. where it was said that "registers of deeds perform both functions of an administrative character and functions which are at least of a quasi-judicial nature. Upon the other hand. section 193 of the Administrative Code.." We have not overlooked reference to the case of Debrunner vs. The grantor's duplicate certificate shall be produced and presented at the fame time. Is that function ministerial or discretional under the law? Section 57 of the Land Registration Act (No. and shall prepare and deliver to him an owner's duplicate certificate. and a reference by number to last prior certificate. 517). (4) require the surrender of the grantor's duplicate certificate for purposes of cancellation. and has appealed from the foregoing resolution of the lower court. 57. Jaramillo (12 Phil. 316). but we find that as plausible . The register of deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate certificates the date of transfer. The duties enjoined upon the register of deed by the aforecited section of the Land Registration Act are clearly ministerial and mandatory in character not only as is indicated by the auxiliary "shall" but by the nature of such functions required to be performed by him. (5) cancel likewise the original certificate and (6) file and endorse in the manner required the deed of conveyance presented for registration. together with the grantor's duplicate certificate. assigning various errors specified in her brief. and a reference by number to the last prior certificate. The register of deeds shall thereupon. we have given weight to what seem are logical inferences of counsel for the appellant in the application of general principles. 100 and 101 et seq. An owner desiring to convey in fee his registered land or any portion thereof shall execute a deed of conveyance.Apolonia Coronado moved for reconsideration but was unsuccessful. (3) note upon the original and duplicate certificates the date of transfer. the volume and page of the registration book where the new certificate is registered. Consolidating the several errors assigned.

Diaz. concur. 630). Imperial. shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. The question of whether or not the conveyance was made for defraud creditors of the transferor should better be left for determination by the proper court. and Garcia Sanchez vs. and Williams vs.. . mortgage. of New York vs. or other instruments presented for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the register of deeds with reference to any such matter.an argument to the contrary may be found in Standard Oil Co. Jaramillo (44 Phil. There is as much danger in giving this authority to the register of deeds without judicial intervention as there would be injustice in the suggested frustration of a judicial victory for Apolonia Coronado. Rosauro (40 Phil. J. If the register of deed is on doubt as to the propriety of recording any given instrument. Concepcion. upon consideration of the matter as shown by the record certified to him.. So ordered. — Where the register of deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed.. we are of the opinion that it is the duty of the register of deeds of Laguna under the law to register the deed executed by Maxima Caballes and Francisco Vicuna in favor of Domingo Cabantog. Villa-Real.. 231). C. 534) with the same divergence of facts and the laws involved. 200. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth branch of Court of First Instance at Manila. JJ. the question shall be referred to the judge of the Fourth Branch of the Court of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District either on the certificate of the register of deeds stating the question upon which he is in doubt or upon the suggestion in writing of the party in interest.. Avanceña. section 200 of the Administrative Code provides the procedure to be followed: SEC. and Moran. and in case of registered lands. Suñer (49 Phil. Limiting ourselves to the facts of the present case. The resolution of the lower court is confirmed with costs against the appellant. after notice to the parties and hearing. and thereupon said judge.

Exhibit C. GURBAX SINGH PABLA. and a new mortgage was executed by the owner in favor of respondents-appellants herein. or possess it as lessees for a period of three years and six months from its completion. Buendia for appellants. 5014. hold.: This is an appeal prosecuted by the respondents-appellants against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated November 29. DHARAM SINGH. 3352.000 to P90. vs. was also .000.148. was amended by Exh. TALOK SINGH and CIPRIANO TAN ENG KIAT. 1949. BELA SINGH PABLA. under the terms of which petitioners-appellees were to construct thereon a three-story building of concrete and of strong materials valued at from P80. by virtue of which the period under which the lessees were to hold any occupy the property without rentals was extended to seven years and four months. compelling them to surrender owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. he entered into a contract (Exhibit A) with the petitioner-appellees. This mortgage in favor of the Calvos was cancelled. 1952 GURBAX SINGH PABLA & CO.R. 1948. 1949. but that the petitioner-appellees were to occupy. The contract also provided that the building shall become the exclusive property of the owner of the land. without paying any rentals therefor. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Jose N. which was registered on the same date in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila under Primary Entry No. petitioners-appellees. under Primary Entry No. HERMOGENES REYES and TEODORA TANTOCO. Honorable Hermogenes Reyes and his spouse Teodora Tantoco. the original contract of lease. 8071 and 8072. C. 1948.000. Volume 15. OJAGAR SINGH.. This contract of lease was filed and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 10. the sum spent in the construction being considered as the rentals.000. dated March 8. so that the contract of lease entered into between petitioners-appellees and the owner of the land covered by said certificates of title be annotated thereon. and on July 23. At the time that the contract was entered into there was an existing mortgage over the land in favor of Jose Calvo and Carlos Calvo for the sum of P110. respondents-appellants. Exhibit A. J. and the rental for the additional two years thereafter reduced to P1. No. L-3970 October 29. that after the above period of three years and six months petitioners-appellees were to continue occupying the said building for another two years at a monthly rental of P2. John Tan Chin Eng is the owner of the land covered by the above-mentioned certificates of title. This amended contract of lease. 1949. LABRADOR.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. Eliseo Caunca for appellees. On May 14.

For this reason. . It expressly found . respondents-appellants' son wrote the owner of the land (Exhibit M) demanding the payment of the overdue interest on the mortgage with the following statement: . the petitioners-appellees filed a motion in the Court of First Instance of Manila praying that an order issue to the owner for the delivery of the owner's duplicates of transfer certificates of title Nos. 8071 and 8072 to the petitioners in order that the Register of Deeds of Manila may be able to make the annotation thereon of the contract of lease. On June 3. without denial on the part of the respondents-appellants. or of its amendments. 1949. On May 25. 1949. Calanog who will take charge of registering the lease contract between Mr. Volume 16. to the effect that the owner could not sell. the Register of Deeds of Manila had demanded in writing from the owner of the land the submission of his duplicate certificates of title Nos. alleging that they had no knowledge whatsoever of the contract of lease. Exhibit C. 1949. 1949. Exhibit C. 5014. Thereafter the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the order already mentioned above. no allegation is made in the opposition of the respondents-appellants that they were not aware of the existence of the contract. assign. Against this petition Hermogenes Reyes and Teodora Tantoco filed an opposition.registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila under Primary Entry No. Exhibit A. 1948. violated the express provision of the mortgage. directing respondents to surrender the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Manila in order that petitioners-appellees' contract of lease may be noted thereon. On June 16. . the son of respondents-appellants acknowledged receipt of the said letter but informed counsel for the petitioner-appellees that the request could not be granted without the written consent of the owner of the certificates of title (Exhibit E). their only allegation being that the only annotation on the certificates of title at the time they entered into the contract of mortgage was the mortgage in favor of Jose Calvo and Carlos Calvo. only documentary evidence was presented. that as early as October 9. 1949. counsel for petitioners-appellees wrote respondents-appellants requesting them to allow him to take the certificates of title to the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila for the annotation of the contracts of lease entered into by the owner with them (Exhibit D). It is to be noted that with respect to the original contract of lease. or encumber the mortgaged premises without the written consent of the mortgages. Exhibit A. Manuel P. Exhibit A. The amended petition further states. and its amendment. on May 20. Singh Pabla and your goodself. and that the execution of the amendment. Exhibit A. 8071 and 8072 in order that the lease executed by him in favor of the petitioners-appellees may be given due course. I wish to request that you come over to my office before 12:00 noon to pay the said interest before we can deliver your Transfer Certificate of Title to Atty. and on May 27. At the hearing of the motion no oral evidence was submitted. Exhibit C. It is also to be noted that respondents-appellants do not deny an express allegation of paragraph 13 of the amended petition to the effect that notice was given to the public by a big sign board placed on the premises while the building was under construction that petitioners-appellees are the owners of the building.

Exhibit A. or that they have been lawfully executed. will prejudice the rights and interest of respondents-appellants. The purpose of registering an instrument is to give notice thereof to all persons (section 51. Reyes is the attorney-in-fact of the respondentsappellants. Indeed. Exhibits A and C. 496). in other words. that it erred in holding that Tirso T. but that respondents' deed of mortgage of March 8. The rights of these parties. or that their mortgage has priority. In this court on appeal claim is made on behalf of the respondents-appellants that the court a quo erred in holding that respondents-appellants had knowledge of the contract of lease. the objections raised by respondents-appellants that they had no knowledge of the contract of lease. may be noted thereon. Exhibits A and C. as in this case. therefore. It is not denied that the contracts have been executed by the registered owner of the land. Exhibit A. has priority over petitioner's amended contract of lease. is whether petitioners have a right to have said deeds registered. Act No. who have registered their rights. are beside the issue. but they are not now in issue. Thus. As regards the (supposed) prohibition contained in the contract of mortgage. The only issue. nor are its effects on other instruments previously registered put in issue by the procedure of registration. before the property was mortgaged to them. important and complicated questions of fact and of law were presented by the respondents-appellants about their alleged lack of knowledge of the contracts of lease and the invalidity thereof. subsisting or existing at the time of the registration. The court a quo passed . that it erred in ordering the registration of the contract of lease. that they had no knowledge of the contract of lease. the owner is agreeable to the registration. Exhibit C. The objections. and that it erred in not holding that the registration of the contracts. or that the same violates their contract of mortgage with the owner of the land — these are not passed upon by the order for the registration of petitioners-appellees' contract of lease. upon all parties affected thereby. shall be decided in the proper suit or proceeding when the opportune occasion arises. simply because petitioners-appellees have applied for the registration of their contract of lease.that respondents-appellants had knowledge of the lease contract. it is not intended by the proceedings for registration to seek to destroy or otherwise affect already registered rights over the land. 1949. who are mortgagees merely. that in spite of the prohibition the amended contract of lease. The objections interposed by respondents. the court held that the prohibition gives a right of foreclosure. in the proceeding for its registration becomes apparent when. Exhibit A. or that they will be prejudiced. nor may they be adjudicated upon. as well as the relative rights of all parties who have registered their deeds. Exhibit C. The impropriety and inconvenience of proceeding to determine completely and in advance all the possible consequences of a document. may not be considered as null and void. or that they have all the qualities of registerable documents. It should be noted that all that the petitioners demand or pray for is the surrender of the titles to the Register of Deeds so that their contracts of lease. Exhibit A. are not put in issue when an instrument is subsequently presented for registration.

the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their registration. Yet the question of knowledge is mainly a question of fact and requires inquiry into many and complicated circumstances. not before. . the opposition to the motion for the surrender of the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Manila is overruled. and validity or effect litigated afterwards. Padilla. for parties may. submit issues for determination at the time of the proceeding to register a document. and the other issues raised by respondentsappellants reserved for determination in a proper proceeding. The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered. Paras. are invalid because they violate the contracts of mortgage executed in favor of the owner of the land. The ruling of the trial court on the above issues should. In accordance with the above opinion.. be set aside and their determination reserved in a proper proceeding. Bengzon. without any other evidence than the above. Reyes is not the attorney-in-fact of the respondents-appellants. is hereby affirmed. in so far as it orders the surrender of the certificates of title for the registration of the contracts of lease. Montemayor and Jugo. But the court should only proceed therewith (determination of the issues) upon giving all the parties concerned sufficient opportunity to present their respective sides and the evidence in support thereof. must not be understood as an absolute and invariable rule of procedure. because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. Exhibits A and C. actually or constructively. C. and the order appealed from. by mutual consent. Wherefore. J. Exhibits A and C — these issues were not properly investigated because respondents-appellants did not have the opportunity to present evidence thereon and did not even present copy of their mortgage at the hearing. and that the respondents-appellants had no knowledge of the execution of the contract of lease. registration.. of their existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice. letters. The foregoing. and upon the documents. and receipts presented. On the other hand. and the trial court decided the questions without full and complete investigation.upon vital issues of fact upon the motion and the opposition thereto. concur. the determination of the issues should be reserved in a subsequent proceeding and the registration of the document ordered. and that if this can not be done. we find that the issues raised by respondents-appellants. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they become aware. which can not be satisfactorily shown except by testimony. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must first be allowed. that Tirso T. JJ. namely. therefore. that the contracts of lease. then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after. but the other rulings are reversed. however. With costs against the respondents-appellants.

the son of Juana Angeles. P. the register of deeds contenting himself by noting the transaction by way of a memorandum on the original certificate of title. Santos and Feria & La O for appellants. and conveying about 47 hectares consisting of a western portion of the tract described in the certificate of title to Pedro Manuntag. J. 414. ET AL. On April 29.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. 414) to a parcel of land containing an area of nearly 61 hectares. Alcid and Vicente Sotto for appellee. SEYMOUR ADDISON. was presented to the register of deeds of Tarlac together with the owner's duplicate of said certificate of title No. I." though a few of them in fact bear other surnames). the aforesaid certificate of title was not cancelled. . was issued in favor of Juana Angeles and seventeen others as tenants in common (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Angeles heirs. Pedro Manuntag proceeded to mortgage the property to Soledad P. TOMAS ANGELES. Hernandez for the sum of P3. The deed contained no technical description of the land conveyed. claimant-appellee. vs. municipality of Concepcion.000. 1921. ET AL. Armed with the owner's duplicate of the original certificate of title containing the memorandum of the alleged sale to him.. a deed purporting to be executed by eleven of the persons in interest in said land and to have been acknowledged before the notary public.R. Valentina J. 1916. claimants. 1926 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS. claimants-appellants.: Omitting the features not strictly relevant to the points of law involved. in the barrio of Santo Niño. the memorandum bearing the date of August 1. OSTRAND.. It has been proven beyond dispute that the deed was a forgery. at least one of the purported conveyors being dead at the time of the date of the instrument. The certificate of title was issued in pursuance of a decree of registration entered in land registration case No. 6540. applicant. This mortgage was also noted on the owner's duplicate of the original certificate of title. in fact no attempt was made to comply with the provisions of section 57 and 58 of the Land Registration Act. L-23148 March 25. a Torrens certificate of title (No. the facts of the present case are briefly as follows: On February 8. HERNANDEZ. in the Province of Tarlac. and no transfer certificate of title was issued neither to the vendors nor to the vendee. SOLEDAD P. No.

414. whether the court erred in holding that Soledad P. This motion was denied by Judge Anacleto Diaz. asked that the corresponding certificate of title be issued to her in the cadastral case. Hernandez by an order dated August 27. . the chief surveyor of the General Land Registration Office. but nevertheless on the authority of the decision of this court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Of the various questions raised by the assignments of error only one need be answered. 144). Hernandez. 1923. In the meantime a cadastral proceeding was instituted by the Director of Lands in the municipality of Concepcion including among other lands the tract covered by certificate of title No. then presiding over the Court of First Instance in Tarlac. having found certain errors in the decision in the cadastral case and having observed the memoranda aforementioned upon certificate of title No. Hernandez again came forward and asked that the proper certificate be issued in her name. notwithstanding the fact that the deed of eleven of the Angeles heirs to Pedro Manuntag had been shown to be a forgery. Hernandez appeared by her attorney and. on the ground that the judgment had become final. After the period allowed by law for an appeal from this decision has passed. entered a decision awarding the property to them though in some respects erroneously stating the respective shares of the coowners. representing that she had acquired the property now in question by purchase from Pedro Manuntag. supra. proceeded to determine the controversy between the Angeles heirs and Soledad P. Fabie (35 Phil. the consideration stated in the deed being P3. In this cadastral proceeding the Angeles heirs appeared as claimants and as no other person at first appeared to contend with them. Upon hearing the court found that the document of April 21. Soledad P. 1924. The deed was presented to the register of deeds of Tarlac who repeated the error committed in connection with the deed from the Angeles heirs to Pedro Manuntag and simply entered the transaction by memorandum on the back of the original certificate of title without complying with sections 57 and 58. This suggestion was opposed by Tomas Angeles in behalf of the Angeles heirs. The judge presiding over the court (now Judge Cayetano Lukban) accepted the suggestion of the chief surveyor and. The memorandum is dated August 1. However. decided the controversy in favor of Soledad P. Hernandez. on July 26.000 in favor of Arturo Sanchez Mijarez. 1921. This transaction was also noted on the original certificate of title. On July 22. 1922. the mortgage was cancelled and an absolute deed of conveyance of the property made by the same Pedro Manuntag to said Soledad P. Hernandez who. 1921. executed a deed of sale with pacto de retro for the term of one year and in consideration of the sum of P2. and Soledad P. 1923. 1921. on October 4.1921.940. was a forgery. the entry bearing the date of October 12. the question of ownership might be finally and definitely determined. the court on November 17. asked the court to set the cause for hearing in order that after notification to the various parties in interest. namely. 414. The owner's duplicate of the original certificate of title remained in possession of Soledad P. from which the present appeal is taken.. purporting to be a deed of conveyance of the land from the Angeles heirs to Pedro Manuntag. Hernandez had acquired title to the property. and after the parties had all been notified. 1923.

When a deed in fee is for a part only of the land described in a certificate of title. designated by numbers or letters. That no new certificate to a grantee of a part only of the land shall be invalid by reason of failure of the register of deeds to enter a new certificate to the grantor for the remaining unconveyed portion: And provided further. the entry of a mere memorandum of a conveyance in fee simple upon the original certificate of title to the purchaser is not a sufficient registration of the conveyance of the fee. and shall prepare and deliver to him an owner's duplicate certificate. and a certified copy thereof is recorded in the registration book with the original certificate. when the original owner makes a deed of transfer in fee of one or ." The deed of conveyance shall be filed and indorsed with the number and place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed. Fabie (35 Phil. in our opinion. It must be conceded that if the transfers to Pedro Manuntag and by him to Soledad P. The grantor's duplicate shall be surrendered. an innocent third party." and it is therefore urged that the presentation of the owner's duplicate certificate and the entry thereupon of the memorandum of a transfer in fee simple to Soledad P. and a plan of said has been filed with the clerk and verified pursuant to section forty-four of this Act. But citing the case of De la Cruz vs.. The register of deeds shall thereupon. But. SEC. That in case the land described in a certificate of title is divided into lots. The original certificate shall be also stamped "canceled. 144). however. make out in the registration book a new certificate of title to the grantee. Fabie. with measurement of all the bounds. 57. it is argued that under our Torrens registration system the act of registration is. In every case of transfer the new certificate or certificates shall include all the land described in the original and surrendered certificates: Provided. in the language of section 50 of the Land Registration Act. and a reference by number to the last prior certificate. it would be difficult to differentiate the present case from that of De la Cruz vs. which the grantor or grantee where the lands lies. The grantor's duplicate certificate shall be produced and presented at the same time.The principle that a forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence and it is clear that standing alone the need purporting to be executed by the Angeles heirs did not make Pedro Manuntag the owner of the land. Hernandez were duly registered. constituted in itself a valid conveyance of the title to the land in question. Hernandez. in accordance with the rules and instructions of the court. An owner desiring to convey in fee his registered or an any portion shall execute a deed of conveyance. The register of deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate certificates the date of transfer. the volume and page of the registration book where the new certificate is registered. and the word "canceled" stamped upon it. "the operative Act to convey and affect the land" and that a deed of conveyance of registered land "shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk of register of deeds to make registration. the register of deeds shall also enter a new certificate and issue an owner's duplicate to the grantor for the part of the land not included in the deed. 58. Sections 57 and 58 of the Land Registration Act prescribe how conveyances in fee registered land must be made and read as follows: SEC.

in purchasing from a person who did not exhibit the proper muniments of title. the defendant Vedasto Velasquez. 414 in favor of the Angeles heirs has never cancelled and is the only certificate in existence in regard to the property. the purchaser must be a holder in good faith of such certificate. The purchaser was guilty of no negligence and was justified in relying on the certificate of title held by the vendor. the register of deeds may. He thereafter sold the land to his codefendant Ramon Fabie to whom a transfer certificate of title was issued upon the cancellation of Velasquez' certificate. and any of the following incumbrances which may be subsisting. As we have already shown. (enumeration of subsisting incumbrances)." In fact the register of deeds has no authority to register a conveyance in fee without the presentation of the conveyor's duplicate certificate unless he is ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction (see Land Registration Act. must be considered to have been guilty of negligence and is not in position to complain of his loss. neither Pedro Manuntag nor Soledad P. In the case of De la Cruz vs. supra. There the registration of the property in question was decreed in the name of Gregoria Hernandez and a duplicate original certificate of title issued to her. the vendor held no certificate of title and there had therefore been no complete conveyance of the fee to him. and every certificate with such memorandum shall be effectual for the purpose of showing the grantor's title to the remainder of the land not conveyed as if the old certificate had been canceled and a new certificate of such land had been entered. and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith. and that the certificate is canceled as to such lot or lots. and such process may be repeated so long as there is convenient space upon the original certificate and the owner's duplicate certificate for making such memorandum of sale lots. Fabie. She returned the duplicate certificate over to her nephew. The purchaser was charged with presumptive knowledge of the law relating to the conveyance of land by registration and. As will be seen. the situation was entirely different. This appears clearly from section 39 of the Land Registration Act which provides that "every applicant receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration. Hernandez ever held a certificate of title to the land here in question and there had therefore been no sufficient legal conveyance in fee to them neither by deed nor by registration. . on the other hand. section 55). enter on the original certificate and on the owners' duplicate certificate a memorandum of such deed of transfer. There was therefore a complete chain of registered title. with a reference to the lots thereby conveyed as designated on such plan. who forged a deed to himself of the property and presenting the same with the duplicate certificate of title to the register of deeds obtained a transfer certificate with its corresponding duplicate in his own name. In the present case. instead of canceling such certificate and entering a new certificate to the grantor for the part of the land not included in the deed of transfer. namely. The original certificate of title No. the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to the purchaser is one of the essential features of a conveyance in fee by registration and in order to enjoy the full protection of the registration system. shall hold the same free of all incumbrance except those noted on said certificate.more of such lots.

which memorandum shall. would have required the presentation of a subdivision plan and through the publicity attending the necessary monumenting of the dividing lines. Eulalia. if in the present case the procedure prescribed by section 58 of the Land Registration Act had been followed and which. Leonarda. in accordance with section 112 of the Land Registration Act. 1921. which interests passed to Soledad P. Malcolm. make such modifications as the evidence before its justifies. Alberto. and Aquilino Tullo of one-thirty. 414 was issued and it is possible that some of the other original coowners have suffered the same fate. the forgery of deed would in all probility have been discovered before any harm could have been done. and Matias Angeles 2d one-thirty-sixth each' and Clemente. No. as amended by Circular No. but the record indicates that Soledad P. All memoranda existing on certificate of title No. The evidence before us is hardly sufficient to definitely or exactly determine the present ownership of the shares of the various original heirs. in which case the court below may upon motion and hearing. Romana. The order appealed from is reversed and it is ordered that certificate of title No. J.We may say further that the distinction we have drawn between the two cases is not a mere technicality.sixth each. Avanceña. amounting in all to a one-eight share in the land. C. No costs will be allowed in this instance. Ambrosia. . Hernandez through the deed executed by Manuntag in her favor. Hernandez. and approved by the Secretary of Justice. 31 of the General Land Registration Office. Tomasa. 414 will be cancelled except the one entered under document. evidencing the sale with the right of repurchase in favor of Arturo Sanchez. Johns. Hernadez is the owner of a one-eight interest in the land. It appears that Bernardino Angeles and Matias Angeles have died since certificate of title No. Maria. the estate of Matias Angeles of one-twelfth. the estate of Bernardino Angeles of one-twelfth. and Pelagia Angeles of onetwelfth each. dated September 28. Villamor. the rest of the land is. So ordered. 1425. effect only the one-eight interest of Soledad P. Romualdez and Villa-Real. 414 be cancelled and that in its stead a transfer certificate of title be issued describing the land in accordance with the cadastral survey and stating the names and shares of the various coowners as hereinabove set forth it should be found that recent changes in ownership have occurred. Florencio and Agustin Angeles of one-twenty-fourth each. however. It appears to be conceded by the parties that Pedro Manuntag has legitimately acquired the interests of Juana Angeles and Silvino Angeles. concur. as we have seen. in accordance with paragraph 3 of section 30 of the Rules for the Uniform Administration of the Registries of Deeds.. still the property of the remaining Angeles heirs.. Tomas. JJ.

905A to 905F. first. now an honored member of this court. It is expecting a great deal to have us believe that not only the mortgage but the power of attorney of Vallejo in favor of Nano and a series of documents were the product of the evil machinations of Nano. From this judgment the plaintiffs have taken an appeal. Nano.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. it needs be recalled that the mortgage was executed in the home of the plaintiffs. In support of the first of our statements. were as indicated in the mortgage. Vallejo was entirely unacquainted with the activities of Nano in dealing with their joint property. 1935 ANGELA BLONDEAU and FERNANDO DE LA CANTERA Y UZQUIANO. purporting to represent both defendants.000. bearing date November 5. Calle Georgia. lived together. defendants-appellees. As to the second statement.R. and covering property situated on Calle Georgia. identified Vallejo as the person who signed the document. was found in contempt of court. J. Following the trial. the principal plaintiff Angela Blondeau and her husband Fernando de la Cantera. for appellants. MALCOLM. members of same family. we are inclined to the view. plaintiffs-appellants. It is significant that the proper cedulas of Vallejo were . and second. and that of those present. Manila. together with the instrumental witness Pedro Jimenez Zoboli. and that although Nano and Vallejo. No appearance for the other appellee.. to secure the payment of the sum of P12. including the transfer certificate of title. With all due deference to the findings of the trial judge. judgment was rendered against Nano but not against Vallejo. Manila. the property of the defendant Agustin Nano. attention need only be invited to a series of documents. The other defendant Vallejo thereupon presented an amended answer in which it was alleged that his signature to the mortgage was a forgery. vs. John R. 1931.: This action was brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila to foreclose a mortgage alleged to have been made by the defendants Agustin Nano and Jose Vallejo to the plaintiff Angela Blondeau. Evangelista and Santos for appellee Vallejo. partially corroborated by the testimony of the notary public Gregorio Bilog. after filing an answer. McFie. showing that Vallejo was considered the owner of the land only. that the accessorias bearing Nos. that the purported signature of the defendant Vallejo to the mortgage was not a forgery. Jr. L-41377 July 26. No. As against their testimony stands the alibi of Vallejo. AGUSTIN NANO and JOSE VALLEJO.

by the requirement that no transfer shall be registered unless the owner's certificate was produced along with the instrument of transfer. Chief Justice Arellano in De la Cruz vs. 1142.. Fabie ( [1916]. the mortgage appears to be regular and to have been duly executed and accepted by Vallejo on November 5. 496. as amended. he found them in due form. the principal plaintiff. a fraud could not have been perpetrated. That there was a conflict between experts as to the handwriting.. a member of the Philippine bar and the husband of Angela Blondeau. 55. the basic rule is found in the opinion delivered by Mr. Vedasto Velazquez. not one but a number of notaries public were deceived thereby. and the denial of its execution on the other hand. one being of the opinion that the signatures of Vallejo were genuine.) With respect to the conclusiveness of the Torrens title and the binding force and effect of annotations thereon even when through a forged deed the land passes into the possession of an innocent purchaser for value. 144). The history of the case was as follows: Vedasto Velazquez was attorney in fact of Gregoria Hernandez. . 1931. We repeat that upon its face. It represents a departure from the orthodox principles of property law. Angela Blondeau would not have lent P12. 51. unless the spurious document is ratified and accepted by the mortgagor. When Fernando de la Cantera. the instrument is invalid for every purpose and will pass on the title or rights to anyone. Act No. we are of the opinion that the balance inclined in favor of the plaintiffs.presented for the accomplishment of the documents. The act erects a safeguard against a forged transfer being registered. if the pretended signature of the mortgagor is a forgery.000 to the defendant Vallejo. Agustin Nano had possession of Jose Vallejo's title papers. and as hereinbefore indicated. in favor of Nano. being the attorney in fact of Gregoria Hernandez. 1141. and that if there was fraud.J. Under such conditions. 35 Phil. But there is a narrower ground on which the defenses of the defendant-appellee must be overruled. The evidence then resolves itself into a question of the execution of the mortgage by Vallejo on the one hand. including the power of attorney of Vallejo. secs. to become the root of a valid title in a bona fide purchaser. had in his possession all the muniments of title of the land. 47. Gregoria Hernandez registered her title of ownership to the land in question in the property registry and was issued certificate of title No. 121. Without those title papers handed over to Nano with the acquiescence of Vallejo. searched the registration records. An executed transfer of registered lands placed by the registered owner thereof in the hands of another operates as a representation to a third party that the holder of the transfer is authorized to deal with the lands. is not unexpected. The Torrens system is intended for the registration of title. (53 C. Under the common law. rather than the muniments of title. the question is. when duly entered in the registry. and the other being of the opinion that they were not genuine. The Torrens Act on the contrary permits a forged transfer. If this had not been so and if thereafter the proper notation of the encumbrance could not have been made. which side produced the weightier testimony.

he was the absolute owner of the land. who presented to the register of deeds the notarial instrument executed for the purpose and was thereupon furnished with the certificate of title No. 281 U. While counsel for the appellee is undoubtedly correct in his contention that neither the case of Fabie nor the case of Olgiva nor any other case relied upon by the appellants is on all fours with the present facts. as a condition to the issue of a new one. forged a notarial instrument wherein he made it appear that she had sold the said land to him for the price of P8. had a certificate issue in his name. 121. Justice Holmes. who forged a deed to himself.S. The statute requires the production of the outstanding certificate.. Plaintiffs in this case. and the deed of conveyance which was purported to have been made by Gregoria Hernandez in his favor in order that he might be registered as the true owner of the land. the principle on which these cases rest should here be carried forward and given application. 60 Phil. . is of enlightening interest. to point out that a dishonest . it was held that Fabie was an innocent holder of a title for value and that. The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Eliason vs. delivering the opinion of the latter court." On these facts. Plaintiffs informed the register of the forgery after the defendants had bought.including the certificate of title No. Wilborn ( [1930]. Gregoria Hernandez' title was cancelled and certificate of title No. All this was done. purchasers of land previously brought under the Illinois Torrens Act. Vedasto Velazquez sold the land finally and absolutely to Ramon Fabie. It does not justify the omission of a precaution that probably would be sufficient. 43 was issued to Vedasto Velazquez.000. and the reissue of a certificate to themselves. the Supreme Court of Illinois. They say that according to the construction of the act adopted the registrar's certificate would have had the same effect even if the old certificate had not been produced. united in dismissing the petition. delivered the certificate of title to a party under an agreement to sell. 121 for cancellation. Illinois. Vedasto Velazquez then went to the register of deeds and applied for the registration of the land in his own name. But that. if correct. one of the most recent instances being found in the case of El Hogar Filipino vs. . 457). The appellants saw fit no entrust it to Napletone and they took the risk. and then conveyed to defendants who were good faith purchasers for value. The decision above cited has repeatedly been reexamined by this court. 1907. 17). said: . under section 55 of the Land Registration Law. a few days after the registration of the land. Mr. Presumably the register will do his duty. xxx xxx xxx On May 31.. and the United States Supreme Court. and if he does he will require the old certificate to be handed in. and a petition was brought to compel such action. and demanded the cancellation of the deeds and certificates. Olviga ( [1934]. 766. is no answer. The Circuit Court for Cook County. abusing her confidence in him. and. presenting Gregoria Hernandez' certificate of title No. The register refused.

that public policy. succeeds in having the land registered in his name. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that Napletone would have got a certificate on which the Wilborns could rely. one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust. There is more natural justice in recognizing his title as being valid than there is in recognizing as valid the title of one who has succeeded in ripening a forged color of title by prescription. public policy. . as between two innocent persons. though he buys on a forged transfer. expediency.official could get around it. but which belongs to the victim of the forgery? His answer was: . as a safeguard. to get possession of the owner's certificate. if the owner has voluntarily or carelessly allowed the forger to come into possession of his owner's certificate he is to be judged according to the maxim. and the need of repose and certainty as to land titles demand that the bona fide purchaser of a certificate of title to registered land. section 213. In the first place. The Act has erected in favor of the owner. without the delivery of the old one by the appellants. the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss. yet. . Therefore. who. Giving to the facts the most favorable interpretation for Vallejo. expediency. a forger cannot effectuate his forgery in the case of registered land by executing a transfer which can be registered. Vargas & Mañalac in their treatise on the Philippine Land Registration Law quote with approval the comment of Mr. should nevertheless hold an unimpeachable title. demand such a rule. in some way. the maxim is. but in its final analysis this is a case of a mortgagee relying upon a Torrens title. Other incidental facts might be mentioned and other incidental legal propositions might be discussed. as announced by the United States Supreme Court. even if the forger stole the owner's certificate. and loaning money in all good faith on the basis of the title standing in the name of the mortgagors only thereafter to discover one defendant to be an alleged forger and the other defendant. Furthermore. in this case Angela Blondeau and Jose Vallejo. and the need of a statute of repose as to the possession of land. the owner is up against no greater hardship than is experienced by one whose money or negotiable paper payable to bearer is stolen and transferred by the thief to an innocent purchaser. at least having by his negligence or acquiescence made it possible for the fraud to transpire. The question which the author propounded was: Why does the law say that the person who had no title at all and only a forged deed as a color of title should become the true owner of the land by merely continuing to occupy and enjoy the land which in fact does not belong to him. the requirement that no voluntary transfer shall be registered unless the owner's certificate is produced along with the instrument of transfer. As between two innocent persons. against a forged transfer being perpetrated against him. unless the owner has allowed him. one of whom must suffer the . Likewise. if not a party to the conspiracy. that when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the wrongful act of a third person the loss fall on him who put it into the power of that third person to perpetrate the wrong. Powell in his book on Land Registration.

the four errors assigned will be sustained. Butte. the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss. the judgment reversed. JJ. concur.So ordered. Accordingly. .consequence of a breach of trust. Imperial. Villa-Real. and in the court of origin a new one entered sustaining plaintiff's mortgage and granting her the relief prayed for in her complaints . without special pronouncement as to the costs in either instance.. and Goddard. in this case Jose Vallejo.