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Lorenzo Bianco Cluj Napoca, 24th may 2011 EU: law, institutions, policies Academic year 2010-2011

Foreign and Security Policy of the EU

The roots of the European Union's foreign policy must be identified in European political cooperation , established in 1970 to promote political integration between the Member States and not just the economic one. The European political cooperation introduced an early form of coordination between the foreign policies of the Member States, resulting in regular meetings and consultations and-where possible-the elaboration of common positions, or the issue of joint declarations. Despite a gradual strengthening, European cooperation policy remained essentially unchanged until the creation of the European Union. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty transformed the European economic community in the European Union and the common foreign and security policy, which envisaged a stronger cooperation that previously, to enable the EU to play a role in the world commensurate with its weight and to efficiently manage geopolitical changes following the end of the cold war. In 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced some changes in CFSP, it created the figure of the high representative for the common foreign and security policy and assigning the EU the possibility to promote operations "peace-keeping". With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, despite some changes, the CFSP continues to operate according to the intergovernmental method, so the European Commission and the European Parliament have very limited powers in this area. Aware of this constraint, the Union has introduced more flexible voting procedures on CFSP decisions by allowing individual governments to abstain, or by using majority voting, or by allowing a majority of countries to act on their own; but unanimity is still required on decisions with military or defense implications. The Treaty of Lisbon has introduced other changes, such as in particular the creation of European external action service as the diplomatic and administrative apparatus that manages the common foreign policy and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and security policy as a stable figure; The High Representative, in conjunction with the President of the European Council, speaks on behalf of the EU in agreed foreign policy matters and can have the task of articulating ambiguous policy positions created by disagreements among member states. The Common Foreign and Security Policy requires unanimity among the now 27 member states on the appropriate policy to follow on any particular policy. On 1 December 2009, Catherine Ashton took over Javier Solana's post as the High Representative, who has held the post since 1999.1 CFSP/ESDP Bodies2 There are a number of bodies set up within the context of the CFSP. Within the Council, there is the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) configuration, essentially a meeting of foreign ministers and the
1 2

Silvio FAGIOLO, Lidea dellEuropa nelle relazioni internazionali, Milano, Franco Angeli editore, 2009

Political and Security Committee or PSC, which monitors the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP and contributes by delivering opinions to the Council of Ministers, either at its request or its own initiative, and also monitors the implementation of agreed policies. The European Defence Agency (EDA) encourages increase in defence capabilities, military research and the establishment of a European internal market for military technology. The European External Action Service (EEAS) is a body established by the Lisbon Treaty to implement the external policy of the European Union (EU). The EEAS comes under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It assists the High Representative in executing their mandates, as regards:

conducting the EUs Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); the Presidency of the European Foreign Affairs Council; the Vice-Presidency of the Commission in the field of external relations.

The EEAS also assists the General Secretariat of the Council, the Commission and the diplomatic services of the Member States, in order to ensure the coherency of European external action. Finally, the EEAS supports the Commission in preparing and implementing programs and financial instruments relating to EU external action. The European Security and Defence College is organised as a network bringing together institutes, colleges, academies and universities dealing with security and defence policy issues, including the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). The task of the ESDC is to provide training in the field of European Security and Defence Policy at the strategic level in order to promote a common understanding of the ESDP among civilian and military personnel and to disseminate best practice in this area.

Why establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy?3 Foreign and security policy are two fundamental features of a countrys sovereignty. Thus there has been reluctance to consider a transfer of powers, even in part, to this area which is not included in the Rome Treaty. This reluctance, although completely understandable, was exacerbated by the failure to establish a European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954. However, two historic fundamental movements helped bring European foreign policies closer: A natural consequence of developments brought about by European integration: European integration led to better mutual understanding and naturally enhanced Europes common economic and trade interests, but it also determined shared founding values of a democratic Europe. It prompted European countries to consider bringing their foreign policies together on account of stepped up exterior action of the European Economic Community (EEC) . And yet, criticism

persisted that Europe was an economic giant, but political dwarf. Growing interaction between economic and trade issues and international policy reflected in the tendency to increasingly resort to sanctions, played a role in this respect. The influence of sweeping changes worldwide: The end of the cold war stepped up the process engaged since the beginnings of European integration. The end of a bipolar world gave Europe the capacity for fresh initiative. It also made it impossible to accept a status quo that was increasingly challenged by European public opinion. At the same time, the EEC became greatly involved in stabilizing Eastern Europe. Last of all, it was important for Europe to catch up politically in the face of the fears of U.S. withdrawal that emerged at that time. The outbreak of the crisis in the Balkans in 1990 was testimony to the already evident fact that for Europe, working on Europes political aspect was a matter of urgency. At the same time, the acquis communautaire had to be strengthened in light of its planned and expected enlargements in order to avoid making Europe merely a free-trade zone. The European Union: a global player? The violence of the two world wars that marked the first half of the twentieth century has given way to a period of peace, stability and prosperity unprecedented in European history. The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. European countries are now committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to cooperating through common institutions. The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, especially through NATO. Now that the Cold War is over, it has become the single dominant military power. However, no country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own. As a union of 27 states with a total population of over 450 million, the EU has inevitably become a global player. It should therefore be ready to share in the responsibility for creating global security and building a peaceful world. The EU could be considered a key player in international issues ranging from global warming to the conflict in the Middle East. The basis for the EUs common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains soft power as explained on The European security strategy, drawn up under the authority of the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and adopted by the Brussels European Council of 12 and 13 December 2003: such as building security in the EU's neighborhoods and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism, the use of diplomacy - backed where necessary by trade, aid and peacekeepers - to resolve conflicts and bring about international understanding. The EU has sent peacekeeping missions to several of the worlds trouble spots. In August 2008, the EU brokered a ceasefire to end fighting between Georgia and Russia and deployed EU observers to monitor the situation. It provided humanitarian aid to people displaced by the fighting and organised an international donor conference for Georgia.

The EU also has a leading role in the Balkans, where it is funding assistance projects in seven countries to help them build stable societies. In Kosovo, the EU deployed a 1 900-strong justice and police force in December 2008 to help ensure law and order. The EU has no standing army. Instead it relies on ad hoc forces contributed by EU countries for peacekeeping, crisis management and humanitarian missions. In order to respond quickly, the EU has established battle groups of about 1 500 forces each. Two battle groups are on standby at any given time. The principles behind these activities are known as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The first EU military missions were in the Balkans. The EU assumed command of the military stabilization force in Bosnia & Herzegovina in 2005. Other short-term missions followed in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. In May 2007, the EU sent a police mission on a three-year assignment to Afghanistan, and in early 2008, an EU military force of more than 3 000 was stationed in border areas of Chad and the Central African Republic to protect refugees displaced by fighting in the neighboring Darfur region of Sudan. In December 2008, the EU launched its first maritime operation. Its mission is to protect ships from pirates along the Somali coast, particularly ships delivering food aid to Somalia.4

EU role in the recent Libyan crisis On the 1th of April 2011 the Council adopted the decision for a European Union military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya ("EUFOR Libya" operation). The decision provides that the EU will, like requested by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), conduct a military operation in the framework of the Common security and defence policy (CSDP) in order to support humanitarian assistance in the region. The Libyan crisis could represent a case of school for any international and security intervention policy by the European Union, through the new diplomatic and operating instruments provided for Treaty of Lisbon. Libya in fact is a "neighbors" countries of the EU, not only geographically, but also for privileged relations with certain countries members of the EU, Italy the first, in the areas of finance, trade and energy. This should, in principle, early induce the EU to mobilize its political and diplomatic resources when the uprising started, to ensure an effective mediation between the Government of Muammar al-Gaddafi and the leader of the popular uprising. The main role should be entrusted to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and security policy, Catherine Ashton, with the support of the new European diplomatic service and the representatives of the Governments closer to the Libyan regime, including Italian Prime Minister. The EU would also have to ensure, through the

mechanisms of the CSDP, a timely operational contribution for the implementation of the resolutions 1970 and 1973, adopted by the United Nations Security Council. The situation in Libya and in the Mediterranean area could represent the first occasion for the creation and the experimentation of the Common foreign and security policies, and underline how the European Union, after its first international missions, has become a global player on the international sphere. However the European response has been weak and fragmented: Member States have made independent choices and not shared, dictated or by internal political needs-in the case of Germany and France--or by a prevailing interest in the transatlantic alliance- in the case of Britain-or for both aspects-in the case of Italy. The European Union is finished to be the big defeated, due to a too cautious attitude of its vertices, incapable of asserting the powers attributed by the treaties and take timely policy initiatives, caused especially by an excessive protagonism of national leaders and political divergences of the member states . However a mission under EU mandate could be started much earlier, thus, its small budget of 7.9 million euros is an evidence of the lack of trust by EU Member States in the relevance of the mission. Once more the EU will launch a relatively small operation, with limited role, and low political risks. Nato, instead, has assumed a leading role, intervening with an aerial and naval military mission, named Operation Unified Protector. According to resolution 1973 of the United Nations Security Council, the operation is trying to ensure the weapons embargo, the no-fly zone in the skies of Libya and the protection of civilians. Intervention in Libya was mostly conducted by United States, France and Britain which outlined new scenarios and a repositioning of the actors of global and regional security. If the United Nations has confirmed to be the main source of legitimacy and vital for international crisis management, regional organizations directly concerned could play a role much more incisive and effective. The EU has shown a substantial impotence to establish itself as a credible actor in its immediate neighborhood. The military operation in Libya was deeply supported by French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The outbreak of the Arab revolt has took unprepared France as many others international players. Paris, however, had lost two bastions of its diplomatic strategy as Egypt and Tunisia, supporting the Government of Ben Ali in the early moments of the uprising. The Libyan uprising has offered to Sarkozy the chance to revive the French policy in the region and, together, to offer a new perception in the Arab world: no longer a France compromised with the autocrats, but France in aid of the needs of freedom and democracy now requests from Mediterranean populations The Eliseo wanted not only a quick recognition of the Transitional National Council of Benghazi but also a strong role of France in this crisis. The history of Paris mixed relations with Tripoli and limited French economic interests with the Gaddafi regime have favored this option. On these motivations in favor of an intervention are added those related to domestic policy and the need to raise up of the image of Sarkozy. The current uncertain situation in the conflict, however, despite the imposition of a "no-fly zone plus" on Libya, put some doubt that the military intervention in Libya may be the key to a French re-launching in the Mediterranean area.

The initial French unilateralism was not devoid of negative political consequences, especially on the relations with Germany and Italy, which does not have hidden disappointment for the lack of coordination in Libya where the strategic interests are divergent. The action then has sanctioned the final collapse of a European foreign and defense policy that it was already weak. On the same time The United States are demonstrating their reluctance to be engaged on a new front and The Arab League and the Arab world in General, after the initial favor, are against the increasing of military action. France seems to pay now the apparent improvisation with which has been prepared the intervention and the evaluations of success after the Libyan revolt. Now the French President should demonstrate the political and military capacity to handle the crisis. More problem it will be more partners, inside and outside Nato, will be ready to perceive this war less humanitarian and more promoted to French interests France and Italy, Mediterranean powers, even in the key of development of the European Union's foreign policy, should take the opportunity that the upspring in Mediterranean has gave. Rediscovering the depth of their common interests, including the effectiveness of military action, the defeat of Gaddafi, the safeguarding of the territorial integrity of Libya. Should, France and Italy, have the same reaction that Germany had after the fall of the Berlin wall. Germany could charging the costs of reunification, accepted huge numbers of refugee and immigrants from neighboring countries and had an important role in the Balkan wars. France and Italy are expected to push Europe to intervene for create a global dialogue, rebuild its role in the International sphere and to encourage a reconciliation in accordance with democratic forms of representation.5 But both France and Italy are creating a Europe incomprehensible and impersonal, ineffective, such as to be perceived as a threat more than as a protection. The two powers are, in the Mediterranean area, at the top regarding the export of weapons and the last for development aid. The Lybic crisis could represent a great opportunity to pass the past of paternalism and colonialism. For Europe is important now not waste the time and give a strong answer like has remembered the President of the Italian Republic Giorgio Napolitano during the landings of migrants at Lampedusa and in the midst of controversy with the European Union, that the international politic needs Europe, a Europe that speaks with one single voice. Europe must not have a subordinate role respect the national States especially when dealing with extremely delicate issues like foreign policy, security, immigration Leaving behind the claims of national interest and particularism, the Libyan crisis would eventually represent the starting point for the development of a common foreign policy of the European Union, for the control of migration, defend Community preference in strategic sectors and especially for the launch of the European security and the vision of the Europe as a true protagonist of international politics. As explained by Mr. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, member of the executive board of the European Central Bank, Nobody said that the creation of a common EU foreign and security policy would be an easy task. Historically, European integration has evolved thanks to crises. Europe is evolving, growing,

Silvio FAGIOLO, Le miopie di Roma e Parigi: un nuovo patto possibile?,, 26 aprile 2011

continuing on its path of integration. This is not happening, however, according to some predefined, agreed plan, but rather in response to the challenges it faces, which in some cases are likely to endanger the very existence of the Union. Lets just hope for the best!

Helen WALLACE, William WALLACE, Mark A. POLLACK, Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University press, 2005. Silvio FAGIOLO, Lidea dellEuropa nelle relazioni internazionali, Milano, Franco Angeli editore, 2009 Dirk VANDEWALLE, To the Shores of Tripoli , Foreign Affair, 21 march 2011 Massimo NAVA, Neogollismo: se Nizza diventa pi importante di Tripoli,,25 aprile 2011. Silvio FAGIOLO, Le miopie di Roma e Parigi: un nuovo patto possibile? ,, 26 aprile 2011.