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United States vs Ling Su Fan Ling Su Fan was accused for exporting silver coins for the Philippines

Islands. In this case the court gave the definition of "due process". And that due process is "a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." That "due process of law" is the process or proceeding according to the law of the land. It is not that the law shall be according to the wishes of all the inhabitants of the state but: That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; That this law shall be reasonable in its operation; That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizen of the state or to all of a class. _______ This defendant was accused of the offense of "exporting from the Philippine Islands Philippine silver coins," in a complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the court below made the following findings of fact: That on the 12th day of December, 1906, an employee at the Manila custom-house found on board the steamship Taming in the bunk occupied by and in the exclusive use and control of the defendant, who was the comprador on board (said ship), 20,600 silver coins, each of 1 peso, being coins made and issued by and under the direction of the Government of the Philippine Islands; that when the said coins were discovered as aforesaid and the defendant was confronted with the fact he stated at first that he knew nothing about it, and afterwards that they had been brought aboard by different Filipinos whom he did not know and had been stored in the place in which they were found for transportation to Hongkong; that these statements were made by the defendant voluntarily; that the steamship Taming, on which these coins were found, had already been cleared from the port of Manila for Hongkong and that she was about ready to sail, and that the coins were not manifested either in the incoming or outgoing voyage of the said vessel; that the finding of the coins on board the said steamship Taming as before stated, was admitted by the defendant at the trial; the bullion value of the said coins at the time they were alleged to have left Hongkong was at least 9 percent more than their apparent face value in the Philippine Islands. The lower court made the following observations concerning the proof offered by the defendant and his witnesses during the trial: Evidence was offered on the part of the defense to the effect that the said money was owned by a Chinaman in Hongkong, who shipped the same to the Philippine Islands by the defendant, for the purpose of purchasing Mexican silver coins and Spanish-Filipino silver coins, in accordance with an agreement made by the defendant with another person in Manila, under which for 82 Philippine pesos he was to receive 100 Spanish-Filipino pesos, and for 97 Philippine pesos he was to receive 100 pesos, Mexican currency, and in corroboration of the shipment there was presented an insurance company at Hongkong. The defendant testified that upon bringing the coins to Manila he ascertained that he could not purchase Mexican coins and Spanish- Filipino coins as advantageously as he had before agreed, and in accordance with his understanding with the owner of the Philippine silver coins, and so decided to take the Philippine coins back to Hongkong to the owner thereof. The lower court also made the following observations relating to the credibility of the defendant and his witnesses: From the appearance of the witnesses while testifying, who testified that said coins were brought to the Philippine Islands for the purpose of buying other coins, and from the unreasonableness of the proposition advanced by them, I am unable to give their testimony credence. I am unable to believe that any person would send this amount of money to the Philippine Islands from Hongkong in the care of the defendant, who was an employee as before stated, on board the steamer Taming without the knowledge of the owners of the vessel or its shipping agent at Hongkong, and without the knowledge of the master of the vessel. Upon these foregoing findings of fact and observations the lower court found the defendant Ling Su Fan, guilty of the offense charged in the complaint, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of sixty days and to pay a fine of P200. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignment of errors:

First. That the court below erred in overruling the demurrer presented to the complaint by the defendant and appellant; and Second. that the sentence of the court below was contrary to law and to the great weight of evidence. The appellant bases his first above assignment of error upon the third ground of the demurrer presented by him in the court below and which the lower court overruled. The third ground of the demurrer is as follows: That said complaint is contrary to the provision of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America and also contrary to paragraph 1 of section 5 of the Act of Congress of the United States of America dated July 1, 1902. That part of the contention of the appellant which refers to the Constitution of the United States can have no important bearing upon the present case, for the reason that paragraph 1 of section 5 of the said act of Congress dated July 1, 1902, is almost exactly in the same phraseology as a portion of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and therefore, decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in construing said fourteenth amendment, may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining what was intended by Congress in enacting said paragraph 1 of section 5, and what laws the Philippine Commission may make under its provisions. Paragraph 1 of section 5 of the said act of Congress is as follows: That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws. It will be noted that this amendment does not prohibit the enactment of laws by the legislative department of the Philippine Government, depriving persons, of life, liberty, or property. It simply provides that laws shall not be enacted which shall deprive persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The question, then, is presented, Is the act under which the defendant is prosecuted here and under which it is sought to deprive him of the money which it is alleged he attempted to illegally export, in accordance with due process of law? The Congress of the United States, on the 2d day of March, 1903, passed an act entitled "An act to establish a standard value and to provide for a coinage system in the Philippine Islands." Section 6 of said act is as follows: SEC. 6. That the coinage authorized by this act shall be subject to the conditions and limitations of the provisions of the act of July first, nineteen hundred and two, entitled "An act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes," except as herein otherwise provided; and the Government of the Philippine Islands may adopt such measures as it may deem proper, not inconsistent with said act of July first, nineteen hundred and two, to maintain the value of the silver Philippine peso at the rate of one gold peso, and in order to maintain such parity between said silver Philippine pesos and the gold pesos herein provided for . . . In pursuance to the authority granted in said section 6, to wit, "the Government of the Philippine Islands may adopt such measures as it may deem proper, ... to maintain the value of the silver Philippine peso at the rate of one gold peso ..." the Civil Commission enacted Act No. 1411, dated November 17, 1905, which act was entitled "An act for the purpose of maintaining the parity of the Philippine currency in accordance with the provisions of sections one and six of the act of Congress approved March second, nineteen hundred and three, by prohibiting the exportation from the Philippine Islands of Philippine silver coins, and for other purposes." Section 1 and 2 of the said act of the Civil Commission are as follows: SECTION 1. The exportation from the Philippine Islands of Philippine silver coins, coined by authority of the act of Congress approved March second, nineteen hundred and three, or of bullion made by melting or otherwise mutilating such coins, is hereby prohibited, and any of the aforementioned silver coins or bullion which is exported, or of which the exportation is attempted subsequent to the passage of this act, and contrary to its provisions, shall be liable to forfeiture under due process of law, and one-third of the sum or value of bullion so forfeited shall be payable to the person upon whose information, given to the proper authorities, the seizure of the money or bullion so forfeited is made, and the other two-thirds shall be payable to the Philippine Government, and accrue to the gold-standard fund: Provided, That the prohibition herein contained shall not apply to sums of twenty-five pesos or less, carried by passengers leaving the Philippine Islands. SEC. 2. The exportation or the attempt to export Philippine silver coins, or bullion made from such coins, from the Philippine Islands contrary to law is hereby declared to be a criminal offense, punishable, in addition to the forfeiture of said coins or bullion as above provided, by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not to exceed one year, or both in the discretion of the court.

It will be noted that the Civil Commission expressly relied upon the act of Congress of March 2, 1903, for its authority in enacting said Act No. 1411. Under the question above suggested it becomes important to determine what Congress intended by the phrase "due process of law." This phrase has been discussed a great many times by the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as by writers upon questions of constitutional law. This same idea, is couched in different language in the different constitutions of the different States of the Union. In some, the phrase is "the law of the land." In others, "due course of law". These different phrases, however, have been given practically the same definition by the different courts which have attempted an explanation of them. The phrase "due process of law" was defined by Judge Story, in his work on Constitutional Law, as "the law in its regular course of administration through the courts of justice." Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, says: Due process of law in each particular case means such an exertion of the powers of the government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribed for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs. The famous constitutional lawyer Daniel Webster, in his argument before the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward (4 Wheaton, 518), gave a definition of this phrase which the Supreme Court of the United States quoted and adopted. It was: By the law of the land is more clearly intended the general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society. Everything which may pass under the form of an enactment is not, therefore, to be considered the law of the land. There are but few phrases in the Constitution of the United States which have received more attention by the courts of the United States, in an endeavor to ascertain their true meaning, than have been given to this expression "due process of law." Recently a volume has been published devoted entirely to the meaning of this phrase. "Due process of law" is process or proceedings according to the law of the land. "Due process of law" is not that the law shall be according to the wishes of all the inhabitants of the state, but simply First. That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; Second. That this law shall be reasonable in its operation; Third. That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and Fourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class. When a person is deprived of his life or liberty or property, therefore, under a law prescribed by the proper lawmaking body of the state and such law is within the power of said department to make and is reasonable, and is then enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed, and is applicable alike to all the citizens or to all citizens of a particular class within the state, such person is not deprived of his property or of his life, or of his liberty without due process of law. When life, liberty, and property are in question there must be in every instance judicial proceedings, and that the requirement implies a written accusation and hearing before an impartial tribunal with proper jurisdiction, an opportunity to defend and a conviction and a judgment before punishment can be inflicted, depriving one of his life, liberty or property. (Story on the Constitution, 5th ed., secs. 1943-1946; Principles of Constitutional Law, Cooley, 434). Such have been the views of able jurists and statesmen, and the deduction is that life, liberty, and property are placed under the protection of known and established principles which can not be dispensed with either generally or specially, either by the courts or executive officers or by the legislative department of the Government itself. Different principles are applicable in different cases and require different forms of procedure; in some, they must be judicial; in others the Government may interfere directly and ex parte; but in each particular case "due process of law" means such an exercise of the powers of the Government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction and under such safeguards for the protection of the individual rights as those maxims prescribed have to the class of cases to which the one being dealt with belongs. (Principles of Constitutional Law, Cooley, 434). Illustrations might be given indefinitely, showing how the Supreme Court of the United States as well as the courts of the different States of the Union have applied this general doctrine. The question is fully discussed in the

following cases: "Murray's Lessee vs. Hoboken Land Co. (18 How., 272), Dartmouth College, vs. Woodward (4 Wheaton, 518), Bank of Columbia vs. Okley (4 Wheaton, 235), Walker vs. Sauvinet (92 U.S. 90), Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (Chap. SI), Story on the Constitution (secs. 1943-1946), Milligan's Case (4 Wallace, 2), Davidson vs. New Orleans (96 U.S., 97), Slaughter-House Cases (16 Wallace, 36), and French vs. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. (181, U.S., 324), which contains a historic discussion of the general meaning of this phrase. In the present case the following facts may be noted: First. That the Civil Commission on the 17th day of November, 1905, regularly and under the methods prescribed by law, enacted Act No. 1411, providing for the punishment of all persons who should export or attempt to export from the Philippine Islands Philippine silver coins. Second. That this law had been enacted and published nearly eleven months before the commission of the alleged offense by the defendant. Third. That a complaint was duly presented, in writing, in a court regularly organized, having jurisdiction of the offense under the said law, and the defendant was duly arrested and brought before the court and was given an opportunity to defend himself against the said charges. Fourth. That the defendant was regularly tried, being given the opportunity to hear and see and to cross-examine the witnesses presented against him and to present such witnesses presented against him and to present such witnesses in his own defense as he deemed necessary and advisable. Fifth. That after such trial the said court duly sentenced the defendant, complying with all the prescribed rules of procedure established. Sixth. That said Act No. 1411 was duly enacted by the Philippine Commission in pursuance of express authority given said Commission by the Congress of the United States in an act duly approved March 2, 1903. A question remaining is, Did the Civil Commission have the authority to enact said Act No. 1411? Certainly said Commission is limited in its powers. As Daniel Webster said in the famous Dartmouth College case: Everything which may pass under the forms of an enactment is not to be considered the law of the land. If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directing and transferring one man's estate to another, legislative judgments, decrees, and forfeitures in all possible forms would be the law of the land. Such a strange construction would render constitutional provisions of the highest importance completely inoperative and void. It would tend directly to establish the union of all the powers in the legislature. There would be no general permanent law for the courts to administer or men to live under. The administration of justice would be an empty form, an idle ceremony. Judges would sit to execute legislative judgments and decrees, but not to declare the law or to administer the justice of the country. But notwithstanding the limitations upon the power of the Commission, there are certain powers which legislative departments of Government may exercise and which can not be limited. These are known as the police power of the state. The police power of the state has been variously defined. It has been defined as the powers of government, inherent in every sovereignty (License Cases, 5 Howard, 583); the power vested in the legislature to make such laws as they shall judge to be for the good of the state and its subjects (Commonwealth vs. Alger, 7 Cushing, Mass., 85); the powers to govern men and things, extending to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons and the protection of all property within the state (Thorpe vs. Rutland and B. R. Co., 27 Vermont, 149); the authority to establish such rules and regulations for the conduct of all persons as may be conducive to the public interests (People vs. Budd, 117 New York, 14). This question of what constitutes police power has been discussed for many years by the courts of last resort in the various States and by many eminent law writers. Blackstone, in his Commentaries upon the common law, defines police power as: The defense, regulation, and domestic order of the country whereby the inhabitants of a state like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations. (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 162.) Chief Justice Shaw in the case of the Commonwealth vs. Alger (7 Cushing, 53, 84), said: We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights to the enjoyment of their

property, nor injurious to the rights of the community ... . Rights of property like all other social and conventional rights are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The police power of the state may be said to embrace the whole system of internal regulation, by which the state seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offenses against the state but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others. The police power of the state includes not only public health and safety but also the public welfare, protection against impositions, and generally the public's best interest. It is so extensive and all pervading that courts refuse to lay down a general rule defining it, but decide each specific case on its own merits (Harding vs. People, 32 Lawyers' Rep. Ann., 445). This power has been exercised by the state in controlling and regulating private business even to the extent of the destruction of property of private persons when the use of such property became a nuisance to public health and convenience. (Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wallace, 36; Minnesota vs. Barber, 136 U.S., 313; Powell vs. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S., 678; Walling vs. Michigan, 116 U.S., 446; Duncan vs. Missouri, 1252 U.S., 377; Morgan, etc., vs. The Board of Health, 118 U.S., 455; Jacobson vs. Mass., Feb. 20, 1905.) The state not only has authority under its police power to make such needful rules and regulations for the protection of the health of its citizens as it may deem necessary; it may also regulate private business in a way so that the business of one man shall in no way become a nuisance to the people of the state. It may regulate the sale and use of intoxicating liquors, the sale of poisons, the sale of foods, etc., and it would seem that nothing is of greater importance to the safety of the state, in addition to the regulation of the morals health of its people, than to regulate and control its own money. In addition to the fact that said Act No. 1411 was enacted in accordance with express permission given by the Congress of the United States, this court has already decided, in the case of Gaspar vs. Molina (5 Phil. Rep., 197), that the Philippine Commission possesses general powers of legislation for the Islands, and its laws are valid unless they are prohibited by some act of Congress, some provision of the Constitution, or some provision of treaty. We are of opinion, and so hold, that Act No. 1411 was enacted by the Philippine Commission with full power and authority so to do. We are of opinion, therefore, and so hold, that the lower court committed no error in overruling the demurrer presented by the defendant. With reference to the second assignment of error above noted, relating to the sufficiency of the proof adduced during the trial of the cause, we are of opinion, and so hold, that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause was sufficient to justify the findings of fact and the conclusions of the lower court. An examination of the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause in the lower court shows the following facts to be true: 1. That on the 12th day of December, 1906, on board the steamship Taming, after the said ship had raised anchor and was ready to sail out of the harbor of Manila for the port of Hongkong, there was found in the room occupied by the defendant the sum of 20,600 Philippine silver pesos, coined by authority of the act of Congress of the United States, March 2, 1903. 2. That the defendant was confronted with the fact that this amount of said money was found in his room, and that he then and there stated that the same had been brought into his room by a Filipino whose name he was unable to give; and that he did not know why the money had been placed there. 3. The money was not on the manifest of the ship when she came into the harbor some days before the said 12th day of December, neither was the said money on the manifest of the ship which had already been prepared for the trip to Hongkong on the said 12th day of December. The said money was taken charge by W. H. Polley, a detective of the custom secret service of Manila, and was turned over to the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands. The defendant was duly arrested and charged with the crime of attempting to export Philippine silver coin from the Philippine Islands contrary to law. At the trial of the cause the defendant attempted to show that he had brought the money in question from Hongkong to be exchanged for certain Mexican coin and Spanish coin in Manila. These statements of the defendant were corroborated by a Chinaman called Wong Tai from Hongkong, and also by testimony of Juan On Hieng of Manila. The said Wong Tai testified that he had sent the said P20,600 from Hongkong to Manila on the said steamship Taming, for the purpose of buying of the said Juan On Hieng old Spanish silver and Mexican silver; that said money was sent in the care of the defendant.

In support of the statements of Wong Tai the defendant presented an insurance policy or a duplicate copy of an insurance policy alleged to have been issued by a certain Japanese insurance company doing business in the city of Hongkong. No proof was offered however to show that said duplicate copy of an insurance policy had actually been issued by said company. The prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila objected to the introduction of the said duplicate policy upon the ground that it had not been sufficiently identified. This objection was overruled. No evidence was presented to show that said company ever, as a matter of fact, issued the policy. In the absence of proof showing that the document had been issued by the proper authorities, the same should not have been admitted in evidence. The duplicate policy did not prove itself. It was dated on the 4th day of December, 1906. In support of the testimony of Wong Tai, the defendant also presented Juan On Hieng as a witness. This witness testified that he had an arrangement with Wong Tai to exchange with him at a certain rate Spanish silver coin and Mexican silver coin for Philippine silver pesos, and that he had an arrangement with a certain Filipino in Manila from whom he was to purchase said Spanish and Mexican coin. He could not remember, however, the name of the Filipino from whom he was to purchase said coins; neither could he describe him, nor could he tell where the said Filipino resided. We do not believe the statements of these witnesses notwithstanding the fact that they seem to corroborate the statements of the defendant. Courts should not lightly regard the statements of witnesses under oath, but nevertheless when the testimony of witnesses seems to be unreasonable from every standpoint it should be weighed with care, when it comes loaded with the temptations of private interests and the impressions of personal penalties; if the defendant had not been guilty of attempting to violate the law, there would have been no occasion for him to have stated at the time the money was found in his room what were the true facts, and then there would have been no difference between his statements then and the statements he made at the time of the trial. These conflicting statements lend much suspicion to the veracity of the defendant as well as to the truth of the statements of the witnesses called in his behalf. The evidence also shows that Philippine silver coin was worth, at the time the coins in question were shipped, about 9 percent more in bullion than they were as money. For all of the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the sentence of the lower court should be affirmed with costs. So ordered. ____________ Forbes, Harding, Trowbridge vs.Chuoco Tiaco, Crossfiled Presidential immunity from suit; president is immune from civil liability and may not be sued during his tenure. Facts: This is an original action commenced in this court to secure a writ of prohibition against the Hon. A. S.Crossfield, as one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,to prohibit him from takingor continuing jurisdiction in a certain case commenced and PENDING before him in which Chuoco Tiaco(respondent herein) is plaintiff, and W. Cameron Forbes, J. E. Harding, and C. R. Trowbridge (petitionersherein) are defendants.The plaintiffs areW. Cameron Forbesis theGovernor-General of the Philippine Islandsand CHIEF OF POLICE J. E. Harding and CHIEF OF THE SECRET SERVICE of the city of ManilaC. R. Trowbridge. Defendant A. S.Crossfieldis one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. DefendantChuoco Tiacois aforeigner of Chinese nationalityand a resident of the Philippine Islands for the last35 years having a family in the country and some properties. Chuoco Tiaco filed a case for DAMAGES (monetary) alleging that defendants forcibly deported the plaintiff to China and forcibly prevented his return for some months in violation of the right of the said plaintiff herein to be and to remain in the Philippine Islands as established by law. Crossfield issued an INHIBITION against Forbes et al from spelling or deporting or threatening to expel or deport Chuoco Tiaco.Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for writs of prohibition against the judge and the respective plaintiffs, alleging that the expulsion was carried out in the public interest and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese government in the Philippines, and was immediately reported tothe Secretary of War. The complaints were demurred to, but the Supreme Court overruled the demurrers,granted the prohibition, and ordered the actions dismissed. The judge, having declined to join in theapplications for writs of error, was made a respondent, and the cases are here on the ground that theplaintiffs have been deprived of liberty without due process of law. Issue: WON the Governor General, as Chief Executive, can be sued in a civil action. Ruling: The principle of non liability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and restrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, LIKE THE JUDGES OF THE COURTS AND THE MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE,MAY NOT BE PERSONALLY MULCTED IN CIVIL DAMAGES FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXECUTED IN THEPERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES: The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and. Note the following:

Therefore the deportation is to be considered as having been ordered by the governor general in pursuance of a statute of the Philippine legislature directing it, under their combined powers, and it is unnecessary to consider whether he had authority, by virtue of his office alone, as declared by the statute, or whether, if he had not, he had immunity from suit for such an official act done in good faith. The former matter now is regulated by a later statute providing for a hearing, etc. No. 2113. February 1, 1912. On the question thus narrowed the preliminaries are plain. It is admitted that sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens, and seemingly that Congress is not deprived of this power by the Constitution of the United States. Furthermore, the very ground of the power in the necessities of public welfare shows that it may have to be exercised in a summary way through executive officers. So that the question is narrowed further to the inquiry whether the Philippine government cannot do what unquestionably Congress might. As Congress is not prevented by the Constitution, the Philippine government cannot be prevented by the Philippine Bill of Rights alone. Act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, 5, 32 Stat. at L. 691, 692. Deporting the plaintiffs was not depriving them of liberty without due process of law, unless on other grounds the local government was acting beyond its powers. But the local government has all civil and judicial power necessary to govern the Islands. Act of March 2, 1901, chap. 803, 31 Stat. at L. 895, 910, act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, 1, 32 Stat. at L. 691. The forms are different, but as in Hawaii, the proximate source of private rights is local, whether they spring by inheritance from Spain or are created by Philippine legislation. It would be strange if a government so remote should be held bound to wait for the action of Congress in a matter that might touch its life unless dealt with at once and on the spot. On the contrary, we are of opinion that it had the power as an incident of the self-determination, however limited, given to it by the United States. By 86 of the act of July 1, 1902, all laws passed by the Philippine government are to be reported to Congress, which reserves power to annul them. It is worthy of mention that the law under consideration was reported to Congress and has not been annulled. The extension of the Chinese exclusion and immigration laws to the Philippine Islands has no bearing on the matter. The right to remain, for instance, under the act of April 29, 1902, chap. 641, 4, 32 Stat. at L. 176, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 524, does not prevail over a removal as an act of state. 7 It is held in England that an act of state is a matter not cognizable in any municipal court. And that was the purport of the Philippine act declaring the deportation not subject to question or review. As the Bill of Rights did not stand in the way, and the implied powers of the government sanctioned by Congress permitted it, there is no reason why the statute should not have full effect. It protected the subordinates as well as the governor general, and took jurisdiction from the court that attempted to try the case. Whether prohibition is technically the proper remedy, historically speaking, we need not inquire. On such a matter we should not interfere with local practice except for good cause shown. In substance the decision of the Supreme Court was right. Judgment affirmed. __________ Petitioner Ardeliza Medenilla was a contractual employee of the Department of Public Works andHighways (DPWH) occupying the position of Public Relations Officer II. In 1987, Medenilla was detailed as Technical Assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary forAdministration and Manpower Management. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 124 dated January 30, 1987, a reorganization ensued within theDPWH and all the positions therein were abolished. A revised staffing pattern together with theguidelines on the selection and placement of personnel was issued. Included in the revised staffing pattern is the contested position of Supervising Human ResourceDevelopment Officer. On January 2, 1989, the petitioner was appointed to the disputed position. The protestants alleged that since they are next-in-rank employees, one of them should have beenappointed to the said position. Thus, on February 28, 1990, the Commission promulgated the assailed resolution, the dispositiveportion of which reads: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to disapprove the promotionalappointment of Ardeliza Medenilla to the position of Supervising Human Manpower DevelopmentOfficer. Accordingly, the appointing authority may choose from among protestants Amparo Dellosa,Marita Burdeos and Rosalinda Juria who to promote to the said position. The Civil Service Field Office isdirected to implement this resolution accordingly." (Rollo, p. 31) The petitioner on March 23, 1990 filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. On May 30,1990 a supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration was also filed. However, prior thereto, theCommission on May 23, 1990 denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The pertinentportions of the denial are: ISSUES: petitioner contends that she was not notified by the Civil Service Commission of the existence of the appeal before it. The resolutions, therefore, were allegedly issued in violation of thepetitioner's constitutionally guaranteed due process of law.

petitioner alleges that the Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion in disapproving her appointment DECISIONS: No YesRATIO "Due process of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present before thetribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty, and property in its mostcomprehensive sense;to be heard,by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of the light in the matterinvolved." The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The presence of a party is not alwaysthe cornerstone of due process. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice butthe absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. In the case at bar, any defect was cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. The preference given to permanent employees assumes that employees working in a Departmentfor longer periods have gained not only superior skills but also greater dedication to the publicservice. This is not always true and the law, moreover, does not preclude the infusion of newblood, younger dynamism, or necessary talents into the government service. If, after consideringall the current employees, the Department Secretary cannot find among them the person he needsto revive a moribund office or to upgrade second rate performance, there is nothing in the CivilService Law to prevent him from reaching out to other Departments or to the private sectorprovided all his acts are bona fide for the best interest of the public service and the person chosenhas the needed qualifications. In the present case, there is no indication that the petitioner waschosen for any other reason except to bring in a talented person with the necessary eligibilities and qualifications for important assignments in the Department. __________________
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819), was a landmark decisionfrom the United States Supreme Court dealing with the application of the Contract Clause of theUnited States Constitution to private corporations. The case arose when the president ofDartmouth College was deposed by its trustees, leading to the New Hampshire legislature attempting to force the college to become a public institution and thereby place the ability to appoint trustees in the hands of the governor. The Supreme Court upheld the sanctity of the original charter of the college, which pre-dated the creation of the State. The decision, handed down on February 2, 1819, ruled in favor of the College and invalidated the act of the New Hampshire Legislature, which in turn allowed Dartmouth to continue as a private institution and take back its buildings, seal, and charter. The majority opinion of the court was written by John Marshall. The opinion reaffirmed Marshall's belief in the sanctity of a contract (also seen in Fletcher v. Peck) as necessary to the functioning of a republic (in the absence of royal rule, contracts rule). The Court ruled that the College's corporate charter qualified as a contract between private parties, the King and the trustees, with which the legislature could not interfere. Even though the United States are no longer royal colonies, the contract is still valid because the Constitution says that a state cannot pass laws to impair a contract. The fact that the government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civil institution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term "contract" referred to transactions involving individual property rights, not to "the political relations between the government and its citizens.

Lopez vs. Director of Lands The principal question presented by this appeal is whether the sale of land in the City of Manila, under the procedure adopted for the recovery of delinquent taxes, has the effect of cutting off all prior liens upon the property sold. The whole story of this action may be told in a few words. The City of Manila, by a decision of the court a quo, in the collection of a land tax of P30.35, by the method permitted by the Administrative Code, deprived the Director of the Bureau of Lands, a bureau of the Insular Government, of a prior lien, in the sum of P1,190, in the form of a mortgage duly registered, which mortgage lien existed before the tax lien in question. The facts stated more in detail, out of which such an anomalous condition resulted, are as follows: On January 12, 1924, Ramon Lopez filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, containing, among others, the following allegations: (a) That on November 7, 1922, one of two parcels of land belonging to Rufo de Jesus, situated in the district of Pandacan, City of Manila, included within certificate of title No. 2458, was sold by the city assessor and collector at public auction for the sum of P30.35 for the payment of taxes due thereon, corresponding to the years 1920, 1921, and 1922, to the petitioner Ramon Lopez, as the highest bidder. There is nothing in the record showing whether the method prescribed for selling property for delinquent taxes was followed or not. We may presume, however, that the procedure was followed. (b) That the owner, Rufo de Jesus, having failed to redeem said one parcel of land within one year from the date of the sale, the sale, it is contended, became absolute and the city assessor and collector on the 8th day of November, 1923, executed in favor of Ramon Lopez, as purchaser of said one lot, a deed conveying to him the title thereto, free from all liens of any kind whatsoever. (c) That Ramon Lopez presented said deed to the registrar of deeds of the City of Manila, requesting that the certificate of title No. 2458, then in the name of Rufo de Jesus, be cancelled insofar as it recovered the said second

parcel, and that a new title be issued therefor in his name, free from all liens and incumbrances of any kind whatsoever, in accordance with section 2500 of the Administrative Code. (d) That the registrar of deeds denied said request, first, because the petitioner did not present the duplicate certificate of said title No. 2458; second, because on said title there appeared a notation of a mortgage executed by said Rufo de Jesus in favor of the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Director of Lands, to secure a debt of P1,190, which still remained unpaid; and, third, because in the absence of an order of the Court of First Instance to that effect, he could not issue a new certificate of title for said lot, free from the encumbrance of said mortgage. (e) That a demand had been made upon Rufo de Jesus for the delivery of said certificate of title and that he had made no response to said request; that the petitioner did not know whether such certificate of title was in the possession of Rufo de Jesus or of the Director of Lands, as the representative of the Government of the Philippine Islands, the owner and holder of said mortgage; and that the Director of Lands or the said Rufo de Jesus be required to deliver to the registrar of deeds said certificate of title No. 2458 for cancellation. (f) It is contended by the petitioner that in accordance with the provisions of section 2500 of the Administrative Code, he was entitled to a new certificate of title covering said parcel of land sold for taxes, and that said new certificate should be issued free from all incumbrances whatsoever; that the Government of the Philippine Islands or its representative, the Director of Lands, could not claim any lien over said parcel of land so sold for taxes under the provisions of section 2497 of the Administrative Code. Upon the foregoing facts, the petitioner prayed: First, that an order be issued directing the registrar of deeds of the City of Manila to cancel said certificate of title No. 2458, insofar as it affected the second parcel; second, that a new certificate of title be issued in the name of Ramon Lopez, free from all liens and encumbrances of any kind whatsoever; and third, that either the Director of Lands or Rufo de Jesus, as the case may be, be required to deliver the duplicate certificate of title No. 2458 to the registrar of deeds for cancellation. This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila on the 12th day of January, 1924. The only proof of service of the commencement of said action is, that a copy of the petition was left at the residence of Rufo de Jesus in Pandacan, in the hands of a person residing at his residence, which person refused to sign a receipt for said petition. The record contains no proof that the Government of the Philippine Islands or the Director of Lands was served with a copy of the petition or had any notice of its presentation. Notwithstanding that fact, however a hearing was held on said petition on the 17 th day of January, 1924, at 8 oclock a.m. The record does show, however, that at said hearing there appeared the attorney for the petitioner, and Mr. Javier Gonzalez, attorney for the Director of Lands. No other persons appeared. The Director of Lands, according to a memorandum by the court a quo, conceded that a new certificate of title should be issued in favor of the petitioner, but that there should be noted thereon the lien held by the Government of the Philippine Islands for the sum of P1,190, invoking, in aid of his petition, article 17 of the Mortgage Law and section 39 and 51 of Act No. 496. Upon the issue thus presented, the court a quo on the 18th day of January, 1924, issued an order directing the Director of Lands to deliver to the registrar of deeds of the City of Manila within five days the duplicate certificate of title No. 2458, and ordered the said registrar of deeds to cancel the same and to issue a new certificate of title to said parcel of land in favor of Ramon Lopez, without nothing thereon the existence of said mortgage in favor of the Director of Lands, and to issue a new certificate to the other parcel of land to Rufo de Jesus and to note on said new certificate the existence of said mortgage. There is nothing of record showing the separate value of said two lots, and for the purposes of this discussion it is not necessary. On the second day of February, 1924, the Attorney-General appeared on behalf of the Director of Lands and prayed for a reconsideration of the decision of the 18th day of January, 1924. Said motion was based upon the ground that the petitioner, Ramon Lopez, was not entitled to have a new certificate of title issued to him, free from all liens whatsoever upon said second parcel of land mortgaged by Rufo de Jesus to the Director of Lands, for the reason that he had acquired said property at public sale and that he could by no means have a better title than the owner of the land at the time of said sale. The Attorney-General, in support of his motion, relied upon the decision of this court in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Adriano (41 Phil., 112) and sections 77 and 80 of Act No. 82. The Attorney-General prayed that the order of January 18th be modified to the effect that the new title to be issued to Ramon Lopez for said parcel No. 2 should bear a notation of the existence of said mortgage in favor of the Government of the Philippine Islands or the Director of Lands. After a consideration of the motion of the Attorney-General and the opposition thereto, the Honorable C.A. Imperial, on the 6th day of February, 1924, denied the same. The Attorney-General, after duly excepting to the judgment and order denying the motion for rehearing, appealed and made several assignments of error. The Attorney-General, in his first assignment of error, contends that the lower court erred in not holding that the tax proceeding under which Ramon Lopez claims an indefeasible title is a proceeding in personam and not in rem. An examination of practically all of the authorities has been made upon the question whether or not the proceeding for the collection of taxes upon real estate is an action in personam or an action in rem. The result of that examination is, that the authorities are about equally divided. Some hold that the proceeding is an action in personam while others hold that it is an action in rem. In this jurisdiction, by virtue of the procedure adopted in relation with the remedy given, we have held in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Adriano, supra, that the proceedings here are in personam and not in rem. (Valencia vs. Jimenez and Fuster, 11 Phil., 492.)

An action in rem may be defined as an action or proceeding instituted against a thing and not against a particular person. (In re Storeys Will, 20 III. App., 183, 190.) Chief Justice Marshall, in discussing an action in rem, said: I have always understood that where a process is to be served on the thing itself, by the service of a process and making proclamation, the court is authorized to decide upon it (the thing) without notice to any individual defendant, to which all the world are parties. The claimant is a party, whether he speaks or is silent, whether he asserts his claim or abandons it. Decisions in such cases are binding and conclusive, not only on the parties litigating, but on all others. Every one who can possibly be affected by the decision has a right to appear and assert his own rights by becoming an actual party to the proceeding. (Cunningham vs. Shanklin, 60 Cal., 118, 125.) A proceeding in rem, in a strict sense, is one taken strictly against property, and has for its object the dispo sition of the property, without reference to the title of individual claimants. But in a larger and more general sense the phrase proceeding in rem is applied to actions between parties, where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein. (Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316.) A proceeding brought to determine the status of a particular thing itself and which is confined to the subject-matter in specie, is in rem, the judgment being intended to determine the state or condition, and, pro facto, to render the thing what the judgment declares it to be. Process may be served on the thing itself and by such service and making proclamation, the court is authorized to decide upon it without notice to persons, all the world being parties. (Cross vs. Armstrong, 44 Ohio St., 613; Woodruff vs. Taylor, 20 Vt., 63, 73.) A judgment in rem is an adjudication pronounced upon the state of some particular subject-matter by a court having competent authority for that purpose; while a judgment in personam is, in form as well as in substance, between persons claiming a particular right, and that it is so inter partie s, appears by the record itself. A judgment in rem differs from a judgment in personam in this, that the latter is, in form as well as substance, between the parties claiming the right, and that it is so inter parties, appears by the record, and it is binding only upon the parties appearing to be such by the record, and those claiming by them. But a judgment in rem is founded upon a proceeding instituted not against the person as such but against or upon a particular thing or subject-matter, whose state or condition is to be determined, and a judgment is a solemn declaration upon the status of the thing and it ipso facto renders it what it declares it to be. (Woodruff vs. Taylor, supra.) In a judgment in personam when property is sold thereunder at p ublic auction, the rights of the owner only are sold, while in a judgment in rem the res itself is sold. An examination of the remedies for the collection of unpaid municipal taxes shows that different states have adopted different methods. The methods may be summarized as: First, an action to recover personal judgment; second, an action to enforce a lien on land; third, a summary sale of the property on which the taxes are in lien; and, fourth, by distraint. In the Philippine Islands the Legislature has adopted practically the third method, by a summary sale of the property on which the taxes have become a lien by advertising and a sale at public auction. Under that system the City of Manila may sell either personal property or the land upon which the tax exists. The City of Manila may use its discretion either by proceeding against the personal property of the taxpayer or against the land upon which the tax has been levied. The fact that the City of Manila has the option of proceeding against the real or personal property, evidently is the fact which induced this court in the two decisions cited above (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Adriano, supra; Valencia vs. Jimenez, and Fuster, supra), to decide that in this jurisdiction the action to collect delinquent taxes upon real property is an action in personam and not in rem. In jurisdictions where the action to recover delinquent taxes upon land is an action in personam, the tax title issued thereunder is purely a derivative title and such a deed conveys only such title as was vested in the delinquent taxpayer. Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Adriano, supra; McDonald vs. Hanna, 51 Fed. Rep., 73.) The purchaser at a tax sale gets no better title under his deed than was held by the person assessed. It is not disputed that the state may decide what shall be liens upon property and what shall be the priority thereof. Yet, nevertheless, a foreclosure of such liens cannot operate to destroy other liens without a proceeding, which we are taught to denominate, under the organic law, as due process of law. By due process of law, as Mr. Daniel Webster said in his argument before the Supreme Court of the United States in the famous Dartmouth College Case, is by the law of the land a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. The remaining is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection of the general rules which govern society. (4 Wheato n, U.S., 518, 581.) Due process of law contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting ones person or property. Due process of law is not every act, legislative in form, that is, law. Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the persons and property of the citizens, is not law. While it is true that section 2500 of Act No. 2711 provides that, in case the taxpayer shall not redeem the realty sold for the payment of delinquent taxes within one year from the date of the sale, the city assessor and collector shall execute a deed, in form and effect sufficient to convey to the purchaser so much of the real estate, against which the taxes have been assessed, as has been sold, free from all liens of any kind whatsoever, the Legislature certainly did not intend that persons who hold a lien against such land should be deprived thereof without a notice and an opportunity to be heard before their lien could be nullified. No rule is better established, under the due-process-oflaw provision of the organic law of the land, than the one which requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before any citizen of the state can be deprived of his rights. That is the rule, whether the action is in personam or in rem, with the exception that in an action in rem substituted service may be had. Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714; Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U.S., 168.)

As was stated above, the legislature of the state has a perfect right to determine what shall constitute liens upon property and the priority thereof. The mere fact, however, that A has, under the law, a prior lien upon the property of B, does not justify him in taking arbitrary possession of said property without notice and an opportunity to be heard by subsequent lien holders, if there are any. To permit such proceedings would allow a violation of one of the fundamental rights of the citizens of the state. In the present case the appellant had no notice whatever of the proceedings by which his lien was nullified, and of course no opportunity to defend his rights until after the issuance of the deed by the city assessor and collector to the appellee, by which the latter obtained a deed free from all liens of any kind whatsoever by virtue of which the appellant was deprived of his rights. We cannot give our assent to a procedure by which citizens of the Philippine Islands may be deprived of their rights without a notice and an opportunity to defend them. In view of the foregoing conclusions, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other assignments of error of the appellant. Our conclusions are: First, that under the procedure adopted in the present case the Government of the Philippine Islands, as presented by the Director of Lands, has not been deprived of its mortgage lien upon the property in question; second, that the judgment of the court a quo, depriving it of its lien without notice and an opportunity to be heard, is null and void. Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the judgment appealed from should be, and is hereby pronounced null and void, and it is further ordered and decreed that the record be returned to the court whence it came, with direction that a new certificate of title be issued for the one parcel of land in question to the plaintiff, Ramon Lopez, with an annotation thereon of the mortgage lien held by the appellant. __________________ Bautista vs. Secretary of Labor It has not escaped the attention of the Court that when a party runs out of arguments, or never had any to begin with, it usually pleads a denial of due process. The plea may impress at first glance, what with all its plaintive invocation of the Bill of Rights, but it does not often succeed upon closer examination. The petition at bar is a case in point. This dispute arose on December 15, 1984, when the herein private respondents filed a complaint against Northeastern College, Inc., where they were employed as janitors, and Jose R. Bautista and Severino Gabuyo as its President and Cashier, respectively. The charge was violation of Articles 113 and 116 of the Labor Code prohibiting unauthorized deduction from the wages of workers. After investigation, Assistant Regional Director Pedro P. Pelaez of Regional Office No. 2, Ministry of Labor and Employment, found the deductions to be illegal. Nevertheless, he disallowed reimbursement of the amounts deducted, holding that the same were used to pay legitimate obligations of the private respondents to the school canteen and Director Villano. The case was dismissed in an Order dated January 14, 1985. In a letter dated January 25, 1985, the private respondents appealed this order to the Ministry of Labor and Employment and claimed that they had already settled their personal obligations with their supposed creditors. They also questioned the disallowance of their claimed reimbursements despite the finding that the deductions made were illegal. In an Order dated January 6, 1986, Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. affirmed the illegality of the deductions and, accordingly, directed the petitioners to reimburse the private respondents the amounts deducted from their salaries. On September 30, 1987, Regional Office No. 2 issued a Writ of Execution addressed to respondent Deputy Provincial Sheriff David R. Medina directing him to secure from the petitioners the full reimbursement of the illegal deductions, the amount of which was to be ascertained from petitioner Gabuyo. However, the writ was returned unsatisfied for the reason that neither the private respondents nor the petitioners could determine the exact amount to be paid. On December 7, 1987, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued, this time fixing the amounts to be paid each of the private respondents On December 22, 1987, the petitioners filed an Exception to the Alias Writ of Execution with Regional Office No. 2. They contended that the said writ was null and void as it proceeded from an invalid order issued pursuant to an appeal filed out of time and without notice to the petitioners. In another Order dated December 29, 1987, Regional Office No. 2 dismissed the petitioners' Exception to the AliasWrit of Execution and directed respondent Deputy Sheriff of Isabela to proceed with its enforcement.

Conformably, he seized several typewriters, electric fans, calculators and various office equipment from the petitioners for payment of the judgment debt. On January 22, 1988, the petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the Order of the DOLE dated January 6, 1986, the Writ of Execution dated Sept. 30, 1987, and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 7, 1987. On their motion, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on February 8, 1988, against the implementation of the Alias Writ of Execution. The petitioners contend that the Department of Labor never acquired jurisdiction over them because they were not served with summons or otherwise notified of the case filed against them. They also argue that no hearing was conducted on the private respondents' charges in violation of the requirements of due process. We do not agree. The record shows that the private respondents gave a copy of their complaint to the petitioners, serving this at the office of Jose R. Bautista, where it was received by Roger Bautista, Executive Assistant to the President. 1 Such service was valid and binding, having been made on a person in charge of the office. As we held in Adamson Ozanam Educational Institution, Inc. vs. Adamson University Faculty and Employees Association: 2 Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which is suppletory to the rules of the NLRC, provides as follows: Sec. 4. Personal Service. Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party's or attorney's residence, if known, with a person of sufficient discretion to receive the same. (Emphasis supplied) Under the foregoing rule, service of papers should be delivered personally to the party or attorney or by leaving it at his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof . . . . Even without such service, the petitioners cannot deny that they were furnished with a copy of the Order dated January 6, 1986, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 00293, 3 a copy of the letter-appeal dated January 25, 1985, as evidenced by the receipt of the same by Roger Bautista, 4 and a copy of the writ of execution, as evidenced by the Sheriffs Return. 5 The Court notes that the only reaction of the petitioners to these processes was an indifferent silence. Given the opportunity to object, they forfeited it with their implied acquiescence to the orders they are now assailing. Surely, they cannot now complain they were denied due process, when they were actually given the opportunity to be heard, which is all due process requires. Moreover, it is not true that they were denied this opportunity in the investigation conducted by the Regional Office No. 2 on December 19, 1984. Severino Gabuyo was interviewed then and even explained the records of the company and the reason for the protested deductions. It is true that no formal hearing was conducted, but as we have held Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners' allegation that they were denied due process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 6 Moreover, since the proceeding was not judicial but merely administrative, the rigid requirements of procedural laws were not strictly enforceable. It is settled that While administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. However, the standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored. 7

It is of course also sound and settled rule that administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial functions are unfettered by the rigid technicalities of procedure observed in the courts of law, and this is so that disputes brought before such bodies may be resolved in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner possible. 8 Given all these circumstances, we feel that the lack of summons upon the petitioners is not sufficient justification for annulling the acts of the public respondents. We agree with the Solicitor General that the invocation of due process was only an afterthoughts on the part of the petitioners, who obviously had not earlier realized the extent of their liability. It was only when the amounts of reimbursement were computed and revealed to be not insignificant that the petitioners were aroused from their lethargy and decided to spring into action. But it was too late. whatever their reason for oversleeping then, it avails them naught at this time. We hold that the challenged orders were validly promulgated. The petitioners were not denied due process when, having the opportunity to challenge them, they chose not to do so. The requisites of notice and hearing have been satisfied. Due process is only for the vigilant, not those who, having the right to be heard, choose to be silent, only to complain later that they have not been heard. The Court is not moved by crocodile tears or by those who piously invoke the name of due process in vain to excuse their own inattention. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. The temporary restraining order dated February 8, 1988, is LIFTED. It is so ordered. ____________ This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Sunset View Condominium Corporation (SUNSET VIEW) seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) of 17 August 1987 affirming the Decision of the Labor Arbiter of 22 April 1986 which ordered the reinstatement of respondent Evelyn A. Lorenzo to her former employment with petitioner with payment of backwages from the date of her dismissal until her reinstatement. Respondent Lorenzo started to work with petitioner corporation as clerk-typist on probationary basis. She became a permanent employee on 1 January 1979 and was appointed administrative secretary in 1980. On 4 October 1985, respondent Lorenzo received from Amado A. Castro, President of petitioner corporation, a memorandum informing her of her suspension effective immediately until further notice in view of evidence linking her to irregularities in Sunset View Towers. She was also given five (5) days to show cause why her services should not be terminated. The following day, 5 October 1985, respondent Lorenzo wrote Castro stating that she could not comply with the latter's order set forth in memorandum as there would be no specific charges supporting her suspension. Notwithstanding respondent's letter to the President of the petitioner, the latter proceeded with respondent's suspension. Petitioner stopped paying her salary on 5 November 1985 and failed to give her 13th month pay for that year. Even after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the date of her suspension, respondent was not reinstated nor paid her salary. Hence, respondent Lorenzo filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal suspension. In her position paper, she prayed for reinstatement, back wages, 13th month pay for 1985, moral or exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Petitioner filed its position paper on 13 February 1986 alleging that prior to 4 October 1985 management had discovered that respondent Lorenzo had tampered with three (3) duplicate copies of official receipts she had issued to condominium unit owners by erasing and replacing the amounts written thereon with lesser amounts, and appropriating the difference for herself; that she was confronted by petitioner concerning the tampered receipts and given an opportunity to return the amounts she had appropriated, but failed to do so; consequently, petitioner issued its memorandum of 4 October 1985 suspending her from her employment. In her reply to petitioner's position paper, private respondent denied the offense imputed to her and the allegation she was confronted by petitioner concerning the falsification. She contented that the handwriting in the falsified copies of the receipts was not hers but that of somebody else, and requested the Labor Arbiter to order the production of the originals of the questioned receipts. On motion of respondent Lorenzo, the Labor Arbiter issued subpoena duces tecum to Amado A. Castro, President of petitioner corporation, to bring the original and duplicate copies of the three (3) questioned official receipts at the hearing of 24 March 1986.

At the hearing before the Labor Arbiter on 24 March 1986, petitioner presented the original and duplicate copies of the questioned official receipts, with counsel for private respondent making the following observations: that in the duplicates of Official Receipts Nos. 18986 and 18987 the words and figures representing amounts received appeared to have been erased and substituted with lesser amounts, and that the handwriting in the altered figures were different from the accepted handwriting of respondent Lorenzo in the original receipts. On 22 April 1986, Labor Arbiter Nestor C. Lim rendered a decision finding illegal and unjustified the indefinite suspension of respondent Lorenzo as it amounted to her constructive dismissal, and ordering her reinstatement with full back wages from the date of dismissal until reinstated, plus payment of her 13th month pay for 1985, moral damages and attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter also concluded that respondent was not properly apprised of the particular offense she was charged with that gave rise to her suspension. Despite repeated requests of respondent Lorenzo for petitioner to particularize or clarify the infraction that she allegedly committed, petitioner refused to shed light on the reasons for her suspension. She was only informed of the charge of falsification against her when the petition raised this matter for the first time in its position paper before the Labor Arbiter who upheld the observations of her counsel that the handwriting of the altered figures in the duplicate copies of the questioned official receipts were quite different and distinct from her accepted handwriting appearing on the receipts, thus creating doubt on he contention that she had participated in the falsification of the duplicate copies of the official receipts to the prejudice of petitioner. Not satisfied with the decision of the Labor Arbiter, petitioner corporation appealed the same to the respondent Commission. On 17 August 1987, the latter affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter and declared that private respondent did not commit the offense attributed to her. Respondent Commission likewise sustained the order for her reinstatement and the award of full back wages and 13th month pay for 1985, deleting however the award of moral damages and attorney's fees. In its petition, SUNSET VIEW raises the following issues before this Court: whether respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding illegal the suspension and dismissal of Lorenzo. Petitioner claims that respondent Commission did not consider the fact that private respondent was the one who received the malversed amounts and that she had control and custody of the official receipts, that even for the sake of argument that she was not the one who altered the duplicate receipts, still, she had been remiss in her duty to see to it that the receipts reflected the true amounts received from the unit owners. The burden of proof that the employee is responsible for an alleged misconduct and that his participation therein has rendered him unworthy to remain in his position, is on the employer. The question of whether respondent altered or tampered with the official receipts so that she can appropriate the difference is a question of fact which is for respondent Commission, as a trier of facts, to determine. Factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality when such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 1The truth or falsehood of alleged facts is not for the Supreme Court to re-examine. The probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them may no longer be inquired into. This Court steps in and exercises its power of review only when on the basis of facts the inference or conclusion arrived at is manifestly erroneous. In the present case, we find that respondent NLRC did not abuse in its discretion, much less gravely, when it concluded that private respondent was not responsible for falsifying the receipts in question. There is no evidence directly pointing to respondent as the perpetrator of the offense. Neither is there any showing that she is guilty of negligence in handling the receipts which led to the falsification thereof of other persons. Petitioner does not deny that as an administrative assistant or secretary to the project manager, private respondent has the duty to assist her superior in the daily operation of the affairs of the condominium building of petitioner corporation, a function more akin to general housekeeping. 2 The Manager and all the personnel hold office inside a small room where the built-in cabinet used for keeping duplicate receipts is located. It is the accountant who holds the key to the cabinet and together with the accounting clerk is in charge of the safekeeping of the receipts and corporate funds. While respondent Lorenzo also accepted payments and issued receipts, she endorsed all the collections and duplicate receipts to the collector for deposit. 3 Taking into account this usual procedure, it is evident that any irregularity that may arise from the collection of payment would be immediately known. However, as found by the Labor Arbiter and respondent NLRC, it took almost one year and a half for petitioner to discover the anomaly. The official receipts allegedly falsified were dated May 1984, while the memorandum suspending respondent Lorenzo was issued only in October 1985. Even then, the issue of falsification of receipts was raised by petitioner as a ground for suspension of respondent only when it submitted its position paper before the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the Labor Arbiter and respondent NLRC are correct in doubting the veracity of the charge of petitioner against respondent Lorenzo.

Petitioner also submits that it was not furnished copy of respondent Lorenzo's manifestation on her observations on the handwriting in the altered figures on the receipts. It argues that this resulted in a denial of the opportunity to present its side of the controversy, especially when the Labor Arbiter adopted the observations in the respondent's manifestation. The position of petitioner cannot be sustained. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard of, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 4 The failure of respondent to furnish petitioner copy of the manifestation which she submitted to the Labor Arbiter was not fatal as to invalidate his decision. Such terminal defect was cured when petitioner was allowed to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter and later to file a motion for reconsideration with respondent NLRC. 5 Further, Art. 221 of the Labor Code provides that "in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling, and it is the spirit and intention of the Labor Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process." Respondent Lorenzo having been illegally suspended and dismissed, she would be reinstated to her previous position with back wages for a period of three (3) years without qualification and deduction, and without loss of seniority rights. However, if reinstatement is no longer feasible, petitioner should pay respondent Lorenzo, in addition to back wages, separation pay in an amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.6 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission of 17 August 1987 is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the amount of back wages to be paid by petitioner to private respondent Evelyn A. Lorenzo shall be for a period of three (3) years without qualification and deduction, and if reinstatement is no longer feasible, petitioner shall be liable to pay private respondent, in addition to back wages, separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of service. ________________
Petitioner Lolita A. Dadubo, Senior Accounts Analyst and Rosario B. Cidro, Cash Supervisor, of the Development Bank of the Philippines, Borongan Branch were administratively charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 1 The charges were based on reports on the unposted withdrawal of P60,000.00 from Savings Account No. 87-692 in the name of Eric Tiu, Edgar Tiu, and/or Pilar Tiu. The formal investigations revealed that in the morning of August 13, 1987, Erlinda Veloso, authorized representative of the Tius, presented an undated withdrawal slip for P60,000.00. 2 Dadubo, as acting teller, prepared the corresponding ticket and voucher in the name of the cash supervisor, Rosario Cidro. Dadubo initialed the withdrawal slip, ticket and voucher, all dated August 13, 1987, and passed on to Cidro all the documents on the said transaction. These were then forwarded to the accountant, Reynaldo Dorado, who signed the voucher ledger card of the Tius' savings account and forwarded the documents to Apolinario Babaylon, bookkeeper, who was also acting as posting machine operator. After posting the amount of P60,000.00 on the ledger card and passbook, Babaylon initialed the withdrawal slip and returned the documents to Dorado, who approved the withdrawal and thereafter disbursed the P60,000.00 to Veloso. The Received payment portion of the withdrawal slip was signed Veloso but Cidro, who disbursed the amount, failed to initial the passbook. After banking hours, another withdrawal slip was presented by Feliciano Bugtas, Jr., also an employee of the Tius. 3 This was the second P60,000.00 withdrawal. Veloso did not know about it. The withdrawal slip was processed and approved on the same day, August 13, 1987. The space Posted by was initialed by Babaylon but no posting was actually made because the passbook was not presented. While the withdrawal slip was dated August 13, 1987, all other supporting documents were dated August 14, 1987, this being a withdrawal after banking hours (ABH). The following day, August 14, 1987, prior to the payment of the ABH withdrawal, Veloso presented another undated withdrawal slip for P60,000.00. 4 This was the third P60,000.00 withdrawal. The withdrawal slip was received by Dorado, who handed it to Dadubo. At that time, Cidro was encashing the check at PNB to satisfy the ABH withdrawal. When she returned from the bank, she paid this withdrawal to Veloso, who thought that what she was collecting was the P60,000.00 corresponding to the withdrawal slip she presented that morning. When Dadubo informed Cidro about the third withdrawal, till money of P100,000.00 was made to service it. Prior to the payment of the third P60,000.00 withdrawal, Veloso came back and presented another withdrawal slip for P40,000.00. 5 The petitioner claimed she disbursed P100,000.00 to Veloso, covering the third P60,000.00 and the P40,000.00 withdrawals. On the other hand, Veloso testified that she received only P40,000.00 from the petitioner. She acknowledged receipt of the amount by signing the withdrawal slip and indicating opposite her signature the amount of P40,000.00. That left the balance of P60,000.00 unaccounted for and directly imputable to Dadubo. On the basis of these findings, DBP found Dadubo guilty of dishonesty for embezzlement of bank funds. She was penalized with dismissal from the service. 6 Cidro was adjudged guilty of gross neglect of duty and fined in an amount equivalent to one month basic salary, payable through salary deductions in not more than 12 installments. Dadubo appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), 7 which affirmed the decision of the DBP, declaring as follows: There is nothing in the records to show that the Senior Manager, Personnel Services and Vice-Chairman, both of the DBP, abused their discretion in deciding the case against the appellant or that their decision was made

and attended with arbitrariness or unfairness. To all intents and purposes, the ensuing decision was a necessary consequence of the evidence. However, DBP was reversed by the Civil Service Commission in its Resolution No. 91-642, dated May 21, 1991, 8which reduced Dadubo's penalty to suspension for six months on the ground that: Although Dadubo made alterations on the dates in the Ledger Card from August 13 to August 14, the fact remains that the bank was defrauded on account of said ABH withdrawal (for) which Cidro is held responsible and accordingly found guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Inefficiency and Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duty. It was also Dadubo who reported on the irreconcilable P60,000.00. The most that Dadubo could be charged with is willful violation of office regulation when she undertook reconciliation for under the Bank Manual the tellers are not allowed access to the savings account ledger cards. Respondent DBP moved reconsideration. On July 16, 1992, the Commission acting favorably on the motion, promulgated Resolution No. 92-878 9 affirming the earlier findings of the DBP as to Dadubo guilt, thus The records reveal that Dadubo admitted in her Answer that she changed entry of the date August 13 to 14 in the ledger in the course of her reconciliation which she was advised not to do. This act of admission needs no further elaboration to prove that Dadubo is guilty of the charge. Such admission is however treated as a mitigating circumstance which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of her official position. There is no reason for her to change or alter entries in the ledger unless she intends to benefit therefrom or to conceal some facts. Further, it should be noted that the report was made only on September 28, 1987 (the date the report on reconciliation was submitted to the Regional Office). It should be emphasized as earlier stated that Dadubo was not authorized to reconcile the subsidiary ledger cards for the period ending August 20, 1987. Hence, as emphatically stated in the MSPB decision, ". . . respondent Dadubo manipulated the bank records to conceal the offense which constituted the act of dishonesty." The opinion of an acting Internal Audit Officer, whose report was among the preliminary findings considered in the investigation of the case, is not conclusive as there are other available and convincing evidence to prove the guilt of Dadubo. Dadubo has brought her case to this Court in this petition for certiorari. She claims that CSC Resolution No. 92-878 failed to comply with the constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts an the law on which the decision is based; CSC Resolution No. 92-878 conflicts with the findings of fact in CSC Resolution No. 91-642; the Commission manifestly overlooked or disregarded certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties; and it based its conclusions entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures. Required to comment, the Solicitor General argued that CSC Resolution No. 92-878 did not need to restate the legal and factual bases of the original decision in CSC-MSPB No. 497 which already explained the relevant facts and the applicable law. The petitioner had admitted that she changed the entry of the dates in the subsidiary ledger card from August 13 to 14 in the course of her reconciliation work although she was not authorized to do this. This admission, along with the other evidence Presented during the investigation in the bank, proved Dadubo's guilt. Moreover, the affidavit of Albert C. Ballicud was inadmissible in evidence because he was never subjected to cross-examination. The petitioner's challenges are mainly factual. The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. 10 is settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. 11 Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. 12 None of these vices has been shown in this case. The petitioner's invocation of due process is without merit. Her complaint that she was not sufficiently informed of the charges against her has no basis. While the rules governing Judicial trials should be observed as much as possible, their strict observance is not indispensable in administrative cases. 13 As this Court has held, "the standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored." 14 The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Eurybiades: "Strike, but hear me first!" Less dramatically, it simply connotes an opportunity to be heard. The petitioner had several opportunities to be heard and to present evidence that she was not guilty of embezzlement but only of failure to comply with the tellering procedure. Not only did she testify at her formal investigation but she also filed a motion for reconsideration with the DBP, then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and later elevated the case to the Civil Service Commission. Having been given all these opportunities to be heard, which she fully availed of, she cannot now complain that she was denied due process. Appreciation of the evidence submitted by the parties was, to repeat, the prerogative of the administrative body, subject to reversal only upon a clear showing of arbitrariness. The rejection of the affidavit of Ballicud, for example, was not improper because there was nothing in that document showing that the petitioner did not embezzle the P60,000.00. It is true that the petitioner was formally charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the bank and not specifically with embezzlement. Nevertheless, the allegations and the evidence presented sufficiently proved her guilt of embezzlement of bank funds, which in unquestionably prejudicial to the best interest of the bank. The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense. 15

We must also dismiss the petitioner's complaint that CSC Resolution No. 92-878 failed to comply with the constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which a decision is based. We have held that this provision applies only to courts of justice and not to administrative bodies like the Civil Service Commission. 16 In any event, there was an earlier statement of the facts and the law involved in the decision rendered by the MSPB dated February 28, 1990, which affirmed DBP's decision to dismiss the petitioner. In both decisions, the facts and the law on which they were based were clearly and distinctly stated. It is worth adding that inasmuch as Civil Service Resolution No. 92-878 was rendered only to resolve DBP's motion for reconsideration, it was not really necessary to re-state the factual an, legal bases for the said decisions. Even resolutions issued by this Court do not need to conform, to the first paragraph of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, for reasoning extensively discussed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals 17 and other subsequent cases.18 We find no justification to nullify or modify the questioned resolution. It would perhaps have been more thorough if certain other officers of the bank had been also investigated for their part in the anomalous transaction. But that matter is not before this Court and cannot be resolved by us at this time. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Civil Service Commission in issuing the questioned resolutions. Costs against the petitioner. _____________
Due Process Hearing
David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs an dthe share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to go back there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do so. David denied that the borthers were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but he resigned to take care of his dad and to work for DOLE. Fewlomeno on the other hand surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the case filed by the brothers against David and after three months he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without any hearing. David averred he was denied due process. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing conducted but he said the decision has already become final and executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed. ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of due process. And it has been held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered at all.

On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner , aggrieved by managements failure to attend to their complaints concerning their working surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance conference. Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner with NLRC of NCR. After due trial, Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate within ten (10) days from receipt private respondents to their former respective positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, without loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited backwages of six (6) months. Private respondents filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715. Petitioner and complainants filed their own Appeals. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion for execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time of its effectivity because it does not expressly provide that it shall be given retroactive effect and to give retroactive effect to Section 12 thereof to pending cases would not only result in the imposition of an additional obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its right to appeal since it would be burdened with the consequences of reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the provision under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 is constitutional. HELD: YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners. RATIO: Presumption against unconstitutionality. The validity of the questioned law is not only supported and sustained by the foregoing considerations. As contended by the Solicitor General, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its permanent police power on the theory that the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital than the preservation of corporate profits. Then, by and pursuant to the same power, the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its family. Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC can validly be given retroactive effect. They are procedural or remedial in character, promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect. There are no vested rights in rules of procedure. A remedial statute may be made applicable to cases pending at the time of its enactment.


1)Respondent Emilie Cayugan in her capacity as the mother and the legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cayugan filed a complaint of Claim for Inheritance against the Petitioner Corito Ocampo who is the administratix of the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo. (2)Respondent Emilie Cayugan has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cayugan. Respondent and Atty. Ocampo had an illicit relationship with each other. As a result of the illicit relationship, they begot a child named Chad Cuyugan. (3)Chad had been showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by the putative father for being his only son. This affection can be proven through letters and documents. (4)RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION: a. although he is illegitimate he is nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceases father, AS ONE OF THE SURVIVING HEIRS. b.she is asking for a financial support from the estate of the putative father for she has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity c.the plaintiff refused to satisfy the claim for the inheritance against the estate of the deceased. (5)The estate of the deceased has not as yet been inventoried by the defendant and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including Chad has not been likewise been ascertained. (6)PETITIONER'S CONTENTION: FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS IMPORTANT GROUND: the complaint merely alleged that the minor Chad is an illegitimate of the child of the deceased and actually asking for the claim of the inheritance, --THIS MAYBE CONSIDERED AS ONE TO COMPEL RECOGNITION. Also, the letters and documents are not a sufficient evidence, the father can no longer testify that he really made it and to establish such filiation child must brought the action during the lifetime of the father. a.action is premature cause of action c.barred of prescription d.she has no legal standing and no judicial personality e.court has no jurisdiction (7)RTC: ordered that the motion to dismiss be denied. CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not Chad has the right to claim over his share of inheritance in the estate of the deceased? HELD: Yes. Chad has the right to claim over his share on the estate of the deceased. RATIONALE: (THE MOTHER PROVED THE FILIATION OF THE SON AND HE FILED IT WITHIN THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD) In this case, SC ruled that if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. ARTICLE 285 of the Civil Code is the controlling factor since the alleged parent died during the the minority of the child, the action of the for the filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of the majority of the minor. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed. Moreover, the right of the action of the minor child has been vested by filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the CIvil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. CITED CASE: Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. NOTE: Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

FACTS: : IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO. 04-92), LIMITING THE TERM OF APPOINTMENT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ONE YEAR SUBJECT TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATION ON AUGUST 12, 1992, RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS ASSOCIATION AND THE MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT. ALBERTO C. COMPAS, QUESTIONED PPAAO NO. 04-92 ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE PPA TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-92ON MARCH 17, 1993, THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C. CORONA, DISMISSED THE APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIER RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL HELD: THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK DISREGARD OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT SAID THAT IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS A DEPRIVATION AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE WITHOUT PROPER OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICE AND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND HEARING THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT. IT IS READILY APPARENT THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ENJOY THEIR PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY RETIREMENT ____________ People vs. Nazareno This is an appeal from the decision,[1], dated May 28, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 136), finding accused-appellants Narciso Nazareno and Ramil Regala guilty of murder for the killing of Romulo Molet Bunye II in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on December 14, 1988 and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In addition, the two were ordered to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00. Two others, accused with them, Manuel Laureaga and Orlando Hular, were acquitted. The evidence for the prosecution shows that on December 14, 1988, between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., Romulo Bunye II took a tricycle (referred to in the record as stainless tricycle evidently because its body was made of stainless steel), which was driven by Fernando Hernandez. Unknown to Bunye was that two men were waiting outside his house and that the two hailed another tricycle in order to follow him. Bunye alighted at the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinlupa and crossed to the left side of the street. Shortly after, the tricycle, driven by Rogelio de Limos, arrived and stopped in front of Hernandezs stainless tricycle. One of the men jumped out of the tricycle and shot Bunye at the back of the head. When Bunye fell face down, the assailant fired another shot at Bunyes head. Then, the other man approached Bunye and shot him also in the head. Rogelio de Limos and Fernando Hernandez, the tricycle drivers, executed sworn affidavits relating what they had witnessed.[2] The two described the assailants and stated that they could recognize the killers if they saw them again. There was another witness, a woman, who was also a passenger of the stainless tricycle on which Bunye rode but her identity had remained unknown. The autopsy report on the victim showed that he died of gunshot wounds in the head. [3] On December 28, 1988, Ramil Regala, Narciso Nazareno, Orlando Hular and Manuel Laureaga were arrested. Regala and Nazareno were put in a police line-up. They were identified and pointed to as the assailants by the tricycle drivers Hernandez and de Limos. Hernandez and de Limos executed additional sworn affidavits. Ramil Regala executed affidavits, dated December 28, 1988 [4] and January 2, 1989[5] admitting participation in the slaying of Bunye and pointing to Narciso Nazareno and a certain Rey Taling as his co-conspirators. He claimed that they had been hired by Orlando Boy Hular to kill the victim and told that they would be pai d P30,000.00 by Manuel Laureaga. His affidavits were corroborated by Orlando Hular who, in an affidavit, executed on the same day, December 28, 1988,[6] stated that it was Laureaga who wanted Bunye killed, apparently in connection with Bunyes job as administrator of the public market in Alabang.

However, Regala and Hular subsequently recanted. Regala claimed that he had been tortured.[7] On the other hand, Hular claimed that, although he was not tortured, he admitted to the crime and signed the affidavit because he was afraid he would also be tortured.[8] Narciso Nazareno also claimed to have been tortured to admit to the crime but refused to sign any written statements.[9] The trial court ruled the confessions of Regala and Hular to be inadmissible. However, it held Regala and Nazareno guilty on the basis of their positive identification by Hernandez and de Limos during the police line-up on December 28, 1988 and their testimony in court. The trial court stated: As between the aforecited testimonies of Rogelio de Limos and Hernandez on one hand and the testimonies of Narciso Nazareno and Ramil Regala on the other, the Court would place its reliance on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, because firstly, there is no showing in the record that Rogelio de Limos and Fernando Hernandez are manufactured evidence. As a matter of fact, none of the defense witnesses had ever made such an imputation; and neither did the defense lawyers do so in their extensive memoranda. Secondly, it is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that as between positive testimonies and denials, the Court should place more weight on the former (People v. Mostoles, Jr. 124 SCRA 906). Thirdly, the testimonies of Narciso Nazareno and Ramil Regala are in the nature of alibis, and it is also settled that because they can easily be concocted the Courts should exercise extreme caution in accepting them as defense (People vs. Bagsica, 65 SCRA 400). Orlando Hular and Manuel Laureaga were acquitted for lack of evidence against them.[10] Hence this appeal by Nazareno and Regala. In his brief, accused-appellant Narciso Nazareno assigns the following errors: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS A FATAL FLAW IN HIS PROSECUTION AND SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ACQUIT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON REASONABLE DOUBT. Accused-appellant Ramil Regala, on the other hand, contends: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE UNLAWFUL ARREST OF RAMIL REGALA AS A GROSS VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONY OF THE EXPERT WITNESS FROM THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IN DETERMINING THE PROBABILITY OF GUILT OF APPELLANT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF FERNANDO HERNANDEZ AND ROGELIO DE LIMOS IN CONVICTING HEREIN APPELLANT. We have reviewed the record and the evidence, and we find accused-appellants contentions to be without merit. First. Accused-appellants claim that their arrests without warrant were illegal and justify the nullification of the proceedings of the trial court. The contention is untenable. The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Narciso Nazareno was upheld by this Court in 1990 in a petition for habeas corpus. It appears that, on January 9, 1989, Nazareno filed a motion for bail.[11] As the trial court denied his motion, a petition for habeas corpus was filed on his behalf with this Court. It was alleged that Nazarenos arrest was illegal b ecause it was made without warrant fourteen days after the killing of Romulo Bunye II. This Court dismissed the petition in its decision of July 9, 1990.[12] He filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court also denied on the ground that the warrantless arrest was in accordance with Rule 113, 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. [13] The question which Nazareno raises has thus been settled long ago in a final decision of this Court. Furthermore, Nazareno and Regala waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. [14] For the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. [15] Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. [16] The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of accused.[17] Second. Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Hernandez and de Limos. Accused-appellant Nazareno claims that the decision of the trial court does not contain an analysis of the testimonies of Hernandez and de Limos and suggests that the killing of Bunye was executed by professionals and not by a simple fruit vendor. Nazareno claims that the witnesses were reluctant, evasive and fearful and that they never had the opportunity to fully observe the incident as there was traffic and they merely had a side view of

the assailants. Nazareno claims that the evidence of torture and maltreatment and the other circumstances were indications of manipulation and manufacture of evidence to frame him. [18] Similarly, accused-appellant Regala claims that the testimonies of Hernandez and de Limos were confused and confusing. He then suggests that the manner the killing was perpetuated shows that it was done by professional assassins. [19] These arguments are without merit. Far from being confused, the testimonies of Hernandez and de Limos were straightforward and unwavering and justified the trial court in giving them full faith and credit. The accusedappellants were positively identified by Hernandez and de Limos under circumstances which were ideal for identification. The incident happened in daylight and only two meters away from them. [20] They did not only see the assailants but they also witnessed the whole incident. The testimonies of Hernandez and de Limos during direct and cross examinations corroborate each other on the material facts. A summary of Hernandezs direct examination[21] reveals that on December 14, 1988, between 8:00 to 9:00 in the morning, a woman took a ride in his tricycle, followed by a man whom he identified as Molet Bunye, who asked to be taken to Purok 6, T. Molina St. Upon reaching his destination, Bunye alighted and walked across the street. Hernandez said that just then he noticed a man approach Bunye, point a gun and fire at him. He saw the face of the assailant. He then saw the assailant position himself near Bunyes head and fire another shot when Bunye fell. Hernandez said he got confused and afraid and, as his other passenger was screaming, he tried to turn his tricycle around to leave. As he was doing so, he noticed accused-appellant Ramil Regala on his right approach Bunye and fire a shot at the victim. When asked if he could identify the assailants, Hernandez answered yes. When asked to point to the assailants, he identified accused -appellant Narciso Nazareno as the first one who shot Bunye and Ramil Regala as the second one. In his cross-examination, defense counsel tried to show that Hernandez did not see what really happened. This is not so. His testimony on cross examination, follows slightly edited, follows:[22] Hernandezs testimony was corroborated by Rogelio de Limos. De Limos testified that on December 14, 1988, between 8:00 to 9:00 in the morning, two men, standing in front of Bunyes house on Ilaya Street, hailed his tricycle. He identified in court the two as Narciso Nazareno and Ramil Regala. De Limos said that he was told by Nazareno to follow the stainless tricycle ahead and that upon overtaking it as it stopped at the corner of T. Molina St. and Mendiola St., he also stopped his vehicle. One of the passengers, Nazareno, jumped out of the tricycle, pulled something from his waist and fired at Bunye. When Bunye fell down, Nazareno fired another shot at the head of Bunye, after which Ramil Regala got off the tricycle, approached Bunye and also shot him in the head. Accused-appellants then boarded the tricycle and ordered him to take them to the rotunda, where they alighted from the tricycle and fled. De Limos was unshaken by questions asked during the cross examination. [23] His testimony, slightly edited, follows: As we have held in other cases,[24] testimonies given in simple, straightforward manner, giving details of the incident that could not have been merely concocted, indicate sincerity in the narration of events of the incident and truth as to what, actually happened, specially, if those giving them have not been shown to have any improper motive to testify falsely against the accused. The weight to be given to testimonies of such witnesses depends chiefly upon their observation and means of knowing the facts testified to by them. [25]Accused-appellants point to inconsistencies in the testimonies regarding distances and time lapse as an indication that the testimonies are lacking in veracity. These are inconsistencies on minor points which do not affect the truth of the testimonies. They are discrepancies to be expected from uncoached witnesses.[26] What is important is that the testimonies corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.[27] Third. Accused-appellant Nazareno makes much of the fact that he was recognized by Hernandez only in the police line-up. Nazareno claims that Hernandez was his classmate in the elementary grade in one subject [28] and therefore should have been able to identify and name him on December 14, 1988, when Hernandez gave his first sworn statement. It is contended that because Hernandez did not then recognize Nazareno shows that Hernandezs testimony was manufactured. Other than Nazarenos claim, however, there is no other evidence showing t hat he and Hernandez were classmates. This matter was brought up only once during Hernandezs cross examination in the hearing for bail, where the following appears:[29] There is nothing in the sworn statements of Hernandez nor in his testimony in court which shows that he ever claimed to know Nazareno because they had been classmates eight years before he identified him in the police lineup. He said he only came to know Nazareno at the police line-up on December 28, 1988. He was able to identify Nazareno because he remembered his face as that of the one who shot Bunye on December 14, 1988. Indeed, Hernandez should first have been asked whether he and Nazareno had not been classmates in the elementary grades. There was no basis for defense counsels questions premised on this fact. Be that as it may, even if they had been classmates, it is possible Hernandez had forgotten Nazareno. After all, as Nazareno claimed, they were classmates in only one subject in the elementary grades and that had been eight years before the incident. Fourth. Accused-appellant Nazareno assails the testimony of the eyewitnesses as contrary to the evidence. He contends that Bunye was 56" tall, while he is only 54". Considering the downward angle of the bullet wound at the

back of Bunyes head, he theorizes that the assailant must have been taller than Bunye or Bunye must have been shot while he was in a kneeling position. This contention is without merit. In the first place, there is no basis for the claim that Bunye was 56" tall and Nazareno only 54. Bunyes cadaver was not measured. Nothing in the record shows how the figure 56" was reached. His death certificate,[30] the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination[31] and the autopsy report[32] do not contain data as to his height. It appears that the basis of accused-appellant Nazareno in claiming that Bunye was 56" is the testimony of the wife of the victim, Evelyn Bunye, who said during her cross examination that barefoot, the height of her husband was 56". Her only basis for saying so was because he was [her] husband. [33] Nor was there evidence as to Nazarenos height. It is only in his appellants brief that his height is said to be 54". This Court then, for lack of any basis, cannot give credence to this assertion. In the second place, only accused-appellants claim that, on the basis of the autopsy report, the trajectory of the bullet was sharply downwards[34] and that therefore the conclusion was that the gun was fired from a certain position in such a way that (1) the gun was aimed at the head of victim; (2) the gun was positioned with the barrel pointed downwards - not upwards and neither laterally; (3) the gun was held at a point approximately five (5) feet four (4) inches from the ground; and (4) was fired while at that position. [35] The autopsy report does not say what accused-appellants say. There are no findings in the report regarding the relative positions of the victim and the accused-appellants. The medico-legal officer, when asked if he could determine the position of the victim from the gunshot wound located at the back, said, Since the entry of the gunshot wound is at the back, naturally it is in the back. [37] The answer is vague and does not shed light on the positions of those involved. No further clarification was made as accused-appellants counsels waived the right to cross examine the medico legal officer. Evidence could have been presented showing that the road was level and not sloping or that the angle could not have been caused by the recoil affecting the assailant. As it is, the mere assertion of disparity in height cannot persuade this Court to do away with the positive identification of the accused-appellants by the witnesses. Moreover, the position of a victim when he was shot vis-a-vis an assailant is difficult to ascertain considering the mobility of the head.[38] It is entirely possible that the victims head in this case was slightly inclined upward. As the autopsy report shows, the trajectory of the bullet was directed forwards, downwards and laterally and not, as accused-appellants claim, sharply downwards. This downward angle could be due to the bullet hitting a specific bone (scalp) causing a slight deflection.[39] On the other hand, accused-appellant Ramil Regala contends that the failure of the prosecution to investigate Rey Taling, his alleged companion and Mang Doming, Mang Romy, and Nick Pealosa, as those who supplied the guns, raises doubt as to accused-appellants guilt. However, the manner by which the prosecution of a case is handled is within the sound discretion of the prosecutor and the non-inclusion of other guilty parties is irrelevant to the case against an accused.[40] Fifth. Indeed, accused-appellants defense consists of denial and alibi. Nazareno claims that at the time of the incident he was in the market selling fruits, while Regala claims that he was at home in Cavite. [41] Accused-appellant Regala failed to present any witness to corroborate his alibi, while accused-appellant Nazareno presented his mother Gloria Nazareno who testified that she asked her son to go to the market to tend their fruit stand because she wanted to stay at home to rest.[42] His mother could not thus testify positively whether he was in the market at the time of the killing. Nor were accused-appellants strangers to each other. Regala hauled fruits for Nazarenos family.[43] This circumstance rules out the possibility raised by the defense that the accused-appellants had simply been picked up at random[44] by the police. Bare denial and alibi are insufficient to overcome the positive identification given by the prosecution witnesses. As the trial court held, between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence and weight. [45] But we find that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not proven and therefore should not be appreciated. There is neither evidence of planning or preparation to kill nor of the time when the plot was conceived.[46] However, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was correctly appreciated by the trial court to qualify the killing to murder. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that Bunye was not in a position to defend himself and that the manner by which the killing was done shows that his assailants consciously and deliberately adopted a particular method or form of attack to insure the accomplishment of their purpose. [47] The attack was sudden and unexpected, giving Bunye no chance to defend himself, thereby insuring the execution of the crime without risk to its perpetrators. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136, being in accord with the law and the evidence, is AFFIRMED. ______________ Halili vs. Public Service Commission

A petition for certiorari was filed seeking for the revocation and annulment of an order by respondent Public Service Commission dated July 3, 1952 which changed part of the route of the bus service established by the respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc., between Balara and City Hall,

Manila. Petitioner herein is the holder of various certificates of public convenience to operate auto-truck services between Balara and various points in the City of Manila and its suburbs. On July 2, 1952, CAM Transit Co., Inc. filed a petition with the respondent Commission alleging that the route authorized in its City Hall(Manila)-Balara line is entirely different from that supported by the evidence presented in the hearing, and praying that the certificate be amended. On the following day, July 3, and without previous notice to the petitioner or a previous hearing thereon, ordered the modification of the line in accordance with the petition. Issue: WON the order of the amendment of the route, without notice to the petitioner and other interested parties, or hearing in which the latter may be given opportunity to be present, was lawfully and validly issued by the Commission. WON petitioners right to due process was violated. Held: The order by the Commission of amending the route was not validly issued and petitioners right to due process was violated. In the first place, the power to issue provisional permits is expressly authorized. In the second place, the change ordered is not provisional merely, like that granted in a provisional permit, but final and permanent in character. In the third place, even if the Commission is not bound by the rules in judicial proceedings, it must bow its head to he constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of a right without due process of law. The "due process of law" clause of the Constitution binds not only the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, but also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. (16 C.J.S., 1149.)"Due process of law, or, in the mean accord with the procedure outlines in the law, or, in the absence of express procedure, under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction for the particular class of cases to which the one in question belongs," (16 C.J.S., 1141.) In the case at bar, the Public Service Act does not include the amendment made in the disputed order among those may be ordered without notice or hearing in accordance with Section 17 of the Act. Is the amendment, without notice or hearing, permitted by the well settled maxims of law? We declare it is not, because due process of law guarantees notice and opportunity to be heard to persons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated. In a General sense it means the right to be heard before some tribunal having jurisdiction to determine the question in dispute. By "due process of law" is meant orderly proceeding adopted to the nature of the case, before a tribunal having jurisdiction, which proceeds upon notice, with an opportunity to bee heard, with full power to grant relief. Some legal procedure in which the person proceeded against, if he is to be concluded thereby, shall have an opportunity to defend himself. A course of proceeding according to these rules and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. ___________________

MIGUEL R. CORNEJO, petitioner, vs. ANDRES GABRIEL, provincial governor of Rizal, and the PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL, composed of ANDRES GABRIEL, PEDRO MAGSALIN and CATALINO S. CRUZ, respondents. MALCOLM, J.: The petitioner in this case, the suspended municipal president of Pasay, Rizal, seeks by these proceedings in mandamus to have the provincial governor and the provincial board of the Province of Rizal temporarily restrained from going ahead with investigation of the charges filed against him pending resolution of the case, and to have an order issue directed to the provincial governor commanding him to return the

petitioner to his position as municipal president of Pasay. The members of the provincial board have interposed a demurrer based on the ground that this court has no right to keep them from complying with the provisions of the law. The provincial governor has filed an answer to the petition, in which he alleges as a special defense that numerous complaints have been received by him against the conduct of Miguel R. Cornejo, municipal president of Pasay; that these complaints were investigated by him; that he came to the conclusion that agreeable to the powers conferred upon provincial governors, the municipal president should be temporarily suspended, and that an investigation is now being conducted by the provincial board. Counsel for petitioner has argued, with much eloquence, that his client has been deprived of an office, to which he was elected by popular vote, without having an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. The respondents reply that all that the provincial governor and the provincial board have done in this case is to comply with the requirements of the law which they are sworn to enforce. Obviously, therefore, we should first have before us the applicable provisions of the Philippine law bearing on the subject of suspension of public officers. Under the title of "Provincial supervision over municipal officers," Article IV of Chapter 57 of the Administrative Code, provides: The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration in office. for minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected, the written charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within ten days. Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. When written charges are preferred by a provincial governor against a municipal officer, the provincial board shall, at its next meeting, regular or special, furnish a copy of said charges to the accused official, with a notification of the time and place of hearing thereon; and at the time and place appointed, the board shall proceed to hear and investigate the truth or falsity of said charges, giving the accused official full opportunity to be heard. The hearing shall occur as soon as may be practicable, and in case suspension has been effected, not later than fifteen days from the date the accused is furnished a copy of the charges, unless the suspended official shall, on sufficient grounds, request an extension of time to prepare his defense. Action by provincial board. If, upon due consideration, the provincial board shall adjudge that the charges are not sustained, the proceedings shall be dismissed; if it shall adjudge that the accused has been guilty of misconduct which would be sufficiently punished by reprimand, or further reprimand, it shall direct the provincial governor to deliver such reprimand in pursuance of its judgment; and in either case the official, if previously suspended, shall be reinstated. If in the opinion of the board the case is one requiring more severe discipline, it shall without unnecessary delay forward to the Chief of the Executive Bureau certified copies of the record in the case, including the charges, the evidence, and the findings of the board, to which shall be added the recommendation of the board as to whether the official ought to be suspended, further suspended, or finally dismissed from office; and in such case the board may exercise its discretion to reinstate the official, if already suspended, or to suspend him or continue his suspension pending final action. The trial of a suspended municipal official and the proceedings incident thereto shall be given preference over the current and routine business of the board. Action by Chief of Executive Bureau. Upon receiving the papers in any such proceeding the Chief of the Executive Bureau shall review the case without unnecessary delay and shall make such order for the reinstatement, dismissal, suspension, or further suspension of the official, as the facts shall warrant. Disciplinary suspension made upon order of the chief of the Executive Bureau shall be without pay and in duration shall not exceed two months. No final dismissal hereinunder shall take effect until recommended by the Department Head and approved by the Governor-General. With the foregoing legal provisions in mind, certain aspects of the case can be disposed of without difficulty. Thus it cannot be seriously contended that the courts should interfere with an orderly investigation which is about to be conducted by the provincial board. Nor can there be any doubt as to the meaning of the law. A very minute and extensive procedure is provided by the Legislature for central and provincial supervision of municipal officers. The provincial governor, in receiving and investigating complaints against such officers, may take three courses. For a minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; but if the maladministration in office is more serious he may temporarily suspend the officer, and thereafter may file written charges against the officer with the provincial board. The procedure followed before the provincial board and later on appeal to the Chief of the Executive Bureau, while interesting, does not concern us. The important fact is that the law, in permitting a provincial governor temporarily to suspend a municipal officer, makes no mention of a formal hearing of the charges.

In the exercise of this disciplinary power by the provincial governor, all that he can do before the presentation of formal charges is either to reprimand the officer or to suspend him temporarily from office. In the latter case the provincial governor's action is not a finality. The law is especially careful to guard the rights of officer charged with maladministration in office. But the point is made that, notwithstanding the provisions of the law and notwithstanding long official practice, the temporary suspension of a municipal officer, without an opportunity to be heared in his own defense, is in contravention of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights concerning due process of law. So much has been written on the subject of due process of law that is would be futile to enter into its intricate mazes. It is self-evident, however, that, in ordinary cases, to condemn without a hearing violates the due process of law clause of the American Constitution and of the Philippine Bill of Rights. It is for this reason that we can well understand the logic of those who cling to this through and to whom a contemplated violation of the Constitution is most repugnant. It is but fair, in ordinary cases, that a public official should not be removed or suspended without notice, charges, a trial, and an opportunity for explanation. But not permitting our judgment to be unduly swayed by sympathy for the petitioner's brave fight, and recalling again that the courts have ordinarily to give effect to legislative purposes, it is further only fair to mention certain exceptions to the due process of law rule, which would seem to include the instant case. The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. (Weimer vs. bunbury [1874], 30 Mich., 201; Den. vs. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. [1856], 18 How., 272 followed in Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco [1910], 16 Phil., 534; Tan Te vs. Bell {1914], 27 Phil., 354; U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus [1915], 31 Phil., 218 and other Philippine cases). In certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. Examples of special or summary proceedings affecting the life, liberty or property of the individual without any hearing can easily be recalled. Among these are the arrest of an offender pending the filing of charges; the restraint of property in tax cases; the granting of preliminary injunction ex parte; and the suspension of officers or employees by the Governor-General or a Chief of a Bureau pending an investigation. (See Weimer vs. Bunbury, supra; 12 C.J., 1224; Administrative Code, sec. 694.) Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office as "property." It is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due proces of law, but is a public trust or agency. In the case of Taylor vs.Beckham ([1899], 178, U. S., 548), Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said that: "Decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere agencies or trust, and not property as such." The basic idea of government in the Philippine Islands, as in the United States, is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people whom he represents. Coming now to the more specific consideration of the issue in this case, we turn to the article by Prof. Frank J. Goodnow, generally considered the leading authority in the United States on the subject of Administration Law, in Vol. 29, Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, and find the rules as to suspension of public officers laid down very concisely as follows: "Power to suspend may be exercised without notice to the person suspended." (P. 1405.) The citation by Professor Goodnow to support his conclusion is State of Florida, ex rel. Attorney-General vs. Johnson ([1892], 30 Fla., 433; 18 L. R. A., 410). It was here held by the Supreme Court of Florida that the governor could, under section 15 of the executive article of the Constitution, suspend an officer for neglect of duty in office without giving previous notice to the officer of the charge made against him. A later compilation of the pertinent authorities is to be found in 22 Ruling Case Law, pp. 564, 565. On the subject of suspension of public officers it is heared said: The suspension of an officer pending his trial for misconduct, so as to tie his hands for the time being, seems to be universally accepted as fair, and often necessary. . . . Notice and hearing are not prerequisite to suspension unless required by statute and therefore suspension without such notice does not deprive the officer of property without due process of law. Nor is a suspension wanting in due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the laws because the evidence against the officer is not produced and he is not given an opportunity to confront his accusers and cross-examine the witnesses.

The case to support the first sentence in the above enunciation of the rule is State vs. Megaarden (85 Minn., 41), which in turn is predicated on State vs. Peterson ([1892], 50 Minn., 239). In a discussion of the subject more general than specific, it was said: The safety of the state, which is the highest law, imperatively requires the suspension, pending his trial, of a public officer, especially a custodian of public funds, charged with malfeasance or

nonfeasance in office. Suspension does not remove the officer, but merely prevents him, for the time being, from performing the functions of his office; and from the very necessities of the case must precede a trial or hearing. Such temporary suspension without previous hearing is fully in accordance with the analogies of the law. It is a constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of his liberty or property except by due process of law, which includes notice and a hearing, yet it was never claimed that in criminal procedure a person could not be arrested and deprived of his liberty until a trial could reasonably be had, or that in civil actions ex parte and temporary injunctions might not be issued and retained in proper case, until a trial could be had, and the rights of the parties determined. We have no doubt, therefore, of the authority of the legislature to vest the governor with power to temporarily suspend a county treasurer pending the investigation of the charges against him, of official misconduct. The case cited by the editors of Ruling Case Law as authority for their second sentence is that of Griner vs.Thomas ([1907], 101 Texas, 36; 16 Ann. Cas., 944). The holding of the court here was that it is within the power of the legislature to authorize the temporary suspension of a public officer during the pendency of valid proceedings to remove such officer and as an incident to such proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that the constitution has given power to remove such officer only for cause and after a hearing. Notice and hearing are not preprequisites to the suspension of a public officer under a statute which does not provide for such notice and hearing. The third case cited by Ruling Case Law comes from the United States Supreme Court. (Wilson vs. North Carolina [1897], 169 U.S, 586.) An examination of the decision, however, shows that while it tends to substantiate the rule, the facts are not exactly on all fours with those before us. Without, therefore, stopping to set forth the facts, only the following from the body of the decisioned be noted, viz.: In speaking of the statute and the purpose of this particular provision the Supreme Court of the State said: "The duty of suspension was imposed upon the Governor from the highest motives of public policy to prevent the danger to the public interests which might arise from leaving such great powers and responsibilities in the hands of men legally disqualified. To leave them in full charge of their office until the next biennial session of the legislature, or pending litigation which might be continued for year, would destroy the very object of the law. As the Governor was, therefore, by the very and spirit of the law, required to act and act promptly, necessarily upon his own findings of fact, we are compelled to hold that such official action was, under the circumstances, due process of law. Even if it were proper, the Governor would have no power to direct an issue like a chancellor." The highest court of the State has held that this statue was not a violation of the constitution of the State; that the hearing before the Governor was sufficient; that the office was substantially an administrative one, although the commission was designed by a statute subsequent to that which created it, a court of record; that the officer taking office under the statute was bound to take it on the terms provided for therein; that he was lawfully suspended from office; and that he was not entitled to a trial by jury upon the hearing of this case in the trial court. As a result the court held that the defendant had not been deprived of his property without due process of law, nor had he been denied the equal protection of the laws. xxx xxx xxx

We are of opinion the plaintiff in error was not deprived of any right guaranteed to him by the Federal Constitution, by reason of the proceedings before the Governor under the statute above mentioned, and resulting in his suspension from office. The procedure was in accordance with the constitution and laws of the State. It was taken under a valid statute creating a state office in a constitutional manner, as the state court has held. What kind and how much of a hearing the officer should have before suspension by the Governor was a matter for the state legislature to determine, having regard to the constitution of the State. (There can also be cited as supporting authority State ex rel. Wendling vs. Board of Police and Fire Commissioners [1915], 159 Wis., 295; Sumpter vs. State {1906], 81 Ark., 60; Gray vs. McLendon [1901], 134 Ga., 224; State vs. Police Commissioners, 16 Mo. App., 947; Preston vs. City of Chicago [1910], 246 III., 26; and People vs. Draper [1910], 124 N.Y.S., 758, where it was held that the legislature has the right to authorize an officer to remove an appointive or elective officer without notice or hearing.) Certain intimations have been made that under the procedure prescribed by the law an injustice might be done municipal officers. Such suppositions are not unusual even as to cases before the courts, but in this as in all other instances, the presumption always is that the law will be followed and that the investigation and the hearing will be impartial. In the language of Justice Trent in Severino vs. Governor-General ([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 402), "the presumption is just as conclusive in favor of executive action, as to its correctness and justness, as it is in favor of judicial action." We entertain no doubt that the provincial governor, fully conscious of the trust reposed in him by the law, will act only in cases where strong reasons exist for exercising the power of suspension and upon a high consideration of his duty.

The suggestion that an unfriendly governor might unduly delay the hearing is also without much force. The same might be said of any administrative officer, or in fact of any judicial officer. The presumption, again, is that every officer will do his duty promptly, and if he does not, certainly a remedy can be found to make him do so. Not only this, but the law before us expedites the proceedings by fixing a short period of ten days within which the provincial governor must lay the charges before the provincial board, which must be heard by the latter body within fifteen days. Of more compelling force is the suggestion from the other side that the public interest might suffer detriment by postponing the temporary suspension until after the hearing. Our holding, after most thoughtful consideration, is that the provisions of section 2188 of the Administrative Code are clear and that they do not offend the due process of law clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. Accordingly, it is our duty to apply the law without fear or favor. Petition denied with costs. So ordered.