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ABSTRACT.

I argue that idealization can throw a new light upon Freuds the-
ory of sublimation and that courtly love can be seen as an illustration of this
suggestion. For Freud sublimation is the process in which the sexual aim of the
instincts is diverted towards a non-sexual aim that is still related with the orig-
inal one. Freuds theory struggles with at least two problems. The first prob-
lem regards the relation between the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem.
Freud describes this relation with different terms. The notion of desexualiza-
tion represents precisely what he has in mind. This term propounds that Freud
understands sublimation as a one-sided movement that consists in leaving
behind the original sexual aim. Courtly love proves that desexualization, as Freud
understands it, is not a necessary condition for sublimation. A weakening of
Freuds strong claim concerning desexualization implies however that the dis-
tinction between sublimation and perversion is not always clearcut. The second
problem appertains to the processes that bring about the transformation of the
sexual aim. Courtly love infers that idealization of the love-object can play an
important role in bringing about sublimation. The kind of sublimation that cor-
responds to courtly love is what has been called Verfhrung (rapture) in German
Idealism.
Psychoanalytic theory is not willing to conceive idealization in this sense.
According to the classical psychoanalytic theory, idealization produces repression
of sexual instincts. I argue that this idea is counter-intuitive and that Freuds
understanding of idealization is more subtle. I give a short overview of Freuds
approach and I draw attention to some elements in his approach that help us to
describe the direct link between idealization and sublimation. Idealization of the
beloved can go together with an inhibition of sexual instincts. But it is wrong
to identify aim-inhibition with repression or with a softening of the instincts. My
suggestion is that the interaction between idealization and sublimation can be
characterised as an interaction between an intensification of the sexual instincts,
as it happens in any form of falling in love, and an inhibition of them. This
interaction results in being lifted up above the sexual instincts that are caused
by the idealised object. In religion and art, the double movement of the instincts
is called exaltation.
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ETHICS NETWORK 14, no. 1 (2007): 53-78.
2007 by European Centre for Ethics, K.U.Leuven. All rights reserved. doi: 10.2143/EP.14.1.2021812
Can sublimation be brought about
through idealization?
Paul Moyaert
K.U.Leuven
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KEYWORDS. Sexual instincts, sublimation, idealization, perversion, courtly
love, repression, inhibition.
irtue is a notion not found in Freud, because Freuds ideas on
instincts and, more specifically, on sexual instincts are incompatible
with the ontological and psychological presuppositions of a traditional
moral theory of virtues. Instincts can never be completely transformed.
Moral perfection, conceived of as a perfection of human nature, cannot
be thought in Freud. Moral life starts with repression and with imposing
limits upon human instincts that that can only be internalized in the form
of a Superego, which replaces the conflict in the heart of the self. Ethics
cannot supersede its own negative tendencies. Ethics not only begins with
repression but always needs it once more, because no repression can ever
be completely successful. Repressed instincts continually interfere with
our moral and social lives. For Freud, sublimation alone can offer an alter-
native for the basically reactive force of ethics. However, we cant return
to the moral life as presented by Alasdair McIntyre, Charles Taylor, and
Paul Van Tongeren. Only sublimation can offer some of the satisfaction
made impossible by ethics. Sublimation seems to take over some of the
functions virtue could play in traditional virtue ethics.
Freud, however, has not been able explain the processes making sub-
limation possible in the sense of a non-reactive transformation of the
repressed and hence perverse sexual instincts. In my essay, I suggest that
closer attention to idealization, the most underrated psychical process in
psychoanalytic theory, can answer some of Freuds unresolved questions.
My paper also suggests that Freuds failure to elaborate a theory of sub-
limation might have deeper grounds. In which sense? Freud argues that
sublimation is a mentally healthy alternative both for repression and per-
version. But his demands are much too high. I explain why the outcome
of a successful sublimation is basically uncertain and that, paradoxically
enough, to be successful sublimation has to remain clearly in touch with
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the perverse tendencies of our sexual instincts. Otherwise, sublimation
cannot be distinguished from repression. My example of courtly love illus-
trates my three claims. Sublimation can be brought about by the idealiza-
tion of the love object; second, it is an alternative for repression, and
finally is stays clearly in touch with the perverse tendencies of the sexual
instincts. Sublimation brought about by idealization is not the most com-
fortable form of sublimation, and that is the reason why it is deeply
human.
Freud defines sublimation as the psychical process through which
sexual instincts are diverted from their sexual aim and transformed into
a non-sexual one, still related to the original. The term aim stands for the
combination of excitation and action. Excitations, for Freud the source
of displeasure, motivate the body to action. The aim of the instinct is an
action which brings about a sensible decrease in tension. This aim is sex-
ual when the instinct motivating the action is a sexual one. Sublimation
is, therefore, a process which basically concerns the aim of the instinct.
What happens regarding the object of the instincts, is for Freud, of sec-
ondary importance. It does not matter which changes are carried out on
the side of the object; as long as the aim of the instinct is not transformed,
there can be no sublimation (Moyaert 2004). The self-transformation of
the instinct results in actions that both improve personal well-being and
stimulate the spiritual life of a cultural community. Freud mentions, by
preference, scientific curiosity, artistic creativity and, to a lesser degree, the
religious life as the most complete expressions of sublimation.
Sublimation is a concept consisting of three elements. For, it refers
to a beginning term that which is transformed, to an end term the result
of the transformation process, and to the relation or the transition between
the beginning and end terms. Thus, to understand sublimation within the
lines drawn by Freud, one has to deal with at least three questions.
First, what falls under the beginning term? What can be transformed
by sublimation, and why is that so? Second, what is the relation between
the end product and the transformed beginning term? How to describe
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the relation between the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem? Freud
says that the new non-sexual aim is still psychically related to the sexual
aim from which it originates. However, it is not very clear how Freud
understands this relation. Let us, therefore, reformulate the second ques-
tion as follows: do we find anything of the beginning term in the end
result or were all traces that pointed out to it effaced along the way? Third,
which psychical processes bring about the transformation of a sexual aim
into a non-sexual one?
For my contribution here to the psychoanalytical debate on sublima-
tion, the second and the third questions are especially important. Concern-
ing the first question, it is sufficient for me to point out that, according
to Freud, only the sexual instincts and their aggressive components are
susceptible to sublimation.
DESEXUALIZATION AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
Freud describes the relation between the starting point and the end prod-
uct in terms of belonging to different semantic areas, such as: diversion
(Wendung), turning away (ablenken), transformation (umbilden), transposi-
tion (umsetzen), and exchange (vertauschen, wechseln). These terms refer to a
process that consists of a unilateral moving away from the original sex-
ual nature of the instincts. The term, however, with which he expresses
most sharply his notion of transformation is desexualization (Desexual-
isierung), but this term is at the same time the most problematic (Lacan
1992, 111). How radical does the turning away from the sexual have to
be? Not realizing the normal sexual aim is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition. Most perversions also do not accomplish the normal sexual
aim, and instead make absolute intermediary sexual aims, which find their
bodily origin in the partial instincts.
One wonders if it is not possible to give a more subtle description of
the transformation, more subtle than the one proposed by Freud. An
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alternative could be, for instance, to redefine sublimation as the realiza-
tion of the same aim in a different way. Sublimation does not mean aban-
doning the sexual aim and replacing it with another non-sexual aim, but
performing the same aim in a less direct, more refined, and thus more cul-
tivated way. One no longer has to conceive of sublimation simply as a
one-sided turning away from the sexual or as a progressive abandoning
of explicit sexual interests. At first sight, this alternative seems to be very
attractive and this particularly for two reasons. It first immediately clari-
fies that sublimating is something other than repressing. The original con-
tent from which one diverts does not necessarily have to disappear from
the scene of the consciousness. The instincts can stay in touch more or
less explicitly with their original aim. Moreover, sublimation can attain a
much broader scope. Why? For Freud, only the sexual instincts, and more
specifically, the perverse and aggressive components of these instincts can
be sublimated (cf. the first question). The ego-instincts motivating the
organism to actions that take care of the body (for instance, to eat, drink,
and wear clothes) are not subject to sublimation since they are, accord-
ing to Freud, not pliable enough. They cannot give up their aim and nei-
ther can they replace their object by its representation. According to the
redefinition of sublimation I suggested, activities such as eating and drink-
ing could also be subject to sublimation. The learning of table manners
and elevation of eating and drinking to the level of art, as happens in gas-
tronomy, could also be regarded as complete forms of sublimation.
Laplanche (1980, 115) and Vergote (1997, 171) argue for a broadening of
the scope of sublimation. But they do it without reformulating Freuds
definition. Their plea for conceiving of table manners and fashion as
expressions of sublimation is not convincing so long as they do not mod-
ify Freuds definition. Could my suggestion offer a conceptual solution for
Laplanche and Vergote? My alternative seems promising but it is not. The
disadvantage is that from the point of view of Freud, one can no longer
mark a difference between behaviour which is unambiguously perverse
and that which is an expression of sublimation. For instance, even sadism
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fits the proposed alternative. For, the sadist also does not accomplish his
sexual aim directly, but enjoys torturing another person in a refined way.
However, it still remains an important question, I think, whether
the transformation process, as proposed by Freud, could receive a less
rigid content, but then of course a reformulation which would not imme-
diately efface the distinction between sublimation and perversion, and
would still make clear that sublimation is something other than repres-
sion. A less linear transformation could be, for instance, that the instinct,
at the very moment of turning away from the sexually perverse origin,
returns for a moment and looks back obliquely at what is left behind
in the process of self-transformation. The transformation does not fol-
low the trajectory of an arrow that moves in a straightforward way, but
rather takes the form of an arrow loop. It is difficult to state this more
sophisticated reformulation in a concise definition, but the advantage is,
in my opinion, that sublimation has no longer to be considered simply
as desexualization. Within this renewed concept, it is not a problem to
consider dancing, which radiates an undeniable erotic glow, as a suc-
cessful form of sublimation. Another advantage is that one could make
a link between sublimation and re-eroticization. What I mean is that sub-
limation can contribute to a restoration of the connexion with sexual
instincts previously broken by repression. To bring sublimation and re-
eroticization of the desire together can, for instance, be important for a
psychodynamic explanation of some kinds of mystic love in Christian-
ity. Accepting that mystic love is indeed a sublimated form of sexual
love and desire, one can hardly deny that this spiritual love, despite its
severe asceticism, can get in touch again, in moments of ecstatic excite-
ment, with the sexual orientation of its divine desire for the absolute, if
one may put it this way. It is wrong to conceive of mystic love as a one-
sided and unilateral turning away from the sexual into the spiritual. It is
sufficient to pay attention to the famous vision of the transverberation
of Teresa of Avila and to read the love poems of John of the Cross to
observe how strongly the spiritual life of a mystic soul can be penetrated
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from within by what one has to describe as a return of sexual drives
(Vergote 1988, 153-162).
Although the second alternative is better than the first, it does not
escape the difficulty already mentioned. For, in one sense or another,
weakening Freuds strong demand for desexualization inevitably has the
consequence of making the demarcation between sublimation and perver-
sion less clear. If one accepts that the sublimated sexual instincts can still
express their own infantile sexual prehistory, then one keeps the door
open for all kinds of sublimations that can no longer hide their perverse
tendencies. Another disadvantage of the second alternative is that look-
ing back at the sexual origin of the transformed instincts cannot be a nec-
essary condition for successful sublimation. For that reason, those who
want to argue for a more sophisticated approach to what Freud under-
stands as desexualization do not have to defend the idea that a phenom-
enon can only be considered as sublimation if and only if something of
the sexual prehistory of the partial instincts is openly functioning in it. If
the second alternative is acceptable, then it is so only in the following
restricted sense: a phenomenon can also be an expression of sublimation
when the sexual aspects are more or less openly participating in it. One
can wonder if all this really has a substantial advantage compared to Freud.
Have we not, after all, replaced one obscurity with another? Is the claim
that one can talk about a successful sublimation even when the sexual is
still more or less actually present, any clearer than Freuds claim that the
new aim is psychically related to the original aim? And what does it mean
to be present more or less explicitly?
THE PROCESSES WHICH BRING ABOUT THE TRANSFORMATION
For Freud, it is crucial to know which psychic processes transform the
sexual aim into a non-sexual one. He suggests two solutions. The trans-
formation can happen via reaction-formation (Reaktionsbildung) or through
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the intervention of narcissism, i.e., via the transformation of object libido
into Ego-libido. He treats the first hypothesis in two passages in Three
Essays On the Theory of Sexuality (178 and 238) and the second hypothesis
in The Ego and the Id (30). Since I want to present a third hypothesis
in my essay, it is not necessary to explain Freuds solutions and to ana-
lyze their limitations (Moyaert 2003). The hypothesis I want to investigate
is whether the transformation process can also take place through ideal-
ization of the love object. In my essay, I have to leave out of consideration if
and in which sense processes such as reaction formation, narcissism, and
idealization can cooperate or rather obstruct each other.
The hypothesis I want to investigate is hardly mentioned in the canon
of psychoanalysis. Moreover, according to the official psychoanalytic the-
ory, idealization and sublimation do exclude each other and idealization
is an obstacle rather than a fertile ground for sublimation. The official the-
ory has it that sublimation is possible only after the negative effects of ide-
alization have been overcome. I want to defend that idealization is capa-
ble of bringing about sublimation directly. My hypothesis does not imply
that each expression of idealization accomplishes sublimation, nor does
it imply that every kind of sublimation has to go through idealization.
To give in advance an idea of the direction I want to follow, it may be
useful to refer to an experience with which art and religion are more
familiar than psychoanalysis; I refer to the experience of rapture. Rapture
is situated at the intersection of idealization of the loved object and sub-
limation. However, it was not in the first place art and religion which
gave me the idea of explaining sublimation from the point of view of an
idealization of the loved object. The example I will use to elaborate my
suggestion is the outdated phenomenon of courtly love, which a few hun-
dred troubadours developed in the twelfth-thirteenth centuries in the
south of France (the region of Languedoc). The idea goes back to the sug-
gestion of Lacan who presented courtly love in his seminar The Ethics of
Psychoanalysis as an exemplary form, a paradigm of sublimation (128).
However, unlike Lacan, who uses courtly love to take a distance from
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Freud and develop his own vision of sublimation, I prefer to use the
example to question some aspects of Freuds theory on sublimation and
give an alternative answer to Freuds question of how the transformation
of sexual instincts is possible.
Let me first give a short presentation of courtly love.
COURTLY LOVE
Courtly love (Bumke 1989) is the very artificial love between a knight and
a Lady of an unequal social status, or between an adventurer of lower
origins and a noblewoman. Due to the difference in social status, as well
as that the Lady already belonged to a Seigneur (Lord), amorous aspira-
tions could not take the form of a legal relation. This love thus falls out-
side the framework of the symbolic relations socially recognized in that
period. However, there existed a kind of binding ritual, a sort of vassalage
of love. After winning the heart of a Lady with the beauty of his musical
and poetic homage, the troubadour swore on his knees, as one would
before his Lord, to be faithful to her. The Lady (domina) became then his
dominus, his Lord or ruler. To pledge her love, the Lady gave her knight
a golden ring, ordered him to stand, and then kissed him on the forehead.
This kiss was called consolation (consolamentum). From then the knight was
supposed to improve himself in the code of conduct of the cortezia, the
code of conduct which implied much more than just chastity. This love
was to be kept secret and, besides the cultivation of a respectful distance,
the courtly lover had to practice virtues such as bravery, generosity,
fidelity, courage, and perseverance. The name of the adored one was kept
secret and was only indicated with a pseudonym, a sign (senhal ). This sym-
bolic gesture is comparable to the practices of the Sufi mystics, who refuse
to use a personal name for God, their highest object of divine love. Above
all, however, courtly love was an expression of servitude. The knight was
a willing servant who had to praise the untouchable, sublime, and cruel
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beauty of his Lady. His highest duty was to commend and please her, to
be obedient and respect her. Courtly love, says Lacan, has something of
a military service about it (Lacan 1992, 153-4), a serving love which
fights for her honourable beauty.
Courtly love rests on the honoring and adoration of the love object.
These are attitudes originating directly from what Freud calls the idealiza-
tion (overvaluation) of the loved object, a process he characterizes in On
Narcissism as Vererhung (1914a, 160), which is translated into English as
homage (1914b, 94), a term which does not sound as strong as the Ger-
man one. Through the idealization, so says Freud, the object is psychisch
erhht (1914a, 159), translated into English as aggrandized and exalted (1914b,
94). The adoration of the noblewoman consists of an exaggerated ideal-
ization, and I mean by this an idealization which is not reciprocated
equally. She is the one to be adored, and he is the one who bows his head
and falls on his knees. In this one-sided adoration ode one can hear some-
thing of a religious echo of may your will happen. The relationship between
the troubadour and the adored woman spontaneously brings to mind a
passage from Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego:
If the sexual overvaluation and the being in love increase even further,
then the interpretation of the pictures becomes still more unmistakable.
The impulsion whose trend is towards directly sexual satisfaction may
now be pushed into the background entirely, as regularly happens, for
instance, with a young mans sentimental passion; the ego becomes
more and more assuming and modest, and the object more and more
sublime and precious, until at last it gets possession of the entire self-
love of the ego, whose self-sacrifice thus follows as a natural conse-
quence. The object has, so to speak, consumed the ego. Traits of humil-
ity, of the limitation of narcissism, and self-injury occur in every case
of being in love. (1921, 113)
The chaste kiss that from time to time he might receive from her was
nothing more than a favor. A legitimate relation involves mutual rights
and duties. The Roman Catholic sacrament of marriage, for instance, is
valid only when the sexual love relation has been consummated. The
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sacrament creates the duty of intercourse and offers the married the priv-
ilege of enjoying sexually each others body. The ritual that binds the Lady
and the knight together does not establish a relation with equal rights and
mutual duties. The courtly lover has only duties and no rights. He is not
allowed to demand anything from his Lady. Other than the pure kiss, he
could receive two other favours very exceptionally. The first was to behold
her naked body. It is important to emphasize that the sexual desire to
contemplate the naked body is an expression of the scopic instinct which
must be distinguished from the vehement and unlimited microscopic
curiosity of the perverse voyeur. Contemplation means that the sexual
instinct and more specifically the violent and aggressive curiosity which
is inherent to the partial instincts find some rest and peace. The drive is
fulfilled by the presence of the contemplated object, while sexual curios-
ity is never satisfied. But the enjoyment one can find in the contempla-
tion of the naked body of the adored love object can hardly deny its own
perverse roots. This enjoyment has to feel from within the presence of
some perverse sexual instincts. Besides this special attraction, there was
very exceptionally a second reward for the lovers great adoration. This
second reward offered more than pure contemplation, but still ruled out
sexual intercourse. In Ren Nelli (1963, 202-203), one can read how a
noblewoman holds her adorer and worshipper in bed in her arms, offer-
ing her chest as a pillow. This is a rather childish erotic scene which, from
the point of view of the troubadour, is not a strong sign of virility. Unlike
in a normal sexual love, in courtly love the act of making love is not a
glory but on the contrary, a failure. Courtly love is a virginal love in the
sense that it does not allow sexual intercourse. Nonetheless, it is not at
all prudish. Courtly love, which aims at purifying sexual love of its direct
bodily expressions, has nothing to do with a dreamy and spiritualized
desire that can only fantasize about an exchange of the hearts and mys-
tic union of souls, leaving the body behind. Courtly love is not the trans-
formation of sexual instincts into a spiritual Schwrmerei. It is neither natu-
ralistic nor platonic. What was forbidden to the sexual instincts is still openly
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present in the poetry of the troubadours. It is well known that some
poems were even extremely obscene (Lacan 1992, 161-164). The process
of spiritualization, meaning a transition from body to mind accomplished
in poetry, did not go hand in hand with a repression of the physical
aspects of sexual love. The sexual instincts are aim-inhibited, but this inhi-
bition did not amount into a repression of the bodily representations of
these instincts. Unlike in hysteria, in courtly love the idealization of the
love object was not based at all on a physical disgust or repulsion of the
sexual (Freud 1905, 152).
Love, by virtue of the adoration that animates it from within, is will-
ing to make sacrifices. The more you adore someone, the more willing you
are, at least in a moment of fanaticism, to bleed for it. Asceticism can be
considered an expression of someones willingness to make a sacrifice.
This willingness goes directly against the spontaneous tendency of the
pleasure principle that pushes the instincts to get rid of their excitation.
Giving up sexual satisfaction is only one sacrifice among many others
which can be reactivated by idealization and certainly not the cruellest
one. The Lady is without any doubt also a figure created by the imagina-
tion and in this creation of the fantasy other more or less dark figures,
which are also strong enough to reign over the pleasure principle, are
reanimated. Idealizing a person gives that person the power to rule over
the pleasure principle and to go against the natural and spontaneous ten-
dency to evacuate unpleasurable tensions. Idealization awakens, reacti-
vates and reinforces the masochistic tendencies of a person and his sex-
ual instincts. Courtly love would be hardly imaginable without a large dose
of masochism (Von Krafft-Ebing 1965, 186, note 1). However, what hap-
pens in courtly love has to be distinguished from neurotic phenomena
where masochistic tendencies can also play an important role; the reason
for this is that the poems of troubadours do not hide or repress the
masochistic roots of their adoration.
Courtly love has to be situated at the intersection of idealization and
sublimation. This example of sublimation suggests that idealization is not
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necessarily an obstacle to sublimation and that the two processes are not
mutually exclusive. But is this all that Freudian psychoanalysis can learn
from courtly love? Does it not invite us at the same time to investigate
whether idealization may also bring about, under certain conditions, desex-
ualization in the sense we have suggested?
IDEALIZATION IS MORE THAN A DEFENCE
Idealization or overvaluation (berschtzung) is an underdeveloped con-
cept in psychoanalysis. In their important reference work The Language of
Psychoanalysis, Laplanche and Pontalis devote no more than one page to
this concept. Moreover, their presentation of this term is incomplete as
they forget to mention that according to Freud, besides the Ego and the
Ego-Ideal, and the independent and non-independent objects of the
libido, the sexual instincts too can be the object of idealization. In Three
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud speaks about idealization of sexual
instincts (161) and, according to Freud, this idealization gives the instincts
the force to transgress limits. Some perversions illustrate this idea. More-
over, the authors of The Language of Psychoanalysis only pay attention to a
statement that has been widely accepted in psychoanalysis, mainly since
Melanie Klein (1952, 222). This statement runs as follows: idealization is
a defence mechanism against the sexual desires and aggressive compo-
nents contained within it and this defence occurs either by repression or
by splitting. The authors of The Language of Psychoanalysis apparently failed
to notice that Freud, firstly, attributes to the idealization of the love object
also the opposite capacity, namely the capacity to neutralize (partially) the
repression or to overcome it. Being in love consists of a flowing-over of
ego-libido onto the object. It has the power to remove repressions and
re-instate perversions (1914b, 100). They also failed to notice that Freud
moreover links the overvaluation of the love object with an increase in
sexual desires, and the increase of their force goes against the idea that
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idealization has an inhibiting effect. Freud describes the increase of power
of the instincts in a passage of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality where
he connects object idealization with the creation of new sexual aims, a
process that results in what he poignantly characterizes as anatomical exten-
sions (Freud 1905, 149-151). I will say more about this process of anatom-
ical transgression later on.
There is another reason why psychoanalytic literature is not prepared
to consider idealization as a process which can bring about sublimation.
In On Narcissism: An Introduction, there is passage that is oft quoted as an
irreplaceable starting point for those who want to discuss sublimation
from a Freudian perspective. There, Freud says that it is very important
not to confuse idealization with sublimation. Idealization, says Freud, does
something with the object of the instinct, while sublimation does some-
thing with the aim of the instinct:
Sublimation is a process that concerns object-libido and consists in the
instincts directing itself towards an aim other than, and remote from,
that of sexual satisfaction; in this process the accent falls upon deflec-
tion from sexuality. Idealization is a process that concerns the object; by
it that object, without any alteration in its nature, is aggrandized and
exalted in the subjects mind. Idealization is possible in the sphere of
ego-libido as well as in that of object-libido. For example, the sexual
overvaluation of an object is an idealization of it. In so far as sublima-
tion describes something that has to do with the instinct and idealiza-
tion something to do with the object, the two concepts are to be dis-
tinguished from each other (94).
In my opinion, Freud expresses himself here in a quite unfortunate way.
Firstly, because his formulation suggests that idealization only concerns
the object of the instinct, which is, as we have seen, not the case. Sec-
ondly, he suggests that idealization of the object has no influence on the
aim of the instinct. However, idealization of the object, as it happens,
for instance while falling in love, undoubtedly has an influence on the
aim. What Freud wants to say is, I think, that idealization gives no new
direction to the instincts. The influence of idealization upon the drives
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has mainly to do with the intensity of the libido and the force of the
object cathexis. To be more precise: idealization works on the pressure
(Drang) of the instinct. The modification consists basically in the increase
of power or in the intensification of its libidinal cathexis. What is over-
valued gains power and increases its influence, hence taking on a dom-
inant position among the different sources of power. Idealization only
brings about a redistribution of the available quantity of energy, being
linked with a gradual modification of the actual object cathexis. If this is
indeed the case, then it makes sense to make a sharp conceptual distinc-
tion between idealization and sublimation. My comment on Freuds
well-known quotation makes it clear why idealization remained a rather
underdeveloped notion in psychoanalytic theory. There is nothing to
be analyzed because idealization, taken as such, produces no other
modification than a mere economical one. At first sight, the effects of ide-
alization on the instincts seem to be fairly simple: the effect occurs
in a completely linear and univocal way; it is a matter of an increase
of excitation accompanied by a decrease of tension elsewhere. The
question is, however, if the repercussions of idealization are always that
simple. It is predictable that I will put this thesis in doubt, as I will argue
that idealization can have a direct effect on the transformation of the
sexual aim.
However, the relation between idealization and sublimation is more
complicated than it seems in On Narcissism: An Introduction. And even for
Freud things are not that simple. For Freud too, the idealization of the
loved object (falling in love) can have two effects: (1) it can revive and
arouse the sexual instincts and intensify their power, and (2) it can inhibit
or slow down the spontaneous expression of the sexual instincts. Once
one notices that it can produce two effects that are, after all, radically
opposed to one another, idealization becomes a much more intriguing
process. We have to explain how it is possible that idealization can pro-
duce two radically different effects. However, this is not the only thing
we have to explain. I have already mentioned that it is a current thesis
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in psychoanalytic theory that idealization is a defence mechanism and,
more specifically, a process that can inhibit the spontaneous expressions
of the sexual instincts. Yet, no matter how familiar this idea is in psy-
choanalytic theory, from a common sense point of view this idea is not
at all evident. On the contrary, it is counter-intuitive. For common sense
is little inclined to ascribe an inhibiting effect to the object idealization.
Would it not be exactly the contrary? Overvaluation of an object is that
not in the first instance a process that can strongly arouse and reinforce
instincts?
Before analyzing the relation between idealization and sublimation, I
have to investigate how it is possible that idealization can produce two
opposite effects. To those who might have forgotten how strong the bod-
ily forces can be that are awoken by falling in love, I have to explain how
idealization is neither only and nor necessarily a defence mechanism. To
those who can only understand what their common sense can understand,
I have to explain in what sense psychoanalysis can indeed attribute an
inhibiting effect upon the sexual instincts to object idealization.
OBJECT IDEALIZATION INCITES SEXUAL INSTINCTS TO EXCEED LIMITS
In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud describes overvaluation of
the sexual object as a process that produces anatomical extensions,
which is a rather weak translation of the German berschreitungen (Freud
1905a, 49):
It is only in the rarest instances that the physical valuation that is set
on the sexual object, as being the goal of the sexual instinct, stops short
at the genitals. The appreciation extends to the whole body of the sex-
ual object and tends to involve every sensation derived from it. ()
This sexual overvaluation is something that cannot be easily reconciled
with a restriction of the sexual aim to union of the actual genitals and
it helps to turn activities connected with other parts of the body into
sexual aims (150-151).
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This extension of libidinal interests is expressed in what Freud calls anatom-
ical transgressions, a process that I would like to qualify as the over-sexualiza-
tion of the body. The more an object is sexually valued, the less sexual
interests are only interested in a direct union of the genitals. Parts of the
body that in normal circumstances are not that attractive and are rather
repulsive, become sexually exciting (151). Sexual overvaluation creates,
according to Freud, new sexual aims and objects. These new sexual inter-
ests do not necessarily replace or repress sexual intercourse. They do not
exclude the normal aim; they can go together with it. In most sexual per-
versions, on the other hand, the new sexual aims and objects (partial objects,
or parts of the body) are isolated and become absolute; they are not rein-
serted in the more embracing normal sexual aim. The new sexual interests
do not necessarily push the normal aim out of its place as is the case with
perversions. Moreover, the infantile partial instincts, which are reanimated
by overvaluation of the sexual object, are not necessarily repressed either.
In neurosis, the idealization of the object is not strong enough to over-
come earlier repression of some partial instincts. The extensions Freud has
in mind in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality are neither the consequence
of repression of the normal sexual aim based on anxiety or disgust, nor a
temporary replacement for the normal sexual aim, which for contingent
reasons could not be realised. Object idealization is capable of breaking the
limits of repulsion and overcoming, at least partially, the restrictive effects
of earlier repressions. In On Narcissism, Freud explicitly attributes the power
to overcome repression to the idealization of the love object (1914b, 100).
IDEALIZATION OF THE OBJECT AND THE INHIBITION OF THE SEXUAL
INSTINCTS
Freud also ascribes the capacity to stop or to inhibit the spontaneous
expression of sexual instincts to the idealization of the love object. He
develops this idea in Being in Love and Hypnosis, chapter eight of
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Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Freuds idea is partially based
on his view that love and sexual desire never become completely compat-
ible. Once you fall in love with a person, perverse fantasies about this
person scarcely become imaginable. Overvaluation of the love object can
drive a wedge between love and sex, between the tendency to take care
of a person and to desire her/him sexually. This idea grounds the psycho-
analytic thesis that the inhibiting repercussions of idealization have first
to be overcome before sublimation can take place. In chapter eight of
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud connects the inhibiting
effect of idealization with the formation of what he calls aim-inhibited
instincts (zielgehemmte Triebe) (1921, 111-113).
The latency period goes together with the development of aim-inhib-
ited sexual instincts and this inhibition finds its expression in what Freud
calls the affectionate (zrtlich) trends of feeling. At the beginning of the
latency period, the sensual current of the sexual impulses disappears
from the surface and makes room for affectionate trends. It is not very
clear how Freud conceives of the relation between the earlier sensual
currents and the appearance of the new affectionate, tender feelings.
Does he understand the submerging of the sensual instincts as an effect
of repression, as an effect of a temporarily biological weakening of the
instincts, or as a combination of repression and weakening? Does repres-
sion prevent the original sexual instincts from expressing them or did
they become too weak to express themselves? Let me formulate the
same question from the point of view of the affectionate trends of feel-
ing. Are they based on a repression of the sexual instincts, or are they
the direct expression of an enfeeblement of the sexual instincts? If they
are the direct outcome of a weakening, then they are not really a defence
mechanism. It is not necessary to put up a barrier against the drives if
they are too feeble to express themselves. In this case, the formation of
affectionate currents is clearly distinguished from reaction-formations.
But the view that tender feelings can be the direct expression of an inner
enfeeblement of the sensual instincts comes into conflict with Freuds
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idea that tenderness is reaction-formation against aggression. Freud says
that the earlier sensual tendencies remain more or less strongly preserved
in the unconscious (1921, 111), and this means that they are not inter-
nally transformed. This is the reason why the formation of tender affec-
tionate feelings cannot be seen as sublimation. In which sense do we
have to understand the term unconscious when Freud says that (they)
remain more or less strongly preserved in the unconscious? Do we have
to understand the unconscious in a topological or in a looser, descrip-
tive sense? After the latency period, thus in early puberty, the body is
again exposed to the pressure of the instincts that now, due to the bio-
logical maturation of the body, have an explicit sexual signification. What
happens, or more precisely, what can happen with the split between the
quietly flowing upper-stream of tender expressions and the undercur-
rent of sexual instincts which return to the surface at full blast? To dis-
cuss this question Freud refers to cases which he labels as unfavorable
(112) and that is the context wherein he examines the inhibiting effect
of object idealization.
In unfavourable cases, the streams of tenderness (love) and violence
(sex) do not come together in one person. This is the case of the man who
shows an exaggerated affection or, as Freud puts it, a sentimental enthu-
siasm (112) for highly respected women in whose company he likes to
stay but by whom he is not sexually excited. This kind of love is the rad-
ical opposite of what Freud considers to be vulgar love (111). In love that
is not only based on adoration, but also reduced to it, the tender feelings
and the violent expressions of the instincts are radically separated from
each other. Freud has in mind the well-known and banal observation of
a man who is only sexually potent with women he does not love and
whom he disdains or is even disgusted by (112). More often, however, the
adolescent succeeds in combining his lyrical images of a romantic love
with the sensual uninhibited expressions of the instincts. This synthesis,
as is known, is never harmonious for a human being. Love and sex will
never become harmonious partners.
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From a psychogenetic point of view, the love relation between the
child and the parents is the first expression of a permanent love, and as
with every kind of love, this love too rests on aim-inhibited instincts.
Later on, a love relation completely dominated by adoration can reinforce
or strengthen the earlier infantile separation (the splitting) between the
sensual and non-sensual tendencies. It is now very important to have a
precise idea of the causal relation between idealization, inhibition, and
repression. Idealization of the love object is not a process that by itself
causes the repression of sensual instincts. But what idealization can bring
about is a reinforcement of a splitting (or repression) that happened already.
Idealization of the object can maintain repression in about the same
sense as over-cathexis can form a supplementary protection against the
return of a repressed content. The point I want to emphasize here is that
the tenor of the inhibiting effect of idealization upon the instincts
depends on the vicissitudes of the infantile prehistory of the instincts.
And it is important to emphasize this point to avoid the direct and exclu-
sive reduction of the inhibiting effect of idealization to repression. How-
ever, a reinforcement of earlier repressions is only one possible aim-
inhibiting effect of idealization. Aim-inhibition is much broader than
repression. What I am suggesting is that an idealization of a person can
also bring about an inhibition without repression. Freuds further considera-
tions in Being in Love and Hypnosis make clear that he strongly hesi-
tates to identify the inhibiting force of object idealization with repres-
sion. Freud uses different alternatives for describing the inhibiting effect
of idealization: If the sensual impulsions are more or less effectively
repressed or set aside (Zurcksetzung der sinnlichen Strebungen) (112). To
set aside impulsions is not exactly the same as to repress them. Further
in the text Freud speaks about the sexual interests that are pushed into
the background entirely (113), which is less strong than repression.
Inhibition has different degrees, and repression is only one form. There
are many mixed-forms between inhibition with repression and inhibi-
tion without repression.
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If one accepts that the idealization of the love object does not nec-
essarily cause the repression of the instincts, nor that it necessarily inten-
sifies the effects of earlier repression in sum if one accepts that inhibi-
tion without repression is possible then we still have to explain how indeed
idealization can have an inhibiting development. How to explain that ide-
alization can lend itself to intensifying or maintaining the effects of the previous
repression? How to understand that the idealization can have an inhibiting
effect? Where does its inhibiting effect come from? Why is it not just the
contrary? Why does idealization not automatically amount to a boosting
up of the sexual instincts that can, at least partially, overcome the earlier
splitting between the sensual and non-sensual instincts? Freuds observa-
tion that love and sex, due to their very nature, are as such more or less
incompatible is only one element of the answer.
The following experience can help to the clarify Freuds insight. An
imposing mountain view can awake a feeling of deep respect. We describe
the grandeur of what makes an overwhelming impression upon us with
terms such as awesome beauty. Respect is a mixture of adoration and
fear. This experience is the core of what is called the experience of the
sublime in religion and art. This religious and aesthetic experience is mainly
illustrated with impressive natural phenomena such as a mountain chain,
a whirling waterfall, the starry sky, an overwhelming storm, an infinite
desert, etc. But a person too can be impressive in about the same sense.
The more we adore someone, the more strongly spontaneous reactions
such as awe, bowing our head, and falling upon our knees come to the
fore. I am not attempting to answer the question of why we adore (ide-
alize) a person; I am simply trying to describe the effects of admiration.
The person who impresses you emanates a natural power that incites you
to respect some distance and to hold back your desires. The movement
of the grasping hand will be transformed into a restrained gesture. The
idealized person rises above his direct surroundings and also above your
desires. His/her imposing appearance dominates not only its immediate
surroundings but and this is more important also the desires that
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he/she produces and awakens in you. The desires refrain from them-
selves, which mean that they retire and move back. The experience I am
trying to describe corresponds to what Freud understands as the narcis-
sistic object choice in On Narcissism. In this essay, Freud describes this
object choice from the point of view of a man who adores the uncon-
scious reappearance of the idealized image of narcissistic self-perfection
in a woman.
INHIBITION IS BROADER THAN AIM-INHIBITION
It is important to notice that the inhibiting effect of idealization upon the
sexual instincts cannot be reduced to repression, nor to a softening or a
soothing of the instincts towards the idealized object. The adoration of a
person does not produce the desire to take care of the admired person.
To adore a person is different from being touched or moved by a vulner-
able person. A vulnerable person can bring about tender feelings and
awake the desire to protect the object. What is impressive and adorable
can bring you into a state of rapture, but this feeling is not accompanied
by the desire to take care of and to protect the object of your admiration.
I refer to this common sense observation to emphasize that, in my opin-
ion, the inhibiting effects of idealization cannot be reduced to the forma-
tion of what Freud calls tender and affectionate feelings.
Being inhibited is a very general qualification of the instinct that is not
capable of accomplishing its direct sexual aim and reaching its object. Dif-
ferent causes can inhibit the spontaneity of the sexual instincts. An exter-
nal obstacle or some intra-psychic conflicts can prevent free passage. But
it is also possible that the instinct lacks the force to overcome obstacles
and that it is internally too softened to sexually grasp the object. Freud
uses the term aim-inhibited mostly to refer to a rather specific class of feel-
ings: i.e., feelings of affection (tenderness) and social feelings. Aim-inhib-
ited is more or less synonymous with affectionate (zrtlich). This means
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that aim-inhibited instincts, in the sense of affectionate instincts, are a
subcategory of inhibited instincts. An inhibited instinct is not necessarily
a tender instinct and not every inhibition is necessarily caused nor accom-
panied by an inner softening of the sexual instincts (Laplanche and Pon-
talis, 24). From a descriptive point of view, it is not very clear what kind
of social feelings fall under zrtliche Gefhlsrichtungen. In chapter eight of
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, he just considers it sufficient to
oppose tender feelings to expressions of the sensual instinct. This is a
rather negative approach: tender is not-sensual. In Two Encyclopedia
Articles, Freud clarifies what he has in mind by referring to the relations
where aim-inhibited instincts play a role. They play a role in the relations
based on tenderness between parents and children, in friendship, and in
marriage (258). Freuds negative definition lacks subtlety. In Three Essays
on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud puts three emotional attitudes side by side
without any further differentiation: affection, admiration (Vererhung), and
respect (Hochachtung). Freud describes these three emotional attitudes as
the affectionate current of the sexual life (1905, 200). This is in fact a
very special trio. What makes Freud name them all in one breath? Only
psycho-analytic investigation can show that behind this affection, admi-
ration and respect there lie concealed the old sexual longings of the infan-
tile component instincts which have now become unserviceable (1905,
200). They are, therefore, all three an expression of non-sensual instincts
and they have all three in common a mitigation (Milderung) of the sexual
aims. This generalization is too rough. First of all, Freud does not make
a distinction between mitigation as the cause of aim-inhibition and miti-
gation as the consequence of the inhibition. Second, it is an open ques-
tion whether one can indeed consider the three examples as a weakening
or tempering of the sensual instincts. Third, one has to investigate whether
in the three cases the sensual current has disappeared from the upper-
stream in the same radical way. What the three attitudes adoration,
respect, and tenderness do have in common is that their sensual aims
are inhibited, but this does not mean that they are aim-inhibited. Since
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Freud seems to use the term aim-inhibition mostly to refer to mitigated
currents of sexual life, I would not use this term as a characterization of
adoration. For my presentation, only adoration is important. Adoration is
not necessarily an attitude coming from an inner weakening of the sen-
sual instincts and it is not an attitude that manifests itself directly as a
softening of these instincts. Adoration is not the effect of an inner miti-
gation of the sexual instincts, but a reaction of the instincts caused by the
imposing greatness of what appears on the side of the object. Moreover,
adoration is not necessarily an expression of instincts that are too weak
to express their sensual character. Adoration can very explicitly commu-
nicate its sensual interests. The sexual core of adoration is not necessar-
ily repressed, nor mitigated, nor evaporated, nor split-off. In sum, ideal-
ization of the love object can consist in an inhibition of the sensual instincts
without repression and without weakening. Inhibition without repression and
without mitigation is what happens in courtly love. The kind of inhibition
brought about by adoration is sublimation. Courtly love is a perfect illus-
tration of this thesis.
ADORATION AND THE UPWARD PRESSURE OF THE INSTINCTS: THE CROSSING
OF IDEALIZATION AND SUBLIMATION
I would like to recall that two opposite effects can emanate from object
idealization: intensification and inhibition of the sensual instincts. There
is no reason to pretend that both effects exclude each other. Both effects
can arise simultaneously, i.e., in one and the same movement, from the object ide-
alization, and this results in what could be described as a rearing up of the
instincts. Instead of taking the two processes, inhibition and intensifica-
tion, separately I want to stress the clash, i.e., the intersection of both
whereby the inhibition has the upper hand. The experience that corre-
sponds to this clash of two opposing forces amounts to the exaltation of
sensual instincts. Exaltation can be seen as a synonym for rapture or
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ecstasy. Rapture is the inhibition of instincts without repression, without
splitting, and without softening. An object that brings me into rapture
has the power to exalt me and to lift me above my desires, to lift me also
above the desires that the idealized object awakens in me and even above
the explicit sensual desires. Idealization can strengthen earlier defence
mechanisms, but it can also awaken desires and make them strong enough
to overcome the counter pressure of repression.
Rapture is the intersection of idealization and sublimation and there,
at that crossing point, the transformation of the sensual instincts happens
in statu nascendi, a transformation to be seen as being elevated above the
sensual desires. This transformation can further be developed into a more
permanent adoration and worshipping. And what else is courtly love than
the cultivation of this adoration? What else is courtly love than the wor-
ship of an unapproachable Lady who, elevated as she is, rises above the
desires that she awakens and who by virtue of her elevated position defies
and inhibits the desires she mobilizes? She, who inhibits the desires with-
out extinguishing them? Sublimation is inhibition without repression and
without mitigation.
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