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G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004 JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of the companys incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock. On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez).2 On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortaez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch (now Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez. Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition for letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a special administrator. As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which included, among other properties, 2,0293 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing 50.725% of the companys outstanding capital stock. On April 15, 1989, the decedents wife, Juliana S. Ortaez, claiming that she owned 1,0144 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortaez failed to repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by

petitioner FLAG in its name. On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortaez, acting in his personal capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining 1,0115 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG, represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortaez failed to repurchase the same. It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate proceedings at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortaez and her two children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately sold by Juliana Ortaez on April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortaez on October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG. On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina OrtaezEnderes and her siblings (hereafter referred to as private respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez. On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of private respondents Enderes et al. and appointed private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock. On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed

a motion to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedents estate. These motions were opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez. On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez. On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special Administrator Jose Ortaez for the approval of the deeds of sale for the reason that: Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a sale of a property of the estate without an Order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. Since the sales in question were entered into by Juliana S. Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez in their personal capacity without prior approval of the Court, the same is not binding upon the Estate. On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another order granting the motion of Special Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement or extrajudicial partition of estate. The court reasoned that: Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the intestate court, Jose Ortaez filed, on December 22, 1997, a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied his petition, however, ruling that there was no legal justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose Ortaez, his brother Rafael Ortaez and mother Juliana Ortaez during the pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortaez, without the requisite approval of the intestate court, when it was clear that there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the sale made by Jose Ortaez and his mother Juliana Ortaez to FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly appropriated for themselves, without approval of the intestate court, was void.8 Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife) and FLAG now raise the following errors for our consideration:

The Court of Appeals committed grave reversible ERROR: xxx D. In failing to declare null and void the orders of the intestate court which nullified the sale of shares of stock between the legitimate heir Jose S. Ortaez and petitioner FLAG because of settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that an heir has the right to dispose of the decedents property even if the same is under administration pursuant to Civil Code provision that possession of hereditary property is transmitted to the heir the moment of death of the decedent (Acedebo vs. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 194); ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the shares of stocks was invalid. HELD: YES. We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock in their favor because this was already settled a long time ago by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated June 23, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively upheld by us in our resolution dated October 9, 1998 in G.R. No. 135177 dismissing the petition for review on a technicality and thereafter denying the motion for reconsideration on January 13, 1999 on the ground that there was no compelling reason to reconsider said denial.18 Our decision became final on February 23, 1999 and was accordingly entered in the book of entry of judgments. From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortaez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortaez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortaez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.

An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent.20 However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares.21 This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.

BAR 2011 COMMERCIAL LAW PRE-WEEK REMINDERS Atty. Maria Zarah R. Villanueva-Castro CHATTEL MORTGAGE Is redemption allowed in case of foreclosure of chattel mortgage on a personal property? There is no law in our statute books which vests the right of redemption over personal property. Act No. 1508, or the Chattel Mortgage Law, ostensibly could have served as the vehicle for any legislative intent to bestow a right of redemption over personal property, since that law governs the extrajudicial sale of mortgaged personal property, but the statute is definitely silent on the point. And Section 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, extensively relied upon by the Court of Appeals, starkly utters that the right of redemption applies to real properties, not personal properties, sold on execution. Unmistakably, the redemption cited in Section 13 partakes of an equity of redemption, which is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property after his default in the performance of the conditions of the mortgage but before the sale of the property to clear it from the encumbrance of the mortgage. It is not the same as right of redemption which is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale, and even after confirmation of the sale. (RCBC vs. ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION, G.R. No. 179756, 2 October 2009) TRUST RECEIPTS What is a trust receipt transaction? A trust receipt as a security transaction intended to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise imported or purchased. (ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS CORP., ET AL. vs. HOME BANKERS SAVINGS & TRUST CO., G.R. No. 137232, 29 June 2005 citing Samo vs. People, 115 Phil. 346) Hence, if the goods received by a party were not held in trust nor were they intended for sale and neither did such party have the duty to return them, but they were only intended for use in the fabrication of steel communication towers, the Court held that the transaction is not one of trust receipt. (NG vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No.173905, 23 April 2010) What are the obligations of the entrustee in a Trust Receipt transaction? The entrustee is obliged to (1) hold the goods, documents or instruments in trust for the entruster and shall dispose of them strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions of the trust receipt; (2) receive the proceeds in trust for the entruster and turn over the same to the entruster to the extent of the amount owed to the entruster or as appears on the trust receipt; (3) insure the goods for their total value against loss from fire, theft, pilferage or other casualties; (4) keep said goods or the proceeds therefrom whether in money or whatever form, separate and capable of identification as property of the entruster; (5) return the goods, documents or instruments in the event of non-sale or upon demand of the entruster; and (6) observe all other terms and conditions of the trust receipt not contrary to the provisions of the Trust Receipts Law. (METROPOLITAN BANK vs. SEC.GONZALES, et al., G.R. No. 180165, 7 April 2009) If the entrustee were to return the goods to the entruster as he was not able to sell them, would the obligation secured by the trust receipt be

extinguished? Is deficiency claim proper in a trust receipt transaction? NO. A trust receipt is a security agreement, pursuant to which a bank acquires a security interest in the goods. xxx The initial repossession by the bank of the goods subject of the trust receipt did not result in the full satisfaction of the loan obligation. A

claim for deficiency would thus be in order. (LANDL & COMPANY INC., VS. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY G.R. No. 159622, 30 July 2004) If the entrustee were to cancel the trust receipt and take possession of the goods, would this amount to dacion en pago? Neither can said repossession amount to dacion en pago. Dation in payment takes place when property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money and the same is governed by sales. Dation in payment is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. (Ibid, citing PNB vs. Hon. Pineda, G.R. 46658, 13 May 1991) The repossession of the goods by the entrustee was merely to secure the payment of its obligation to the entrustor and not for the purpose of transferring ownership thereof in satisfaction of the obligation. LETTERS OF CREDIT How does the independence principle apply to letters of credit? The so-called independence principle assures the seller or the beneficiary of prompt payment independent of any breach of the main contract and precludes the issuing bank from determining whether the main contract is actually accomplished or not. Under this principle, banks assume no liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any documents, or for the general and/or particular conditions stipulated in the documents or superimposed thereon, nor do they assume any liability or responsibility for the description, quantity, weight, quality, condition, packing, delivery, value or existence of the goods represented by any documents, or for the good faith or acts and/or omissions, solvency, performance or standing of the consignor, the carriers, or the insurers of the goods, or any other person whomsoever. The independence principle thus liberates the issuing bank from the duty of ascertaining compliance by the parties in the main contract. The obligation under the letter of credit is independent of the related and originating contract. (TRANSFIELD PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION, G.R. No. 146717, 22 November 2004) What is a standby letter of credit? How does it differ from a commercial letter of credit? There are three significant differences between commercial and standby credit. First, commercial credits involve the payment of money under a contract of sale. Such credits become payable upon the presentation by the seller-beneficiary of documents that show he has taken affirmative steps to comply with the sales agreement. In the standby type, the credit is payable upon certification of a partys nonperformance of the agreement. The documents that accompany the beneficiarys draft tend to show that the applicant has not performed his obligation. The beneficiary of a commercial credit must demonstrate by documents that he has performed his contract. The beneficiary of the standby credit must certify that his obligor has not

performed the contract. (Ibid) How does a letter of credit differ from a contract of guaranty? The concept of guarantee vis--vis the concept of an irrevocable letter of credit are inconsistent with each other. The guarantee theory destroys the independence of the banks responsibility from the contract upon which it was opened and the nature of both contracts is mutually in conflict with each other. In contracts of guarantee, the guarantors obligation is merely collateral and it arises only upon the default of the

person primarily liable. On the other hand, in an irrevocable letter of credit, the bank undertakes a primary obligation. Moreover, a letter of credit is defined as an engagement by a bank or other person made at the request of a customer that the issuer shall honor drafts or other demands of payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit. (MWSS vs. HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, G.R. No. 160732, 21 June 2004) . NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS Explain the meaning of check kiting. It refers to the wrongful practice of taking advantage of the float, the time that elapses between the deposit of the check in one bank and its collection at another. In anticipation of the dishonor of the check that was deposited, the original check will be replaced with another worthless check. (Notes and Cases on Banks, Negotiable Instruments and other Commercial Documents, Aquino, 2006ed) Distinguish between: contract of indorsement and guaranty. A contract of indorsement is primarily that of transfer, while a contract of guaranty is that of personal security. The liability of a guarantor/surety is broader than that of an indorser. Thus, unless the bill is promptly presented for payment at maturity and due notice of dishonor given to the indorser within a reasonable time, he will be discharged from liability thereon. On the other hand, except where required by the provisions of the contract of suretyship, a demand or notice of default is not required to fix the suretys liability. He cannot complain that the creditor has not notified him in the absence of special agreement to that effect in the contract of suretyship. (ALLIED BANKING CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No.125851, 11 July 2006) When the drawee bank pays a materially altered check, can it claim reimbursement from the drawer? When the drawee bank pays a materially altered check, it violates the terms of the check, as well as its duty to charge its clients account only for bona fide disbursements he had made. Since the drawee bank did not pay according to the original tenor of the instrument, as directed by the drawer, then it has no right to claim reimbursement from the drawer, much less, the right to deduct the erroneous payment it made from the drawers account which it was expected to treat with utmost fidelity. (METROBANK vs. CABILZO, 06 DECEMBER 2006) Exception: when the drawer was the one who made or authorized the alteration or when he failed to exercise reasonable diligence to avoid it. (ibid) Will discharge of the drawer from liability due to lack of protest operate to discharge him from his letter of undertaking which he signed as additional security for the draft (bill of exchange)? The drawer can still be made liable under the letter of undertaking even if he is discharged due to failure to protest the non-acceptance of the drafts. xxx It bears

stressing that it is a separate contract from the sight draft. The liability of the drawer under the letter of undertaking is direct and primary. It is independent from his liability under the sight draft. Liability subsists on it even if the sight draft was dishonored for non-acceptance or non-payment. (PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS. vs. EXCELSA INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 152071, 8 May 2009) Who is an accommodation party? What is the nature of his liability? An accommodation party is one who meets all the three requisites, viz: (1) he must be a party to the instrument, signing as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser; (2) he must not receive value therefor; and (3) he must sign for the purpose of lending his name or credit to some other person.

The accommodation party is liable on the instrument to a holder for value even though the holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him or her to be merely an accommodation party, as if the contract was not for accommodation. The relation between an accommodation party and the accommodated party is one of principal and surety the accommodation party being the surety. (ANG vs. ASSOCIATED BANK, ET AL., G.R. NO. 146511, SEPTEMBER 5, 2007) The accommodated party was allowed extension of payment without the consent of the accommodation party. Is the latter still liable? Since the liability of an accommodation party remains not only primary but also unconditional to a holder for value, even if the accommodated party receives an extension of the period for the payment without the consent of the accommodation party, the latter is still liable for the whole obligation and such extension does not release him because as far as the holder for value is concerned, he is a solidary co-debtor. (Ibid.) A check, payable to the order of X and Y was deposited to a bank (collecting bank) with the lone indorsement of X. X, subsequently withdrew the entire proceeds thereof. State the implications. Where an instrument is payable to the order of two or more payees or indorsees who are not partners, all must indorse unless the one indorsing has authority to indorse for the others. The payment of an instrument over a missing indorsement is the equivalent of payment on a forged indorsement or an unauthorized indorsement in itself in the case of joint payees. A collecting bank, where a check is deposited and which indorses the check upon presentment with the drawee bank, is an indorser. This is because in indorsing a check to the drawee bank, a collecting bank stamps the back of the check with the phrase "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed" and, for all intents and purposes, treats the check as a negotiable instrument, hence, assumes the warranty of an indorser. Without the collecting banks warranty, the drawee bank would not have paid the value of the subject check. The collecting bank or last indorser, generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior indorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of prior indorsements. (METROBANK vs. BA FINANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 179952, 4 December 2009) Can the holder sue the drawee bank if the latter refuses payment of a check notwithstanding sufficiency of funds?

NO. A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder, unless and until it accepts or certifies the check (Section 189, NIL). Thus, if a bank refuses to pay a check (notwithstanding the sufficiency of funds), the payee-holder cannot sue the bank. The payee-holder should instead sue the drawer who might in turn sue the bank. Section 189 is a sound law based on logic and established legal principles; no privity of contract exists between the drawee-bank and the payee. (VILLANUEVA vs. NITE, G.R. No. 148211, 25 July 2006) Does the alteration on the serial number of the check constitute material alteration? The alterations on the serial numbers do not constitute material alteration within the contemplation of the Negotiable Instruments Law. An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. It means an unauthorized change in an instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party or an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete instrument relating to the obligation of a party. In other words, a material alteration is one which changes the items which are required to be stated under Section 1 of the NIL. (THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 129910, September 5, 2006) Distinguish between: inland and foreign bill of exchange.

An inland bill of exchange is a bill which is or on its face purports to be, both drawn and payable within the Philippines (Sec. 129, NIL). Thus, a foreign bill of exchange may be drawn outside the Philippines, payable outside the Philippines, or both drawn and payable outside of the Philippines (BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. CIR, G.R. No. 137002, 27 July 2006). Further, a foreign bill of exchange must be protested in case of dishonor to charge the drawer and the indorsers while an inland bill of exchange need not be protested. What is a managers check? A managers check is one drawn by the banks manager upon the bank itself. It is similar to a cashiers check both as to effect and use. A cashiers check is a check of the banks cashier on his own or another check. In effect, it is a bill of exchange drawn by the cashier of a bank upon the bank itself, and accepted in advance by the act of its issuance. It is really the banks own check and may be treated as a promissory note with the bank as a maker. The check becomes the primary obligation of the bank which issues it and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand. The mere issuance of it is considered an acceptance thereof. (EQUITABLE PCI vs. ONG 15 September 2006) Discuss the effects of certifying a check. The effects are: 1) It is equivalent to acceptance and is the operative act that makes the bank liable. 2) It amounts to the assignment of the funds of the drawer in the hands of the drawee. 3) If obtained by the holder, persons secondarily liable are discharged. INSURANCE What is a pre-need plan? These are contracts which provide for the performance of future services or the payment of future monetary consideration at the time of the actual need, for which plan holders

pay in cash or installment at stated prices, with or without interest or insurance coverage and includes life, pension, education, interment, and other plans which the SEC may from time to time approve. The policy reads: The insurance of any eligible Lot Purchaser shall be effective on the date he contracts a loan with the Assured. However, there shall be no insurance if the application of the Lot Purchaser is not approved by the Company. It would appear that at the time of loss, a loan has been contracted with the Assured but it is not clear whether the Insurer has approved the insurance application. When should the policy be deemed effective? While one provision appears to state that the insurance coverage of the clients of Assured already became effective upon contracting a loan with the Assured, another appears to require the Insurer to approve the insurance contract before the same can become effective. It must be remembered that an insurance contract is a contract of adhesion which must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer in order to safeguard the latters interest. Thus, the vague contractual provision must be construed in favor of the insured and in favor of the effectivity of the insurance contract. The seemingly conflicting provisions must be harmonized to mean that upon a partys purchase of a memorial lot on installment from the Assured, an insurance contract covering the lot purchaser is created and the same is effective, valid, and binding until terminated by the Insurer by disapproving the insurance application. The second sentence is in the nature of a resolutory condition which would lead to the cessation of the insurance contract. Moreover, the mere inaction of the insurer on the insurance application must not work to prejudice the insured; it cannot be interpreted as a termination of the insurance contract. The termination of the insurance contract by the

insurer must be explicit and unambiguous. (ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK vs. PHILAMLIFE, G.R. No. 166245, 09 April 2008) Does the buyer have insurable interest over the goods even while the goods are still in transit? YES. The buyers interest is based on the perfected contract of sale. The perfected contract of sale between him and the seller/shipper of the goods operates to vest in him an equitable title even before delivery or before he performed the conditions of the sale. The contract of shipment, whether under F.O.B., C.I.F., or C & F is immaterial in the determination of whether the buyer has insurable interest or not in the goods in transit. (FILIPINO MERCHANTS INSURANCE CO. vs. CA, 28 November 1989) Distinguish between: Loss Payable Clause and Standard or Union Mortgage Clause. Under a Loss Payable Clause, the mortgagee is made merely a beneficiary under the contract. Any default on the part of the mortgagor, which by the terms of the policy defeat his rights, will also defeat all rights of the mortgagee under the contract, even though the latter may not have been in any fault. On the other hand, a Standard or Union Mortgage Clause create collateral independent contracts between the insurer and the mortgagee and provide that the rights of the mortgagee shall not be defeated by the acts or defaults of the mortgagor. (Vance, pp. 654-655) What is a Mortgage Redemption Insurance?

A Mortgage Redemption Insurance is a group insurance policy of mortgagors which is intended as a device for the protection of both the mortgagee and the mortgagor. On the part of the mortgagee, it has to enter into such contract so that in the event of the unexpected demise of the mortgagor during the subsistence of the mortgage contract, the proceeds from such insurance will be applied to the payment of the mortgage debt, thereby relieving the heirs of the mortgagor from paying the obligation. In a similar vein, ample protection is given to the mortgagor such that in the event of death, the mortgage obligation will be extinguished by the application of the insurance proceeds to the mortgage indebtedness. Consequently, where the mortgagor pays the insurance premium under the group insurance policy, making the loss payable to the mortgagee, the insurance is on the mortgagor's interest, and the mortgagor continues to be a party to the contract. In this type of policy insurance, the mortgagee is simply an appointee of the insurance fund, such loss-payable clause does not make the mortgagee a party to the contract. (GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORP. vs. CA, 316 SCRA 677) In a contract of insurance, how does subrogation take place? Upon payment to the consignee of an indemnity for the loss of or damage to the insured goods, the insurers entitlement to subrogation pro tanto equips it with a cause of action in case of a contractual breach or negligence. In the exercise of its subrogatory right, an insurer may proceed against an erring carrier. To all intents and purposes, it stands in the place and in substitution of the consignee. (FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION vs. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY and PHILAM INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 150094, August 18, 2004) State the exceptions to the subrogation rule. There is no subrogation in the following cases: (1) When the insured, by his own act, releases the party at fault from liability. (2) When the insurer pays the insured without notifying the carrier who has in good faith settled the insureds claim for loss. (3) When the insurer pays the insured for a loss excepted from the policy. (4) When life insurance is involved.

In what cases is the designation of beneficiary in life insurance void due to disqualifications under the law? In the following cases, the designation of beneficiary is void: (a) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; (b) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof; (c) Those made to public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office. (NOTE: The disqualification applies to life insurance (Article 2012, NCC) and the insurance contract itself remains valid, only the designation of beneficiary is void.) Under the policy, disabilities which existed before the commencement of the agreement are excluded if they become manifest within one year from its effectivity. The insured allegedly prevented presentment by the insurer of the doctor who will testify on her medical condition because of the doctor-patient

privilege. The insurer thus assumed that the testimony would be adverse as it was willfully suppressed by the insured. Decide whether the insurer is liable. It is an established rule in insurance contracts that when their terms contain limitations on liability, they should be construed strictly against the insurer. These are contracts of adhesion the terms of which much be interpreted and enforced stringently against the insurer which prepared the contract. (BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE, INC. vs. OLIVARES, G.R. No. 169737, 12 February 2008) The insurer never presented any evidence to prove that the insureds stroke was due to a pre-existing condition. It merely speculated that the doctors report would be adverse to the insured based on her invocation of doctor-patient privilege. This was a disputable presumption at best. (Ibid) In a third party liability insurance, could the insurer be sued directly by the victim? Could the insurer be made solidarily liable with the insured or the wrongdoer? The victim may proceed directly against the insurer for indemnity. The insurance is intended to provide compensation for death or bodily injuries suffered by innocent third parties or passengers as a result of the negligent operation of motor vehicles. The victims and their dependents are assured of immediate financial assistance, regardless of the financial capacity of vehicle owners. Be that as it may, the direct liability of the insurer under indemnity contracts against third party liability does not mean that the insurer can be held liable in solidum with the insured and/or the other parties found at fault. For the liability of the insurer is based on contract, that of the insured carrier is based on tort. (WILLIAM TIU AND VIRGILIO TE LAS PIAS vs. PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO, BENJAMIN CONDOR, SERGIO PEDRANO AND PHIL PHOENIX SURETY AND INSURANCE, INC. [G.R. No. 138060, 01 September 2004) The third party liability of the insurer is only up to the extent of the insurance policy and that required by law; and it cannot be held solidarily liable for anything beyond that amount. Any award beyond the insurance coverage would already be the sole liability of the insured and/or the other parties at fault. (THE HEIRS OF GEORGE POE vs. MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., G.R. 156302, 7 April 2009) In what cases is the policy binding even if premium is unpaid? (1) When the grace period applies in case of life and industrial life policy; (2) When there is an acknowledgement in the policy of receipt of premium; (3) When there is an agreement that the premium shall be payable on installment; (4) When there is a credit extension; and (5) When the equitable doctrine of estoppel applies (Summary based on the ruling in UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE vs. MASAGANA TELAMART, INC., G.R. 137172, 04 April 2001)

When is return of premium warranted? Return of premium is warranted in the following cases: (1) The thing insured was not exposed to the period insured against (Sec. 78, ICP) (2) Time policy is surrendered before the stipulated period lapses (Sec. 79, ICP) (3) The contract is voidable due to fault or misrepresentation of the insurer or default of the insured other than actual fraud (Sec. 81, ICP)

(4) Over-insurance by several insurers (Sec. 82, ICP) What is an industrial life insurance? An industrial life insurance is one where the premiums are payable either monthly or oftener, if the face amount of the insurance provided in any policy is not more than 500 times that of the current statutory minimum daily wage in the City of Manila, and if the words industrial policy are printed upon the policy as part of the descriptive matter. (Sec. 229, ICP) What are cover notes? What are the limitations on the issuance of cover notes? Cover notes are interim or preparatory contracts of insurance. An interim coverage may be necessary because the insurer may need more time to process the insurance application. The issuance of cover notes is subject to the following: (1) Issuance or renewal is upon approval of the Insurance Commission. (2) Duration is not more than 60 days from issuance. (3) Cancellation by either party is upon prior 7-day notice to the other. (4) Main policy to be issued within 60 days after cover note was issued. (5) Extension of 60-day coverage is subject to Insurance Commissions approval. In reinsurance, when does the original insured have direct recourse against the reinsurer? The original insured may directly sue the reinsurer if the reinsurance policy clearly contains a stipulation pour autrui in his favor. Such stipulation, however, should not, in any way, affect or curtail, the original insureds recourse to the original insurer and the latters recourse against the reinsurer. Explain the Inchmaree Clause in a marine insurance. This is a clause included in a hull policy to cover loss or damage through the bursting of the boiler, breaking of shafts or through latent defects of the machinery or equipment, hull or its appurtenances and faults or errors in navigation or management of the vessel. (CEBU SHIPYARD ENGINEERING WORKS, INC. vs. WILLIAM LINES, INC., et al., G.R. No. 132607, 05 May 1999) The clause should be expressly provided for because damage of this sort are not included in the term perils of the sea. (Ibid.) State the requisites of co-insurance in marine insurance. Co-insurance in marine insurance is subject to the following requisites: (a) there must be partial loss; and (b) the insurance coverage is less than the value of the property insured. Explain the FPA Clause. FPA or Free from Particular Average clause limits the liability of the insurer in case of partial loss. (Sec. 136, ICP) What are the rules on claims under the no fault indemnity provision? Proof of fault or negligence is not necessary for payment of any claim for death or injury to a third party subject to the following:

(5) Total indemnity in respect of any person shall not exceed P15,000.00. (IC Memo
Circular 4-2006) (6) Proofs of loss shall consist of: (a) police report; (b) death certificate; and (c) medical report and evidence of medical or hospital disbursement. TRANSPORTATION Explain the registered owner rule. What is the purpose of the rule? Regardless of who the actual owner is of a motor vehicle might be, the registered owner is the operator of the same with respect to the public and third persons, and as such, directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered merely as his agent. The main purpose of vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be held responsible for any accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. Easy identification prevents inconvenience and prejudice to a third party injured by one who is unknown or unidentified. (NOSTRADAMUS VILLANUEVA vs. PRISCILLA R. DOMINGO and LEANDRO LUIS R. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 144274. September 20, 2004) Who is a ship agent? Is his liability the same whether he acts as agent of the ship owner or the charterer? Article 586 of the Code of Commerce states that a ship agent is the person entrusted with provisioning or representing the vessel in the port in which it may be found. Hence, whether acting as agent of the owner of the vessel or as agent of the charterer, petitioner will be considered as the ship agent and may be held liable as such, as long as the latter is the one that provisions or represents the vessel. (MACONDRAY vs. PROVIDENT INSURANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 154305, 09 December 2004) Does extraordinary diligence require the carrier to vouch for the correctness of the entries made in the travel papers of a passenger? NO. It may be true that the carrier has the duty to inspect whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents, however, such duty does not extend to checking the veracity of every entry in these documents. A carrier could not vouch for the authenticity of a passport and the correctness of the entries therein. The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act, which cannot be interfered with even by the carrier. (JAPAN AIRLINES vs. MICHAEL ASUNCION et al, G.R. No. 161730, 28 January 2005) Thus, the carrier could not be faulted for the denial of a passengers shore pass where it was discovered by immigration officials that he appeared shorter than his height as indicated in his passport. (Ibid) The defendants main business is brokerage but it also offers carrying services. For liability purposes, may the defendant be sued as common carrier if the damage occurred in the performance of its carrying services? YES. Article 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. It suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods for pecuniary consideration. (A.F. SANCHEZ BROKERAGE INC. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 147079, 21 December 2004)

(1) A claim may be made against one motor vehicle only. (2) If the victim is an occupant of a vehicle, his claim shall lie against the insurer of the vehicle in which he is riding, mounting or dismounting from. (3) If the victim is not an occupant, the claim shall lie against the insurer of the directly offending vehicle. (4) In any case, right to recover from the owner of the responsible vehicle shall remain.

Explain the doctrine of last clear chance. When does the doctrine apply?

The doctrine states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. BRUNTY, G.R. No. 169891, 02 November 2006; SEALOADER SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. GRAND CEMENT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, et al., G.R. No. 167363, 15 December 2010). The doctrine applies to a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not apply where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver/owner on the ground that the other driver was guilty of negligence. (TIU vs. ARRIESGADO, et al., GR 138060, 01 September 2004). The consignee failed to file a formal notice of claim within 24 hours from receipt of the damaged merchandise as required under Article 366 of the Code of Commerce. Is the filing of a notice of claim a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against the carrier for the damages caused to the merchandise? The requirement to give notice of loss or damage to the goods is not an empty formalism. The fundamental reason or purpose of such a stipulation is not to relieve the carrier from just liability, but reasonably to inform it that the shipment has been damaged and that it is charged with liability therefor, and to give it an opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury. This protects the carrier by affording it an opportunity to make an investigation of a claim while the matter is still fresh and easily investigated so as to safeguard itself from false and fraudulent claims. The 24-hour claim requirement has been construed as a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for loss of, or damage to, the goods. The shipper or consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of the condition. Otherwise, no right of action against the carrier can accrue in favor of the former. (UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE vs. ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORP., et al., G.R. No. 168433, 10 February 2009) What are the clauses that may be included in a Charter Party? They are as follows: 1. Jason Clause a provision which states that in case of maritime accident for which the shipowner is not responsible by law, contract or otherwise, the cargo shippers, consignees or owners shall contribute with the shipowner in general average (Pandect of Commercial Law and Jurisprudence, Justice Jose Vitug, 2006ed.) 2. Clause Paramount a provision which states that COGSA shall apply, even though the transportation is domestic, subject to the extent that if any term of the bill of lading is repugnant to the COGSA or applicable law, then to the extent thereof, the provision of the bill of lading is void (ibid) Describe the relationship between the consignee and/or the shipper. This relationship is akin to that existing between the consignee and/or the owner of the shipped goods and the common carrier, or that between a depositor and a warehouseman.34 In the performance of its obligations, an arrastre operator should observe the same degree of diligence as that required of a common carrier and a warehouseman. Being the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre

operators duty is to take good care of the goods and to turn them over to the party entitled to their possession. (ASIAN TERMINALS vs. DAEHAN FIRE and MARINE INSURANCE CO., Inc., G.R. No. 171194, 4 February 2010) What is the liability of a forwarder for damages caused to the goods being transported?

The term "freight forwarder" refers to a firm holding itself out to the general public (other than as a pipeline, rail, motor, or water carrier) to provide transportation of property for compensation and, in the ordinary course of its business, (1) to assemble and consolidate, or to provide for assembling and consolidating, shipments, and to perform or provide for break-bulk and distribution operations of the shipments; (2) to assume responsibility for the transportation of goods from the place of receipt to the place of destination; and (3) to use for any part of the transportation a carrier subject to the federal law pertaining to common carriers.1avvphi1 A freight forwarders liability is limited to damages arising from its own negligence, including negligence in choosing the carrier; however, where the forwarder contracts to deliver goods to their destination instead of merely arranging for their transportation, it becomes liable as a common carrier for loss or damage to goods. A freight forwarder assumes the responsibility of a carrier, which actually executes the transport, even though the forwarder does not carry the merchandise itself. (UNSWORTH TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 166250, 26 July 2010) What is the Package Limitation Rule under the COGSA? It is to be noted that the Civil Code does not limit the liability of the common carrier to a fixed amount per package. In all matters not regulated by the Civil Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws. Thus, the COGSA supplements the Civil Code by establishing a provision limiting the carriers liability in the absence of a shippers declaration of a higher value in the bill of lading. Section 4(5) of the COGSA provides: (6) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package of lawful money of the United States, or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight unit, or the equivalent of that sum in other currency, unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading. This declaration, if embodied in the bill of lading, shall be prima facie evidence, but shall not be conclusive on the carrier. (UNSWORTH TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 166250, 26 July 2010) In what place should an action for damages under the Warsaw Convention be filed? Is the place jurisdictional? Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before 1. the court where the carrier is domiciled; 2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business; 3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has

been made; or 4. the court of the place of destination. A number of reasons tends to support the characterization of Article 28(1) as a jurisdiction and not a venue provision. First, the wording of Article 32, which indicates the places where the action for damages "must" be brought, underscores the mandatory nature of Article 28(1). Second, this characterization is consistent with one of the objectives of the Convention, which is to "regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of international transportation by air." Third, the Convention does not contain any provision prescribing rules of jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which means that the phrase "rules as to jurisdiction" used in Article 32 must refer only to Article 28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with the exclusive enumeration in Article 28(1) as "jurisdictions," which, as such, cannot be left to the will of the parties regardless of the time when the damage occurred. (LHUILLER vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS, G.R. No. 171092, 15 March 2010)

What is the prescriptive period for filing an action under the COGSA? Would the filing of an amended complaint retroact to the date of the filing of the original complaint so as to satisfy the prescriptive period? Inasmuch as neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Commerce states a specific prescriptive period on the matter, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) -- which provides for a one-year period of limitation on claims for loss of, or damage to, cargoes sustained during transit -- may be applied suppletorily to the case at bar. As the records would show, petitioner was not impleaded as a defendant in the original complaint filed on March 11, 1993. It was only on June 7, 1993 that the Amended Complaint, impleading petitioner as defendant, was filed. The settled rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original; hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the amendment. It is true that, as an exception, this Court has held that an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint. The exception, however, would not apply to the party impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint. Hence, if the petitioner was only impleaded in the amended Complaint of June 7, 1993, or one (1) year, one (1) month and twenty-three (23) days from April 15, 1992, the date when the subject cargo was fully unloaded from the vessel. Reckoned from April 15, 1992, the one-year prescriptive period had already lapsed. CORPORATION LAW Explain the SPECIAL FACTS Doctrine. Under the so-called "special facts" doctrine, while a director does not stand in fiduciary relation to the stockholder, he is under legal obligation to make fair and full disclosure of pertinent official information where special circumstances exist giving rise to the obligation to disclose. (Strong vs. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) Explain the CONCESSION THEORY. Under this theory, a corporation is a creature without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of the state acting according to law.

What are essential for the existence of a de facto corporation? The filing of articles of incorporation and the issuance of the certificate of incorporation are essential for the existence of a de facto corporation. It has been held that an organization not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) cannot be considered a corporation in any concept, not even as a corporation de facto. (SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CONFERENCE CHURCH OF SOUTHERN PHILS., INC. vs. NORTHEASTERN MINDANAO MISSION OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST, INC. GR No. 150416, 21 July 2006) What is a sole proprietorship? Does it enjoy separate personality? A sole proprietorship is the oldest, simplest, and most prevalent form of business enterprise. It is an unorganized business owned by one person. The sole proprietor is personally liable for all the debts and obligations of the business. A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits, register its business name, and pay taxes to the national government. The law does not vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an action in court. (EXCELLENT QUALITY APPAREL, INC. vs. WIN MULTI RICH BUILDERS, INC., G.R. No. 175048, 10 February 2009)

Cite specific cases where the separate identity of the corporation could be pierced. 1. When the veil of corporate fiction is made as a shield to perpetuate a fraud or confuse legitimate issues such as the relation of employer and employee (CLAPAROLS vs. CIR, 65 SCRA 613); 2. When used as a shield for tax evasion (CIR vs. NORTON & HARRISON CO., 11 SCRA 714); 3. When used to shield violation of the prohibition against forum shopping (FIRST PHIL. INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. CA, 252 SCRA 259); 4. When the separate identity of the corporation is being utilized to violate intellectual property rights of a third person (UY vs. VILLANUEVA, GR No. 157851, 29 June 2007) Explain the INSTRUMENTALITY RULE. Where one corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are conducted so that it is, in fact, a mere instrumentality or adjunct of the other, the fiction of the corporate entity of the instrumentality may be disregarded. The control necessary to invoke the rule is not majority or even complete stock control but such domination of finances, policies and practices that the controlled corporation has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or existence of its own, and is but a conduit for its principal. It must be kept in mind that the control must be shown to have been exercised at the time the acts complained of took place. Moreover, the control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss for which the complaint is made. (CONCEPT BUILDERS vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 108734, 29 May 1996)

Explain briefly the DOCTRINE OF RELATION. Under this doctrine, when the delay in effecting or filing the amended articles of incorporation for the extension of corporate term is due to an insuperable interference occurring without the corporations intervention which could not have been prevented by prudence, diligence, and care, the same will be treated as having been effected before the expiration of the original term of the corporation. Explain the DOCTRINE OF EQUALITY OF SHARES. Where the articles of incorporation do not provide any distinction of the shares of stock, all shares issued by a corporation are presumed to be equal and entitled to the same rights and privileges and subject to the same liabilities. Would deposit on stock subscription make a person a stockholder of the corporation? The deposit on stock subscription is merely an amount of money received by a corporation with a view of applying the same as payment for additional issuance of shares in the future, an event which may or may not happen. The person making a deposit on stock subscription does not have the standing of a stockholder and he is not entitled to dividends, voting rights or other prerogatives and attributes of a stockholder. (COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. FIRST EXPRESS PAWNSHOP COMPANY, INC., G.R. Nos. 172045-46, 16 June 2009) Which should prevail in the determination of shareholders, the general information sheet or the corporate books? The information in the General Information Sheet submitted to the SEC will still have to be correlated with the corporate books of the Company. As between the General Information Sheet and the corporate books, it is the latter that is controlling. (LAO vs. LAO, G.R. No. 170585, 6 October 2008) Could any stockholder, at his pleasure, pull-out the machines and equipment, following the sale of his shares to a third party?

NO. The property of a corporation is not the property of its stockholders or members. Under the trust fund doctrine, the capital stock, property, and other assets of a corporation are regarded as equity in trust for the payment of corporate creditors which are preferred over the stockholders in the distribution of corporate assets. The distribution of corporate assets and property cannot be made to depend on the whims and caprices of the stockholders, officers, or directors of the corporation unless the indispensable conditions and procedures for the protection of corporate creditors are followed. (YAMAMOTO vs. NISHINO LEATHER INDUSTRIES, G.R. No. 150283, 16 April 2008) State the requisites that must be established for the legal existence of a subsidiary to be disregarded. While a corporation may be a subsidiary of another, it does not necessarily follow that its corporate legal existence can just be disregarded. A subsidiary has an independent and separate juridical personality, distinct from that of its parent company; hence, any claim or suit against the latter does not bind the former, and vice versa. In applying the doctrine, the following requisites must be established: (1) control, not merely majority or complete stock control; (2) such control must have been used by the defendant to

commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest acts in contravention of plaintiffs legal rights; and (3) the aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. (JARDINE DAVIS, Inc. vs. JRB REALTY, G.R. No. 151438, 15 July 2005) When the corporate mask is removed, is the corporate character thereby abrogated? NO. The corporate mask may be removed and the corporate veil pierced when a corporation is the mere alter ego of another. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated, where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, or where a separate corporate identity is used to evade financial obligations to employees or to third parties, the notion of separate legal entity should be set aside and the factual truth upheld. When that happens, the corporate character is not necessarily abrogated. It continues for other legitimate objectives. (PAMPLONA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC et al. vs. TINGHIL, et al., G.R. No. 159121, 03 February 2005) Can a corporation provide limitations on the voting rights of the members of a non-stock corporation? YES. Section 89 of the Corporation Code pertaining to non-stock corporations provides that "(t)he right of the members of any class or classes (of a non-stock corporation) to vote may be limited, broadened or denied to the extent specified in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws." This is an exception to Section 6 of the same code where it is provided that "no share may be deprived of voting rights except those classified and issued as preferred or redeemable shares, unless otherwise provided in this Code. Hence, the stipulation in the By-Laws providing for the election of the Board of Directors by districts is a form of limitation on the voting rights of the members of a non-stock corporation as recognized under the aforesaid Section 89. Section 24 of the Code, which requires the presence of a majority of the members entitled to vote in the election of the board of directors, applies only when the directors are elected by the members at large, such as is always the case in stock corporations by virtue of Section 6. (LUIS AO-AS, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 128464, 20 June 2006). Who are corporate officers? What is the nature of a complaint involving dismissal of a corporate officer? An "office" is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an "employee" usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee

A corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation. The question of remuneration involving a stockholder and officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management and is a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code. xxx The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from his employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an intracorporate

dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts. (OKOL vs. SLIMMERS WORLD, G.R. No. 160146, 11 December 2009) In what instances are officers, directors, or trustees personally liable for corporate acts? The instances are: when 1. He assents (a) to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or (b) for bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or (c) for conflict of interest, resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; 2. He consents to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto; 3. He agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or 4. He is made, by a specific provision of law, to personally answer for his corporate action. (REPUBLIC vs. INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL CONCERN, FELIPE SUZARA AND RAMON GARCIA, G.R. NO. 156306 January 28, 2005; SOLIDBANK CORPORATION vs. MINDANAO FERROALLOY CORPORATION, et al., G.R. No. 153535, 28 July 2005) What would constitute a patently unlawful act which makes a director personally liable for the obligations of the corporation? For a wrongdoing to make a director personally liable for debts of the corporation, the wrongdoing approved or assented to by the director must be a patently unlawful act. Mere failure to comply with the notice requirement of labor laws on company closure or dismissal of employees does not amount to a patently unlawful act. Patently unlawful acts are those declared unlawful by law which imposes penalties for commission of such unlawful acts. There must be a law declaring the act unlawful and penalizing the act. In this case, Article 283 of the Labor Code, requiring a one-month prior notice to employees and the Department of Labor and Employment before any permanent closure of a company, does not state that non-compliance with the notice is an unlawful act punishable under the Code. There is no provision in any other Article of the Labor Code declaring failure to give such notice an unlawful act and providing for its penalty. (CARAG vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 147590, April 2, 2007) Explain the DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY. When a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or any other agent, to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it holds him out to the public as possessing the power to do those acts; and thus, the corporation will, as against anyone who has in good faith dealt with it through such agent, be estopped from denying the agents authority. (LAPU-LAPU FOUNDATION vs. CA, 29 January 2004) Who are entitled to receive dividends? Dividends are payable to the stockholders of record as of the date of the declaration of dividends or holders of record on a certain future date, as the case may be, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. And a transfer of shares which is not recorded in the books of the corporation is valid only as between the parties, hence, the transferor has the right to dividends as against the corporation without notice of transfer but it serves as trustee of the real owner of the dividends, subject to the contract between the transferor and transferee as to who is entitled to receive the dividends. (COJUANGCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, 24 April 2009)

Under what conditions could the PCGG vote sequestered shares?

It is settled that as a general rule, the registered owner of the shares of a corporation, even if they are sequestered by the government through the PCGG, exercises the right and the privilege of voting on them. The PCGG as a mere conservator cannot, as a rule, exercise acts of dominion by voting these shares. The registered owner of sequestered shares may only be deprived of these voting rights, and the PCGG authorized to exercise the same, only if it is able to establish that (1) there is prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten and thus belong to the State; and (2) there is an imminent danger of dissipation, thus necessitating the continued sequestration of the shares and authority to vote thereupon by the PCGG while the main issue is pending before the Sandiganbayan. (TRANSMIDDLE EAST (PHILS.) vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al., G.R. No. 172556, 09 June2006) Can a corporation sole change its character into a corporation aggregate by mere amendment of the articles of incorporation without first going through the process of dissolution? Yes. There is no point to dissolving the corporation sole of one member to enable the corporation aggregate to emerge from it. Whether it is a non-stock corporation or a corporation sole, the corporate being remains distinct from its members, whatever be their number. The increase in the number of its corporate membership does not change the complexion of its corporate responsibility to third parties. The one member, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the membership of the organization for whom he acts as trustee, can self-will the amendment. He can, with membership concurrence, increase the technical number of the members of the corporation from "sole" or one to the greater number authorized by its amended articles. (IGLESIA EVANGELISTA METODISTA EN LAS FILIPINAS vs. BISHOP LAZARO, et al, G.R. 184088, 6 July 2010) When does merger or consolidation take effect? The issuance of the certificate of merger is crucial because not only does it bear out SECs approval but it also marks the moment when the consequences of a merger take place. By operation of law, upon the effectivity of the merger, the absorbed corporation ceases to exist but its rights and properties, as well as liabilities, shall be taken and deemed transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation. The same rule applies to consolidation which becomes effective not upon mere agreement of the members but only upon issuance of the certificate of consolidation by the SEC. When the SEC, upon processing and examining the articles of consolidation, is satisfied that the consolidation of the corporations is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Corporation Code and existing laws, it issues a certificate of consolidation which makes the reorganization official. The new consolidated corporation comes into existence and the constituent corporations are dissolved and cease to exist. (MINDANAO SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION vs. WILLKOM, et al, G.R. No. 178618) Determine whether the buyer at execution sale of shares will immediately acquire title thereto. It should be restated that since there is no right to redeem personal property, the rights of ownership are vested to the purchaser at the foreclosure (or execution) sale and are not entangled in any suspensive condition that is implicit in a redemptive period. xxx There is no valid reason why the buyers at execution sale of petitioners shares of stock

should be prevented from obtaining title to the same. The pendency of a case involving the parties does not affect the registrability of the shares of stock bought at execution sale, although the registration is without prejudice to the proceedings to determine the liability of the parties as against each other. (LEE vs. HON. TROCINO, et al., G.R. No. 164648, 19 June 2009) Should dead members of a non-stock corporation be counted for quorum and voting purposes?

In a non-stock corporation, membership is personal and non-transferable unless the articles of incorporation or by-laws states otherwise. Section 91 states that termination extinguishes all the rights of a member of the corporation, unless otherwise stated in the articles of incorporation. Hence, dead members are not to be counted in determining the requisite vote in corporate matters or the requisite quorum in the members meeting. (TAN vs. SYCIP, 499 SCRA 216, 17 August 2006) Are the requirements for termination of membership in a non-stock corporation required to be provided in the Articles of Incorporation? Section 91 of the Corporation Code provides: SEC. 91. Termination of membership.Membership shall be terminated in the manner and for the causes provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. Termination of membership shall have the effect of extinguishing all rights of a member in the corporation or in its property, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, the right of a non-stock corporation to expel a member may also be established in the by-laws. It need not be provided for in the articles of incorporation. (VALLEY GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB vs. VDA. DE CARAM, G.R. No. 158805, 16 April 2009) What are the conditions for the penal provision under Section 144 of the Corporation Code to apply in case of violation of a stockholders right to inspect the corporate books/records as provided for under Section 74 of the Corporation Code? (1) A director, trustee, stockholder or member has made a prior demand in writing for a copy of excerpts from the corporations records or minutes; (2) Any officer or agent of the concerned corporation shall refuse to allow the said director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation to examine and copy said excerpts; (3) If such refusal is made pursuant to a resolution or order of the board of directors or trustees, the liability under this section for such action shall be imposed upon the directors or trustees who voted for such refusal; and, (4) Where the officer or agent of the corporation sets up the defense that the person demanding to examine and copy excerpts from the corporations records and minutes has improperly used any information secured through any prior examination of the records or minutes of such corporation or of any other corporation, or was not acting in good faith or for a legitimate purpose in making his demand, the contrary must be shown or proved. (ANG-ABAYA vs. ANG, G.R. No. 178511, 4 December 2008) What are the requisites for filing a derivative suit? The requisites for filing a derivative suit are as follows:

a) The party bringing suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction complained of, the number of his shares not being material; b) The party has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., he has made a demand on the board of directors for the appropriate relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; c) The cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having been, or being caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit. (FILIPINAS PORT SERVICES, INC., et al. vs. Go, et al., G.R. No. 161886, March 16, 2007); d) No appraisal rights are available for the act/s complained of; and

e) The suit is not a nuisance or harassment suit (Sec.1, Rule 8, Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies) When is exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies excused as a requirement for derivate suit? While it is true that the complaining stockholder must satisfactorily show that he has exhausted all means to redress his grievances within the corporation; such remedy is no longer necessary where the corporation itself is under the complete control of the person against whom the suit is being filed. The reason is obvious: a demand upon the board to institute an action and prosecute the same effectively would have been useless and an exercise in futility. (HI-YIELD REALTY, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 168863, 23 June 2009) Note, though, that in YU, et al. vs. YUKAYGUAN, et al., G.R. No. 177549, 18 June 2009, the Supreme Court held that exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies cannot be dispensed with even if the company is a family corporation. There is nothing in the pertinent laws or rules supporting the distinction between, and the difference in the requirements for, family corporations vis--vis other types of corporations, in the institution by a stockholder of a derivative suit. In an Agreement, the foreign companys activities in the Philippines were confined to: (1) maintaining a stock of goods solely for the purpose of having the same processed by another company; and (2) consignment of equipment with such company to be used in the processing of products for export. Do these acts amount to doing business in the Philippines? NO. By and large, to constitute doing business, the activity to be undertaken in the Philippines is one that is for profit-making. Under Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Foreign Investment Act, the foregoing activities do not constitute doing business. (AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES SINGAPORE (PTE) LTD. vs. INTEGRATED SILICON, GR 154618, 14 April 2004) Would participation in a bidding for the development and operation of a modern marine container terminal constitute doing business in the Philippines for which a license must be secured? Participating in the bidding process constitutes doing business because it shows the foreign corporations intention to engage in business here. The bidding for the concession contract is but an exercise of the corporations reason for its existence. xxx it is the performance by a foreign corporation of the acts for which it was created, regardless of the volume of business, that determines whether a foreign corporation

needs a license or not. (HUTCHISON PORTS PHILIPPINES LIMITED vs. SBMA, GR 131367, 31 August 2000; EUROPEAN RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGIES, INC, et al. vs. INGENIEUBURO BIRKHAHN, et al., G.R. No. 159586, 26 July 2004) Petitioner is engaged in the importation and exportation of lace products. On several occasions, respondent purchased lace products from the petitioner with the instruction to deliver the purchased goods to a Hong Kong based company. Upon receipt of the goods in Hong Kong, the products were considered sold. The Hong Kong based company, in turn, had the obligation to deliver the lace products to the Philippines. Determine whether the petitioner is doing business in the Philippines. It is not doing business in the Philippines. To be doing or transacting business in the Philippines, the foreign corporation must actually transact business in the Philippines, that is, perform specific business transactions within the Philippine territory on a continuing basis in its own name and for its own account. Actual transaction of business within the Philippine territory is an essential requisite for the Philippines to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corporation and thus require the foreign corporation to secure a Philippine business license. If a foreign corporation does not transact such kind of business in the Philippines, even if it exports its products to the Philippines, the Philippines has no jurisdiction to require such foreign corporation to secure a Philippine business license. (B. VAN ZUIDEN BROS. LTD. vs. GTVL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 147905, May 28, 2007)

Does the engagement of a Filipino national to run a foreign companys premixed concrete operations in the Philippines a mount to doing business? YES. The act of negotiating to employ a Filipino national to run a foreign companys premixed concrete operations in the Philippines are managerial and operational acts in directing and establishing commercial operations in the Philippines. These are not mere acts of a passive investor. (PIONEER INTERNATIONAL vs. HON. GUADIZ, G.R. No. 156848, 11 October 2007) What are the general tests to determine whether a foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines? Substance Test whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. Continuity Test continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, the purpose and object of its organization (AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES SINGAPORE (PTE) LTD. vs INTEGRATED SILICON, GR 154618, 14 April 2004) Do the powers of a foreign corporations resident agent include the authority to execute a certification against forum-shopping on behalf of its principal? NO. This is because while a resident agent may be aware of actions filed against his principal (a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, being the one

authorized to receive services and other legal processes on its behalf), such resident may not be aware of actions initiated by its principal, whether in the Philippines against a domestic corporation or private individual, or in the country where such corporation was organized and registered, against a Philippine registered corporation or a Filipino citizen. (EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, G.R. No. 152392, 26 May 2005) Where the insured (a foreign corporation doing business without license) is incapacitated to sue before the Philippine courts, would it follow that its insurer, in exercising its subrogation rights, would also suffer from such incapacity? NO. Rights inherited by a subrogee pertain only to the obligations not to capacity. Incapacity of the insured will not affect the capacity of the insurer exercising its right of subrogation because capacity is personal to its holder. It is conferred by law and not by the parties. (LORENZO SHIPPING vs. CHUBB & SONS, 8 June 2004) Would a pending intra-corporate case against an officer preclude the filing of a criminal action against the said officer? The filing of the civil/intra-corporate case before the SEC (now RTC) does not preclude the simultaneous and concomitant filing of a criminal action before the regular courts; such that, a fraudulent act may give rise to liability for violation of the rules and regulations of the SEC cognizable by the SEC itself, as well as criminal liability for violation of the Revised Penal Code cognizable by the regular courts, both charges to be filed and proceeded independently, and may be simultaneously with the other. A dispute involving the corporation and its stockholders is not necessarily an intracorporate dispute cognizable only by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Nor does it ipso facto negate the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the subject cases. It should be obvious that not every conflict between a corporation and its stockholders involves corporate matters that only the SEC can resolve in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The better policy in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case would be to consider not only the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the questions raised in the subject of the controversy. ( PEOPLE vs. FERNANDEZ and HAJIME UMEZAWA, GR No. 149403, 04 March 2005)

CORPORATE REHABILITATION State the requisites for the creation of a management committee. The requisites for the creation of a management committee, to wit: (1) an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of assets or other properties of respondent corporation; and (2) paralysis of its business operations which may be prejudicial to the interest of the parties-litigants, petitioners, or the general public. In the case at bar, the records show that there has been no slack in the business operations of the corporation. Further, mere possibility without proof of abusing corporate positions and dissipation of assets and properties of the corporation is not a valid ground for the appointment of a management committee/receiver. (SY CHIM vs. SY SIY HO, G.R. No. 164958, 27 January 2006) Explain the SERIOUS SITUATION TEST. In appointing a receiver, the court should consider whether the companys financial

situation is serious and whether there is a clear and imminent danger that it will lose its corporate assets if a receiver is not appointed. (PRYCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 172302, 04 February 2008) Discuss the effect/s of the creation of a management committee. The appointment will result in suspension of all actions against the corporation, the avowed objective of which is to enable such management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the rescue of the distressed company. (TYSONS SUPER CONCRETE, INC., et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 140081, 23 June 2005) Are labor claims likewise suspended upon the creation of a management committee or appointment of a receiver? The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions shall be suspended accordingly. No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. (LINGKOD MANGGAGAWA SA RUBBERWORLD, et al. VS. RUBBERWORLD (PHILS.) INC., et al., G.R. NO. 153882, JANUARY 29, 2007) Are actions suspended regardless of the stage of proceedings? The suspension of all actions for claims against the corporation embraces all phases of the suit, be it before the trial court or any tribunal or before this Court. No other action may be taken, including the rendition of judgment during the state of suspension. It must be stressed that what are automatically stayed or suspended are the proceedings of a suit and not just the payment of claims during the execution stage after the case had become final and executory. (GARCIA, ET AL. VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 164856, August 29, 2007) Are non-pecuniary claims also stayed with the creation of a management committee or appointment of a receiver? When a corporation is taken over by a rehabilitation receiver, all creditors stand on equal footing, not anyone should be given preference by paying ahead of other creditors. All claims whether pecuniary or not. The Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation define a claim as referring to all claims, demands of whatever nature or character against the debtor or its properties, whether for money or otherwise. The definition is so encompassing, there are no distinctions or exemptions. (SOBREJUANITE vs. ASB, G.R. No. 165675, 30 September 2005) Is enforcement of maritime lien also affected by the suspension order?

PD 902-A mandates that upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended. PD 902-A does not make any distinction as to what claims are covered by the suspension of actions for claims against corporations under rehabilitation. No exception is made therein in favor of maritime claims. Thus, since the law does not make any exemptions or distinctions, neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. The issuance of the stay order by the rehabilitation court does not impair or in any way diminish a creditors preferred status. The enforcement of its claim through court action

was merely suspended to give way to the speedy and effective rehabilitation of the distressed shipping company. Upon termination of the rehabilitation proceedings or in the event of the bankruptcy and consequent dissolution of the company, the creditor can still enforce its preferred claim upon the company. (NEGROS NAVIGATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 10 December 2008) Does a petition for rehabilitation require prior filing of petition for suspension of payment? A corporation may have considerable assets but if it foresees the impossibility of meeting its obligations for more than one year, it is considered as technically insolvent. Thus, at the first instance, a corporation may file a petition for rehabilitation a remedy provided under Sec. 4-1 of the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery. When Sec. 4-1 mentioned technical insolvency under Sec. 3-12, it was referring to the definition of technical insolvency in the said section; it was not requiring, therefore, a previous filing of a petition for suspension of payments. (PNB vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 165571, 20 January 2009) Does the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan violate the creditors right to nonimpairment of contracts? Section 6 [c] of P.D. No. 902-A provides that "upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended." The approval of the Rehabilitation Plan and the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver merely suspend the actions for claims against respondent corporations. A creditors preferred status over the unsecured creditors relative to the mortgage liens is retained, but the enforcement of such preference is suspended. Considering that enforcement of loan (including preference) is merely suspended, there is no impairment of contracts, specifically its lien in the mortgaged properties. (ibid) Decide whether receivership will excuse a corporation from complying with the reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter. Case law recognizes that unless there is a restraining order, the implementation of the order of reinstatement is ministerial and mandatory. This injunction or suspension of claims by legislative fiat partakes of the nature of a restraining order that constitutes a legal justification for respondents non-compliance with the reinstatement order. The Companys failure to exercise the alternative options of actual reinstatement and payroll reinstatement is therefore justified. Such being the case, the Companys obligation to pay the salaries pending appeal, as the normal effect of the non-exercise of the options, did not attach. While reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does not contemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a judicially

monitored state of being resuscitated in order to survive. (GARCIA vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 164856, 20 January 2009) Does the SEC have jurisdiction over the liquidation of a dissolved corporation? SECs jurisdiction does not extend to the liquidation of a corporation. While the SEC has

jurisdiction to order the dissolution of a corporation, jurisdiction over the liquidation of the corporation now pertains to the appropriate regional trial courts. This is the correct procedure because the liquidation of a corporation requires the settlement of claims for and against the corporation, which clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. (CONSUELO METAL CORPORATION vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, G.R. No. 152580, 26 June 2008) Does the rehabilitation of a corporation suspend the criminal actions filed against its officers? The prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending rehabilitation of the corporation, especially since they are charged in their individual capacities. Such being the case, the purpose of the law for the issuance of the stay order is not compromised, since the appointed rehabilitation receiver can still fully discharge his functions as mandated by law. It bears to stress that the rehabilitation receiver is not charged to defend the officers of the corporation. If there is anything that the rehabilitation receiver might be remotely interested in is whether the court also rules that petitioners are civilly liable. Such a scenario, however, is not a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings, because should the court prosecuting the officers of the corporation find that an award or indemnification is warranted, such award would fall under the category of claims, the execution of which would be subject to the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court. The penal sanctions xxx can therefore be implemented if petitioners are found guilty after trial. However, any civil indemnity awarded as a result of their conviction would be subject to the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court. Only to this extent can the order of suspension be considered obligatory upon any court, tribunal, branch or body where there are pending actions for claims against the distressed corporation. (PANLILIO vs. RTC MANILA, G.R. No. 173846, 2 FEBRUARY 2011) (Note that Section 18 of the Republic Act No. 10142, or the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010 explicitly provides that criminal actions against the individual officer of a corporation are not subject to the Stay or Suspension Order in rehabilitation proceedings.) SECURITIES REGULATION CODE Under what conditions may the SEC issue a cease and desist order? There are two essential requirements that must be complied with by the SEC before it may issue a cease and desist order: First, it must conduct proper investigation or verification; and Second, there must be a finding that the act or practice, unless restrained, will operate as a fraud on investors or is otherwise likely to cause grave or irreparable injury or prejudice to the investing public. (SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. PERFORMANCE FOREIGN EXCHANGE CORP. G.R. 154131, 20 July 2006) Hence, a mere clarificatory conference undertaken by the SEC cannot be considered a proper investigation or verification process to justify the issuance of a CDO. It was merely an initial stage of such process considering that after the SEC issued the CDO, it sought verification from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on the nature of the respondents business activity. (Ibid.) Is the CDO valid even if signed by only one SEC commissioner?

NO. The SEC is a collegial body composed of a Chairperson and four (4) Commissioners. In order to constitute a quorum to conduct business, the presence of at least three (3) Commissioners is required. The issuance of the CDO is an act of the SEC itself done in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to review actual cases or controversies. It should be clear now that its power to issue a CDO cannot, under the SRC, be delegated to an individual commissioner. Explain the Mandatory Close Out Rule. The rule vests upon a broker or dealer, the obligation, not just the right, to cancel or otherwise liquidate a customers order, if payment is not received within three days from the date of purchase. The word "shall" as opposed to the word "may," is imperative and operates to impose a duty, which may be legally enforced. (ABACUS SECURITIES CORPORATION vs. AMPIL, G.R. No. 160016, 27 February 2006) How may violations of the Securities Regulation Code be pursued? A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution. (BAVIERA vs. PAGLINAWAN, GR No. 168380, February 8, 2007) What does tender offer mean? When does it apply? A tender offer is an offer by the acquiring person to stockholders of a public company for them to tender their shares therein on the terms specified in the offer. The Tender Offer Rule applies also in an indirect acquisition arising from the purchase of shares of a holding company of the listed firm. Tender offer is in place to protect minority shareholders against any scheme that dilutes the share value of their investments. It gives the minority shareholders the chance to exit the company under reasonable terms, giving them the opportunity to sell their shares at the same price as those of the majority shareholders. Under existing SEC Rules, the 15% and 30% threshold acquisition of shares under the foregoing provision was increased to thirty-five percent (35%). It is further provided therein that mandatory tender offer is still applicable even if the acquisition is less than 35% when the purchase would result in ownership of over 51% of the total outstanding equity securities of the public company. Whatever may be the method by which control of a public company is obtained, either through the direct purchase of its stocks or an indirect means, mandatory tender offer applies. (CEMCO HOLDINGS INC. vs. NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, G.R. No. 171815, August 7, 2007) Can the RTC order the conduct of a stockholders meeting in connection with an intra-corporate dispute under its jurisdiction? Yes. The RTC now has the power to hear and decide the intra-corporate controversy and

concomitant to said power is the authority to issue orders necessary or incidental to the carrying out of the powers expressly granted to it. Thus, the RTC may, in appropriate cases, order the holding of a special meeting of stockholders or members of a corporation involving an intra-corporate dispute under its supervision (YUICO vs. QUIAMBAO, 513 SCRA 208, 29 January 2007) What is an intra-corporate controversy?

An intra-corporate controversy is one which "pertains to any of the following relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State in so far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. What is an election contest? An election contest refers to any controversy or dispute involving title or claim to any elective office in a stock or non-stock corporation, the validation of proxies, the manner and validity of elections, and the qualifications of candidates, including the proclamation of winners, to the office of director, trustee or other officer directly elected by the stockholders in a close corporation or by members of a non-stock corporation where the articles of incorporation or by-laws so provide. Can the SEC pass upon the validity of proxies in relation to election controversies? NO. This power has been withdrawn from the SEC by the SRC and transferred to the regular courts. Questions relating to the proper solicitation of proxies used in election are now cognizable by the regular courts. However, the power of the SEC to regulate proxies remains extant and could very well be exercised when stockholders vote on matters other than the election of directors. (GSIS vs. CA, G.R. No. 183905, 16 April 2009) State the reason for the prohibition against insider trading. The intent of the law is the protection of investors against fraud committed when an insider, using secret information, takes advantage of an uninformed investor. Insiders are obligated to disclose material information to the other party or abstain from trading the shares of his corporation. The duty to disclose is based on two factors: first, existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly to information intended to be available only for a corporate purposes and not for the personal benefit of anyone and second, the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. (SEC vs. INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, et al., G.R. No. 135808, 6 October 2008) What is a fact of special significance for purposes of insider trading? A fact of special significance maybe (a) a material fact which would be likely, on being made generally available, to effect the market price of a security to a significant extent, or (b) one which a reasonable person would consider especially important in determining his course of action regard to the shares of stock. (ibid) BANKING LAWS What degree of diligence are banks required to observe? Since the banking business is impressed with public interest, of paramount importance

thereto is the trust and confidence of the public in general. Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and performance are even required, of it. By the nature of its functions, a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. (CITIBANK, N.A. vs. SPOUSES LUIS AND CARMELITA CABAMONGAN, et al., G.R. No. 146918, 02 May 2006). Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their works the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. Banks are

expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. (ibid) Thus, the Court held that the bank was negligent when it allowed the pre-termination of the account despite noticing the discrepancies in the signature and photograph of the person claiming to be the concerned depositor. Further the required waiver document has not been notarized contrary to the standard procedure designed to protect the bank. (ibid) The bank was also found negligent and thus could not be considered a mortgagee in good faith it appearing that it had knowledge that the respondent was in the United States at the time her SPAs were allegedly executed, yet, it did not question their due execution. (CHINA BANKING VS. LAGON 11 JULY 2006) The Court also emphasized that banks cannot merely rely on certificates of title in ascertaining the status of mortgaged properties; as their business is impressed with public interest, they are expected to exercise more care and prudence in their dealings than private individuals. Indeed, the rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks. (URSAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS 14 October 2005) What is the relationship between the depositor and the bank with respect to the amount deposited by the former with the latter? The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan. There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations of the parties. (BPI vs. FIRST METRO, G.R. No. 132390, December 8, 2004) Failure of the Bank to honor the time deposit is failure to pay its obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from a depository's failure to return the subject matter of the deposit. Thus, the relationship being contractual, mandamus is not an available remedy since mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. (LUCMAN vs. MALAWI, et al., G.R. No. 158794, December 19, 2006) How does DOSRI violation differ from estafa? A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank and failure to enter such approval into corporate

records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. (SORIANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., et al., G.R. No. 159517, 30 June 2009) Respondents, as directors and officers of a bank, were accused of engaging in unsafe, unsound, and fraudulent banking practices, more particularly, acts that violate the prohibition on self-dealing. In question was the manner with which the directors have handled the affairs of the bank, in particular, the fraudulent loans and dacion en pago authorized by the directors in favor of several dummy corporations known to have close ties and are indirectly controlled by the directors. Decide whether the case is within the jurisdiction of the BSP or regular court. The allegation call for the examination of the allegedly questionable loans. Whether these loans are covered by the prohibition on self-dealing is a matter for the BSP to determine. These are not ordinary intra-corporate matters; rather, they involve banking activities which are, by law, regulated and supervised by the BSP. It is well-settled in both law and jurisprudence that the Central Monetary Authority, through the Monetary Board, is vested with exclusive authority to assess, evaluate and

determine the condition of any bank, and finding such condition to be one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve a probable loss to its depositors or creditors, forbid bank or non-bank financial institution to do business in the Philippines; and shall designate an official of the BSP or other competent person as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities. The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and other financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail generalia specialibus non derogant. (ARCENAS, JR. vs. HON. MARELLA, G.R. Nos. 168332/169053, 19 June 2009) The Monetary Board issued a Resolution ordering the liquidation of Philippine Veterans Bank. A number of employees accepted their separation pay while the others chose to question their separation. Subsequently, Congress enacted RA 7169 authorizing the reopening of the bank. The affected employees are now claiming that RA 7169 effectively nullified the earlier resolution of the Monetary Board and in effect, also nullified their termination. Upon implementation of the Monetary Board resolution and prior to the passage of R.A. No. 7169, the Bank had already ceased to exist. Its subsequent rehabilitation was not an ordinary rehabilitation. R.A. No. 7169 had to be passed as a legislative fiat to breathe life into the Bank. While it is true that the Bank used its old name, a new law had to be enacted to restructure its outstanding liabilities. xxx The enactment of R.A. No. 7169 did not, therefore, nullify the subject resolution of the Monetary Board which earlier placed the Bank under liquidation and caused the termination of employment of the petitioners. The Banks subsequent rehabilitation did not, by any test of reason, revive what was already a dead relationship between the petitioners and the Bank. (CORNISTA-DOMINGO vs. NLRC, 17 October 2006) Does Section 30 of RA 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) require a current and

complete examination of the bank before it can be closed and placed under receivership? No. From the words used in Sec. 30, RA 7653 no longer requires an examination before the issuance of a closure order. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. The Court cannot look for or impose another meaning on the term report or to construe it as synonymous with examination. The absence of an examination before the closure of a bank did not mean that there was no basis for the closure order. Needless to say, the decision of the Monetary Board and the Central Bank, like any other administrative body, must have something to support itself and its findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence. But it is clear under RA 7653 that the basis need not arise from an examination as required in the old law. The purpose of the law is to make the closure of a bank summary and expeditious in order to protect public interest. This is also why prior notice and hearing are no longer required before a bank can be closed. (RURAL BANK OF SAN MIGUEL, INC. vs. MONETARY BOARD, G.R. No. 150886, 16 February 2007) Does the liquidation of a bank require a prior tax clearance? No. The liquidation of a bank is undertaken according to Sec. 30 of the New Central Bank Act. The said provision lays down the proceedings for receivership and liquidation of a bank. It is silent as regards the securing of a tax clearance from the BIR. The omission cannot compel the Court to apply by analogy the tax clearance requirement of the SEC since the dissolution of a corporation by the SEC is totally different from the receivership and liquidation of a bank by the BSP. There are substantial differences in the procedure for involuntary dissolution and liquidation of a corporation under the Corporation Code, and that of a banking

corporation under the New Central Bank Act, so that the requirements in one cannot simply be imposed in the other. (IN RE: PETITION FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE LIQUIDATION OF THE RURAL BANK OF BOKOD (BENGUET), INC. (RBBI), PHILIPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), G.R. No. 158261, 18 December 18, 2006) Are trust accounts also protected under RA 1405 (Bank Secrecy Law)? May trust accounts be examined in connection with a plunder case without violating the law? RA 1405 is broad enough to cover trust accounts because the term deposit as used in RA 1405 is to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank. If the money deposited under an account may be used by banks for authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the country. However, there are exceptions on the protection under RA 1405: (1) the examinations of

bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of litigation. The first exception applies since the plunder case pending against the petitioner is analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty and the second, because the money deposited in petitioners bank accounts form part of the subject matter of the same plunder case. (EJERCITO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 157294-95, 30 November 2006) When a co-depositor inquires into the deposit, does he need the written consent of the other depositor? A co-payee in a check deposited in a bank is likewise a co-depositor. No written consent therefore of the other co-payee is needed in an inquiry of the deposits by the said codepositor. (CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 140687, 18 December 2006) Can a foreigner own capital stock in a rural bank? No. Section 4, Republic Act No. 7353, provides that with the exception of shareholdings of corporations organized primarily to hold equities in rural banks as provided for under Section 12-C of Republic Act No. 337, as amended, and of Filipino-controlled domestic banks, the capital stock of any rural bank shall be fully owned and held directly or indirectly by citizens of the Philippines or corporations, associations or cooperatives qualified under Philippine laws to own and hold such capital stock. (BULOS, JR. vs. KOJI YASUMA, G.R. No. 164159, July 17, 2007) Explain the dragnet clause or blanket mortgage clause? A dragnet clause is one which is specifically phrased to subsume all debts of past and future origins. Such clauses are "carefully scrutinized and strictly construed." Mortgages of this character enable the parties to provide continuous dealings, the nature or extent of which may not be known or anticipated at the time, and they avoid the expense and inconvenience of executing a new security on each new transaction. A "dragnet clause" operates as a convenience and accommodation to the borrowers as it makes available additional funds without their having to execute additional security documents, thereby saving time, travel, loan closing costs, costs of extra legal services, recording fees, et cetera. (PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS. vs. EXCELSA INDUSTRIES, Inc., G.R. No. 152071, 8 May 2009) Machang Realty was incorporated to hold and purchase real properties in trust for Pigue Bank. This was conceived by Pigue Bank in view of the limit on a banks allowable investments in real estate to 50% of its capital assets. In the implementation of the trust agreement, Pigue Bank sold to Machang Realty some of its real properties while the latter simultaneously leased to the former the properties for 20 years. Eventually, Machang repudiated the trust, claimed the titles for itself and demanded payment of rentals, deposits and goodwill,

with a threat to eject Pigue Bank. Pigue Bank filed a complaint for reconveyance of the properties against Machang Realty. Will the case prosper? The agreement between the parties adverted to as an implied trust is contrary to law. Thus, while the sale and lease of the subject property is genuine and binding upon the

parties, the implied trust cannot be enforced even assuming the parties intended to create it. xxx "the courts will not assist the payor in achieving his improper purpose by enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance with the clean hands doctrine." Pigue Bank cannot thus demand reconveyance of the property based on its alleged implied trust relationship with Machang Realty. The parties being in pari delicto, thus, no affirmative relief should be given to one against the other. Pigue Bank should not be allowed to dispute the sale of its lands to Machang Realty nor should Machang Realty be allowed to further collect rent from Pigue Bank. The clean hands doctrine will not allow the creation nor the use of a juridical relation such as a trust to subvert, directly or indirectly, the law. Neither party came to court with clean hands; neither will obtain relief from the court as the one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean hands. (TALA REALTY, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 7 April 2009) Would reference to the penalty charges in the promissory note constitute substantial compliance with the disclosure requirement of the Truth in Lending Act? The Court has affirmed that financial charges are amply disclosed if stated in the promissory note in the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Arcilla, Jr. The Court there said, "Under Circular 158 of the Central Bank, the lender is required to include the information required by R.A. 3765 in the contract covering the credit transaction or any other document to be acknowledged and signed by the borrower. In addition, the contract or document shall specify additional charges, if any, which will be collected in case certain stipulations in the contract are not met by the debtor." In this case, the promissory notes contained data, including penalty charges, required by the Truth in Lending Act. They cannot avoid liability based on a rigid interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act that contravenes its goal. (BPI vs. Sps. YU, G.R. No. 184122, 20 January 2010) ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT Is ex parte court order allowing bank inquiry legally permissible? Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze order under Section 10 and the bank inquiry order under Section 11 are similar in that they are extraordinary provisional reliefs which the AMLC may avail of to effectively combat and prosecute money laundering offenses. Crucially, Section 10 uses specific language to authorize an ex parte application for the provisional relief therein, a circumstance absent in Section 11. If indeed the legislature had intended to authorize ex parte proceedings for the issuance of the bank inquiry order, then it could have easily expressed such intent in the law, as it did with the freeze order under Section 10. xxx That the AMLA does not contemplate ex parte proceedings in applications for bank inquiry orders is confirmed by the present implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA, promulgated upon the passage of R.A. No. 9194. With respect to freeze orders under Section 10, the implementing rules do expressly provide that the applications for freeze orders be filed ex parte,75 but no similar clearance is granted in the case of inquiry orders under Section 11. (REPUBLIC vs. EUGENIO, G.R. No. 174629, 14 February 2008) What is the venue of a case for civil forfeiture under the AMLA?

Section 3, Title II (Civil Forfeiture in the Regional Trial Court) of the Rule of Procedure in

Cases of Civil Forfeiture (A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC) provides: Sec. 3. Venue of cases cognizable by the regional trial court. A petition for civil forfeiture shall be filed in any regional trial court of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located; provided, however, that where all or any portion of the monetary instrument, property or proceeds is located outside the Philippines, the petition may be filed in the regional trial court in Manila or of the judicial region where any portion of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is located, at the option of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Explain the DOCTRINE OF PATENT EXHAUSTION. In the essential nature of things, when the patentee sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use. The article, in the language of the law, passes without the limit of the monopoly. That is to say, the patentee, having in the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentee. (ADAMS vs. BURKE [1873]) Explain the DOCTRINE OF SECONDARY MEANING. A word or phrase originally incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article on the market, because geographically or otherwise descriptive, might nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article that, in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was his product. (LYCEUM OF THE PHILS. vs. CA, 219 SCRA 610) Explain the DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS. The doctrine of equivalents provides that an infringement also takes place when a device appropriates a prior invention by incorporating its innovative concept and, although with some modification and change, performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result. (SMITH KLINE BECKMAN CORPORATION vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 126627, 14 August 2003) State the elements of unfair competition. The essential elements of an action for unfair competition are (1) confusing similarity in the general appearance of the goods and (2) intent to deceive the public and defraud a competitor. The confusing similarity may or may not result from similarity in the marks, but may result from other external factors in the packaging or presentation of the goods. The intent to deceive and defraud may be inferred from the similarity of the appearance of the goods as offered for sale to the public. Actual fraudulent intent need not be shown. (IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC. vs. SEHWANI, INC., G.R. No. 179127, 24 December 2008) Does an infringement case constitute a prejudicial question to an unfair competition case? NO. There is no prejudicial question since the two actions- an action for infringement and unfair competition are independent of each of other. The basis of an action for unfair competition is fraud, while that of infringement, the fact of registration.

At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil (infringement) and criminal (unfair competition) action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under

Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (SAMSON vs. HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, et al., G.R. Nos. 160054-55. 21 July 2004) What constitutes infringement of registered trade name? Should the trademark be registered before a complaint for infringement can be brought? The following would constitute infringement of trade name: (1) The trademark being infringed is registered in the Intellectual Property Office; however, in infringement of trade name, the same need not be registered; (2) The trademark or trade name is reproduced, counterfeited, copied, or colorably imitated by the infringer; (3) The infringing mark or trade name is used in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods, business or services; or the infringing mark or trade name is applied to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, or advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection with such goods, business, or services; (4) The use or application of the infringing mark or trade name is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the goods or services themselves or as to the source or origin of such goods or services or the identity of such business; and (5) It is without the consent of the trademark or trade name owner or the assignee thereof.10 (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, a trade name need not be registered with the IPO before an infringement suit may be filed by its owner against the owner of an infringing trademark. All that is required is that the trade name is previously used in trade or commerce in the Philippines. (COFFEE PARTNERS, INC. vs. SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY, G.R. No. 169504, 3 March 2010) What are the two types of confusion arising from the use of similar or colorable imitation marks? Section 22, IPC covers two types of confusion: a) confusion of goods (product confusion), in which event the ordinarily prudent purchaser would be induced to purchase one product in the belief that he was purchasing the other and b) confusion of business (source or origin confusion), though the goods of the parties are different, the defendants product is such as might reasonably be assumed to originate with the plaintiff, and the public would then be deceived either into that belief or into the belief that there is some connection between the plaintiff and defendant, which, in fact, does not exist. (MCDONALDS CORPORATION, et al. vs. L.C. BIG MAK BURGER, INC., et al.,G.R. No. 143993, August 18, 2004) Does the exemption provided by RA 623 apply even to large scale manufacturing?

YES. RA 623, as amended by R.A. 5700 or An Act to Regulate the Use of Du ly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and other similar Containers was meant to protect the intellectual property rights of the registrants of the containers and prevent unfair practices and fraud on the public. However, Section 6 of the said Act specifically allows the re-use of such bottles as containers for sisi, patis, bagoong, and other native products. The law did not distinguish between small scale and large scale manufacturing. Hence, notwithstanding that the native products are produced on a large scale, the re-use of registered bottles still comes within the exception provided by the law. (TWIN ACE HOLDINGS CORP. vs. RUFINA AND COMPANY (G.R. No. 160191, 08 June 2006)

Can a distributor register a trademark in its name? As a mere distributor had no right to register a trademark in its name. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the rule that the right to register a trademark should be based on ownership. When the applicant is not the owner of the trademark being applied for, he has no right to apply for the registration of the same. Under the Trademark Law, only the owner of the trademark, trade name or service mark used to distinguish his goods, business or service from the goods, business or service of others is entitled to register the same. An exclusive distributor does not acquire any proprietary interest in the principals trademark and cannot register it in his own name unless it is has been validly assigned to him. (SUPERIOR COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. KUNNAN ENTERPRISES, G.R. 169974, 20 April 2010) How is ownership of a trademark established? Is actual use a requirement? The ownership of a trademark is acquired by its registration and its actual use by the manufacturer or distributor of the goods made available to the purchasing public. Section 122 of R.A. No. 8293 provides that the rights in a mark shall be acquired by means of its valid registration with the IPO. A certificate of registration of a mark, once issued, constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, of the registrants ownership of the mark, and of the registrants exclusive right to use the same in connection with the goods or services and those that are related thereto specified in the certificate. R.A. No. 8293 requires the applicant for registration or the registrant to file a declaration of actual use (DAU) of the mark, with evidence to that effect, within three (3) years from the filing of the application for registration; otherwise, the application shall be refused or the mark shall be removed from the register. In other words, the prima facie presumption brought about by the registration of a mark may be challenged and overcome, in an appropriate action, by proof of the nullity of the registration or of non-use of the mark, except when excused. Moreover, the presumption may likewise be defeated by evidence of prior use by another person, i.e., it will controvert a claim of legal appropriation or of ownership based on registration by a subsequent user. This is because a trademark is a creation of use and belongs to one who first used it in trade or commerce. (BERRIS AGRICULTURAL CO., INC. vs. ABYADANG, G.R. No. 183404, 13 October 2010)


Bar Reminders (2012) Atty. Maria Zarah R. Villanueva-Castro A contract of suretyship is an agreement whereby a party called the surety, guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of an obligation or undertaking in favor of another party called the obligee. By its very nature, under the laws regulating suretyship, the liability of the surety is joint and several but is limited to the amount of the bond, and its terms are determined strictly by the terms of the contract of suretyship in relation to the principal contract between the obligor and the obligee.


What is an All-Risk Policy?

An All-Risk Policy insures against all causes of conceivable loss or damage except when otherwise excluded or when the loss or damage was due to fraud or intentional misconduct committed by the insured. The policy covers all losses during the voyage whether or not arising from a marine peril. (New World International Development [Phils.], Inc. v. Nyk-FilJapan Shipping Corp., et al./New World International Development[Phils.], Inc. v. Seaboard-Eastern Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. Nos. 171468/174241, August 24, 2011)

Although the contract of suretyship is, in essence, secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the suretys liability to the creditor is direct, primary, and absolute; he becomes liable for the debt and duty of another although he possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does he receive any benefit therefrom. (American Home Insurance co. of New York V. F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., G.R. No. 174926, August 10, 2011)


Is non-presentation of the policy fatal to an insurance claim? Explain the presumption of consideration in negotiable instruments. Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not necessarily fatal. In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that the presentation of the insurance policy was not fatal because the loss of the cargo undoubtedly occurred while on board the petitioners vessel.

And even though it was not offered in evidence, it still can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case. (Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance, Co., Inc., G.R. No. 171406, April 4, 2011)

Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is presumed that every party to an instrument acquires the same for a consideration or for value. It devolved upon the party who claims that there is no consideration to present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption and prove that the checks were in fact issued without valuable consideration. (Engr. Jose E. Cayanan v. North Star International Travel, Inc. G.R. No. 172954, October 5, 2011)

Who is an accommodation party? What is his liability to the holder?

Explain the nature of Suretyship.

An accommodation party is one who meets all the three requisites, viz: (1) he must be a party to the instrument, signing as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser; (2) he must not receive value therefor;

and (3) he must sign for the purpose of lending his name or credit to some other person. An accommodation party lends his name to enable the accommodated party to obtain credit or to raise money; he receives no part of the consideration for the instrument but assumes liability to the other party/ies thereto. The accommodation party is liable on the instrument to a holder for value even though the holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him or her to be merely an accommodation party, as if the contract was not for accommodation. (Eusebio Gonzales v. Philippine Commercial & International Bank, et al., G.R. No. 180257, February 23, 2011)

vehicle figured in an accident, the registered vehicle owner would still be liable for damages caused by the accident. The sale, transfer or lease of the vehicle, which is not registered with the Land Transportation Office, will not bind third persons aggrieved in an accident involving the vehicle. (FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation (now BPI Leasing Corp.) v. Sps. Sergio P. Baylon and Maritess Villena Baylon, et al., G.R. No. 181398, June 29, 2011)

What is the purpose of the Registered Owner Rule? Can the registered owner evade responsibility by proving the actual owner/operator of the vehicle at the time of the incident? TRANSPORTATION Were a registered owner is allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who the owner is. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. (Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation [Formerly Consolidated Orix Leasing and Finance] v. Minors: Dennis, Mylene, Melanie and Marikris, All surnamed Mangalinao y Dizon, et al. Sonny Li and Antonio Delos Santos v. Minors: Dennis, Mylene, Melanie and Marikris, All Surnamed Mangalinao Y Dizon, et al., G.R. No. 174089 and G.R. No. 174266, January 25, 2012)

Does the acquittal of the driver in the criminal case for reckless imprudence excuse the carrier from liability?

No. The action for the recovery of damages arising from breach of contract of carriage is an independent civil action arising from contract which is separate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide against the driver by reason of the same incident. Hence, regardless of the drivers acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, same has no bearing in the resolution of the case for damages. (Heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, namely: Ruby B. Ochoa, et al. v. G & S Transport Corporation / G & S Tranport Corporation v. Heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, namely: Ruby B. Ochoa, et al., G.R. Nos. 170071/170125, March 9, 2011)

Can a franchise issued to a public utility be exclusive? Explain the Registered Owner Rule. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. The President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration to create franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 PD No. 198, as amended, allows the Board of Directors of La Trinidad Water District and Local Water Utilities Administration to create franchises that are exclusive in character. Clearly, Section 47 is patently

In accordance with the law on compulsory motor vehicle registration, with respect to the public and third persons, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation regardless of who the actual vehicle owner might be. Well-settled is the rule that the registered owner of the vehicle is liable for quasi-delicts resulting from its use. Thus, even if the vehicle has already been sold, leased, or transferred to another person at the time the

unconstitutional. (Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011)

only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term capital shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors.


This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities.

Is the Boy Scouts of the Philippines a public corporation? (Note: As of April 2012, the Motion for Reconsideration of this case is still pending before the Supreme Court) (Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves, et al.; Pablito V. Sanidad, et al., Petitioners-in-intervention, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011)

As presently constituted, the Boy Scouts of the Philippines still remains an instrumentality of the national government. It is a public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the DECS pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and be economically viable to justify its existence under a special law. Thus, the test of economic viability clearly does not apply to public corporations dealing with governmental functions, to which category the BSP belongs. (Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011)

Explain the Trust Fund Doctrine? What is the extent of the doctrine?

What does the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution mean?

The trust fund doctrine enunciates a rule that the property of a corporation is a trust fund for the payment of creditors. As between the corporation itself and its creditors it is a simple debtor, and as between its creditors and stockholders its assets are in equity a fund for the payment of its debts. It is established doctrine that subscriptions to the capital of a corporation constitute a fund to which creditors have a right to look for satisfaction of their claims and that the assignee in insolvency can maintain an action upon any unpaid stock subscription in order to realize assets for the payment of its debts.

The term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constituti on refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in this case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.

Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation. This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that controls or manages the corporation. Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers

The trust fund doctrine is not limited to reaching the stockholders unpaid subscriptions. The scope of the doctrine when the corporation is insolvent encompasses not only the capital stock, but also other property and assets generally regarded in equity as a trust fund for the payment of corporate debts. All assets and property belonging to the corporation held in trust for the benefit of creditors that were distributed or in the possession of the stockholders, regardless of full payment of their subscriptions, may be reached by the creditor in satisfaction of its claim.

Also, under the trust fund doctrine, a corporation has no legal capacity to release an original subscriber to its capital stock from the obligation of paying for his shares, in whole or in part, without a valuable consideration, or fraudulently, to the prejudice of creditors. The creditor is allowed to maintain an action upon any unpaid subscriptions and thereby steps into the shoes of the corporation for the satisfaction of its debt. (Donnina C. Halley v. Printwell Inc., G.R. No. 157549, May 30, 2011)

What makes a controversy intra-corporate?

To reiterate, not all conflicts between the stockholders and the corporation are classified as intracorporate. Other factors such as the status or relationship of the parties and the nature of the question that is the subject of the controversy must be considered in determining whether the dispute involves corporate matters so as to regard them as intra-corporate controversies. (March II Marketing, Inc. and Lucila V. Joson v. Alfredo M. Joson, G.R. No. 171993, December 12, 2011)

Who owns the shares purchased with the use of coconut levy funds?

When is an officer personally liable for the dismissal of an employee?

It is fairly established that the coconut levy funds are special public funds. Consequently, any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property. Being government properties, they are accordingly owned by the Government, for the coconut industry pursuant to existing laws. (Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. [COCOFED], et al. Vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., Intervenors/Danilo S. Ursua Vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58/178193, January 24, 2012)

Even if the company has a valid cause for dismissing an employee due to cessation of business operations, however, if the latter's dismissal was done abruptly and where he was not given the required one-month prior written notice that the company will already cease its business operations, bad faith is clearly present on the part of the responsible officers. (March II Marketing, Inc. and Lucila V. Joson v. Alfredo M. Joson, G.R. No. 171993, December 12, 2011)

When is the officer deemed to have acted in bad faith? When may the Board create additional positions for corporate office? When an officer modified the initial result of the technical evaluation of the computers by imposing an irrelevant grading system that was intended to favor one of the bidders, after the bids had been opened, he is deemed to have acted in bad faith. PD 1445 states that expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor. (Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Caraque, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011)

Though the board of directors may create appointive positions other than the positions of corporate officers, the persons occupying such positions cannot be viewed as corporate officers under Section 25 of the Corporation Code. Unless and until the corporation's by-laws is amended for the inclusion of General Manager in the list of its corporate officers, such position cannot be considered as a corporate office within the realm of Section 25 of the Corporation Code. (March II Marketing, Inc. and Lucila V. Joson v. Alfredo M. Joson, G.R. No. 171993, December 12, 2011)

A lawyer entered his appearance accompanied by the companys director and general manager who himself attended several court hearings, and sent a letter to the RTC asking for the status of

the case. There is no board resolution for the representations made before the court. Is the company bound by the representations of the lawyer?

opportunity to be heard by the rehabilitation court. Hence, even if belated filed, opposition or comment to rehabilitation should be accepted. (Asia Trust Development Bank v. First Aikka Development, Inc. and Univac Development, Inc., G.R. No. 179558, June 1, 2011)

A corporation may be held in estoppel from denying as against innocent third persons the authority of its officers or agents who have been clothed by it with ostensible or apparent authority. Its lawyer may not have been armed with a board resolution, but the appearance of the director and general manager made the parties assume that the company had knowledge of i ts lawyers actions and, thus, clothed the latter with apparent authority such that the parties were made to believe that the proper person and entity to address was such lawyer. Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency, imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists. This is especially true since the company never repudiated the authority of its lawyer when all the motions, pleadings and court orders were sent not to the office of the latter but to the office of the company, who in turn, would forward all of the same to the lawyer. (Megan Sugar Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 68, Dumangas, Iloilo; New Frontier Sugar Corp., et al. , G.R. No. 170352, June 1, 2011)

Where should a petition for corporate rehabilitation be filed?

Petitions for rehabilitation pursuant to these Rules shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the territory where the debtors principal office is located. (Asia Trust Development Bank v. First Aikka Development, Inc. and Univac Development, Inc., G.R. No. 179558, June 1, 2011)

When a company has secured a suspension order, is foreclosure of properties belonging to its stockholders/officers which were mortgaged to secure the debt of the company also suspended?

How should the Rules on Corporation Rehabilitation be construed?

The Court promulgated the Rules in order to provide a remedy for summary and non-adversarial rehabilitation proceedings of distressed but viable corporations. These Rules are to be construed liberally to obtain for the parties a just, expeditious, and inexpensive disposition of the case. Rehabilitation proceedings in our jurisdiction have equitable and rehabilitative purposes. They attempt to provide for the efficient and equitable distribution of an insolvent debtors remaining assets to its creditors; and to provide debtors with a fresh start by relieving them of the weight of their outstanding debts and permitting them to reorganize their affairs. The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is to enable the company to gain a new Lease on life and thereby allow creditors to be paid their claims from its earnings.

NO. These properties are not under the purview of the SEC Suspension Order. PD 902-A vested the SEC with jurisdiction on petitions for suspension of payments only on corporations, partnerships and associations; not on individual persons. Private individuals and their privately owned properties cannot be placed under the jurisdiction of the SEC in a petition for suspension of payments. The SEC has no jurisdiction over private individuals relative to any petition for suspension of payments, whether the private individual is a petitioner or a co-petitioner. The SECs jurisdiction is limited only to corporations and corporate assets; it has no jurisdiction over the properties of private individuals or natural persons, even if they are the corporations offic ers or sureties. (Samuel U. Lee, et al. v. Bangkok Bank Public Company, Limited, G.R. No. 173349, February 9, 2011)

Is the rehabilitation plan an indispensable requirement in a corporate rehabilitation case?

The determination of the true and correct amount due a creditor is important in assessing whether the company may be successfully rehabilitated. It is thus necessary that the creditor be given the

The rehabilitation plan is an indispensable requirement in corporate rehabilitation proceedings. Section 5 of the Rules enumerates the essential requisites of a rehabilitation plan: The rehabilitation

plan shall include (a) the desired business targets or goals and the duration and coverage of the rehabilitation; (b) the terms and conditions of such rehabilitation which shall include the manner of its implementation, giving due regard to the interests of secured creditors; (c) the material financial commitments to support the rehabilitation plan; (d) the means for the execution of the rehabilitation plan, which may include conversion of the debts or any portion thereof to equity, restructuring of the debts, dacion en pago, or sale of assets or of the controlling interest; (e) a liquidation analysis that estimates the proportion of the claims that the creditors and shareholders would receive if the debtors properties were liquidated; and (f) such other relevant information to enable a reasonable investor to make an informed decision on the feasibility of the rehabilitation plan. Failure to include a liquidation analysis is fatal to the rehabilitation plan. (Siochi Fishery Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 193872, October 19, 2011)

The Rules of Procedure of Corporate Rehabilitation provides that a stay order does not apply to sureties who are solidarily liable with the debtor. (JAPRL Development Corp., et al. v. Security Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 190107, June 6, 2011)

Does the stay order apply to pending criminal cases against the officers of the corporation?

Can a corporate officer (duly authorized by the Board of Directors) file a suit to recover an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the corporation s pending rehabilitation?

The rehabilitation receiver is tasked only to monitor the successful implementation of the rehabilitation plan. There is nothing in the concept of corporate rehabilitation that would ipso facto deprive the Board of Directors and corporate officers of a debtor corporation, of control such that it can no longer enforce its right to recover its property from an errant lessee. The rules enumerate the prohibited corporate actions and transactions during the pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings but none of which touch on the debtor corporations right to sue. The implication therefore is that our concept of rehabilitation does not restrict this particular power, save for the caveat that all its actions are monitored closely by the receiver, who can seek an annulment of any prohibited or anomalous transaction or agreement entered into by the officers of the debtor corporation. (Leonardo S. Umale (deceased), represented by Clarissa Victoria, et al. all surnamed Umale Vs. ASB Realty Corp., G.R. No. 181126, June 15, 2011)

The rehabilitation of the corporation is not a legal ground for the extinction of its officers criminal liabilities. There is no reason why criminal proceedings should be suspended during corporate rehabilitation, more so, since the prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. It would be absurd for one who has engaged in criminal conduct could escape punishment by the mere filing of a petition for rehabilitation by the corporation of which he is an officer. The prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending rehabilitation of the corporation, especially since they are charged in their individual capacities. (Jose Marcel Panlilio, et al. v. Regional Trial Court, etc., People of the Philippines and Social Security System, G.R. No. 173846, February 2, 2011)

Is execution of judgment against the corporation also covered by a stay order?

All pending actions, including the execution of the judgment against the corporation, should be suspended pending termination of the rehabilitation proceedings. Jurisprudence is settled that the suspension of proceedings referred to in the law uniformly ap plies to all actions for claims filed against a corporation, partnership or association under management or receivership, without distinction, except only those expenses incurred in the ordinary course of business. (Agripino V. Molina v. Pacific Plans, Inc., G.R. No. 165476, August 15, 2011)

Are sureties of the debtor corporation affected by the Stay Order? A stockholder demands accounting of association dues from a condominium corporation. Is this intra-corporate in nature? Will foreclosure sale prevent such stockholder from questioning the assessments?

Yes, this case involves an intra-corporate dispute. Just because the property has already been sold extra-judicially does not mean that the questioned assessments have now become legal and valid or that they have become immaterial. In fact, the validity of the foreclosure depends on the legality of the assessments and the issue must be determined by the court if only to insure that the owner was not deprived of her property without having been heard. (Chateu de Baie Condominium Corp. v. Sps. Raymond and Ma. Rosario Moreno, G.R. No. 186271, February 23, 2011)


What is a public company under the Securities Regulation Code? Is this limited to companies whose shares of stock are publicly listed?

What is the applicable term of office of the trustees of an educational stock corporation?

Section 108 of the Corporation Code determines the membership and number of trustees in an educational corporation. The second paragraph of the provision, although setting the term of the members of the Board of Trustees at five years, contains a proviso expressly subjecting the duration to what is otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws of the educational corporation. Hence, if the by-laws of such corporation provide for a term of two years, such term shall prevail. It follows that the officers appointed by the trustees should also serve for the same term. (Petronilo J. Barayuga v. Adventist University of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 168008, August 17, 2011)

Subsections 17.1 and 17.2 of the SRC and Rule 3(1)(m) of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the SRC, it is clear that a "public company," as contemplated by the SRC, is not limited to a company whose shares of stock are publicly listed; even companies whose shares are offered only to a specific group of people, are considered a public company, provided they meet the requirements enumerated in the SRC such as existence of (i) assets exceeding P50,000,000.00 and (ii) 395,998 shareholders. (Philippine Veterans Bank v. Justina Callangan, etc. and/or the Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 191995, August 03, 2011)

What is an investment contract?

Are employment contracts automatically assumed by the surviving corporation in a merger, even in the absence of an express stipulation in the articles of merger or the merger plan?

An investment contract is a contract, transaction, or scheme where a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits primarily from the efforts of others. The United States Supreme Court held in Securities and Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co. that, for an investment contract to exist, the following elements, referred to as the Howey test must concur: (1) a contract, transaction, or scheme; (2) an investment of money; (3) investment is made in a common enterprise; (4) expectation of profits; and (5) profits arising primarily from the efforts of others.

Yes but only after the SEC has approved the merger. However, nothing in this Resolution shall impair the right of an employer to terminate the employment of the absorbed employees for a lawful or authorized cause or the right of such an employee to resign, retire or otherwise sever his employment, whether before or after the merger, subject to existing contractual obligations. (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank, G.R. No. 164301, October 19, 2011)

Sale of internet website does not fall under investment contract as the buyers do not invest money in the company that it could use for running some business that would generate profits for the investors. (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Prosperity.Com Inc., G.R. No. 164197, January 25, 2012)


In what currency should payment of an obligation be discharged? What rate of exchange should be followed for the payment of an obligation?

diligence to negate its liability to the depositor. In this instance, a bank was sorely remiss in the diligence required in treating with its client if the latter has not been properly notified of the delinquencies of the loan and the process of terminating his credit. Had the required diligence been observed, dishonor of the check would have been avoided. (Eusebio Gonzales v. Philippine Commercial & International Bank, et al., G.R. No. 180257, February 23, 2011)

Payments of monetary obligations, subject to certain exceptions, shall be discharged in the currency which is the legal tender in the Philippines. But since R.A. No. 529 does not provide for the rate of exchange for the payment of foreign currency obligations incurred after its enactment, the Court held in a number of cases that the rate of exchange for the conversion in the peso equivalent should be the prevailing rate at the time of payment. (Commissioner of Customs v. Agfha Incorporated, G.R. No. 187425, March 28, 2011)

What is the diligence required of banks in handling real estate mortgage?

The general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title does not apply to banks and other financial institutions as greater care and due diligence is required of them. Imbued with public interest, they are expected to be more cautious than ordinary individuals. Thus, before approving a loan, the standard practice for banks and other financial institutions is to conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered to be mortgaged and verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owner or owners thereof. Failure to do so makes them mortgagees in bad faith.

When is there an improper disclosure of bank account details? This requires the bank to further check the actual occupants of the subject property and verify their status therein. (Armando V. Alano (deceased), substituted by Elena Alano-Torres v. Planter's Development Bank, as successor-in-interest of Maunlad Savings and Load Association, Inc., G.R. No. 171628, June 13, 2011)

A mere discussion of his functions as an account officer of the bank and identification of a person as the one who had guaranteed the payment or obligations of the importers under a Surety Agreement do not constitute actual disclosure of the confidential information described in Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act. (Ricardo B. Bangayan v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and Philip Saria, G.R. No. 149193, April 4, 2011)

What is the degree of diligence required of banks in the conduct of their business?

A bank dealing in real property has the duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty. Its duty included the responsibility of dispatching its competent and experience representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of investigating who was its real owner. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), represented by Rosella A. Santiago v. Antonio O. Tobias III, G.R. No. 177780, January 25, 2012)

Indeed, the business of banking is impressed with public interest and great reliance is made on the banks sworn profession of diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable service. Like a common carrier whose business is imbued with public interest, a bank should exercise extraordinary

What is a certificate of deposit?

A certificate of deposit is defined as a written acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the bank or banker promises to pay to the depositor, to the order of the depositor, or to some other person or his order, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the depositor is created. A document to be considered a certificate of deposit need not be in a specific form. Thus, a passbook issued by a bank qualifies as a certificate of deposit drawing interest because it is considered a written acknowledgement by a bank that it has accepted a deposit of a sum of money from a depositor. (Prudential Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 180390, July 27, 2011)

prevailing market rate. This may result to either an increase or a decrease in the interest. (Lotto Restaurant Corporation v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 177260, March 30, 2011)

Is 24% per annum interest rate unconscionable?

Unconscionable rates are those which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. The Court declared that the 24% per annum interest rate is not to be considered unconscionable, consistent with jurisprudence previously rendering the same rate valid. Moreover, considering that the mortgage agreement was freely entered into by both parties, the same is the law between them and they are bound to comply with the provisions contained therein. (Spouses Nelson and Myra Villanueva v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 163433, August 22, 2011)

Can a bank unilaterally increase interest rate on a loan?

No. The unilateral determination and imposition of the increased rates is violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of the Civil Code, which provides that [t]he contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them. Hence, where the Promissory Note shows that the increase or decrease of interest rates hinges solely on the discretion of petitioner and does not require the conformity of the maker before a new interest rate could be enforced, mutuality rule is violated. Any contract which appears to be heavily weighed in favor of one of the parties so as to lead to an unconscionable result, thus partaking of the nature of a contract of adhesion, is void. (Philippine Savings Bank v. Sps. Alfredo M. Castillo and Elizabeth C. Castillo, et al.G.R. No. 193178, May 30, 2011)

Does the Land Bank have the power to write-off loans though this is not clear in its charter?

While the power to write-off is not expressly granted in the charter of the Land Bank, it can be logically implied, however, from the Land Bank's authority to exercise the general powers vested in banking institutions as provided in the General Banking Act (Republic Act 337). The clear intendment of its charter is for the Land Bank to be for the exercise of those express powers is clothed not only with the express powers granted to it, but also with those implied, incidental and necessary. (Ruben Reyna, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011)

What if the parties have agreed that the interest rate may be increased based on the prevailing market rate? Is this allowed?

Is writing-off a loan equivalent to condonation?

The Court has previously upheld as valid the proviso in loans that the interest rate would be made to depend on the prevailing market rate. Such provision does not signify unilateral and automatic increase in the interest. It simply means that the bank may adjust the interest according to the

Writing-off a loan does not equate to a condonation or release of a debt by the creditor. It is not one of the legal grounds for extinguishing an obligation under the Civil Code. It is not a compromise of liability. Neither is it a condonation, since in condonation gratuity on the part of the obligee and acceptance by the obligor are required. In making the write-off, only the creditor takes action by removing the uncollectible account from its books even without the approval or participation of the

debtor. It is merely an accounting strategy that can help a company maintain a more accurate inventory of the worth of its current assets. In general banking practice, the write-off method is used when an account is determined to be uncollectible and an uncollectible expense is recorded in the books of account. If in the future, the debt appears to be collectible, as when the debtor becomes solvent, then the books will be adjusted to reflect the amount to be collected as an asset. In turn, income will be credited by the same amount of increase in the accounts receivable. Thus, the employees obligation to pay exists despite the write-off. (Ruben Reyna, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011)

Is actual sale of the counterfeit goods essential to trademark infringement?

Under the IP Code, preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive (Sec. 155.1) and to reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce (Sec. 155.2) are acts of infringement regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or services using the infringing material. (Gemma Ong a.k.a. Ma. Theresa Gemma Catacutan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 169440, November 23, 2011)

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GENERAL BONDED WAREHOUSE ACT Skechers USA has registered the trademark Skechers and the trademark S (with an oval design) with the IPO. Pursuant to a search warrant. More than 6,000 pairs of shoes bearing the S logo were seized. Respondents moved to quash the search warrant arguing that there was no confusing similarity between petitioners Skechers rubber shoes and its Strong rubber shoes. RTC applying the Holistic Test ordered the quashing of the warrant which was affirmed by the CA. RTC noted the following differences: 1) the mark S is not enclosed in an oval design; 2) the hang tags and labels bears the word Strong for respondent and Skechers USA for petitioner; 3) Strong Shoes are modestly priced compared to Skechers Shoes. Decide.

What is a Continuing Bond? A continuing bond is one that has no fixed expiration date and may be cancelled only by the oblige, by the Insurance Commission and by the court. (Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Antonio Lagman, G.R. No. 165487, July 13, 2011)

CHATTEL MORTGAGE Infringement exists. Applying the Dominancy test, even if respondents did not use an oval design, the mere fact that it used the same stylized S (same font and size of the lettering) the same being the dominant feature of petitioners trademark constitutes infringement. Applying the Holistic Test, the dissimilarities between the shoes are too trifling and frivolous that it is indubitable that respondents products will cause confusion and mistakes in the eyes of the public. Respondents shoes may not be an exact replica of the petitioners shoes, but the features and overall design are so similar and alike that confusion is highly likely. Registered trademark owner any use its mark on the same or similar products, in different segments of the market, and at different price levels depending on variations of the products for specific segments of the market. The purchasing public might be mistaken in thinking that petitioner had ventured into a lower market segment which scenario is plausible especially since both petitioner and respondent manufacture rubber shoes. (Skechers, U.S.A., Inc. v. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corp., et al., G.R. No. 164321, March 23, 2011)

What is the effect of an unnotarized Chattel Mortgage?

An unnotarized Chattel Mortgage does not bind third parties. However, the lender can still sue the borrower for payment. (Union Bank of the Philippines v. Alain Juniat, et al., G.R. No. 171569, August 01, 2011)


Can the creditor sue the debtor for payment and at the same time, foreclose the mortgage security?

If there is a deficiency arising from foreclosure of real estate mortgage, can the mortgagee still collect the deficiency? If he can, within what period?

The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt. The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. An election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties. The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by itself. If the mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the debt, and vice versa. (Arturo Sarte Flores v. Sps. Enrico L. Lindo, Jr. and Edna C. Lindo, G.R No. 183984, April 13, 2011)

It is settled that if "the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to cover the debt in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the mortgagee is entitled to claim the deficiency from the debtor. While Act No. 3135, as amended, does not discuss the mortgage es right to recover the deficiency, neither does it contain any provision expressly or impliedly prohibiting recovery. If the legislature had intended to deny the creditor the right to sue for any deficiency resulting from the foreclosure of a security given to guarantee an obligation, the law would expressly so provide. Absent such a provision in Act No. 3135, as amended, the creditor is not precluded from taking action to recover any unpaid balance on the principal obligation simply because he chose to extrajudicially foreclose the real estate mortgage. (BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Ma. Arlyn T. Avenido & Pacifico Avenido, G.R. No. 175816, December 7, 2011)

Where is the proper venue of extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage?

A mortgage action prescribes after ten years from the time the right of action accrued. (Philippine Export and Foreign Load Guarantee Corporation [now Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines] v. Amalgamated Management and Development Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 177729, September 28, 2011]

The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, hence, the city or municipality where the property is located. The stipulation of the parties as the venue of actions cannot prevail. (Sps. Hermes P. Ochoa and Araceli D. Ochoa v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011) What is the period to redeem a real property which was extrajudically foreclosed?

It is being alleged by the mortgagor that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale did not comply with the formal requirements of Act 3135, specifically that: 1) the sheriff failed to post the notice of sale in the premises of the mortgaged property and the place where the auction was conducted and other conspicuous public places where the property is located; and 2) the newspaper where the notice of sale was published, was not a newspaper of general circulation. Should this be upheld?

Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides for the redemption of an extra-judicially foreclosed property within a one-year period. (BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Ma. Arlyn T. Avenido & Pacifico Avenido, G.R. No. 175816, December 7, 2011)

The Court has ruled in previous cases that foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity and that the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of proving such fact. If based alone on these allegations, the presumption cannot be destroyed. (Sps. Victor Ong and Grace Tiu Ong v. Premier Development Bank, et al.G.R. No. 159615, February 9, 2011)

Under what condition is the highest bidder entitled to a writ of possession during the redemption period?

During the period of redemption, the highest bidder is entitled to a writ of possession upon depositing the approved bond. (Spouses Fernando and Angelina Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 168523, March 9, 2011)

When may a writ of possession under Act 3135 be issued to the winning bidder? When does it become ministerial to the court?

It may be issued in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, either 1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or 2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond or of a separate and independent action. (Viola Cahilig and Antonio G. Sinel, Jr. v. Hon. Eustaquio G. Terencio, et al., G.R No. 164470, November 28, 2011)

After the consolidation of titles in the buyers name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, entitlement to a writ of possession becomes a matter of right. As the confirmed owner, the purchasers right to possession becomes absolute. There is even no need for him to post a bond, and it is the ministerial duty of the courts to issue the same upon proper application and proof of title. (ibid)