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not verbal-distinctions. Their agreement on
this point seems to be shared even by those,
like Hume, who question our ability to know
whether substances exist; or those, like Berke'"
ley, who question the validity of the distinction
between quality and quantity.
In one sense, no one questions the existence
of qualities, as they do the existence of
stances-the enduring things, material or other...
wise, in which qualities are supposed to inhere.
Everyone somehow acknowledges the hot and
the cold, the light and the dark, the moist and
the dry, the hard and the soft. But such
acknowledgement does not preclude a number
of basic questions about quality on which much
disagreement exists.
Are qualities attributes? Do they exist, that
is, only as qualifiers, only as belonging to some'"
thing else? Or do they exist independently, in
and of themselves? If qualities are attributes,
do they belong to things quite apart from our
experience of them, or do they belong to things
only as experienced and have no separate reai-..
ity? Do things have in reality certain attributes
that cause in us the experience of other traits
which we then attribute to the things them..
Are all the attributes of things, whether in or
apart from experience, to be conceived as qual-
i ties, and if so, are there different kinds of qual..
ities? Or is quality only one kind of attribute,
and if so, hoyv is quality related to other kinds
of attributes? Is quality, for example, distinct
from quantity, dependent on quantity, reduc"
ible to quantity, affected by quantity?
These questions appear to be related in ways
which rnake the issues they raise dependent on
one another. If, in addition, their presupposi-
tions and implications are observed, it will be
seen that they cannot be fully discussed without
entering into matters considered in other chap'"
Chapter 75: QUALITY
is sometin1es supposed that the fundamen'"
at' categories in terms of which men think
are describing reality or their experience
ly reflect the conventions of their language.
tance and attribute-and among attri...
5, quality and quantity-happen to be fun"
ental categories in western thought, it is
,only because the group of languages which
\Vestern cultures use all have a grammatical
cture that involves a distinction between
nand adjective and between different kinds
cljectives. It is said, for example, that Aris'"
's enumeration of the categories is merely
bal classification based on Greek grammar.
n he says that the basic terms of discourse
sent substances, qualities, quantities, re"
ns, and so forth, he is recognizing the gram...
ical difference between such words as "man"
"white," or between "white" and "six feet
"and "double." The lineaments of reality,
'Varieties of being, or the modes of experi"
are not, it is held, thereby finally described.
the tradition of the great books, another
rpretation generally prevails. Even those
disagree in one way or another about the
categories do not regard them as conven"
a.l or of linguistic origin. Kant, for example,
grees with Aristotle's listing of the cate'"
es. I-Ie makes substance a mode of relation
er than coordinate with quality, quantity,
relation. He calls his categories "transcen...
al" to indicate that they are not drawn
PV1'"\pt"1pr,\rp and that, as a priori forms of
they determine the structure of all
experience. Aristotle, on the other
draw's his categories from experience. He
that they represent fundamental modes
and that they are, therefore, the basic
in terms of which thought apprehends
Despite all these differences, Kant and
agree that the categories signify real---
SALEILLES. l'he lndividualisation
BRADLEY. Collected Essays, VOL I
WHARTON. Ethan Frome
FAUCONNET. La responsabilite
EWING. The Morality of Punishment
R?ss. The Right and the Good, II (I)
o NEILL. Emperor Jones
--. Mourning Becomes Electra
8HAw. Crude Criminology
HUGo. Les Mise,-ables
R. BROWNING. The Ring and the Book
S . BUTLER. Erewhon
MAUDSLEY. Responsibility in Mental Disease
T. HARDY. The Return ofthe Native
T..H. GREEN. The Principles of Political
tzon, (K)
S. M. GREEN. Crime: Its Nature, Causes, Treatment
and PreventIon
IBSEN. Ghosts
--. Hedda Gabler
QUALITIES DO NOT change into one an-
whereas substances undergoing altera-
froil1 one quality to another, seems
to distinguish quality from sub-
"The most distinctive mark of sub-
he vvrites, "appears to be that, while
numerically one and the same, it is
contrary qualities.... Thus,
the same color cannot be ,vhite and
.. But the same individual person is at
white, at another black, at one time
at another cold, at one time good, at
er bad." The qualities do not change, but
ubstance in changing, passes from one
ty to its contrary. (fhe difference be'"
change of quality, or alteration, and the
types of change which substances can un-
discussed in the chapter on CHANGE.)
suggests another mark of distinc-
substance and quality. One sub-
he says, never stands to another as its
in the way in which qualities are con-
all these considerations/' Socrates traryto one another, like hot and cold,white
arises a general reflection that there and black, good and bad.; A quality may have
() self-existent thing, bitt everything is a correlative as well as a contrary, e.g., ifknowl-
ing and in relation." edge isa quality of mind, the.objectknownis
bcrates explains that, for those who assert a its correlative, whereas ignorance of the object
ersal flux,qualities are not only the prod- is the contrary of knovvledge. In some cases,
s;of motion, but also are themselves in mo- the contrary qualities may be the extremes or
even white continues to flow white, limits of a continuous series of intermediates,
.whiteness itself isa luxor change whichis e.g., white and black with all the intermediate
ing into another color." no r:eed t? greys. In some cases, as with knowledge and ig-
te this doctrine, Socrates thmks,. smce it norance, the contrary qualities have no inter-
lies itself by its. unintelligibility or, worse, mediates. (Contrariety and correlation, most
inability to say anything definite in conse- frequently exemplified by qualities, are con-
ce of denying that words can have a con- sidered in the chapteron OPPOSITION.)
meaning from moment to moment. Still another mark of distinction hetween
ristotle concurs in this attitude toward" the substance and quality, according toAristotle,
t extreme view of the professed. Hhacli- is that qualities do and substances do not admit
s," but goes on to remark that "not even at of variation in degree. "One man cannot be
erent times does one sense disagree about more man than another," he writes, "as that
quality, but only about that to which the which is white may be more or less white than
ity belongs. I mean, for instance, that the some other white object. . The same quality,
wine might seem, if either it or one's body moreover, is said to subsist in a thing in varying
ged, at one time sweet and at another time degrees at different times. A whiteiJody is said
but at least the sweet, such as it is to be whiter at one time than it ,vas before, or a
it exists, has never yet changed." The ,varm body is said to be warmer or Jess warm
thing may become sour, either in itself than at some other time."
us, but sweetness itself never becomes This observation raises a number of ques-
tions. Does variation in the degree of a quality
from time to time imply that qualities them-
selves undergo change, just as substances un-
dergo change in quality ?Do they remain one
and the sanlC in kind while varying in degree?
Is this change which qualities undergo as they
increase or decrease in intensity, a change in
quantity? Furthermore, does the fact that
something white can become more or less white,
mean that a quality can have a certain quantity
even as a body can? Aquinas suggests an answer
by distinguishing between what he calls the
"dimensive quantity" of bodies and the "virtual
quantity" of qualities. Virtual quantity is the
degree or intensity which non-quantitative at-
tributes may possess-such personal qualities
as virtues and habits, or such corporeal qualities
as colors and textures.
But this still seems to leave a very difficult
question to be answered. How can qualities
have the attribute of quantity without becom'"
ing substances? On the principle which both
Aristotle and Aquinas accept-that accidents
exist only in substances-how can one kind of
their being perceived, does not
into substances, for qualities
quali ties of bodies as perceived, and
gether have their existence in the
The contrary view---!::that 1111-,)
and of themselves-does not seenl
clear or explicit expression in
the great books. It may be implied in
ception of experience which Hurne
more fully in the Treatise on Human
than in the Enquiry. There it
posed that each element of PVlr'\Pt"1-=-,."',..,... L I
same reality as any other; that each
itself without any perceptible llPl'"\Plnrl,o.... ,,,-'
any other; and that it has no PV111..''I-'"''''''''''''''''
its momentary appearance. On
during substances exist. In addition,
propriate to call the elements of
"qualities" as it is to call them --In'(T'l-t''' ...... .....
Experience can be described
qualities and relations-or as .........,.." ......... -
by succession and cantigui ty.
The notion that experience is a r"\,.'\f- ......
in \vhich nothing has a
from moment to moment, seems to
any theory which denies substances
the independent reality of qualities.
ory of qualities vlhich Plato
Heracli tus or his followers
"Their first principle," Socrates tells
tus, "is that all is motion, and upon
affections of which we were just
are supposed to depend; there is
motion, which has two forms, one'
the other passive, both in endless
out of the union and friction of
ated a progeny endless in number,
fornls, sense and the object of sense."
For example, "when the eye and
priate object meet together and
whiteness and the sensation rn1'ln.-.f-l',t".-.1
... then, while the sight is flo,ving from
whiteness proceeds from the object
bines in producing the color.... This
all sensible objects, hard, warm, and
which are similarly to be regarded not
any absolute existence, but as being
generated by motion in their
one another ... for the agent has no
until united with the patient, and the
has no existence until united with
ters, such as the notions of substance and acci-
dent in the chapter on BEING; the theory of
experience and the various accounts of sense"":
perception and the objects of sense inthe chap:
ters on EXPERIENCE and SENSE; and, of course,
some of the principal topics considered in the
closely related chapter on QUANTITY.
SPINOZA DISTINGUISHES between substance and
Illode as that which exists in itself and that
which exists in another thing. He lays down as
an axiom that "everything which is, is either in
itself or in another." Whether or not qualities
are modes of substance, it seems to be clear
that Spinoza would not call them substances.
The notion of qualities existing in themselves,
and not as the qualities ofanything, seems to be
self-contradictory. As Descartes points out, to
assert "the existence of real accidents," by
vvhich he means the existence of qualities or
quantities apart from substances, is to deny the
distinction between substance and accident.
"Substance," he vvrites, "can never be con-
ceived after the fashion of accidents,nor can it
derive its reality from theIn"; whereas "no
reality can be ascribed to [accidents], which is
not taken from the idea of substance."
Anyone who ackno,vledges the distinction
between substance and accident also conceives
qualities as accidents or attributes, i.e., as exist-
ing in the things they qualify. Spinoza, Des-
cartes, Locke, and Aristotle do not conceive
substance in the same way, nor do they all use
the word "accident" to name the characteris-
tics which inhere in substance. Locke, for ex-
ample, uses the word "quality" with almost the
same generality that Spinoza gives to the word
"mode," or Descartes and Aristotle to "acci-
dent." And the word "substance" Locke uses
in a sense that is nearer to Aristotle's meaning
for the word "matter," when, in trying to con-
ceive bare substance as the underlying "I know
not what," l"ocke defines this substratum as
that which supports qualities. Apart from its
qualities, substance has no positive character-
Nevertheless, such differences in theory leave
untouched the point ofagreement that qualities
do not float freely-without any support-in
either reality or experience. Even Berkeley's de-
nial of matter, or of bodies existing apart from
ONE OF THE GREAT ISSUES in the tradition of
western thought concerns our perception or
kno\vledge of qualities. If certain characteris-
tics which are not directly sensible are to be
called "qualities," then the problem of how we
know such qualities does not differ from the
problem of how we know anything else that
cannot be apprehended by our senses. We may,
for example, be able to infer such qualities as
habits or powers from the sensible evidences of
a thing's behavior, even as in turn \ve infer the
thing's nature or essence from its proper qual-
ities or properties. With regard to sensible
qualities, the problem does not seem to be how
\ve know them-for the fact that they are sen-
sible means that they are kno\vable by the
senses. The question is rather one of the mode
of existence-the objectivity or subjectivity-
of the qualities sensed.
Locke's famous distinction between primary
and secondary qualities states the problem. It
is preceded by his distinction bet"veen the
qualities of things and the ideas in our minds.
"Asnow-ball," he writes, has "the power to pro-
duce in us the idea of white, cold, and round.
The powers to produce those ideas in us, as
they are in the snow-ball, I call qualities; and
as they are sensations or perceptions in our
understandings, I call them ideas; which ideas,
if I speak of them sOlnetimes as in the things
themselves, I would be understood to mean
those qualities in the objects which produce
them in us."
The primary qualities of bodies are those
which are utterly inseparable from body-such
as "sense constantly finds in every particle of
n1atter \vhich has bulk enough to be perceived,
and the Inind finds inseparable from every par-
accident (quantity) exist .in another (quality)?
The view which 'Villiam James holds, namely,
that variation in intensi ty creates differences in
color as much as variation in hue, would solve
the problem, or rather it \vould dismiss the
problem as not genuine by denying Aristotle's
thesis that a color can remain the same \vhile
varying in degree.
Ho\vever handled, the problemis not peculiar
to qualities. Actions and passions, Aristotle
points out, also vary in degree. Nor are qual-
ities distinguished from everything else in the
\vorld by having contraries. Correlatives can
also have contraries, as can actions and passions.
Furthermore, not all qualities have contraries.
Not all admit of variation in degree. Shape, like
triangular or square, which Aristotle regards as
a kind of quality, cannot vary in this way. The
square thing cannot become more or less square.
In viewof all this, Aristotle concludes that there
is one characteristic alone which differentiates
quality not only from substance, but also from
everything else. Quality is the basis for saying
that things are like or unlike, similar or dissim-
ilar, as quantity is the basis for saying that
things are equal or unequal.
Other contrasts benveen quality and quan-
tity, especially those bearing on the reduction
ofquali ty to quanti ty, are discussed in the chap-
ter on QUANTITY. Here it may be illuminating
to apply the foregoing distinction between
quality and quantity to shapes or figures.
Shape or figure is a curious mixture of quality
and quantity. It is a quantified quality or a
qualified quantity or, as Aquinas says, "a qual-
ity about quantity, since the nature of shape
consists in fixing the bounds of magnitude."
This seems to be evident in the fact that shapes,
like quantities, do not admit of variation in
degree. But it may also be seen in the fact that
Euclid deals quite separately with problems
concerning the equality of triangles and prob-
lems concerning their similarity.
EXCEPT FOR THE QUESTION of whether quali-
ties subsist by themselves or are the attributes
of substances, most of the problems of quality
seem to concern its distinction from or relation
to quantity. As we have seen, the question of
the degree or alllount of a quality involves the
notion of quantity. Even more explicitly a
problem of ho\v qualities and nn-:ln1"11-.,.... _
lated, is the question of the
attributes. Can it be said that
the more fundalnental attri butes of
that they somehovv pretede or
ities? Is it the reverse? Or are rill., 111-.",_
certain respects and quantities
Aristotle's theory of the elements
give absolute primacy to quality in
of material things. The four elements
are characterized by combinations of
of contrary qualities, the hot and
dry and the moist. On the other
atomic theory of Lucretius appears
quantities, such as size and weight,
properties of matter. Newton's en1umlerc:lHn
what he calls "the universal qualities
ies whatsoever," including, of
"least particles," lists "extension,
penetrability, mobility, and
dicated in the chapter on
reason Newton gives for calling
"universal" would seem to justify
"quantities" rather than qualities. In
Newton's view, like that of the
ists, seems to be opposed to the
elementary and contrary qualities.
But Aristotle himself also appears
vie\v which makes quantity prior to
Considering the way in which the
is in a body, he says that it is in the
tue of the body's extended surface.
extension is interpreted as a physical
then it \vould seem to follow that this
underlies a body's possession of visible
haps other qualities. Aquinas, for eX,lffilPle.
that "quantity is the proximate
qualities that cause alteration, as
color," and, again, that "quantity
stance before sensible qualities are."
This last statement can be
mean that quantity is universally
ity among the attributes of substance.
be understood to mean that ........."" ...... f-.f- ... ,..
only to sensible qualities and
the physical attributes of bodies.
pretation is chosen depends in part
all qualities are sensible.
It would seem that all qualities
sible, according to Aristotle and
therefore quantity is not prior to
alnong the accidents of substance. The moral and spiritual qualities of men seem
qualities, Aquinas writes, "may be in to afford another example of qualities either
intellectual part or in the body and its prior to, or at least independent of, quantities.
ers." Certainly the qualities inherent in the Even in the case of inanimate bodies, it may
llectual part of man's nature are not sensi- be thatcertain fundamental properties or pow-
. nor are the first two of the four species of ers are essentially qualitative rather than quan-
;lity which both Aristotle and Aquinas titative. The proposition that in substances,
merate. quantities are prior to qualities-or that quaI-
l their enumeration, human qualities-the ities inhere in substances in virtue of their
ts or dispositions of a man, such as kno\vl- quantities-may apply only to sensible qual-
e and virtue, or beauty and health-are ities, as, for example, colors in relation to sur-
first sort. The powers or inborn capacities faces.
reby men and other animals act to develop
ir natures are a second type of quality;
,the po\ver of sensitivi ty in animals, the
yer of rationality in men, are qualities proper
these species and are, therefore, sometimes
d "properties. " This second type of qual-
does not seem to be restricted to living
gs. Inanimate bodies also have, among their
perties, certain fundamental powers of ac-
or reaction. The third and fourth types of
lity differ from the first two in that both are
sible, i.e., capable of affecting the senses di-
tlyand, therefore, sometimes called "affec-
qualities." Of these, the third type-shape
gure-has already been discussed. The
th type-colors, sounds, textures, odors,
s, and such thermal quali ties as hot and
are, more than shape or figure, regarded
e.principal affective or sensible qualities.
It fact that Aristotle regards certain qual-
,such as hot and cold, or hard and soft, as
g dispositions or powers as well as being
tive qualities, need not invalidate his four-
classification. His classification of the same
ibute under two distinct species of quality
s. to imply that it can be considered from
points of vie\v. The elementary qualities,
example, are affective or sensible qualities
they are also the active qualities or po\vers
eproperties--of the elements.
view of this classification of quali ties, it
not seem to be the case that quantities are
1." to all the qualitative attributes of sub-
pe. On the conception of living things as
posite of soul and body, the quali ties which
ital powers are usually regarded as proper-
\vhich the thing has in virtue of having a
They are certainly not founded upon the
titative attributes of the organism's body.
PRECISELY THE OPPOSITE direction seems to be
taken by Berkeley and Hume. Where Aristotle
criticizes the atomists for treating quantities (or
common sensibles) as objective, and qualities
(or proper sensibles) .as subjective, Berkeley
criticizes Locke for treating primary and sec-
ondary qualities differently. Where Aristotle's
own theory assigns the same reality . to all ob-
jects of sense, granting them an actuality apart
from perception, Berkeley makes the actuality
of the primary as well as the secondary qualities
dependent upon their being perceived.
"Some there are," \vrites Berkeley, "who
make a distinction betwixt pri1nary and second-
ary qualities. By the former they mean exten-
sion, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impene-
trability and number; by the latter they denote
all other sensible qualities, as colors, sounds,
tastes and so forth. The ideas we have of these
they acknowledge not to be the resemblances
of anything existing without the mind or
unperceived, but they will have our ideas
of the primary qualities to be patterns or
images of things which exist without the mind,
in an unthinking substance which they call
Berkeley then argues that the so-called pri-
filary qualities are incapable of being separated,
in reality or thought, from the secondary qual-
ities, and that, therefore, the one like the other
exists only in the mind. "In short, let anyone
consider those arguments which are thought
manifestly to prove that colors and tastes exist
only in the mind, and he shall find they may
with equal force be brought to prove the same
thing of extension, figure, and motion." His
own arguments, he thinks, "plainly show it to
be impossible that any color or extension at all,
or other sensible quality whatsoever, should
exist in any unthinking subject without the
mind, or in truth, that there should be any
such thing as an out\vard object."
Hume professes to adopt Berkeley's reason-
ing. "It is universally allowed by modern en-
quirers," he writes, "that all the sensible qual-
ities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold,
white, black, etc., are merely secondary, and
theory of sensation and the sen-
discussed more fully in the chapter on
According to it, the qualities, no less
quantities, perceptible by sense have
actual existence as the attributes of
On this score Aristotle does not differen-
quali ties (the proper sensibles)
t"lll'lnf"t1-t,,,,C' (the common sensibles). Just as
actually has the shape we perceive it to
it actually has the color we perceive it
on the supposition, of course, that our
is accurate in both cases. If the
fallible at all, we are less prone to
.Aristotle thinks, in the field of the
and Lucretius-seems itself to take proper than of the common sensibles, e.g., the
forms. Aristotle, for example, criticizes stick in water \vhich looks bent to the eye feels
ocritus and the atomists for treating per- straight to the hand.
tible qualities differently from perceptible
ntities. According to his own theory ofthe
ets of sense, some, like colors, sounds,
s, flavors-which Locke calls "secondary
ities" and the others simply "qualities"-
(the proper objects of the special senses, such
ight, hearing, smell, taste. In contrast to
e"proper sensibles," each exclusively per-
ed by one and only one sense, there are the
man sensibles," such as size and shape,
ber, movement and rest, which can be per-
ed commonly by several senses, e.g., shape
isible and tangible, motion is visible and
'ble. Such sensible attributes of body, which
ke calls "primary quaIi ties," Aristotle, no
than Hobbes or Lucretius, regards as quan-
es, not qualities. Reporting his view, Aqui-
writes that "the common sensibles are all
eibIe to quantity."
ristotle's critical point seems to be that the
ists "reduce the proper to the common
ibles, as Democritus does with white and
k; for he asserts that the latter is a mode of
ough and the former a mode of the smooth,
he reduces savours to the atomic figures."
atomists sometin1es rnake the opposite
representing "all objects of sense as ob-
touch." But in either case they have no
in Aristotle's opinion, for giving to
sensible attributes-whether these be
qualities or the commonly sensible
objective reality they deny to
sensible traits, like colors, sounds, and
formulation of Locke or in that
ers who do not speak of primary and secon
qualities attribute to bodies only the Ich.
teristics which Locke calls primary,. and
what he calls secondary qualities no reali
all, that is, no existence 6'utside the mintt
secondary qualities are not qualities oft
but of sensations or images. Descartes,
ample, says that nothing belongs "to theIn
or essence of body except ... length, 01'
and depth, admitting of various shape
various motions.... On the other hand,\(;
odors, savours, and the rest of such thin
merely sensations existing in my thougli
differing no less from bodies than pain
from the shape and motion of theinsfl'u
which inflicts it."
Hobbes similarly regards the variousse
qualities as feelings in us-the seemings
cies of sense. All these "qualities
are in the object that causes them, nothi
so many several motions of the rnattet..
object is one thing, the fancy is
type of "absurd assertion," in the opitil
Hobbes, consists in giving "the names
accidents of bodies wi thout us, to the ac
of our own bodies, as they do that say,t
is in the body, the sound is in the
The attributes or accidents
and Hobbes assign to bodies seem
titiesrather than qualities.
as Locke attributes both primary
ary qualities to bodies, Hobbes
seem to be saying that bodies
another only and
or qualitative oC:CU.ronl'Vln
of sense or thought. Expounding
of Democritus and Epicurus,
pears to make precisely this point
that the first-beginnings or atoms
terized only by size, weight, shape,
"The bodies of matter," he
color at all." They are bereft not
"they are also sundered
and cold, and fiery heat, and are
barren of sound and devoid of
qualities, caused by the blows
the sense-organs of anilnals, are
sensations, not of things.
ticle of matter, though less than to make itself
singly perceived by our senses." Locke's enu-
meration of these "original or primary qualities
of body, which we may observe to produce
simple ideas in us, viz., solidity, extension, fig-
ure, motion or rest, and number," closely re-
sembles Newton's list of the universal qualities
of perceptible bodies and of their "least par-
ticles" or atoms.
In contrast, the secondary qualities, such as
colors, sounds, tastes, etc., are "nothing in the
objects themselves, but powers to produce
various sensations in us by their primary qual-
ities, i.e., by the bulk, figure; texture, and
motion of their insensible parts. . . . From
whence," Locke declares, "I think it iSi easy
to draw this observation, that the ideas of
primary qualities of bodies, are resemblances of
them, and their patterns do really exist in the
bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us
by these secondary qualities, have no resem-
blance of them at all. There is nothing like our
ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They
are in the bodies we denominate from them,
only a power to produce those sensations in us:
what is sweet, blue, or warm, in idea, is but the
certain bulk, figure and motion of the insensible
parts in the bodies which we call so."
Locke thinks the sensation of pain confirms
this insight. As the piece of steel which by its
corporeal properties has the power to produce
pain in us, does not itself have the quality of
pain, so it does not have anything correspond-
ing to the ideas of blueness or coldness which it
produces in us, except the power to produce
these ideas through the action of its primary
qualities on our senses. Yet Locke maintains
that all our simple ideas of quality-not only of
primary, but also ofsecondary qualities--' 'agree
with the reality of things." By agreement he does
not mean resemblance in the sense of copying;
and therefore he thinks he can, without incon-
sistency, deny any resemblance between sensa-
tions of color or taste and the secondary qual-
ities of bodies, while saying that "if sugar pro-
duces in us the ideas we call whiteness and
sweetness, we are sure there is a power in sugar
to produce those ideas in our minds, or else they
could not have been produced by it."
Locke's point, however, is sometimes given
exactly the opposite implication. Earlier think-
I. The nature and existence of quali ties: the relation of quali ty to substance or
the transcendental categories of quality
2. The kinds of quali ty
2a. Sensible and nonsensible qualities: habits, dispositions, po\vers or r'1,".,,.,,t".,,,..t"
and affective qualities
2b. Primary and secondary qualities: the related distinction of proper and
nlon sensibles
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 67,
A3, REP I 351b-352a; Q 78, A 3, REP 1-2 410a-
411d; Q 83, AI, REP 5 436d-438a; Q 85, A I,
REP I 4S1c-4S3e; Q 115, A3, REP 2 S88e-S8ge
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q49,
AA 1-2 Ib-4a; Q 53, A2, REP 1-3 21a-d; Q110,
A2, REP 3 349a-d; PART III SUPPL, Q 91, A 4,
REP I l022d-l023d
23 floBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49b-d; PART III,
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, .19a-c / A1editations,
VI, lOOa-d I Objections and Replies, 162d-165d
esp 164d-165a; 211a,.b; 228e-229c; 229d-230a;
34 NEWTON: OptICS, BK I, 428a-b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding,BK I, eH III,
SECT 19 117e-d; BK II, CH VIII 133b-138b
passim, esp SECT 8 134b-e; CH XIII, SECT 19-20
IS2c-d; en XXI, SECT 3 178d; CH XXIII, SECT
1--6 204a-20Se; CH XXX, SECT 2 238b-e; CH
XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; SECT 6, 241a-d; SECT I I
242d-243a; SECT 13, 243b; CH XXXII, SECT
14-16 245e-246b; BK III, CH IV, SECT 16
263b-e; CH VI, SECT 2--3 268c-d; SECT 6 269d-
270a; BK IV, CHIli, SECT 12-14 316a-d; CH IV,
SECT 4 324e
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge 403a-444d
passim, esp INTRO, SECT 7 406a-b, SECT 1-3
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in type, \vhic.h are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, In 4 HOMER: I!tad, B.K [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d IndIcates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: vVhen the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example,' in 53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b, the
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends In the lower half of page 119. \Vhen the text IS
printed in two colulnns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower of left-
hand side of the page, the letters e and d to the upper and lower halves of sIde of
the page. For example,in 7 PLATO: 163b-164e, the beg1ns the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends In the upper half of the nght-hand sIde of page 164.
AUTHOR's DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douav versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a CD), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehelniah, 7:45-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or. more especially
relevant parts of a whole referen.ce; "passim" signifies the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously In the work or passage CIted.
addi tional information concerning the style of the references, see. the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
Categories, CH 5 [3bID-23] 7d-8a;
8 13d-16c / Posterior Analytzcs, BK I, CH 22
113d-114a / Physics, BKV, CH 2
306d / Metaphysics, BK v, CH 14
BK VII, CII 13 [r038b24-28] 562e;
IX, CH I [I045b28-32] 570b; BK XII, CH I
598a; CH 5 [I07ob36-r07Ia4]
[107Ia23-bI] 600d-601a / Sense and
Sensible, CH 6 [44Sb4-2I] 683b-d
Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 2, 167d
Nature of Things, BK I [298-34]
BK II L398-521] 20a-21c; [73-864] 24b-26a
First Ennead, TR VIII, CH 8, 30d-
I Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 8 52e-53a; CH
SSb-d; TR VI 60e-62d / Third Ennead, TR
CH 8-Io
111c-113a / Fourth Ennead,
173d-174a; TR VII, CH 8, 196a-b I SIxth
TR I,CH 10--12 257b-2S9d; CH 29
TR II, CH 14 276c-277a; TR III, cH
CH 15 289a-c; CH 19--20 291d-293a
AfT0Tl;;:-ry",-v' City ofGod, BK XI, CH 10, 328a-d
nature and existence of qualities: the
relation of quality to substance or matter;
transcendental categories of quality
Timaeus, 462b-466a I Theaetetus,
521d-522a; 533b-d /Philebus,
we examine it accurately, we shall
unintelligi hIe, and even absurd."
One fundamental point about
ities may, ho\vever, re11lin unarreclterl
long and many-sided controversy.
nies that sensible qualities are the .......
human experience. That they are
innate, or a priori properties of our
nature," Jarnes declares, must be
"all schools (however they
. . This is so on either of the
we may make concerning the
feelings to the realities at whose
become alive."
exist not in the objects themselves, but are
perceptions of the mind, without any external
archetype or model \\rhich they represent. If
this be allo\ved, ,vith regard to secondary qual-
ities, it must also follow \vith regard to the sup-
posed primary qualities of extension and solid-
ity.... The idea of extension is entirely acquired
from the senses of sight and feeling; and if all
the qualities, perceived by the senses, be in the
mind, not in the object, the same conclusion
must reach the idea of extension.... Nothing
can save us from this conclusion, but the assert-
ing that the ideas of those primary qualities are
attained by Abstraction, an opinion, which, if
3. Quality and quantity
. The distinction between quality and quantity: its relation to the rt."'t- ....,"_ ...
bet\veen secondary and primary qualities
. Shape or figure as qualified quantity
. The or amounts of a quality: intensity and extensity; the ........,..,...,.1-,1-"-If-,, ..,,'""
condlhons of variation in quality
. The priority of quality or quantity in relation to form, matter, or su[)st:anc:e
4 The relation of quali ties to one another
. Qualities which inlply correlatives
. The contrariety of qualities: with or without internlediate dearees
The silnilarity of things with respect to quality: likeness and unlikeness in
5 Change of quality: the analysis of alteration
6. Qualities as objects of knowledge
6a. Quality in relation to definition or abstraction
6b. The perception of qualities
6c. The objectivity of sense-qualities: the cOlllparative objectivity of primary
secondary qualities .
(1. The nature and existence of qualities: the rela.
tion of quality to substance or matter; the
transcendental categories of quality.)
413a-d, SECT 7-15 414b-416a, SECT 25-33
417d-419a, SECT 48-49 422a-b, SECT 56-57
423c-424a, SECT 73 427b-c, SECT 76 427d-
428a, SECT 78 428a-b, SECT 86-91 429c-431a,
SECT 102 432d-433a
35 HUME: HU111an Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
122-123 505c-506a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; 23a-24a; 29d-33d
esp 30d-31a, 31d-32a, 32d-33b [fn I]; 41e-4Sb;
212a-c I Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-c
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 144b-145a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 127b-128a; 4S7a-459b;
546b-547b [fn I]; 851b-852a; 860b; 882a-883a
2. The kinds of quality
2a. Sensible and nonsensible qualities: habits,
dispositions, powers or capacities, and
affective qualities
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [8
26] 13d....
15b; CH IS [ISbI7-I9] 21c / Physics, BK v, CH 2
26-30] 306d I Metaphysics, BKV, CH 14
541c-542a; CH 19-21 543d-544b
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Anin1als,B:I<. VIII, CH I
[588ar8-b4] 114b,d .
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR. VI, CH I60c-
61c / Sixth Ennead, TR I,CH 11-12 258b.;.259d
esp CH 12, 258d-259a; TR III, ClI 16-19 28ge-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49,
A 2 2b-4a; A 4, ANS Sa-6a; Q 110, A 3, REP 3
35 LOCKE: Ifuman Understanding, BK II, CH VIII,
SECT 8-10 134b-d; SECT 23-26 137a-138b; cH
XXI, SECT I-6178b-180a;cH XXIII, SECT 7-10
20Sd-206d; SECT 37, 214a-b; CH XXX, SECT 2
238b-c; CH XXXII, SECT 14-16 245c-246b esp
SECT 16 246b
2b. Prim.ary and secondary qualities: the re-
lated distinction of proper and common
7 PLATO: Ti111aeus, 462c-463d; 464b-465d
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK II, CH 6 [4I8a6-I9] 648d-
649a; BK III, CH I [425aI4-29] 657b-c; [425b4-
10] 657c-d I Sense and the Sensible, CH I
[437a3-IO] 673d-674a; CH 4 [442a3o-br8]
680a-b; CH 6 [44Sb4-446a20] 683b-684c
9 ... -'\RISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 8 [II42a23-3I]
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 6, 169c-d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [398-521]
20a-21c; [73-864] 24b-26a; BK IV [522-721]
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 78,
A3 esp REP 2 410a-411d; A4, REP 2 411d-413d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL,
Q 92, A 2, ANS 1032b-l034b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49b-d;
30 BACON: Novum Organunl, BK I, APR 66 1
lISa '
31 Rules, XII, I Objections
J<.eptzes, 162d-165d; 228c-229c; 229d-2
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, RULE III 270b-
I Optics, BK I, 428a-b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II,
131h; CH VIII, SECT 7-26 134b-138b; CH
SECT 3 178d; SECT 75 200b-d; CH x
SECT 7-13 20Sd-208b; SECT 37, 214a-b'
XXX, SECT 2 238b-c; CH XXXI,SECT 2 230'
BK III, CH IV, SECT 16 263b-e; BK IV,
SECT 11-14 315d-316d esp SECT 13 316a
SECT 28 322a-e
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9
414d-4I6a; SECT 25 417d-418a; SECT
427b-c; SECT 102 432d-433a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII,
122 SOSc-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; 23a-24a; 29d-
esp 30d-31a, 31d-32a, 32d33b [fn I]
53 JAMES: Psychology, S03a; 651a
3. Quality and quantity
3a. .between quality and qua
tlty: Its relation to the distinction
tween secondary and primary qualiti
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [6a31-36] 10d-
CH 8 [IIa5-I4] 16a-b I Generation and Cor
tion, BK I, CH 2 [3Isb32-316a4] 411b-c /
physics, BK v, CH 4 [IOI4b20- 27] 535a;
[I020b3-8] 541d; CH 28 [I024bIO--I6]5'
BK x, CH I [I052bI-1053b8] 578d-580a; B
CH 6 [I063a22-28] 591c; BK XII, CH 4 [1070
] 599d-600a; BK XIII, CH 8 [10831:\1
614d .1
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [298-
4d; BK II [398-521] 20a-21c; [73-864]
26a; BK III [221-227] 32d-33a; BK IV [
721] 51a-53d
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 13 5
/ Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 8, 196a-b/
Ennead, TR III, CH 14 288b-289a
19 AQUINAS: Sumrna Theologica, PART I, Q
A 3, REP 2 410a-411d
20 AQUINAS: Sumnla Theologica, PART I-II, Q
A 2, ANS 2b-4a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49b-d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19a-c / Objections
Replies, 162d-165d esp 164d-165a; 228c-
35 LOCKE: Hun1an Understanding, BK II, CH
SECT 7-26 134b-138b passirp, esp SECT
134c-d; CH XXI, SECT 3 178d; eH XXIII,
8-9 206a-c; SECT I I 206d-207a; SEC
214a-b; BK IV, CH II, SECT 9-13 3110-3
CH III, SECT 12-14 316a-d esp SECT 13 31
SECT 28 322a-e
BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9-15 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q5,
414d-416a; SECT 25 417d-418a; SECT 73 A I, REP 3 6a-7b; QQ 52-53 15d-22d;Q 54, A4,
427b-e; SECT 102 432d-433a REP Id 25b-d; Q 7
, A 7,ANS 117a-118a;
5HUME: HUlnan Understanding, SECT XII,DIV PART II-II, Q 5, A 4 412d-413c; Q 24, AA 4-
r22 505e-d 491d-498a; PART III, Q 7, A 12 754c-755c
ZKANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; 23a-24a; 29d-33d 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
esp 30c-31a, 31d-32a, 32d-33b [fn I]; 66d-72c 131d-132a; THIRD DAY, 200b-202a; 205b-d
esp 68a-72c; 211c-213a 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 13 145b-
6 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 63 148d
28b-c; ADDITIONS, 40 122d-123b 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, RULE III 270b
MARX: Capital, 149d 271a / Optics, BK I, 431a-443a; BK II, 458b
3 JAMES: Psychology, 320a-322a 460a; 466a-467b; 472b-474a; 482b-485a
35 LOCKE: Hurr1an Understanding, BK II, CH XVI,
Shape or figure as qualified quantity SECT .3 165d-166a; CH XVII, SECT 6 169a-b;
ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [IOaII-I6] 15a-b; CH XXVIII, SECT I 228c; BK IV, CH II, SECT
4] 16a-b / Metaphysics, BK v, CH 14 11--13 311c-312b
] 541c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 68a-72c
1 EUCLID: Elements, BK VII, DEFINITIONS, 16- 45 LAVOISIER: Ele111ents of Chemisuy, PART I,
19 127b 14a-b; PART III, 99d-l03b
1 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK II, 831d-841c 45 FOURIER: Theory of Ileat, 169a-172a; 177a-
PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR III, CH 14 288b- 193a
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 411c-
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 7, A I, 412c
REP 2 31a-d; Q 7
, A 3, REP 2 410a-411d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 319b-322a ESp 319b-320a;
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, 329a-330a; 346a-b; 540a-547a ESp 541a, 544a,
A 2, ANS 2b-4a; PART III, Q 2, A I, ANS 710a- 547a
711c 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 87a / Interpretation of
HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 262b Drea1ns, 384d / Narcissism, 403d-404a /
DESCARTES: Geonletry 295a-353b esp BK I, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639b-d
298b-304a, BK II, 308a-314b 3d. The priority of quality or quantity inre-
PASCAL: Arithmetical Triangle, 455a-456a lation to form, matter, or substance
KANT: Pure Reason, 212a-c
JAMES: Psychology, 548b-552a 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 2 [I 85
260a-b; BK IV, CH 3 [2IO
I-8] 289b-c / Meta-
The degrees or-amounts of a quality: in- physics, BK IX, CH I [I045b28-32] 570b; BK x,
tensity and extensity; the quantitative CH I [I052bI-1053b8] 578d-580a; BK XI, CH 3
conditions of variation in quality [I06Ia29-b4] 589c; BK XII, CH I [1069
PLATO: Philebus, 615c-616c 598a / Sense and the Sensible, CH 6 [445
ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [.3
9]8a-b; 44
] 683b-684c; CH 7 [449
-30] 688d-
CH 7 [6b20-26] 11b; CH 8 [r ob26-1 raI 4] I5d- 689a
16b; CH 10 [I2a2-'--25] 17b-c/ Topics, BK III, CH 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 13, SSe
5 166b-c / Physics, BK IV, CH 9 [217a34-bu] / Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 8, 196a-b / Sixth
297b / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 7 [IOIIb29-37] Ennead, TR III, CH IS 289a-e
531d; BK X, CH I [I052bI-I053b8] S78d-580a; 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A2,
CH 3 [Io54b6-II] 581h; CH 7 584c-585b; BK CONTRARY 15c-16a; Q 7
, A 3, REP 2 410a-
XI, CH 3 [I06IaI8-28] 589b-c 411d; Q 85, A I, REP 2 451c-453c
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VIII, CH I 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 52,
[S88aI8-b4] 114b,d / Parts of Anima!s, BK II, A I, ANS 15d-18a; PART III SUPPL, Q 83, A 2,
CH 2 [648bI2-649b9] 173a-174a / Ethzcs, BK II, ANS 976c-978c
Cll 6 351e-352d; BK x, CH 3 [II73aI4-29] 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 18d-19c / Objections
427b-c and Replies, 162d-165d esp 164d-165a; 228c-
2 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [826-833] 229c; 231a-b
25c; BK IV [
S] 53b-e 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VIII,
PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR III, CH 20, 292d- SECT CH XXI, SECT 3
293a 178d; CH XXIII, SECT 9 206b-c; SECT 37,
AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XI, CH 10, 214a-b; CH XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d
328b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9-
AQUINAS: Sum1na Theologica, PART I, Q4, A3, 414d-416a esp SECT 10 414d-41Sa; SECT 73
ANS 22b-23b; Q 8, A 2, REP 3 35c-36b; Q 42, 427b-c
A I, REP I 224b-225d; Q 45, A 5, REP 2-3 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-<;; 41c-45b
245c-247a; Q 4
, A 4, ANS and REP 3 262a- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 63
263a; PART I-II, Q 22, A 2, REP I 721e-722c 28b-c
6c. The objectivity of sense-qualities: the com-
parative objectivity of primary and sec-
ondary qualities
7 PLATO: Til1zaeus, 462b-466a. / Theaetetus,
517b-520b; 521d-522a; 533b-d
8 .lA.RISTOTLE: Generation and Corruption, BK I,
CH 2 [3Isb33-316a3] 4I1c / Metaphysics, BK IV,
CH 5 [IOIOb30-10IIa2] 530c / Soul, BK III, CH
2 [426a20-26] 658c / Sense and the Sensible,
CH 6 [44Sb4'-446a20] 683b-684c
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts ofAnil1zaIs, BK II, CH 2 [648b
15-17] I73a
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 2, 167d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [730- 864]
24b-26a; [1002-1022] 27d-28a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49b-d; 57b;
59d; 62b; PART III, 172b; PART IV, 258b-c;
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19a-c / Meditatons,
VI, 100a-d / Objections and Replies) I62d-
165d; 211a-b; 228c-229c;
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, RULE III 270b-
27Ia / Optics, BK I, 428a-b
35 LOCKE: fluman Understanding, BK II, CH VIII
SECT 7---26 134b-138b; CH XXI, SECT 3 178d;
CH XXIII, SECT 7-13 205d-208b esp SECT 9
206b-c; SECT 37, 214a-b; CH XXX, SECT 2
238b-c; ClI XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; CH XXXII,
SECT 14-16 245c-246b; BK IV, CH II, SECT 11-
14 3IIc-3I2d; CH III, SECT 6, 3I4b; SECT 28
322a-c; CH IV, SECT 4 324c; CH XI, SECT 4-9
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 1-91
413a-43Ia esp SECT 3 413c-d, SECT 9--15 414d-
416a, SECT 48-49 422a-b, SECT S6-S7 423c-
424a, SECT 73 427b-c, SECT 76-78 427d-
428b, SECT 86-91 429c-431a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
42 KANT: Pure Reason, I5b-c; 23a-24a; 29d-33d
esp 30d-31a, 3Id-32a, 32d-33b [fn I J; 69c-
72c I Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 38Sa-c
50 Capital, 3Ic-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, I27b-128a; 150a-151a;
176a-177a; 457a-479a esp 457a-459b, 469a-
b, 471b-474a, 479a; 650b-651a; 85Ib-852a;
Leviathan, PART I, 49b-d; PART lIlt
Rules, XII, 18d-19c / Meditations,
100a-d I Objections and Replies, I62d-165d
I64d-165a; 211a-b; 229d-230a
Optics, BK I, 428a-b; BK III, 519a-b
HUlnan Understanding, INTRO, SECT 2
BK II, CH II, SECT I 127d-128a; CH
SECT 4 I33d; SECT 11-21 I34d-136d
CH IX, SECT 1-10 138b-140b passim;
XXIII, SECT 11-13 206d-208b; BK III, CH
SECT 9 270d-27Ia; BK IV, ClI II, SECT 9-13

Pure Reason, 15b-c; 29d-33d
30d-3Ia, 31d-32a, 32d-33b [fn I]; 212a-c
Afoby Dick, 39b-40a; 144b-145a
PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR VI, CH I 60c- S3 JAMES: Psychology, 98b-l05a passim, esp
61e I Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 10-12 257b-259d; l04a-105a; 184b; 327a-34Ia esp 327a-b, 329a-
TR III, CH 16-19 289c-292b 331h; 363b; 452a-471a esp 452a-456a, 459a-b,
9 AQUINAS: Sumlna Theologica, PART I-II, Q35, 469a-471a; 479a; 502a-S05b esp 505b; 520a-
A 4, ANS 774d-775d 521a; 526b-527a; 540a-635a esp 54Ia, 548b-
HOBBES: Let'iathan, PART I, 72a-d; PART IV, 549a, 552a-564a, 589b-595a, 606b-608b,
272b 627a-628b
l-luman Understanding, BK II, CH XI, 54 FREUD: Interpretation ofDreanzs, 352d; 367b-
SECT 9 I45b-c; CH XII, SECT I, I47b-c; BK III, c; 384c-385c
cH IV, SECT 4-1 I 260b-262b passim, esp
SECT 7 260d; SECT 16 263b-c
HUlnan Knowledge, SECT 6-19
tJ.H:.J.OQ'10U passim, esp SECT 7-10 4I4b-415a;
HUME: HUlnan Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
KANT: Pure Reason, 73c-74a
JAMES: Psychology, I85a-b; 305a-308b esp
329a-331b esp 331a-b; 503a-b; 668a-
178a; BK VI, CH 6 196d-199c /
V, CH 14 [I020
9] 54Ic-d;
541d; BK XI, CM 6 [I063a22-28]
5. Change of quality: the analysis
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 226d-227b
S09b-510a / Theaetetus, JJ..
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH
CH 14 [ISaI4-32] 20d-21a
- 13] I98c-d I
9] 266b; BK V, CH 2
9] 307a; BK CH 10
330d; BK VIII, CH 7
Heavens, BK I, CH 3 [27oa26-36]
[283bI7-23] 375c-d / Generation
tion, BK I, CH I 409a-410c; CH
Metaphysics, BK I, CH 8
BK V, CH 21 544a-b; BK XI, CH 12
597c / Soul, BK II, ClI
648d / Sense and the
9] 685b-c / Dreams,
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals,
CH 7 [7
]-CH 8 [702a22] ""v'vu...
[703b8-2I] 239b-c / Generation
BK I, CH 18 [724a20_bI3] 264b-d;
[74Ib.5-15J 282c
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I,
168b; cn S 169b-c; CH 8 171a; CIl
173c; BK III, CH 7, 203c-204c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I
8d-12b; BK II [730-787] 24b-25a;
-4 IS] 64a-66c
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR Vl
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,
A 4, ANS and REP 3 262a-263a
20 .A.QUINAS: SUlnlna Theologica, PART
A I, REP 3 6a-7b; Q 52, A I, ANS and
18a; PART III SUPPL, Q 82, A 3, ANS
971a-972d; Q 91, A I, REP 2,4
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, I72b
30 BACON: NOVU11'l Organum, BK I,
APH 66 1I4d-115c; BK II, APH 7'
34 NE\VTON: Optl"CS, BK III, 541b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK
SECT 1-2 178b-c; CH XXII, SECT
CH XXVI, SECT 1-2 217a-d
35 BERKELEY: Human
4I7d-419a passinl, esp SECT
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of
87c-d; 103b-c; l05d
45 FOURIER: Theory of IIeat, 169b
53 JAMES: Psychology,
4. The relation of qualities to one another
4a. Qualities which imply correlatives
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [6
+-8] Ila; CH 8
[I I
20-39] I6b-c; CH 10 [IIb27-33] I7a /
Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [246b3-248a8l329c-330d
4b. The contrariety of qualities: with or with.
out intermediate degrees
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 226d-227b; 243c-244b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [4aIO_bI9] 8h-9a.;
CH 8 [IObII-2SJ I5d; CH 10 [I2a9-2S] 17b-c /
Physics, BK IV, CH 9 [217a34-bI I] 29Tb / Gener-
ation and Corruption, BK II, CH 1-3 428b,d-
43Ia / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 5 [986a22-b4]
504b-c; BK V, CH 10 [Ior8a22-3I] 539a-b; BK
XIV, CH I 6I9b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH I [1129aI'-35J
376a-d; BK VIII, cn 8 [II59bI9-23] 411d
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient A1edicine, par 13-
4c-7b; par 24 8d-9a,c
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 2, 167b-
168b; BK II, CH 8-9 191b-199a,c passim
12 LUCRETIUS: J.lature of Things, BK II [5I5-5
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR III, CH 19-
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK I, STANZA
91-92 13a
48 MELVILLE: lvloby Dick, 39b-40a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 327a-328b; 363b-364a;
387b; 458a-459b
4c. The similarity of things with respect to
quality: likeness and unlikeness in
7 PLATO: Pannenides, 493d-494a
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, eH 6 [6a27-35] 10d-
l1a; eH 8 [II
IS-19] 16b / Generation and Cor-
ruption, BK II, CH 6 [333a27-34] 434a / Meta-
physics, BK V, CH 9 [ror8
IS-19] 538d-S39a;
CH IS [102I
8-14] 542b-c; BK X, CH 3 [10S4
13] 581h
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK I, CH I
[486arS-487al] 7b-d; BK VIII, CH I [s88
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK VI, DEFINITIONS, r 99a
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR II, CH 2, 7b /
Fourth Ennead, TR IX, CH 4, 206c-d / Sixth
Ennead, TR III, CH IS 289a-c
19 AQUINAS: Sumn1a Theologica, PART I, Q4, A3,
ANS 22b-23b; PART I-II, Q 27, 738c-739c;
Q 28, A I,REP 2 740b-741a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Jneologica, III SUPPL,
Q 69, A I, REP 2 885c-886c; Q 92, A I, ANS
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 73c-74a / ]udgelnent,
602b-603a esp 602b,d [fn 1]
53 JAMES: Psychology, 319b-322a; 344b-348a esp
346a-348a; 378b-379a
this point. Newton refers to "extension, hard"
ness, impenetrability, mobility, and inertia" as
"the qualities of bodies" which "are to be es-
teemed the universal qualities of all bodies
whatsoever." Following him, Locke calls our
simple ideas of "solidity, extension, figure, mo-
tion or rest, and number" ideas of "the original
or primary qualities of bodies," and says that
even if bodies are divided "till their parts be-
come insensible, they must retain .still each of
them all those qualities. For division .... can
never take away either solidity, extension, fig-
ure, or mobility from any body, but only makes
two or more distinct separate masses of matter,
of that which was one before."
Though Locke uses the word "quality" for
those attributes which belong to bodies even
when they are not sensed. or are not even sensi-
ble, he also appears to that number,
extension, and figure are, as the traditional ob-
jects of the mathematical sciences, traditionally
regarded as quantities rather than qualities. "It
has been generally taken for granted," he writes,
"that mathematics alone are capable of demon-
strative certainty; but to have such an agree-
ment or disagreement as may intuitively be
perceived, being, as I imagine, not the privilege
of the ideas of number, extension,. and figure
alone, it may possibly be the want of due meth..
od and.application in us ... thatdemonstration
has been thought to have so little to do in other
parts of knowledge. " Yet, he adds, "in other
simple ideas, whose modes and differences are
made and counted by degrees, and not quan-
tity, we h(lve not so nice and accurate a dis..
tinction of their differences as to perceive, or
find ways to measure, their just equality."
Newton also gives some indication that his
"universal qualities" are He restricts
them to attributes "which admit neither in-
tensification nor remission of degrees." One dif-
Chapter 76: QUANTITY
indicated in the chapter on QUALITY, the
traditiona! consideration of that funda-
tal notion involves questions concerning
relation of quality and quantity and the
r-ity of one or the other in the nature of
gs. to one theory, of the ele-
ts, difference in quali ty rather than in
tity seems to be the defining characteristic.
ain kinds of qualities, it is thought, inhere
bstances directly and without. being based
their quantitative aspects. But it is seldom
er suggested that quality takes universal
dence over quantity.
the tradition of western thought, the op-
e view-that quantities areprimary__
s to occur with some frequency, at least so
the realm of material things is concerned.
held that bodies have only quantitative
utes. Such sensible qualities as colors,
,tastes, textures are thought to have no
y apart from experience; or, as it is some-
red and blue, .hot and cold, sweet
our are the qualities of sensations, .not of
ose who think that bodies can existwith-
eing perceived, also. tend to think that
s can exist totally 'bereft of qualities, but
rwithout the dimensions ofquantity. The
ns of matter and quantity seem to be in-
ably associated. For matter to exist with-
xisting in some quantity seems to be as in-
eivable as for experience to exist. without
itative diversity. "As if there could be mat-
";says Hobbes, "that had .not some de:
:iIled quantity, when quantity, is nothing
.\}utdetermination of matter; that is to say,
gdy, by which we say that one body is
or less than another by. thus or thus
of the word "quality". where quanti-
to be meant only slightly obscures
LEIBNITZ. New Essays Concerning
standing, BK II, CH 8
W. HAMILTON. Lectures on Metaphysics
VOL I (24)
C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL I,
BRADLEY. Appearance and Reality,
BERGSON. Matter and Meraory, CH 2, 4
J. C. WILSON. Statelnent and Inference,
12) .
HUSSERL. Ideas: General Introduction to
nomenology, par 15, 40 --4 I, 52, 124,
WHITEHEAD. The Concept of Nature, en
--. Process and Reality, PART III, CH
BORING. Ine Physical Dimensions
CH 6
Listed below are works not included in Great Books ofthe Western World, but relevant
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two
1. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited,
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great
For: Discussions relevant to the problem of the existence of qualities an<\,,pf their
stance, n1atter, or experience, see BEING 7b, 7b(S)-7b(6); EXPERIENCE I;
Discussions relevant to the conception of the categories as transcendental '-"T-..,..C>_ ....
Ie(I); PRINCIPLE 2b(3).
The consideration of such non-sensible qualities as habits, dispositions, and
The distinction between proper and common sensibles, and the related .....
primary and secondary qualities, see SENSE 3C(2)-3c(4).
Other discussions of the relation of quantity to quality, see lvfECHANICS 4b; '-/L.I1"\cl"'IEI
and for the problem of the variation of qualities in degree or intensity, see
The contrariety and correlation of qualities, see OPPOSITION Ia-I b.
The conception of similarity asJikeness in quality, see SA11E AND OTHER 3c.
The distinction of alteration, or change in quality, from other kinds of change,
The general theory of sensitive knowledge and its bearing on the objectivity
qualities, see KNOWLEDGE 6b( I); SENSE 4-4C.
BERKELEY. Three Dialogues Be!tlJeen Hylas and Phi-
KANT. Metaphysical Foundations ofNaturaI Science,
--. Introduction to Logic, VIII
HEGEL. Logic, CH 7, par 91-98
Treatise on the Breadth of F'onns
SUAREZ. Disputationes MetaphYJicae, XIV, XVI, XVIII
JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus
misticus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART III, Q 10
BOYLE. The Origin o/Forms and Qualities, According
to the Corpuscular Philosophy