physical discussion as indulging in "vicious ab-
stractions" or as verging on the meaningless,
can easily avoid such notions as identity and
diversity. It is not merely that ordinary speech,
as well as scientific discourse, must use such
words as "same" and "other" almost as fre-
quentlyas the words "is" and "not" or "one" and
"many." Those who are critical of theorizing
and who want to save discourse itself from be-
coming "too n1etaphysical" are still obliged to
give some account of what it means for things
to be the same or different and of how we know
when they are.
Semantics .. currently has vogue as· a critical
instrument for safeguarding discourse from
ambiguity and nonsense and perhaps also for
spotting metaphysical legerdemain. But seman-
tics itself cannot go far in its own analysis of
wor,ds and meanings without having to explain
how the same ,vord can have different meanings
or how the same meaning can be expressed by
different words. It does not seem likely that an
adequate explanation could be developed with-
out some theory of sameness and otherness.
THE "SENSE OF SAMENESS," says William James,
"is the very keel and backbone of our think-
ing." I-Ie is here speaking "of the sense of same-
ness from the point of view of the,.lnind.'s struc-
ture alone, and not from the point of view of
the universe.... Whether there be any real
sameness in things or not, or whether the mind
be true or false in its assumptions of it," he goes
on, the point ren1ains that "the mind makes
cantinual use of the notion of sameness, and if
deprived of it, would have a different structure
from what it has.... Without the psychologi-
cal sense of identity, sameness might rain down
upon us from the outer world forever and we
be none the wiser. With. the psychological
sense, on the other hand, the outer world might
Chapter 82: SAME AND OTHER
considerations are sometimes called
with an invidious tone. But no
even those \vho would eliminate meta-
,'he··.lundarrlen.tal relation of quantities with
namely, equality, consists in their
same. The fundamental relation of
consists in their being alike, or the
spite of some difference in degree or
e.g., a brighter and a darker red· of
hue. The notion of relation itself
to be as fundamental as that of sameness,
comparisons one thing is said to be the
different only in relation to something
it also seems to be true that relations
the same or similar, for the essence of
or analogy lies in one thing's being
to a second as a third is to a fourth. The
of two relationships is the object of
,HE problems of identity and diversity-
of sameness· and otherness, similarity and
"erence-occur at that level of philosophical
ught which deals with being and with unity.
tinus, for example, says that in addition to
ng, Motion, and Rest, "weare obliged to
it the further two, Identity and Difference,
that we have in all five
IlAristotle's conception, terms like 'being,'
e/ and 'same' have a greater universality
the terms he calls the highest genera, e.g.,
stance,' 'quantity,' 'quality,' 'relation,' and
rth. These latter represent categories or
es under which certain things. fall and
rs do not. Not everything is a substance or
llantity, but in Aristotle's opinion there is
of which it cannot be said that it is a
g in some sense,. thatit has some kind of
y, that it is identical with itself,. and that,
ared with anything else in the whole uni-
is in certain respects the san1e, in others
DE QUINCEY. Rhetoric
WHATELY.Elelnents· of Rhetoric
T. CARLYLE. "Stump-Orator," in
--. "The Art of Controversy,"
LEWES. The Principles of Success in .L..Jj,l-l"l  
EMERSON. "Eloquence," in Society and
VERLAINE. Art poetique
PATER. An Essay on Style
BRUNETIERE. An Apology for Rhetoric
CROCE. Aesthetic as Science of Expression
--. "On the Truth," in The
BUCHANAN. Symbolic Distance
--'. The Doctrine of Signatures
RICHARDS. The Pkilosophy of Rhetorit:
--.... Interpretation in Teaching
CICERO. De Oratore (On Oratory)
--. Brutus
--. Orator
LONGINUS. On the Sublime
QUINTILIAN. Institutio Oratoria·· (Institutes of Ora-
tory) ,BK II-VI, VIII, X-XII
.J\LCUIN. Rhetoric
T. WILSON. Arte of Rhetorique
FENELON. Dialogues on Eloquence
LA BRUYERE. "Of the<Worksof the Mind," in
J. HARRIS. Hermes, or A Philosophical Inquiry Con-
cerning Universal Gramnlar
BUFFON.Discours sur Ie style
VOLTAIRE. "Style," in A PhilosophicalDictionary
\V. G. HAMILTON. Parliamentary Logic
G. CAMPBELL. Philosophy of Rhetoric
BLAIR. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres
BENTHAM. The Book of Fallacies
CASE OF 1\IAN, however, Locke thinks
face the additional problem of per-
What makes a .man the same
from moment to moment, sleeping and
remelnbering or not remembering his
In what does the continuity of the self
on the identity of which, Locke insists,
_'V' .....     all the right and justice of reward
I-lis ans,ver seems to be that,
organism is identical· throughoutone
substances, or things which somehow and the same life, it is the continuity of the
continuously the same while changing same consciousness which "makes a man be
or that respect, the point of Locke's himself to himself" and establishes his personal
___.. Tn ...... about living things still holds, for identity.
identity does not seem to lie in the con- "Whatever has the consciousness of present
or of the matter-the and past actions," Locke writes, "is the same
they are composed. person to whom they both belong.... That
familiar riddle about the pipe-whether with which the consciousness of this present
in any respect the same after it has its thinking thing can join itself, makes the same
bowl replaced by a new one, and then person, and is one self with it, and with nothing
..... added to the new bowl-may be else.... If the same Socrates, waking and
rlt"OOOllnCleu for living organisms. But in their sleeping, do not partake of the same conscious-
Locke argues, a principle of identity can ness, Socrates, waking and sleeping, is not the
A plant, he says, "continues to be same And to punish Socrates waking
as long as it partakes of the same for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking
that life be communicated to new Socrates was never conscious of, would be no
matter vitally united to the living more right than to punish one t\vin for what
in a like continued organization con- his brother twin did, whereof he knevv nothing,
vtnr:maUIC to that sort of plant." because their outsides were so like that they
principle, he thinks, applies to animals could not be distinguished."
"The case is not so much different 'Villiam Jarrles also attributes the sense of
but that anyone may hence see ,vhat personal identity to continuity of conscious-
an animal and continues it the same. ness, but for him there still remains a problem
""''''''....,,,,.o,..n1I"1lr), we have like this in machines, and of explaining that continuity. In theflo\v of
serve to illustrate it. For example, what consciousness from moment to moment, "con-
? It is plain it is nothing but a fit tinuity," he thinks, "makes us unite what dis-
....   or construction of parts to a cer- similarity might other\vise separate; similarity
which, when a sufficient force is added makes us unite what discontinuity might hold
it is capable to attain. If we would sup- apart.... The sense of our personal identity,
this machine one continued body, all then, is exactly like anyone of our other per-
parts were repaired, increased, ceptions of sameness among phenomena. It is a
a constant addi tion or separa- conclusion grounded either on the resemblance
Insen:Slble parts, with one common life, in a fundamental respect, or on the continuity
something very much like the before the mind, of the phenomena com-
oEan animal. ... This also shows wherein pared."
of the same man consists; viz., in In his opinion, "resemblance among the parts
but a participation of the same con- of a continuU1n of feelings (especially bodily
by constantly fleeing particles of feelings) experienced along with things \videly
in succession, vitally united to the different in all other regards, thus constitutes the
organized body." real and verifiable 'personal identity' which we
feel. There is no other identity than this in the
'stream' of subjective consciousness. . .. Its
parts differ, but under all their differences they
are knit in these t\VO ways; and if either way of
knitting disappears, the sense of unity departs.
If a man wakes up soule fine day unable to re-
call any of his past experiences, so that he has
to learn his biography afresh ... hefeels and he
says that he is a changed person. He disowns
his former me, gives himself a new name, iden-
tifies his present life with nothing from out of
it being impossible for two things of the
kind to be or exist in the same instant in
very same place, or one and the same
different places. That, therefore, that
beginning is the same thirfg; and that which
a different beginning in time and place
that, is not the same, but diverse." In
across a lapse of time a thing remains
in Locke's view, or maintains its trll"n T. t- .....
existence having made it "one particular
under any denomination, the same eXIStenCe
continued preserves it the same
under the same denomination."
applies without difficulty to an atom
which, being at a given instant "what it
nothing else ... is the same and so must
tinue as long as its existence is     •.•. lJLJr
so long it will be the same, and no
like manner, if two or more atoms be
together into the same Illass, one
atoms will be the same by the
and whilst they exist united together,
consisting of the same atoms, must be the
mass or the same body, let the parts be
differently jumbled. But," Locke .... ...., ...... \. ......... u'".",
one of these atoms be taken away,or
one added, it is no longer the same mass
same body."
The problem of identity in living
Locke does not find so easy to solve.
state of living creatures," he says, "their
tity depends not on a mass of the'
ticles, but on something else. For in
variation of great parcels of matter
the identity; an oak growing from a
great tree, and then lopped, is
oak; and a colt grown up to a horse, 0V.l,.l.l"'"............ \.
fa t, sometimes lean, is all the while the
horse, though in both these cases there
a manifest change of the parts, so that
they are not, either of them, the same
The problem of the real identity
tinuity of living things through
change is, as we shall see presently,
special case of the larger problen1 of
anything at all remains identical for
an instant in the universai flux of
supposing that problem solved in
be an unbroken flux, and yet we should per-
ceive a repeated experience."
James distinguishes three principles ofiden-
tity. In addition to the psychological law ac-
cording to which ,ve feel a later experience to
be the same as an earlier one, he refers to the
ontological principle which "asserts that every
real thing is ,vhat it is, that a is a, and b, b";
and the logical principle which declares that
"what is once true of the subject of a judgment
is ahvays true of that subject."· James seems to
think that "the ontological law is a tautological
truism, " whereas the logical and the psycho-
logical principles have further implications not
immediately obvious. Locke appears· to take a
contrary vie"v. He finds the identity of all ideas
self-evident, ,vhile to him the real identity of
things is much more difficult to grasp.
l'he principle of identity and its companion
principle of' contradiction are, according to
Locke, expressed in the propositions 'Whatso-
ever is, is' and 'It is impossible for the same
thing to be and not to be'-"these two general
propositions amounting to no more, in short,
but this, that the same is the same, and the
same is not different." But, Locke adds, "the
mind, without the help of any proof or reflec-
tion on either of these general propositions,
perceives so clearly, and knows so certaiJ}ly,
that 'the idea of white is the idea of white, and
not the idea of blue,' and that 'the idea of
white, when it is in the mind, is there and is
not absent,' that the consideration of these
axioms can add nothing to the evidence or cer-
tainty of its knowledge.... I appeal to every-
one's own mind, whether this proposition 'A
circle is a circle' be not as self-evident a proposi-
tion as that consisting of more general terms
'Whatsoever is, is.'"
But unlike the comparing of an idea with
itself, real identity, according to Locke, re-
quires us to consider a thing "as existing at any
determined time and place" and to "compare
it with itself existing at another time. . . •
When, therefore, ,ve demand whether anything
be the same or no? it refers always to some-
thing that existed at such a time in sucha place,
which, it was certain, at that instant, was· the
same with itself and no other; from whence it
fo11o\vs that one thing cannot have two begin-
nings of existence, nor two things one beginning,
the older time. Such cases are not rare in mental
In the tradition of the great· books, other
solutions are offered to the problem of personal
identity. I(ant thinks, for example, that a
"transcendental unity of apperception" is nee",:
essary to constitute "in all possible phenom-
ena which may come together in our experi-
ence, a connection of all these representations
according to laws. Unity of consciousness," he
writes, "would be impossible if the mind, in the
knowledge. of the manifold, could not ·becolne
conscious of the identity offunction by which
it unites the manifold synthetically in one
knowledge.T'herefore, the original and neces-
sary consciousness of the identi ty of one's self
is at the same time a consciousness of the equal-
ly necessary unity ofthe synthesis ofall phenom-
ena accordiqg to concepts."
\Vhere Kant posits a transcendental ego to
account for the ·cxperienced identity· of the
self, other philosophers who hold one or an-
other theory of the soul as an imperishable sub-
stance or an unchanging principle seem to find
no special subtleties in the problem of the
identity of living organisms persons. So far
as such theories bear upon that problem, the
consideration of theln belongs to the chapter
on SOUL. Here we are concerned with the no-
tions of same and other as they apply to every-
thing in the universe. Hence we must face all
the problems of how two things can be the
same, not merely the problem of self-sameness
or the identi ty of a thing with itself.
THE WORD "IDENTICAL" is SaInetimes used as
a synonym for "same," as when vve say that
two things are identical in a certain respect.
But without the qualification expressed by "in
a certain respect;" it is seldom if ever said that
two things are identical, for if they can •• be dis-
criminated from one another in any respect at
all, they are two, not one, and therefore not
identical. This seems to be the sense of Leib-
nitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles,
concurred in by all \vho understand identi ty as
the self-sameness of that which is one in num-
ber and existence..A. plurality of things involves
a numerical diversity:-each of the .many being
an other. To this extent at least, the traditional
discussion of same and other tends to merge
with matters discussed in the chapter
For both Plato and A-ristotle, the
between these two and
same and other-seems to be much
the comparison of two things, Aristotle
to treat san1eness as a kind of oneness,
to the various ways in which t\VO
be "one and the same." Of sameness,
that "it is a unity of the being, either
than one thing or of one thing when it is
as more than one"; and of the one he
to it" belong . . . the same and the like
equal, and to plurality belong the
the unlike and the unequal."
The enumeration he gives of kinds
seems to be paralleled by his enllmeralttoiri
kinds of similitude. As a thing rnay
sentially or one by accident, so two
be the same essentially or by rtrr·trf""" .... i·
totle's statement that "some things
number, others in species, others
others by analogy," finds its rr\1'ln1h""rn,,·,.t-
statement that" 'different' is
which, though other, are the
respect, only not in number, but
species or in genus or by analogy."
As indicated in the chapter on .... ...  
distinction is traditionally tnade
lationships which really exist
apart from the mind, and logical rp.I.') t-I'''i" ... h.
which occur in thought alone. This rfIC't"trl,,"'t-f,
seems to separate self-sameness
all relations of similitude which "I...., ......... ,.... ,..."'" ... ..•.
two things. "The relation signified
the same," l\quinas says, "is a
only if it is taken in regard to ab:5011ute:ly
same thing, because such a relation
only in a certain order observed by
regards the order of anything to itself.
case is othenvise, however, \vhen
called the same, not but
cally or specifically."
Nevertheless, identity seems to llrl,r1Plr-l1po
other reladons of sameness, for among
ideas lacking identity no comparisons
made. "Tho deny identity on the
that everything is in flux, nullify all
'cussion of sameness. The theory of a
flux, which Plato attributes to
mits nothing ever to remain ct-rtt-tr.. n'llr·u
instant; and "the professed I-Iera'"
" Cratylus, \vent even further, according
he "criticized Heraclitus for saying
itis impossible to step t\vice into the same
r;for he thought one could not do it even
nsaying of men that "they are nothing but a
tile or collection ofdiJferent perceptions, vvhich
reed each other with an inconceivable ra-
ity, and are in a perpetual flux and move'"
nt," Hume does more than deny personal
tity. He affirms an utter diversity-"as if
e were no manner of relation" at all-be-
n distinct perceptions, each of which· is for
a distinct existence. The opposite point of
affirms things which have an enduring
renee and\vhich can, as Aristotle says ofsub...
res, undergo change inmany respects ",,,hile
aining numerically one and the
BAND CHANGE raise the question of how
one· thing can be the· same from moment
moment. The question of how two· things
be one and the same in any respect arises
mthe simple fact that, at the instant of
parison, they are two. If they were the
only for the comparing mind, then their
would be a logical and not a real re-
For two things to be the same in
seems to imply that, although two in
they are one in· some respect. To use
language, there is identity in diversity;
the language of Aquinas, a real com-
ity exists, according to which some one
g is comUlon to two.
he problem of the sameness of two things
be stated in terlns of the significance of
tHobbes, Berkeley, and Hume call com-
or general names. Denying that such
s as "man" or "tree" or "stone" express
.tact or general ideas, they SeelTI to say that
1110n names like these signify \vhat is com'"
II to two or more individuals-whether
19s, perceptions, or ideas. Those who, like
istotle, Aquinas, and Locke, take general or
mon names to signify abstract ideas, seem
y .such ideas themselves signify that .in
ty two or more things have something in
on. Still another view is that, apart from
I things, real universals exist as the
the mind's conceptions.
If the latter alternative is chosen, then .two
individuals-two men, for example-may be
thought alike only because both somehow re-
semble, as Plotinus suggests, the separate ar-
chetype Man. What is common to the two men
lies in a third and separate reality, of which
Plotinus says that it is "present in multiplic-
ity," as if "in multi-impression ... from one
sea1." But as Parmenides observes, in Plato's
dialogue of that name, if a separate idea of Man
is required to explain how two individuals are
alike in being men, then still another idea is
needed to account for the likeness between
each individual man and the idea Man.
On the other hand, the view that the real
sameness of t\VO individuals, or the reality of
the one kind to which both belong, resides in
them-in their common· possession of the same
nature, quality, or other attribute--seems to
lead to the difficulty already intim.ated,namely,
the difficulty of understanding how distinct
existences can have anything in common-how
they can be two in number and yet also one in
nature. If John and James are alike as men be-
cause they share a comInon humanity, then can
it be said that each has his ownhurnan nature?
If their natures and properties are as individual
as their existences, how can .. two things be
really the same in any respect? Must not kinds
or universals-or whatever is supposed to be
common to many and the source of their same-
ness-exist only in the general meaning of
words, or in the mind's abstract concepts, or as
separate archetypes? But, then, \vhat truth is
there in the familiar statement that two indi-
vidual things are in some respect really alike or
the same?
THESE QUESTIONS indicate that the traditional
discussion of the sarne and the other tends to
involve not merely the theory of the one and
the many, but also, in certain issues at least,
the problemof the individual and the universal.
shows, the several positions traditionally taken
with regard to universals afford different an-
swers to the problem of how any salneness be-
tween two or more things exists. The factor of
similitude in knowledge (the nature of the like-
ness between image or idea and its object) and
the function of similitude in love (the attrac-
tion, or repulsion, of like by like) also extend
the consideration of sameness and.diversity into
the field of problems dealt with in other chap-
ters. Here attention must be given to the mean-
ing of sameness itself, as that is affected by the
distinction betvveen the same and the similar,
by the enumeration of various kinds or degrees
of likeness, and by the range of opposite mean'"
ings in the notions of diversity and difference.
.Discussing discrimination and comparison,
William James, for example, draws a sharp line
between the simple and complex components
of our experience. Simple impressions,he seems
to think, are either absolutely alike or absolute-
lyunlike. Here there can be no degrees of re-
semblance or similarity. "T\vo resembling
things," he writes, "owe their resemblance to
their absolute identity in respect to some at-
tribute or attributes, combined with the abso-
lute non-identity of the rest of their being.
This, which luay be true of compound things,
breaks down when we come to simple impres-
sions." The latter, apart from their numeriC'll
non-identity or otherness, are either the same
in quality or diverse. But compound things
may be more or less alike, varying in degree of
similarity or difference according to the num-
ber of simple respects in which they are or are
not the same.
"Similarity, in compounds," says James, "is
partial identity," and he gives the following
illustrations. "The moon is similar toa gas-jet,
it is also similar to a foot-ball; but a gas-jet and
a foot-ball are not similar to each other....
Moon and gas-jet are similar in respect of lu-
n1inosity and nothing else; moon and foot-ball
in respect of rotundity, and nothing else. Foot-
ball and gas-jet are in no respect similar-that
is, they possess no common point, no identical
Other writers seem to agree on this distinc-
tion between the same and the similar, the
diverse and the different. The latter in both
cases combine elements of sameness and diver-
sity to give degrees of likeness. Aquinas, for
exanlple, says that '\ve seek for difference
where we also find resemblance. For this rea-
son, things which differ must in some way be
composite, since they differ in SOine respect and
in some respect they resemble each other. In
this sense, although all things that differ are
diverse, yet all things that are diverse do
differ. ... For silnple things are diverse thr
themselves, and do not differ from one an
by differences as their Fo
stance, a man and an ass differ by the diffe
of rational and irrational, but \ve cannot say
these again differ by some furtherdifferen<n
The specific difference bet\veen man anti
with respect to rationality, accompanied
their generic sameness with respect to ani
ity, makes them similar. If they were utt
diverse, i.e., the same in no respect, they w
not be said to differ; just as if they were i
tical in all respects except number, they w
not be called similar. "The other and the sa
writes Aristotle, "are thus opposed. But d"
ence is not the same as otherness. For the or
and that \vhich it is other than need not
other in some definite respect .. . but t
which is different is different from some p
ticular thing in some particular respect, so t
there must be something identical bywh"
they differ."
But within the area of t:his agreement
fundamental terrns, there seems to be some ti
agreement about whether two things can
utterly diverse. Since they are two, they cann
be the same in all respects-certainly not
number-but can they be totally incomp
able? James appears to say Yes in his ren1
about the football and the gas jet having"
common point, no identical attribute." Yet
also seems to hold that no two things are e
absolutely incomparable. They may not di-
or be similar as the diverse ·species of the sa
genus, e.g., man and ass; but regarding th
as "'thinkables' or 'existents,'" he writes, "ev
the smoke of a cigarette and the \vorth 0
dollar bill are comparable-still more so
'perishables' or as 'enjoyables.'" The gasj
and the foot ball would appear to be camp
able also as 'existents' or 'usables'-or eve
perhaps, as 'bodies.'
The question thus arises whether-all thin
being someho\v cOlnparable-they are all t
same in genus, as, for example, all three-dim
sional rnaterial things rnay be said to
the genus 'body' no matter ho\v much else tl
differ as species or subordinate kinds wit
this genus. I(ant ans\vers this question by
firming a principle of ultin1ate hOinogeneo.
COr to this principle, "there are no If the example seems inappropriate on the
t Gr:igillal and first genera, as it were ground that the soul and the hand are of the
al'l(f 5eparated from each other, butall same genus, i.e., both substances or parts of the
same substance man, it may be necessary·' to
eralgenus." Kant a introduce the distinction between natural and
Ie of; variety or
peclficatlon, accordIng logical genera. According to this distinction, a
en "every genus requires species, and material and a spiritual substance can both be
in $u!Jr.5pecies, and as none called "substances" as a matter of logical classi-
cies is without a sphere ... reason In Its fication, but they ate not in the same genus by
extension requires that no species or their own natures. In this sense, Aquinas as-
eies should in itself be considered as the signs a geometrical solid and a physical body
" to the same logical genus 'body' .but regards
tode's theory of species and genera ap- them as of heterogeneous natures; and Des-
o be exactly opposite to Kant's on both cartes, calling an extended and a thinking sub-
. For there is no single all--em- stance both "substances," insists upon the utter
genus, but rather a number ofdiverse diversity of their natures.
reme genera, such as An easier example, however, may not be too
ualitY', etc. Where is a finIte, not   difficult to find. A man and a number belong to
arietY' ofspecies. The lowest speCIes IS different genera, according to a
rdivisibleonly into kinds which differ, substance, the other a quantity. But the Ulan
·vidualsof the same species do, in acci- can be related to his sons as the number one is
, not essential respects, e.g., white man related to any other whole number. The rela-
dOlan aiffer in" the same way as John and tion which is the same in both cases is that of
do within the species 'man,' not as the priority, according to which the man and unity
s'man' and 'ass' differ within the genus are the principles or generators respectively of
aI.' Furthermore, where Kant insists upon his sons and other numbers. I-Iere, then, we
aprinciple of continuity, according to see two heterogeneous things-a substance and a
between any   .. always.. quantity-=.which samehy
n possible intermediate species, differing analogy, each standing to another in the same re-
the first and the second by·smaller degrees lationship; both, therefore, can be called "prin-
those by which these' differ from each ciple" or "generator" analogically.
," Aristotle seems to find no intermediates Aristotle's other indication that a special
Ie between the contrary species of a single mode of similitude obtains between hetero-
s. mhe order of species is for him a dis- geneous things, occurs in all those passages in
nubus series like the order of the whole which he says that terms like 'being' can be
ers,·between proximate members of predicated of things in every category or genus.
no fractions are admitted. Just as James seems to think that any two things
sAristotle's position with respect to the may be comparable as 'thinkables' or 'existents,'
eneityof an animal and the color so Aristotle seems to hold that all things,
e in· the genus 'substance,' the other in though otherwise heterogeneous, are at least
nus'quality'--mean that such things, alike in being, i.e., in having some mode of ex'"
tely diverse in genus, are absolutely in- istence. Yet the term 'being' cannot be equated
arable?· His answer seems to be twofold. with Kant's single supreme genus. Though
e place he says that things which are di- Aristotle agrees with Kant that every genus
in genus may still be the same by analogy: must be capable of division into species, he
gs that are one by analogy are not all one does not think' that 'being' can be so divided by
us." In another, he givesus an example specific differences.
alogical reselnblance (between the soul
e hand9: HAs the hand is a tool of tools, Two POINTS MUST be observed concerning
e mind is the form of forms and sense the Aristotle's theory of the predication of a term
of" sensil:>lc tllings." like 'being' of everything in the universe.
utterly diverse, and have no similarity even in
being. We can say, (2) that they are homogene..
ous-that, with respect to being, for example,
they have the kind of sameness which things
have when they belong to the same genus. Or
we can say, (3) that they are only similar in the
sense ofa diversified sameness, whether such sim-
ilarity isor is not always analogical in character.
1, and analogical names, especially as it
lcerns the names of God, is discussed in the
apter on SIGN AND SYMBOL. The theological
coblero of the similitude between God and
eatures confronts us with three basic alterna-
yes in man's speculation about the sameness
d diversity which exists among all things.
Ie can say, (1) that infinite and finite being are
I. The principle of identity: the relationofa thing to itself 674
la. Oneness in number or being: numerical diversity or otherness
lb. The 'identity. of the. changing yet enduring individual: personal identity, the
continuity of self; the denial of identity in the realm of change 675
2. The sameness of things numerically diverse
za.The being of sameness or similitude: the reality of kinds or universals
zb. The relation between sameness and unity: sameness as a participation in the one
zc. The distinction between sameness and similarity and their opposites, diversity
and difference: the composition of sameness and diversity; degrees of like"
ness and difference
zd. The distinction of things in terms of their diversities and ·differences: real. and
logical distinctions 676
ze. The lin1its of otherness: the impossibility of utter diversity
. The modes of sameness and otherness or diversity
3a. Essential sameness or difference and accidental sameness or difference
(1) Specific and generic samenes's: natural and logical genera
(2) The otherness of species in a genus: the diversity of contraries 677
(3) Generic otherness or heterogeneity
3b. Relational sameness: sameness by analogy or proportional similitude
3c. Sameness in quality, or likeness: variations in degree of the same quality 678
3d. Sameness in quantity, or equality: kinds of equality
Sameness and diversity in the order of knowledge
4a. Likeness or sameness between knower and known: knowledge as involving imi..
tation, intentionality, or representation
4b. The role of differentiation ·.in definition: the diversity of differences 679
4C. Sameness and diversity in 'the meaning of words or the significance of terms:
.. the univoca.l and the equivocal ,-
The principle of likeness inlove·and friendship
Similitude bet\veen God.. and creatures: the degree and. character of
traces or irnages of God in creatures'· 680
heterogeneous things, they must be predicat
analogically of them. The existence whic
found in all things, he says, "is common to
only according to some of analogy,"
"according to the same specific orgen
fonnality." This is most easily' seen in
"likeness of creatures to God," which is "sol
according to analogy, .inasmuch as God is
sential being, whereas other things are be'
by participation."
Aristotle's statement that "things which
one by analogy are not all one in genus, " see
to be converted by Aquinas into the prop
tion that things which are not one in genuS,a
yet are alike .in way, are all one byanalo
For Aristotle, sameness by analogy may
ei ther simple sameness or diversified samen
(i.e., similarity); and diversified sameness
or may not be analogical, that is, it maybe
kind .of similarity .which two· heterogene
things have in respect to being or in respect
some relation in which they stand to ot
things. For Aquinas, on th.e other hand, wh
ever heterogeneous things are the same in
single respect, .their diversified sameness is
ways analogical; and whenever the similit
between two things is truly analogical, t
it is always similarity, that is, a diversified
a simple san1eness. Likeness in being, acco
to Aquinas; affords us .the prime example
similitude vvhich is·at once an an
diversified sameness.
Aquinas applies his theory of the, analog
being to the great traditional issue, which
all theories of similitude to the test-the qu
tion of the resemblance between God andcn
tures, or between infinite and finite b
Against the answer first given by Maimoni
and later expressed by Spinoza when,o
cOlnparisons between God and man, he
that "His essence ... could resemble our
nothing except in name"; and against til
on the other hand, who think that whate
names a,pply to both God and creatures Gs
as "being" or "good" or "one"), apply si
in. the same sense, Aquinas seems to take
middle ground. The names which are pro
applicable to both God and creatures, a,oo
ing to him, are said of them, not equivo
and not univocally, but analogically.
This threefold distinction of
First, he repeatedly asserts that 'being' is
not said in the same sense ofsubstances, quanti-
ties, qualities, and so forth. Hence. when such
heterogeneous. things are all called 'beings,' the
implication cannot be that, as beings, they are
all the same. The point seems to be that they
are· somehow at once both the same and diverse.
As, to use an example from Aristotle's Physics,
a tone and a taste can both be' sharp, though
the sharpness of a tone is as diverse from
the sharpness of a taste as tone and taste are
qualitatively diverse from each other; soa
man and a number can both have being,.though
their modes of being are as diverse as substance
is from quantity. If the word "similarity" were
to be used to signify not· the· combination of
separable elementsof sameness   diversi ty,
but rather.the inseparable fusion ofthe.twoto
constituteq diversified sameness, then hetero-
geneous things should be called· similar, not the
same, in being.
Second, Aristotle does not identify such
similarity of heterogeneous things with the
sameness by analogy which heterogeneous
things can have. 'Being' is nota relative term
and therefore it cannot be predicated analog,;.
ically, as 'principle' or 'generator' can be.
Terms which. are .predicated analogically, as
'principle' can be predicatedQf a father and
the number. one; may signify similarity {in \the
sense of diversified sameness) ratherthan simple
sameness in a single respect. The relation of
generation which creates the analogical simili-
tude between a father and the number one
seems to be the same relation in the two' cases
(between a father and his sons, and between
one and other numbers); it is· not, however,
simply the same, for that relation is diversified
according as the things related-substances in
the one case, quantities in the other-are abso-
lutely diverse in genus. But in Aristotle's
analysis it does not follow that because some an-
alogical predicates signify diversified rather than
silnple sameness, all do; or that because some
instances of diversified sameness happen to be
analogical (i.e., sameness in a relation), all are.
The interest in Aristotle's separation
two points lies in the fact that Aquinas com-
them in a theory which states that, when
.peing and other terms (which are not genera
and yet are above all genera) arepredicatedbf
1. The principle of identity: the relation ofa
thing to itself
7 PLATO= Theaetetus, 518d-519b; 521b-522b /
Sophist, 571d-574c esp 572d-573b
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 7 146a-e; BK VII,
CH I 206b,d-208a I Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5
528c-530c; BK X, CH 3 581a-d
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR IX, CH 1-2 353d-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13,
A 7, ANS 68d-70d; Q 28, A I, REP 2 157c-
158d; A2, REP 1 158d-160a; A 3, REP I 160a-c;
A4, REP 1 160c-161d; Q 40, AI, REP 1-2 213b-
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 159d-160a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III,
SECT 3-5 113a-e; BK II, CH XXVII, SECT I
218d-219b; BK IV, CH I, SECT 4 307b-e; CH III,
SECT 8 315b-c; CH VII, SECT 4 337b-338b;
CH VIII, SECT 2-3 345a-346b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 299a-301a esp 299b [fn I]
la. Oneness in number or being: numerical
diversity or otherness
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VII, 392a-394a / Theaete-
tus, 537b-c / Sophist, 561d-574c esp 564d-
2b. The relation between sameness and unity:
sameness as a participation in the one
7 PLATO: Parmenides, 493b-d; 498a-499a
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK V, cn 6536a-
537e; CH 9 538e-539a; BK X, CH3 581a-d
11 NICOMACIdUS: Arithmetic, BK II, 838e; 83ge-
2c. The distinction between sameness and sim-
ilarity and their opposites, diversity and
difference: the composition of sameness
and diversity; degrees of likeness and
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 49a-b
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BKI,CH 16-17 152a-b /
Physics, BK VII, CH 4 330d;..333a / Metaphysics,
BK v, CH9     CH 28 [1024bIO-I6]
BK x, CH 3 [IOS4b3-IOS5a3]S81b-d; CH
8-9 58Sb-586c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theolog£ca, PART I, Q3, A8,
REP 3 19d-20e; Q 4,A 322b-23b; QII, A I,
REP 2 46d-47d; Q 13 62b-75b passim, esp A S
66b-67d; Q S7, A 2, REP 2 295d-297a; Q 93
492a-501c passim; PART I-II, Q 27, A 3 738e-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,PARTuI SUPPL,
Q69, A I, REP 2 885c-886c; Q92,A I,'ANS and
REP 7 1025c-1032b
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 22
153b-e; APH 27 157b-158d
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK II, CH
53" JAMES: Psychology, 319b-322a; 344b-348a esp
347a-348a; 378b
42 KANT: Pitre Reason, 99a-108a,c 'esp 100a-b, XII, CH 3 [107oa4-30] 599b-d; BK XIII, CH 4-S
102b-e, 105a-106b 610a-611d; CH 10 618e-619a,e
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 811b-:d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,Q 3, A3,
ANS 16a-d; Q IS, A3, REP 4 93b-94a; Q16, A7,
REP 2 99a-d; Q 29, A 2, REP 4 163b-164b; Q
30, A 4 170e-171b; Q 84, A I, ANS and REP I
440d-442a; A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 5 446c-
447e; Q 8S, A I, ANS and REP '1-2 451c-453e;
A 2, REP 2 453d-455b; A 3, REP 1,4 455b-
457a; PART I"':'II,Q 29, A 6, ANS and REP I
20 AQUINAS: Sunlnla Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A
S, REP 2715a-716b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I,55b-56a; 59d
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK III, CH
III, SECT 6-20 255c-260a; CH VI, SECT 26-S1
274d-283a esp SECT 36-37 279a-b; BK IV, CH
III, SECT 31 323c-d; CH VI, SECT 4 331d-332b
35 BERKEL.EY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
6-I9A05d-410e passim
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
12S, 507h [fn I]
53 JAMES: Psychology, 299b-300a; 305a-314a;
. The being of sameness or similitude: the
reality of kinds or universals
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 87d-89a; 113e-114a,c /
Phaedo, 228d-230c; 231c-232a;240b-246e esp
242e-244b / Republic,BK X, 427e-429c /
Timaeus, 457e-d /Parmenides 486a-511d /
Theaetetus, 535a-536b / Sophist, 570a-574e /
Philebus, 610d-613a / Seventh Letter, 80ge-810b
8 ARISTOTLE : Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH I I
S-9] l05d-106a; CH 24' [8Sa3I-b3] 116e;
S-22] 117a / Sophistical Refutadons, Cli 22
37-39] 246c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6
505b-506b; CH 9 508e-511e; BK III, CH I
3-I8] 514a; [995b31-38] 514b; [996a4-9]
514e; CH 2 [997a34-c-bI2] CH 3 [998bI 4]
-CH 4 [999
4] 517b-518e; CH 4 [IOOIa4-b2S]
519d-520c; CH 6 [1002bII-3I] 521b-d; BK VII,
CH 8 [1033bIg-I034a8] 556d-557b; CH 10
[I035b28-32] 55gb; CH II [I037aS-9] 560e; CH
13-1 4 562a-563e; CH IS [I040aS_b4] 564a-c;
CH 16 [1040bI6-104Ia4] 564d-565a; BK IX, CH
8 [IOSob35-IOSla2] 576d-577a;BK x, en 10
586e-d; BK XI, CH 1 [I059a39-b8] 587b-c; BK
identity of the changing yet enduring
individual: personal identity, the con-
tinuity of self; the denial of identity in
the realm of change
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 94e-d; 99b; 113c-114a,c /
. Theaetetus, 517d-534b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH S 6a-9a /. Physics,
BK I 259a-268d; BK IV,CH II [2I9bI2-32]
299b-d / Metaphysics,BK IV, CH S [IOIoa6-38]
_52ge-530a; BK XI, CH 6 [I063aro-281591b-e
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic,' BK I, 811b-d
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VI,SECT IS 275a-b;
BK VIII, SECT 6 285d-286a; BK IX, SECT 19
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 79
951b-956b passim
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 292c-293b; 388e-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BKI, CH III,
SECT 4-S   BK II, CH I, SECT 11-12, 123d-
124e; SECT 19, 126a; cHxxvn218d-228e esp
SECT 9-26 222a-227d
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9S
431e; SECT 139 440d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 49c-51desp 51e-d; 74b-
76e; 120c-129c esp 121a-124d, 126a-128b;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy oj,Right, PART I, par 47
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man,297b-c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 147a-149aesp147b; 154a-
157a; 191a-192b; 194b-196a;213a-:-259b esp
,213a-219a, 226a-228a, 239a-240a,. 258b-259b;
• The sameness of things numerically diverse
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK VII, CH 1 206b,d-208
/ Generation and Corruption, BK II,CH I
[338bI2-19] 440d-441a,c / Metaphysics, BK II
CH 4 [IOOI&S..c..
2S] 519d-520c; BK V, CH
[IOI4b22-26] 535a; CH 9 [IOI7b26-IoI83r
538e-d; BK VIII, CH 6 569d-570d; BK X, CH
[IoS4&33-34] 581a; BK XII, CH 8 [1074a3I-3
604d; BK XIV, CH 1 [1088&8-14] 620b / SOU
BK II, CH 1 [4I2b6-9] 642c
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmet£c, BK II, 838c; 839d
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IX, CH 2 205
206a; CH S 206d-207a,c / Sixth Ennead, TRI
CH 9-11 273c-275d; TR VI, CH 5 312e-313
CH 11-16 315d-319d; TR IX, CH 1-2 353
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 6,
3, REP 1 29c-30b; Q II, A I, REP 1--2 46d-47
Q 30 167a-171b passim; Q 76, A2, REP 23
391a; Q 79, A S 418c-419b; Q 103, A 3,
530a-e; PART I-II, Q 17, A 4 688d-68ge
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III,Q
806d-B09d; Q 79 951b-956b paSSilTI
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies,
156a; 224d-225d
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 512262a
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lo\ver halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. \Vhen the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower of left-
hand side of the page, the letters e and d to the upper and lower halves of the nght-hand SIde of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164e, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:4S-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-:
tendy rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidancein the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
(2. The sameness of things numerically diverse.)
2d. The distinction of things in terms of their
diversities and differences: real and
logical distinctions
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 134b-c / Phaedo, 227d-
228a / Theaetetus, 548c-549d / Statesman,
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 7 146a-c; CH 16
152a-b; BK VII, CH I 206b,d-208a / Meta-
physics, BK X, CH 3 581a-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 2-4
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A8,
REP 3 19d-20c; Q II, A I 46d-47d; Q 13, A 7,
ANS 68d-70d; Q 14, A 6, ANS 80a-8Ie; Q 28,
A 3 160a-c; A 4, REP I 160c-16Id; Q 30, A I,
REP 2 167a-168a; Q 31 171b-175c; Q 36, A 2,
ANS 192a-194c; Q 40, A 2, ANS and REP 3
214b-215b; Q 47, AA 1-2 256a-258c; Q 50,
A 2, ANS 270a-272a; A 4, REP 1-2 273b-274b;
Q 75, A 3, REP I 380c-38Ib; Q 76, A 3, REP 4
391a-393a; Q 77, A 3, ANS 401d-403a; Q 8s,
A 7, REP' 3 459c-460b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2,
A 3, REP I 713a-714c; Q 17, A I, REP 7 807a-
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 87c-d / Objec-
tions and Replies, 114d-115a,c; 119d-120c;
136a-b; 152d-156a; 224d-225d; 231a-232d
31 SpINOZA: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM S 355d; PART
II, PROP 1-2 373d-374a; PROP 7, COROL and
SCHOL 375a-c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH
III, SECT 13-14 257c-258b; CH VI, SECT
7-2S 270b-274d; SECT 36-42 279a-280c;
BK IV, CH I, SECT 4307b-c; CH III, SECT 8
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 99a-l08a,c esp 100a-
b, 102b-c, 10Sa-I06b; 193a-200c esp 197b-
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 25d-29a esp 28b-
29a; 30d-3Ib; 241d-242a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 315a-336a esp 319a, 320a-
322b, 324a-b, 327a-334a; 550b-551b [fn 2];
867a-874a; 878a; 880b
2e. '"The limits of otherness: the impossibility
of utter diversity
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 4 [lb25-2a4] 5d-6a
/ Metaphysics, BK III, CH 3 517a-518a; BK X,
CII 3 [I054bI4-23] 581b-c
19 AQUINAs:Sunima Theologica;PART I, Q'3, A 5
17e-18b; A 8, REP 3 19d-20e; Q II, A I, REP 2
46d-47d; Q 90, A I, REP 3 480d-481d
25 :rvfONTAIGNE: Essays, 516b-c; 518d-519a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM S 355d; PROP
2-3 355d-356a; PROP 17, SCHOL 362c-363c;
42 !(ANT: Pure Reason, 107b-e; 197b-198a
,53 JAMES: 320a-322a esp 321a-b;
3. The modes of sameness and
3a. Essential sameness or difference and acci.
dental sameness or difference
7 PLATO: Republic, BK V, 358a-360a
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 5 [IOIb37-I02aI7J
144d-145a; CH 6 [I02
27-35] 145d; BK VI, elf
I [I39
] 192a-b; CH 4 194e-196a; CH 5
[I42b30-I43a8] 196b-e; CH 6 [I44
3-27] 197d'
CH 6 [I44
3]-CH 7 [I4
35] 198a-200b; BK VII'
CH 2 208a / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 9
539a; BK VII, CH 12 [I038a8-30] 561d-562a.
BK X, CH 3 [I054a3J-b2] 581a-b '
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK I, CH I
[486aIS-487aI] 7b-d / Parts of Animals, BK I
CH 2-4 165d-168e / Generation of Animals'
BK V, CH I [778aIS_b20] 320a-321a '
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q3, A 3
16a-d; Q 4, A 3, ANS 22b-23b; Q 29, A I,REP
3 162a-163b; Q 57, A 2, REP 2 295d-297a;
Q 75, A 3, REP I 380c-381b; Q 77, A I, REP 7
39ge-401b; Q 93, A 2, ANS 493a-d; PART I-II
Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-68ge;Q' 3S, A 8
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2,
A 3, REP I 713a-714e; Q 17, A I, REP 7 807a-
808d; Q 79, A I, REP 2,4 951b-953b; A 2, REP
1--2 953b-955e
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 136a-b;
152d-156a; 224d-225d; 231a-232d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 4-S 356a-b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH III,
SECT 13-14 257c-258b; CH VI 268b-283a pas-
sim, esp SECT 22 273d-274a, SECT 49 282c;
CH X, SECT 20-21 296d-297b; BK IV, CH VI,
SECT 4 331d-332b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 193a-200c
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 212d-213c
3a(1) Specific and generic
and logical genera
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 7 [1°386-23]
146a-b / Physics, BK v, CH 4 [227b3-21] 308b-c;
BK VII, CH I [24
4] 326c-d; CH 4 3300-
333a / Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH I I
[33SbI2-19] 440d·-441a,e / Metaphysics, BK III,
CH 3 517a-518a; BK v, CH 6 [IOI6a24-_bI] 5360-
537a; [IOI6b32-IOI7a3] 537e; CH 9  
538d; CH 10 [IOISa38-b8] 539b-e; CH 28
[I024bIO-I6] 546c; BK X, CH I [1052a28-37
578d; CH 3 [1054a33-b2] 581a-b; CH 8-9 585
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK I, CH
[486aI S'-487aI] 7b-d / Parts of Animals,. BK
CH 1 [639aI2._b9] 161b-d; CH 2-4 165d-168c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [107
1089] 28d
19 AQUINAS: Sum1na Theologica, PART I, Q3, A
17e-18b; Q 4, A 3 22b-23b; Q II, A I, REP
46d-47d; Q IS, A 3, REP 4 93b-94a; Q28, A
REP 2 157c-158d; Q29, A2, REP 4 163b-16
.3a(2) to 3b
Q 30, A 4, ANS and REP 3170e-J71b; Q 50, A
2, REP I 270a-272a; Q 57, .1\ 2, REP 2 295d-
297a; Q 66, A 2, REP 2 345d-347b; Q 75, A 3,
REP I 380e-381h; Q 76, A 3, REP 4 391a-393a;
Q77, A 4, REP I 403a-d; Q79, A 5, REP] 418c-
41gb; Q 85, A 3, ANS and REP 4 455b-457a;
A 5, REP 3 457d-458d; Q 88, A 2, REP 4 471c-
472e; Q93, AI, REP 3 492a-d; A2, ANS 493a-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H,Q61,
A I, REP I 54d-55c; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A I,
ANS 1025e-l032b
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 25
155a-d; APH 28 158d-159a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH III,
SECT 6-20 255e-260a; CH IV, SECT 16 263b-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341b-342b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 197b-198a
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 28b-29a; 207a-
208a esp207d j Descent of Man, 332b-c;
53 JAMES: Psychology, 870a-871a
3a(2) The o!herness of in a genus: the
diverslty of contraries
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics,BK I, CH 5 [I88
.263e; CH 6 [189811-14] 264c; [I 89b23-27] 265b;
BK IV, eH 14 [22482--16] 303rl-304a,c / "Afeta-
physics, BK V, CH IO[IOI8
7] 539a-b; BK x,
CH 4581d-582d; CH 8-9 585b-586c / Soul, BK
I, CH I [402bI--9] 631c-d ,
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Antmals, BK I, CH I
[486aI5-487al] 7b-d / Part,s ,of Animals, BK I,
CH 2-4 165d-168c / Poltttcs, BK IV, CH4
[I29ob25-36] 489d-490a
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TRIll, CH 18-20
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,PART I, Q 4, A
3, ANS 22b-23b; Q II, A I, REP 2 46rl-
47d;Q 50, A 4 273b-274b;Q 75, A 3, REP I
380e-381b; PART 1-'11, Q 23, A I, ANS 723c-
20 AQUINAS: Summa 1neologica, PART I-II, Q 54,
A I, REP 1 22d-23d; Q 72, A 7, ANS 117a-
35 LOCKE: lluman Understanding, BK III, CH VI,
SECT 39 27ge-280a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 197b-198a
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 30d-31b; 241d..
53 JAMES: Psychology, 344b-345b;387b
a(3) Generic otherness or heterogeneity
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 4 [lb25-2a4] 5d-6a
/ Topics, BK I, CH 15 149d-152a passim; CH
16 [107b37]-CH 17 [108aI4] 152a-b / Physics,
BK VII, CH 4 330d-333a esp [249a3-24] 331d-
332b / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 3 517a-518a;
BK V, CH 28 [I024bIO-16] 546c
19 AQUINAS: Sumn1a Theologica, PART I, Q3, AS
17e-18b; Q 4, A 322b-23b; Q 88, A 2, REP 4
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 197b-198a
3b. Relational sameness: sameness by analogy
or proportional similitude
7 PLATO: Gorgias, 267e-268a / Ti,naeus, 448b-d
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 10
BK II, CHI4 [98a20-23] 134a;
CH 17 [99aI6] 135b / Top£cs, BK I, CH 17
[108a6-14] 152b; BK IV,.CH 4 [I24aIS-20] 172d;
BK V, CH 7 [I36b33-I37820] 189a-e; CH· 8
[138b23-27] 191b-c / Physics, BK I, CH 7 [I9Ia
8-12] 266d; BK VII, CH 4 [249a22-24] 332b /
Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 6 [33.3
21'-34] 434a / Aleteorology, BK IV, CH 9 [387
6] 491e / Metaphysics, BK V, CH·· 6 [IOI6b.32-
3] 537e; CH 9 [IOI8aI2-13] 538d; BK IX,
CH I [10463.4-8] 570d-571a; CH 6 [I048a31-b8]
573d-574a;' BK XII,. CH 4-5 599d-601a passim
/ Soul, BK III, CH 7 [43Ia20_bI] 663d-664a; CH
8 [43Ib20-43282] 664b-c
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BKI, CH I
[486aI5-487aI] 7b-d; BK VIII, CH I[588aI8-bS]
114b,d / Parts ofAn£mals., BK I, CH 4167d-
168e; CH 5 [645br-646a5] 169b-d / Generation
of Animals, BK I, CH I [7I5bI7--261 255d; BK
HI,CH 10 [760a9--17] 301b / Ethics, BK I, CH 6
[1096b27-30] 342a; BK v, CH 3 378e-379b; BK
VIII, CH 7 [I I58b29-33] 410d / Politics, BK v,
CH I [130Ib29-36] 503a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2
[I357b25'-1358a2] 597e-d; BK II, CH 20 [1393
22-I394a8] 640d-64Id; BK III, CH 4 657b-d;
CH 10-1 I 662e-666b / Poetics, CH 21 [1457b6-
33] 693a-e
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK v 81a-98b esp DEFINI-
TIONS, 5-6 81a; BK VII, DEFINITIONS, 20 127b
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK II, 841e-d
16 KEPLER: Hartnonies of the World, 1078b-
10aOa passim
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 4, A3
22b-23b; Q 13, AA 5-6 66b-68e; A 10 72e-73e;
Q 14, A3, REP 2 77d-78b; Q16,A 6, ANS 98b-d;
Q 44, A 3, ANS 240b-241a; Q 66, A 2, ANS
345d-347b; Q 93, A I, REP 3 492a-d; PART
Q 20, A 3, REP 3 713c-714c; Q 27, A 3,
REP 2 738e-73ge
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q6I,
A I, REP I 54d-55e; PART III, Q 60, A I, ANS
and REP 3 847b-848a; PART III SUPPL, Q 69,
A I, REP 2 885e-886e;Q 92, A I, ANS and REP
6-7 1025e-1032b
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I,
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 336b-d;
449a-b; 469d-470d
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 27 157b-
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 158b-161d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IX, DIV
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72c-74a / Judgement,
5. The principle of likeness in love and friend-
'1 PLATO: Lys£s, 19d-21b iSympos£um, 167a-c /
Gorg£as, 285d-286b / Statesman, 608b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VIII,CH I [I 15s
hIS] 406d-407a; CH 3 [II56b6-24] 408a-b; CH
4 [II56b33-1I573,I5] 408c-d; CH 5 [II57
409c-d; CH 6 [IIS8aI7-2I] 410a; [II58a38-b3]
410b; CH 7-'9 410c-412e; CH 13 [I 162a34-b4]
414d-415a; BK IX, CH 3 418c-419a; CH 4
[I I 66a29-b2] 41ge / Rhetor£c, BK I, ell II
[I37IbI2-2S] 615a-b; BK II, CH 4 [I38Ia8-I9]
12 EPICTETUS: D£scourses, BK II, eli 22 167d-
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IV, par 22--23
Sameness and in the meaning of
words or the significance of terms: the
univocal and the equivocal
'1 PLATO: Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Soph£st, 551a-
552c / Philebus, 609d-610a / Seventh Letter,
8 ARISTOTLE: Categor£es, CH I 5a-b / Interpreta-
tion, CH I [I6a3-8] 25a / Top£cs, BK I, CH 18
[I08aI7-37] 152b-d; BK VI, CH 10 [I48a23-25]
202b; [I48a38-b4] 202c; BK VIII, CH .3 [IS8
] 215b-e / Sophistt'cal Refutations, CH I
S-I3] 227b-c; CH 33 [I82bI3-2I] 251d /
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH xxx, Physics, BK I, CH 2 [I85820]-CH 3 [I87aIO]
SECT 2 238b-c; CH XXXI, SECT 2239b-d; CH 260a-262a; BK VII, CH 4 [249aJ-241331d-332b
XXXII, SECT 14-16 245c-246b; BK IV, CH IV, / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [99oa33-99I88] 508c-
SECT 1-12 323d-326d 509b; BK IV, CH 2 [I003833-hI2] 522b-c; BK
a5 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 1'-91 VII, CH 4 [I0308.32-h3] 553a;..b; BK VIII, CH .3
4I3a-431a esp SECT 2-4 413b-414a, SECT 8-9 [I043a29-b4] 567d; BK IX, GH I [I046a4-8J
414c-d, SECT 25-33 417d-419a, SECT 48-49 570d-571a;BK XI,CH .3 {ro6ob34-I06IaIO]
422a-b, SECT 56 423c-d, SECT 86-91 429c- 589a-b; BK XII, CH 4-5 599d-601a I Soul, BK
431a; SECT 135-142 440a-441c III, CH 2 [425b26-'"426a26] 658a-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 2
118, 504d f648bi]-CH.3 [649b22] 172d-174b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 7b-d; 12c-d [fn I]; 15d- 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 2, 168c
16c; 23a-24a; 34a-35b; 55a-56e; 88b-91d; 19 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART I, Q I, A
99a-l01b; lOld-102a; 115b-c / judgelnent, 10, REP 1 ge-lOc; Q 3, A 2, REP 1-2 15c-16a;
550a-551a,e A 6, REP I 18e-19a; Q 13 62b-75b; Q 16, A 6,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of R£ght, PART III, par ANS 98b-d;Q 29, A 4, ANS and REP 4 165c-
146-147 55c-56a 167a; Q 32, A I, REP 2 175d-178a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 126b-129a; 142a-143b; 20 AQUINAS: SU1nma Theologica, PART I-'"II, Q
153b-154a; 307a-31la esp307a, 309a; 325b- 61, A I, REP I 54d-55e; PART In, Q 60,' A I,
327a esp 326a-b [fn I]; 851b-852a ANS and REP 3847b-848a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 57d-58a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 60b-c;
65b-c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 43 109d-
110a; APH 59-60 112b-113a
31 SPINOZA: Eth£cs, PART I, PROP 17, SCHOL 362c-
363c; PART II, PROP 40;SCHOL 1.;...2 387b-388b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BKII, CH IV,
SECTS, 131a; CH XIII,. SECT J[8 152a-e; CH
XXIX, SECT 6-12 234d-236c; BK III, CH VI,
SECT 28 276a-b esp 276b; SECT 47-51 282a-
283a; CHIX 285a-291c; CH X, SECT 5 292d-
293a; CH XI, SECT 3--7300b;..301c; BK IV, CH
35 HUME: HU1nan Understandi11g, SECT VIII,
36 STERNE: Tristram· Shandy,307b-308b
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 315d-316a / Science
of Right, 400d / Judgement, 547b..548c; 602b-
53 JAMES: Psychology, 332h-334a; 549b·-550a;
689a-b; 875b-876a
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 277d-278a
/ General Introduction, ·517e-518b
h. The role of differentiation in definition:
the diversity of differences
'1 PLATO: Phaedrus, 134b-d / Theaetetus, 548c-
549d / Sophist 5S1a-579d espS52b-561d /
States1nan 580a-608d / Ph£le!?us, 610d-613a
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, OR 5 [IOIb37-I02aI7]
144d-145a; CH 18   152d; BK VI, CH
6 196d-199c; BK VII, CH 3 [I53aI3-b241208b-
209a / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 3 [998b2I-27]
517c; BK VII, CH 10,-12 558a-562a
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of An£mals, BK I, CH 2-4
17 PLOTINUS: S£xth Ennead, TR HI,CH 8-10
285a-286d; CH 16-18 289c-291d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I, A I,
REP 3 162a-163b; Q 75, A 3, REP I 380e-381b;
Q77, AI, REP 7 399c-401b; A3, ANS 401d-403a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q49,
A2, REP 3 2b-4a; PART III, Q2, A I, ANS 710a-
oBACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH24 154c-
5 LOCKE: Human Understanding,BK III, CHIlI,
SECT 10 256c-257a; CH VI 268b-283a passim
2 KANT: Pure Reason, 193a-200c; 215d-216c
9 DARWIN: Or£g£n ofSpec£es, 28b-29a; 30d-3Ib;
.3 JAMES: Psychology, 344b-345b; 669a-671a
17 PLOTINUS: S£xth Ennead, TR III, CH IS 289a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 4
I, ANS and REP I 224b-225d; Q 47, A 2, REP
20 AQUINAS: Summa 'Pheolog£ca,
I 13, A 9, ANS368d-369c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding,
SECT 9-10 311b-c
50 MARX: Capital, 19a-25desp 19d-20b, 25ct..,d
53JAMES: Psychology, 874a..875a
4. Sameness and diversity in the order ()
4a.·Likeness or sameness knower an
known: knowledge as involvingitnita
tion, intentionality, or representation
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124c-126cesp 126a-e
Phaedo, 231b-232h/ Republ£c,BK III,333b-
BK VI--VII, 383d-398c esp BK VII, 397a-398
BK X', 427c-431b I Theaetetus,
538d-541a / Seventh Letter, 809c-BIOd
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation,_ CH I [I684-9]25a.
Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [I072bI7-24] 602
603a; CH 9 [I074b36-I075aII] 60Sc-d / SO
BK I, CH 5 [409bI8-4I187] 639c-641a; BK
eH 5 [416b32-417a2] 647b; [4I7aI7-2I] 647
[418a2-'"6] 648c-d; BK III, CH 2 [425bI7-2
657d-658a; CH 3 [427aI6-b6] 659c-d; CH
661b-662c; CH 5 143oaI4-I6] 662c; [430a20-2
662d; CH 7 [43
- 8] 663c; CH 8 [43Ib2
432a2] 664b-c /Memory and Remin£scence, c
I [45oa25-45IaI9] 691a-692b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [26-10
44b-45c; [722":'817] 53d.,.54d
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VIII, CH 6, 132
CH 8, 132d-133b; CH 9, 134a-b / Fifth Ennea
TR I, CH 4, 210b-c; TR III, CH 4-5 217b-218
CH 10-13 221b-224b; TR v, CH 1-2 228b-229
TR IX, CH 7249b-c / S£xth Ennead,TR VII,
36-41 339c-342c
18 AUGUSTINE: Conjessions,cBK X, par 17750.-
par 19 76a-b; par 22-24 76d-77c; par 27-
78b-d / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 26gb
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12,
2 51c-52c; A 4, REP r 53b-54c; A 9 58b-59
Q 14, A 2, REP 2 76d-77d; A 5 79a-80a; A
REP I,J 80a-81c; A 9, REP 2 83b-d; QIS 91
94a passim; Q 18, A 4 107d-108c; Q 27, A
REP 2 156b-d; Q 30, A 2, REP 2 168a-169
Q 34, A I, REP 3 185b-187b; Q 55, A2, ANS a
REP I 289d-290d;A 3, REP 1,3 291a-d; Q
A 2, ANS and REP 2-3 295d-297a; Q S81
301b-d; Q 75, A I,REP 2 378b-379c; Q85,
REP 3 460b-461b; Q 87, A I, REP 3465a-46
Q 93, A 2, REP 4 493a-d; PART I-II, Q 28, A
REP] 740b-741a
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 84a-85a;
99a-b / Objections and Repl£es, 108b-l
AXIOM V 131d-132a; 219b-e
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM 6 355d; p
II, PROP 7 375a-c; PROP 11-13 377b-378c
(3.. TlJe modes oj sameness and otherness or-diver-
sity. 3b.Relational sameness:sarlleness by
analogy or proportional similitude.)
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 212d-213c
53 J Psychology, 549b-S50a';688a-689b
3c. Sameness in quality, or likeness: variations
in degree of the same quality
7 PLATO: Parmenides, 493d-494a
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [.3b32-4a91 Ba-b;
CH 6 [6a27-35] 10d-l1a; CH 8
15d-16b / Topics,.BK III, CHS 166b-c/ Physics,
BK IV, CH 9 297b / Generation
and Corruption, BK II, eH 6 [33.3a27-34] 434a
/ Metaphysics, BK V, CH 9 [IoI8aI5-191538d-
539a;cH IS [I02I
8-I 4] BKX, CH 3
[I054b8-I3] 581b
9 ARISTOTLE: History of An£mals, BK 1,CH 1
[486aI5-487aI] 7b-d; BK VIII, CH I [588aI8-3I]
114b,d / Parts ofAni1naIs, BK II, CHi [648bI2-
9] 173a-174a
1'7 PLOTINus:First Ennead, TR II, CH 2, 7b /
FourthEnnead,TR IX,CH 4, 206c-d/ Sixth
Ennead,TR III,. CH 15. 289a-c
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XI,· CH 10, 328b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q4, A3,
ANS 22b-23b;Q 42, A I, REP.I 224b-225d;
PART I-II, Q27, A3 738c-:73ge; Q28, A I, REP 2
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theolog£ca,. PART I-II, Q 52
15d-19c; Q 72, A 7, ANS 117a-118a; PART III
SUPPL,Q 69, A I, REP 2 885c-886c; Q 92, A I,
ANsand REP 7 1025c-1032b
30 BACON: NotJum Organum, BK II, APH I3145b-
35 LOCKE: Human Understand£ng, BK II, CH
XXVIII, SECT I 228c; BK IV, CH Ii, SECT 11-13
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 73c-74a / ]udgement,
602b-603a esp 602b,d [fn I]
53 JAMES: Psychology, 319b-322a; 329a-h; 346a-
3d. Sameness in quantity, or equality: kinds of
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228a;..229c / Parmenides,
494b-e; 500c-502a; 508c-d; 510b-511a
8 ARISTOTLE: Categor£es, CH6 [6a27-35] lOd-11a
/ Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 6 [333
27-34] 434a / Metaphysics, BK V, CH IS [I02I
8-14] 542b-c; BK X, CH 3 [IoS4bI-3] 581h; CH
9 ARISTOTLE: Eth£cs, BK V, CH 3-5 378c-381d
PROP 4 4a-b; PROP 8 6b-7a; PROP 26 16a..J7b
11 NICOMACHUS: Ar£thmetic, BK I, 821d-822b
16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1012b-
For: Other discussions of the principle of identity and of its significance for being, change, a
thought, see BEING 2b, 7b(S); CHANGE 2; LOGIC Ia; ONE AND MANY 2a; PRINCIPLE
(3); RELATION Ia; and for the problems of personal identity and the identity of a sta
see SOUL Id; STATE 3g.
LEIBNITZ. Net'J Essays Concerning [-Iuman Under-
standing, BK II, CH 27
VOLTAIRE. "Identity," in A Philosophical DictionalY
WHE\VELL. The Philosophy ofthe Inductive Sciences,
JEVONS. The Substitution of Similars
LOTZE. Logic, BK I, eH 2 (A)
BRADLEY. !he Principles of Logic, BK II, PART I, CH
6; Tennlnal Essays, IV
--. Science and Philosophy, 2
GARRIGOu-LAGRANGE. God, His Existence and
WHITEHEAD. The Concept of Nature, CH 6
AGGART. The Nature of Existence, CH 7-10
SANTAYANA. The RealJn of Matter, CH 8-9
PENIDO. Le role de l' analogie en theologie dogntatique
MARITAIN. The Degrees of Knowledge, CH4
--. A Preface to Metaphysics, LECT V
B. RUSSELL. HUlnal1 Knowledge, Its Scope and
Limits, PART VI, CH 3
for: Other considerations of sameness or similarity, and of the problem of the reality of kinds or

11atters relevant to the analysis of essential and accidental sameness, specific and generic
sameness, and otherness in species or in genus, see EVOLUTION I b; IDEA 4b(3); NATURE
na the simili tude bet,veen heterogeneous things, and for the problem of signifying
such slmlhtude, see BEING I; SIGN AND SYMBOL 3d; and for the related distinction benveen
univocal, equivocal, and analogical terms, see IDEA 4b(4); SIGN AND 3b-3d.
Another discussion of sameness by analogy or relational sameness, see RELATION rd, sa(3);
and for sameness in quality and quantity, see QUALITY 3C, 4c; QUANTITY lb.
Similitude in the relation of knower and kno\vn, of lover and loved, and in inli tation, see
The principle of sirrlilarity in the association of ideas, see IDEA se; MElVIORY AND
The theory of definition as constituted by the statement of genus and difference, see DEFINI-
The problem of the similitude between God and creatures, and for its bearing on the signifi-
cance of the names\ve apply to God, see GOD 3f, 6a-6b; MAN I Ia; NATURE I b; ONE AND
below. are in Great Books ofthe World, but relevant to the
Idea and topICS With which thiS chapter deals. These vvorks are divided into two groups:
I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For ?ate, place, and facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Blbhography of Additional Readings 'which follo\"s the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
®AJETAN. De NOlninuln Analogia
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, IV-VI, XV (10),
XXVIII (3), xxx (10), XXXII (2), XXXIII (2),
(II, 14-15, 17)
- .. On the Various Kinds ofDistinctions (Disputa-
tones Metaphysicae, VII)
SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Tho-
1ZStzcus, Ars Logica, PART II, Q 2 (3); Q 13 (2-5);
A.QUINAS. On Being and Essence, CH 2
IDESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART I,
HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART II, CH I I, 13
HUME. A Treatise ofHuman Nature, BK I, PART IV,
F.S. MILL. A System of Logic, BK III, CH 20
19 AQUINAS: Sumnza Theologica, PART I, Q3, AI
REP 1--5 14b-15b; A 2, REP 1-2 15c-16a; A 3,
REP 1-2 16a-d; A 5, REP 2 17c-18b; A 7, ANs
and REP I 19a-c; Q 4, A 3 22b-23b; Q 6, A 2
ANS and REP 3 Q 8, A I, REP 3
35c; Q 13, AA 2-6 63c-68c; Q 14, A 2, REP 3
76d-77d; A 6 80a-81c; Q IS, A 2, ANS 92a-
93b; Q 18, A 4 107d-108c; Q 26, A 4
152a,e; Q 27, A I, ANS 153b-154b; Q 44, APo..
3-4 240b-241d; Q 47, A I, ANS and REP 2-3
256a-257b; Q 50, A I, ANS 269b-270a; Q55, Po..
3, REP 3 291a-d; Q 57, A 2, ANS and REp 2
295d-297a; Q 59, A I, CONTRARY 306c-307b'
Q 65, A 2, REP I 340b-341b; Q 72, A I, REP
368b-369d; Q77, A2, ANS and REP I401h-d'
Q 84, A2, ANS and REP 3 442b-443c; Q 88, A 2'
REP 4 471c-472c; A3, REP 3 472c-473a; Q9I:
A 4, REP 1-2 487d-488c; Q 93 492a-501c'
Q 103, A4, ANS 530d-531b; PART I-II, Q I, A8
615a-e; Q 2, A 4, REP I 618a-d; A 5, REP 3
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q
55, A 2, REP 3 27a-d; Q 110, A 4, ANS
351d; PART III, Q 4, A I, REP 2 730d-731d'
PART III SUPPL, Q 69, AI, REP 2 885c-886c;
Q 92, AI, ANS and REP 7 1025c-1032b
21 DANTE: Divine Con1edy, PARADISE, I [1°3-142]
107b-d; II [112'-148] 109a-b; VII [64-87]
116a; XIII [52-84] 126a-b
25 .MONTAIGNE: Essays, 238d
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT II, SC II [314-322]
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 41h-d;
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 88c-d; IV,
91b / Objections and Replies, 122a-b; 214a-d;
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK II [345'-353] 1180
119a; BK IV [288--294] 158b; BK VII [150-173
220b-221a; [519-528] 228b; BK XI [466-522
309b-310b / Areopagitica, 384a
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 430 -431, 246b-247b; 434
435, 249b-251a; 537 265b; 555 270a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XI, DI
113, 502c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS,
130b-d / Philosophy ofHistory, PART II, 270
271c; PART III, 306a-c; 310d
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 84b-85a
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK
(5. The p'1"inciple oj likeness in. love and jriend-
19 AQUINAS: Sun-una Theologica, PART I, Q27, A
4, REP 2 156b-d; Q 30, A2, REP 2 168a-169b;
PART I-II, Q25, A2, REP 2 731b-732a; Q27, A
3 738e-73ge; Q 28, A I 740b-741a; Q 32, A 7
20 .AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q
26, A 2, REP 2 511a-d
25 Essays, 83a-d; 395b-398e pas-
30 BACON: Advancel1tent of Learning, 89a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 31 405d·-406a;
PROP 33 406e; PROP 45-46 410b-e; PROP 52
413d-414a; PART IV, PROP 29..,-4° 431d-437a
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 16Sb-166a
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 317e-d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 15a-b; BK VI,
242e-243e; 270b-e; BK VII, 278c-279b; 296a-
300e; BK VIII, 311a-313a; 314e-316a; 326b-e;
330d-332a; BK XII, 543b-544b; BK XIII, 576a-
b; BK XV, 616a; 617e; 631e-633a; 640a; EPI-
LOGUE I, 669d-672a
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 404d-406e esp 405a /
Group Psychology, 677c-678b; 678d-684a esp
680b, 681b,d [fn 4], 682c, 684a; 685b-686a
6. Similitude between God and creatures: the
degree and character of the similitude;
t.races or images of God in creatures
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:26-27; 5:1; 9:6 /
Job, 12:7-9 / Psabns, 19:1; 75:1; 1°7:23-24-
CD) Psalms, 18:2; 74:2; 106:23-2 4
ApOCRYPHA: Wisdom ofSolomon, 2:23; 13:1-5--
(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 2:23; 13:1-5 /
Ecclesiasticus, 17:1-3; 42:15-4.3:33-(D) OT,
Ecclesiasticus, 17:1-3; 42:15-43:37
NE\V TESTAMENT: Romans, 1:20 / I Corinthians,
II:i; 15:49/ II Corinthians, 3:18/ Colossians,
.3 :9--10 Ijames, 3:9 / II Peter, 1:3-4 / I John
passim, esp 2:29,3:7,3:9-10,3:16,3:24,4:7-
II, 4:16,4:19 / II John
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 849a-b; 853b-854a;
860a / flarmonies ofthe World, 1038a; 1048a;
1080b-1085b passim
18 l\UGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, par 14 12a-b;
BK IV, par 26 25e-d; par 31 26c-27a; BK VI,
par 4 36a-b; BK XIII, par 32 119a-b / City of
God, BK XI, CH 25-28 336b-338d; BK XII, CH
23 357d-358a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 22