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The privatisation of urban development and the London Olympics 2012

Mike Raco
a a

Bartlett School of Planning, University College London Published online: 10 Aug 2012.

To cite this article: Mike Raco (2012) The privatisation of urban development and the London Olympics 2012, City: analysis of urban trends, culture, theory, policy, action, 16:4, 452-460, DOI: 10.1080/13604813.2012.696903 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2012.696903

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CITY, VOL. 16, NO. 4, AUGUST 2012

The privatisation of urban development and the London Olympics 2012

Mike Raco
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Introduction
On the Olympics she [Tessa Jowell] was telling me it was an enormous opportunity. Think of the impact on our young people, on fitness, on sport, on the countrys self-belief. I would say but suppose we get beaten by the French and I end up humiliated? One day when I had finished saying this to her in graphic terms, sitting in the Downing Street garden . . . she looked at me reproachfully and said I really didnt think that was your attitude to leadership. I thought you were prepared to take a risk. And it is a big risk. Of course we may not win but at least we will have the courage to try . . . Oh, OK, well go for it. (Tony Blair, 2010, p. 545)

his extract from Tony Blairs autobiography provides a revealing glimpse of the politics that brought the Olympic Games of 2012 to London. It seems that it was not the result of a carefully reasoned set of deliberations but the culmination of a wider political project that converted urban policy into simple questions of leadership and vision. What mattered was delivery, not deliberation. It was about getting things done in a challenging and complex environment and using a major event to showcase the UKs development expertise to the world. In so doing, it would provide a further boost to Londons global city credentials. Questions of political conflict in the city and/or alternative ways of thinking about urban development were politely put to one side and redefined as legacy concerns. Teams of experts were rapidly mobilised to

create a winning bid and a global network of advisers, businesses, sponsors and lawyers were on hand to provide the necessary capacities to cut through the complexities of project delivery. For Graham (2012) the mobilisation of an Olympic project is like a society on steroids. They exaggerate wider trends. This is, of course, partially true, but the interesting question is not around the relevance, or otherwise, of medical metaphors for urban politics but what it is that these wider trends consist of and how major projects reflect and reproduce them. This paper argues that it is dangerous to write off the London Olympics as an exceptional event. Its analysis is often pigeon-holed and becomes circumscribed by the literature on so-called mega-events, which makes it seem as if it is somehow separate from normal, everyday forms of urban politics. Clearly, there are features of the Games that are distinct, such as the set timeframes for development and the multi-scalar attention given to development and planning processes. However, of greater interest are the connections between the Games and broader modes of contemporary capitalism. The Olympics is not so much a game-changer in terms of urban politics but part of the longer term emergence of what David Levi-Faur (2011) has characterised as regulatory capitalism or a context in which states have been spending ever higher proportions of [their] budgets on regulation (Braithwaite, 2008, p. xi). This represents a new order that goes beyond privatisation

ISSN 1360-4813 print/ISSN 1470-3629 online/12/0404529 # 2012 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2012.696903

RACO: THE and includes an increase in delegation to autonomous agencies, formalisation of relationships, proliferation of new technologies of regulation in both public and private spheres, and the creation of new layers of both national and international regulation (Levi-Faur, 2005, p. 27). Under regulatory capitalism, hybrid relationships emerge between states and powerful corporations, to the point that the distinctions between providers and policymakers become increasingly blurred. The implications for decision-making, policy effectiveness and accountability are potentially enormous as private interests become involved in co-producing all aspects of urban projects. Thus despite decades of global good governance discourses and a broader emphasis by states on devolution and community empowerment, the political realities of regulatory capitalism often involve a systematic erosion in the power and legitimacy of democratic systems. In Levi-Faurs terms (2011), there is a longer term liberty cost of regulatory expansion and its associated contractualism based on the quiet accretion of restrictionan accretion hardly visible because it is hidden behind technical rulemaking, mystifying legal doctrine and complex bureaucracies (p. 4). It is a system that enables giant management consultancy firms to shape policy and regulatory environments in their own image. It is remarkable how little academic research on urban development acknowledges the role of such interests. This is a surprising lacuna given that the so-called Big4 global accountancy firms, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Ernst & Young, KPMG and Deloitte, now act as a private police force of capitalism as their audits are the main tools through which societies know about, and regulate, the worlds biggest corporations (Shaxson, 2011, p. 176; see also Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002; Khurana and Raman, 2004). The discussion here uses the London Olympics to examine regulatory capitalism in action. It begins by charting the evolution

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of hybrid forms of governance surrounding the Games and the growing influence of private corporations on all aspects of its development. The Olympics provides one obvious source of contract-based revenue for these elites. The second part of the discussion then turns to the wider liberty costs of regulatory capitalism and the barriers to openness that have been established. It describes the authors own experiences of trying to gain access to key data and the limitations imposed by emerging regulatory orders. The paper then concludes with a wider discussion of what additional research is needed and implores researchers to make greater efforts follow the money.

Regulating the London Olympics From the outset, the London Olympics has represented an enormous business opportunity for global firms that are looking to capture and regulate state spending and policy programmes. The rather simple explanation given by Tony Blair above for the Labour governments decision to bid for the Games in the early 2000s, represented the beginning of a process in which state authorities became locked in to multinational forms of regulation and private sector networks of expertise. Global providers of business services were quickly enrolled to give a sense of legitimacy and quality to the bidding process. Their reputational capital was seen as a necessary requirement in the development of a credible bid. In 2002, PWC were therefore commissioned by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) to provide a subjective, probabilistic assessment of the risks and uncertainties involved in a bid to hold the Olympics in London in 2012. PWC has been heavily involved in Olympic audits, research and bids across the world, and the London Games represented an opportunity for it to capture the growing market in mega-events. PWCs estimates were for a public subsidy of between 0.9 and 1.3

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democracy to indirect representative democracy. Democratic governance is no longer about the delegation of authority to elected representatives but a form of secondlevel indirect representative democracy citizens elect representatives who control and supervise experts who formulate and administer policies in an autonomous fashion from their regulatory bastions. (Levi-Faur, 2005, p. 13)

billion, a figure that was wildly inaccurate, given that the likely cost of the Games will be in excess of 10 billion. Despite this, PWC, as will be discussed below, has continued to benefit from past and future Olympic-related work. It acts, for example, as an accountant for numerous European Olympic committees (see Financial Times, 2010), has carried out key audits for the Vancouver Games (PWC, 2010) and will be the Official Professional Services Advisor for the Sochi Winter Games in Russia in 2014. Following the Singapore meeting of the IOC in July 2005, at which the Games was awarded to London, the DCMS and the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) commissioned further assessments by global experts such as EDAW, Ernst & Young and KPMG, to assess the real costs of holding the Games. Other expert firms such as global project consultancy PCU3ED were also recruited and played a key role in drawing up Master Plans for the Olympic site, basing their estimates on their experiences of previous Olympic Games, World Cups and other major sporting events. Such firms were ideally placed to co-produce the development process and were richly rewarded for it. An investigation by the Sunday Express (2009) found that anticipated spending on consultants for the Games would amount to 680 million with companies such as Ernst & Young earning over 12 million between 2005 and 2009 in direct payments. Such payments highlight the ways in which regulatory capitalism operates and how governance has become a more technical process, managed by contract-writers, lawyers and accountants. Public agencies are reduced to the role of intelligent clients who draw on expensive or seconded technical advisers and advice to ensure that they are being compliant with contractual and regulatory procedures. It is a process through which the quiet accretion of shifting power is taking place so that,
we could now be experiencing a transformation from representative

This is perhaps best reflected in the formation of the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG) as a private company limited by guarantee. A core part of LOCOGs activities relate to corporate sponsorship and it has a target of raising $376 million of which approximately twothirds is in the form of goods and services values in kind (LOCOG, 2011, p. 34). It has been very successful in attracting sponsors and a Tier system now exists with seven Tier One Partners,1 seven Tier Two Supporters2 and 27 domestic Tier Three Suppliers and Providers.3 LOCOGs accounts show that it has also been hedging its funds, thus enabling international investors, to make further gains from Olympic spending. Its sponsorship arrangements warrant more scrutiny and tell us much about regulatory capitalism in action. Deloitte were appointed by LOCOG, to act as the Official Professional Services Provider to the London 2012 Games in 2007, a role that includes tax, human capital and management consulting, and the projects delivered so far range from security profiling to customer experience consulting and employer tax solutions. In taking on this role, Deloitte began to act as a delivery agent and a key part of the regulatory architecture surrounding the Games, thus further blurring the boundaries between public and private responsibilities and accountability. As its Head of London 2012 Sponsorship Annabel Pritchard (2009, p. 1) proudly declares, We want to stand shoulder to shoulder with our colleagues at LOCOG in delivering a successful 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Gamesfor athletes, for London, for the UK and for the young

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RACO: THE people of the world. The company sees its sponsorship role as its most ambitious and largest ever development in the area of community engagement (Deloitte, 2010, p. 5). And yet one of its key objectives is to use the Games to boost its market share of business. In 2011, it published a strategy for Olympic procurement entitled State of Play in which it sought to highlight areas that businesses need to consider in readiness for the Games. Innovative thinking to maximise opportunities and robust planning to minimise potential impacts (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, 2011, p. 1). The document is very clear in setting out the importance of a professional way of working for companies interested in tendering for Olympic contracts. After establishing the core areas of security, crisis management, flexible working arrangements and the importance of company preparedness, the document then highlights what services it is able to provide, at a cost, for client companies. It has been creating lucrative market opportunities for itself on the back its Olympic sponsorship. However, the relationship goes much further. The companys webpage highlights its secondee programme across the breadth of LOCOGs organisation, to ensure fulltime access to people with the skills they need. It is curious that the role of private secondees in public projects remains underresearched by academics, despite the obvious implications of exchanges of key personnel (for an exception, see Larner and Laurie, 2010). There has been a gradual accretion of private sector workers on the Olympic project with according to the International Accounting Bulletin (2012) the global business services firm Deloitte has seconded over 130 staff to LOCOG since 2005. Secondments have been made at all levels, including key senior positions such as the appointment of Neil Wood as Chief Financial Officer in 2005 and Laurie Neville as Procurement Programme Manager. According to LOCOGs accounts, the former has been paid 260,000 per annum

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and is one of two listed Executive Directors (the other is Paul Deighton, who was taken on in 2005 from Goldman Sachs, and who in 2010/11 was paid 479,8734). The Accounts, produced by Ernst & Young, also note that Deloitte waves its secondment fees as part of its sponsorship deal with LOCOG. The same logics are used to incorporate other elites. For instance, the AngloGerman legal firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer became the official legal services provider to the Olympics in 2009. It played a key role in creating LOCOG and the ODA and in separating out their specific power, resources, rights and obligations. As the company declares on its webpage, we took the mass of legal rights and entities around the Games and turned them into a simple, two-body structure: one government, the Olympic Delivery Authority; one private, the London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (Freshfields, 2012, p. 1). This initial work then generated lucrative commissions with the company playing a leading role in organising the contractual arrangements for the Games procurement arrangements covering a broad range of activities from catering to seating and sponsorship. It is worth noting that, according to the Lawyer Magazine (2012), at one point, over half of LOCOGs legal team was made up of Freshfields secondees and it also had former employees in key positions within the organisation. Such firms have been ideally placed to co-produce urban development projects and welfare programmes. This section has examined some of the mechanics of regulatory capitalism in action and has charted some of the high-powered private governance networks that have shaped the Olympic project. It indicates the directions in which some of the spending in the Olympic area has gone and some of the wider relationships between the corporate co-production of events and subsequent policy directions. In the next section, the paper explores some of the implications of these changes for academic research, citizen empowerment and the democratic process.

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CITY VOL. 16, NO. 4 however, is a private company, and is not subject to disclosures despite the fact that it receives government payments and is responsible for large parts of the Olympic programme. Other major contractors have also been exempt. For example, in 2006 the ODA contracted-out its project management functions to a conglomerate named CLM Ltd. This consisted of three multinational corporations, CH2MHill, Laing ORourke and Mace (see Raco, 2012). This author was able to obtain the Delivery Management Contract signed by the ODA and CLM under an FOI request.5 It is a fascinating 125-page document and its release has provided some key insights into how the Games has been delivered. However, any sections containing commercially confidential information were redacted. Drawing on the language of Section 43, the ODAs explanation for these redactions was that the appearance of commercial information in the public domain would not only prejudice CLMs commercial interests but also indirectly the
ODAs commercial interests, because part of CLMs role as the delivery partner under the contracts is to negotiate agreements at arms length with supply side contractors in the open market for the delivery of various aspects of the Games. (ODA Information Office, 2011, p. 2)

Regulatory capitalism and the transparency of governance processes As noted earlier, regulatory capitalism and privatisation comes with significant liberty costs for democratic societies (cf. Levi-Faur, 2005). A key requirement of any liberal society is that citizens have access to information and that, in Robert Dahls terms, all affected interests have some influence over the policymaking processes that affect them (see Goodin, 2007). In this respect, the UKs Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI Act) represents one of the most significant pieces of legislation in recent decades. Under the Act, every citizen has a general right of access to information held by public authorities. The Act has allowed for new insights to be shed on how the Games has been delivered but only up to a point. With the expansion of regulatory capitalism and new publicprivate hybrids, understandings of what constitutes a public body have become more complex and difficult to untangle. Section 43, for example, states that commercially confidential information is exempt from public view, if,
the information requested is a trade secret, or release of the information is likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any person. (A person may be an individual, a company, the public authority itself or any other legal entity.)

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There is a so-called Public Interest Test that can be applied to release information but increasingly private companies are negotiating contractual terms with other private companies on behalf of the state. The disclosure of financial information may undermine such negotiations. This, in effect, means that citizens can only access information on contracts after decisions have been taken and even then, financial details will be kept to an absolute minimum to protect the interests of the companies that bid for public sector money. As noted above, the ODA was officially a public body and was therefore required to comply with the FOI Act. LOCOG,

Whilst the ODA accepted that there is a general public interest in the accountability and transparency of public authorities and that there is also a general public interest in allowing an understanding of important and high-value commercial decisions made by public authorities (p. 2), the net result of disclosure would be a significant commercial advantage to CLMs existing and potential contractual counterparties (p. 2). Greater public awareness and democratic openness within such processes is therefore substituted by a concern with commercialism and contract-writing, so that a lack of knowledge becomes a form of indirect and delegated empowerment in which it is in the

RACO: THE public interest to ensure that the commercial interests of the ODA and CLM as delivery partner are not damaged . . . and value for money is not put at risk (ODA Information Office, 2011). As the response goes on to state,
prejudice to CLMs commercial interests is also likely to result in prejudice to the ODAs commercial interests, because part of CLMs role as delivery partner under the contracts is to negotiate agreements at arms length with supply side contracts for delivery of various aspects of the Games . . . and public disclosure of this information is likely to provide a significant commercial advantage to CLMs existing and potential contractual counterparties. (ODA Information Office, 2011, p. 2)

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There is nothing new in the redaction of commercially sensitive information from the public realm. But the justification for reduced transparency highlighted above, despite its apparent banality, is qualitatively different to past understandings. It would be difficult to find an example that better illustrates the new hybrid nature of regulatory capitalism and the elision between public policy objectives and commercial needs and practices. The traditional distinction between a public and private interests has been dissolved and replaced by new institutional entanglements, objectives and priorities in which the commercial interests of private companies become aligned with the public interest in the name of regulatory and contractual governance. It is argued by the ODA that it is in the public interest not to know how public money is being spent because this might influence contractual discussions. If these ambitions are compromised by disclosure, it is argued, then this is likely to undermine the ability of the ODA to effectively perform its statutory functions, and in particular, to ensure best value (ODA Information Office, 2011, p. 3). The interests of the private and public sector are thus intertwined. The latter has been tasked with governing on behalf of the state and the

public. The more insulation from democratic processes that can be provided, the better the system will function. Take the politics out of the process and it will be more effective. This treatment of information is very different to the inter-firm contractual obligations enshrined in the Olympic delivery contracts, such as those between the ODA and CLM. Under its contract, CLM is required to monitor and report back on a range of regulatory requirements including the meeting of Key Performance Indicator targets, Health and Safety legislation, staff salaries, personnel files on staff members (ODA, 2005, p. 7). All subcontractors are also required to provide detailed accounts of their costs and actions. However, the details of such information are then redacted, meaning that they are only deemed necessary to the managerial process of delivering the infrastructure for the Games, with accountability converted into delivery milestones and targets. There is no requirement for other publics or audiences to possess such information. Instead, the demands of others are to be filtered by negotiators, who are themselves members of a non-elected quango, and their teams of private sector advisers and experts. The democratic process becomes best served by a subservience to private sector demands and rationalities. It is with this rationality in mind that the Delivery Contract states that the only information CLM is allowed to disclose to subcontractors is that which is necessary for them to undertake their duties to provide the services (p. 40). It must also be treated in confidence by them and not disclosed without ODAs a priori acceptance or used by them otherwise. CLM is to act as a gatekeeper that takes responsibility for ensuring that information is controlled and managed so that only those at the centre of the network possess the full range of information. It is then distributed strategically to facilitate contract-writing and project implementation. It forms a pyramid of accountability in which a small number of gatekeeper actors at the top possess the

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CITY VOL. 16, NO. 4 The paper has also shown that the rise of this system generates new tensions over the relationships between political projects and democratic accountability. On the one hand if what matters is what works, then the delivery of the Olympic infrastructure constitutes a successful governance model. The complex requirement to host the Games, founded on the loosely articulated priorities set out in the Bidding document, has been converted into a disciplined, managed and costed project. In its own terms, it represents a significant achievement and if governance is to be defined through its (in)effectiveness then this represents a prime example. On the other hand, this has come at a price, in terms of democratic accountability and significant financial costs. The more complex the legal and technical arrangements surrounding a development, the more difficult it becomes to identify the location of power and decision-making. If the focus is to be on regulated forms of delivery, then urban politics becomes peripheral and relegated to what the ODA CLM delivery contract terms a risk factor that could interfere with the free-flow of project implementation. The use of private companies in urban projects has always created tensions between commercial confidentiality and a wider public interest. However, as shown in the paper there is now a qualitative difference in these relationships, with an elision of public and private interests. Private companies are now acting on behalf of the state, under contracts. Politicians have effectively handed over responsibility and for citizens and researchers intent on uncovering organisational practices, this presents a new set of challenges as decision-making is drafted at a distance from the formal political process. In Rancie ` res terms what emerges is a government of shepherds focused on resolving the problem but at the cost of eliminating politics (2006, p. 49). The sheer scale of corporatisation that has been associated with the Games is remarkable but not unique. It draws attention to wider questions over how public benefit should

majority of information, whereas the majority of small-scale contractors have only that which they are deemed to require in order to deliver on their contractual commitments. The regulatory networks surrounding the Games are thus creating new informational hierarchies and a further atomisation of project management and control.
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Conclusions The London Olympics has provided enormous opportunities for major private sector companies to both obtain business and to gain reputational capital. As soon as the intention to bid was announced in the early 2000s, networks of international advisers, consultants, lawyers and experts were mobilised, with the aim of maximising and capturing relatively risk-free and guaranteed statebacked returns. For Richard Murphy (2011) this exemplifies a wider trend in which new private elites are emerging who have become entrepreneurial in obtaining contractual rights to public projects, welfare assets and services. Such elites show a growing reluctance to invest in traditional forms of private sector activity as the risks of failure are deemed to be too high. They, in turn, operate in a wider system of regulatory capitalism in which states and major corporations act in each others interests. In many instances, new regulations are drafted by networks of private beneficiaries and regulators. State powers and resources are then used to institutionalise and fund these new arrangements (see Cutler, 2010). The payback for governments is that these corporations are able to work through the complex regulatory systems that they have helped to establish and deliver projects on the ground. They can provide solutions to the problems that they themselves have defined. In the case of LOCOG, they can even deliver policy programmes through public and private hybrid organisations that are filled with their seconded employees.

RACO: THE be defined and who it is that should be responsible for its delivery. In any discussion of policy effectiveness there needs to be a more rounded understanding of exactly where resources have gone. In crude terms, researchers need to follow the money. For instance, the amount of Games expenditure that has ended up in the tax-efficient accounts of multinationals, based in havens around the world, is hard to assess, as it is increasingly difficult to trace these account-trails through the UK system. As Shaxsons recent study of global taxation demonstrates, more than half of world trade passes, at least on paper, through tax havens (2011, p. 8), most of it through the activities of multinational investors some of whom have been involved in the planning and delivery of the Olympics. It is perhaps surprising that there is not more research on such practices and their affects on urban politics and development.

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Notes
1 Adidas, BMW, BP, British Airways, BT, EDF and Lloyds TSB. 2 Adecco, ArcelorMittal, Cadbury, Cisco, Deloitte, Thomas Cook and UPS. 3 Aggreko, Airwave, Atkins, Boston Consulting Group, CBS Outdoor, Crystal CG, Eurostar, Freshelds Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, G4S, GSK, Gymnova, Heathrow Airport, Heineken UK, Holiday Inn, John Lewis, McCann Worldgroup, Mondo, NATURE VALLEY, Next, The Nielsen Company, Populous, Rapiscan Systems, Rio Tinto, Technogym, Thames Water, Ticketmaster, Trebor and Westeld. 4 His former colleague from Goldman Sachs, Terry Miller, took over as head of LOCOGs legal team in 2006. 5 E-copies of this can be made available by the author on request.

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Mike Raco is Professor at the Bartlett School of Planning, University College London. Email: m.raco@ucl.ac.uk

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