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Law 8nforcement Privacy

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T~, of Event: Interview otl..__ ......I(LAPD Detective assigned to JTTF)

\, Date: November 20,2003

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Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: M,~chael Jacobson

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\, Tearrt,..,number: 6 \"
:, '.

Location: FBI, Los Angeles Field Office

Participants Non-Commission: Assistant General Counsel Randy Blair

pa~cIPants\commission: p~ter.Run~~:;::i:hael Jacobson

• "Dha~\~een

with the LAPb'{or 27 years. He has a two year college degree. He
\ is currently a supervisory detective assigned to the LAPD's Anti-Terrorism Division.
c:Jcame to the J~TF in January 2002. \~fter 9/11, the LAPD was working a CT case
~hat w~s e,ventually 't,~med over to the FBL'Dwas
brought over to supervise the

Role and Responsibilities

His responsibilities in that job are twofold: 1) to provide management over LAPD
personnel assigned to the JrTF and 2) to protect the interests of the department by
keeping them abreast of developments, His chain of command is not interest in learning
about the day to day aspects '~f the investigations. The Chief wants to know, rather, what
the threat is. So, for example>,:when the threat level rises, the captain will call him and
want to know what's going on.'DaIso assists the FBI and others with their
investigations, participating in surveillances, interviews, etc. He does not carry a case

LAPD presence on' the JTTF

At the FBI's LA Field office, they have 5 LAPD officers, including him, and at

the FBI's Long Beach RA they have 3. One of those three is also a supervisory detective .
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• In the LA FieJd o~ce, there is one detective assigned to the DT squad, one to
Iran/Hizbollah, and 1, to AI-Q'.i,'ida. The 5th LAPD officer is a sergeant, who is serving as
an intelligence analyst. '~,e revi'e~~ overseas cables and disseminates them to the squad.

Doted that iQe\:~APD h~~"Q~ena part of the JTTF since its inception in the
late 1980s. As 0[9/11, they had 5 officers assigned (as opposed to 8 overall now). The
LAPD, the FBI and the LA"ShetjfT's Department were the founding members of the
JTTF in LA. The LAPD and FBl.have an MOU: regarding the LAPD's participation. It
governs personnel, vehicles, and the sharing of information, and also designates the FBI
as the lead agency in CT. .", "

All of the detectives wo;k~ng f~'c:::}and]e ca~~s'.'<!hey will draft NSLs,

coordinate surveillance, etc. They-are the co-case agents on these cases. A]) of them
have full ACS access. \'.....
, "

The LAPD intelligence person-on the JTTF is a big picture g~Y:c::Jcan't

comment on the quality of FBI analysts. The detective who is working as an intelligence
analyst doesn't get TS information, only-secret. He will look for threat information. He
has an ongoing "living" document with key information he comes across in there.
~:~~:.llY, he has his own database, which h.~.S.come in handy, particularly for running

• As a side note, one of his detectives Wa\gOing to go to GTMO .

The ATD will select the LAPD officers to\~"erveon the JTTF. They look at the
officer's experience and at how they will fit in.

How LAPD develops CT inv~stigations

As far as how the LAPD develops investigations'Oaid that they receive tips
from the public and have their own sources as well. They also have contacts in private
industry. The LAPD comes across a lot of information. When the ATD receives a tip or
information, they will "work it up" but only to a certain point. If it appears that there is
some terrorism nexus they will discuss it with the FBI. There are only certain things that
the LAPD can do. They are a local agency and don't have FISA, NSL or subpoena
power. There are cases that the JTTF doesn't have enough time to pursue. In some of
these cases, the LAPD can do it work up and see if something is there .

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The call ins are cyclical in nature. When DRS raises the threat level, they tend to
get more calls. Most of the leads are non-productive, and don't amount to anything. He
doesn't know how many IT FFls there are, but everyone is busy. He's asked his captain
-....~osend a few more detectives to the JTTF.

Overal1, it's hard to say how good a handle they have on the IT issue in LA. He
thinks ..that they have a pretty good handle.

The LAPD's relationship with the FBI

Overall~'Dsays that relations between the LAPD and the FB] are very good.
There is a good exchange of information, One reason for the good relationship, in his
opinion, is that they have been working together for so long. The LAPD has been doing
intelligence work for a long time, and they understand the sensitivity of information.

The Tunisian investigation is the most significantIT investigation they've worked

" on. They turned it over to the FBI. There have also been cases which they've discussed
\ with the JTTF but which haven't been turned over. They did tum over an IRS bombing
\ case to the JTTF as well. It started as an LAPD investigation. When they've turned

:investigations over, they have worked them jointly with the FBI .

\ They could also tum over cases to Customs, INS, etc. There could be cases with
C:T links, but maybe cases that they are having a hard time developing in that regard.
The LAPD would first offer the case to the JTTF before offering it to another agency.

\ The LAPD does not have contacts with foreign governments. These are all done
through the FBI and their Legats.

Clearances of LAPD personnel

'C}as TS/SCI clearance, as do the other detectives on the JTTF. In the ATD,
there are some people who have TS while others have secret. There are only about 12
people within the ATD who do not have clearances now. ATD tripled in size after 9/11.
The Captain has a Top Secret clearance, while the Commander has a secret clearance.
The Chief has a Secret clearance, and the head of the CT Bureau has a secret clearance.
Pre 9/11, the Chief did not have a clearance. The person overseeing the CT Bureau did.
Even pre 9111, almost all of the officers in ATD had clearances. He thinks that the
Deputy Chief (Wil1ie Panil) had a TS clearance.

Guidelines for LAPD CT investigations
• The ATD has guidelines defined by the Police Commissioner. ATD is authorized
to look at individuals threatening to do bodily injury, harm, etc. and this applies to both
IT and DT. This enables them to look at issues which might be considered "First
Amendment" issues.

ATO has an "initial lead" stage. This doesn't rise to the reasonable suspicion
level.' This allows them to just take a look. They are given 90 days in which to do so. If
they develop something at the reasonable suspicion level, but there is still no
corroboration, they can open a preliminary investigation. The PI stage can last for 6
months. Once the information is corroborated, they can open a full investigation. These
were all developed post 9/11. The standards are more relaxed than they were pre 9/11.
Pre 9111, there was no vehicle through which they could run the initial lead and take a
look. If there was no reasonable suspicion, they couldn't look at it. They had to have
something right away to even look at it.

The history is that there used to be a public disorder and intelligence unit at
LAPD. After a lawsuit, they were disbanded in 1983. The LAPO was sued because of
perceived infringement of First Amendment issues. The LAPO was subsequently put on
probation by the Court. The Guidelines have evolved to what they are now.

The guidelines say that they can go to other jurisdictions to conduct

investigations. The LAPD has peace officer power throughout the state .

The LAPD can install tracking devices on cars, but they can't bug a place. They
are allowed to do consensual monitoring. These all require approval up the chain of

Structure of LAPD's CT program

When Chief Bratton came in he performed a reorganization (Captain Williams is

the one who came up with the current structure), Bratton formed a CT Bureau, which
encompasses ATD and critical response (Hazmat, bombs, etc). Pre 9111, ATD had about
40 detectives and now there are over 100. ATD has an intelligence section, a criminal
conspiracy section (which handles all bombing investigations), a liaison section (with
other law enforcement agencies outside the JTTF).

They were unique in what they were doing. After 9/1 l , a number of other
state/local agencies called them to ask about what they were doing and how they were set

The ATD also has a survei11ance section. There are 3 surveillance teams, with 10

people on each team. They help the JTTFs, the. ATO, as well as the rest of the
department (on non-CT related investigations). The criminal investigations section is the
enforcement ann for the intelligence side of the house.
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ATD als~'ha&,an analytic section (withi'ri>~heintelligence section). There are

maybe 10 people in there. The analysts are all detectives and police officers. They
provide daily briefings to the,~~?tain on significarh::ST leads.

They just renamed the CT Bureau. It's 'now, the Critical '.lncident Management Bureau,
and it will handle not just CT matters.' ". '... \,

The LAPD still has a wall between the criminal a~'d"h,1tel~e sections to
protect sources and methods and to protect the intelligence sid~':L--Jhas worked in the
A TD intelligence section. He has worked there both as an inve's,bgator and as a
supervisor. He has experience gathering intel1igence. The A TD'\nteU,igence section
probably works 50-50 on IT VS. DT matters. \\" \\'.

The IT work has evolved. Most of the information they received was DT related.
As the US and LA became bigger melting pots) they started getting additional
information. For example, the Turkish Consul General was assassinated' .., They started
getting information from al1 over. Over time, they've gotten more calls like, "my
neighbor is involved with Hamas." '...\. \,

• will have access to.

Composition and location of JTTFs

~ At the offsi e t e are 4 JTTF s uads. There are 3 JTTF s uads in Westwo04,
\one DT and 2 IT.
\ On the JTTF, they also have Customs.A'IF, INS, CHP, CATle, and the
Sheriffs Department. CA TIC is a state agency, and he's not really sure what they do.
'the Sheriffs Department has an early warning group. It was set up an as information
clearinghouse, and has been around for a while. CATIC is a part of the JTTF, but is only
part time. They are more liaison in nature and don't carry their own cases. They are
i~vestigative in nature though. The Sheriffs Department has a supervisor on the JTTF,
bU\,he's not sure what his role is.

LAPD's access to databases and intelligence information

The ATD has access to Lexis/Nexis, Autotrak, and has many other official
dataraseslsuCh as DMV, criminal history databases, etc. Everyone on the ATD knows

who s. If they need another type of check done, like an INS check, they would call
him as well, because they know there is an INS representative on the JTTF. The LAPD
would also run the names through 'LA Clear.
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Dha~'~;'~all back to"~~~·,g~t ~i~e~~

to state and local databases. They
are supposed to be getting it at the FBI office tfi?hgh/..T~ey will get it at both Westwood
and at the offsite. He doesn't know about ac ess t<>;iIntelirtkl
7 I
His recommendation would be that there needs to be a way to integrate all of the
different agencies' information (LAPD, Sheriff, and FBI). They need searchable
databases. There has been talk between the LAPP and the LA Sheriffs office about
creating one. Right now, if they want to.know what's happening in the Sheriff's area,
they have to call down. He's talking more about sharing information from the initia1
leads. :/'

:' ...

As far as sharing inforrri~tion with otber FBI field offices, this does come up from
time to time. It's hard because the FBI is so/big.

Int~rest of LAPD readership in CT issues

• The LAPD management is interested in what is the threat. His chain of command
is interested in the specific threats (such ~s a threat to LAX). Everyone knows what the
broader threat is, and-they are less interested in that. His bosses are interested in specific
threats, which havepublic safety concerns. The ATD has a detective assigned as a
liaison to LAX, and one as a liaison to the Ports. The FBI has liaison there as wel1. As
far as passing information up the chain, it depends on how sensitive it is, and what could
be compromised; etc. Sometimes he might say that there is a threat but he can't giVe the
exact specifics.' It's handled on a case by case basis.

~oes down to the LAPP at least once a week. He passes information at that
time. He reports to Lt. Vega.Dwill brief them on the progress of cases his people are
working on, and on the threat. They also have a STU at the LAPD and at the FBI for
more immediate matters. With a cable, he could bring a copy for the captain to read.
The LAPD does not have facilities, however, to store classified information.

He will pass up any threat assessments done by the detective.

A wareness of Patrol officers

Patrol officers know what they need to know. When there is an issue related to

officer safety, they need to know. They don't need to know about the day to day
intelligence. They do get calls from Patrol officers. For example, they pull over a person
• on a Dl.ll and will discover they have a Koran, or they will stop someone with Nazi
paraphernalia, they will get a call.


His department has a terrorism module of training. They handled the training
internally. They had a course on bio terrorism. The patrol officers are given general
training on CT a~ss. Most of the LAPD officers on the JTTF receive their training
from the LAPD. L...J1as done some virtual academy training, in addition to training on
FISA and the virtual case file. He has been to the NJTTF training and to a suicide
bomber course. He alSd'h~.:..:ad one of the detectives attend the basic CT course at Quantico.

Source development

There is a pretty big push for source development. It's harder to say whether
developing sources is easier or more difficult post 9111. There are some people who are
willing to talk.

\\Regional Intelligence Center

As far as legal/policy obstacles, we should ask Captain Williams. He's putting

together the Regional Intelligence Center. He's finding the players and the site. This
would not be an investigative body. It would be just a funnel for information, It would
be the one point where information comes in and someone can call. It would not include
classified information. He noted that a lot of people provide information through the
A TD Threat Line. \.

The FBI has also been talking about turning the lOIG into a CT entity.


D~esn't knowaboutHUES,

\ Data mining
, .
He has no exp~ri~~ce with data mining. He doesn't know whether they do it or

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