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STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW NYU Fall 2001 – Briffault Not !

" OUTL#NE
#$ #NTRO%UCT#ON A$ Stat ! & Lo&al Go' r() (t! 1. What is local government? a) Most policies, services, political participation happens at state or local level. b) LGs: Uncertain status, wrt rights entailed. rea ! population di""erences, and di""erences in power, status, organi#ation, "unction, authorit$, and mode o" creation. LG%s usuall$ provide basic services &edu, policing, "ire prevention, road maintenance, transit, waste)&*+). '$pes o" local gov%ts: &1) (chool districts &)) 'owns, cities, villages &*) +ounties, parishes, boroughs, wards &,) Water-par.-"ire-ambulance districts &special svcs) &/) 'ransit-0ort uthorities &1) 23 local gov%ts: 23 +it$-23 +ount$, 4orough o" Manhattan, 0ort 5istrict o" 23-26. 7ther svc districts, business improvement districts 8 all overlapping, with di""erent overlapping duties. c) (tates: limited 9: stable. 7ther characteristics: &1) +onstitutionall$ protected &boundaries, representation) 8 ; indestructible… residual power over all aspects of gov’t…< &*,) &)) =>ual status in Union &*) 4asic structure prett$ similar &bicameral, gov, independent ?udiciar$, etc) d) (ome di""erences between state-local: some non@elected ?udiciaries, some pluralist elections, most have direct democrac$ 8 voter initiative B$ Lo&al Go' r() (t Sour& ! of Aut-orit. & Ra(/ of 0o1 r! 1. 'op@down vs. 4ottom@up &!our& of aut-orit.) a) +lassic top@down: count$ 8 provide basic state services at count$ level &1) Law en"orcement, record.eeping, minimal svcs: courts &5 -prosecutors), coroners, registr$ o" deeds, elections, wel"are, road maintenance 8 state "unctions delegated to counties &)) Aistoricall$, not "unctionall$ speciali#ed, but territoriall$ created &thus relativel$ stable). &*) +ounties traditionall$ regulator$ ! service@providing entit$: not law@ or polic$@ma.ing one. &,) (mall bottom@up element: the$ are usuall$ locall$ elected. (imultaneousl$ an arm o" the state $et an agent o" the peopleBdilemmaB b) +lassic bottom@up: cit$-municipalit$ &1) +reated locall$ 8 in response to local interests-petition, due to svcs needed, regulations needed. Cnspired b$ denser populations. &)) .in to private corporations 8 similar interests getting together to achieve some purpose. Get chartered b$ the state &*) 1/D or so o" U( lives in incorporated areas 8 but on onl$ )D o" the land c) Modern developments: &1) +ombination o" top-bottom: townships &2ew =ngland)&*10) &)) )Eth centur$ 8 as urban sprawl intensi"ied, local gov%ts are too small "or area@wide problems. +ount$ gov%ts started ta.ing on svc provision ! legal regulation &moreso than classic minimalist count$ "unctionBthe Furban count$%) &*) 2ow cit$-count$ distinction is more blurred. 'op@down-bottom@up distinction derived mainl$ "rom ) t-o2 of i(& *tio(

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General vs. (pecial &ra(/ of *o1 r!) a) +lassic general: cities, counties &1) Gelativel$ broad responsibilities over a signi"icant number o" areas &public health-sa"et$, land use, streets, transport: general police power)& *11) b) +lassic special: ports, transit &top@down): schools, "ire-water &bottom@up) &1) (ome "unctions combined 8 but u!uall. li)it 2 to o( "a f 1 *ur*o! ! &)) Geasons "or creation: &a) Cndependence "rom general purpose gov%t: ta3 it out of *oliti&! concept &important "or schools) &b) 'ailor HterritorialI scope: 3 . !&al to !i4 of *ro5l ). 5i""erent services best provided over di""erent areas. More e""icient to have one large commuter rail s$stem, or smaller ambulance districts. Large water districts in the West &watersheds, "lood control). &c) void state restrictions on cities-counties and obtain bene"its o" LG without costs &i.e. rules and procedures "or "ormation, voting, taJing powers). S* &ial r ' (u !our& : taJing ! borrowing restrictions can get out "rom under 8 change "ees 8 assured own revenue source that sta$s within that source. 4ridge tolls 8 go toward pa$ing bonds to build it. c) Within special-general districts: authorities o"ten appointed: others elected.

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T6EOR#ES *. 7a) ! Ma2i!o( 8 Kederalist 1E 8 "actions. &(ee *1,.) Wa$s to control "action: remove cause o" "action &destro$ libert$ or "orce sameness) or control e""ects o" "action &use republic s$stem 8 small 9 o" elected o""icials L better leadership and more di""icult "or t$rann$ o" ma?orit$ to "orm). a) +ase against local gov%t. =Jclusionar$ aspects: small groups act to preserve homogeneit$, eJclude Fothers%, in process the$ impose eJternalities on others 8 this is a more modern issue 8 breeds parochialism. =ven i" minorities in town, the$ can be t$ranni#ed b$ fa&tio(!. 5emocrac$ creates problem o" "actions in ma?orit$ rule% it%s a sel"@interested group &ma?oritarian interest, rather than public interest). Madison suggests that e""ects o" "actions can be controlled b$ eJtended r *u5li& rather than pure democrac$. 'his results in better people being elected, and harder "or "actions to "orm &lo&al t.ra((. of t- )a8orit.). Less li.el$ to have one dominant group over a larger area. ,. Al 9i! 2 To&:u 'ill 8 5emocrac$ in merica 8 wh$ townships roc.. &(ee *22.) Local government ma.es people ;citi#ens.< VO#CE. a) +ase for local gov%t. (aw 2ew =ngland as the eJample "or democrac$, without chaos o" democrac$. Local gov%t as school "or democrac$ 8 people get taste o" decision ma.ing, negotiation, etc. 6e""erson also has this idea 8 people learn to be F/oo2 &iti4 (!.% Cmportant &! better than centrali#ed gov%t) b-c people have a sta.e in s$stem, ! people have e>ualit$. 'his supports individualism 8 pursuit o" sel"@interest 8 but not aristocrac$-despotism. (olution to old "ear o" democrac$ leading to chaos-despotism. Local gov%t is solution 8 mechanism "or avoiding chaos 8 b-c people must wor. together. 0ro;li5 rt. 'ia *arti&i*atio( & 2 )o&ra&. 5uil2i(/. 0eople get taste, habit, eJperience: power is decentrali#ed. /. C-arl ! Ti 5out<! theor$ 8 consumer@voters who pic. communit$ which best satis"ies pre"erence "or a particular pattern o" goods. Mariance among communities allows greater reali#ation o" pre"erences. Movement between governments leads to good ones. E=#T. a) Movement between local gov%ts. Ne$ idea L allo&ati' ffi&i (&.. C" local gov%ts have autonom$ re. provision o" services, taJing, regulation 8 distinctive pac.ages are created ! people can choose. Greater chance to satis"$ people%s needs &assuming mobility, variety of choices, information…in reality, often constrained

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by what you can afford, ltd choice, etc…yet ltd choice is better than one centrally dictated option?) 0ro;lo&al /o'<t 2u to ffi&i (&. 8 this leads to competition ! "ewer unhapp$ people. E9it o*tio(! are .e$. +lassic eJample "or consumer activit$: $ou bu$ a di""erent cereal: go to gov%t giving $ou a better pac.age. Most people "ocus on taJes ! schools. &1) What about prohibition? =Jit ma$ be a good theor$ wrt bundles o" svcs, but doesn%t address regulation as well. &)) What about ine>uities? 'iebout%s theor$ supposes "ew eJternalities. Wealth di""erences a""ect abilit$ o" districts to di""erentiate themselves. Ri&-ar2 Briffault 8 eJamines two theories re. scope o" local autonom$, public participation &voice), and e""icient provision o" goods-services &eJit), and problems with them. &*>>;?1)

##$ LOCAL GOVERNMENT #N T6E AMER#CAN CONST#TUT#ON Local gov%s are a combo o" top@down &ar) of !tat ) - bottom@up &*oli!), and characteristic o" >uasi@private organi#ation &&or*oratio() 8 service providers. . Lo&al Go' r() (t a! A/ (t of t- Stat &dominant-o""icial model o" LG) 8 LG%s as state instrumentalities. 2o "ed constitutional rights against state: no "ed constitutional right to sel"@gov%t. (tate is principal. 1. Hunter v Pittsburgh 8 blac. letter principles re. municipalities. gent-arm o" state 8 top@ down 8 authorit$ as derived "rom state &principle is state: ma$ be vicariousl$ liable). a) (tate agent role is articulated &*+?): (tate plenar$ power is set out >uite clearl$. rticulation o" "ederalism 8 state power. b) 0 created enabling legislation, 0ittsburgh initiated vote 8 positive regional ma?orit$ wins &rather than concurrent ma?orit$ 8 o" each cit$). lleghen$ protests since it%s more developed 8 more in"rastructure. Merger would mean more taJes "or lleghen$ to pa$ "or 0ittsburgh%s in"rastructure. c) +laim: constitutionall$ protected right to have own local gov%t 8 made under contracts clause ! due process clause. N between lleghen$ citi#ens ! local gov%t that the$%ll be taJed there onl$ &SC rejects this arg): due process right to hearing-vote be"ore Floss o" propert$% &thru additional taJes) & SC rejects this too). d) =nd o" case: vestige o" old idea o" private municipal corp%s 8 land owned privatel$ b$ municipal corp is not totall$ sub?ect to state decisions. 4ut this was not eJplored in brie"s ! court doesn%t discuss "urther. &1) 'his could pla$ out as such: usuall$ when state condemns local-muni propert$ 8 no compensation owed. 4ut incorporated cit$@owned amusement par. or asphalt plant: i" condemned, it%s >uasi@proprietar$ ! could be a claim "or compensation? e) Cnsubstantial, "u##$ line between proprietar$ - other prop 8 is it related to "undamental public health-sa"et$ vs. super"luous or "or@pro"it sanctions? +it$ onl$ Fowns% in capacit$ as arm o" state. ") Hunter rul : t- !tat i! !u*r ) and ;at its pleasure, ma$ modi"$ or withdraw all such powers, ma$ ta.e without compensation such propert$, hold it itsel", or vest it in other agencies.< &*+,) ). Gomillion v Lightfoot 8 con law case re e""ect vs. intent 8 &see esp *@0) a) Gedistricting eJcluded all blac. voters "rom within cit$ voting boundaries. (tate relies on unter: unrestricted power to establish, destro$ &etc) cities. b) (+ rereads unter: not plenar$ power to establish, destro$ &etc) cities: ?ust a resolution o" particular claims. 7ther cases have imposed restrictions & !t "leasant) &i.e. creditors do have N claim with cities although residents don%t 8 state can%t destro$ liabilit$ on cit$ bonds) &1) (tate cannot create-destro$ "or for5i22 ( *ur*o! ! 8 to prevent voting, "or racial-religious discrimination. Kran."urter%s decision 8 can%t eliminate right to vote &1/th ). &4ut this strangel$ b$passes unter 8 right to vote

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/. a) Cssue was +ongress% intentPdid +ongress intend "ull discretion o" LG or state@ imposed allocation? b) +t held that +ongress intended "ull discretion. LG%s have de "acto autonom$.A) ri&a( 0oli!E Lo&al Go' r() (t a! Auto(o)ou!F % )o&rati& 0olit. not damages. T. 5istricts di""ered enormousl$ in population b-c one was urban with Q/D o" the count$%s population. Under state law. c) 7n sovereign immunit$ issue. "or declarator$ relie". . . though not right '7 that cit$?? (+ somehow preserves unter $et ma. LGs eJercise state power R . sub?ect to correction thru elections.*.s at what was happening be"ore state action 8 to see i" new action was i('i2iou!. d) Gomillion is now treated as a 1. th issue 8 racial discrimination 8 legislation based on race is unconstitutional. in a certain cit$. a) Aolding: ac."ast program: 'O had statute re>uiring certain school districts to participate: GC(5 sued state o""icial "or declarator$ ?udgment that it didn%t have to participate. a) (upremac$ clause: can "ederal gov%t grant local authorit$-give "unds over the head o" the state? A1B Tra2itio(al rul C LG! la&3 !ta(2i(/ to rai! f 2 &o(!titutio(al &lai)! a/ai(!t !tat "&r ator A5"& LG! 1 r ! ( o(l. and local sel"@governance has important role in democratic political s$stem.. 1. +t held that GC(5 had standing to sue 'O. (chool district sued count$ "or proportion o" the pa$ment.egee didn%t prevent blac. "rom districts.s "rom voting elsewhere: this is a 1.B Lawrence County v( Lead)*eadwood School *ist( + +ongress established 0CL7' &"ederal 0a$ment in Lieu o" 'aJes) to compensate counties "or loss o" taJes caused b$ "ed prop in the count$: the statute provided that LGs could use the propert$ "or an$ gov%t purpose. (tanding is di""erent than prevalence on merits. Kederalism concerns 8 Aills article &*@D)8 "ederalism values o" decentrali#ation and local participation would allow +ongress to deal directl$ with LGs. LGs should be able to be mal@apportioned in theor$. and "unctional matter o" the value o" decentrali#ation. 4. .es this modest eJceptionB) c) Whitta.er concurrence: right to vote eJists where $ou live. . Avery v. note that 0 sued an o""icial. T-i! i!!u i! !till u(r !ol' 2 & +%s are split on standing: U((+ hasn%t ruled).nowledged that LGs are arms o" the state: as long as state legislature is properl$ apportioned. +' recogni#es local autonom$ "rom state when motives are unconstitutional. not the state. Midland County 8 +ommissioners +ourt was composed o" / members 8 1 elected at large "rom entire count$. #ogers v $roc%ette &/th circuit) 8 does local gov%t itsel" have F!ta(2i(/< to sue state on "ed claim? Ked gov%t subsidi#ed a voluntar$ school brea. 4ut Aills distinguishes state regulator$ limits and state revenue enhancements &con"using). 'ension within "ederalism b-t "ormal matter o" the power o" states. &(ee e& parte 'oung). &1) nother conse>uence o" LGs as arm o" state 8 LGs don%t >uali"$ "or !o' r i/( i))u(it.th caseB e) 7ther cases restricting state power: &1) +an%t prohibit bussing &)) +an%t pass amendment prohibiting ga$ rights laws &*) +' o"ten loo. 'us. LGs were re>uired to distribute the pa$ment in the same wa$ as locall$@ raised taJ revenues. a! a( ar) of t. LG is creature o" state but enables communities to implement local vision o" public interest & esp wrt voting).!tat B &)) More modern notion "ocuses on whether there%s a real con"lict: LGs ma$ have su""icient autonom$ that there%s a legitimate con"lict o" interest b) +' here 8 common sense: there%s an actual con"lict. uthorit$ is derived "rom people 8 the taJpa$ers &principle is people 8 universal su""rage). 4ut in practice.

). olt Civic Club v( City of 0uscaloosa – Aolt lies outside 'uscaloosa. so doesn%t appl$ here. 7nl$ real propert$ taJpa$ers were permitted to vote on the bond issues. not strict scrutin$.(. Unless the "ormal authorit$ o" police ?urisdiction means more than eJtraterritorial e""ects. though tests were still cr$stalli#ing. at the bene"iciaries. 4-c Aoltians are non@ residents. c) 5i""erence b-t ma?orit$ and dissent is over "actual matterPwhere the ++ "alls on continuum "rom general to speciali#ed.es a binding commitment to repa$. 10-1M doesn%t appl$ to special@purpose govts. Under T law.ramer v( . Under rational basis. ct doesn%t determine whether the state has chosen the soundest "orm o" internal govt possible & *D@) Uphold statute. a) 2ote: issue o" eJtraterritorialit$ isn%t seen at state level at all: onl$ relevant at local level. but w-i the police ?urisdiction &dealing with crime.el$ to be a""ected have a constitutional right to vote. . 0olice ?urisdiction boundar$ is more signi"icant than indirect e""ect. etc. voter approval is re>uired. ct%s sense is that prop owners are not a discrete communit$Pbene"its o" public "acilities and services are shared with non@propert$ owners and burden o" taJ ripples through the communit$. which will mostl$ be done through propert$ taJes.). mainl$ "ocusing on rural roads. so U is which boundar$ matters more.* r!o("o( . Aere there were two state@created boundaries. propert$ taJes would be used to service the indebtedness. Aolt voters claimed that +it$%s eJtraterritorial eJercise o" police powers over them w-o eJtension o" the "ranchise e>ual to +it$ residents was violation o" 5ue 0rocess and =>ual 0rotection. +". b) +t in "hoeni& also seemed to appl$ strict scrutin$. &Ma?orit$ "ound that 10-1M may not appl$ to special@purpose govts)&*G>).e a cit$ boundar$ v. City of "hoeni& v( . Must loo. c) 4ri""ault: +t duc. a) 4ond issues involve a two@step process: "irst.ed the cruJ o" the matterPto what eJtent is the police ?urisdiction li. cademic debate over how eas$ it is "or propert$ owners to pass on the taJ: some probabl$ stic.). Aoltians have no argument "or "ranchise. 7verall. autonomous polic$ and decisionma.s with propert$ owners. the rural dominated ++ could use taJes to redistribute SS: such redistribution would be tenable i" done at a state@wide level b-c urban dwellers would be "airl$ represented: but the$ weren%t "airl$ represented here. this case is not about voting rights. &1) +it$%s decisions alwa$s have eJtraterritorial e""ects. b) Kortas dissent: agreed with ma?orit$ that one@person-one@vote applies in mini@state govts. &1) G4 doesn%t "ind dissent persuasive b-c ++ had count$@wide taJing power: thus.'ot applies. / . the +it$ +ouncil votes on the issuance: second.ing over man$ matters &*G2).nion /ree School *istrict &U. indirect e""ects. a) +t applied strict scrutin$ std: "ound that rule was not narrow enough &didn%t reach U o" compelling state interest). *. 'hrough a bond issuance. . b) Aolding: Moting rights cases concern residents &*D. with blurred admin and legis "unctions. sanitation. 4ut "ound that the +ommissioners +ourt was a special@purpose govt. but no one suggests that all nonresidents li. the LG ma. (o the test becomes rational basis. 'hus. 1Q1Q) &*D>) 8 +t invalidated a 23 law that limited the right to vote in school board elections to owners or renters o" taJable propert$ within the school district and to parents o" children enrolled in the schools.. as well as the people who bear the burden &*D0).olod-iejs%i 8 cit$ o" 0hoeniJ held an election to authori#e issuance o" general obligation bonds. including non@propert$ owners. LGs are local autonomous democracies and o( . b) Aolding: 2on@propert$ owners cannot be disen"ranchised. L7%s don%t bear the "ull burden b-c taJ has rami"ications throughout communit$ &*D1).

but lower court can%t impose it.e &he li.e: tra""ic ! congestion are legit concerns but should be addressed di""erentl$. 'he$%re independent o" state ! each other. &1) +. &)) 6. control housing-prices-densit$-tra""ic 8 but done b$ eJamining relationships o" people. Marshall dissent 8 "undamental rights at sta. o" revenues came not "rom L7%s sub?ect to assessment but "rom residents o" 0hoeniJ bu$ing electricit$. &1) (tate could have made metro area remed$. i" 10-1M applies. Lo&al Go' r() (t a! Hua!i. etc.0ro*ri tar. *10D) giving schools responsibilit$. Moting scheme was 1acre-1vote. it%s rational basis. bout right o" people to create environment the$ li. so rational basis? Gational wa$ o" limiting tra""ic. b) (+ 8 practice in Mich. 0ro@"ranchise: Aoltians are sub?ect to more control than other non@ residents. Kamilies have right to ma. Cssues o" limited &though multiple) powers. Man$ laws &see "n )E. a) (+ 8 scope o" remed$ must match scope o" problem &1) 5+ had said 8 state was complicit. =Jample @ special districts &principle is taJpa$ers or special groups 8 constituents. Fir) 8 assumes LG%s act on behal" o" local constituents &investors-consumers) rather than state. 'hen came $all… b) $all v 2ames 8 special purpose district a""ected some people much more than others 8 ver$ "ew people in large area &metro 0hoeniJ): water storage issue. 2o constitutional re>%t "or local autonom$ 8 but it eJists. 1 . had connections to desegregation. 4ul. disproportionate impact. e) +ommunities can%t o""iciall$ Fopt out% o" nationall$ de"ined civil rights-constitutional rights 8 but this case comes close 8 local gov as protecting "amil$-home interests: and values are loaded di""erentl$ in balance o" constitutional rights. is local autonom$. Cn post@1very cases dealing with special districts. d) 6.ed open space ! conservation). not ?ust general public). 5etroit schools are arms o" state 8 so state is vicariousl$ liable 8 and suburbs can also be brought in as arms o" state. Local control leads to participation &'oc>ueville idea): structure programs to "it local needs and use variet$-innovation-competition &'iebout ideas). &*) 'his is vision o" communit$ o" "amilies 8 using local gov%t to protect values. 5i""erent views o" what a school district is. and not necessar$ to be a natural person &corp%s-owners could vote). Kamil$ law also somewhat implicated 8 what is a "amil$? 4ut that%s not a direct >uestion here. Village of Belle Terre v Boraas 8 land use regulation. +osts o" district borne b$ L7%s. no clear basis to decide otherwise.e space "or selves. &)) nti@"ranchise: Aoltians are not sub?ect to the same degree o" control as 'uscaloosians. 1. c) 5+ ! dissent see school district ?ust as arm o" state 8 not locall$ autonomous. 5ouglas summaril$ dismisses idea o" "undamental right 8 so. so strict scrutin$? 'ra""ic ! congestion rules "ail 8 should ?ust limit 9 o" cars or peopleB&or)B?ust rational legislation. c) (+ >uestion: which standard o" review? &1) Kundamental right L "reedom o" association. Hua!i./.*ri'at )o2 l$ 1$ Voti(/ Rul ! a) 1very le"t open possibilit$ o" some special district eJemptions "rom 10-1M rules. !illi%en v $radley 8 school desegregation case &LG imposed cross@district bussing). a) &(+ upheld #oning in =uclid 8 ver$ local regulation 8 upheld local autonom$) b) Aere 8 aggressive use o" #oning to separate not ?ust industrial-residential uses but to separate character o" living arrangement &to eJclude students).

*issent 8 characteri#es as citi#ens. Weiher article *1?D 8 political boundaries as per"orming social "unctions. par. can the$ discriminate. Bu!i( !! i)*ro' ) (t 2i!tri&t! a) 4C5 8 instituted b$ initiative. 7verall debate 8 when cit$ serves non@residents. &)) 'his case.: &1) =Jtra securit$ services &)) =Jtra sanitation services &*) 0h$sical improvements 8 streets. not such limited services.s scope o" duties. i.) Aelp business development. more li. putting them on polis side 8 but water districts are still on "irm side. uthorit$ is limited.e cities 8 not much state oversight 8 1very) &1) ###$ LOCAL GOVERNMENT FORMAT#ON & BOUN%ARY C6ANGE A$ T. but not bottom@up: elected.+. *.s &. /. boundar$ mar. *1. c) +ourt had to decide 8 polis or "irm? 5oes 10-1M appl$? &1) .income taJes) c) (ervices &usuall$ within borders: an$ dut$ outside borders i" eJtended?) d) Gegulation &limited amounts o" eJtraterritorial regulation) ). 'his cr$stalli#es idea o" communit$. +it$ gives S to management bod$ o" 4C5 &district mgmt ass%n 8 5M 8 elected b$ L7%s) 8 which provides services. City of "hoeni& 8 circular? &a) F(pecial limited purpose% is ver$ sub?ectiveB &b) 2ew concept created 8 public.2$ +': Salyer still limits powers &passage on *12@: . might be economicall$ ?usti"ied) &Klip >uestion 8 can cit$ bar outsiders charge more "or services?B$es) V .ing at cit$%s duties. 0e&ar%ana 8 charge more "or eJtraterritorial services? C" more costl$ 8 ?usti"ied. &a) Gesidents want 10-1M representation. c) (chool districts now seen as general purpose 8 so 10-1M "unction necessar$. b) 4C5%s have open@ended eJistence &usuall$ no sunset clause) 8 4C5 has N with cit$: can be cancelled. but mainl$ administrative. 4oundaries determine: a) Who votes b) 'aJation &revenue-S raising) &usuall$ done within boundaries: primaril$ landtransaction. 2o "urther (+ cases.. to "und special services. not consumers. but ma?orit$: utilit$ consumer relationship. condemnation. seems to give cit$ power to raise rates). (ub?ect to cit$ control.> . issue bonds 8 but court sa$s it%s >uasi@gov%t. nd business@"ocused. ! no disproportionate impact &ii) 4C5 ma$ be public but not a gov 8 no power to ma. 10-1M isn%t triggered.e. treat di""erentl$? &C" taJ "unded. (harpl$ di""erent racial-economic distinctions are made even crisper when "ormal boundaries eJist 8 whereas in"ormal neighborhoods blur together. 'a%ima 8 court loo.Si/(ifi&a(& of Lo&al Bou(2ari ! 1.essler v GC*!1 *1>. &iii) (o.KirstBonl$ nominall$ publicB T courts recogni#eBessentiall$ businessB) &a) Ct is gov%t 8 can assess "ee. *1. +ourt%s argument: &i) Kocuses on special districts 8 though here. 'reats public utilit$ as private &even though statute. tourism.e a "irm. 2ot Fgov%t% 8 lots o" oversight &unli. 4ut no voice or eJit options "or them 8 so must be protected. L7%s agree to sub?ect themselves to additional &prop) taJes &cit$ collects them). homeless issues &/) L7%s have dominant voice in running 5M .e law. (ocial distinctiveness "rom geographical boundaries.

resources &. cases? &1) Cnternal 8 services.need< &to grow? to "und svcs?). taJes.s? 4rings up issues o" eJcludabilit$ too 8 can $ou gate it o""? Wwhat about nat%l "orests 8 U(K( pass? 'his implicates "inancing issues-user "eesX B$ Mu(i&i*al #(&or*oratio( W4oundaries "ormed during incorporationBX 1.e? Aow re"lected b$ laws. +ounties usuall$ still have some authorit$. but less.e. ?udicial review. Municipalities have power to decline to anneJ &*1D+).e. public trust doctrine. vote &people usuall$ vote "or smaller gov%s though). ideas o" local autonom$ or ! lf. &1) Cn past. or not? 'iebout variet$ better? Y . lso loss o" regulator$ power. advisor$ committee 8 ad hoc-permanent. transition agreementsB &)) Aow should metro areas be organi#ed? Cs larger area part o" whole. re"erendum: or an$ combo o" these) c) (tandards "or Cncorporation: &o"ten "u##$ terms) &1) Minimum population &)) rea-si#e o" land &*) 2eeds. &o(o)i&!. regulations. review o" petition. &*) (tates with a sales taJ 8 goes either to count$-cit$: but wh$ else would count$ care about losing area?BtaJing ! #oning powerB d) Aow do courts balance: -ar) to eJisting communities. taJ rates var$: cities have more services. Cncorporation 8 creating new cities a) What are interests at sta. segregation: motive: impact C$ A(( 9atio(F S & !!io(F & Bou(2ar. other cities% potential anneJation. C-a(/ 1. or more centrali#ed bigger governments &better service coordination ! diversit$)? b) rguments "or sel"@determination. 2ear universal rule: can%t anneJ an area without its consent. advantage to ?oin: now business ! people "lee cities to escape high taJes. what boundar$ si#e is appropriate. elitist@driven &or developer driven) )oti' !. abilities to provide services. boundar$ negotiation.e.) 3hite v Lorings 8 internal disagreement over what%s needed. capacit$. best interests. voting &)) =Jternal 8 count$-township having land subtracted. etc. *1+? b) 0rocess-Cnitiation: b$ initiative? &1) Geview &b$ count$. ta. cities wealthier. 7verall >uestions: a) (hould we "avor man$ small governments &'iebout variet$ ! 'oc>ueville participation). revenue. or let new areas sel" determine.ing advantage o" center@cit$ services.a) b) c) d) i. limitations &i. have their own governments? c) U!ual *ro& !!: petition. &*) Man$ cities de"ensivel$ incorporate to avoid anneJation. &..) Urbani#ation-communit$ &local pre"erences?) &/) 7ther authorit$%s capacit$ to "ul"ill needs &1) =""ects on. or "or larger area needing consolidation? Kavor central cit$ "ollowing pop growth. etcB Cssues o" consent. beaches 8 or even 1st issues &Laden v Greenwich) (ame theor$ o" par. &)) +ounties 8 usuall$ "ewer services.son)B (tatute elements to center@cit$ .2 t r)i(atio(B e) What standard do courts appl$: I-ar)o(iou! 1-ol J &0 cases) or r a!o(a5l ( !! &6ac.. i. growth #ones) &1) Aow to draw line? 4 +-administrative level does "act "inding.

&b) +t upheld decision to den$ incorporation. disincorporation &see *1DG) Q . unless u(r a!o(a5l. 2i!ru*ti' &ct said disconnection not that disruptive. 23+ must consent to secession. +it$ must consent &ct reviewed cit$ discretion wrt re"usal to consent to deanneJation Hcit$ "ound economic hardshipI. homeowners. detachment.0?) &1) +t: desire to cut taJes is "ine but not enough to overcome overall municipalit$%s ob?ection to deanneJation .s at present loss to other cities o" taJes. also are ver$ top@down. d) *augherty v City of Carlsbad + challenge to anneJation &1) 'echnical >uestionsBwhat is Fcontiguit$%? 2earl$ universal re>uirement o" contiguit$.secession c) What is Fcommunit$%? What model to go with 8 Ti 5out !* &iali4atio( or 2i' r!it. 4orough would be "inanciall$ o. and not a clear )oti' an$wa$. (ecession would change balance o" power in 23+ 8 it%s "airl$ homogenuous. and is not even considering.es services easier: easier to have Fone communit$% imageB &b) (ubstantive contiguit$ &some states have actual re>uirements) *1D?.inds o" boundar$ change: consolidation. with court con"irmation. somewhat separate eJistence alread$B &)) 2ow 8 ease o" governing. not "uture potential loss. e>uit$. . but still up to local gov%t unless it%s acting unreasonabl$. nd court loo. *. more middle@class. c) 4n #e 4ncorporation of Chilton *1@0 &1) lso "ew people: but wanted to ma. b) 4n #e 4ncorporation of 5ew !organ *1+G &1) Wanted to incorporate an area that overlapped with some othersB impermissible avoidance o" #oning? &a) +ourt said. *20>. 6ust barel$ touching 8 barbell-string anneJation 8 does it count? &a) 0h$sical connection ma. (mall area ma$ secede. not a problem. +ourt less worried here about fi(a(&ial i)*a&t on eJisting township &no harm) but more about !o&ial i)*a&t 8 better to regionali#e services than to "ragment broader area. Cncorporation cases a) 4n #e 4ncorporation of $ridgewater *1+@ &1) 0etition 8 4orough dvisor$ +ommittee 8 ?udicial review 8 voters &)) What authorit$ did 4 + have? &a) Cncorporation would result in predominantl$ white secluded area in otherwise integrated area. but remaining township would be worse o"". &)) 5istinction between anneJation initiated b$ cit$ or b$ outsiders wanting in? &Lower danger o" eJploitation?) (ecession: issues o" local sel" determination &smaller ! larger areas): preservation o" integration. in line with view o" cit$ as problem to be Fmanaged% 7ther . +ourt reads "rom statute a polic$ o" having Z/EE people to incorporate. "or incorporation or anneJation. +onsistent with state laws. 2o people reall$ there $et &1): ?ust L7%s. &something "or ever$one)? d) (taten Csland 8 1YQY 8 incorporated into 23+: got services. Mer$ little 2i!ru*ti' ff &t. 23+ got open space &"or garbage ! "or "uture eJpansion). taJ base issues eJist 8 these are common. *202) b) *emarest + 26 statute.D. &1) Good theoretical potential "or secession though due to geographical separation.). &b) 5issent 8 applicants should not be allowed to avoid local laws the$%re unhapp$ with b$ incorporating.e peninsula into its own area &elite residential communit$ with gol" club). a) arris 0rust + Cllinois statute..

local autonom$ a) 0(0 is dominant model in all state constitutions 8 see language in unterBLocal gov%t is a delegate. &a) Aere: *21> issue is state%s power to decide how subdivisions are created.e creation o" municipalit$ less attractive. &d) C" initiation is onl$ thru L7%s. Geal governance at the local level. can be created b$ LG%s pursuant to state enabling legislation.e$ action o" local gov is regulation o" land thru #oning. voter approval. (tate matter.ic. can be voter@initiated thru general enabling legislation.en account o". +haracteristics: ver$ diverse.LOCAL RELAT#ONS E$ Stat 0o1 r & #t! Li)it! 1. local people getting together ! "orming states. a) 0rocess 8 petition &) routes).Ri/-t to Vot /. 0etition is su""icientl$ removed "rom election that right to vote is not implicated: but L7%s can%t bloc. (o rational basis review given. 0rovision o" some o" same services. need su""icient L7 support to get to election. Usuall$ wrt initiating local government changes. decision re. but potential "or voting rights in"ringementsB S* &ial %i!tri&t! 1. but also increases taJ base per capita 8 political dilemma. b) Moting ! sel" determination issuesB &1) Who votes 8 what does right to vote eJtend to? &)) 5iscussion o" Loc%port 8 concurrent ma?orit$ re>uirement: (+ said constitutional: .) &*) nother right to vote >uestion: L7%s pre"erred position. but less SS.recessive gene< persists 8 historical practice &though "ormal Fagent% setup) has been. L K+7 review ! negotiations. (tate has discretion to determine voting boundaries "or boundar$ change issues.e$ issue is whether local gov "ormation ! boundar$ polic$. who votes on incorporations "alls under rational basis. o"ten created b$ special legislative process. &a) (+: strict scrutin$ onl$ on right to vote: petitions are not votes. what about local citi#ens who want sel" determination.B$ %$ Bou(2ar. . better abilit$ to provide services?? Good urban planning polic$ to anneJ.s in. &4ri""ault article *22+) 1E . 0lenar$ state power vs. +an implicate other local gov%t "ormation 8 ma$ ma. 'his is !tat la1. Gational basis. &(tate legis. ##$ STATE. Gight to vote here is related 8 it%s about polic$.) &b) Usuall$ petition to initiate  admin review  &L7 protest?)  election. cities anneJing white suburbs 8 changes ma?orit$ o" voters. local gov? &2o real answer out there $et??) &. taJing power. 'rade reduction in political minorit$ power "or more SS. C-a(/ & t. cities. agent o" the state. $oard of Supervisors of Sacramento County v L1/C6 of Sacramento County ) 4oard o" sup%s suing because o" ma?or loss o" revenue i" +itrus Aeights incorporates. b) 3et local autonom$ . Cllustrates historical local gov%t association with land. 'raditionall$ the$ pa$ "inancing taJes: a .ED lac.) Moting Gights ct *21G &a) Kederal law re>uires that certain statutor$ changes a""ecting right to vote are sub?ect to "ed litigation &[ )): certain areas o" historical discrimination sub?ect to 576 preclearance &[ /) "or an$thing "rom polling locations to district-general elections to anneJationsB &b) 'ensions created 8 cases brought this on in 1QVE%s due to blac. 6udicial review o" "ormation o" special districts is limited. elections?? &c) +ourts sa$ing. and then 10-1M . Goodyear is leading case but no (+ "inal sa$ &on G4 "or L7%s greater interest in being ta.

*22@ Cnherent right to local autonom$ has b$ now been re?ected 8 it eJists. usuall$ identi"ied b$ population). the$ had their own voc. local autonom$. or within general categories. capacit$-who%s better. ed. (o onl$ applicable to 4a$onne. at how to protect local gov b) 4an on (pecial Legislation &1) (imilar to e>ual protection clause on state level: to protect against legislative time spent on deal ma. who decides on capacit$.e into account and create laws o" general applicabilit$. Fcities o" the 1st class% 8 classi"ication to order rules due to common needs-problems. (trong local autonom$ shran. have to loo. burdens 8 wh$ can constitution prevent a ma?orit$ o" state legislature "rom helping a localit$? &.e. etc. Li)it! o( Lo&al 0o1 r: shield-limits on state &ban on special commissions 8 o"ten over political Fpatronage% battles: ethnic battles: power grabs.e over a municipal "unction) &1) (ometimes done thru Fripper bills%: not ver$ common now &1Q1Es@VEs. &)) What is special commission: what is municipal "unction? Specht court doesn%t reall$ de"ine. eJtra@local e""ects) &iii) Whenever state intervenes.) 7merald 4sle: Man$ non@locals have interest in this beach "acilit$B 11 . Gational. spate o" redevelopment commissions).ing. &b) 'wo prongs o" Specht: &i) (pecial commission & utonom$? +reation o" @@? ppointment b$ @@ ?) &ii) Municipal "unction &loo. 4ut problem was. 2ot a Fripper% situation. +it$ appoints commissioner. +lasses must be open: must be minimal-rational? basis "or di""ering laws between classes.e$ thing: separation o" some activit$ "rom historical cit$ control 8 !* &ial &o))i!!io( i! auto(o)ou! fro) &it. a state bod$ to ta. &a) Aow legislature got around: de"ined a special law wrt location o" count$ &mista. &a) 7dd in Specht: state authori#ation. &*) $ayonne case: separate state taJ rules applied. and advance goal o" greater continuit$ in legislation: recognition o" var$ing needs o" localities 8 legislation should ta. but cit$ actuall$ creates the special commission.) a) 4an on (pecial +ommissions &i.e\ 8 should have ?ust done b$ si#e-classi"ication) 8 then "urther b$ population &so it was limited to one count$): then added that cit$%s program must have longevit$.>1) &a) 5eciding about municipal "unctions: problems with histor$-tradition. 6ust shouldn%t target speci"ic cities. around the time 'oc>ueville wroteB 6udge +oole$: eJcerpt re. 5oes the matter occur within boundaries. &*22D. who does it better.e. or are there spillover e""ects? &*) nother . it%s ma$be good.c) d) e) ). &)) General legislation should recogni#e diversit$ and classi"ication &i. program. but 0(0 is law-dominant legal model-blac. letter rule. &b) Longevit$ re>uirement seems o. &to 4ri""ault) 8 shows investment b$ cit$ in programB &c) Geographical re>%t seems most suspicious &d) 4ene"its vs. +it$ couldn%t "ire them once appointed. at histor$. necessit$ o" it "or libert$. didn%t want to be double taJed "or count$ program.

not mandated costs? +ourt reads teJt narrowl$ 8 cost ≠ service.> &(upports idea o" FeJpressio unius%) e) M : still has 27 home rule 8 i. *2.er%s comp "its within concerns above &b) 4ut not reall$ within law 8 not a new program. &a) Ge>%t "or higher wor.e.local< act?) U!uall.no special or local act shall be enacted concerning the sub?ect matter directed or authori#ed to be accomplished b$ general or uni"orml$ applicable laws.: +ouncil didn%t re>uest Fno term limits% 8 (tate could have passed general law 8 no term limits in 23 state. who%s responsible 8 political accountabilit$?.2 8 rule as protecting private prop against abuse b$ democrac$ ! b$ private economic powers.? &c) *2?>: state constitutional provision 8 . distinctive? C" it is-had been.< &Loo. b) Gule "ollows concept o" local gov%t as agent 8 tight delegation doctrine. was law o. at whether it%s a .ground norm. (o !* &ial la1! ar allo1 2 1. or can it target this spot? (ome places do have distinctive characteristics 8 special concernsBhere. isn%t about regulation o" "irms 8 acting less as gov%t than as an emplo$er 8 in providing bene"its. L%s protest: be$ond scope o" what statute eJpressl$ authori#ed.1) a) nti@local@democrac$? +oncern that locals would be too closel$ dominated b$ private interests 8 "actions &Madison). (o limited local autonom$. Gule L bac.) &1) 'his case doesn%t have eJtraterritorial e""ects. 5CLL72%( GUL=: . +ourt agrees.e special laws wrt prop-a""airs-gov%t o" 23+ onl$ with special re>uest b$ cit$ council &-o) rul r :u !t) &a) i. *2.< &*2. 1rlington Co v 3hite &LG eJtended insurance coverage to domestic partners. not targeted at local gov%ts &but rather at emplo$ers across board) &c) C" it had been targeted on locals 8 should there be a di""erent outcome? &d) Cs there a reason "or state constitution to onl$ address mandated services.c) 5oes state have to ma.e general law re. &(ee also 4ri""ault. interest b$ outsidersB &b) Cs =. c) Was both rule ! controversial at timeB1Y1Y rule: "irst Fhome rule% adoption b$ 1YV/ &(t Loius M7) d) GC: 5illon%s rule mentalit$ 8 statute re habitabilit$: cit$ includes hot water. municipal corporation possesses ! can eJercise onl$ the "ollowing powers: &1) those granted in e&press words: &)) those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers eJpressl$ granted: &*) those essential to the accomplishment o" the declared ob?ects ! purposes o" the corporation 8 not simpl$ convenient. 1) .er%s comp. Ma$ be more appropriate to include costs?? (hould teJt be changed? &a) K. when is it ?ust an eJpected norm o" behavior &i.e. could lead to separation o" costs-bene"its 8 state bene"its 1EED but at no cost? Gov%t ine""icienc$B &see *2?+) &1) When is something a mandate. or no term limits when a disaster o" a certain magnitude occurs within FJ% time period be"ore end o" termB Gules gainst Un"unded Mandates: concerns L sheer "inancial burden.e./oal$ &/) 23: state legislature ma$ ma. S&o* of Lo&al 0o1 r to A&tE %illo(<! Rul F 6o) Rul – local agenc$ 8 counterpart to unter 1.( / ( ral la1! &a( a&&o)*li!. substantial doubt concerning the eJistence o" power is resolved b$ the courts against the corporation. reasonable.C. and the power is denied. n$ "air. all beaches. Fmust "ollow anti@pollution-discrimination laws%?) &)) L1 v State: + constitution made new state mandate 8 must pa$ wor. but indispensable.

1.e. presumes LG has power to act until ! unless ta. . "ailure.e. *2+. i. 1QY. densit$. or implied &regulating election is di""erent than regulation spending practices). 4ut @ pre"erences. eJperimentation. ?) Cnitial "orm o" home rule L i)* rio rul 8 local initiative ! immunit$ 8 most sa$. needs are di""erent? What rules are appropriate "or uni"ormit$-variet$? &ii) 5issent 8 Widespread nature o" problem means that it isn%t a local matter &narrowing o" AG). see *2.. not eJpressl$ authori#ed-re>uired b$ state law. constitutions. etc.+1). 8 "actors same. &i) Cssue o" restriction doesn%t turn on uni>ue issues 8 i. (tates reluctant to give immunit$. Under home rule this would be considered local matter 8 but M court loo. especiall$ in light o" rarel$ meeting legislature\ &2+2) &)) 5issent: 5illon%s rule is about state sovereignt$: limit on use o" police power: gov%t poses problem o" t$rann$ 8 so should have limited gov%t. so initiative o"ten also impaired.. 2eeded "or e""ective gov%t. to 'iebout.L /i!lati' -o) rul .e actions without speci"ic state authori#ation &i(itiati' .+ ") 5eparture "rom 5illon%s Gule: .g.) 2L+-2ML home rule &*2+@) 8 give up immunit$ ! go "or initiative 8 home rule as delegation o" all power state could give until it ta. diverse pre"erences) or is there a value to uni"ormit$ throughout state? Cs rule consistent with state polic$? &1) . *2++ .es it bac. about common problems &i. &)) 1* ..< &Cn the sense that legis has delegatedB) 5illon%s rule in reverse 8 instead o" presumption o" no power unless given.) &a) Cs the Morton Grove ordinance Flocal%? Local v. +oncern re.en.e.tah v utchinson( &1) Aome rule "or cities but not "or counties: count$%s re>uirement o" campaign spending disclosure. local abilit$ to deal with local problems. +ourt "ocuses on right to govern selves 8 local gov%t is appropriate locus o" responsibilit$ &2+0. &(uspicion o" too man$ gov%tsB) &a) 5illon%s Gule reduces 9 o" gov%ts 8 bac. .es down domestic partner bene"its. ecolog$. not evenl$ distributed &clumping).alodimos v !orton Grove: &(+ o" Cllinois. emplo$ment discrimination) a diversit$ issue or an authorit$ problem? 'his is underl$ing issue "or courtsB h) +ontrol on local abuse o" powers lies in: &1) local electoral-political control &)) ?udicial en"orcement o" state-"ed rights &*) state autonom$ to intercede-oversight A7M= GUL=: i) Cnvolves two powers 8 to enable LG%s to underta. but need minimal protection o" rights 8 at state or local level? g) re di""ering local rules.shield). widespread nature doesn%t convert to statewide concern as long as there%s a local interest and LG can handle e""ectivel$.ed at whether states gave local authorit$ to do this? &Aome rule states would have "ramed as: is this Flocal%?) &*) 2o eJpress authorit$Bimplied? 5epends on what means Fdependent%B ultimatel$ court stri. political views var$. l) #(itiati' fu(&tio( &home rule as Fsword%) 8 5oes rule concern something uni>uel$ local or statewide? 5oes rule have eJtraterritorial-spillover e""ect? Cs there a value to diversit$ in this rule &e. statewide concern 8 lthough gun sa"et$ is an issue in ever$ localit$.sword): and to protect LG decisions concerning local actions "rom displacement b$ state law &i))u(it.

&ii) +it$ has power to grant visitation rights to cit$ ?ail to registered people.'he powers o" cities must be strictl$ construed. but its onl$ legal e""ect was on who could visit ?ails and no eJtra@territorial e""ect. &i) 7rdinance does not alter state laws regulating marriages. domestic partners would be treated the same as a group o" relatives: with bene"its. .Aome rule unit ma$ eJercise an$ power ! per"orm an$ "unctionBma$ eJercise and per"orm concurrentl$ with the (tateB< &") *2@1: Aome rule . 1rlington County "or similar issue in 5illon%s Gule conteJt. &iii) Gegistr$ ordinance is a reasonable eJercise o" cit$%s power. &i) 5issent 8 (tate deadl$@weapons statute is comprehensive.&b) &)) =Jtra@territorial e""ect 8 Morton Grove doesn%t have central e""ect on state &although other villages might): some people ma$ avoid Morton Grove. &iv) 2ote that with ?ail visitation. &b) 0rohibition o" discrimination in cit$ emplo$ment  valid. and an$ doubt concerning the eJistence o" a particular power must be resolved against the municipalit$. &iii) +t uses 5illon@t$pe anal$sis: . &c) 4ene"its to domestic partners o" cit$ emp%ees  invalid. & ct doesn%t de"ine. &i) 7rdinance prohibiting discrimination is proper eJercise o" cit$%s police power &to protect health. &i) +t loo. diversit$ is o.s to speci"ic AG provision in Municipal AG ct that grants cities authorit$ to provide insurance bene"its "or cit$%s emp%ees and their dependents issue is whether cit$ can de"ine . &or even good) &i) 5issent 8 Cnconsistent local gun laws could cause problems: what%s to prevent LGs "rom enacting more permissive laws? &d) +onsistenc$ with state polic$ 8 Language o" state constitution &*2@0) sa$s that .dependent< in other state acts: traditional de"inition is spouses &whether or not literall$ dependent) and minor children.inney &(+ o" Georgia 1QQ/) tlanta adopted three measures: &a) 5omestic partnership registr$ valid.< &*2@D) &a) c".is predicated on the assumption that problems in which local governments have a legitimate and substantial interest should be open to local solution and reasonable eJperimentation to meet local needs. &i) 5issent 8 =mphasi#es e""ect on non@residents and ad?acent communities.) &ii) +t loo.s to de"initions o" . general wel"are o" public). ct 1. &e) Cmperio provision here: *2@0 . &iv) 2ote that registr$ ma$ have been a polic$ statement on non@marriage relationships b$ the +it$.dependent< to include domestic partners. sa"et$.concurrent< action b$ LGs and state is permitted. &c) 5iversit$ 8 C" people reall$ disagree. "ree "rom veto b$ voters and elected representatives o" other parts o" the (tate who might disagree with the particular approachB< City of 1tlanta v( !c.

little need "or uni"ormit$: local interest strong 8 cost o" bene"its. &/) Gationale: wh$ can%t LGs address these matters? &a) Manderbilt 8 b-c o" their nature these matters are inherentl$ reserved "or the states &b) +ardo#o 8 ""airs are eJclusivel$ those o" the state: do not touch a""airs that cit$ is organi#ed to regulate. &d) Ma?orit$ and dissent agreed that there%s local interest.) 0rivate law eJception 8 idea that home rule authorit$ doesn%t eJtend to enactment o" private or civil law governing civil relationships. but "ocus was reall$ on sharing. 4ut 23+ could not determine that "ailure to chec. propert$. (tate power to act is presumed: onl$ need to chec. public sa"et$) &iv) sserted local interests. Kailure to do so would in"luence a landlord%s tort liabilit$. 8 little eJtraterritorial e""ect. &. &b) +overs contracts.(. that there are no bars to state action. &c) 'hese rationales suggest that state couldn%t delegate power to LGs to legislate in these areas.)B was war$ o" treating domestic partners li.g. but law in this area is unclear. but disagreed on strength o" state interest  "act@based in>uir$ into duties o" deput$ sheri""s. esp. legislative@home@rule@li.e approach &which means that state will win). landlord@tenant law is state. &)) Local power to act comes "rom AG provisions in state constitution. &iii) 7ther state interests &i.. state would have won). cornices ever$ O $ears. fu(&tio( A6o) Rul a! a IS-i l2JB &1) +ases below all concern imperio home rule states &had the$ been legislative home rule. 23+ regulation that landlords must chec. but blurr$ at the margins &e.. "amil$ law.e spouses &the onl$ permissible non@ dependent dependents). &.g. &*2D>). "or propert$ law.g. 1/ . &b) +t held that 5enver deput$ sheri""s are not entitled to minimum training prescribed in state act. #))u(it.. but housing regulations are local). civil procedure. e.e.) La Grande v( #etirement $oard 8 7G approach. cornices leads to strict liabilit$. &b) 4ri""ault >uestions whether ordinance was reall$ much di""erent or whether there was a change in the ct. Kactors "or determining whether state%s interest is su""icient to override home rule: &i) 2eed "or statewide uni"ormit$. balances state ! local reasons "or action. prohibition on un"unded mandates. &a) (tate is onl$ prevented "rom acting where it would harm the structure o" LG. tort. &*) City of 1tlanta v( !organ &(+ o" Georgia 1QQV): revised bene"its provision upheld. &d) lso need to >uestion wh$ these limitations on LGs are inherent. &ii) =Jtraterritorial impact. &*) "olice v( *enver 8 +7 approach. &a) +7 has strongest home rule language in U. which concerns local matters o" land use. &c) =. local control o" local emplo$ees. &c) Aere: state interest wea. similar to interdependenc$ in "irst version. &a) 7rdinance re>uired some dependenc$ in "act. *2GD &a) =Jception ma$ be eJplicit in state home rule provisions or ct ma$ read eJception into home rule provision.

&c) +ompeting interests 8 what standards to separate them? (ince greater power &state) has interest in smaller 8 de"er to its decisionB &d) 'his decision nearl$ ma.r1i! !tat 1i(!.ierBmunicipalities have initiative. &preemption issues)Bot.). but totalit$ o" state law precludes additional local laws even i" consistent &what is the "ield though?). #)*li 2 *r )*tio(E a) +on"lict o" laws: when ordinances are inconsistent with state law &allows-prohibits something prohibited-allowed) &1) =Jpress con"lict: state ! local laws eJpressl$ con"lict on same issue &)) Cmplied con"lict: local bar on something state allows 8 since local ordinance inconsistent with something?? Local ord creates new re>uirements be$ond what state sa$sB &*) When is more regulation ?ust more. see *>12. the$ ?ust thought it was wrong\) &c) + case was imperio.es 7G a legislative home rule state &imperio. =nough rules alread$\ &7hio case?) 11 .1> &a) 6ust since state leg has passed a law. (till state is more inclusive bod$ 8 a""ects more interests 8 so in substantive polic$.) When is local action inconsistent with state polic$? What is state polic$? b) 7ccupation o" "ield: no actual con"lict o" laws. &/) 2ohnson v( $radley 8 + dialectical approach. state prevails: i" . not nec a statewide concern. +t compares state-local rules: count$ ord re>uires more 8 so it con"licts with state law. Lo&al! 1ill 1i( 5ala(&i(/ if 2 )i(i)i! !tat i(t r !t or la1 2o !(<t ! r' i(t r !t: also will prevail i" there%s reall$ (o &o(fli&t.es into account &interest o" well@being o" all citi#ens). in e""ect intermediate scrutin$ o" means-ends. +ourt applies intermediate scrutin$ 8 state must show important interest in integrit$ o" local elections &G4: this is >uestionable): but ban on public "unding doesn%t enhance integrit$ 8 doesn%t inter"ereBthis loo. but balancing test turns out "or state.e a ?udgment on merits o" two laws @ court getting too political? &what 7G court was worried about) Hor court placing more de"erence on voter initiative than legislation?I &G4: no. possible immunit$ &b) G. but turns into 2ML). when is it in con"lict? Cs state sa$ing. t-i! )u&. E9*r !! *r )*tio(E state law speci"icall$ prohibits something a) Goodell *>1D &C case): eJpress preemption o" cit$ #oning re. 0rinciple: this is not a matter o" legislative decision 8 should be ?udicial? &b) (trong local interest in elections-procedures 8 this goes to core o" municipal a""airs. +' is concerned that i" it tries to search out sub?ect matter interest 8 substituting courts "or political process? 5on%t want to ?udiciali#e these matters.s li. ). (!L +on"licts: WA7 WC2(? a) 2ML: state wins 8 built in statement 8 Fnot in con"lict with state laws% b) Cmperio: tric. 0r )*tio(E (eries o" e""orts to stop state inter"erence with local integrit$: deciding when state action inter"eres with local action. agriculture.& (o )or or ! tti(/ a floor and cities ma$ go "urther? &. 1.mode< o" local gov%t 8 cit$ has power o" home rule &*>00). &i) (tate is more inclusive as to which interests it ta.

e. the more ine>ualit$ problems): also i" shared regional concerns. need not be statewide issue 8 room "or locals *. learn "rom each other &eJperimentation ! innovation). *>+? 8 must show Freasonable reasons% "or actions though: court needs evidentiar$ records &)) Moratorium on new housing in Livermore has eJtralocal e""ect o" driving up regional prices &due to less suppl$) c) 1V . harder >uestion is.Lo&al Co(fli&t!$ #NTERLOCAL RELAT#ONS & METRO0OL#TAN AREA 0ROBLEMS 6$ #(t rlo&al R latio(! 1. Kragmentation 8 municipalities near each other .e decisions as an entit$? V. eJtra commercial activit$. at: &a) =conomic bene"its o" theatre 8 how much gain to region? &b) +osts to region? &c) 2et gain or loss 8 to region. =vents have regional impacts. 8 gets taJes.=.ind o" "alse. *.s at "ederal concerns &i. discrimination): then local concernsB<general wel"are< applies to region. but "ew H only speciali-ed?I."loor< ! locals can increase regulation? outli( &-art o( *a/ ! >??.ing bod$? Usuall$ no regional oversight committee 8 though man$ states have some sort o" review.?. 'iebout%s wor.S ###$ 1llied 8ending *>2G &M5 case): local gov%t had stronger interest in regulating cig salesB&better argument about additional local concern than in Cowa case. 4etween local ! general region a) Livermore: 5illon%s-home rule issue here too 8 court loo. 'oc>uevillian response: democratic up@si#ing loses abilit$ o" people to hold gov%t accountableB A$ #(t rlo&al Co(fli&t! Y. +ourt suggests school district is superior: seen as arm o" state "or these purposes. M' . should region ma. to localities? &d) +oasian anal$sis 8 . (ince 1Es. 3et legal-political 8 no such thing as regional gov%t.e. "ame.A.. 4urden o" proving an ord doesn%t serve general wel"are is on challenger &here 8 developers) &1) 'his case is both pro@local and pro@regional. speciali#ation.) superimposed on top o" separate municipalities /. 7verlap 8 addition o" a district &water. litter impacts 8 a""ects 4. nd what i" region as whole loses &net loss) $et Ao""man =states still gains locall$? &)) +ould there be a regional decision 8 b$ vote or decision@ma. r /ar2i(/ Stat . who wins? Loo. 4etween localities a) $arrington ills v offman 7states: Toning "or open air music theatre in A. who controls schools? school district-count$ #oningB a) 1ustin v Sunset 8alley: Gap 8 no eJplicit authorit$ "or either district-count$. rguments: should there be a uni"orm state rule? (trong state concern? (tate setting . transport. 5ownside o" competition 8 ine>ualit$ &the more services are decentrali#ed. Cn corner o" localit$ though so no noise. acting reasonabl$. tra""ic. &1) ssuming standing. more.) +omprehensive state interest here: but does state@granted license L entitlement? d) +ali"ornia election case: court sa$s.. 1E. Long assumption 8 this was bad 8 ine""icient. "ew entities have regional scope 8 i. showed bene"its o" this. +ould do better with economies o" scale. 1. (ocio-econ realit$ 8 people ! businesses utili#e ! rel$ on resources-services all over region. 4etween overlapping entities: i. etc. 4urden on local to sa$. multiple localities. +ompetition.e. 'riangular relationship between state-local-local ). right to travel. &5ebate over who must prove un-reasonableness) Q.

) 6udicial review o" these t$pe o" cases alwa$s wants to loo. Gationale "or limiting: controls apartment suppl$ 8 population demanding services also controlledBvalue o" properties . +ourt decisions to deal with this 8 but econ segregation is tough 8 econ ! mar. Toning still done locall$. b) !t( Laurel: . 0oor. to increase below@mar. but must ta. econ disparit$) &)) Motives "or eJclusionar$ #oning: &a) 5rive up taJ base to provide better services. econ regulation. s idea o" common school spread 8 became more o" a local "unction.11.e eJternalities into account. &*) 1Y . wel"are) &c) Little or no state oversight o" LU decision &hand"ul o" bodies to review env.et realitiesB &.ground: &a) (ubstantial delegation o" power to #one &b) Kew guidelines &health. &b) Lower taJ rates ma$ drive up prop value &c) Kiscal.et housing: should it be paid "or b$ greater densit$? &a) 26 supreme court: integrationist model: legis@housing model: ?ust get it built somewhere\ &b) 7ther 2= states 8 &!+ ) statutor$ measures. largest single eJpense) &a) Used to be that local "unctions centered around LU 8 "ire. &d) =con segregation &can lead to school finance problems) &/) 6udicial response: curtail action without den$ing power to actB Cnterlocal Kiscal Cne>ualit$ a) S&-ool Fi(a(& R for) &closel$ related to eJclusionar$ #oning): &1) (chool "inance creates ! rein"orces interlocal wealth di""erentials &)) Most states 8 Cndus-commercial prop taJed at higher rate 8 generate hi revenue. at regional impact 8 i" eJclusionar$ e""ects eJist.per capita taJ base goes upB"iscal bene"its. old inner@suburbs ! rural areas 8 get least revenue. 5istribution o" these. whereas 2A approach negative 8 Fnot too much eJclusion% c) E9&lu!io(ar. econ. &*) 0ublic education L 91 eJpense "or local-state gov%ts &at least. pro?ected need. lso hi@value homes.) +onse>uences o" eJclusionar$ #oning: &a) 5rive up housing costs &b) Greater homogeneit$ &c) (prawl\ Leap"rog development 8 older communities have more regulation so people move "urther out. availabilit$ o" multi"amil$ dwellings? &. water. Gacial-class incentives? 0eople who can own homes? What counts as eJclusionar$: wrt lot-house si#e. social issues tied together 8 structuring communities in certain wa$s &*) Kine line between eJclusionar$-inclusion 8 !t( Laurel F"air share% o" F"uture need% 8 how to de"ine? Aow to reproduce H force?I local FmiJ% o" regional characteristics? Cnclusionar$ measures 8 set asides. 4o(i(/: &1) +haracteristics-bac. waste.e on greater portion o" F"air share% &1) 26 approach is more positive. but how "ar can $ou go? Cs this a local "unction. low@income across a region that has man$ taJing boundaries 8 leads to enormous disparit$. "air share? 26 has special masters to "igure out 9sB lso Gegional +ontribution greements 8 localities can pa$ each other to ta. sa"et$."air share< concept 8 but how to de"ine region. bonuses.

&/) 'hen. &*) #ose &N3.b) c) d) (plit between state-local "unding varies greatl$Band state aid &"lat grants) doesn%t nec e>uali#e &. C" base J rate L lower $ield than guaranteed amount. provide same per capita level o" spending &but. innovation. state delegation to localities is norm.also pure sel"@interest: don%t want to share taJ@base: can $ou reall$ separate out decision ma. guaranteed 8 district chooses own rate. (o G4 test: and local control counts as G4. M2 case &b) 1Q .. Cn school "inancing. &5i""erent "rom "ed const 8 which is more about power. 'his ?usti"ies local "inancing ! di""erences. state shi"t: education as "und right in state constitutions 8 must create Fthorough ! e""icient% method o" educBMandates "or educ. LG%s usuall$ provide local services out o" local taJ base. etc. =""icienc$ L provide ever$ child with minimal capacities &listed *>D0) &N3 is now model o" school re"ormBbut how to reall$ measure improvement?) &. lso "ederalism implications 8 state matter. in e""ecting "inance ! state-local roles? +asesB6udicial pproachesB &1) *u"ree & r. on disparate school "inance 8 :ual *rot &tio( const challenge. &V) *rd wave o" school "inance re"orm litigation: &a) 1st 8 "ederal &b) )nd 8 state L protection &c) *rd 8 Gose-=nglewood 8 e""icienc$ arguments &Y) Gole o" courtsB0rod public agenda? +onst interpretation? Aow much o" a role in deciding e""ective schools.ing powerB. e>uali#ation removes local abilit$ to controlB) &b) Guaranteed min amount to meet basic educational needs &c) 5istrict power e>uali#ation 8 give each district taJ base o" a hi@end district..ing power "rom "inancing? 9e: *oes . not "or (+.. separation o" powers) school >ualit$ is not an appropriate ?udicial determination. state ma. e""icienc$) 8 loo.s at whole school s$stem.) 7dgar &CL. Gegional response to Cnterlocal Kiscal Cne>ualit$: $urnsville. &5oesn%t necessaril$ mean e>uali#ed education though) &d) Gedraw taJ district lines 8 but lots o" opposition to this 8 wrt maintaining decision ma. U((+ laid out test 8 suspect classi"ication or "und right 8 and wealth ≠ suspect class and educ ≠ "und right.) 1st method o" attac. =0 challenge) 8 school "unding disparit$ due to reliance on taJ base. L protection issue &b) =""icienc$ 8 enormous ine>ualities shows that state has "ailed to "ul"ill mandate &1) pproaches "or e>uali#ation re"orm &what =0 re>uires): & *>G>) &a) Kocus on une>ual spending 8 state should e>uali#e. &)) 7dgewood &'J.es up di""erence. ade>uac$-e""icienc$) 8 school "inancing s$stem violates 'O const re>%t "or e""icient s$stem o" "ree public schools &became more about e>ualit$ in later appeals).es s$stem down: not rational. +hallenges usuall$ "ocus on e""orts to promote greater e>uit$. +t stri. even matter anyway? 3hat about social effects? p399 &") What about ade>uac$? 5oesn%t nec mean the best 8 but is relativeBade>uac$ changes over time with technolog$. ver$ little mandate o" an$thing) 'wo strands o" arg 8 &a) (tate L protection clauses 8 now since educ is obligator$ in state. even though important.

amenities &competition). Aas count$ lost control? &a) +ourt: shared management-"inancing not necessaril$ needed "or cooperation. Lead agenc$ concept. i. &)) Aere. transportation. 'he$ serve a regionBHwhat i" localit$ would rather have their share go towards better schools. =ach localit$ bene"its "rom activities o" others.e.eBI 8 no real constitutional argument here. supported b$ regional taJ 8 i. together.e over count$ transport s$stem 8 contract between cit$-count$.) &/) &1) Kiscal 5isparities ct 8 treats 'win +ities area as unit. better growth potentialsB &#egionalist argument 8 see also 0eirce article *>?+) What about services serving region. 'argeted state response to deal with speci"ic state need. #$ #(t rlo&al Coo* ratio( 1. 1ED o" commercial valuation goes to regional potBredistributed bac.cooperative< 8 it%s the cit$ ta. with e""ective criteria-guidelines given to control.e this. 5ecision to share is enough: )E . What "unctions cross local lines? Aow to deal with it L mergers-anneJations &not too man$). i(t rlo&al a/r ) (t! 8 three archet$pes 8 &*?0G) &1) +ontract "or services 8 localit$ bu$s .e advantage o" economies o" scale)? a) Volu(tar.&1) &)) &*) &. Gegional taJes to support an amenit$ located in one localit$ 8 i.e M2 8 it%s earmar. 0rivate co which currentl$ controlled transport didn%t li.ed. water suppl$. or e""ective oversight? c) Co(tra&t for ! r'i& !E urango 8 cit$ to ta."orce. &*) 7ther >uestion: this isn%t . transport s$stemsBnot general revenue sharing li.ing over "or the count$. "ire protection) "rom localit$ 4. &Goreham case) b) '$pical legal issues: &1) Cs agreement authori#ed b$ statute? &a) Usuall$ gov%ts don%t have authorit$ to act be$ond boundariesB &)) 5oes activit$ "all within scope o" statute? &*urango) &*) Cs local consent re>uired "or agreement arrangements? & "laggemeier) &. crime lab use. Cs this M2 ct ?ust eJpropriating S "rom one localit$ to another? &a) +ourt: no.e. &a) +ourt: ambiguous language.) 5elegation issue 8 was authorit$ delegated properl$. cit$ has authorit$ but it%s limited to own boundaries.e. &1) +7 constitutional language 8 ma$ cooperate-N with each other to provide "unction-service law"ull$ authori#ed to each. #oo. impactB(o growth happens regionall$ ! i" localities wor. sports arena. &*urango case) &)) 6oint services agreement 8 pooling o" resources &"laggermeier case 8 pooled policing to go a"ter drun. Aow to maintain legal-political-"iscal independence $et come together voluntaril$ "or individual activities &! ta. unless authorit$ received "rom 0U+. 5ecides to liberall$ construe 8 state meant to encourage cooperation. Gegional taJes are imposed-collected b$ state 8 not sub?ect to ban on special legislation because special problem. level o" envir. drivers) &*) +ollaborative establishment o" new governmental unit 8 ?oint entities 8 ?oint ventures.J< &i. 5ecision to locate a compan$ in a region ma$ have a lot to do with regional distribution o" wor. based on need &based on population-capacit$) Main legal response: being taJed to support someone else? Cdea o" uni"ormit$ that ever$one in a ?urisdiction should be taJed the sameBand also idea that local taJes should go to local services.

laid down reasonabl$ clear guidelines "or its application.nowledge this. needing more "ull@"ledged process. waste avoidance. transport s$stems must cross lines &i. not necessaril$ a good idea &issues o" accountabilit$.e agreement is o. accountabilit$ )1 . &. drivers into other ?urisdictions.e.e N ma$ be le"t-voided &at will?) 8 in a longer term N where cit$ needed to invest heavil$ in e>uipment. etc. which re>uires legis authori#ation) &)) 4ut court: this doesn%t vitiate eJisting consent. more than cit$-count$? +o@eJtensive with count$? &)) 2ecessit$ 8 i. cities agreement to deal with drun. +onsent ma$ be an admin decision 8 a handsha. &1) (tructure not "iled though or rati"ied b$ each o" local legislatures 8 so agreement not e""ective &tas.) 'his is about &o(trolK Cr atio( of N 1 Go'<t E(tit. &More loss o" control than a state@created admin agenc$Bcourt doesn%t reall$ ac. "orce is commitment. Less direct accountabilit$. *?20 &*) 4ut problem 8 no oversight.er the harder the N is to leave. 7$ R /io(al Go' r(a(& Stru&tur ! 1. it might be harder to withdraw "rom N &also i" debt were to be entered into in reliance on N) +ourt arg gets wea.el$.) c) Cssues: &1) Governance: who? &a) =lected &1p-1v implications) or &b) ppointed &b$ whom?) &i) Goughl$ representative o" population? &ii) +ontrol with general purpose gov%t. (ingle 0urpose Gegional Gov%ts a) +haracteristics: &1) Less than state.) 'his is implicitl$ supported since it loo. to allow the eJtended pursuit. or with state. &*) Cs accountabilit$ lost here? +hie" o" police can change mindBand residents can remove chie" &assumption 8 serves at pleasure)Bwhereas tas.s li. Legislature has ade>uatel$ stated ob?ect ! purpose o" legislation. 7oi(t S r'i& ! A/r ) (tE Plagge!eier 8 count$ ! . &. "orce re>uires pa$ment. "orce.d) e) count$ citi#ens still represented since N is entered into b$ elected rep%s. coordination o" activities &a) 0lanning issues complicated too b) +oordination could be o"ten done at state level &7G said this) &1) +ould be accomplished b$ large general purpose local gov%t. 'ri@Met) &*) =""icienc$ 8 economies o" scale &i.) Loss o" control particularl$ b-c this creates a debt ! hard to get out o" b$ an$ one localit$. gov%ts 8 ?oint solid waste agenc$ &M (W ) &1) +onstitutional >uestion: delegation doctrine &a) (tate delegated to localities the authorit$ to create ?oint venture &)) 5oes delegation L loss o" public control? Cs bod$ given enough guidance-control? Aere 8 enough guidance to M (W ? &a) +ourt: $es. ?oint board &this approaches ?oint ventureB) 0olice authori#ed to pursue drun.e. hospital districts).E "oreha! 8 5es Moines area 8 1. 5istributive issues are not reall$ controlled 8 collective control is not necessaril$ e""ective. driving via tas. but unli. 7nl$ removed "or@cause or b$ termsB &iii) Main issues 8 control. so loss o" accountabilit$ is not a problem.e.

incorp< into a closer district? 7r lobb$ state to re>uire concurrent ma?orities o" areas to be merged into a district? Multiple 0urpose Gegional 5istricts a) =ven when multiple "unctions.) +ourt%s role 8 "igure out what rules appl$. pic. and eJpanded to transit ! land planning. Less common is LU-planning related &7G) b) Cssues: &1) Governance: t$picall$ appointed &0ortland 8 rare 8 elected) &)) Kunctions 8 these evolve. &)) )) .up< &"rom-b$ cit$) d) 1ngel /ire 8 institutional design.). 7""icials are reall$ elected 8 so it%s a Fgovernmental bod$% and 1p-1v applies.1F ?. *?>> &1) 2ew issues: Cn Cllinois ! 7regon cases. &i) ppointed members drawn mainl$ "rom elected o""icials &ii) +ourt 8 not a >uasi@proprietar$ agenc$. Kinancing: &a) (ome power to taJ 8 general or &usuall$) related to services provided &special assessment "ee) &b) Given revenues b$ cit$-count$ &*) 5elegation doctrine issues: &a) Miolation o" home rule? Usuall$ state%s concern is su""icientl$ important to displace local autonom$ &b) 2ot eJactl$ general purpose gov%t 8 not state agenc$ 8 what are the$? lso unclear interaction with state laws &tort liabilit$. whether or not state ma$ create 8 &a) Little issue on state power to create &b) More problems with moving LU-other power . 5isproportionate bene"it-burden. so Metro got merged into count$. &iii) Cn end 8 no agreement over voting design.'wo@tier "ederations 8 see *??G. 1QYQ. etcB 1p-1v re>uirements complicate this though. & re the$ pa$ing "or closer hospital at all though?) Gight to create not disputed but the bottom@up creation is resulting in eJploitation o" taJ base. countr$ voice. c) Gegional gov%ts might be more widespread i" $ou could "ind acceptable representation scheme 8 where cit$ voice. so Salyer eJception to 1p-1v is n-a &*??2).\ &Cs this comparable to redistribution o" territorial wealth though??) &c) +ould address this thru incorporation@t$pe methods: &i) 5e"ensive . sovereign immunit$. &b) +ourt response: health care alwa$s entails redistribution o" resources 8 "rom the health$ to the sic. up more over time &a) (eattle 8 began with ?ust water pollution. etcBsometimes spelled out b$ statute) &.. 5o these districts serve general sa"et$? &a) L7 argument 8 no material bene"it "rom inclusion in this district. ] o" population but ^ o" taJ base. Cn 2M state passed enabling act 8 allowing creation o" hospital districts.D a) Largest consolidation: 23+. sunshine laws. Loo. *. to appointing structure. 0rocedural protections don%t protect them since the$%re a built@in minorit$. bodies state@created b$ special laws &! large distinct interest area so no ob?ection). +onsolidations . usuall$ in"rastructure related: economies o" scale or needs "or coordination. taJing power 8 same issues as above. other issuesB &/) Cssues re.

Miami 8 strong count$ gov%t created.00< is c) Gecentl$ &/E$rs) courts less willing to anal$se ends: loo. &a) 7"ten these measures are onl$ a small "actor to locating businesses 8 though hard "or LG%s to resist tr$ing to leverage location decisions thru more direct incentivesB b) (tic. /. V.iest point is the means 8 even i" legit ends &public bene"it).. 7"ten "ocused on .00<? What level o" private aid is 7N? c) +ourt%s role 8 2+ didn%t "ollow earlier cases.then 1QVEs@YEs in"lation. maintains some independence o" pre@eJisting LG%s &i. contracts clause 8 a""ects borrowing).ends< 8 who received bene"it o" gov%t aid-action.) C" legis sets a goal o" public purpose. S towards that goal B. etcB.etch$: can gov%t promote ?obs b$ direct assistance to private companies? 5oes public interest in ?obs ?usti"$ gov%t assistance to widget plant? Most courts sa$ $es.e. deep recession. almost not at all at "ed level &eJcept. but some things le"t in place to cities.s in count$ setting: i. Gegional gov%ts still "airl$ uncommon. at means. ll blew up in 1Y*V 0anic. local policing) Ning +ount$ &Cunningham case). lendB d) 2eJt waves o" economic situations leading to re"orm 8 Great 5epressionB. Aeavil$ regulated at state &constitutional ! statutor$) level. 3et recognition o" public bene"its "rom private sector goods b) 5i""icult to determine eJactl$ what .. Might have merger o" count$ ! big cit$ &i. STATE & LOCAL F#NANCE A$ 0u5li& 0ur*o! R :uir ) (t! . 1.b) c) d) e) #V$ Usuall$ )@tier "ederations: wor.e.00< stretch? a) (teps: &1) =conomic development &?ob creation) L 00 &ends) &universall$ accepted) &)) +ash-loans to private "irms L &means) &*) Will it wor. 0rotects smaller cities. Unigov in Cndianapolis) Ma?or "unctions o" gov%t done at count$ level 8 e""icienc$ measure. &1) +hanging times issue &)) Cs purpose ostensibl$ to bene"it public? &*) . smaller cities. Aistor$: a) (tate debt crisis in 1Y*Es brought this about. pollution reduction &re>uired an$wa$\\) 8 too much o" a . wa$s to raise S. public doctrine. More revisions limiting cities% abilit$ to borrow. creates more capabilit$ on larger scale.e.0risoners% dilemma< 8 all the other states are providing these incentives 8 the$ have to. ends o" economic development-activit$ 8 usuall$ legit public purpose. $et the means can be s. Nansas +it$. =Jpands count$%s abilit$ to provide services . pools taJ base. i. (peci"ic constraints 8 lending. limits on incentive "or corruption. debt limitationsB c) (till. 0ublic purpose doctrine ver$ logical 8 supports republican notion o" public gov%t supporting public sector. a) 00 doctrines "airl$ e""ective. =rie canal success inspired publicl$ "inanced transport s$stems.&???) )* . will it generate ?obs? &Usu courts de"er ?udgment to the legislature). 3et pa$ing S to widget production.? C" 00 eJists in giving cash. 5illon%s rule. 2eed to constrain corruption ! also eJuberance. &. !aready 8 2+ case 8 1 o" last states to ac. does that mean it%s . a"ter states constrained 8 cities would invest in GG%s.nowledge this as 00.Es led to state const revision b) =""orts to limit goals ! techni>ues o" gov%t 8 limit wa$s to aid private sector. Gegional ! local services ! taJes. 5i""erent anal$sis.e. (tate "iscal crises thru 1Y.Led to 1Y1Es re"orm. Massive public ! private investment ! incentives. 1 large cit$.

0rop taJ is largest single source o" local revenue. in actual loans though 8 possibl$ 27 state resources are ever used in suret$ship. arms@length transaction. Growing in popularit$ b-c not sub?ect to legal or political constraints on taJes. municipal action has reasonable connection with convenience ! necessit$ o" particular municipalit$: )nd activit$ bene"its public generall$. or other LG &e. &a) 7ver time.. &)) 'aJ 8 real propert$ taJ.tah 0echnology 8 *?G0.ing b) Minorit$ states% de"inition o" lending credit 8 state borrows S then lends to private co. 4ased on value o" prop &ad valorem). &a) 7ther techni>ues "or valuing prop: &*. state. 23. based on what people have. taJ is imposed neutrall$.et data approach &compile comparable sales data) &iii) Cncome approach &measure present worth o" "uture bene"its o" prop) ). pre"erence problems: =0 down the line?X &)) 6o1 to 2ra1 &l ar li( 5 t1 ( *u5li&"*ri'at – *o!!i5l L 4road public acceptance o" legitimac$ o" gov%t activit$ in econ development pro?ects? e) What about indirect F"inancing% 8 i. but sub?ect to constitutional. prop taJ came to "ocus on real prop onl$. . !adison Cablevision prongs "or "inding a public purpose: &an$ bite to these?) 1 st. charges. sales. +ommittal o" credit abilit$ to private co%s. in appropriate means to legit end? +ountr$ club memberships? Wdissent loo%s at short term benefit< majority loo%s at long termX Loo. as well as eJit option o" people): &1) 2on@taJ 8 "ees. ). at *?@+. statutor$. etc) 8 lending o" credit occurs when state provides loan guarantees to private lenders 8 suret$ship. it%s too eas$ to do and will get states into trouble. legis "indings o" public purpose. Greater ris. Land is immobile: all owner can control is amount o" improvements that have taJ conse>uences. &1) Greater ris. 4ut the "ear is. b) 7wn source &LG controls. cit$ gives mone$ to school district). Uuestion eJisted about techni>ues. or o" bu$ing stoc.B a) Un-authori#ed means? *?@G: not allowed to lend credit "or private underta. to pa$ "or LG services..1?) &i) +ost approach &estimate cost o" replacing building) &ii) Mar.. &*?@>) 4oth involve ends ! meansB . c) Ma?orit$ states% reading &U'. assessments. and political constraints.g.d) Y. Aanding cash would have been o. income). also issue about bu$ing stoc. other taJes &e... 4ut state agenc$ borrowing S then in turn loaning to private "irms &state gets lower interest rate) L Flending credit%. 5issent: where%s the logical brea.e. 0ropert$ 'aJ a) 0roblems: &1) 4uilt@in uncertaint$ since prop values are onl$ . Most states sa$ no suret$ship b$ state to private lender. +lassi"ications o" LG revenues: a) Cntergovernmental &LG does not control): &1) Krom "ed.nown with certaint$ i" there%s been a recent. d) 0rohibition here is on techni>ue 8 not broad techni>ue o" aid but speci"ic techni>ue o" suret$ship.g. &b) Cn theor$. taJ incentives 8 are these sub?ect to public purpose re>%ts? &see *?G?) M$ R ' (u ! 1. Q.? Less protected? Aow are these techni>ues worse than giving cash? &Greater intertwining o" public-privateB) Walso more bias.

so taJ $ield might not di""er). low@mid priced props could be gentri"$ing ! incr@ easing in value >uic. *.l$. but note that court made a polic$ ?udgment too. &b) Mer$ di""icult "or taJpa$er to prove an =0 violation &would have to gather data on prop values.now@ ledge that capping rates o" increase doesn%t necessaril$ "avor the wealth$ &i.nowledge b-c assessor can ?ust change the "ractional D. but not write o"" )/ .0>. i. *. &e) LGs can get more state "unds b$ under@valuing prop. &b) Kor retirees. while high@value props could be stable). at assessment ratio: are ratios e>ual. ellerstein v( 1ssessor of the 0own of 4slip &23 +t.) 7ther cts &e. not the actual use &e. not the taJ rate.e. &c) =Jamples. based on use o" prop or classi"ication o" user. or a set schedule o" assessments "or di""erent classes. which is a permissible "eature o" prop taJ s$stem.&)) b) c) 'aJ on wealth that%s paid with income ma$ lead to wealth@income disparit$: &a) C" in"lation causes prop values to rise "aster than income. it would compensate b$ having a higher rate.g. down re"erendum.iga &W 1QQY) &1) Ge"erendum mandated . there would have been uni"ormit$. taJ rate ma$ have to increase "or ever$one. rates. C" 23 had a set "ractional D less than "ull value.e. &c) C" "ull mar. &*) Ge"erendum did not create an eJemption.. &a) =Jemptions ma$ be constitutional or statutor$.. b$ using a low "ractional D. &. &d) 'aJ can be raised without public . 4ut practice o" under@ valuation was ?ust too unpredictable. &a) 'aJ uni"ormit$ can be anal$sed b$: loo.shall be estimated b$ the assessor at its "ull value< &*?D2).et value re"lects the use with the highest value..g. Miewed it as a gi"t to the wealth$ ! burden on people with low@mid@value props. &(tate countered with (tate =>uali#ation 4oard. etc. &b) +t held that eJemptions must be eJplicit. 23) ma$ have held that this re"erendum gave uni"orm treatment to rapidl$ increasing propPless principled approach. ppeals 1QV/) &1) 23 statute mandated that prop values . i" KMM is "or subdivision dev%ment.01 &b) 'his was a principled holding.) &)) +t held that assessments should be done at "ull value.) &)) +t struc. C" taJ base is held down. &/) lternatives "or W would have been to set up scheme that de"erred taJ liabilit$Pwhich would achieve $ear@to@$ear consistenc$. $elas v( . 4ut practice in Cslip &and across 23) was to assess "ractional value. which attempted to e>uali#e assessment rates in calculating state aid pa$ments. &c) +t didn%t consider polic$ bene"its o" the re"erendum or ac. i" ?-d assessed lower "raction. so percentages were unpredictable problems: &a) Cne>ualit$ in "raction assessed across ?-ds &o" course. not "armland on urban peripher$).) &c) 0otential "or "avoritism within ?urisdictions. with no set pattern "or application: no rules governed. &'his is one attempt to deal with the wealth@income disparit$ in prop taJes..value averaging< to minimi#e $ear@to@$ear variation in prop taJes and to cap the rate o" increase in prop values i" rate was over 1/D-$ear.

Legislature also "inall$ put a measure on. &)) 0rop 1* rolled bac. &)) 'o pa$ o"": calculate taJ base be"ore investment J rate L $ield.value in use<..'CK< "unds. &*) (o growth seems cost@"ree: municipalit$ not sacri"icing an$ new dollars.base< i" the$ move to a same@si#e or smaller home.< &*.d) e) ") taJ liabilitiesPor "ine@tune the measure to limit re@assessments when there%s no change o" hands. used to pa$ o"" debt. 5idn%t cut rate &there was an increased demand "or servicesB) 8 so how to change prop taJ assessment s$stem? Kinall$ the people got an initiative together. &/) L7%s in district 8 capture bene"it b$ having taJ growth pa$ "or debt.< which di""ered "rom KMM.et value principles: =0 rules violation. State $oard of 0a& Commissioners v( 0own of St( 2ohn &C2 1QQY) &1) (tate +onstitution mandated . 0rop 1* &people%s measure) won most votes.. Crouch 8 case about idea that growth pa$s "or itsel": b$ taJing the growth &1) . &. dopted in 1QVY &+ ) 8 culmination o" rapid housing in"lation. value growth >uic.true taJ value. Legislature unable to deal with this e""icientl$. but di""erent methods o" assessment ma$ be used "or di""erent classi"ications o" prop in order to achieve u(ifor)it. 'he$%re pa$ing the same rate 8 so literal uni"ormit$ eJists 8 but more subtle uni"ormit$ issue since their taJes are bene"iting them directl$ &none o" the courts pic. +laim: other entities with limited "unctions are being "orced to pa$ "or something &redevelopment) that the$ don%t bene"it "rom. )1 . '$picall$ not done out o" regular budget but b$ borrowing. ! special districts): (5%s are an$thing that can taJ prop since that was the thrust o" 0rop 1* &court loo.uni"orm and e>ual rate o" propert$ assessment and taJation. and old people ma$ . &.0+).ed at legislative intent). cit$. and capped taJ growth at )D per $ear: eJceptions: &a) Gov%t ma$ reassess prop &update the value) when sold. districts) 8 all incremental growth goes into "und. as well as capping prop taJes. 'hese ma$ have survived ?udicial review.e 0rop 1*) was a violation o" mar. &a) 0rop taJ assessments must be based on prop wealth. to them.) 1mador County case 8 immediate challenge to 0rop 1*: + (+ upheld law &/) 'hen 1llegheny "ittsburgh case occurred: count$ assessment &li.) 0roblem here: man$ di""erent taJing entities &count$. (o )-* re>uirement n-a to (5%s which don%t do prop taJ. 'his 'iolat ! *u5li& *ur*o! a(2 u(ifor)it.l$ impacted higher prop taJes. 'hen taJ base a"ter investment J rate L $ield. 5ue to assessment re"orms.eep their . 5i""erence between $ield@1 and $ield@ ) is put into .ed up on this). 6ust opportunit$ cost. &*) 0rop 1* also imposed )-* local vote re>uirement "or new taJes and 1D overall rate cap "or prop taJes &this includes all LG%s that are taJing prop. counties. &a) Later court interpretation o" )-* re>uirement &applicable to cities. &)) +t upheld state%s s$stem o" prop taJation according to . 'heir taJes go right bac. or when improvements made &b) Aowever parent@child trans"ers don%t result in ?ump@up o" rate.4lighted< &?) area 8 LG commits to redevelop 8 put S in. 0ro* 1> 8 5ordlinger &1) 0rop 1* simultaneousl$ raised pro"ile o" use o" ballot@initiatives as a political techni>ue. (tate 4oard established rules "or classi"ication o" prop according to . taJ base to 1QV/. combined).

+al. c>uisition value &what%s used in + ) is not the same as "air mar. regulator$ "eesB &Q) Aow otherwise can states deal with wealth@income gap? &When prop value increasing. $ou get credit on state income taJ. limits on increases &i.e.e. 'his has an interestingl$ slightl$ progressive e""ect 8 low income . &)) 0rocedural 8 voter approval &i.er program &*.out@o"@ staters?? A!! !!) (t!F F !F & C-ar/ ! &1) )V . Ked +onstraints: a) (tates impose lots o" taJ limits: &1) (ubstantive 8 limits on taJ rate &i. stabilit$. Union 0aci"ic GG) who don%t reall$ ever move. 0rop 1* 1D cap total).e.elderl$ people tend to move less &can%t a""ord costs) so their taJes are more controlled. ?$ 0rop 1* re@challenged: still upheld.) 1st amendment limits &/) +ommerce clause 8 taJation on activities primaril$ re.l$ an$more. at what D o" income prop taJ eats up.>G) 2o such thing as too high. +ourts won%t ?udge reasonableness &though i" taJ is regulator$ 8 it ma$ become a ta. &b) 4lac. &LG%s love this program 8 the$ still get all the S.newcomers< become less than what the$%d be i" no 0rop 1* limits.*. 0rop 1* )D rate cap). (tate constraints on 0rop 'aJ vs.mun &ma?orit$): "ocuses more on abilit$ to pa$. circuit brea. 4ut politicians ! people not happ$ with this result.) &d) lso.e$ then 0rop 1* does violate =0: same value homes 8 di""erent taJes being paid.>. &e) 'hese issues have "aded somewhat 8 prop value not in"lating so >uic. Cssue is predictabilit$. taJ de"erral programs 8 don%t have to pa$ now.). &c) 7r. )-* vote) &*) Uni"ormit$ &as modi"ied b$ state rules permitting clari"ication. &Y) 0rop 1* has led to huge creativit$ to manipulate it. there%s "ed discrimination within classi"ication scheme &??) &. commerce .ing?) &)) 2o procedural limits either &*) =0 claims do appl$ 8 though enormous de"erence to states% abilit$ to classi"$ &review is onl$ rational basis). &G4: this seems ver$ plausible). limits on $ield as D o" value &also 0rop ) ^) Latter ) more about limiting gov%t: "ormer two about protecting homeowners. &b) Widespread response: homestead eJemption.@taJes out o" gains reali#ed.et value &what was used in 0 ??).J< thousand S worth o" home.>>) 8 loo.e. prop taJes even "or . &a) (tevens &dissent): i" prop value is . Gevenue raising taJes are not 50 violation &see *. Gare violation 8 but 1llegheny "ittsburgh case 8 when assessment violates state law. 0G!=.e. + has led wa$ in user "ees. or in the sense o" "ull value) b) Ked limits: &1) (ubstantive 8 no limits on taJation in constitution. limits on $ield &i. C" more than a certain amount. 'his especiall$ helps low@ income people. income dropping) &a) 7bvious response 8 L7 can sell. development impact "ees. state bears the burden. &see p /*)) 4iggest winners though are business prop owners &i. but i" $ou sell home then pa$ bac. Mass 0rop ) ^ see *. &V) (tud$ done later: a"ter 1@V $ears. 0rop taJ is n-a to "irst . (o s$stem does bene"it stable people more than mobile people.

.a) b) c) . &+it$ can%t collect more than cost. tourism o""ice &a) +haracteristics o" ( %s . L7%s still complained 8 assessment not e>ual. !orristown &prop value assessment) S* &ial B ( fit! Ta9 8 !orristown &1) 5i""erent than a taJ: targeted at particular lots &businesses) within particular neighborhood.? &vii) Aow much $ou pa$: ( %s ma$ not eJceed cost o" pro?ect.0. +omplaint 8 it%s a taJ that violates uni"ormit$. ssessment there"ore coercive. council decided to improve streets in a bunch o" neighborhoods 8 residents didn%t get to choose. o") bene"it. Aas loo. Used "or @ i. 2o particular bene"it calculation. 6ust a reimbursement to municipalit$ "or bene"it: not a revenue@raiser. streetlights) 8 ph$sical in"rastructure: usuall$ a one@time charge.e speci"ic determination o" peculiar bene"its. 4ut court: *.2 &v) =Jpansive view o" ( %s &blending into taJes) 8 see *. not possible to ma. but a rate on assessed valuation.taJBso costs ! bene"its are ceiling "or charge 8 can%t be "orced to pa$ more than what $ou get 8 or also a taJ. no bene"it to )Y . area@wide improvements. o" uni"ormit$ v@a@v other 7%s). lso sent assessors out to ensure reasonable. homes worth more though "ront "ootage sameB bsolute overcharge &wrt bene"it received) as well as relative overcharge &lac. &)) 'eanec. s to absolute overcharge: court assumes cost L bene"it: burden is on _ to prove wrong.?+ &i) ( supports local improvements &! should be proportional *. not based on "ootage but on assessed valuation. directl$.) &/) ( %s traditionall$ used "or special bene"its appurtenant to land &paving. o" uni"ormit$ applies onl$ to taJes: ( %s not a taJ. &1) oweverB=Jpansion o" concept o" bene"its 8 ongoing services.?G): taJ "inances general operations &ii) ( is one@time charge: taJ is annual &iii) ( re>uires direct bene"it: taJ doesn%t &iv) 4oth coercive: gov%t decides to provide service L7%s can%t necessaril$ re"use *. nature o" bene"it is general. .ing.no attempt to assess "or peculiar bene"its< 8 "lag lots.e. 'hough can onl$ be speciall$ charged "or things with special neJus Wprecursor to 5ollan?X &a) (ometimes communit$ input is available 8 vote-negative vote &*) ssessment here b$ "ront "ootage. +it$ has police power to install bene"its: ! to collect reimbursement due to discrete private bene"its. corner lots. +harges on speci"ic prop%s receiving &bul.'he Gise o" the 2on@'aJ 'aJ< 8 wa$s o" pushing "ees out until the$ start to resemble taJesBwhat distinguishes taJes .) +': lac. &.. Cndividual bene"it determinations 8 see !c5ally &"ront "ootage assessment).. +ompulsor$ use &as compared to voluntar$ 8 "ees 8 choose whether to use: or choose to regulate amount o" use). lso public hearings. cit$ par. or b$ use distinctionsB*. voter approval all depend on distinction..> &vi) Who pa$s: can be de"ined b$ territorial distinctions. a value assessment is appropriateB_%s didn%t prove assessment didn%t match bene"it. S* &ial A!! !!) (t! 8 !c5ally v 0eanec% &1) ( %s basic wa$ communities "inanced in"rastructure. not an ( B) 4ene"it applies to discrete subpart o" communit$. &L7%s could argue. otherwise it%s a revenue raiser .-"eel-concept o" prop ' O.."ees? ssessments 8 h$bridB +aps. &'hese arg%s could have proven it was a taJ. &)) C" it%s a taJ 8 unconstitutional.taJes: *. (ome public bene"it &otherwise no gov%t interest) but also special-local-private bene"it &this ?usti"ies gov%t charging them speciall$). uni"ormit$ issues.

f on those using lead in production.d) me 8 i. to pa$ "or child lead screening. education 8 or partial subsid$ to mass transit since it bene"its ever$one-less carsB &e) User charges usuall$ earmar. f !. does LG see.ed. &c) Cssue is whether there%s a limit to what +it$ can charge.. 0rivate entities get bene"it o" use o" public land. state will use S to screen victimsB &ii) FMitigating e""ects% "ee 8 to de"ra$ costs o" speci"ic t$pe o" business operation B creative use o" Fregulator$% concept in that it has e""ect o" regulating "uture behaviorBsee *.. &a) Cmportant distinction between "ee ..e. Kees are voluntar$ in that private entities don%t have to use public land. *. C" regulation ?usti"ied. &Loo.how much &c) 'hese are attractive to avoid limits on taJation &d) 0olic$ too: e""icienc$. &/) 4ene"it taJ distinguishable "rom general taJ: &a) +oercive &b) 5iscrete bene"it &?usti"ies ! limits taJ 8 no more than cost-bene"it) &c) Kor discrete program &earmar.+. internali#ation o" costs. commercial use o" public land charges. to put cost on regulatee. 4ndiana v( 1meritech 4ndiana &C2 )EEE) 8 *ro*ri tar.ing to impose "ee have legal authorit$ to do so &speci"ic grant or home rule)? Cs the local "ee preempted b$ state law &limited in Gary 45)? &1) Sinclair "aint 8 r /ulator. place eJamples. e>uit$ &i) 3ou pa$ more directl$ "or what $ou use 8 water. utilit$ "ees). or pa$ "or something particular) &b) 4ut voluntar$ 8 not coercive 8 $ou choose to use . meritech argued that charge should be "or management costs onl$.) &*) 'hese (C5%s are hard to challenge though 8 bene"its are general: S goes into speci"ic "und.e. then it%s o. Malue added ma$ be mar. +ourts generall$ de"er to cit$ 8 but sometimes re>uire cit$ to show some ?usti"ication.es sense 8 i.D) &. F ! & U! r C-ar/ ! &reg "ees. go toward maintaining a certain service R /ulator. &i) lmost li. gol" 8 whereas sometimes subsid$ b$ all ma. +ategor$ wrongl$ de"ined. &b) +it$ charged 1/D o" gross revenues o" meritech. &a) Gecall that cities are proprietar$ in that the$ own land: cities give permission to private entities to use land and charge them a "ee.e a tort "ee though? Kund? 0ermit activit$ but cover costs..processingB &)) City of Gary.monitoring .taJ due to 0rop 1* and )-* vote re>%ts "or taJes. i. )Q .ed) &1) User charges-regulator$ "ees: &a) lso discrete &"und certain program. the costs it imposes on Gar$.e. Gemember to as.) Man$ o" these cases 8 over-underinclusive arguments.G.++ &iii) G4: "ee here doesn%t reall$ "all into paradigm o" "ees to cover costs o" oversight . warehouse doesn%t bene"it "rom tourism board 8 and i" this is not a taJ then it%s wrongl$ applied.. &b) 5oesn%t seem ver$ voluntar$ &though >uasi@vol: $ou could prospectivel$ stop using lead ! thus escape "ee) &c) +': some activities are permissible $et sub?ect to regulation &licenses ! permits 8 gov%t regulates them ! charges $ou).et value rather than HcurrentI use value. at +hicago Mc+ormic.

or "ees< &*. not revenue@generating): thus.s li.et costs onl$ or share o" private revenues? &d) Aolding: 'here%s no reason +it$ can%t ma. i.e a reasonable rate o" return."ees< can%t reall$ mean "ees b-c "ees are sel"@limiting &tied to costs.e taJes.e a taJ. G4: this "actor doesn%t add an$thing.&1) 0ower to charge "ee is within AG powers &authorit$ doesn%t eJtend to taJ. license.taJ. so "ee v.management costs< &*.e. "inding that . 4ut this is sill$ b-c some taJes are paid with use &sales taJ) ! some "ees are paid periodicall$ &gas ! electric). &iii) Cs the amount o" the a""ected b$ level o" goods or services provided? 4mportant to analysis 8 although +it$ could argue that "lat rate is administrativel$ cheaper and more e""icient. this is a "ee.e a pro"it b-c +it$ is providing a mar. &g) +t anal$#ed . as opposed to one@time pa$ment. &i) When is the "ee paid? Cdea is that "ee is more "ee@li.s li. not a taJ.. all charges sub?ect to voter approval). C2 legislature limited "ees to .eller’s "ive "actors "or distinguishing "ees and "ee@ li. lthough the "ee ma$ have re"lected the bene"it to meritech.e this in an$ other case. as in 1ce #ent)1) Car). +it$ cannot even ma. which preempts +it$%s "ee.@.@?. so loo. &ii) +t did not give much attention to revenue@generating nature o" "ee. 'hus. $eatty v( !etropolitan St( Louis Sewer *istrict &M7 1QQ*) 8 user "ees-service charges. and there%s not much variation among users.+D) out@o"@poc."ees< must mean "ee@li. &e) 2ote that in assessing "ees v.ing?) &i) +t here paid most attention to &1) voluntariness and &)) bene"it received b$ meritech."ees< as "ees &thus. (o. so sub?ect to voter approval.e i" it%s paid with use. &iv) Cs the govt providing a service or good? 4mportant to analysis 8 +it$ provides a service in return "or a direct pa$ment.) &iii) +t did not give much attention to ongoing nature o" the "ee. &h) +t held that charge was a taJ.@1). the big di""erence b-t the cost to the +it$ and the "ee paid b$ meritech.etplace to meritech &*. &v) Aas the activit$ been historicall$ and eJclusivel$ provided b$ the govt? G4: this isn%t relevant b-c almost an$ govt service has a private@sector analogue. it was much greater than the cost to the +it$. 'hus. taJes.@0. &") Metro (ewer 5istrict charged "or sewer service &"lat "ee "or residences). &ii) Who pa$s the "ee? =ven i" almost all residents pa$ it could still be a "ee &it%s still voluntar$). M7 &through Aancoc. G4: irrelevant. .@?). &We don%t see a "ee li. taJ distinction matters). &i) *E . #oberts &1QY)) interpreted .e taJes: *. mendment) re>uires voter approval "or . cts give weight to di""erent "actors &voluntariness? receipt o" service? proportionalit$? earmar. so test is alwa$s ambiguous.e a "ee. not periodicall$."air and reasonable compensation< &*.eller &1QQ1) overturned. it loo. Aowever. &ii) (tatute limited "ees to . .

&iv) !ore factors = reasoning 8 *.) G4: ct got it wrong. *.%s "actor 1: Must serve regulator$ purpose rather than revenue raising purpose. &G4 "inds this persuasive. the problem here was that the charge was imposed over *E $ears. 4ut isn%t this a straight"orward charge "or the costs that $our land imposes? +t could have made a bigger deal out o" the "lat rate "or ` ) acre parcels. &iii) (ome element o" 'olu(tari( !!.) &c) *issent 8 enough that "unds are earmar.&C) &*) &. o" correspondence between charges ! bene"it con"erred &cit$ "ailed to di""erentiate an$ particulari#ed bene"its). &ii) 4ene"it to L7s &continue getting sewer service). &i) =ver$one was charged. but it%s understandable wh$ the ct came out this wa$.e characteristics o" charge: &the "actors as outlined b$ G4) &i) =armar. &a) lso &in boo.%s "actor 1: user "ees must be proportionate to necessar$ costs o" the service. &iii) +harge paid "or capital costs.) Ta9 or u! r f L &a) Kee@li. but consider how much scrutin$ this could re>uire. but it would re>uire voter approval &under MC constitutional amendment). +it$ set up "und to impose charge on each parcel o" prop in +it$ based on si#e o" lot and D impervious land. Ct%s unclear "rom the "acts whether whole s$stem would be shut down i" +it$ didn%t compl$ with +W . not ?ust the )/D o" L7s who still needed services to be separated &*. &a) 4oo. +it$ needed to separate storm sewers "rom sanitar$ sewers.) &a) Kactors: &i) uthorit$ 8 not in >uestion.ed "or the sewer s$stem. &a) G4 argues that all service "ees re"lect some in"rastructure improvements and maintenance. &` ) acres resid  "lat rate: commercial-industrial or Z ) acres resid  calculation. &! *. *1 . (ome capital cost is part o" ever$ "ee\ &b) (till. +ost S1V1m over *E $rs. o" signi"icant element o" regulation are important. F or ta9L &C" taJ.G> City of untington v( $acon &WM 1QQ1) +it$ charged "ee "or "lood and "ire protection 8 "lat rate R amount based on s>uare "ootage. ! lac. &a) *issent 8 must see sewer s$stem as a whole.G2) lac. $olt v( City of Lansing &MC 1QQY) 'o compl$ with +W .G1). it%s sub?ect to state limitations and schools are eJempt. +it$ could do this thru taJes. +t was troubled b$ idea that L7s could change use o" land to decrease "ee b-c it inter"eres with use o" prop.ed &not into general revenues). &a) 4oo. &ii) 2ot voluntar$.G0) &b) 4ut ct held it was a taJ. Cnstead. but the in"rastructure would last Z *E $ears. &ii) +harge was not voluntar$.

&c) C" this is a "ee.e it di""icult to eJclude non@pa$ors "rom pa$ors. Li. 0 challenged validit$ o" the "ee b-c bene"it to developers who paid was speculative &not clear whether the$ would actuall$ bene"it).D. other uses according to acre-"oot o" water use). +t didn%t give much attention to proportionalit$.) is much more common. &b) +t upheld "ee 8 there was a lo/i&al &o(( &tio( b-t need "or water imposed b$ growth ! earmar. but paid be"ore the development. ! it%s earmar. &b) 7ne@time &li. the$%d get protection. there%s no need to show direct bene"it to developer or mature. apartments. &iii) *) .e a service "ee.e a ( ). &v) 2ature o" "lood and "ire protectionPspillover e""ectsP ma. &iv) Geceipt o" service? =ver$one has to pa$. 'hus.e a ( ). it doesn%t loo. ct held not a taJ b-c it%s not imposed li. Kee was imposed on tall buildings "or greater than usual services.e) % ' &1) &)) &*) 0roportional onl$ in that people can control s>uare "ootage o" their buildings. &)) *ro*ortio(alit. what wouldn%t be? 'his is an eJtreme decision.e even i" some didn%t. loc. single@"amil$ homes. &c) 'his 5CK eJpands the concept o" a ( : it%s paid be"ore development ! it%s cit$wide. it avoids the appearance o" a taJ). Cssue that deserves more attention is the e>uit$ o" charging onl$ newcomers. not old@timers &hori-ontal e?uity). but the desire "or growth to pa$ "or itsel". &c) 'ied to ph$sical improvement o" land &li.ed "ees. with developer. &*olan?) ome $uilders 1ss’n of Central 1> v( City of Scottsdale & T 1QQV) &a) ll new developments were charged water resources development "ee based on categories &e. and it seems li.entr$ "ee. not neighborhood based..ed. lo*) (t #)*a&t F ! &=Jactions?) +haracteristics: &a) 5CKs re"lect cost o" growth 8 costs are non@linear. )E states have eJpress authori#ation "or LGs to impose 5CKs: ma$ also be authori#ed under home@rule.e a taJ 8 not ad valorem &i. li. lso consider 5CKs as an alternative to using #oning to control growth. ?agged when new in"rastructure is re>uired. &g) (tate cts t$picall$ sub?ect 5CKs to 2ou5l .. down b-c mone$ didn%t go to discrete "und "or tall buildings.( 9u! t !t: &1) &o(( &tio( b-t the need "or services that growth places on the communit$ ! and eJaction imposed. 2ot ?ust a circumvention o" taJ limitations. so bene"its weren%t limited to pa$ors. 4-c pa$ors do not get direct receipt o" service. &b) 5espite these "actors.ed "unds. Mone$ went to water resources "und.ed in plan "or earmar. &") pproJ.e. +t struc. b-t eJaction and burden created b$ proposed development. &d) Ma$ be passed "orward to "uture homeowner or ma$ stic.g. &e) 0eople who pa$ "ee might not receive the bene"it. &i) (ituation o" 7merson College &*. Country 2oe v( City of 7agan &M2 1QQV) &a) +it$ adopted road unit connection charge as a condition to issuance o" all building permits in the +it$.e an .< a condition "or development to proceed.

isn%t it a taJ? &ii) =ven i" prop owner has a child. so must be eJempt &will never bene"it: do not burden). &ii) Cn addition. &+ case) &c) 7r. or patterns o" development &*+0. revenues. &iii) 0lus. down "ee. *+0? &c) 5e"inition o" 5CK: *+0? &i) Korm o" development eJaction in "orm o" predetermined S pa$ment: assessed as condition to receiving permitapproval: pursuant to LG power to regulate growth: levied to "und services nec. Ct%s closest to ( . Gegarding the taJ issue.o( 1. (+ suggesting S can be a '. Ct%s not a user "ee b-c not paid per child: it%s not a taJ b-c not uni"orm &applied onl$ to newcomers). o" proportionalit$ violates principle that 5CK must re"lect the cost o" in"rastructure improvements necessitated b$ the development.ed to "und pro?ects necessitated b$ new development: it was intermingled with general road "und. &ii) 'hus.e.ids. 5CK%s ! 'a. ct distinguished homes that do not have . &Cs this a plausible distinction?) &iii) 'uition issue is harder. not the pa$or: houses turn over and will impose burden at some point: better schools raise prop values. '$pes o" debt: aB %uratio( &1) (hort term debt &a) i. "or an age@restricted communit$. &i) 4ut this argument does not wor. ir =rlich *+1. 4ut could be i" re>%ts not met. L$ Borro1i(/ & % 5t Li)itatio(! *+??. so no authorit$ to impose "ee: and state had preempted. &b) Kee had two problems: &i) C" applied to all prop owners in "lat "ee. 23 +it$ 8 /lushing ** . cit$ was not home rule. that had minimum age re>uirement. "or new development: in proportionate amount to public need generated b$ new development.). +ount$ assessed public school impact "ee on new homes..ids and that cannot have . i" "ee meets double neJus &rough proportionalit$ ! relationship between gov%t purpose ! eJaction) 8 not a '. some people won%t get an$ bene"it b-c the$ don%t have . &i) Lac. C" "ee is not tied to discrete bene"it. down charge on proportionalit$ grounds 8 charge had not been periodicall$ updated to account "or changes in costs. even prop owners w-o .ings 8 5olan = *ollan + *+1> &a) =Jactions cases &2ollan-5olan) 8 limited to land-ph$sical eJactions? &so n-a to "ees?) &b) 7r.ids gain bene"it 8 the "ee is tied to the prop.ids. 8olusia County v( 1berdeen &KL )EEE) &a) KL has constitutional re>uirement "or "ree public schools. 0 was mobile home par.) &/) +t struc. the mone$ collected was not earmar. isn%t "ee a tuition charge? &c) +t struc.&b) &.

tunnels. in"luJ o" "ed "unds. Mass transit L a bottomless pit. etc. some to 0 'A. .non@guaranteed .en ?ust to cover temp de"icits. and immunit$ "rom suits to "orce pa$ment. substantial program and union wor. 5oes de"erment violate this? &a) +': debt L binding commitment o" cit$%s abilit$. tolls. lso needed to satis"$ bond mar. voter approval. +it$ tried to convert short@term cit$ debt into long@ term state debt: get note holder to roll the notes over into long@term notes. &1) 1QV/ mar. threat to taJpa$ers. 7therwise. pplies in emergencies too. special "unds. repa$? 4orrowing no longer allowed.+ &*) =""ects: strength "or states-cities to be able to use such well@bac.lose< case since court%s emphasis made mar. Lots o" limitations.et re@entr$ easier\ see *+.ed b$ speci"ic revenue sourcesBmore common now) &b) 'otal obligation to pa$: ver$ attractive to lenders. due to bindingness. below) E(for& ) (t of Stat & Lo&al % 5t O5li/atio(! a) /lushing: 23 +it$ 8 eJplosion o" taJes. +it$ cut services and raised taJes: de"erred loans. due to bindingness. ceilings on amount o" debt or on D o" assessed valuationB) &)) Gevenue bond debt &discussed under state const( limitations. &i.@ 8 U((+ emphasi#ed binding nature o" U( +onst contracts clause.o5li/atio( &1) General obligation debt &"ull "aith ! credit) &a) G7 debt bac.) to mass transit or GG%s other than 0 'A &or an$ non@sel"@su""icient thing).ed b$ "ull revenue raising capacit$ o" borrower &special obligation . +losed b$ short term notes.) 'his case emphasi#es binding nature o" state "aith ! credit clause.ed credit\ (o. plus not "air 8 "uture residents. so long as bonds &b) *.B*+.S 0rust &re 0ort uthorit$ bonds) *+. better outcome "or state to . etc &e) 2ot supposed to be part o" normal budget c$cle &") 'oo much repeated short term debt indicates "iscal problems.generations will be using in"rastructure. ) states agreed 27' to appl$ an$ 0 S &"ees. (ome S went to W'+. airports.et &)) 0 did lots o" bridges.es to repa$. pa$ incrementall$ &same principal as a home mortgage) 5B Natur of t.e. alwa$s running a de"icit.2$ 5ebt ta. &)) +ase: 23 constitution re>uired F"aith ! credit% behind cit$ borrowing. corruption? &)) Long term debt &a) 'o "inance large capital eJpenditures &"or larger pro?ects with long term bene"its) &b) 'oo eJpensive to "inance large pro?ects up "ront. Kaith ! credit clause re>uires cit$ to do whatever it ta.ed b$ speci"ic state revenues. 5ebt ! interest grew ! grew. G 2%s.+ &. &b) +reditors end up with pre"erred position here 8 cit$ must pa$ them bac. short@term notes. so the$ are made to help "inance it down the road &vertical e?uity??) &c) Get "ull bene"it now. b) . or "ed "unds) &c) 5ebt repaid within a $ear &d) ' 2%s. uneJpected revenue short"alls or increased eJpenses: S borrowed to balance budget &on basis o" eJpected neJt $ear%s revenues. bac.revenue bond debt onl$ bac. &1) 0 "ormed between 23@26.et got nervous 8 how will cit$ close the gap.er buildupBbegan to develop discrepanc$ between revenue-costs. cit$ said * $ear moratorium on pa$ing bac.

new taJes re>uired "or new debts. b) 'o deal with binding...S 0rust was not. then state did via covenants. awa$ Fan important securit$ provision% 8 so perhaps certaint$ o" repa$ment was reduced? 5ebt not as secured? &G4: 'his seems to be guesswor.) &b) re r ! r' 2 *o1 r! involved? contract binds current and "uture gov%ts. &ii) Ma$be some Ns creating negative cov%s would in"ringe on substantive polic$B&unclear) t some point it ma$ get into reserved powers.>$ outstanding. bene"its accrue though all around 8 in "inance communit$. c) 4etween these two cases 8 ironclad obligation "or state-LG debt obligations &helps in long run b$ having good credit. cit$ wants more mass transit. &*) 'hen came 1QV* oil shoc.) 4U' once gov%t pledges ""!c.’s??X &ii) *++0. leads to nice simple borrowing pledges: we%ll pa$ $ou bac. but ?usti"ication arg is better.) Stat Co(!titutio(al Li)it! o( S&L % 5t a) Kull "aith ! credit obligations in general bonds: source o" enormous securit$ "or borrowers.< Wdoes this treat gov’t . real N obligation. state repealed covenants retrospectivel$.etB) &d) C" so. to service recipients. Would be good to raise tolls a lot: subsidi#e. 2ot an issue. repeal o" covenant too. 2ollar & ili(/! on debt &with re"erence to assessed value-revenue-B) */ . good basis "or debt. Fseductive% nature o" debts. &c) #)*air) (t to changing N%s? Was there an outright repudiation o" obligation "or a while &li. gov%t has power to contract. c) Marious "orms: 'ot r a**ro'al o" debt. no re@negging o" pa$ment: ?ust terms changed.es in anal$sis: &a) Kirst see i" N eJists 8 not ever$ law is a N &Aere. especiall$ between states-gov%ts and people. but not till later)? &i) Aere.e 5epression or suchBG4: impairment is wea. . 4ut not here. where the$ did pa$ bac. +lause is meaning"ul. (omewhat ps$chological wrt what%s valuable-not in bond mar. N%s protected.’s more leniently than private .e const amendment &so vote needed?). the states% covenant. states impose lots o" limits. +ore pa$ment commitment didn%t changeBCmpairment la$s in removing ban on using "unds "or GG%s 8 threat to debt service pa$ments? +ourt sa$s though that not all N modi"ications are . (tates can%t contract about ever$thing 8 to do so would be li. S ends up going to mass transit.s. (ee *++>. though. $es. Cs legislature allowed to bind itsel" so strongl$? &i) +': &gives circular answer) Gov%t has some core reserved powers it can%t N awa$.) +': repeal invalid under N +lause. *++1 Aere. 0 made this commitment to lenders &no more GG%s). to construction world. (till. 5anger with N +lause: don%t want people to contract around public lawB whenever private citi#ens involved. &/) (teps court ta. 1QV.impairments. 8u!tifi 2? Geasonable ! necessar$ "or important public purpose? &i) 2o emergenc$ li. 4ut covenant against using "unds "or that. & /lushing was general ob. environmental consciousness. 5anger o" debt seen in 5epressionBdebt limits began. voters are bound. &.e in /lushing.

F(eat o" the pants reasonableness. &d) +' distinguishes 7a%in &C2 case) which attributed all o" hotel-user taJ to new "acilit$Bthis case didn%t go as "ar. C2 cases) L taJing activit$ generated b$ the pro?ect. guidelines on how to set-raise tolls. &b) i.e. bond bu$ers  debt  bridge built  user tolls collected  tolls used to pa$ o"" interest-debt to bond bu$ers.2 5t % 5t a) 'he (pecial Kund 5octrine: (o long as state limits its obligation to the Fspecial "und% o" S generated b$ the pro?ect ! doesn%t obligate general revenue. common "orm o" non@debt debt) &a) a. L: no debt allowed ever: but *E@something amendments\ *++D). no bindingness o" revenue raising capacit$.a pro?ect "inance 8 bonds whose interest is "inanced solel$ b$ revenue "rom operation o" "acilit$ being "inanced.No(. Not ( 1 r ' (u !F (o ( 9u!F r *r ! (t! t-r at to ta9*a.e arg in "avor 8 not enough.< &6ust as some assessments.e. use special taJes &i. &*) (tretching the doctrine 8 rather than using admission "or "or +onvention +enter to pa$ bonds. on hotels) &AC.e. or elseB6ust as non@taJ taJes &! special districts not bound to rules) grew to escape limits: we have (o(. +ourt sa$s no.! to / t arou(2 li)it! 8 state const amendment &i.e. Gev bonds ma$ also involve other debt obligations 8 i. &4f bridge falls down.Ri! of t. 7N "or user taJ to precede "acilit$.irley 8 taJ increment as special "und *1 . bond holders are screwed??) &d) 5istinctive characteristics: ( 1 r ' (u is involved &that wouldn%t eJist but "or the bonds): revenues are f ! (ot ta9 !: net@ plus &more revenues being generated than debt accrued &?)).% Ct is li)it 2 lia5ilit. (o not a direct pledge o" ++ revenues 8 but indirect "unding &more hotel taJ collected as a b$@product o" ++B) &b) 'his is a stretch 8 i" taJ raised now but ++ isn%t "inished "or ) more $ears. 5 i(/ 5uilt & ta9 &willingness to tease out this relationship varies by state thoughB) (tretch "rom classic pro?ect "inance but o.. &a) City of artford v .) (uch bonds are generall$ new S. r ' (u 5o(2! ≠ . &1) R ' (u Bo(2! &basic. etc. Gev bonds have recentl$ been pushed into new domainsBi. &1) Convention Center 1uthority v 1n-ai &AC case) &a) (tate had maJ%d debt limit. "ees ! charges are not taJ: some t$pes o" borrowing are not debt.d) ?$ Wa. is it legit to use current taJ revenues that aren%t reall$ "rom ++ guests?? &c) 2onetheless the +' upholds the user taJ: reasonabl$ close "it &( 9u!). &)) !aroc%ie v 3agoner &WM case) &a) No &o(( &tio( between school building bonds ! consumer sales taJ. looser conneJ between "acilit$ "inanced ! use o" revenuesB T. &c) Gevenues onl$ are pledged 8 not ""!c-revenue raising capacit$. (tate raised hotel taJ ! pledged incremental revenue to pa$ o"" bonds "or +onvention +enter. &e) Gev bonds tend to be ver$ sa"e: interest onl$ slightl$ higher than G7 bonds. not pulling S "rom other taJes. &so low threat to taJpa$ers): ( 1 r ' (u !: and r al ( 9u! 5 t1 ( fa&ilit.e. r! &diverting eJisting taJ would mean a new taJ elsewhere)Bstate relies solel$ on limited liabilit$ to ma.debt.2 5t 2 5t: revenue bonds ! moral obligation bonds.

&=ven though charge not necessaril$ e>ual to actual cost o" operating) &. &1) Cssues o" cheaper cost. or renting space &guaranteed space is better) 8 long term commitment might be needed b$ vendor "or capital investment 8 i. so prop taJ increment "inancing not nec limited liabilit$. that all revenue is due to pro?ect.e pro?ect "inance 8 but +' doesn%t accept premise that it is. S r'i& 0ur&-a! : C" cit$ wants long term N "or services &i. 5ebt? &a) LG%s tried to st$le it as service purchase 8 bu$ing Metro services &b) 1st case. pa$ment provided onl$ i" service provided 8 but court points out: calculation o" pa$ment amount had no relation to amount o" service provided. &*) !assey &M case) 8 bond bu$ers% S went to WM ' "or Metro s$stem &operation ! maintenance: construction alread$ dealt with as debt): "ares pa$ bac. Cncrease in land value could occur outside o" pro?ect. (een as series o" short term agreements. $ulman 8 state wanted o""ice building built 8 can%t do itsel" due to debt limits: ma. supplier. Cs this debt? &ii) rg that it isn%t: limited liabilit$. assurance to vendors ma.es long term commitment "or periodic pa$ments to contractor). hotel-"ood taJBusing prop taJ carve@out is not o.) $ulman 8 another evasion o" debt limits b$ waiving service purchase idea 8 even more manipulable. bonds onl$ paid out o" new "unds. &i. S collected b$ pro?ect pa$s "or itsel". &iv) 'his is a close case 8 ver$ close to pro?ect "inance 8 other courts go the other wa$.b) +it$ wanted pro?ect to help investment in blighted area: raise taJ. especiall$ when used as incentive on LG%s behal". &v) 'his loo. bonds 8 this would be classic pro?ect "inanceBbut Metro "ares don%t pa$ totall$ "or itsel". 2ote that court wasn%t sa$ing bonds unconst. (o agreements between M -5+-M5 to pa$ into Metro ! cover s$stem costs. that%s wh$ it%s not o. with court as a .. Ct%s a threat to eJisting revenue.ing investments "or LG. investing in special e>uipment to produce LG@speci"ic items. &a) 4ut debt@li.e. Kragments prop taJ. &i) *V . "ormula based on amount o" service in each ?urisdiction &to determine amount o" pa$ment) 8 o.s a lot li.e. 7ther bonds use other charges. paper clips) 8 to loc. Cs a long term service purchase commitment debt? &)) =arl$ court decisions: true service N%s &periodic pa$ment. (et@up is. Cncrease in prop taJ value is b-c o" pro?ect &iii) 4ut +': long term commitment to divert "uture revenues: use o" prop taJ is troubling. in price. it%s a share o" operating de"icit.< 8 not debt.. but that enabling statute sa$ing bonds ≠ debt is wrong: and since +it$ had alread$ surpassed const debt limits.. tied to receipt o" products inthat period) is not debt. or cost o" particular service. '$picall$ N%s sa$ dut$ to pa$ tied to receipt o" services. Not tru li)it 2 lia5ilit.e >ualit$. &c) &LG%s rewrote statute) &d) )nd case. pro?ect "inance aspect 8 no diversion o" other "unds. incremental revenue collected used to pa$ "or pro?ect.service purchase. assurance o" suppl$.e. here. no obligation on cit$ revenue raising capacit$. +' throws out 8 that%s not what it is.

2ot a totall$ binding obligation 8 so ! r'i& *ur&-a! . Moral o5li/atio( 8 is this . eJpense. 4ond bu$ers% S went to building. &d) 5issent: ma?orit$ con"lates . use to build par. contingent upon annual appropriation.&B (tate contracts with developer to build a state building. based on overall cost o" construction. Method o" calculation matters too.. pro"it. but practicall$ bound &*+DD). M 'ransportation 5ist: '5 will issue bonds. "rom general revenues. so not o.legall$ obligated.debt< or is it nothing? &)) *y%es case 8 M court 1st sa$s. Ma$ not be legall$ binding.el$ no att$%s on sta"" "or adviceB No(. &a) (ome sense o" +' treating W0(( cities li. service purchase L pa$ment in eJchange "or services. (tate could lease a building "or )/ $ears: interprets this arrangement as a lease rather than installment@purchase arrengement.< &a) *Y . debt.ed b$ +ount$ but not general obligation. 'his is a little di""erent though than paper clips &a discrete item that%s shopped "or?) 8 here the item .ll or -i/. (hould have gone thru "orum re>uirements 8 voter approval 8 the$ didn%t. &b) G4: 5eveloper is ?ust a middle man 8 has nothing really to do with "inancing.e children &N capacit$ o" minors) 8 eJcept that court ma. 2o revenues generated b$ 4 .s it%s o. Mone$ is coming "rom general "unds. bonds bac. nothing. state sa$s it%ll send S to pa$ debt service.A**ro*riatio( Clau! !F Moral O5li/atio(!F Borro1i(/ 5. =ven though small cities. &d) G4: real deal here 8 LG probabl$ at debt capacit$.1at r< clause L huge liabilit$.. is this unconst debt not approved b$ voters? &c) +': not a special "und eJception since road doesn%t pa$ &and no gas taJ or something related to pro?ect S generated to rel$ on either).es them ta. 5eveloper pa$s bac.wa$ +ount$ wants. lease termination.D+) 8 . 6ust an evasionar$ device. 0u5li& Aut-oriti ! &1) Ultimate >uestion: what i" LG doesn%t pretend to be bu$ing an$thing? (tate-building authorit$-bond holders arrangements 8 where building authorit$ builds. 2ot a N: the$%ll pa$ i" the$ want to pa$\ &b) 0romise to appropriate is non@binding. Ct%s a lease b-c o" clauses providing "or damage repair. &/) 'hese ) cases demonstrate 8 not ?ust as simple as. &a) Kair"aJ +ount$ 8 deal with 2o. C" $ou aren%t Fbinding% $oursel" 8 it%s a non@binding commitment. Ma?or concern was ?ust to avoid debt limit.practical e""ect< ! . &1) +ommon to have declarator$ ?udgment at beginning sa$ing bonds-debts constitutional 8 else later LG can get out o" debt-bond b$ having it declared unconstitutional\ &V) W0(( bonds comments &*+D.. &c) 2onetheless +' thin. +ount$ promises to send S to cover debt service. 23 court sa$s straight awa$ it%s nothing.e responsibilit$. get S. 2ot a pledge o" "ull "aith ! credit. 'hen reverses itsel" ! sa$s. 4ond bu$ers also told. li. or didn%t want voter approval.. LG ?ust sa$s the$%ll pa$ amount o" S needed to cover debt serviceBon a $ear@to@$ear determination. bonds b$ charging state Frent%.purchased< has been created b$ LG%s in the 1st place.

spend mone$ on certain things are not debt 8 it%s a good idea 8 e""icienc$ 8 to .%(ub?ect to appropriation% "inancing does not create constitutionall$ cogni#able debt b-c it does not impose an$ en"orceable dut$ or liabilit$ on the +ount$.. not bene"its. in realit$.< *@0G. but have problems.ind o" "inancing is reall$ common "or 23( though. &a) +' sa$s state is not automaticall$ liable "or public service authorit$ debtBstate is barred "rom lending its credit: but state can give S to them and commit itsel" to do so. Ct needs S and its credit is bad. di""erent . 4ut commitments to run programs. *@0@ Moral obligation ma$ eJist 8 but it%s not legall$ binding.Cs an$one so naave that the$ trul$ believe that the +ount$.1?. 'hat doesn%t necessaril$ mean abandon them thoughB? 0ublic authorities 8 sometimes reall$ needed.e annual appropriations until the bonds are retired?< Schul. is not compelled to ma.0D &b) G4: this is reall$ a scam.) &/) &1) &V) Gehearing: court sa$s there is a di""erence a"ter all: li.Laws ma. but not binding upon "uture governments &whereas promise to pa$ Fcome hell or high water% certainl$ is debt). *@1? 'his . .eep programs going.v 5' 8 state deal with 'hruwa$ uthorit$ which issues debt "or various highwa$ pro?ects. 5ebate over whether limits. see *@12. thruwa$ is ?ust a conduitBbac. *Q . 2oncommittal: . General idea here 8 debt has >uasi@constitutional aspect that binds into "uture.inds o" "inancing are good 8 what%s the right level o" debt limitations? &see *@1.&e) &*) &.e dissent had pointed out\ (ee *@02: ma?orit$ sa$s.< &i) *issent: . that we end up with ?ust costs o" limits.1+) G4: so much evasion.door "inancing.ing annual appropriations "rom a special "und do not ! cannot create debts within the meaning o" the re"erendum re>uirement.