You are on page 1of 5

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-4089 January 12, 1909

As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered by the court below on the 5th of April, 1907, whereby the defendants were absolved from the former complaint, on account of the lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against the defendants, with costs against the plaintiff, who excepted to the said judgment and in addition moved for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law; the motion was overruled and the plaintiff excepted and in due course presented the corresponding bill of exceptions. The motion of the defendants requesting that the declaration contained in the judgment that the defendants had demanded therefrom, for the reason that, according to the evidence, no such request had been made, was also denied, and to the decision the defendants excepted. Assuming that it is a real fact of knowledge by the defendants that the plaintiff, by virtue of having been sent for by the former, attended a physician and rendered professional services to a daughter-in-law of the said defendants during a difficult and laborious childbirth, in order to decide the claim of the said physician regarding the recovery of his fees, it becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay the bill, whether the father and mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of the latter. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasicontracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.) The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses are mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. This liability originates from the above-cited mutual obligation which the law has expressly established between the married couple. In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen, and compliance

ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-appellees. J.H. Junquera, Filemon Sotto, for appellee. TORRES, J.: On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escaño, it was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he was occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient several times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with any other relief that might be deemed proper. In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation therein contained and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore, he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the court below sustained the demurrer, directing the defendants, on the 23rd of January, 1907, to amend their answer. In compliance with this order the defendants presented, on the same date, their amended answer, denying each and every one of the allegations contained in the complaint, and requesting that the same be dismissed with costs. for appellant.

and and Tracey.) Within the meaning of the law. concur. concurs JJ. who believes that he is entitled to recover his fees. it is needless to declare whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical operation. C. it does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician. The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the judgment below are unfounded. if the plaintiff has no right of action against the defendants. while recognizing the validity and efficiency of a contract to furnish support wherein a person bound himself to support another who was not his relative. Therefore. in view of the consideration hereinbefore set forth. and. 1897. nor in consequence of any contract entered into between them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen. nor are they now. From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought an action against the defendants simply because they were the parties who called the plaintiff and requested him to assist the patient during her difficult confinement.. but as the liability arose out of a contract. J. in the .. the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support. and also. among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement. dissents. because. must direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an emergency. established the rule that the law does impose the obligation to pay for the support of a stranger.. Mapa Arellano. the stipulations of the agreement must be held. Carson. the supreme court of Spain. to pay the fees claimed. it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant. therefore.. In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support. Willard. (Decision of May 11. because they were her father and motherin-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The defendants were not. the plaintiff. on the other hand. So ordered. for which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they consented to bind themselves.J. result. J. under any obligation by virtue of any legal provision. possibly.therewith is unavoidable.

and since then possessed.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G. The original action instituted in the case at bar sought the complaint filed by the plaintiffs Felipe Capua. Gonzales for respondents. Province of Pangasinan described in paragraph 2 of the complaint was being possessed by Jose Maramba. 895 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan against Sabina Capua and companions for revindication but that notwithstanding. 1977 JUAN DACASIN. and in the trial of the case both parties sought to sustain their respective positions by oral and documentary proofs. de Joya for petitioners. 1963 alleging that he was the true owner. SORAHAYDA MARAMBA. 895 Jose Maramba having died..R. his heirs and successors-in-interest sometime afterwards on 2 August. 895 was pending. with that development.Maramba filed Civil (Case) No. Exh. Plaintiffs-Appellants. notwithstanding the writ. docketed as Civil Case No. l952. Exh.£îhqw⣠Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. it will appear that Sabina also had her own. vs.:têñ. et al. the heirs of Jose . respondents. petitioners. Capua and his wife be declared the absolute owners of the property. Felipe Capua began the present hostilities by filing together with his wife and his original vendors Gualberto Calulot and wife the present Civil Case No. GUERRERO. an In answer to that Sabina alleged that she had already disposed of the property more than ten (10) years previous to Gualberto Calulot who in turn had sold afterwards to Felipe Capua. et al. JOSE MARAMBA. Sinforosa Padilla. L-32723 October 28. in due time filed their answer on 30 April. 42404-R entitled "Felipe Capua. G and possession was unto him delivered by the Sheriff on 4 October. 1962 against Sabina Capua and companions in the old Civil Case No. D-1292 in the Pangasinan Court on 22 February. G-1. while Jose Maramba had his own declaration of land tax. Exh. Gualberto Calulot and Olimpia Lomibao (herein respondents) against the defendants Juan Dacasin. J. 4. the gist . and that the question of ownership was already judicially settled in Civil (Case) No. FLORDELIZA MARAMBA and FILIPINAS MARAMBA. went to the Court in Civil (Case) No. 1960. F. the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared Jose Maramba absolute owner and condemned Sabina and companions to vacate and deliver to Maramba. now in anticipation of repercussions that would have to be produced by that judgment. A and Gualberto took over there is no evidence that Gualberto was informed or came to know of the pending litigation between Jose Maramba and Sabina Capua: at any rate by decision dated 1 (September). C Gualberto sold the same property unto now plaintiffs spouses Felipe Capua and Sinforosa Padilla. R. Exh. 1943 the property in question. Exh. sold the property to herein defendant Juan Dacasin and his wife. 1455. FELIPE CAPUA. sometime afterwards on a date not very clear in the record. MARIA MARAMBA. THE COURT OF APPEALS. The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: ñé+. 895 for revival of the judgment.R. (Jose Maramba) asked to punish him for contempt but the Pangasinan Court by order of 5 February.£ªwph!1 IT RESULTING: That the antecedents are quite complicated and it will be the task of this Court to simplify. Sec. while that Civil Case No. from then on actual possession came to be a seesaw. vs Juan Dacasin. Barbara. C and defendant Juan Dacasin. No. 895 and secured a writ of possession on 3 October. 895. 1. Exh. SINFOROSA PADILLA. 1961 held that there could be no contempt because the writ of possession having been issued more than 5 years from the date the judgment had become final became a nullity under Rule 39. 1456 against Juan Dacasin and the heirs of Jose Maramba asking that he. Exh. Sabina remained.. see Exh. et al. 1960. in that month and year a certain Sabina Capua with companions grabbed possession of the property. 1950 of his immediate predecessor-in-interest Gualberto Calulot succeeded by himself on 27 May. Alberto R. 1950 Exh. 1961. 1960 under Exh. X. Felipe Capua tried to come in once again. and the Pangasinan Court after hearing the case for revival of judgment revived it by decision of 21 March. 1960. GUALBERTO CALULOT and OLIMPIA LOMIBAO. 6 and so it was that the Pangasinan Court restored Felipe Capua to possession. and these last came in to possess thereafter: meantime the prevailing party in Civil Case No. Jose Maramba and Filipinos Maramba (herein petitioners). 895. No. sometime prior to January 19. Defendants-Appellees" reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan which adjudicated the ownership of the land in controversy to the plaintiffs. Y. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. and for his part several years later specifically on 27 May. E. it was at this stage where the trouble came to brew because Jose (Maramba) having tried to possess and thwarted in his efforts by Felipe Capua. Sabina sold the property unto Gualberto Calulot on 21 April. unfortunately decision was not executed within the reglementary period of five (5) years from the time it had become final pursuant to the Rules. 1963 against Sabina Capua and her old companions in Civil Case No. a parcel of rural land in the barrio of Patayac Municipality of Sta. Jose Maramba filed Civil Case No. virtue of his purchase in good faith and by the continuous possession from 21 April.

After trial. paragraph 6. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of a litigious disposition on the part of the suitors to the preservation of public tranquillity and happiness.£ªwph!1 The Court hereby renders judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant. We are in full agreement for the judgment in Civil Case No. (Santos vs. declaring the plaintiffs. SO ORDERED.£ªwph!1ge Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court. The claim made by the defendants for damages in the amount of P5. 61) We find in this case at bar the following requisites that concur (1) there must be a final judgment or order. 1963 against the defendants permanent. Ong Lian. pursuant to the document Exh. and (4) there must be between the two cases Identity of parties. July 8. 45 SCRA. adjudicating the ownership of the lot to the defendant spouses Felipe Capua and Sinforosa Padilla. that is. ownership therein could be defeated by acquisitive prescription. however. public policy and necessity. San Gabriel. stating that "the trouble is that plaintiff Felipe Capua has squarely raised the question of his own title obtained thru acquisitive prescription. and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law. in view of all the foregoing. Mariñ. 288. Tuason. jointly severally. CFI of Pangasinan on September 8. 1952 in favor of Jose Maramba. and on September 1. this Court rules that defendant. with rights of possession and enjoyment of the land in question and orders the defendant to vacate the same and deliver to the plaintiff the possession. the absolute owner. defendants predecessor-in-interest having been declared the true owner of the property as against Sabina Capua. the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing the judgment a from. the amount of P500 00 spent by them in defending this suit. We do not agree to this holding of the Court of Appeals. (3) there must be a judgment or order on the merits. Pfleider. p. and that possession was exclusive. Plaintiffs now appeal to the Court in fourteen (14) t of which can be reduced to only one issue.£ªwph!1 (Record on Appeal. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and the counterbond filed by the defendant Juan Dacasin is ordered cancelled. or for a space of seventeen (17) years not Jose Maramba but Sabina Capua and after the sale by Sabina to Gualberto on 21 April.000. ñé+. went further. 57 SCRA 531." To this holding of respondent . ( the true owner notwithstanding Civil Case No. the plaintiffs are also ordered to pay the costs of this proceedings. adverse and continuous. plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest litigation must have to be decided in the same manner. 1964 dissolving the writ.£ªwph!1 The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. 1970. the plaintiffs appealed to the appellate court. 65 SCRA 13). 1950 under Exh.00.. The plaintiffs are hereby ordered to respect defendants' possession and to refrain from further molesting defendant Juan Dacasin in the enjoyment of said property. Benin v. with costs against the defendants. The Court of Appeals held "that the question of ownership was litigated by the parties' respective predecessor-in-interest in Civil Case No. DOMONDON ñé+.£ªwph!1 WHEREFORE. (2) the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties." The Court held that "throughout the intervening period from 1943 to 1960. Juan Dacasin is the true and lawful owner of that certain parcel of land described in the above-entitled complaint. which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation the other the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. the same not having been satisfactorily proven. et al. 42 SCRA 589) Respondent court. 1960 by herein plaintiff. 1968. On July 17. made the writ of injunction issued by the trial judge on March 28. whether the decision is in accordance with law and jurisprudence. were the ones in possession in the concept of owner of the property. 895 in favor of their predecessor-in-interest Jose Maramba. and is therefore. resolved the question of title and ownership of the property in litigation as follows: ñé+. complaint. the full and complete possession of the same. is hereby denied. entitled to. the said successive possession of. 1944. rendered in favor of the petitioners Juan Dacasin et al. 895 (and) if this were to be the only point involved there should be no question that Jose Maramba. that the holding on the issue of ownership was already impossible to evade having been finally settled in Civil (Case) No.£ªwph!1 SIXTO A. Finally. and it must have to be admitted that the property being 49 SCRA 44. having shown that this title thereto has been acquired in good faith from unpolluted sources. ñé+. The plaintiffs are also ordered to pay the defendants. 895 because of his long continued possession tacked with that of his predecessors-in-interest while defendants sought to show the reverse. vs. Dagupan City. judgment war. Pacific Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. It is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence. in the following wise and ñé+. and as Gualberto in turn was succeeded on 27 May. Viray vs.ñé+. Gualberto Calulot from 1950 to 1960 and Felipe Capua herein plaintiff from 1960 up to the institution of the present case was enough to perfect a title of ownership. C. namely Sabina Capua from 1943 to 1950. Felipe Capua. the one.of plaintiff's position sought to be developed in his evidence being that he ". . Jose Maramba. Identity of subject matter and Identity of action. and set aside the order of the trial judge dated April 29. 895 file and docketed in the. A afterwards Gualberto.

1944 to September 1. titles of ownership or of other rights over immovable property duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property constitute notice to third persons and affords protection in favor of him who in good faith relies upon what appears in the registry. 1950. when Jose Maramba sued Sabina Capua on September 8. The same is true with Felipe Capua. As between two parties relying on their respective instruments of sale of the same property. Felipe Capua cannot claim good faith as to ripe his possession to acquisitive prescription. 895. there is no evidence that he paid taxes in his name or that he paid taxes any other year before or after 1958.00 under Tax No. Petition granted. Article 709 of the New Civil Code. At this point in time. The name of Sabina Capua as the declared owner remained from 1950 to 1964. 1960 as the deed was executed on May 27. By this time.C. This being so. it is not correct to say that the intervening periods of 1943 to 1950 (the possession of Sabina Capua). 1944 in Civil Case No. 4) WHEREFORE. hence the inevitable conclusion is that said Gualberto Calulot did not deem himself the owner thereof and. Although Gualberto Calulot paid taxes on the land for the year in 1958. the deed having been executed April 21. the New Civil Code was already enforced and the possession of Gualberto Calulot including its legal effects must be governed by the New Civil Code. When the spouses Gualberto Calulot and Olimpia Lomibao sold the same property to Felipe Capua under Exhibit C. hence they cannot prevail over the rights of the petitioner who holds in his favor the instrument of sale duly registered. Exhibits F-1. Teehankee (Chairman). Felipe Capua may have acquired the land in good faith on May 27. 1950. therefore. Calulot's occupancy failed in one essential requisite of acquisitive prescription. By reason of this interruption. because there was a gap from 1944 to 1952 (interruption due to judicial summons up to the termination of the litigation).oz Palma. Muñ. 1äw phï1. the possession of Sabina Capua over the land did not run. (Supra at p. 1952. Under Article 1131 and 1128. 1960. During the pendency of the litigation. Gualberto Calulot had not declared the land in his own name for tax purposes. made him aware that he possessed the land improperly or wrongfully. N. 1960 by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the court in Civil Case No.C. with costs against the respondents. which we repeat was rendered interrupted by the judicial summons. is the sole question of ownership which as respondent court itself held . None of the deeds of sale evidencing the ownership of Gualberto Calulot and Felipe Capua were registered in the Registry of Property. The successor-in-interest of Sabina Capua who is the vendee Gualberto Calulot cannot tack his possession to that of his vendor Sabina Capua not only because the judicial summons interrupted the latter's possession but also because she finally lost in the litigation. Felipe Capua became aware or came to know that there existed a flaw in his title or mode of acquisition. 1455 affirmed. JJ. SO ORDERED.e. In the first place.. The New Civil Code of the Philippines took effect on August 30. 1960 when he bought the property from Gualberto Calulot but his eviction therefrom thru the writ of possession. He had not sought the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Sabina Capua to him as the vendee. the land as described in the deed still bears the same description as in Exhibit A. it can only commence after the decision is rendered therein. his possession was not in the concept of owner. although later annulled in January. F-2. In other words. the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. The claim of the respondents based on acquisitive prescription is. from September 8. The facts are also undisputed that the deed of sale executed between Jose Maramba as vendee and Emiliana Abad as vendor in 1958 was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds as well as the deed of sale executed in 1929 between Emiliana Abad and the original owner Florentino Quinajon. The tax receipts. 895. It remained interrupted. 1952 when judgment was rendered. showed that Sabina Capua was the declared owner. law and justice command that he who has registered his deed must prevail over his adversary who has not done so. F-4.if respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription is defeated ." i. When possession of the property was taken from Felipe Capua and given to Jose Maramba by the Provincial Sheriff on October 4. Under the law. concur . therefore. this evidence showing that Felipe Capua's possession was not in truth and in fact in the concept of owner during the required period of time. 4. Makasiar. The Court has ignored or failed to consider material evidence found in the records that disproves clearly and positively respondent Felipe Capua's claim of acquisitive prescription. Consequently. that is. The tax number of the lot in 1950 is the same tax number in 1960. 1950 during the pendency of the case to Gualberto Calulot cannot revive or restore the possession of the vendor. F-3. the possession of Sabina Capua was thereby interrupted by the issuance of the judicial summons (Article 1123. good faith and just title are necessary for ordinary prescription of real property. therefore. 'assessed at P240.must unquestionably be rendered in favor of petitioner Jose Maramba and his co-petitioners by right of res judicata. 17426 for the current year.ñët . without merit. 1952. What remains. We hold that the vendee Gualberto Calulot cannot legally acquire possession during the pendency of the litigation. 895. New Civil Code). passive or suspended up to the date when the judgment was rendered against her on September 1. The deed of sale executed by Sabina Capua to Gualberto Calulot (Exhibit A) describes the land sold to be " at P240. The fact that Sabina Capua sold the land on April 21. 3. which was promulgated on September 1. or a period of eight (8) years." that is. 17426 for the current year. the possession of Sabina Capua was not running for it had been interrupted by the judicial summons in Civil Case No. 2. 1950.1. then from 1950 to 1960 (possession of Gualberto Calulot and from 1960 to 1963 (possession of Felipe Capua up to the institution of the present suit) the possession was a continuing and uninterrupted occupancy enough to perfect a title of ownership. The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of the vendor and he who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and consequent to such failure. Martin and Fernandez.00 under Tax No. The land was in custodia legis. which is possession in the concept of owner. 1961. Her possession of the land remained interrupted.