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Drieskens: red Pomorska: blue

1. Why did the European External Action Service come up In terms of power delegation? Explain the core, how does it work, functions, how do you get recruit? What is the power-structure/administrative structure within this institution? What is the relation between the HR and the EEAS? The ‘ultimate challenge’, as the Commission wrote in 2004, was the creation of the EEAS, as proposed by the Convention on the Future of Europe (hereafter, the Convention), which in 2003 laid the foundation for the Lisbon Treaty.  The Convention’s Working Group on External Relations concluded that the EU’s coherence and efficiency should be increased both at the institutional and service levels. It thus recommended transforming the Commission delegations into EU delegations, which would work under the authority of the new High Representative and of the Commission — for CFSP-related and other issues, respectively. The new delegations would be encouraged to provide support and information to the High Representative and could be tasked with servicing EU member states that are not represented in a particular country. They would be staffed by officials of the Commission (Secretariat) and the European Council, as well as by officials seconded by their national diplomatic services. Capacity-building : The Treaty foresaw that the EEAS staff would be drawn from civil servants of the European Commission, the Council Secretariat and national diplomats.The first two groups, transferred en masse in December 2010 from DG Relex (585 officials) and from parts of Directorate-General (DG) Development (93 officials) of the European Commission and DG External and Politico-Military Affairs of the Council Secretariat (411 officials). They joined the service immediately in January 2010, while the third category of national diplomats was employed through a huge recruitment round (Hemra et al. 2011). This process turned out to be rather problematic, partly because capitals fiercely lobbied for catapulting their nationals into senior positions, but also because nominations were delayed owing to the HR’s micromanagement. Claiming authority : 2. How did the external service of the EU develop? - (Drieskens) The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), changed the EU’s functioning not only in Brussels, but also around the world. The delegations of the European Commission (hereafter Commission delegations) in third countries and at international organizations were transformed into EU delegations. Taking over some of the responsibilities of the rotating Council Presidency, they are also responsible for representing the EU regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Before there was a wide network of Commission delegations. In fact, when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the network included over 130

. It thus recommended transforming the Commission delegations into EU delegations  The Working Group on External Relations’ suggestions provided a blueprint for the provisions included in the Convention’s outcome document.the Maastricht Treaty (1992) stipulated that the diplomatic and consular missions of the member states and the Commission delegations would cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions are complied with and implemented. . reflecting the European Commission’s expanding agenda and ambitions.Then a single management structure was introduced.When the Cold War came to an end in 1989.9 . representations were mainly established to monitor implementation of the European Commission’s development policies in the African. yet the Lisbon Treaty echoes the document’s wording on delegations.7They took a more formal representation role and became full delegations . . the former communist states became another important focus.In the 1960s and 1970s.The foundations were laid in the early 1950s: bureaux de presse et d’information) were created to represent the interests of the newly established European Communities in strategically important capitals such as London (1954) and Washington (1954).The Constitution. but was instead motivated by external reasons. Asia and Latin America.After the Lomé Convention in 1975. in a later stage. Delegations became responsible for monitoring the implementation of financial and technical assistance programmes such as PHARE and TACIS and. namely the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE). Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. which represented the former European Community (EC) in third countries and in international organizations. some nuances and adaptations notwithstanding. .The growing presence of the European Commission’s network of delegations was recognized in the Single European Act (1986).The United Kingdom’s accession to the European Communities in 1972 broadened to the former British colonies.The ‘ultimate challenge’ was the creation of the EEAS  The Convention’s Working Group on External Relations concluded that the EU’s coherence and efficiency should be increased both at the institutional and service levels.  Article 221 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): 1.5 . . did not enter into force.From the mid-1970s. representations opened in the Mediterranean. . the European Commission’s field offices doubled in number and started covering issues other than development cooperation. Most often. which stated that the EC member states and the European Commission would intensify cooperation between their representations in third countries and in international organizations ‘through mutual assistance and information’. for assisting countries with their (pre-)accession.local offices around the world. Union delegations in third countries and at international organizations . expanding its coverage and functions did not result from internal decisions. .

but typically have been operating mostly as project managers. the EEAS does not yet have a single institutional memory at its disposal. 2) Secondly. Union delegations shall be placed under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. nor between the national embassies’ member states and the European Commission 3. the divergences in knowledge and expertise have further complicated the daily management of EU foreign affairs. 1) Several issues play a role here. the new service brings together people from different epistemic communities – each with their own mind-set (Spence 2012). They shall act in close (see page 7)  the Lisbon Treaty. Former Commission officials have very sound knowledge on both the geographical areas and horizontal themes. More fundamentally. the European Council appointed Catherine Ashton High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. tend to ‘get lost’ in the highest levels of the EEAS hierarchy. neither among the EU member states. it has to be taken into account that many of the former staff of DG Relex and the Council General Secretariat are not professional diplomats. While it is clear that the different groups have plenty to learn from each other. For example. but there is no real tradition of local cooperation. as they also became responsible for representing the EU in CFSP-related matters. Some see the process as being slowed down by . Rules and procedures are developed as problems present themselves. it cannot be taken for granted that the different components of the EEAS have convergent views about diplomacy and Europe’s future role in international relations. The High Representative is assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS). Different players come with divergent working methods. 3) The agenda management by the EEAS is still weak and that dossiers. Staff coming from the national diplomatic services may be highly skilled diplomats but may not always have experience in Brussels (Spence 2012). Firstly. even those that have been through the inter-service consultation procedures. They can rely on support from seconded national experts in doing so. She chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and conducts the Common Foreign and Security Policy. she ensures the consistency and coordination of the European Union's external action. Function? What are the problems/ challenges (cases?) of the function of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy? Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. the hierarchical culture of Commission officials has been clashing with the more horizontal work culture of some of the national diplomats (Interview 1). the tasks of the former Commission delegations became more demanding and diverse.shall represent the Union. Drawing on her role as Vice-President of the European Commission. Last but not least.

Some see the process as being slowed down by Ashton’s insistence on controlling the dossiers. . relations with the European Commission. especially at the higher levels of the hierarchy. even those that have been through the inter-service consultation procedures. Pre-Lisbon : . but also by the EU’s external partners (New York) 4.Ashton’s insistence on controlling the dossiers. On the other hand. there is definitely room for improvement in the process of mobilizing supporters as a step towards effective agenda-setting. Ashton’s dual-hatted position makes the European Commission a natural ally. it is in the first place the member states mobilizing the HR and the EEAS for their own priorities and preferences rather than vice versa Pomorska: This article addresses the question of how the post-Lisbon institutional structure has affected the process of agenda-setting and to what extent the HR and her staff have taken over from the rotating Presidency as an engine behind initiatives in European foreign policy. tend to ‘get lost’ in the highest levels of the EEAS hierarchy.In sum. Others point to the inability of the HR cabinet to deal with dossiers effectively. In the Council. The new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have emerged after the Lisbon Treaty as a potential driving force in European foreign policy. The agenda management by the EEAS is still weak and that dossiers. The relations with the member states are still tense overall. Others point to the inability of the HR cabinet to deal with dossiers effectively. There is a lot of informal lobbying 4) Importantly. both in the EU and outside. this new actor not only has to be accepted by the EU’s member states. While co-operation with the Presidencies so far has been rather good. could benefit from more attention and co-operation. PSC are rather shallow. The member states also complain about the lack of interest on the part of the HR in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (see below). The relations with the member states are still tense overall. as the Ambassadors are simply not given enough time to consult with their capitals. What are the influencing forces in the EU agenda-setting? Effective agenda-setting is linked to mobilizing supporters. EEAS officials complain that member states often push for their ‘pet’ issues when choices have to be made. There are continuous complaints about the late delivery of agendas and documents.

which could have functioned as a source of continuity. she can submit joint proposals together with the European Commission (Art.1. Post-Lisbon: The Lisbon Treaty aimed to address the continuity and leadership problems by installing a longer-term chair both at the level of the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). As there was no general agreement on a strategic agenda. Gaining attention A key challenge for any policy entrepreneur aiming to put an issue on the agenda is to gain attention for it. she shares the right to put forward proposals with the member states (Art. the new High Representative for CFSP. The latter is the dual-hatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. rotating Presidencies were tempted to (ab)use their period in the chair to get on their national hobbyhorses. The European Commission. Like the member states. In the area of CFSP. it is important that the proposed venue is credible both in terms of organizational capacity as well as in terms of legal competencies and expertise. The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) brought foreign policy entrepreneurship from an unexpected corner. the agenda was set by the six-monthly rotating Presidency. Formally. The Lisbon Treaty considerably strengthened the potential role of the High Representative as foreign policy entrepreneur. 30. the HR has the right to put forward foreign policy proposals.One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pre-Lisbon was that it was the member states. She is assisted by her own foreign policy administration. the EEAS. Once their term was over. Building credibility Given the parallel existence of several venues to discuss foreign policy issues. . In the other areas of EU external action. In practice. based at the Council General Secretariat. The national capitals wanted to keep a firm grip on the direction of foreign policy. The two main strategies concern the control of participation (mobilizing support) and the framing of the topic (arousing interest).was careful not to step on member states’ toes and was reticent to use its right of policy initiative (Nuttall 2000). Formally.22. the major flaw of the rotating chair system was lack of continuity and direction. there was often no follow-up. acting as the motor of co-operation and integration. While having the advantage of bringing new impulses. TEU). rather than the European Commission.2. the HR is now an autonomous player who can submit proposals and fulfil an implementing and representational role. who besides chairing the FAC is also Vice-President of the European Commission. TEU). did not have an autonomous role.

Ashton and her staff shied away from a proactive approach. EU member states have been reticent to equip ‘Brussels’ with the required bureaucratic resources and have been managing policy co-operation through the national capitals. this is less the product of a well developed strategy than of the unexpected revolutionary events in the region.. the EEAS suffered from the diverse professional backgrounds of its members. Although the Treaty gives her important powers in terms of agenda-setting. does not come automatically.(a) Building Capacity: A key condition in becoming accepted as an actor in a particular domain is possession of the required organizational capacities. The strategies used by thenew EU foreign policy chief and her staff to build credibility and gain attention: 1. When assuming her position. at least on paper. justifying why it should be dealt with at the EU level Arousing interest A second way for the HR and the EEAS to gain attention is by linking EU action to broader international objectives or to particular strengths of the EU as an external actor. the Lisbon Treaty has. and the lack of an esprit de corps. The establishment of the EEAS is therefore a significant milestone. . the HR has undoubtedly invested the most in capacitybuilding. (b) Claiming authority. Of all four strategies. since the new diplomatic service had to be established from scratch and a well-equipped organization was imperative to become operational 2. While the latter topic has not yet received much attention. the new HR clearly suffered from her lack of foreign policy expertise. Despite the receptive political climate and the general recognition that EU action was required.e. The second strategy of claiming authority has proved more difficult. Catherine Ashton could depart from an already well-established narrative. relations with the Mediterranean borderlands have been omnipresent. This brief overview shows that Ashton has very much embedded her European foreign policy discourse in the traditional narrative of Europe as a ‘soft power’. However. however. framing an issue in EU terms. Conclusion By giving the HR and her staff the formal right to put forward policy proposals. In foreign policy. preferring to wait for a mandate from the member states. the absence of standard operating procedures. This is not a surprise. created a potentially important new foreign policy entrepreneur. i. with a special emphasis on the neighbourhood and the strategic partnerships. The EU’s documents often portray the Union as an example of successful international co-operation and as a soft or normative power. exerting influence through cooperation rather than coercion. Being an influential agenda-setter.

Finally. 4. but higher in the hierarchy it continues to be rather problematic. Overall. Overcoming some of them. Indeed. the European Commission is a natural partner. more fundamental questions about status and membership also prohibited full implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Neither should we be amazed that this process was full of hurdles. need to focus on those four strategies Drieskens: This article examines this new type of delegation and highlights the main challenges that are inherent in its establishment and functioning. The initial choice for shared representation cannot be explained only by referring to an initial lack of capacity. A closer look at the arrangements for the UNGA reveals that the EU delegation quickly took over the more informal task of EU coordination. has been unconvincing. She has also managed to clearly articulate her foreign policy priorities of establishing the EEAS. Successful agenda-setters rarely have the luxury to act on their own.3. have proven more difficult to materialize. Conclusion Meanwhile. They have to mobilize allies and sideline opponents.  In contrast to the sometimes extremely negative reviews in the press. . Given the HR’s dual-hatted role. the strategies aimed at building credibility have been most developed. fostering close relations with the EU’s neighbourhood and strategic partnerships. At lower levels the co-operation is taking shape well. may be only a question of time. like the development of an EEAS esprit de corps. The strategies aimed at gaining attention. our balance sheet is more nuanced. such as the lack of budget and understaffing. transformation has been a reality in more than 130 cities around the world. It shows that the transformation from Commission to EU delegations The EU opted for a gradual approach in New York. The way these priorities have been followedup by both the HR and the EEAS.Relations with the member states vary but tend to be competitive. may be more structural. decreasing the role of the rotating Presidency and enhancing that of the new EU delegation. The HR and the EEAS have been more preoccupied with internal problems than with investing efforts in mobilizing possible partners and thinking in terms of framing particular foreign policy issues. we looked at how the HR and the EEAS have tried to raise interest. while the rotating Presidency remained responsible for external representation. If they want to continue and work out. this should not come as a surprise. but others. however. especially in a period of financial crisis. Ashton has not shunned away from situating her role in that of the broader context of the EU as a soft power and the rapidly changing international context of emerging new powers. Given the fact that we look at the agendasetting role of a new player. as the former Commission delegations were upgraded to EU delegations.

and new actors have joined their staff. Yet once again. With this transformation. Indeed. The EU delegations have taken over the tasks of the rotating Presidency in international organizations. Even if limited. The adoption of the status resolution removed a heavy burden from the shoulders of the EU delegation in New York and fostered hope that it can focus on content rather than form. only time will tell whether the EU is able to move beyond enhanced status to enhanced performance. respected by both the EU and UN memberships. actors and contexts. But even if New York seems Lisbon-proof on paper. but its implementation in New York implies the merging of functions. and whether the new EU delegation manages to establish itself successfully as the European Union’s interface. both of functions and actors challenges with the UN in New Yok: The institutional basis for the transformation may have been available when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. . but not the UN’s functioning. the literature on the Commission’s delegations provided a valuable starting point for mapping the complexities surrounding this upgrade. one should not forget that the Lisbon Treaty’s implementation may have changed the EU’s functionaries at the UN. the EU had to learn the hard way that its internal wishes are not necessarily the outside world’s command. their role became more diverse and demanding.including in the UN context. pointing at important internal challenges of integration.