This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
The Soviet and Japanese Communist Parties: Policies, Tactics, Negotiating Behavior*
What can the Japanese Communist Party's (JCP) record of its dealings with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) tell us about Soviet policies toward nonruling Communist Parties, Soviet strategy and tactics, and their negotiating techniques? Can the Japanese experience provide a glimpse into the Soviet decisionmaking process? These are some of the questions that this essay will attempt to answer. Of course, as pointed out in the introduction to this collection of studies, the revelations of foreign Communists constitute a supplementary source, which nonetheless is at times the only available account of negotiations and may on occasion shed light on the Soviet way of doing things, and perhaps even on Soviet motivation. And again, as indicated in the introduction to this issue, the most rewarding sources are official Party publications when the Party in question is attempting to present and defend its position in a dispute with Moscow (or with Peking), internal confidential Party documents obtained somehow by government law enforcement agencies or resourceful journalists, and finally the writings of ex-Communists or purged Party leaders.
*I wish to thank my colleagues Thomas Greene and Joseph Nyomarkay for reading and commenting on the introduction to this issue, and especially Paul Langer for helpful comments on this study. I am also grateful to Lynn Sipe, Head of the World Affairs Library at USC, Emiko Moffitt, Head of the Japanese Collection at the Hoover Institution, and Hisao Matsumoto, Head of the Japanese Collection at the Library of Congress, for their kind assistance and computer searches of pertinent documentation. Needless to say, final responsibility is mine alone. STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM VOL. XV, NO. 3, AUTUMN 1982, 266-287
THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Fortunately, all of these categories of sources are available in Japan. The JCP has feuded with both the CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for almost two decades and has made public some of the records of the Party's negotiations with Soviet and Chinese leaders (including Mao Tse-tung himself). The Japanese government intelligence community has been engaged in the surveillance and analysis of the international Communist movement and the Japanese left-wing parties for the past sixty years and continually issues documentary collections and analytical studies through semigovernmental or subsidiary channels. ~ Japanese investigative reporters also constantly publish a stream of revelations and exposts of the Japanese Communist movement, some obviously sensationalized, but others quite plausible. And, finally, the Japanese Party has its share of disillusioned or purged leaders, including former secretaries general of the Party and, a few years ago, the vice-chairman of the Presidium of the Politburo, Hakamada Satomi. 2 This study presents three vignettes gleaned from recently published Japanese-language sources and covers the late Stalin era, the Khrushchev period, and the Brezhnev years. The first vignette describes a meeting of the JCP leadership with Stalin in August 1951, when he forced a radical left policy on the Japanese Party; the second portrays the unsuccessful JCP-CPSU negotiations in Moscow in March
1964; and the last concerns the conclusion of the normalization agreeI. See, for example, the publications of the Nikkan Rodo Tsushinsha [Daily Labor Press] and the monthly l¢oan joho [Public Security Intelligence] edited and published since 1954 by the Shakai Undo Kenkyukai [Research Group on Social Movements]. 2. Japanese names appear in the Japanese style of surname first. This study has relied on three groups of primary sources. The first group includes recently published books of Hakamada. Until his purge, he was a long-time comrade-in-arms of the present Chairman Miyamoto Kenji, with whom Hakamada spent many years in prewar Japanese jails after a period of study at the Communist University for the Toilers of the East (KUTV) in Moscow in the mid-1920s. Hakamada's writings include Watakushi no sengo shi [My Postwar History] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1978) and Kino no doshi Miyamoto Kenjii e [To Kenji Miyamoto---My Erstwhile Comrade] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1978). They have been augmented by interviews conducted in Japanese and Russian (Hakamada speaks no English). A second helpful group of primary sources consisted of official JCP publications, especially the records of press conferences of top Party leaders, and includes the JCP daily Akahata [Red Flag] and the English-language Bulletin--Information for Abroad (Tokyo: Japanese Communist Party, Central Committee) (hereafter cited as Bulletin); "Essential Points in the JCP-CPSU Talks---On the Joint Statement," Miyamoto's press conference held in Moscow on December 24, 1979, Akalmta, December 27, 1979; Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979), pp. 6-15. The most illuminating group of sources consisted of confidenfal Party documents obtained by enterprising Japanese investigative reporters and published in book form. (Generally such documents are obtained from disgruntled Party members or are leaked to the press by government agencies.) This group includes Mizushima Tsuyoshi, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo --Misshitsu no naka kara no kokuhaku [The Conspiracy of Kenji Miyamoto----Confessions from Behind Closed Doors] (Tokyo: Zembosha, 1980).
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM
ment between the two Parties in December 1979. But first some background on Japanese-Soviet Party relations.
J C P - C P S U Relations
Although the Japanese Communist Party has just celebrated its sixtieth anniversary, 3 for more than half of this period it was no more than an appendage of Moscow. During the prewar years, the Party was a small and docile branch of the Comintern which for all practical purposes ceased to exist when efficiently repressive Japanese government policies caused many of its members to recant, while the stubborn leadership (including the present Chairman Miyamoto Kenji) lingered for more than a decade in jails to be released in the fall of 1945 by the order of General Douglas MacArthur. 4 Given the constraints of the American Occupation, the Party leaders tried to project the image of a "lovable" Communist Party. They stressed parliamentary tactics, which bore fruit in 1949 when the Party captured 10 percent of the electoral vote. But sfiortly thereafter, in January 1950, Stalin (with the support of the Chinese Communists) ordered an attack on these "Eurocommunist" policies. The orders, transmitted in the form of a very critical article in the Cominform paper, caused a split in the Party ranks. Eventually, the JCP adopted a suicidal hardline strategy and the leadership went underground, and on to Peking. (The first vignette shows how Stalin forced this left program on the JCP.) Fortunately for the Japanese Communist movement, this violent episode was rather short. In March 1953 Stalin died and the Korean War came to an end, so that there was no more need to disrupt the American rear base in Japan. Within two years, most of the Communist leaders and cadres were back in Japan, and a serious struggle for power ensued. (Secretary General Tokuda Kyuichi died in Peking in October 1953.) It was also clear that the only hope for the Party in democratic Japan was to pursue the old (pre-Cominform criticism) Eurocommunist policies, but the divisions in the Party hierarchy were very deep, with some of the followers of Stalin's line reluctant to allow 3. The Partywas establishedon July 15, 1922. 4. The standardworks on the earlyJapaneseCommunistmovementare: RodgerSwearingen
and Paul Langer, Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919-1951 (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1952); and George M. Beckmannand Okubo Genji, The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945 (Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress, 1969). Robert A. Scalapino's The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966 (Berkeleyand Los Angeles: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1967)coversthe firstfourand a halfdecades,
T H E JAPANESE C O M M U N I S T
full and public criticism of the disastrous course. The struggle for power was won by the present leader Miyamoto who switched factions in order to become Secretary General and has since pursued a soft, parliamentary line, albeit by dictatorial means. In another study, I have divided the evolution of Miyamoto's policies into three periods: (1) 1955-1961, consolidation of power and rejection of Palmiro Togliatti's structural reform theories; (2) 1961-1968, growth, rejection of the Soviet and Chinese models, and declaration of independence; and (3) 1968 to the present, nationalism and growing convergence with Eurocommunism. 5 The transitional period from the old to the new policies and the consolidation of power in Miyamoto's hands coincided with the emerging ideological dispute between the Soviet and Chinese Parties, which some scholars date back to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. The JCP reaction to this split in the international Communist movement was to stay neutral and to work toward reconciliation of the two Communist super-Parties. 6 By the early 1960s, however, most Asian Communist regimes and Parties (including the JCP) had begun to lean toward Peking. The Japanese Party's switch was mostly due to the fact that its domestic policies of strident opposition to "American imperialism" were more compatible with the Chinese position than with Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence line. The CPSU's crude pressure in the international Communist movement may also have been counterproductive. For example, Miyamoto related an incident that took place during the 1960 Moscow summit of eighty-one Communist and Workers' Parties. When a Japanese delegate responded with a "no comment" to a question on an issue under dispute between the Russians and the Chinese, chief Soviet ideologue Mikhail Suslov reportedly stood up, banged on the table, and said, "That's no way for a Communist to respond. ''7 But the one issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute that has decisively pitted the Japanese Party against the Soviets was the signing of the partial nuclear test ban treaty in Moscow in 1963. The JCP, in line with its
5. Peter Berton, "Japan: Euro-Nippo-Communism," Chap. XV in Vernon V. Aspaturian, Jiri Valenta, and David P. Burke (eds.), Eurocommunism Between East and West (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 331. 6. Here I follow the narrative of events in my article, Peter Berton, "The Japanese Communists' Rapprochement with the Soviet Union," Asian Survey, XX, 12 (December 1980), p. 1211 ft. See also Sei Young Rhee, "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Conflict on the Japanese Communist Party, 1961-1968" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Missouri-Columbia, 1973), 430 pp. 7. Robert Sealapino's interview with an ex-JCP leader, Kasuga Shojiro, November 26, 1963 (Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, p. 109).
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
strident anti-Americanism, supported the Chinese rejection of the nuclear treaty. Yet, the entire question of nuclear weapons is a highly charged one for the Japanese, who are the only victims of atomic warfare. One top Party leader, Shiga Yoshio, broke ranks and voted in the National Diet for Japan's adherence to the treaty. The CPSU hailed the "courageous" stand of a Japanese patriot and "faithful son of the Japanese people." The CPSU also took sides against the JCP in the various Japanese front organizations that reflected the split between Moscow and Peking. As the second vignette will describe, a high-ranking JCP delegation traveled to Moscow in February 1964 in a futile attempt to reconcile the differences between the two Parties and to stop the CPSU's disruptive activities in Japan. Shortly thereafter, the JCP purged Shiga and his pro-Soviet followers, who formed a rival Japanese Communist Party--Voice of Japan (Nihon no koe), a rather strange name for a group which should have been called more correctly "Voice of the Soviet Union." The JCP weathered this defection rather well, as most of the rank and file held, and the Ninth Party Congress in November 1964 all but ratified the split between the Japanese and Soviet Parties, which was to last for fifteen years, s The break with the CPSU should have led to much closer relations with the CCP. And indeed for a while it did, but in early 1966 Mao Tse-tung personally intervened in the talks between the Japanese and Chinese Parties and insisted that the JCP endorse his rather extreme anti-Soviet positions. The Japanese delegation, headed by Miyamoto, refused to sign on the dotted line and returned home. 9 Thereafter relations between the two Parties continued to deteriorate and with the onset of the Cultural Revolution were completely broken off. Cut off from both Communist super-Parties, the JCP began to search for allies among other Communist Parties who were also trying to steer a neutral course and to assert their independence from both Moscow and Peking. io I have elsewhere characterized JCP relations with the CPSU after the Japanese Party's break with the CCP as "The Long Road to Normalization with Moscow. ''~t Essentially, between 1968 and 1979, the Soviets made three unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation with the obstreperous
8. Berton, "The Japanese Communists," pp. 1211-1212. 9. For a detailed account of the Sino-Japanese talks, see C. L. Chiou and Tsiu-shuang Han, "Ideology and Politics in the 1966-1967 Split Between the Communist Parties of China and Japan," Studies in Comparative Communism, XI, 4 (Winter 1978), pp. 361-387. 10. Berton, "Japan: Euro-Nippo-Communism," pp. 344-351; and idem., "The Japanese Communists," pp. 1213-1214. I1. ibid., pp. 1214-1221.
THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Japanese Party before grudgingly making a carefully-planned, limited conciliatory gesture which sufficed to bring the two Parties to agreement. The unsuccessful contacts between 1968 and 1977 involved visits to Tokyo by Suslov and other Soviet Party officials and mostly unofficial and brief meetings in Moscow between Miyamoto and other Japanese Presidium members and Suslov (also Brezhnev on one occasion). Although the main reason for the failure of negotiations until 1979 was Soviet reluctance to come around to the basic JCP position that Soviet support of "anti-Party elements" (notably the pro-Soviet Shiga group) must be repudiated, other issues contributed to the estrangement between the two Parties. These included Japanese condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the expulsion of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the attacks on Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo, and most importantly the high-handed policies toward Japan, especially the territorial dispute, the fishery negotiations, and Soviet bombing exercises in the vicinity of Japan. 12 The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978 and the specter of closer collaboration between these two countries may have served as a catalyst for the Soviet decision to make some concessions in order to normalize relations with the JCP. The CPSU sent two signals: a Central Committee congratulatory cable on the occasion of Miyamoto's seventieth birthday in October and a positive article in Pravda in December which contained the highly significant observation that "the JCP continues its struggle against antiParty elements. ''~3 But there is many a slip between the cup and the lip. While "anti-Party elements" could refer to the pro-CCP factions and the ultraleft Trotskyists, they definitely also included, of course, the pro-Soviet Shiga group, and the Soviets were determined to offer the least damaging concessions and as few of them as possible. Over the next several months, negotiations were conducted in Tokyo and in Moscow, with the Soviets dragging their feet. 14 At the first meeting in Tokyo, they refused to sign a joint communiqu6, leaving it to the JCP negotiator to present the positions of both sides (he intimated that the CPSU had admitted the incorrectness of their previous action in publishing articles in Pravda supportive of the Shiga clique). At the next meeting in Moscow, the two Parties signed a joint statement in which the CPSU admitted to no wrongdoing but allowed the
12. For a detailed description and analysis of these issues see Berton, "Japan: Euro-NippoCommunism," pp. 339-343. 13. Pravda, December 27, 1978. 14. Berton, "The Japanese Communists," p. 1216 ft.
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
Japanese side to state that they "evaluated positively the constructive approach of the CPSU representatives at the preliminary talks in Tokyo "e to the past issues in the relations between the two Parla s. 15 But Pravda conveniently omitted the words "the past issues," leaving no trace of any possible past wrongdoing, headlined the report as a "working discussion" (not an agreement), and buried it on the inside international page (Akahata gave the accord front-page coverage). Eventually the Soviets reluctantly gave in to pressure from the JCP and published the entire text in the CPSU Central Committee organ Partiinaia zhizn, with an advertisement in Pravda drawing attention to the publication of the full text of the document. In a further attempt to downgrade these preliminary negotiations, the editors of Partiinaia zhizn headlined the report as a "Working Meeting of the Representatives of the CPSU and the JCP" and not as an agreement, t6 A final round of preliminary negotiations in Tokyo in August undoubtedly dealt with the agenda for the forthcoming summit meeting to be held in Moscow. But as the third vignette will convincingly demonstrate, Soviet occupation of the northern islands, a politically important issue for the JCP, was summarily dismissed by the Soviet negotiators. Nor did the final agreement confirm any past Soviet culpability in supporting "anti-Party elements." Although the December 1979 agreement did normalize relations between the Soviet and Japanese Parties, hopes for a genuine rapprochement were shattered by the almost simultaneous Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which the JCP condemned, demanding the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops, t7 In the three years since the normalization agreement, polemics between the two Parties have continued, ts The most recent manifestations of basic disagreements between the JCP and the CPSU are visible in the slogans of the Fifty-third JCP May Day celebrations in 1982 and in the speeches at the Sixteenth Party Congress held at the end of July 1982. Of the eighteen slogans, four
15. Emphasis added. 16. Berton, "The Japanese Communists," p. 1218. 17. "On the Situation in Afghanistan," Akahata, January 11, 1980; Bulletin, No. 427 (January 1980). 18. See, for example, the report of the Paris correspondent of Akahata entitled "One Year Since the Afghanistan Intervention," Akahata, December 16, 1980; and the exchange of letters between the JCP and the CPSU on the Polish and other issues in the summer of 1981, particularly the June 15 and July 4 letters from the JCP Central Committee (Akahata, June 16-18, and Akahata Commentary Edition, July 13, 1981, respectively; Bulletin, Nos. 461 and 466) and the CPSU Central Committee letter dated July 30 (Partiinaia zhizn, No. 16 [August 1981], pp. 21-27; Radio Moscow, August 8, 1981). The JCP also immediately reacted to the imposition of martial law in Poland with an article entitled "A Grave Situation Unbecoming of Socialism: On the Establishment of Martial Law in Poland," Akahata, December 15, 1981.
THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
contained anti-Soviet points: a demand for the withdrawal from Asia of the SS-20 and other Soviet nuclear weapons (Slogan 2 also demanded the withdrawal of American nuclear-armed troops and nuclear weapons); the immediate return of Habomai and Shikotan islands, and the return of the entire Kurile island chain upon the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty (Slogan 12); the dissolution Of all military blocs and alliances (Slogan 13); and the immediate termination of the military government in Poland, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and opposition to all hegemonism and "great powerism'.' (Slogan 15). 19 In his speech at the Party Congress, Miyamoto singled out twenty-three theoretically and politically significant documents issued by the Party since the 1970s. One of these documents was "A Critique of Hegemonism in the International Communist Movement-The Problems of Afghanistan and Poland. ''2° Against ,this background of relations between the Japanese and Soviet Parties, let us proceed with our three vignettes.
The Late Stalin Era
Some four months after his arrival in Moscow, Hakamada was visited in early August 1951 by a Soviet official whom he had not met before121 The emissary, who turned out to be the deputy director of the CPSU International Department, thrust a document into Hakamada's hand and said, "Comrade Hakamada, I would like you to tell me if you approve this document, and if you do, we'll immediately go together to Stalin's place. ''22 Thedocument was entitied "Immediate Demands of the Japanese Communist Party--A New Program. ''23 In the Soviet Union i n 195!, it was distinctly unhealthy to decline an invitation to see Stalin, and Hakamada reluctantly said "yes." Although it was almost 9:00 P.M., it was common knowledge that Stalin was up until 2:00 or 3:00 A.M. His well-protected dacha at Kuntsevo 19. Akahata. May 1, 1982.
20. Text of Miyamoto's speech on July 27, 1982. Akahata, July 28, 1982. 21. Tokuda, Nosaka Sanzo, and other top JCP leaders leftJapan secretly in September 1950 and set up "the Tokuda Organization" (Tokuda kikan) in Peking. Hakamada, at the time an influentialmember of the Party Central Committee, leftTokyo secretlyon December I and arrived in Peking (via Kobe and Hong Kong) on December 25. In early April 1951, Tokuda, Nosaka, Nishizawa Tomio, and Hakamada left Peking for Moscow. Hakamada, Watakushi no sengo shi, Chronology, pp. 302-343. 22. This account is based on "The FatefulKuntsevo Conference" in ibid., pp. 93-102.
23. For the text of this "1951 Thesis,"see "ImmediateDemandsof the CommunistParty of Japan--New Programme,"For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, November 23, 1951, p. 3. See also Chap. HI, "The Shiftto the Left:GuerrillaWarfare,JapaneseStyle" in Scalapino,The Japanese Communist Movement, pp. 79-96.
2 7 3.
STUDIES IN C O M P A R A T I V E C O M M U N I S M
was located in a forest near the Moscow River, some ten miles from the Kremlin. The Japanese visitors (other leaders of the JCP arrived almost simultaneously) were ushered into a large living room on the first floor, which, except for a large conference table, a chandelier, and a thick carpet, was very sparsely furnished. The Soviet leaders were already assembled in the room and after a round of handshakes invited the Japanese to take their places at the conference table. Stalin seated himself at the end of the table opposite Tokuda. To Stalin's right were Georgii Malenkov (opposite Nosaka), Lavrentii Beria (opposite Nishizawa Tomio), and Viacheslav Molotov (opposite Hakamada). An interpreter was seated between Stalin and Tokuda, and Wang Chiahsiang, chief of the CCP International Department, sat next to Hakamada. ~ Stalin began in a quiet tone: '~'hcre were good reasons for the Corninform criticism, and I think that it was correct." He said nothing about why the criticism was correct. Hakamada claims that he stood up and appealed to Stalin about the splitting machinations of the Tokuda group, complaining about Tokuda's violent character and his autocratic behavior in purging duly elected Central Committee members and thus splitting the Party. At this point Tokuda jumped up and shouted, "Hey, what the hell are you saying!" Without hesitation, Hakamada said, "Here, see for yourself. If he can do this in front of all of you, you can imagine how he behaves at the meetings of the Japanese Politburo." After a silence, Hakamada continued to expound on his differences with the Tokuda group, whereupon Nosaka accusingly said, "Hakamada, what did you actually do this past year? You didn't do a thing, did you?" At this point Molotov, who sat opposite Hakamada, murmured in a quiet tone, "Isn't this because you didn't give any work to Comrade Hakamada?" Although this offhand remark was not translated, Hakamada understood it. ~ Stalin, in the meantime, was quiet, doodling on a piece of paper before him. Then he got up and, walking behind Malenkov and Beria and puffing on his pipe, spoke very, very slowly,
Comrade Hakamada, You arc now creating an opposition group to the Party Center. This is not good. Aren't you a metal worker? That's why you should well understand that there can be no victory without workers' solidarity. As far as this thesis is concerned, we have also cooperated in drawing it up. I would like the'Japanese Party to go forward on this basis.
24. Hakamada, Watakuahi no senso shi, pp. 95-96. 25. IBM., pp. 97-98.
T H E JAPANESE C O M M U N I S T P A R T Y
Nervously, Hakamada was about to light up a cigarette, but Wang, who sat next to him, pushed down his hand intimating that it was forbidden to smoke in Stalin's presence. Hakamada then noticed that the only ashtray on the table was in front of Stalin. 26 During the conference Stalin did most of the talking, enunciating every word, while slowly walking back and forth. Although his tone was very quiet, there was no allowance for any compromise. Later, Stalin directly addressed Hakamada: Tovadshch Khakamada, [ have heard from our Japanese comrades that there is a fierce factional strife in Japan. This is not good. It must be stopped. I would like the Party to unite on the basis of the presently adopted directive. Therefore it is imperative to have Comrade Hakamada's self-criticism. I think you should write it now and send it to the comrades in Japan. All those present (both Russians and Japanese) stared at Hakamada, reinforcing Stalin's dictum, and Hakamada promptly agreed to prepare a self-criticism. The meeting ended after 11:00 P.M., without any expression of opinion by the Chinese representative. On parting Stalin turned to Hakamada and said, "Comrade Khakamada, I've heard that your health is not too good. How about recuperating in the Soviet Union? ''27 In fact, Hakamada's tuberculosis was worse than originally diagnosed, and he was sent to the Crimea for recuperation.
The Khrushchev Era
The Japanese delegation arrived in Moscow in late February 1964. It was headed by Hakamada and included Presidium member Matsushima Harushige, Central Committee member Nishizawa Tomio, and Yonehara Itaru who joined the group from Prague, where he was stationed as Akahata correspondent. The JCP's objective was to stop the high-handed interference of the CPSU and organizations under its influence in the affairs of the Japanese Party and its affiliated organizations. The Soviet delegation was headed by Brezhnev and included, among others, member of the Politburo and of the Secretariat Otto Kuusinen and the Head of the International Department Boris Ponomarev. The real negotiator, however, was none other than Suslov. The meeting took place in Brezhnev's office, who opened the proceedings by invit26. Ibid., pp. 98-99. 27. Ibid., ¢¢. 99-102.
STUDIES IN C O M P A R A T I V E C O M M U N I S M
ing the guest delegation to begin. 28 Hakamada started his speech by paying homage to the role that the Soviet Party, "the first Party in the world to succeed in a socialist revolution," had played vis-i~-vis the fraternal Parties. But he noted t h a t recently, our Party's relationship with the Soviet Embassy and the
Pravda correspondent was not as good as before. How did it get that
way? Wasn't it because ever since the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty problem, the Soviets were supporting only those people who agree with them and do as they are told? Wasn't it because the Soviets were engaging in splitting operations and interfering in our internal affairs? We have our own way of doing things, and we cannot support all CPSU decisions. And it is a mistake to criticize and attack us simply because we do not always support you. At this point, Suslov shouted out, "We are not doing any such thing," but Hakamada pressed on, "Communists must be honest with each other. At present you are engaging in harmful activity which is giving us trouble." Suslov protested, "I d o n ' t know of any interference in the internal affairs of any Party" and asserted that, "far from harming, in the past we have given all kinds of assistance to other C o m munist Parties. I d o n ' t know how much aid we have given to the Chinese Party. ''29 Without hesitation, Hakamada responded, Isn't it better not to blow constantly your own horn about giving aid to other Parties. People who receive aid don't want to hear it. And speaking of aid to China, the Soviet Union did not give aid for nothing; there must have been a reciprocal agreement. And when relations with China worsened, you quickly withdrew all your technicians. I wonder how severe a blow this was, and how it harmed China--a young socialist country. 3° Ponomarev, who sat next to Hakamada, shouted out, "This is an ultimatum!" a word that was repeated in unison by Brezhnev and Suslov. Hakamada responded, "We did not come here to break off relations between our two Parties. Take your words back." He also reminded the Soviet hosts that the 1950 Cominform criticism had come as a bolt out o f the blue and constituted blatant CPSU interference in the affairs o f the Japanese Party, forcing (jointly with the CCP) the 1951 thesis of extreme left adventurism upon the JCP. At this point, Suslov, vigorously waving his hands in denial, protested, "We have absolutely noth28. This account is based on "The Great Dispute with Suslov" in Hakamada, Watakushi no sengo shi, pp. 184-190. 29. Ibid., p. 188. 30. Ibid., p. 189.
THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
ing to do with that, That was all Stalin's work. If you purposely bring up these problems now, you must have other motives." Hakamada did not flinch, "You all blame everything on Stalin, but even if it was his doing, isn't it proper for the Soviet Party to assume some responsibility?,,31 The negotiations continued intermittently from March 2 until the l l t h without any agreement. 3z Yet, in spite o f the lack of an agreement, the Soviets insisted on issuing a joint communiqu6. The Japanese refused to draft or to sign one, citing the lack of any agreement that could be mentioned in such a communiqu6. But the Soviet delegation was determined to get a communiqu6 signed, and Ponomarev stubbornly persisted in his efforts to get Hakamada to sign a communiqu6, pulling his sleeve even as the Japanese delegation was getting on the plane, saying, "Comrade Hakamada, please sign a joint communiqu6; otherwise I'll be in trouble! ''33
The Brezhnev Era
The Japanese delegation left Narita Airport near Tokyo in t h e morning o f December 15, 1979, on a direct Japan Air Lines flight to Moscow, arriving shortly after 3:00 P.MI (9:00 P.M. Japanese time). The following day, the 16th, was a Sunday, and the Soviet-Japanese conference began on Monday, the 17th, at 11:00 A . M . in the conference room adjoining Secretary General Brezhnev's office in the Kremlin. 34 The Japanese delegation, headed by Chairman o f the P r e s i d i u m Miyamoto, had five other Presidium members, including two vicechairmen: Ueda Koichiro (the brother o f First Secretary Fuwa Tetsuzo) 35 and the Russian-speaking Nishizawa Tomio (who is also in 31. Ibid. Actually, the 1951 document was reportedly drafted by Suslov, and after Stalin's approval translated by Nosaka into Japanese. Fukuyama Hideharu, "Soren no talnichi seisaku--sono rekishi to genjo" [Soviet Policy Toward Japan: Its History and Present State of Affairs], Koanjoho, No. 346 (July 1982), p. 18. 32. Some of the topics taken up at these secret talks were revealed when the Soviet Party made public on July 1I, 1964, its April 18 letter to the JCP and the Japanese Party replied on August 26, 1964 (Akahata, September 2). For an analysis of the issues in the dispute, see Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, p. 169 ft. See also "On Interventions in and Subversive Activities Against the Democratic Movements of Our Country and Our Party by the CPSU Leadership and the Institutions and Organizations Under Its Guidance," Akahata, June 22, 1965; Bulletin, No. 41 (June 1965); also published as a pamphlet by the Foreign Languages Press in Peking in 1966, 47 pp. 33. Hakamada, Watakushi no sengo shi, p. 190. 34. Except as noted, this account is based on Chap. 1, "Nisso ryo Kyosanto kaldan to kuppuku shita Miyamoto Kenji" [The Conferenceof the Japanese and Soviet Communist Parties and Kenji Miyamoto's Surrender] in Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, pp. 12-35. 35. At the Sixteenth Party Congress held at the end of July 1982, Fuwa became chairman of the Presidium, while Miyamotoassumed the chairmanship of the Central Committee.
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
charge of the Committee on International Diplomatic Relations), as well as Uno Saburo, Miyamoto's personal secretary, who is a Central Committee member. The Soviet delegation was headed by Brezhnev and included Suslov, Ponomarev, Deputy of the CPSU International Department R. A. Ulianovskii, two Central Committee members--B. G. Afanasyev (chief editor of Pravda) and P. N. Fedoseev (vice-president of the Academy of Sciences)--and Ivan Kovalenko, head of the Japanese Section of the International Department. a6 Perhaps for the benefit of the Japanese correspondents who accompanied the Miyamoto mission and were briefly allowed in the conference room, the Russian hosts extended a most cordial welcome to the Japanese delegation. In an exaggerated gesture Brezhnev greeted Miyamoto with open arms, a bear hug, and a handshake. He led the way to the table, pointed to the tea service, and acted as a charming host to the Japanese visitors. 37 The first session started as soon as the doors were closed; Brezhnev arose to deliver a fifty-minute welcome and opening statement. He expressed his joy that the preliminary conferences had affirmed the normalization of relations between the two Parties and welcomed the JCP delegation to the Soviet Union. After a tour d'horizon of the international situation from the Soviet point of view, which included references to Europe, Indochina, and China, Brezhnev asked the Japanese to support the Soviet proposal made to the Japanese government for a treaty of "good-neighborhood and cooperation" and ended with an expression of hope that relations between the two Parties would expand in the future and a promise that the Soviet side would do its utmost to meet the expectations of the Japanese side. Brezhnev naturally made no reference whatsoever to the "Northern Territories Problem," which was uppermost on Miyamoto's mind. as Miyamoto responded by expressing his pleasure that the present talks would confirm the normalization of relations between the two Parties agreed upon in the preliminary conferences and talked at length about "the Shiga problem" which, according to the JCP, was at the center of relations between the two Parties and which also affected the movement for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen bombs, the Japanese36. "Joint Statement on the Talks Between the Delegation of the Japanese Communist Party and the Delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Akahata, December 25, 1979; Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979), p. 1; Pravda, December 25, 1979, pp. I and 4. 37. Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, p. 16, 38. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Soviet friendship movement, and other mass movements in Japan. After touching upon the international situation (especially in Asia), the political scene in Japan, the recent policies and developments in the Japanese Party, and the international Communist movement, Miyamoto took up the problems "of concern to the people of Japan and the Soviet Union," namely the so-called Northern Territories problem, fishing, fishermen detained by the Soviet authorities, visits to the graves and the gathering of ashes of Japanese World War II prisoners-of-war and detainees who died in Siberia. During the translation of Miyamoto's remarks, Suslov and Kovalenko feverishly took notes, while Brezhnev, seemingly paying no attention to the proceedings, sat expressionless with closed eyes. The meeting adjourned for lunch at 1:00 P . M . 39 Although during the preliminary conferences the Japanese had insisted and been led to believe that this would be a summit meeting between Miyamoto and Brezhnev, the initial two-hour morning session was the only one attended by Brezhnev in the eight-day negotiations, over which Suslov thereafter presided. The first day's meeting reconvened at 3:00 P.M. in the conference room of the CPSU Moscow Party Headquarters and went on for almost three hours. Suslov announced that Brezhnev's absence was due to "administrative duties" and took over as the deputy head of the Soviet delegation. At this meeting Miyamoto's plan was to reconfirm and nail down the points agreed upon during the preliminary negotiations regarding the normalization of relations between the two Parties, leaving the difficult Northern Territories problem for later discussions, so as not to jeopardize the normalization agreement. He spoke at length about the Shiga problem, stressing the points of agreement reached during the preliminary talks and the desirability of reunifying and strengthening the Japanese mass movements which had been split in the past. Miyamoto also tried to mollify his Soviet hosts by agreeing with their position on relations with the United States, and especially on Indochina where the JCP supported Vietnam against ChinaJ ° After this long detour, Miyamoto began his exposition of the Northern Territories issue and related problems. Essentially, he reiterated the Japanese Party's arguments as outlined in its "Open Letter to the CPSU" of May 1977 (which the Soviets ignored), citing historical claims based on the Russo-Japanese treaties of 1855 and 1875, and proposing a two-stage
39. Ibid., p. 17. 40. Ibid., pp. 17-19.
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM
return of the territories. 41 Habomai and Shikotan islands, which are part of Hokkaido (and not part of the controversial Kurile Island chain), were to be returned as soon as possible, while the entire chain of Kurite Islands should revert to Japan upon the emergence of a "democratic" Japan in the future, presumably with the JCP in the government and friendly to the Soviet Union. 42 (Significantly, the JCP sought to appear to be more patriotic than the Japanese government dominated by the Liberal-Democratic Party, which has claimed for Japan only the two southernmost Kurile Islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu.)43 The Soviet delegation's reaction was understandably extremely cool, with everyone from Suslov down staring as if they wore Noh masks, and there was no response at all when Miyamoto finished his long impassioned speech. The Japanese delegation remained silent waiting for the Soviet response. Finally, after an awkward silence, a cheerless Suslov said, "Miyamoto-san, since this is a difficult problem, let us tackle it later." But while Suslov deliberately skirted over the territorial issue, he tried to appease the Japanese by saying, We also understand the problems of fishing, detained fishermen, and grave visits in Siberia. Let's try to find a solution to these problems. Let's create a subcommittee for this purpose, and I would like the Japanese delegates to meet with the Minister of Fishing Industry Viadimir Kamentsev. We'll arrange such a meeting. Kaneko Mitsuhiro and Tachiki Hiroshi were assigned to meet with the Soviet minister the following day. As for the detainees, Suslov promised to telephone immediately the Siberian Maritime Patrol Headquarters to see about their release. He also promised to have the Ministry of Foreign Affairs look into the matter of grave visitation. These promises gave the Soviets an opportunity to stall on the main issue--the Northern Territories problem--leaving it for the next session. 44 Before the second session, the Japanese delegation gathered in Miyamoto's suite for a strategy meeting on the territorial issue. (They took care to keep this meeting secret from the accompanying Japanese 41. "The Open Letter of the Japanese CommunistParty to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on [the] Chishima (Kurile) Islands Issue," Akahata, May 28, 1977; Bulletin, No. 371 (June 1977). See also Chishima mondai to Nihon Kyosanto [The Kuriles Problem and the JCPI publishedby the Party Central Committeein 1974. 42. Mizushima,Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, pp. 19-20. 43. Japan, Prime Minister's Office,NorthernCountermeasuresHeadquarters,Hoppo Ryodo [Northern Territories](Tokyo,March 1973), 48 pp., and Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Northern Territories (Tokyo, 1982), 20 pp. 44. Mizushima,Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, pp. 20-21.
THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
journalists.) The meeting worked out a three-pronged approach: (1) Although it is totally unlikely that the Soviet side will agree to the Japanese Party's plan for a two-stage return of the Northern Territories, the delegation should continue to advocate forcefully the Japanese position (including the historical record) from the point of view of future talks and in order to "educate" the Soviet negotiators; (2) Even if the Soviet side rejects the Japanese position, the delegation should try to get them to agree on the inclusion in the final joint communiqu6 the views of both sides on this question; (3) the delegation should seek to obtain a pledge from the Soviet side that even though they do not accept the Japanese position on the Northern Territories issue at the present time, both sides will continue to consider this matter, as The second meeting took place two days later on December 19th at 3:30 P.M. in the same CPSU Moscow Party Headquarters conference room. The Soviets proved to be totally indifferent to the Japanese delegation's serious concern about the Northern Territories issue, and Suslov slammed the door on further negotiations on the subject by saying, Miyamoto-san, The problem which you have raised last time is very difficult to solve. We have thought about it but there is just no way out. This is because there is really no territorial problem between the Soviet Union and Japan. This is an issue which has been already settied. Let's take up another agenda item. We think we can cooperate with you and be of service to the Japanese Party. 46 Miyamoto was speechless and m a y have thought to himself, "That's not right, w e ' v e been deceived." When he recovered, he pointed out that, at the recently held preparatory talks, the Soviet side had at the end agreed to place the problem of the Northern Territories on the official agenda and to tackle it at the summit conference. Miyamoto also observed that Soviet insistence that "the [territorial] problem is already settled" only provides a good excuse for the reactionary forces who are trying to exploit this problem to estrange Japan and the Soviet Union from each other, and that the Soviet Union would "lose the understanding of the Japanese people." The Soviet Union should not take the attitude of "having no ears to listen" but should take the attitude of listening seriously. 47 Suslov interposed, "It is true that we have agreed to take up this problem officially at this conference. And that is really why at our last
45. Ibid., pp. 21-22. 46. Ibid. 47. Miyamoto's press conference in Moscow, December 24, 1979, Akahata, December 27, 1979; Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979), pp. I0 and 12.
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
session we have listened to your views on the subject for such a long time. And now we have given you our answer. There is no difference in our attitude. Isn't it so, Miyamoto-san?" Miyamoto countered, "It seems that you have simply not understood our position. Let me explain it once more in detail. ''48 At his press conference at the conclusion of the Moscow meeting Miyamoto reported that he had spoken for five hours out of the ten hours taken up by the Soviet-Japanese talks, and that he had devoted half of his time to the territorial issue. He also recounted one of the lighter moments at the conference when, after a long presentation on the territorial question, one of the Soviet negotiators said, "We have listened to you carefully and patiently. This is the evidence that we have ears to listen," a remark that provoked a burst of laughter. 49 But at this session, Suslov showed no reaction at all to Miyamoto's stirring presentation of about an hour. The Japanese delegation could not even get to their fall-back position. At a suitable moment, Suslov said, "Miyamoto-san, let's end for today and meet again tomorrow. And let's discuss other problems which are easier to resolve." The third session, on December 20, lasted almost four hours from 11:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. The Japanese delegation prepared another fall-back position on the territorial issue, but no matter how much Miyamoto argued about the two-stage return of the islands, the Soviet side stuck to its position that "there is no territorial problem between the Soviet Union and Japan" and that "the territorial problem is already settled. ''5° Suslov also brought up the security aspects of the northern islands: "Japan, the United States, and China are tightening the encirclement of the Soviet Union, using the Japan-U.S. military alliance as the core. If Habomai and Shikotan are returned, there is the consequent danger that they would be made into a strategic stronghold, aimed at attacking the Soviet Union, with a military buildup that threatens the security of the U.S.S.R." Miyamoto tried to reassure the Soviets that the islands .would not be used, or be allowed to be used, for military bases, that neither the Japanese Self-Defense Forces nor the U.S. forces would use them, that the islands would be kept out of the area covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and that the islands would be returned only after the receipt of such assurances. 5! The Soviet negotiators, meanwhile, did not counter the Japanese claim that
48. 49. 50. 51. Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, p. 23. See Miyamoto's press conference, Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979), p. 12. Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, p. 24. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Habomai and Shikotan were part of Hokkaldo, and not part of the Kurile chain. Since the Soviet delegation objected even to the word "territory," Miyamoto, as a tactical maneuver, substituted the words "peace treaty" as a topic for future discussions, for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union was stymied largely on account of the territorial issue. While insisting that the territorial problem had already been settled, Suslov agreed that the "peace treaty" was not yet settled, and that in the future there would be an exchange of opinion between the two Panics on this topic. This was, of course, a matter of semantics. The Japanese insisted that the words "peace treaty" included the territorial issue, while the Russians held that the "peace treaty" did not include the thorny territorial problem, s2 At this point, the negotiations turned to the preparation of the joint communiqud and a subcommittee consisting of the Russian-speaking Nishizawa and Ponomarev was assigned to the task. The final session to iron out the differences over the communiqu6 and to sign it was scheduled for December 24. Miyamoto again protested Brezhnev's absence, noting that the Soviet side had agreed at the preliminary talks that Brezhnev would lead the Soviet delegation at the Moscow "summit conference," and that, of the three formal sessions, Bmzhnev had attended only the first, and even then only the morning session. Suslov seemed annoyed and, after exchanging glances with Ponomarev who sat next to him, quietly said, Secretary General Brezhnev is an old man. [Suslov was, of course, several years Brezhnev's senior.] Also his health is not very good. Whenever various chiefs of state visit him, we try to limit the conferences to one hour. And when the conferences run over one hour, we step in for him and carry on. Please try to understand. However, he will definitely attend the final session of December 24th.s3 Suslov could have also added that the first meeting with the Japanese delegation lasted almost two hours. Miyamoto half-sarcastically responded, "Please do arrange the meeting. I was about to forget what Chairman Brezhnev looks like. But I am relieved to hear that I'll be able to see him on the 24th." The following day, December 21, one of the Russian interpreters dropped by the Japanese delegation's quarters and reported that "unfortunately Secretary General Brezhnev is still recuperating from his cold and may not be able to attend the final meeting on the 24th. ''s')
52. Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, pp. 25-26. 53. Ibid., pp. 26-27. 54. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM
The subcommittee to draft the final joint communiqu6 worked on it from the evening of December 20 to the 23rd. The Soviet side suggested that the Japanese delegation prepare a draft of the joint communiqu6, which was then subjected, sentence by sentence, to minute negotiations. 55 A lot of time was devoted to the territorial issue, and since the Soviets refused even to mention the word "territory" in the communiqu6, the following compromise wording was adopted: Both sides recognized that the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the U.S.S.R. is necessary for the friendly development of relations between the two countries on a stable long-term basis, frankly expressed their views, and agreed that the exchange of views would continue in the future.56 Two other Japanese points were strongly resisted by the Soviet side, but in the end Suslov agreed to include both of them in the final communiqu6: In order that the people of each country, in the existing complicated international situation, may effectively promote the truly independent and democratic undertaking of transformation and construction of its own country, based on the fight to national self-determination, both sides oppose both "export of counterrevolution" and "the export of revolution," and Both sides confirm that each party has the fight to independently decide in its choice of road of social progress, transformation, transition to socialism, and building socialism and Communism in its own country, based on the historical conditions and concrete situation of the country, and guided by the principles of scientific socialism, Communism. In this, no outside interference whatsoever is permissible.57 Of course, during these Soviet-Japanese negotiations Soviet troops were in the final stages of both "outside interference" in and the "export of revolution" to Afghanistan. The fourth and final session started at 2:00 P.M. on December 24. Brezhnev was absent, "recuperating from a cold" (but in fact involved in the final preparations for the invasion of Afghanistan), and the joint communiqu6 was signed by Miyamoto and Suslov. Following the signing ceremony, the meeting moved to another room for a small, low-key farewell party of fewer than twenty participants. Here Suslov an55. Ibid.. p. 29. 56. For an analysis of the agreement, see Berton, "The Japanese Communists." See also the "Joint Statement," Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979), p. 4. 57. Ibid.. pp. 4 and 5.
THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
nounced Brezhnev's message about his cold. This was a fitting conclusion to a conference, like a play, directed and acted by Suslov. Miyamoto did not get his "summit meeting" with Brezhnev, nor did he receive any pledge regarding the Northern Territories. 5s
Some Final Observations
Heinz Timmermann argues that the Soviet leadership makes a clear distinction between large and politically important nonruling Communist Parties on the one hand, and the small and insignificant ones on the other. 59 The JCP ranks somewhere in the middle: it is one of the very largest nonruling Communist Parties in the world, but rather impotent on the Japanese political scene. Yet Japan, in spite of its military weakness, is very important to the Soviet Union for a whole range of reasons: strategic, economic, technological, and political. Nevertheless, the Soviet treatment of the JCP has been just as clumsy and counterproductive as its treatment of the Japanese government: high-handed, tricky, inflexible. Of course, Soviet negotiations with the Japanese government have occurred in a context of changing power relationships, ranging from the period of Bolshevik helplessness and Japanese power over a large area of the Soviet Far East in the post-October Revolution period, to the era of relative Japanese weakness in the immediate postOccupation era, to one of growing Japanese economic strength in the 1960s and 1970s. No such ebb and flow in power has characterized the relationship between the CPSU and the JCP. A creature of the Comintern, the Japanese Party was subservient to the Party of the October Revolution and personally to Stalin. There could be no negotiations with Stalin, only a diktat, as the first vignette presented here corroborates. In the post-Stalin period, Suslov emerged as the primary negotiator with nonruling Parties and apparently had very wide power and latitude in such talks. It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which he was also the primary decisionmaker, given the absence of minutes of Politburo meetings, but certainly he had the major say within an agreed upon general political line, which he no doubt also decisively influenced. 6° The last two vignettes presented above clearly indicate Suslov's preem58. Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, p. 30. 59. See a special section, "Varying Behavior TOward Small and Large Parties" in his concluding comment below. 60. Suslov has been rumored to have been largely responsible for choreographing Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. See, for example, Roy Medvedev, Ascesa e caduta di Nikita Chruscev (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1982), p. 316 ft.
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
inent role in the 1964 and 1979 negotiations with the Japanese Party. From the Japanese sources Ponomarev emerges as Suslov's righthand man in charge of technical matters, such as the drafting of communiqu6s. He is probably responsible for Soviet success in avoiding any apologies for Soviet interference in the internal affairs of fraternal Parties and any explicit admission of past errors, as well as in excluding sensitive issues from the final comrnuniqu6s. As for negotiating tactics, the Japanese case clearly brings out that Soviet negotiators or their superiors are not above going back on their word to publicize in Soviet organs the agreements reached in preliminary talks. In their subsequent announcements, the Soviets have omitted crucial words, thereby emasculating the agreements. They have mislabeled "agreements" as "meetings," and have done everything else in their power to bury unpleasant agreements in obscure publications or specialized organs with limited circulation, reserving the central mass dailies of Pravda and lzvestiia for "positive" news. Indeed, one of the lessons to be drawn from the JCP's experience in its Soviet negotiations is the need to specify in the preliminary agreement that the Soviet side will reproduce the agreement in its entirety and where and how it will do so. Another element in the Soviet negotiating style, as evidenced in negotiations with the Japanese Communists, is the Soviet tactic of evading resolution of a thorny issue by agreeing to place it on the agenda of the next level of negotiations and then immediately rejecting the issue when it arises. Such rejection of an important issue is often accompanied by Soviet willingness to consider or promise help on secondary issues (which they may have purposely created in order to have the opportunity to show a spirit of conciliation at a later stage). The Soviet side is reluctant (if not unwilling) to admit errors or interference in the internal affairs of fraternal Parties. The demolition of "the cult of personality," beginning with Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, conveniently allows the Soviet negotiators to blame all policies pursued before 1953 on the late dictator. (Of course, all Communist Parties--including the JCP--engage in such historical revisionism, witness the treatment of Mao Tse-tnng in post-Mao China). 61 The history of relations between the CPSU and the JCP also demon61. See the treatment of JCP policies before Miyamoto's advent to power in the official Patty history on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary. Fifty Years of the Japanese Communist Party, rev. and enlarged ed. (Tokyo: Japanese Communist Party, Central Committee, 1980), 295 pp.
T H E JAPANESE C O M M U N I S T
strates the willingness of the Soviet leaders to split obstreperous Parties, to support pro-Soviet splinter groups editorially in Pravda and other Soviet organs (and also no doubt financially), while at the same time keeping an eye on the power relationship between the official Party and the splinter groups. When it became obvious that the JCP had weathered the defection of both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese elements, the Soviet Party began to mend its relations with the official JCP. They proceeded cautiously and slowly, alternating overtures with verbal attacks. The attacks, in response to JCP criticisms of Soviet policies, sometimes took the form of direct statements in the Soviet press and at other times used the subterfuge of reprinting attacks on the JCP by third Parties (usually minor, politically insignificant, and servile Parties, like the Argentine or American Parties). The Soviet Union has also been willing to support non-Communist political parties in its conflict with a Communist Party, as the record of Soviet support of the Japanese Socialist Party (and its affiliated organizations and mass movements) demonstrates. Behind these Soviet tactics lie the imperatives of foreign and domestic propaganda. The Soviet Union must maintain the myth of its omnipotence and omniscience by always stressing the positive, minimizing the negative, and blaming someone else for its problems. The CPSU must maintain the fiction that all "progressive" forces acknowledge the primacy of the Party of the October Revolution which ushered in "a new stage in the history of humanity." Soviet negotiating partners should appreciate this reality, learn from the record of Soviet negotiations (especially those with nonruling Communist Parties in advanced industrial democratic societies), be prepared to dot all the "i"s and cross all the "t"s, and display great patience. That may not always be possible in a free democratic society, with all its public opinion and electoral pressures, but it is essential for success.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.