Smartmatic-TIM JV

The contract for the automation of the 2010 Elections has been awarded to the Smartmatic-TIM joint venture. SMARTMATIC CORPORATION, INC. Smartmatic Group is a multinational group of companies that designs and deploys technological solutions intended to help governments fulfill, in the most efficient way, their commitments with their citizens. It is one of the largest, most advanced technology suppliers, with a wide and proven experience in the United States, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Smartmatic Group aims to help societies become more efficient and transparent through relevant technological innovations. Its capacity for innovation and wide range of products and services has earned Smartmatic extensive recognition in the technology community worldwide. Smartmatic Group is organized around three business areas: Electronic Auditable Voting Systems (SAES), Intelligent and Integrated Security Platforms (USP) and Advanced Solutions for People Registration and Authentication (SIMS) for a wide range of government applications. As a leading global provider, Smartmatic Group has an international ownership structure comparable to other multi‐nationals companies. Smartmatic Group is a private capital Netherlands/Netherlands Antilles Corporation, which owns several subsidiaries located in the United States, Netherlands, Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador and Barbados. Since August 2004, Smartmatic has successfully organized and performed multiple national and regional elections using an electronic voting solution in Latin America (eight nationwide electoral events), the Caribbean, Asia (the first completely automated election ever held in the Philippines ‐ Autonomous Region Muslim Mindanao) and, the United States (through Sequoia Voting Systems, a company divested in November 2007, but currently a partner to distribute Smartmatic’s election technology in the US market).

Over the years, Smartmatic has developed a comprehensive insight of each of electoral project, and has crafted solid relationships with our customers.

TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION Total Information Management (TIM) Corporation is a fully Filipino‐owned Information Technology (IT) company with nationwide operations offering varied products and services. It considers itself as “The Filipino IT Company” competing in a field dominated by multinationals. Established in 1985 initially as a vendor for remanufactured and refurbished IBM mainframes, TIM today is a multi‐product and multi‐services company catering to all of the IT needs of various industries. TIM has an Authorized Capitalization of One Billion Pesos (Php 1B) of which Four Hundred Million Pesos is paid‐up. Revenues generated from sales of products and services have been consistently over P700 Million annually. Its growing workforce of 110 regular and 150 project employees are a testament to the company’s organizational stability and dynamism. Source: Smartmatic-TIM’s Technical Proposal to the 2010 Elections Automation Project 2010 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS AUTOMATION TIMELINES As of 24 July 2009

REVISED IMPLEMENTATION CALENDAR ACTIVITY 1. Publication of Invitation to Bid 2. Issuance of Invitation/ Request for Proposal 3. Pre-bid conference 4. Submission and opening of bids 5. End-to-end demonstration and Systems Evaluation 6. Bid Evaluation and Post-qualification 7. Issue Notice of Award 8. Contract preparation 9. Approval of contract and signing START FINISH 03.16.09 03.18.09 03.27.09 05.04.09 05.27.09 05.29.09

05.07.09 05.31.09 06.10.09 06.10.09 07.10.09 07.13.09

10. Issue Notice to Proceed 11. Customization of systems / systems development 12. Project Initialization, Set up Project Management Team (PMT) and Project Systems including delivery of all SW licenses and firmware 13. Delivery of 20 units for customization and kick-off of SW customization 14. Delivery of functional system and software agreement 15. Delivery of EMS, CCS (HW, SW and website) 16. Report of Transmission and Logistics 17. Complete system including customization 18. Testing of systems/application software 19. Field test 1 (internal for COMELEC), Mock election, TEC systems certification and COMELEC Training 19.1 Field test 1 19.2 Mock Election 19.3 Train COMELEC executives 19.4 Train COMELEC technical personnel 19.5 Train Trainors 20. Train COMELEC field personnel on operation (with information technology-capable person) 21. Field test 2, if needed 22. COMELEC Systems Acceptance 23. Delivery of PCOS machines (Nov-12K, Dec30K) 24. Testing and acceptance of machines 25. TEC Systems Certification 26. Conduct public demonstration using machines 27. Creation of machine configuration, ballot face, etc 28. Commencement of ballot production

07.14.09 06.26.09 11.11.09



08.01.09 09.01.09 09.30.09 10.31.09 10.31.09 11.12.09 11.28.09

08.31.09 11.30.09 11.30.09 10.31.09 11.30.09 12.12.09 12.31.09

11.28.09 12.13.09 12.01.09 12.01.09 12.01.09 12.11.09 12.07.09 12.09.09 12.15.09 02.13.10

12.05.09 12.12.09 12.13.09 11.01.09 11.12.09 12.18.09 12.16.09 12.07.09 01.01.10 12.31.09 02.18.10 12.18.09 05.01.10 03.15.10 01.31.09

29. Print ballots 30. Second delivery of PCOS machines (Jan 30K; Feb - 10.2K) 31. Setting of Configuration of machines 32. Testing of machines in their actual configuration with the ballots 33. Deployment of machines/transmission equipment 34. Prepare transmission sites 35. Training of operators/DOST certification 36. Prepare voting/counting/canvassing sites 37. Delivery of ballots 38. Final checking, demos, and sealing of machines 39. Ship ballots 40. Election Day services and completion report and final acceptance in lieu of retention of warranty security 41. Count precinct & proclaim city/municipal winners 42. Canvass results & proclaim winners

01.07.10 01.01.10 01.07.10 01.14.10 03.02.10 03.02.10 01.20.10 03.02.10 03.10.10 05.02.10 04.22.10 05.07.10 05.10.10 05.12.10

04.18.10 02.28.10 04.18.10 04.21.10 04.25.10 04.25.10 04.30.10 04.25.10 03.31.10 05.06.10 05.08.10 05.17.10 05.11.10 05.13.10

Computer system na gagamitin ng Comelec sa 2010 elections handang subukin ng solon
03/19/2009 | 07:23 PM | | More MANILA – Handang subukan ng isang kongresista mula sa Mindanao kung gaano kaligtas ang sistemang gagamitin ng Commission on Elections (Comelec) sa computerized elections sa May 2010 presidential polls. Sinabi ni Agusan del Sur Rep. Rodolfo “Ompong" Plaza na tatanggapin niya ang hamon ng Comelec na i-hack ang computer system na gagamitin ng Comelec kung pagbibigyan ang kanyang mga kondisyon. “I accept the challenge of the Comelec to hack them, on the following terms and conditions," ayon sa kongresista.

“First, we will be allowed to choose our own weapons, there will be no time limit, the whole process will be televised, the primary objective is to paralyze the system, the secondary objective is to manipulate the data and the tertiary objective is to crack the software code," ayon kay Plaza. Kamakailan ay inapruhan ng Kongreso ang P11.3 bilyong pondo para sa ipatutupad na poll automation ng 2010 elections. Ngunit ilang mambabatas ang nangangamba na maging daan ng mas madaling pandaraya ang naturang modernong halalan. Sa kabila nito, inihayag ng Comelec na kumpiyansa silang hindi kayang i-hack ang sistema na gagamitin nila sa 2010 elections upang mapadali ang bilangan ng boto. Sinabi ni Jose Tolentino, executive director ng Comelec na kumpiyansa sila sa security features na nakapasok sa precinct count optical scan (PCOS) machines upang biguin ang mga hacker. Magsasagawa rin ng mock elections ang Comelec tatlong araw bago ang aktuwal na halalan sa Mayo 10, 2010 upang masiguro ang kapasidad ng gagamiting makina sa halalan. -

MAPping the Future : Automated election fraud By Manuel A. Alcuaz Jr. Philippine Daily Inquirer Posted date: July 06, 2009
AUTOMATED ELECTION fraud like manual election fraud can be divided into two parts: 1. Retail cheating in the counting and preparation of precinct election returns. 2. Wholesale fraud in the transmission and canvassing at the municipal, district, city and provincial levels.

Fraud usually does not happen at the national level since there are fewer numbers to transmit and canvass, and there are many eyes focused on the process. We will start by discussing how fraud can be done on the OMR (optical mark reading) counting machines. Then we will discuss how fraud can take place in transmission and canvassing. The Comelec claims that we will finally have clean and honest elections because the 2010 elections will be fully automated. The old cheaters who are computer illiterate and not in Comelec or with the automated system vendors may indeed find that their old tricks will no longer work. Misreading and manual tampering of ERs and COCs will no longer be possible. Transparency The beauty of the old system of writing names of candidates voted for, public reading of votes in front of watchers and citizens, tallying and manual preparation of election returns was that it was visible. At times there could have been fraud. But it was visible. Maybe sometimes due to guns and goons, people would just keep quiet. In the new OMR system voters will feed the ballot into the machine the next thing they will see is the printed election return. Whether their votes were properly counted they will not know. Transparency at the precinct level is gone. Fraud can take place and the voters and watchers at the precinct will not know if fraud has taken place. Comelec’s claims Comelec claims that the AES (automated election system) cannot be hacked and that the source code will be open for inspection. These are good for Comelec’s PR efforts, but they do not make automated elections safe from fraud. In fact, they are smoke screens that cover the real areas where fraud can take place. The Random House Encyclopedia defines hacking as unauthorized access to a computer, either for fun or for malicious or fraudulent purposes.

Hackers generally use microcomputers and telephone lines to obtain access. In computing, the term is used in a wider sense to mean using software for enjoyment or self-education, not necessarily involving unauthorized access. Hacking is not the problem and, therefore, spending time and money to prevent hacking is not very useful. If only outsiders would rob you in your home then having grilled windows, special locks, alarms, etc. will ensure your safety. But if you live in the company of thieves, you can still be robbed. That is what the police refer to as an “inside job.” The greatest danger of fraud in the 2010 computerized elections will come from insiders in Comelec and computer vendors, not from outsiders. In a recent meeting of the Management Association of the Philippines Election Automation subcommittee, with former Customs and BIR Commissioner Guillermo Parayno, we asked him whether his agencies had ever been hacked. His answer was no, any intrusions were always by insiders. Source code inspection The other point Comelec likes to stress is that the source code of the OMR counting machines will be available for inspection by computer experts. Looking at the source code is practically useless. OMR machines are used in schools for scoring tests and in survey companies for tabulating survey results. Members of the administrative staff in schools and survey companies do not change the source code. They provide a scoring or tabulating table to modify how the OMR machine scores a test or tabulates a survey. By changing this table, fraud is easily committed. In order to cheat on the OMR counting machines, all that is needed is to download a new counting table that changes for whom a shaded circle is counted. In areas where the candidates that want to cheat are weak, the table can be modified so that votes will be switched. This does not have to be done on all machines.

If done on even just 10 percent of the OMR machines, a tight race may be reversed in favor of those who are cheating. How would the counting tables be switched? Since the OMR machines are connected to the Internet, it is possible for an outside party, in connivance with Comelec or system vendor people, to enable an unseen computer to load the fraudulent table. At the end of counting, the original table can be reloaded so that any tests would indicate that the machines are counting correctly and honestly. It could also be possible for someone that seems to be authorized to quickly insert a USB memory stick that would load the fraudulent table. Fraud at provincial level While the Comelec has budgeted P8.2 billion for machines rental of OMR machines, it has only budgeted P200 million for transmission and P200 million for canvassing. There is no provision for parallel transmission and canvassing. Therefore, there is no provision for audit. In the old manual system, the hard copy of the precinct ERs were brought to the municipality to be read and entered in the statement of votes, which was visible to watchers. Watchers could compare the statement of votes with their own copies of the ER. Before the ER was read and added to the statement of votes, the authenticity of the ER was first verified. This process took time and caused delays when lawyers argued, but at least citizens could see what was going on, hopefully make sure that votes were properly canvassed and at the very least be aware that frauds had taken place. The Comelec AES has no safeguards against insider-initiated fraud. It assumes that the Comelec and the vendor officials, managers and staff are absolutely honest. It assumes that an automated system will not commit mistakes or fraud. In the Comelec system, massive fraud can take place, but it will not be discovered until after the beneficiaries of fraud have been proclaimed. Good luck with the election protests to the real winners who were defrauded! How can fraud be done? While RA 9369 provides for the printing of up to 30 copies of ERs and their posting at the precinct, the single transmission and canvassing system can move much faster. Some vendors claim that national candidates could be proclaimed in less than 48 hours.

Unfortunately, the political parties and citizens arms cannot move that fast and would not be able to point to fraudulent manipulation before the rushed proclamation of the favored candidates, as what recently happened in Iran. It is interesting that while it was said that the slow transmission and canvassing in the old manual system created many opportunities for fraud, in the new automated system, very fast transmission and canvassing in 2010 may lead to massive fraud, frustrating the true votes of our nation. I would propose that legislation be passed to deliberately institute auditing steps at each level. There is nothing wrong with the national count taking two weeks. There is a saying that haste makes waste. Let’s not have our new leaders elected by automated election fraud. Smartmatic case Avante has documented how Smartmatic was able to remotely change the ERs of three precincts in Wao in last year’s ARMM election. Three precincts reported 0 votes because the number of votes exceeded the number of voters. Smartmatic was able to remotely change the votes in the three precincts. The Internet and the World Wide Web are powerful tools for doing good. They can also be used for evil. Good or evil My company uses the Internet and collaboration software to be able to access our customers’ computers and manipulate them as if we were onsite. The same could be done with the Comelec OMR machines and transmission and canvassing computers. What could we do with such remote access and manipulation capabilities? Someone could access OMR machines and change their vote counting tables temporarily to make some candidates get votes and others lose votes. After counting, the proper tables could be restored so that the fraud would go undetected. The same technology could be used to access municipal canvassing systems to change the COC prior to transmission. The best way to cheat would be to switch votes between candidates. Something similar could be done on provincial canvassing computers.

Key safeguards However, instead of altering the provincial COC, one could change the statement of votes of some municipalities. These changes would be reflected on the provincial COC. How do we safeguard our vote? In order to prevent automated election fraud, certain safeguards have to be instituted. These include: 1. The OMR machines should not have any network connection. The election results should be copied to USB memory sticks, which can subsequently be loaded to a separate PC that will transmit the results to the Comelec canvassing system at the municipality and to the dominant majority and minority parties, as well as to the citizens arms such as PPCRV and Namfrel. 2. The above parties should be provided with their own PCs to be able to produce their own COCs. If the Comelec COC does not match the COCs produced by other parties, a careful review should be done prior to transmission to the provincial level. 3. The verified municipal COC should then be transmitted to the multiple groups defined above. Again, the Comelec COC should be compared with the other COCs and the reason for discrepancies should be determined. 4. The verified Provincial COC should again be transmitted to multiple parties. The Comelec and Congressional Canvass should again be compared to the parallel canvasses to assure that fraud is minimized as much as possible. 5. Each of the concerned groups should make their results available on their websites for the public to access. If these proposed measures are followed, there will be true transparency and automated fraud will be minimized. (The article reflects the personal opinion of the author and does not reflect the official stand of the Management Association of the Philippines. The author is president of Systems Sciences Consult Inc. Feedback at For previous articles, please visit .)

A Policy Critique
By the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG) May 07, 2009 The Precinct Count Optical Scan-Optical Mark Reader (PCOS-OMR) technology chosen by the Comelec goes against the basic democratic principle of “secret voting and public counting.” This is because the OMR system makes the counting, canvassing and consolidation of election results

hidden from public eye and, hence, lacks any transparency as the Constitution and RA 9369 require. The proclamation of winners will be done in 2-3 days making it extremely impossible for file any election protest which is expected to be widespread – and poll watching almost futile. Moreover, the Comelec appears to be unprepared and ill-equipped to manage the complexities and uncertainties posed by the automated election system. The OMR technology will most likely lead to wholesale electronic cheating that will, in turn, lead to a possible failure of election with serious political repercussions. There are alternative technologies that can ensure an open, transparent, credible, and participatory elections as mandated under RA 9369. It is unfortunate, however, that the poll body has shut all doors against further dialogues and debates on the viability of its choice of technology system. On the other hand, the Comelec has taken no strong measures and safeguards toward reducing if not completely dismantling the powerful cheating machineries in the country. In such a situation, the use of modern technology will not deter – and may even enhance – automated cheating. Center for People Empowerment in Governance May 07, 2009

Choose the best poll automation system, Gordon warns Comelec Independent Senator Richard J. Gordon today warned the Commission on Elections (Comelec) to choose the best poll automation system that would ensure that wholesale cheating, which often marred the country's electoral exercises, would no longer be easily carried out in the May 2010 presidential elections. Gordon, author of the amended Automated Elections System (AES) Law, issued the warning in the wake of proposals from various sectors to consider using the Open Elections Sytem (OES) instead of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) technology that the Advisory Council recommended. "Too much is at stake in the May 2010 presidential elections, hence the Comelec should choose a system that would finally get rid of wholesale cheating that usually mars elections in our country," he said. "Using an automation system that is invulnerable to manipulation would erase public suspicion that the Filipino people's sacrosanct votes would be stolen from them. Dapat yung mawawala na yung pagtingin na dito sa Pilipinas dalawa lang ang klase ng kandidato - yung nanalo at yung nadaya," he added. The Comelec is reportedly considering using the PCOS technology, an improved Optical Mark Reader (OMR) system that was used along with the Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) technology in the August 2008 automated elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

PCOS is a technology wherein optical paper ballots, hand-marked by the voters, are inserted for counting into optical ballot scanners placed in every polling precinct. But several sectors, including the Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas of National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, several members of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) and former Comelec Chairman Christian Monsod, have asked the Comelec to consider using an OES while Congress is deliberating on the proposed P11.3 billion supplemental budget for the automation of the 2010 elections. They claimed that the OMR and DRE technologies are both expensive in terms of procurement and storage, and they also do not exactly guarantee fraud-free election results because the electorate cannot manually recheck or validate the results generated by the two systems. They added that an OES is a more credible method that can be adopted by the Comelec for the scheduled national and local elections in 2010. In an OES, voters cast their votes manually as they have been doing in past elections. After the close of voting, the ballots are read and tallied as traditionally done with an Election Return (ER) filled out by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). A copy of the ER is brought to an encoding center within the school and uploaded to a national central database. Gordon pointed out that the use of an effective poll automation system would modernize democracy, put an end to the divisiveness in the country and finally bring the longsought-for closure. "If the Comelec will ensure that the automated system to be used will stop manipulating election results, we would finally see candidates who were truly elected by the people emerge as victors. It would mean that our country has indeed achieved true democracy," he said.

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