_____________________________________________________________ No.

06-15344 ________________________________________________ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT _____________________________________ MIGUEL GADDA Plaintiff-Appellant v. STATE BAR OF CALIFORIA;TRACEY MCCORMICK;BETTY JUNG;THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA;BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS;DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;MICHAEL CHERTOFF, Secretary; JENNIFER BARNES; MIRIAM HAYWARD; ALBERTO GONZALEZ; MIMI S. YAM, Defendants-Appellees
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA _______________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC ___________________________________________________________ Miguel Gadda P.O. Box 318070 San Francisco, CA 94131-8070 (415) 826-6704 Fax: None E-mail: mgadda4196@aol.com In Pro Se

TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………..i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………...iii STANDARD FOR REHEARING EN BANC...........................................................1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT….…………………………………………………1 RECENT FACTS…………………………………………………………………..6 ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………….7 I. THE PANEL DECISION GOES AGAINST SUPREME CORT AND NINTH CIRCUIT OPINIONS. STATUTES HAVE NO TEMPORAL LIMIT……………7 A. The Statutes are Silent on Temporal Limit…………..…………………..7 B. Application of the Statutes Lead to Absurd Results…………………….11 II. THE PANEL DID NOT DISCUSS GADDA’S PRO SE STATUS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT PROPER IN THIS CASE.TWO JUDGES SHOULD HAVE RECUSED THEMSELVES………………………………………………………13 A. Pro Se Status…………………………………………………………….13 B. Motion to Dismiss Under FRCP 12(b)(6)………………………………13 C. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under FRCP 12(c)……………..14 D. Two Judges of the Panel Should have Recused Themselves……….......14 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………...15 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cacique v. Robert Reiser & Co., 169 F.3d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 1999)……………..10 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)…………………………………….13 Decker v. Advantage Fund, Ltd., 362 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004)..............13 Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1090-91 (10th Cir. 1997)………..11 Gadda v. Ashcroft, 377 F. 3d 934 (9th Cir. 2004)………………………………6,14 Gadda v. State Bar, et al., 2007 WL 4531958, (No. 06-15344 9th cir. Dec. 27,2007)………………………………………………………………………..5,6 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982)……………3,4,0,11 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)…………………………………………...13 Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 703 (1995)............................................4, 9 In the Matter of TIMOTHY JOHN MACKENZIE, (Review Dept. of the State Bar Ct., No. 04-R15895, May 11, 2007)………………………………………………..8 Morton v. DeOliviera, 984 F.2d 289..........................................................................2 Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966)…………………….3,9,11 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Westgate Partners, Ltd., 937 F.2d 526, 529 (10th Cir. 1991)……………………………………………………………………………11 Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004)................................................4 United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940……………...3,9,11 United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994)………………………………2,7,9,10
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United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 549 (1981)…………………………7,8,9,10 United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 1992............................................2 United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 562 (1986)…………………………….7,10 United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, 501 (1937)…………………………….8,10 United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999)………………..11 United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042............................................2, 3, 8 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976)……………………………………………………………8 Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001)……………………………13

United States Codes 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)………………………………………………………………..14 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure FRAP 35…………………….……..….……………………………………………1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure FRCP 12 (b)(6)...............................................................................................6,13,14 FRCP 12 (c)…..……………………………………………………………12,13,14 Local Rules for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Local Rule 35-1……………………………………………………………..........1

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ATTACHMENTS DC Opinion………………………………………………………………………...A Panel's Opinion…………………………………………………………………….B Pursuit Policy of State Bar………………………………………………………..C1 Prospective Application of B&P 6140.5………………………………………….C2 California Supreme Court Minutes………………………………………………...D

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STATEMENT OF COUNSEL FRAP 35 AND CIRCUIT RULE 35-1 STANDARD FOR REHEARING EN BANC Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 and Circuit Rule 35-1, a majority of the circuit judges in regular active service may order that an appeal be heard or reheard en banc where: (1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2 the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance. FRAP 35(a). Miguel Gadda (“Gadda”) states that in his judgment, the situations described below merit a Panel Rehearing and a Rehearing En Banc. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT This is a case of first impression that will affect hundred of attorney’s who have been ordered to pay discipline costs retroactively, immediate money judgments and a pursuit policy collecting discipline costs and maybe the attorneys’ estates of deceased if the assets are located. See Attach. C1(Section 3 (c) and 4 (c).) The panel found the amendments retroactive but did not mention how far back the State Bar had to go to collect. Presently the State Bar set ten years as the temporal limit. This Court should grant rehearing or a hearing en banc for two reasons.

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First, this case contradicts a U. S. Supreme Court decision and a Ninth Circuit Court decision that discusses short retroactive time limits for retrospective application of statutes. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994), United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1062 (2004). (Congress was silent on time limit and scope). The panel did not consider these cases in their opinion. The California legislature amended B&P Codes 6086.10 and 6140.5 but the amended statutes were silent on the temporal limit to collect from these attorneys and whether estates of disciplined attorneys could be collected from their estates (Our emphasis). It also made discipline costs of disciplined attorneys, money judgments payable immediately. However the State Bar of California has now a “Pursuit Policy” that set guidelines which make the amendments more bewildering and the application of the statutes absurd. Ex. C1 . (Pursuit Policy for Court Ordered Discipline Costs and CSF Obligations). This was adopted by the Board of Governors July 20, 2007. Ex. C1. A three-judge panel does not have the authority to overrule or set aside a prior Ninth Circuit decision. Instead, “only the court sitting en banc may overrule a prior decision of the court.” Morton v. DeOliviera, 984 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1993). The sole exception is where “an intervening Supreme Court decision undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth Circuit, and both cases are closely on point.” United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the

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Supreme Court decision of United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994), is an intervening case not cited or analyzed by the panel. The panel did not follow the Law of the Circuit regarding silence of temporal limits in statutes. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1062 (2004). (Congress silent). This application of the amended statutes results in absurd results. Where applying the plain language "would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended," we need not apply the language in such a fashion. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982). This is because "interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available." Id. at 575; see also Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (noting that when the conventional interpretation of a statutory text produces "absurd or futile results," a court may look "beyond those words to the purpose of the act" (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940))). The panel did not discuss the absurd results of this amended statute which results in going back to any time period at the whim of the State Bar which might affect collection of discipline costs of attorney’s estates. It would also report attorneys to collection reporting and collection agencies, thereby ruining the attorney’s credit. See Attach C1. Moreover, the State Bar has arbitrarily set a ten

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year time limit for retroactivity and has now stated that it will only collect CSF funds prospectively. See Attach. C1, C2. The application of the amended statutes by the State Bar results in absurd results. If the language of a statute is clear in its application, the general rule is that we are bound by it. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 703 (1995) ("In the ordinary case, absent any indication that doing so would . . . yield patent absurdity, our obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it." (quotation and citation omitted)). Nevertheless, where applying the plain language "would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended," we need not apply the language in such a fashion. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982). This is because "interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available." Id. at 575. Second, this appeal involves an issue of exceptional importance. It will affect hundreds of disciplined attorneys and maybe their estates. The question for en banc review is whether the State Bar can arbitrarily set a time limit for collection of discipline costs. Can they go back to 1928 when the State Bar was formed or ten years as their “pursuit policy “goes into effect. Attach. C. Moreover, The State Bar is thinking of applying the amended statute 6140.5 prospectively. Our Emphasis. Attach. C1. (California State Auditor Report 2007-406, at 114). It

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clearly shows that the State Bar can choose at their discretion when to apply the statute, how far back and to whom and possibly their estates. The California Supreme Court now has in their opinions and orders that discipline costs are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment. Attach D. The State Bar Review Department has a recent decision conditioning reinstatement to the State Bar to be able to be reinstated. See In the Matter of TIMOTHY JOHN MACKENZIE, (Review Dept. of the State Bar Ct., No. 04-R15895, May 11, 2007). The panel did not analyze or mention Gadda acting in pro se regarding liberal construction of the complaint, permission to amend and summary judgment. Gadda v. State Bar, 2007 WL 4531958, (No. o6-15663 9th cir. Dec. 27, 2007). RECENT FACTS The California Legislature passed amendments to B&P Codes 6086.10 and 6140.5 effective January 1, 2004. Gadda was the only attorney to file against the State Bar. The 9th Circuit panel declared these amendments constitutional and as an immediate money judgment to any attorney who had discipline costs and retroactive. It did not mention a time limit on how far back the State Bar could go to collect these costs. , arbitrarily giving the State Bar no limit on the time period and when to issue an immediate money judgment. The California Supreme Court approved this, but did not set a time limit

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Before April 1, 2007, discipline costs or restitution to Client Security Fund (CSF) ordered against a disciplined lawyer were collected either by including the amount in the billing of the annual membership fees or requiring payment as a condition of reinstatement. On January 1, 2004, changes in the State Bar Act provided that discipline costs and CSF restitution orders could be enforced as money judgments in the civil courts. With the Supreme Court’s approval of Rule 9.23 of the California Rules of Court, effective April 1, 2007, the State Bar may now obtain automatic judgments for court-ordered discipline cost and Client Security Fund obligations. Attachment C1. The goal of this policy is to raise money from collections by a new “pursuit policy”. of discipline costs and CSF obligations as quickly as possible, to utilize available tools effectively and efficiently collect these debts owed by disciplined California lawyers. Attach. C1. The State Bar has arbitrarily set a period of ten years to collect these debts. The Bar, however is thinking of collecting CSF funds prospectively. Attach. C2. The California Supreme Court in its orders regarding discipline costs now say that they are considered money judgments. Attach. C2 . The panel consisted of Judges Beezer, Sidney Thomas and Farris reviewing the opinion of District Court Judge Marylin Hall Patel. Gadda v. State Bar. et al., 2007 WL 4531958, (No. 06-15344 9th cir. Dec. 27,2007). Judge Beezer and Judge Thomas were on the same panel that denied relief to Gadda on preemption issues

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and disbarred Gadda in big fonts on another opinion by Judge Marylin Hall Patel. Gadda v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 943(9th Cir. 2004). ARGUMENT I. THE OPINION OF THE PANEL CONFLICTS WITH AN EXISTING OPINION BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND AN OPINION OF THIS CIRCUIT. THE STATUTES ARE SILENT ON TEMPORAL REACH AND ALSO CREATE ABSURD RESULTS. THIS CASE IS ONE OF FIRST IMPRESSION AND OF EXCEEDING IMPORTANCE. A. The Statutes are silent on temporal limit. The California legislature amended B&P Codes 6086.10 and 6140.5 to make discipline costs of disciplined attorneys, money judgments payable immediately. The amended statutes were silent on the temporal limit to collect from these attorneys and whether estates of deceased disciplined attorneys could be collected from their estates. (Our emphasis). The panel’s opinion conflicts with Supreme Court opinions on retroactive application of statutes with no time limit. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994). Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32 (quoting United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 549, 296 (1981)). The Court upheld the retroactive reach of the statute because Congress made it retroactive for a limited period of time. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32 (“Congress acted promptly and established only a modest period of retroactivity.”). “In every case in which we have upheld a retroactive federal tax statute against a

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due process challenge . . . the law applied retroactively for only a relatively short period prior to enactment.” Carlton, 512 U.S. at 37-38 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 562 (1986) (1 month); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 294-295 (10 months); United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, 501 (1937) (1 month)). The panel’s opinion also is in conflict with opinions of this circuit regarding legislature without temporal limit. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1062 (2004). The California Legislature’s silence is troubling because the Court requires that Congress have an independent rationale as to why a statute should be applied retroactively. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 at 17 (“The retrospective aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former.”). The panel did not discuss the absurd results of the amended statutes which results in going back to any time period at the whim of the State Bar which might affect collection of discipline costs of deceased attorney’s estates. It would also report attorneys to collection reporting and collection agencies, thereby ruining the attorney’s credit. See Ex. C. (State Bars Pursuit Policy). At the moment it appears that the State Bar will apply amended statute 6140. 5 prospectively. (Our emphasis). Attach. C2. The California Supreme Court has now put in all its

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discipline orders that costs are also money judgment. See Attach. D. (Cal. Supreme Court Minutes). This leans to prospective application of the statutes. A recent State Bar Review Court opinion states that discipline costs must be paid in order to be reinstated. This was Gadda’s argument all along and it is a prospective application. See In the Matter of TIMOTHY JOHN MACKENZIE, (Review Dept. of the State Bar Ct., No. 04-R15895, May 11, 2007) If the language of a statute is clear in its application, the general rule is that we are bound by it. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 703 (1995) ("In the ordinary case, absent any indication that doing so would . . . yield patent absurdity, our obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it." (quotation and citation omitted)). Nevertheless, where applying the plain language "would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended," we need not apply the language in such a fashion. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982). This is because "interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available." Id. at 575; see also Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (noting that when the conventional interpretation of a statutory text produces "absurd or futile results," a court may look "beyond those words to the purpose of the act" (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)))The panel’s opinion conflicts with Supreme Court opinions

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on retroactive application of statutes with no time limit. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994). Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32 (quoting United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 549, 296 (1981)). The Court upheld the retroactive reach of the statute because Congress made it retroactive for a limited period of time. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32 (“Congress acted promptly and established only a modest period of retroactivity.”). “In every case in which we have upheld a retroactive federal tax statute against a due process challenge . . . the law applied retroactively for only a relatively short period prior to enactment.” Carlton, 512 U.S. at 37-38 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 562 (1986) (1 month); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 294-295 (10 months); United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, 501 (1937) (1 month)). The panel’s opinion also is in conflict with opinions of this circuit regarding legislature without temporal limit. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1062 (2004). Here, the uniformity of this Court’s decisions is threatened because the panel decision directly conflicts with Carlton, Hemme, Darusment and Ubaldo-Figueroa, and would effectively overrule or nullify these decisions. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Cacique v. Robert Reiser & Co., 169 F.3d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 1999) (state law). B. The State Bar’s Application of the Statutes Lead to Absurd Results.

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If the language of a statute is clear in its application, the general rule is that we are bound by it. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 703 (1995) ("In the ordinary case, absent any indication that doing so would . . . yield patent absurdity, our obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it." (quotation and citation omitted)). Nevertheless, where applying the plain language "would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended," we need not apply the language in such a fashion. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982). This is because "interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available." Id. at 575; see also Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (noting that when the conventional interpretation of a statutory text produces "absurd or futile results," a court may look "beyond those words to the purpose of the act" (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940))). This absurdity exception to the plain language rule is consistent with the doctrine that "the function of the courts . . . [i]s to construe . . . [statutory] language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress." Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 542; see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Westgate Partners, Ltd., 937 F.2d 526, 529 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The 'absurdity' exception to the plain language rule is a tool to be used to carry out Congress' intent . . . .").

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Although the absurdity doctrine is "exceptional" in character, we have applied it where construing the plain language of a statute would produce an illogical result. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding it would be absurd to apply witness bribery statute to prosecutor's offer of leniency in exchange for codefendant's testimony); Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1090-91 (10th Cir. 1997) (invoking absurdity doctrine to expand Americans with Disabilities Act's affirmative defense against conditions posing "direct threats" to safety). This is a case of first Impression so a careful reading of the3 statute is required. The panel found the state retroactive but that there was clear intention by the legislature. What are the absurd results if this law is applied? 1. There is no temporal limit on the statute so the State Bar can go as far back to the founding of the state bar. The State Bar can go after the estates of deceased attorneys if they can locate assets to collect discipline costs with a money judgment as far back as ten years for now but they can change it at will. Attach. C1 Sec. 3(c) and 4(c). Did the California Legislature intend this? 2. They will report all debts to collection credit rating organizations. The Bar will hire collection agencies to do collect monies. This might conflict with Federal and State Consumer laws. 3. In order to collect on the majority of these Client Security Fund obligations, the State Bar is required to file a subrogation lawsuit under Business

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and Professions Code 6140.5, subd. (b) and obtain a judgment via traditional civil litigation processes. It is clear the State Bar went too far in their pursuit policy and temporal limit. They will hurt unfairly persons that had settled expectations. Making the statutes prospective will cure many of these ills and maintain uniformity with just results. II. THE PANEL DID NOT DISCUSS GADDA’S PRO SE STATUS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT PROPER IN THIS CASE.TWO JUDGES SHOULD HAVE RECUSED THEMSELVES A. Pro Se Status Appellant is proceeding pro se. Accordingly, this Court must hold plaintiff’s pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). It is law in this circuit that pleadings made in pro se are construed liberally. See Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (Court has a “duty . . . to construe pro se pleadings liberally. . . . This rule particularly applies to complaints and motions filed by pro se prisoners.”). Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652. . However the panel did not discuss Gadda’s pro se status as to liberal construction, amendments of complaints or summary judgment. B. Motion to Dismiss Under FRCP 12(b)(6) The Ninth Circuit reviews de novo a motion to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Decker v. Advantage Fund, Ltd., 362
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F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004). For a defendant to prevail on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The panel did not consider any of the relevant facts in Gadda’s complaint. C. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under FRCP 12(c) We review a dismissal on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) de novo. Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004). Judgment on the pleadings is proper when, taking all the allegations in the pleadings as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The collection efforts by the State Bar in Gadda’s First amended Complaint are facts that question retroactivity, constitutionality and due process. D. Two Judges of the Panel Should have Recused Themselves. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) states, “Any justice, judge, or magistrate [magistrate judge] of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In 2004, Judge Beezer and Judge Thomas were on the panel that affirmed an opinion of Judge Marilyn Hall Patel regarding preemption issues of discipline by the State Bar of Federal practitioners. Judge Beezer wrote the opinion and he

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seemed mad. He disbarred Gadda and told him if he did not comply he would be sanctioned a $1,000.00 for each case. Gadda v. Ashcroft, 377 F. 3d 943 (9th Cir. 2004). In the present case Judge Beezer and Judge Thomas were on the panel again reviewing Judge Patel’s Opinion. They were given the files on December 7, 2007 and they decided the case on December 27, 2007. The case was uncategorized (Constitutional law, Ethics, Civil procedure), and it seemed that it was made in a hurry without thorough analysis. Gadda always thought that the panels were picked at random but this is hard to believe that Gadda would get two of the same Judges on the panel. Gadda phoned the Court Clerk to ask how to get another panel but they said it was too late. Gadda knew then that he would lose. Any reasonable person in his position would think the same. This case seems to have been rubber stamped and it leaves a bad taste and a worse odor. CONCLUSION Petitioner respectfully requests that the issues presented be heard En Banc and that this Court vacate the panel’s opinion find the new amended statutes unconstitutional and remand to the district court with instructions. That each party pay their own costs and any other order and relief it deems just. Date: _________________________ Miguel Gadda

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