Hara (2008) - Increasing Childlessness in Germany and Japan

International Journal of Japanese Sociology 2008, Number 17
doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6781.2008.00110.x
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Increasing Childlessness in Germany and Japan: Toward a Childless Society?

TOSHIHIKO HARA
Abstract: This paper focuses on childlessness in Germany and Japan and its sociological meanings in family formation in postmodern societies. First, it shows the trends of fertility decline and increasing childlessness, and claries the similarities and differences in both countries, by comparing parity composition, educational attainment, and other socioeconomic correlates of childlessness. Second, using the data of attitudinal surveys, such as the 2003 Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS) in Germany and the 13th National Fertility Survey (JNFS; 2005) in Japan, the reasons for having no children are observed. Third, referring to the discussions of German scholars, it tries to explain the sociological meanings of childlessness and to describe the development toward a childless society (even if its demographically not sustainable) as one of the possible consequences of the Second Demographic Transition. Important ndings are as follows: (1) In Germany the fertility decline began early in the mid-1960s but in Japan later from mid-1970s so that the increase of childlessness has been a little delayed. The proportion of childless women in Western Germany increased to 28% for the 1967 cohort. In Japan, it has increased to 12.7% for the 1960 cohort, but is expected to reach 30% for the 1970 cohort. (2) The educational gap in childlessness is clearly observed in Germany; however, this is not so simple in Japan. Corresponding with the increase of childlessness, the desired number of children in average is declining. The emergence of a child-free culture is observed in Germany by PPAS, but not yet in Japan by JNFS. (3) Polarization may proceed further in both countries, between childless people and people with many children. Keywords: fertility decline, childlessness, family formation
Introduction
In Germany, the total fertility rate (TFR) has stagnated at below replacement level ranging from 1.3 to 1.6 for more than 30 years. Meanwhile, childlessness has increased and coming to draw public attention. Dobritz and Schwarz (1996) warned that childlessness has already become common,
at least in West Germany, and has began to be a behavioral pattern. The proportion of childlessness is growing from 20% for the 1955 birth cohort of women, up to 28% for the newest 1967 birth cohort and nowadays, one in three women could remain childless throughout her lifespan. In Japan, the fertility decline has continued from the mid-1970s to the present. Since
2008 The Author Journal compilation 2008 The Japan Sociological Society
Toward a Childless Society?
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1990s the lowest-low fertility, a TFR below 1.3, has emerged. Even if public concerns are concentrated on the results of lowest-low fertility, such as the emerging hyper-aging society and the beginning of the decrease in total population, the childlessness issue is not seriously recognized. However, as we will see, childlessness in Japan is rapidly growing, as the sum total of the never-married and childless married couples. According to the latest population projections for Japan (December 2005) by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR), childlessness has increased from 12.7% for the 1955 birth cohort up to 22.7% for the 1965 birth cohort (2007b). So it is nearing one in three women. This paper focuses on childlessness in Germany and Japan and its sociological meanings in family formation in postmodern societies. First, I show the trends of fertility decline and increasing childlessness in both countries and clarify their similarities and differences by comparing the developments of parity composition, educational attainment, and other socioeconomic correlates of childlessness. Second, using the data of attitudinal surveys such as the Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS) 2003 in Germany and the 13th National Fertility Survey (JNFS) 2005 in Japan, the reasons for having no children are observed. Third, referring to the discussions of German scholars, I will try to explain the sociological meanings of this phenomenon and to describe the development toward a childless society (even if its demographically not sustainable) as one of the possible consequences of the Second Demographic Transition.
Increasing Childlessness
Fertility Declines in Germany and Japan Germany is a European Union member for which the fertility decline began relatively earlyin the mid-1960s. The TFR increased
and peaked at 2.53 in 1964 (2.55 in 1964 in West Germany and 2.49 in 1965 in East Germany). After that, it continued to fall dramatically below the replacement level of 1.48 (1.45 and 1.54, respectively) until 1975, and has stayed at a low level ranging from 1.3 to 1.6 for more than 30 years (Figure 1a). The same trends have been observed in neighboring countries such as Switzerland and Austria (Hara, 2003). In contrast, in the late 1990s, Northern European countries such as Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands began to exhibit signs of a rise in fertility after changing family policies to support womens labor force participation. The recuperation of the TFR close to the replacement level of 2.1 has also been observed in the U.S., England, and other English-speaking countries, chiey due to high fertility among young age groups. Further, France has recently demonstrated a remarkable recovery of the fertility level, where the TFR peaked at 2.91 in 1964 and after that declined to 1.66 in 1994, but thereafter began to increase. As of 2005, the TFR of France has been recorded as 1.94, the highest level of fertility of the EU countries. In Japan, the fertility decline below the replacement level occurred later than in Germanyfrom mid-1970s. The TFR peaked at 2.14 in 1973, after then began to decrease below replacement level. After a temporary rise to 1.81 in 1984, it has continued to fall monotonically to the lowestlow fertility, below 1.3, since 1990s. As of 2005, a record low of 1.26 has been recorded. The TFR is the sum of age-specic birthrates in various age groups in each calendar year; thus it doesnt necessarily indicate the trend of the completed fertility of woman. Nevertheless, the cohort total fertility rate (CTFR), which is the sum of age-specic birthrates in each birth cohort, also shows the same basic trend of decreasing completed fertility (Figure 1b). The CTFR of Germany peaked at 2.23 for the 1932 cohort and began to fall progressively to 1.80 for the 1944 cohort. After a short-term stagnation, it has
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Figure 1. Fertility Trends. (a) TFR, total fertility rate. (b) CTFR, cohort total fertility rate. Source: Council of Europe (2006) for Germany, NIPSSR (2007a) for Japan
continued to decrease to 1.66 for the 1957 cohort and subsequently decline, until it returned to 1.46 for the newest 1967 cohort. This value is at almost the same level as the TFR. This means low fertility in Germany has been rmly established as a lifestyle pattern through all age groups and generations.
In Japan, the CTFR of the 1933 birth cohort was nearly at the replacement level but it was still lower than in Germany. It was very stable, reaching 2.03 for the 1954 birth cohort and then it began to fall dramatically to 1.50 for the 1967 birth cohort. This means that the decline of completed fertility is still a
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recent phenomenon in Japan. At least a signicant decline concerns cohorts born after 1960. In any case, if one assumes that the replacement level of completed fertility is CTFR 2.08, then 29.8% of women in Germany (CTFR 1.46) and 27.9% of women in Japan (CTFR 1.50) would lose the chance to reproduce. To be sure, the CTFRs are mere averages of the composition of different parities from childless women to women with many children. Nevertheless, losses of reproduction by around 30% suggest increasing childlessness in both countries. Denition and Indicators of Childlessness According to Dobritz and Schwarzs denition, childlessness (Kinderlosigkeit) means never being a father or mother, whether or not it was intended, and whether or not one lived with children (1996). Thus, in Germany as in other European countries, childlessness is not researched separately among the never-married and the married couples, as cohabitation and extramarital birth are no longer unusual. Lets look at the trends of childlessness estimated by microcensus data (Figure 2a).1 In Western Germany, the proportion of childless women has increased from 20% of the 1955 birth cohort up to 28% of the newest 1967 cohort. Already one in three women could stay childlessness throughout her lifespan (Dorbritz, 2005). Originally, childlessness was common in West Germany and rather rare in Eastern Germany as a legacy from the family policies in the socialist regime. However, childlessness has shown a clear tendency to grow after reunication and marks over 15% of the 1967 birth cohort. Childlessness is the one of the different parities and the proportion of childless women affects other women. Lets look at the long-term trend of parity distribution of women by the number of births in West Germany (Figure 2b). Childlessness has increased from less than 10% for the 1935
cohort to 15% for the 1950 cohort, then progressively to 22% for the 1955 cohort, and beyond 25% for the 1960 cohort. The proportion of women with one child, traditionally high in Germany, increased by up to 30% for the 1950 cohort, but in contrast to childlessness, it began to drop in two recent cohorts. Also, the proportion of those with two children increased up to the 1945 cohort then declined to 32% for the 1960 cohort. On the other hand, proportions of high parity, such as 3 or more than 4 children, were decreasing up to the 1945 birth cohort, then ceased to fall or began to increase in recent two birth cohorts. In other words, it shows a growing share of childless women and a reducing share of women with one child on the one hand; and a stable share of women with two or three or more children on the other hand. This change suggests a polarization tendency into a group of childless women and a group of women living with a more-than-two-child family. In Japan, even though the extra-marital birth rate is increasing, it is still at a low level2.03% in 2005. Therefore, the data on this issue depends on mostly the distribution of parity 0 in married women derived from the JNFS by the NIPSSR conducted every 5 years. According to the 13th JNFS (2005), the proportion of childlessness in the married women increased from 3.6% for the 1935 cohort to 5.6% for the 1960 cohort with some uctuations and a recent progression. It still seems to be at a low level, presumably because of the strong cultural link between marriage and birth in Japanese society (Figure 3a). On the other side, the postponement of marriage and the increase of the nevermarried could also result in childlessness in the long term. If one assumes that nevermarried women remaining single at ages 4549 are childless, then childlessness has increased from 4.4% for the 1935 cohort to 8.2% for the 1960 cohort, progressively. By adjusting the proportion of childlessness in married women to the proportion based on
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Figure 2. Childlessness in Germany. (a) Proportion of childless women by birth cohort (Dorbritz, 2005: 367372). (b) Proportion of women by number of births in West Germany. (Biedenkopf et al., 2005: 46)
the total population of women and then adding the proportion of never-married women, approximately, one can estimate childlessness of the women in sum. According this rough estimation, childlessness in Japan
increased from 7.5% for the 1935 cohort to 12.7% for the 1960 cohort. Its still lower than the 21.8% in Western Germany but higher than the 5.9% in Eastern Germany for the 1960 cohort. Lets look at the long-term
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Figure 3. Childlessness in Japan. (a) Proportion of childless women by birth cohort. (b) Proportion of women by number of births (NIPSSR, 2007a: 70, 111). *Including birth cohorts in the previous 2 and following 2 years, for example 1935 refers to 1933 1937
trend of parity distribution (Figure 3b), estimated by the same procedure. According to the estimation, the share of women with two children in Japan exceeded 45% in the 1935 cohort. This concentration strengthened in the 1945 cohort, and then since the
1955 birth cohort it has begun to decrease with the rising share of childlessness. In Japan, we can observe a polarization into a group of childless women and a group of women living in a more-than-two-child family.
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According to the assumption of the parity distribution in the latest population projections for Japan (December 2005) by NIPSSR (2007b), childlessness will increase from 12.7% for the 1955 cohort up to 30% for the 1970 cohort, beyond the present level in Germany, and reach 37.4% for the 1985 cohort. On the other side, the share of women with two children is estimated to decline from 47.1% to 36%, and nally to 33.1%. In other words, childless women will comprise the largest female cohort in Japan in the future. Childlessness, Education, and Careers In Germany, it is a well-known fact that childlessness is affected by educational attainment, and the clear tendency towards increasing childlessness is observed in both women and men in higher education (Figure 4a,b). For instance, in 2003, childlessness among women aged 4044 in Western Germany reached 19.3% of women falling into the lowest school/career group without certication, 30.4% of women in the higher school/career group less than Bachelor, and 32.7% of women in the highest school/ career group Bachelors degree and above. Also, childlessness among men aged 4044 reached 28.4% in the lowest group, 37.6% in the higher group, and 35.7% in highest school/career group; such that the high proportion of childlessness among highly educated men is remarkable. In addition, it should be noted that between 1995 and 2003, childlessness stagnated at high level or was even increasing in higher education groups, while it was decreasing in the lowest education groups (Biedenkopf et al., 2005). In Japan, as already mentioned, childlessness survey data concerns only married couples; therefore comparable data on childlessness according to educational attainment is limited to married couples in the JNFS. Nevertheless, the results of my own calculations, using the 2003 and 2005 JNFS, show that educational differences in childlessness also exist in Japan (Figure 5a,b). For 2003,
Figure 4. Differences in education attainment level and childlessness in West Germany. (a) Females in West Germany. (b) Males in West Germany (Biedenkopf et al., 2005: 48)
childlessness gures for women (wives) aged 1549 reached 9% among those who had attained the level of junior high school, 8.8% for high school, 16.1% for professional school, 15.8% for junior college and higher professional school, 19.5% for university, and 23.3% for graduate school. These gures show a similar tendency towards increasing childlessness according to educational attainment to that in Western Germany. Furthermore, for 2005, we can observe this proportion growing by 25% or more among the married women at the graduate school level. The childlessness of men (husbands) aged 1549 isnt as simple it is for women (wives),
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Figure 5. Differences in education attainment level and childlessness among married couples in Japan. (a) Married women; (b) married men (NIPSSR, 2007c, 2007d)
but one can see the same basic trend towards increasing childlessness with greater educational attainment. For 2003, childlessness gures reached 4.7% among those who had attained the level of junior high school, 10.1% for high school, 19.6% for professional school, 14.4% for junior college and higher professional school, 15.6% for university, and 19.5% in graduate school. For 2005, childlessness seemed to be higher
in men (husbands) at the graduate school level, but reached 21.3%, lower than for women (wives) with the same education level. The educational differences in childlessness should be considered also for the nevermarried. For this purpose, I have calculated the proportions of the never-married according to educational attainment in different age groups, using the Japanese Census of 2000 (Figure 6a,b).
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Figure 6. Differences in education attainment level and childlessness among never-marrieds in Japan. (a) Females; (b) males (Census in Japan, 2000)
The results show that the proportions of never-married women aged 2529 reached 42.1% among those who had attained the level of junior high school, 45.1% for high school, 56.5% for junior college and higher professional school, and 69.3% for university or graduate school. Such that it seems to be correlated with educational attainment. However, in the 3034 age bracket, the proportions are 26.7% for junior high school, 22.6% for high school, 27.1% for junior college and higher professional school, and 33.2% for university or graduate school. This partly reverses the order, and giving smaller differences in educational attainment than for the younger
age bracket. This tendency is observed more clearly among older age groups. In the 4549 age bracket, the proportions are 7.4% for junior high school, 5.1% for high school, 6.8% for junior college and higher professional school, and 9.2% for university or graduate school. The gaps are minimized and the proportion of the never-married is higher both in junior high school and at the university level, giving a so called Uformed distribution shape. The proportion of never-married men aged 2529 shows also a positive correlation with increasing educational attainment levels: 58.9% for junior high school, 64.4% for high school, 67.6% for junior college and higher professional school, and 75.5% for university or graduate school; while in the 3034 age bracket, the order is reversed and junior high school education gives the highest proportions of never-marrieds with 45.1%, then high school with 41.7%, junior college and higher professional school with 41.6%, and university or graduate school with 40.0%. This negative correlation is more evident in the 4549 age bracket. The highest never-married rate at 25.3% corresponds to the lowest education group, in contrast to the lowest never-married rate at 9.3% for the highest education group. Its difcult to say whether these age patterns in the Census of 2000 will remain unchanged, because the rapid increase in Japan of never-married people began far later than in Germany, so that this phenomenon is observable only in limited age groups. To be sure, the nal state of the never-married rates in the age 4549 bracket will be higher across all education groups in the future. However, as regards Japan, one cannot assert that the simple positive relation between a higher level of educational attainment and the rate of never-marrieds as the indicator of childlessness.2 Risk Groups for Childlessness Which groups may be childless? According to PPAS 2003 in Germany, the childless
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group (childlessness and no desire for children) comprises a signicantly higher proportion of people than the child-having group across all socioeconomic characteristics. These include not active in religion (39% vs 26.7% in women, 51% vs 32% in men), living in large cities (37.8% vs 21.2% in women), full-time worker (75.5% vs 24.2% in women, but 79.3% vs 84.8% in men, with insignicant difference), higher education (26.1% vs 14.7% in women, but 19.2% vs 18.6% in men, with insignicant difference), and lower income under 1500 Euros (39.3% vs 28.4% in women, 45.5% vs 17.9% in men) (Dorbritz, 2005: 388). In Japan, few analyses concerning these issues have been conducted. Even so, the probit model analysis by Wada (2004) using individual data from never-married women aged 1849 and married women below the age of 50 in the 11th JNFS (1997) suggests some interesting socioeconomic characteristics for childlessness. According to the results of his analysis, the marriage probability (the reversed indicator for staying nevermarried) is signicantly lower for those at the level of higher education (secondary and high school = 1 as the standard value, junior college and higher professional school = 0.93, university or graduate school = 0.343), and for those residing in large cities (non-DID [densely inhabited district] = 1, 1 2 million residents = 0.65, above 2 million residents = 0.71). In contrast with Germany, the difference regarding labor participation is insignicant (full-time = 1, part-time = 0.94, jobless/ housework = 0.00, student/other = 0.29). It suggests that instable labor participation may relate to the proportion of never-marrieds, along with lower occupational status (ofce worker/professional career/director = 1, farmer/sher/forester = 0.21, other selfemployed = 0.26). Thus there appears to be no link between career-oriented women and childlessness, as is often argued in Germany. On the other side, the result shows signicantly lower marriage probability in the
case of women living with parents (not with parents = 1, with parents = 0.04). The same probit model analysis on having a rst child (the reversed indicator for childlessness among married women) shows also signicantly lower probability for those at the level of higher education (secondary and high school = 1, university or graduate schools = 0.76) and for those residing in large cities (non-DID = 1, 12 million residents = 0.79, above 2 million residents = 0.72). They accord with characteristics in Germany, but regarding labor participation and occupational status, there are no signicant differences. In Germany, two separate risk groups of women for high childlessness were reported in PASS (1993) (Dorbritz and Schwarz, 1996: 246). One was termed the career-oriented group (das Karrierenmilieue) comprising unmarried, highly educated, and full-time employed women, for which the rate of childlessness was 89%. They tended to abstain from marriage and childbearing because of foreseen difculties with combining a career and family. The second group was named the group of competitive options (das Milieu der konkurrierenden Optionen), comprising unmarried, full-time employed women with a low income (under 2500 DM per month). The childlessness rate of this group was about 65%. They had the feeling that their income was not enough for both having children and enjoying the desired consumer lifestyle. The same risk groups were identied in PASS 1993 again (Dorbritz, 2005: 389). As for Japan, little is known about such groups.
Change in the Desire to Have Children

Desired Number of Children Corresponding with increasing childlessness and diminishing numbers of families with many children, it has been shown that the
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Table 1. Desired number of children of women (average) in Germany 1988* Womens desired number of children (average) Source Source: Hhn et al. (2006: 16). Note: For women aged between 20 and 39. *Only in West Germany. FS, Family Survey (DJI: German Youth Institute); FFS, Fertility and Family Survey (BiB: Federal Institute for Population Research); PPAS, Population Policy Acceptance Study (BiB); GGS, Gender and Generation Survey (BiB). 2.15 FS 1992 1.75 FFS 2003 1.74 PPAS 2005 1.75 GGS
desired number of children4 on average has been declining in Germany. For instance, the desired number of children among women aged 2039 in 1988 was 2.15more than two childrenbut in 1992 it went down to 1.75. Since then it has stagnated at 1.74 in 2003 and at 1.75 in 2005 (Table 1). Figure 7(a) shows the desired number of children among people aged aged 2049 by comparing eight European countries which participated in PPAS 2003. Germany has the lowest values among them: 1.75 for women, and 1.59, a particularly low level, for men. Because of Japans lack of participation in PPAS 2003, there is no equivalent data. Nevertheless, the results of the 13th JNFS (2005) show that the ideal number of children among never-marrieds aged 1849 on average is 1.92 for women and 1.91 for men, fewer than two children. These gures almost accord with those of Italy and Hungary, 1.92 and 1.90, respectively (Figure 7a). Such gures seem to be excessively low; however, they dont include the values of married people. In fact, the expected number of children among the married women is 2.11, slightly higher than the replacement level (as for married men, no research data is available). I tried to estimate5 the desired number of children on average among Japanese women, including never-married and married women aged 1849, using their percent distribution data by age and marital status from the Japanese Census of 2005. According to my own estimation, the desired number of children is 1.86, similar to Austrias 1.84 in PPAS 2003.
Lets look at the parity distribution of women, on which the average value is based. Comparing Germany, Japan, and Poland, Poland has the highest desired number of children (2.33 in women and 2.29 in men) among the PPAS participants (Figure 7b). The proportion of those desiring two children is the highest common gure, even though Japan has the highest value at 53.9%. On the other hand, the proportion of those wanting three children and more is very high in Poland at 36.6%, compared with 22.9% in Japan and 17% in Germany. In contrast, Germany has the highest proportion of women desiring one child (18.3%) or no children (15.4%). In Figure 7(b), the data on men is not shown, but these proportions of men are in fact much higher than for women, that is one child (19.1%) and no children (22.8%). Reasons for Not Having Children In the results of PPAS 2003 in Germany, the most commonly mentioned reason for having no children was having no partner, that is, I live alone and I dont have a steady partner, which was answered by 67.1% of childless women and 71.2% of childless men (asked only of those without partner) (Figure 8a). The second-most common reason was wanting to maintain individual lifestyles, that is, I want to maintain my present standard of living (67.1%, 61.0%), and I could not enjoy life as I have so far (59.5%, 51.9%). The emergence of the low fertility culture (die Kultur der niedrigen Fertilitt), also known as the child-free culture
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Figure 7. Desired number of children in comparison. (a) Desired number of children (average). *Aged 2049 years, by estimation. (b) Desired number of children (women) (Hhn et al., 2006: 16; NIPSSR, 2007c, 2007d with own estimation)
(die kinderferne Kultur), is attributed to increasing childlessness in Germany (Dorbritz, 2005: 378 389). In the JNFS 2005 in Japan, also having no partner, that is, I have not yet met a suitable partner, was most commonly mentioned as the reason for not being married by the never-married (among those intending to marry, and excluding those who wont marry at all), by 43% of women and 41.5% of men
(Figure 8b). It corresponds somehow to having no partner in Germany. The subsequent most common reasons given included: I have not yet felt the necessity for the marriage (36.3%, 30.1%), I dont want to lose my free and comfortable single life (28%, 24.8%), and so far I am enjoying my leisure-time pursuits (18%, 20.6%). These reasons show the same tendency towards individualistic concerns as in Germany.
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Figure 8. (a) Reasons against having children among childless women and men in Germany in 2003 (Dorbritz, 2005: 390). From 2003 Population Policy Acceptance Study, Federal Institute for Population Research (BiB). Proportion of answers of yes, very much and yes, very. (b) Reasons for not being married among never-married women in Japan in 2005 (NIPSSR, 2007d). Women were aged 2049. (c) Reasons for not having the desired number of children among married women in Japan in 2005 (NIPSSR, 2007c). Respondents were aged 20 49. planned 0 < desired 1 refers to married couples who plan to have no children, even though they desire one. planned < desired refers to married couples who planned number of children is less than the desired number
On the other hand, the reason for not having children mentioned by married women in this survey was a somewhat different from that given by the never-married women (as for married men, no such research data is available). The most frequently cited reason was: it costs too much to bring up a child and to educate it by 62% of women who expect to have fewer children than desired, and by 22% of women who expect no children despite their desire for them (Figure 8c). This seems to reect the high cost of education in Japan, which somewhat accords with attitudes among the childless in Germany (Figure 8a)a (or another) child would cost too much (39.2% of women, 49.8% of
men). Following this response, reasons related to the rise in late marriage and childbearing are frequently cited in Japan, for example I am too old to bear a child (35.6%, 37.8%), I cant endure psychologically and physically taking care of a child (20%, 4%), and my state of health does not allow it (16%, 16%). Such responses also resemble responses in Germany such as I am/my partner is too old (25.5%, 20.2%), and my state of health does not allow it (22.3%, 15.1%) (Figure 8a). Further, the reason I have not had a child but want one (15.2%, 58%) suggests the increase of involuntary childlessness among women in Japan who want to have baby but cannot
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Figure 8. continued.
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become pregnant because of limited fecundity due to aging.6 On the other hand, reasons relating to labor participation or expectations of gender role equity are weakly supported, especially among women who expect no children despite of their desire them, for example, its incompatible with my job (16.4%, 6.8%) and husbands cooperation with housework and childcare is not available (12.9%, 4.1%). These reasons contrast with higher support in Germany for the reason my job and professional activities would not allow it (42.0%, 39.2%) (Figure 8a). In the JNFS, women research objects are separated into never-married and married categories, so that the clear observation of childless as whole is not easy, especially concerning reasons for having no children. However, it seems to be too early in Japan to argue that a child-free culture, such as that in Germany, is emerging. In fact, JNFS 2005 also shows the reasons for having children. Support for the reason life becomes more joyful and fruitful with children was most common among married women, and although it dropped from the 81.6% recorded in JNFS 2003, it still reached 74.8%. Further, among the answers to the question on the merits of marriage, having my own children and family ranked still rst among 45% of never-married women and second with 33% of never-married men.
Sociological Meanings of Increasing Childlessness

As A Consequence of the Second Demographic Transition From the end of 18th to the beginning of 20th century, Northern and Western European nations underwent the transition from the high fertilityhigh mortality state to the low fertilitylow mortality state. This process was formulated as the demographic transition
model by F.W. Notestein et al. It spread to Southern and Eastern Europe, and also to Japan afterwards, and now is found in developing countries (Kono, 2007: 101). Although this model optimistically foresaw the homeostatic nal phase of the transition, where fertility and mortality are balanced and the population reaches the steady state, the fertility rates in developed countries began to fall around the mid-1960s, falling under the replacement level in the 1970s and then lingering until the early 1980s. Van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe proposed in 1986 the second demographic transition (SDT) theory to explain this unexpected decline in fertility as the result of changing family formation patterns caused by value change in postmodern societies. Namely, in the rst transition, norms based on the altruistic interests of other family members, spouses, and descendents ruled, and in the industrialized society, the modern family with divided gender roles emerged. In the second transition with the emerging post-industrialized and post-materialistic society, young people have been freed from traditional norms regarding sexual behavior, cohabitation, marriage, divorce, and birth timing, with the spread of the oral contraceptive pill. The highest value is placed on the expansion of individual freedom and self-realization, which determines an individuals behavior, including reproductive behaviors such as partner choice and childbirths, as well as other purely individual matters. Above all, it depends on the reproductive rights of women freed from gender role division. In regard to SDT, van de Kaa (2002) pointed out that the slight rise in fertility caused by increasing births at lower parity at older ages was as a catch-up effect stemming from delayed childbearing. On the other hand, there is no evidence that all the postponed births will be realized during other reproductive ages; thus involuntary childlessness could increase, along with voluntary childlessness caused by the value changes in family norms. This could result in the decline
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of complete fertility, which is dropping and stabilizing under the replacement level. Risk Management and Avoidance of Decision-Making In the SDT, the decision to form a union or whether or not to have children is purely an individual matter. Since the spread of the oral contraceptive pill and the general prevalence of contraception in Germany, the practice of birth control is the problem, not in regard to preventing unintended pregnancy, but because of its effect on undertaking planning parenthood (Kaufman, 2005: 134). Marriage and parenthood are hardly able to be canceled. In this context, the rational behavior to avoid making the wrong choice is postponing making any decision at all. In fact, the mean age of women at the rst birth is rising both in Germany (29.0 in 2004) and in Japan (28.6 in 2005). In the SDT, the separation between sexuality and reproduction is promoted and various patterns of partnerships are tolerated by society. This means in turn that there are increased risks of failing to maintain the marriage and bring up children with a xed partner, as the high divorce rate demonstrates. In addition, the risk of losing out socially and economically is rising through the instability and uncertainty related to globalization, for example growing unemployment and irregular employment among young people. In fact, an increasing disparity between winners and losers has been observed in Germany and also in Japan. In both societies, the bond between marriage and childbearing is still strong, perhaps because of the tradition of stem-family system. So while late marriage is promoted and the proportion of the never-married is growing, cohabitation and extra-marital birth has not increased as much as it has in Northern European countries, the U.S. or France. As a result, cultural conditions in both countries may promote the postponement of decision-making, in order to avoid the risks associated with childbearing.
To be sure, postponement and risk avoidance dont mean that individuals intend to remain childlessness. However, the results in PPAS 2003 and JNFS (2005) show older age groups there are changing trends in reasons given for childlessness, from I dont have a steady partner or I have not yet met a suitable partner, to I am/my partner is too old or my state of health does not allow it, and nally to I have not had a child but want one. This suggests that avoidance of decision-making will end in involuntary childlessness because of limited fecundity due to aging. The Changing Value of Children As a more serious explanation of increasing childlessness, the decline in the value of children should be considered. The famous theory on the economics of fertility initiated by G. Becker suggests that the decision whether or not to have children depends on the costbenet balance. The benet of having children as immediate labor power has long disappeared in developed countries with the general prohibition of child labor. As nancial supporters and aged carers, the value of children has also declined because of the development of social security systems, such as pension insurance and nursing-care insurance. As durable consumer goods to be loved, children have many competitors, from cars to pet animals or even robots. The last benet derived from having children might be the biological reproduction of ones own genes, which may not be seen as being worth economic sacrice. On the other hand, costs associated with having children are rising higher than ever. The direct costs of bringing up children are so high in Germany, and also in Japan (especially for education), that the economic responsibilities of parenthood are burdensome. Furthermore, as Becker has rightly pointed out, the indirect cost of childrearing (opportunity cost) has increased with the expansion of womens employment opportunities and rising wage levels, which are the result of growing numbers of women
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Toshihiko Hara
with higher educational attainment levels. Therefore, if Beckers model is right, we are living in a society with clear decits in the costbenet balance sheet. Rather, it is problematic that we cannot explain why an economically rational subject could have children (Kaufman, 2005: 136). Structural Imbalance of Gender Roles Also, it is widely argued that the increase of the opportunity cost for child-rearing has been successfully reduced with establishing child-care systems to enable a better work life balance in Northern European countries and in France. In contrast, family policies in Germany and Japan are not progressive enough to allow the alteration of traditional gender roles. Taking this into consideration, childlessness could be also explained by gender role conicts. While female labor force participation has increased to higher levels, male participation in housework and child-rearing activities still remains staying at a low level. Furthermore, social security systems and the labor market are based on the conception of the male as the breadwinner and the female as the homemaker. They are structurally supporting the imbalance of gender roles in the home, with the gender gap in wages and promotions occurring outside the home. Therefore, the numbers of women desiring to undertake this handicapped gender role, demanded by nation, market and men, must be decreasing. In this context, according to Kahlert (2007), the increase of childlessness in Germany should be interpreted as the rational adaptation to the structural imbalance of gender roles, caused by limited institutional support for child-rearing in society.7 Culture of Childlessness: Ultimate State of Individualism In Germany and also in Japan, fertility recovery is expected to be driven by new family policy measures by government, to realize the worklife balance. However, this problem could be understood as coming
from the ultimate state of individualism, beyond gender role conicts. In Germany, according to Burkart (2007), a so called culture of childlessness (Kultur der Kinderlosigkeit) has emerged in the past decade. He remarks that childlessness is regarded in Germany as neither a problem nor defect, but rather it is beginning to possess attractiveness as a new culture for couples and individuals. Modern society brings the idea of individual, which is freed and independent from traditional communities. At rst, the individual belonged to a class or social bracket which formed the reference group, and identity was derived from membership of this group. In the 1960s, however, the structural homogeneities of such memberships were broken down and as a result, individual must nd their own identity, as a free and independent subject, through lifestyle and ultimately self-realization. This selfrealization demands that each individual set their own values. For instance, the expansion of education, beginning in the 1960s, enabled women to develop their own careers. Simultaneously the womens liberation movement in the 1960s raised fundamental questions about the values of the stereotyped lifestyle represented in the male breadwinner female homemaker model. Finally, family formation and having children were no longer matters of course, but problems to be carefully examined, in the relation to self-realization. In such a situation, that is, in the ultimate state of individualism, partnership formation also requires complete matching between two individuals, so that they may seek selfrealization within free and independent lifestyles. The individual must wait for such a miraculous occasion. Furthermore, even if that miracle happens, there is no guarantee that the relationship will be successful, so therefore it may be perceived that there is no point in attempting the relationship if it requires sacricing self-realization. Further, having children without any guarantee of a
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stable partnership means that parenthood would be not only an obstacle to selfrealization but also affect the childrens own self-realization. This sort of discussion around interpreting increasing childlessness in relation to the ultimate state of individualism has not yet occurred in Japan. To be sure, a culture of childlessness has not become mainstream in Germany either. Nevertheless, it may be also become possible in Japan, that, as Burkhart argues, childlessness might have some value, but not so much as the family. At least, it would be a serious competitor against the family (2007: 410).
Conclusion: Toward a Childless Society?

So far we have observed the tendencies towards increased childlessness in Germany and Japan and considered its sociological meanings. They all point towards a childless society, at least as one of the possible consequences of the Second Demographic Transition. Demographically, of course, a low fertility rate that is less than the TFRs value of 1.5 will reduce the female reproductive population by more than 30% every generation, and the total population will be almost zero sooner or later (perhaps within 2000 years). In fact, before such a nal stage, the socioeconomic structures of society could not be adapted to the rapidly shrinking population (the inverse of a population explosion with an annual growth rate of 2%). Taking this into account, a society with a below-thereplacement-level fertility is not sustainable in long term. Therefore, if society continues to develop towards childlessness, then polarization would proceed further, into childless people and people with many children. If that is the case, and the low parities of 0, 1 are balanced with high parities of 3, 4 and more children,
then the reproduction of society may continue. Although such a situation seems absurd, it might be highly consequent with historical development of the division of labor in human history. Labor would nally begin to expand from productive activities to reproductive activities. For instance, we could speculate polarization into childless elites who are totally freed from traditional family formation and enjoy a professional career and consumer lifestyle, and in turn non-elites with many children who depend on governmental social support and undertake the reproductive function of society. Or there could be polarization into super elites with many children who are capable of attaining self-realization including partner choice and child-rearing, and childless, working, poor non-elites who are live with instability and uncertainty related to globalization. Or all four groups may develop. This paper has focused on increasing childlessness in Germany and Japan. However, same phenomena are observed to more or less the same extent in German-speaking countries such as Switzerland and Austria, in Southern European countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece, and in former socialist countries. In Asian countries, as the fertility decline began later than in Europe, this tendency is till now known only in Japan; but it is highly possible that other countries, for example Korea and Taiwan, will join countries with increasing childlessness in the future. Thus, further developments in both Germany and Japan should be carefully monitored to see if they are temporal exceptions or precedent cases towards the development of childless societies.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank C. Hhn and J. Dorbritz of the Bundesinstitut fr
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Toshihiko Hara at the nal state is biologically uncertain. For further discussion on the different values of childlessness in Germany, see Dorbritz and Ruckdeschel (2007: 4581). The effects of the educational career on marriage and fertility are generally mixed in nature during the period in education and after education, because of value changes caused by education, and because of the homo- and heterogamy trends according to educational attainment. Fukuda (2005) demonstrated, in his analysis using microdata obtained from the International Comparative Survey on Marriage & Fertility in 2004, that the levels of womens education signicantly affected the time of the rst childbirth in Japan, but did not have any bearing on the probability of remaining childless. The gures are converted from probit coefcients in the original paper to multiples for probability in reference categories. According to Hhn et al., (2006: 15), the desired number of children (die gewnschte Kinderzahl) is dened as the sum of children who are already born and who are expected. The objects are women and men in the 2039 age bracket and the data excludes cases with answers of unknown. In contrast, there are three variations on this number in the JNFS, as for the never-married, the desired number of children (kibo kodomo suu) was related to the question how many children would you have?; for the married couples (in the rst marriage), the ideal number of children (riso kodomo suu) was related to the question what is your ideal number of children?; and the expected number of children (yotei kodomo suu) was related to the question how many children do you expect to have in sum? The data excludes the divorced and the widowed. Therefore, although the conception of the desired number of children is not equivalent to the desired number in Germany, the sum of the ideal number (kibo kodomo suu) for the nevermarried and the expected number (yotei kodomo suu) for married couples can be regarded approximately the same as that for Germany. However, as regards married men, the expected number of children is not researched separate from their wives in the JNFS. Using data from the Japanese Census of 2005, the number of women by parity desire is calculated proportionally to its parity distribution in the JNFS for both never-married and married women. The number is multiplied by each parity number, summed up, and divided by the total population of women. This average excludes
Bevlkerungsforschung (Federal Institute for Population Research, Germany), M. Iwasawa and R. Moriizumi of the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan, and J. Raymo of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, for their valuable advice.
Notes
1 There are several methods to estimate childlessness and the values could be slightly different among them. Data for the microcensus are drawn from a sample of 1% of the total population in Germany in every year. This provides the number of children who are less than 18 years and living in households. It does not include the children living apart, and there is also no distinction between biological and adopted children. In Figure 2, childlessness as a nal state in each birth cohort is estimated by the lowest value of the proportion of women who are living with no child, among the time series microcensus data within 13 years from 1991 to 2003, that is, at the point where the decrease in rst births and the increase in children living apart cross over (Dorbritz, 2005: 367372). Another method is estimation using the number of children by birth order in the vital statistics in every year, that is, the value of the one subtracted by accumulated proportions of women with a rst birth in each birth cohort. In Germany, records on the birth order are limited to births within a present marriage and do not contain the birth order of extra-marital births, so that should be estimated by another procedure. Further, even in the case of remarriage with children, the birth order is counted within a present marriage, so there is a risk that data are inaccurate. Moreover, in the cases where a birth cohort of women has not reached the age of complete fertility, it is necessary to project the number of the rst births in future by another procedure. The other method is estimation using the data from sample research, which gather data on the number of births biographically, for example the Fertility and Family Survey, PPAS, and Gender and Generation Survey. Such surveys have problems including the long intervals between research. In addition, mens childlessness is more difcult to estimate womens, as the age of childlessness
Toward a Childless Society? data on those younger than 20 in accordance with the German data, and excludes the divorced and widowed. The desire for ve children or more in the original category has been merged with four children or more. The desired number 0 contains the answers unknown. This effect of limited fecundity due to aging could be serious in Japan. Iwasawa and Mita (2007) pointed out that by their estimations, the number of women desiring a child in Japan increased by 17% between 1982 and 2005, from 9.78 million to 11.47 million, for those of reproductive age. In the same period, the proportion at of those desiring a child aged at least 35 years rose from 5% to 15% in this population. In Japan, regarding the rapid rise in nevermarrieds since the 1990s, Atoh (2001) concluded that it can be related to a change towards valuing a gender-equal society rather because of secular individuation or the end of a child-centered society.
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References
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Dorbritz, Jurgen and Karle Schwarz. 1996. Kinderlosigkeit in Deutschlandein Massenphnomen? Analysen zu Erscheinungsformen und Ursachen. Zeitschrift fr Bevlkerungswissenschaf. 21: 231 261. (In German.) Federal Institute for Population Research (BiB) and Robert Bosch Foundation ed. 2005. Results of the Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS). European Conference on the Demographic Future of EuropeFacts, Figures, Policies (PDF). [Cited 26 December 2007.] Available from URL: http://www.bib-demographie.de/ppa/ Main.htm. Fukuda, Nobtaka. 2005. [Womens Education and Fertility Strategy in Japan: Spacing or Stopping.] Jinko Mondai Kenkyu (Journal of Population Problems) 61: 3 20. (In Japanese.) Hara, Toshihiko. 2003. [Fertility Trend and Family Policies In Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands.] Jinko Mondai Kenkyu (Journal of Population Problems) 59: 8198. (In Japanese.) Hhn, Charlotte, Andreas Ette and Kestin Ruckdeschel. 2006. Kinderwnsche in Deutschland: Konsequenzen fr Eine Nachhaltige Familienpolitik. Stuttgart: Bundesinstitut fr Bevlkerungsforschung and Robert Bosch Stiftung. (In German.) Iwasawa, Miho and Fusami Mita. [Delayed Childbearing and the Changing Age Composition of Women who Desire Children.] Jinko Mondai Kenkyu (Journal of Population Problems) 63: 24 41. (In Japanese.) van de Kaa, Dirk J. 2002. The Idea of a Second Demographic Transition in Industrialized Countries. Proceedings of the 6th Welfare Policy Seminar of the National Institute of Population and Social Security (NIPSSR); 29 Jannuary 2002, Tokyo, Japan. [Cited 3 September 2008.] Available from URL: http://www.ipss.go.jp/ index-e.html. Kahlert, Heike. 2007. Die Kinderfrage und der halbierte Wandel in den Geschlechterverhltnissen. pp. 338363. In: Ein Leben Ohne Kinder: Kinderlosigkeit in Deutschland, edted by Dirk Konietzka and Michaela Kreyenfeld. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften. (In German.) Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver. 2005. Schrumpfende Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. (In German.) Kono, Shigemi. 2007. Jinkogaku eno Syotai (Invitation to Demography). Tokyo: Chuou Koron Shinsya. National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR). 2007a. Jinko Tokei
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Toshihiko Hara National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR). 2007d. Dokushin Seinensou no Kekkon-kan to Kodomo-kan (Attitudes toward Marriage and the Family among the Unmarried Japanese Youth: The 13th National Fertility Survey) [Cited 21 September 2007.] Available from URL: http://www.ipss.go.jp/ index.html. Wada, Kohei. 2004. Dai 3 shyou kekkon to kazokukeisei no keizaibunnseki (Chapter 3: Economic Analysis of Marriage and Family Formation). pp. 6583. In: Demography of Low Fertility-Demography Library vol.1. edited by Hiroshi Ohbuch and Shigesato Takahashi. Tokyo: Hara Shyobou. (In Japanese.)
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Toshihiko Hara School of Design, SAPPORO CITY UNIVERSITY, Geijutsu no Mori 1, Minami-ku, Sapporo 005-0864, Japan. E-mail: t.hara@scu.ac.jp

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International Journal of Japanese Sociology 2008, Number 17

Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Increasing Childlessness in Germany and Japan: Toward a Childless Society?

Toward a Childless Society?

Toward a Childless Society?

Toward a Childless Society?

Toward a Childless Society?

Toward a Childless Society?

Change in the Desire to Have Children

Toward a Childless Society?

Toward a Childless Society?

Sociological Meanings of Increasing Childlessness

Toward a Childless Society?

Toward a Childless Society?

Conclusion: Toward a Childless Society?

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