Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud on Madness and the Unconscious Author(s): DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND Source: The Journal

of Speculative Philosophy, New Series, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1991), pp. 193-213 Published by: Penn State University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25669999 . Accessed: 11/02/2014 15:20
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Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud on Madness and theUnconscious

Hegel's theory of insanity or madness (Verrucktheit)has been largely ne glected. This is partly due, no doubt, to the facts that his one detailed discussion of the topic is confined to a few pages inhis Encyclopaedia,1 and

that he makes only passing reference to insanity inhis other works. And yet many of the themes Hegel develops inhis anatomy ofmadness are mirrored inhis phenomenology of the healthy or rational mind.2 Madness is in many respects the invertedmirror of the developed consciousness, incorporating the structures of rationality within a different construction of the relation

We might therefore think that Hegel is simply one more of "the philoso phers" so frequently criticized byNietzsche and Freud, who, as Freud says, "protest that they could not conceive of such a monstrosity as the uncon " scious, and are thus doomed to a fundamental misunderstanding of human experience (AS 31).3 Nietzsche writes in a similar vein:

ical project. One such theme, which will serve as the focus of the present article, is the role of the unconscious in mental life. As in the case ofmadness, Hegel does not often directly refer to the unconscious inhis writings, and does not explicitly develop this concept as a central principle of his phenomenology.

between the self and its world. By occupying in thisway a sort of "negative space" relation to the healthy mind, insanity provides us with an intriguing point of access to the study of themes that occur in Hegel's largerphilosoph

Copyright ? 1991 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.

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. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .. at several junctures of Hegel's phenome nology of the developed consciousness?for example. In this article I will seek to clarify Hegel's unconscious inmadness theory of the role of the the of against general features ofNietz backdrop sche's and Freud's thoughts. points towards the domain of the body.(BGE ?? 23. I will infernal regions"?the higher powers being the sphere of consciousness and rationality." [thewhole of) philosophy has not been . Finally. we may gain a Further. speaks ing them back to the "infernal regions" of the unconscious?Hegel ofmadness as a reversion to the unconscious.190. frightening lengths?and body." (PM ? 408 6k Z) Only a phenomenology of these infernal regions of mental life. infernal powers of the heart are set free. philosophy. and "the dark. a misunderstanding of the yet it is simply not true that Hegel as one "totally lacked the Freudian suggests. For example.4 The unconscious idea commentator does emerge.however. there are sub respects these three as well. the unconscious.. 230) experience from their exile by the puritanical.194 DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND The unconscious disguise of physiological needs under the [philoso pher's] cloaks of the objective. where "the earthly elements" of the body have theirhome. clearer sense of his own contributions. the new psychology will be a "physio-psychology. . . ." and will "translate man back into nature. By allowing Hegel to enter into dialogue with the more fullydeveloped theories of Nietzsche and Freud.5 More importantly. all link this new psychological orientation to the need for a "physiology": The unconscious Iwill show that while in important writers offer competing psychologies.150 on Tue. . spiritualistic tradition of will allow for a full explanation This content downloaded from 193. the unconscious plays a central role inhis portrait of insanity. As Nietzsche says. and in his theory of guilt and intentionality. inhis doctrine of the List der Vernunft. and it ishere that a comparison ofHegel with Nietzsche and Freud becomes particularly interesting. all three regard the unconscious as crucial to the development of a decisively new orientation for psychology. instinct. nature. [and] purely spiritual goes to often I have asked myself whether . albeit infrequently. whose structures cannot be fullyunderstood without trac Thus. we will see that all three propose an stantial parallels understanding of illness as essential for an appreciation of health.(GS Pref?2) And of." into the "eternal basic text of homo natura" recovering the biological roots of human just as Freud adopts as the motto for his InterpretationofDreams move the Virgil's dictum that "if I cannot bend the higher powers. daring to descend to the depths. . ideal.253. .

Further. Specifically. Con sciousness is a mere surface.150 on Tue. parable. And yet while Hegel would reverse Nietzsche's view (shared by Freud) that "thoughts are the For Hegel. forwhom this line is at best tenuous. Nietzsche must be distinguished fromHegel and Freud in terms of his evaluation of illness. (PN Intro) A second difference is that the line of demarcation between madness and health ismore clearly drawn by Hegel than it is by either Nietzsche or Freud. on the other hand. First. spirit asleep. is a "riddle. and I will especially stress three such oppositions in this article. or rationality and instinct. the unconscious (GS ? 354) sign-world. important and far-reaching differences between the theories of Hegel. shadows of our feelings" (GS ? 179).253. we will see thatNietzsche views a certain formof illness as essential to health.MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS 195 There are. the domain of spirit sleeping and hence unconscious to itself. (EL 19) It is essential to abandon the overvaluation of the property of being . and consciousness or rationality which is the genuine text of the psyche. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ." Hegel says. Nietzsche and Freud both effect a reversal of the values Hegel assigns to consciousness and the unconsciousness. a disguise. the unconscious. he writes that "even in times of grave illness I did not become pathological. consciousness and the uncon scious. as Hegel and Freud do.The unconscious is the true conscious. In speak Nietzsche. Nietzsche. Nature. but in This content downloaded from 193. ."6 Indeed. since while it appears alien to spirit. and Freud on illness and the unconscious. Third. (ID 613) And Nietzsche: The world of which we can become conscious isonly a surface-and All our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commen taryon an unknown. (D ? 119) is the merely "immedi ate" stage of spirit. Nietzsche tends to locate the source of disease not in the unconscious. Thus Freud: Consciousness is the surface of the mental apparatus. it is spirit's presupposition. In this sense it is the unconscious which isa mere surface. the inarticulate voice of nature awaiting education into the language of rationality which is itsdestiny and truth. perhaps unknowable. . he would still agree on the intimate connection between thought and feeling. of course.190. psychical reality. illness isnot necessarily pathological for ing of his own illness. and facade covering over the true depth of the psyche. but felt text.

basically pre-rational. connections with reality?becomes "self-supporting and independent" of the "threads . DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND itself is often described as a disease and a Nietzsche will often stand as counterpoint such. SEPARATION. madness ironically a therapeutic attempt. the body. pre-conscious level ofmental life.. the mind severs its We will elaborate on these two essential features of illness shortly. .196 consciousness. the neglect of the distinction between [reality] and phantasy" (IL 368). an effort to heal what Hegel calls the "wounds of spirit" through a self-protective gesture of retreat. Consciousness state. Like Freud. two points are stressed: a regressive withdrawal or "sinking back" of the developed mind. Hegel associates the domain of feeling with the unconscious. external world" (PM ? 406)?and adopts an essentially new form of discourse.150 on Tue.8 He speaks of "the low valuation of reality." (IL 359) In both accounts. of interconnection between [the] self and the . whose peculiarity . and a resulting separation from reality..9 But there is an even stronger relation between the mad and healthy selves than the fact that madness presupposes health: Insanity and ra tionality share some of the same basic underlying structures. consists in itsbeing no longer in immediate contact with actuality but in having positively separated itself from it. instinct.190. but should clarify here that the movement of withdrawal is a retreat to a displacing the centrality of the reality principle and the "laws of the ego" by a more primitive language of fantasy." (PM ? 408 Z) Freud's definition of neurosis is a very close echo of Hegel's view. and the "path of regression" taken by the libido which has been "repulsed by reality" and must seek satisfaction through a "withdrawal from the ego and its laws. Hegel's and Freud's definition ofmental illness as a regression shows that they both see madness as presupposing a healthy consciousness (see PM ? 408 Z).253.7 As pathological rather than companion THE DEFINITION OF MADNESS: REGRESSION. . NOSTALGIA Hegel defines madness as "a state inwhich themind is shut up within itself. nature. . In undertaking this regressive path to the world of the unconscious.what Hegel calls the "life of feeling" (Gefiihlsleben). Insanity is a response to the developed mind's encounter with an is experience of pain that it cannot cope with. has sunk into itself. . For both Hegel and Freud the basic desire of all mind is to achieve a reconciliation and This content downloaded from 193. In this sense. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . to Hegel and Freud in their thoughts on illness.

. subject and object." (Nar 100) As such. A helpful point of departure is to look at the basic duality of instinct in Freud and desire inHegel. Eros is the unity between the inner and outer worlds. So too for Hegel. the standpoint of the 'I am I.of growth. which is retrogressive and nostalgic. or Hegel's second face of desire. a sort of seductive siren's song promising a sense of security and primordial peace from the toils of existence.MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS 197 gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state. the condition of the 'I am V remains a continuing object of nostalgic desire in all the subsequent shapes of consciousness. all mind. projecting itsdesires in fantasy. becomes dominant.followed by the attempt to external other?"and project a unity from out of itself. the urge to recreate and restore a primal sense of unity and rest. while the death instinct is regressive and destructive. This parallelism of the structures of madness and health is important. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and yet all mind is perpetually confronted with the experience of disunity and contradiction. the impulse towards withdrawal and regression that characterizes neurosis isalso a basic drive of all ego development. "to return to the quiescence of the inorganic world. calling consciousness back to a past that it yearns for as a scene of peace and the power of the death instinct. and not only the deranged mind. and calls for some further elaboration. inmadness it isdisplaced from its search for unity in the external world and now assumes the function of repose. womblike autonomy. developed in the 1920s.253.' the self's sense of certainty which recognizes no challenge to its This content downloaded from 193.11 In madness. While Hegel most known forhis emphasis on the progressive.190. As for the life instinct.150 on Tue. The first point to emphasize is that all instinct is animated bywhat Hegel . engages in a recurring cycle of withdrawal from the world of suffering." (BPP 62) There is a quite similar duality inHegel's portrait of desire." (PM ? 379) This is a calls "craving exemplified in the first shape of self-consciousness inHegel's Phenomenology. leading the rational consciousness back to the archaic world of the unconscious. (PS 1040 While Hegel shows that this desire to completely coincide with oneself is inherently unstable.. This iswhy for Freud ego development "con initial state of unity of sists in a departure from primary narcissism"?the self and world in the infant. there is also what Ihave called elsewhere a "second face of desire" in his dialectic.10 Freud's final theory of the instincts. self and other. for unity. evolutionary character is of desire. the drive toward union with the other. prior to the "cathexis" or "binding" of an instinct of life. proposes a conflictual relation between the two primary instincts of Eros and Death.

(CD 117ff)Our instincts reflect the universal human desire to recover this state can never entirely of its primary narcissism. cannot. the gesture of retreat from the disheartening world of external reality to the internal world of the serves as the mind." is explained by Freud as a nostalgic vestige of the firstperiod of infancy. (PS 51. the desire for unity which leads to themovement of withdrawal.when the ego does not yet distinguish anything outside itself. Consciousness itsdesire for a recovery of its lost primordial unity. is. In his Encyclopaedia discussion of mad ness. Nostalgia.253. echo the famous Hegelian characterization of history as "the slaughter-bench at which the . (CD 83) What results is a continually renewed temptation to withdrawal. that "all the regulations of the universe run counter to. whether qualified as madness or not. that while we can never achieve a permanent state of happiness. This content downloaded from 193. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . [is] victimized. is always on the borderline of disease. is just how distinct these two states are. This basic structural dynamic of the mind. Both Hegel and Freud see consciousness as delivered over to a fundamen tal experience of anxiety in its inevitable encounter with discord and world we actually live in. again." (RH 27) Anxiety explains the happiness of peoples presence within consciousness of the nostalgic yearning for an idealized past. given their view of the overlapping of the formal structures of mental disease and health. precisely the fundamental structure of madness. A question that both Hegel and Freud must face. And we see it in Freud's hypothesis of a "compulsion to repeat. the "oceanic feeling" of "being one with the external world as a whole. the original state of unity. give up our efforts" to achieve it. sion to a more primitive condition luring consciousness towards a regres and a corresponding rejection of the estrangement.190. the sense of the ego being haunted by the (at least unconscious) of primary narcissism. "yet we must not.198 DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND Thus Freud also sees the goal of the instincts to be the attainment of unity.150 on Tue. We see this inHegel's account of Stoicism?which movements of withdrawal in further paradigm for all of the successive recover the standpoint of to the stoic seeks shapes of consciousness?where the 'I am P through a retreat from the world which causes it somuch pain. . ISA passim)12 The starkwords of Freud's Civilization and itsDiscontents.38) goal" of quiescence." which animates the instincts with a retrogressive urge to recover the "ancient recollection exorcise (BPP 12ff. .. This is the paradox at the heart ofHegelian desire and Freudian instinct. . the intention thatman should be 'happy'" (CD 76). Hegel gives the appearance of not really taking this question seriously.

" to use Hegel's well-known image.MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS Madness 199 occurs when the rational mind has reverted to the lifeof feeling.must be given up.150 on Tue. But Hegel should have considered this question more carefully.(WP ? 812) Health and sickness are not essentially different. he is much more elusive inhis definitions of health and illness. where the line separating illness from health has become obscure. however."14 It does seem plausible. . a "pathway of despair.16 One might try to discover similarities with Hegel's and Freud's characterizations of mental disease in terms of the double This content downloaded from 193. to assume that the struggle of the rational mind with its experience of despair will constantly threaten consciousness with the possibility of becoming radi cally dislocated from itsworld. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ." (PM ? 382) The path of consciousness seeking its reconciliation with reality is a road of loss.253. having to do simplywith a matter of degree: "If you take up a theoretical point of view and disregard thismatter of quantity [degree]. Nietzsche's even is than Freud's: stronger position Health as such does not exist. is. . The difference between madness and health is essentially a practical rather than a theoretical one." (IL 358) you may quite well say that we are all ill?that It is at this juncture. while the healthy mind retains these rational threads of association with reality. typically. that we must turn toNietzsche. and beckon the mind to "sink back" into man madness. The goal of the unity of consciousness and reality is constantly under mined.190. beset again and again by the essential "negativity" of lifewhich entails an "infinite pain. If anything. The concept of normal health . It isyour goal that determines what health ought to mean even for your body. and when the connections to reality have been severed. (WP ? 47) I have delayed Nietzsche's entry into the dialogue with Hegel and Freud until this point because.We need not go as far as Jean Hyppolite. rational consciousness is so strongly committed to showing how the connections between self and world are never stable. and tends to see the substantial mirroring of the formal structures of these states as blurring the line of demarcation. Freud takes the question of the distinction between health and disease more seriously than Hegel.15 By now we have learned better than to speak of healthy and sick as of an antithesis. neurotic.13 since his phenome nology of the developed. who sees this essential negativity of life as itself entailing that "the essence of is to be mad [for Hegel]. . . .

and disease as any way of thinking that calls the common value of "rationality" into question. .200 movement DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND of withdrawal and separation from reality. . The great health sees disease as necessary for self-transcendence. its secret sharer. from such severe sickness. "an as yet undiscovered country whose boundaries nobody terrible .150 on Tue. craving to possess ithas got beside itself. That which is truly sick seeks to repress nature. feeling?and "pure spirit. allows a closer contact with the depths. which for will. genuine health incorporatesdisease as itsclosest com panion." (GS ? 382) By this valuation." is one able to "return newborn." (HH Pref ? 4) Disease is the descent or going under (Untergang) that is necessary for health: Only "from such abysses. is a sort of The common ideal of health." (GS ? 382) What complicates the comparison with Hegel and Freud is that Nietz sche also calls this "illness" his "great health" (diegrosseGesundheit. see GS tional values. . Nietz sche is grateful to his own experience with illness for its reinforcement of his tendency towards isolation and solitude?his "pathos of distance" from others. having shed one's skin.The great health is"a new ? 382.which permits paths tomany opposing ways of thought. where we may shed the skin of conventional mores and tap the source of a more elemental creativity. gives it up again and again. . .HH Pref? 4. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Nietzsche is pathology. and must acquire because one health" WP ? 1013). the disease that is essential to the great health. Nietzsche's revalued disease. pas "vampirism. quite different from the common concept of health which essentially sanctifies the status quo and regards as sick "any inconve nient disturber of the peace." (GS Pref ?4) Nietzsche thus revalues the opposition between health and disease. he lives in a differentworld.GM II ? 24. . an Untergang into the domain of nature. ." a sheer surface leaving only without depth. of these our rational. This content downloaded from 193. the unconscious world of instinct. [so] strange.190. questionable.253. . his dislocation from the human-all-too-human world of conven illness allows for a new form of experience. the body." sucking the lifeblood of the body?the of the corpse sion."17 The great health isone "that one does not merely have but also acquires continually. and must give it up. His (GS ? 382). itsnecessary other. logical schemes are merely epiphenomenal sign-languages. instinct. that [his] has surveyed yet. a hollow husk of consciousness that has utterly repressed its darker but more vital unconscious origin. reconstructing the pedestrian definition of health as herd morality. as an education into new ways to see and create: It is a "health which cannot do without even illness itself. For example. as an instrument and fishhook of knowledge.

EH 1. they logician. ressentiment. are no more than projected wish-fulfillments of the philosophers' yearning forultimate answers in a world that remains mockingly silent. as Freud says. ? 2)." But however we finally decide this question. Truth in the grand style. Hegel's interest in the darker side of the human spirit?spirit in its negativity.20 and Freud's concerns than might be supposed by a FEELING. and guilt. and the deposing of the pursuit ofTruth with the agenda of diagnosing the causes of cultural pathology. the will-to-truth. SUBLIMATION Let us turn to a closer examination of what Hegel calls the "life of feeling" intowhich themind withdraws in madness. a constant reopening of the "wounds of spirit. with an intrinsic historicity.g.Hegel writes. DREAM. the sources of decadence. Truth is a becoming. and infinite pain?positions him more closely with Nietzsche's too hasty caricature.18We must. bacchanalian character of truth that results in the essential negativity of human history. with the will to health (e. of of Hence the world the pri psychical reality" cautious. Human existence is a pathway of doubt and despair. nihilism. Hegel. has gone down in the annals of the history of philoso the pursuer of Absolute phy as the consummate Weltanschauung-builder. Metaphysical Weltanschauungen. there This content downloaded from 193. a theater of suffer ing. (GS a as fantastic falsification of the essential subjectivity of the will-to-truth reality. dismemberment. of course. and calls for a "philosophical physician" to replace the metaphysician and see in is Freud like that Pref Nietzsche both ? 2) here. weariness. GS Pref ?? 2-3. the constructs of thewill-to-truth.MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS Nietzsche 201 in fact replaces the age-old motivating drive of philosophy.190. And it is just this dynamic. forHegel also effects a revaluation of Truth. nor in the brute givenness of the empiricists' Nature. In insanity. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . "transform metaphysics into metapsychology" (PEL 259).150 on Tue. into of the the "true mythologies translating philosophic Weltanschauungen inner unconscious instinct.And as such he is seen as the archetypal opponent of the Nietzschean and Freudian critiques of philosophy. Yet we must be ority of the physician over the philosopher. a slaughter-bench of happiness. nor in the cosmic eternity of the rationalists' eye of God. the perpetual loss and death of our successive constructions of reality.19 Truth no longer resides in the serene immobility of Platonic forms."We would surely need to look much more closely at Hegel's phenomenological method to determine towhat extent it could be seen as thework of a "philosophical physician.253.

. the projected images of "the night of themind. . of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent [pre-rational] individuality (in seiner bewufit-und ver dreams. The feeling soul "is the stage of [mind's] darkness." (PM ? 406 Z) There is a fundamental rupture of the relation to reality.22 Just as Freud constantly reminds us that the neuroses have an "organic foundation" (e. and proposes as one of the central analogies of his discussion ofmadness that illness is to health as the dream is to waking life: "Between ." as central symbols of the unconscious. Hegel holds a similar position. and drives. ." (IL 88) With thismovement of withdrawal and rupture. gains the mastery over the objective.g. Dreams are themselves often described as neurotic symp toms?distorted substitute formations of underlying unconscious drives and wishes. in onto reality as substitutes.150 on Tue." where the "light" of consciousness is not yet explicit. This language foreshadows the Freudian analysis of the regressive turnof neurosis. and as presenting important clues to our understanding of illness. and becomes "fixed" to feeling states.21 For both Hegel and Freud this reversion and imprisonment in nature is linked to the body.190. a withdrawal Madness. IL 389). . entails a form of flightor escape." (PM ? 408 & Z) In nature. . 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . consciousness. fantasies. rational." like the dream.202 DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND is a "reversion to mere nature" in which "the natural self . the self is "mastered" by. but is more or less bound up with it. (PM ? 404) Gefuhlsleben is the "dull stirring. are projected wishes. .As Freud says. but within itself. "imprisoned" in. only waking limits. (PM ? 408 Z) (PM ? 408) Madness isa dreaming This content downloaded from 193. . which. and insanity the difference is like that between subject waking and in the dream falls the within that insanity dreaming." Hegel writes. the self-possessed and healthy ." (PM ? 406 Z) Further. the inarticulate breathing. with the resulting fixation of an archaic content that gains mastery over the ego and its laws. . the language of rationality is replaced by amore primitive. the body is the domain of the unconscious. from the external world: "The soul immersed in its inwardness. Freud's use of dreams as a paradigm forhis study of the neuroses is well known. In at least one place Nietzsche also links "the fantasizing of dreams and The language of darkness with which Hegel characterizes feeling and nature and the body points to another close parallel with Freud: Both see standbsen (PM ? 400)23 IndividualitatV whileawake.253. "contemplates its individual world not outside. archaic discourse of unconscious madness as indreams. when I dream "I want to know nothing of the external world. Hegel repeatedly insists that "mental illness is not merely to be compared with physical illness.

Nietzsche's (Tl p. [since even] our moral judgments and evaluations are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us. 486)?there remains only dream."Nietzsche writes.MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS 203 insanity" together." "feeling. and the question then becomes whether our dreams are a form of self-affirmationor self-denial. All three associate the domain of the unconscious and instinctwith the particularityof human lifeopposed to our social being. and cf. . In an analogous way. Nietzsche's distance from Hegel and Freud on the nature of illness comes into further focus when we look at the way "nature. whereby the reality projected by dreams in no way stands in a less privileged position than the reality of waking life. dreams will not hold to be sure.150 on Tue. . he effects a reversal. we may make value judgments between different types of claim that there is no clear distinction between dreaming and waking directly mirrors his view that "health and sickness are not essentially different.GS ? 107) As creative projections of values. then. the "beautiful illusion of the inner [dream] world of fantasy" (BT ? 1) with the primal unconscious force of nature which is the heart of all great art. who purportedly substituted an "aesthetic Socratism" for Diony sian nature. (D ? 312) But more usually. where he art holds the power to heal and redeem us from the "horror that argues and absurdity of existence" (BT ? 7). 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .24 This nature. (BT ? 5. as occurred inGreek tragedy with last point ismade clear inNietzsche's Birth of Tragedy.253. so typical of his thinking." and "instinct" are described. by appealing to the standard ofReality." Unlike Hegel and Freud. Nietzsche argues that art becomes sick when dream is detached from nature. and whether they appropriate and express the "eternal basic text of homo natura" or seek an escape from it. but only ifdream is united with Euripides.Thus in his Daybreak he writes that "there isno essential difference between waking and dreaming . Apollo with Dionysus. a glorification of rationality.190. "It isonly as an aesthetic phenomenon that exis essentially tence and the world may be eternally justified. all dreams are aesthetic phenomena. logic. for example. and the "cool clarity of consciousness11 (BT ? 14) for the bacchanalian forces of the unconscious. It is true that both Freud and Nietzsche recognize a collective character of (See BT ?? 10-15) This content downloaded from 193. religion. just as we must distinguish between illness that accom panies the great health and the neurotic illness of." has been put into question? (D ? 119) Once themyth of a Reality in itself or actually "abolished" projected by the mind. reality as any straightforward explanatory value for illness. but on an dreams?not. aesthetic basis. A more subtle typology of dreams isneeded.

For Nietzsche. . weariness. and would see his call for the sacrifice of the particularity of feeling as simply a call for repression. (CD 86. (RH 30) genuine history to prior to we move must of T of 'We'. (see PS 136-39. the laws of instinct" of pre-historical way of being. itwould seem that Freud and Nietzsche depart fromHegel on this point. DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND forexample.204 our unconscious?both.150 on Tue.25And for certainly universal features of feeling. every content of consciousness. surrendered. isolating language of feeling be sacrificed.27 Again. Their "priestly is a disguised "lust for nothingness" that is itself the greatest medicine" illness of all. 212f) Similarly. is a Hegel as it is for This content downloaded from 193. but it is not as simple as itmight seem." (RH 17) The "sacrifice" of feeling is thus in fact its sublimation. then to renounce this reality is to repress life itselfand become sick. nature is the "presupposition" of spirit. This is just as ill for Nietzsche and Freud: Asceticism. unconscious to is For all socialization. anything that is product and subject of thought.253. feeling precludes community and communication. that the purely private. ressentiment. and originally does. And Freud sees the essential neurosis of civilization as resulting from the "psychologically unrealistic" demands of the social repression of our instincts. neurosis. pre-rational "language. as the "innermost. (GM 1 ? 6) If "nothing else [is] 'given' as real except our world of desires and passions" (BGE ? 36). Feeling isdethroned but not destroyed. The point is that these features express our private interests. renounced. a private. are the the individual heart: Feeling is the terrain of seclusion. 143-44) There is a real difference between Hegel. and as such must be preserved. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .190. isola it speaks tion. which the that from arise. speak of our dreams as expressing the Hegel too there are phylogenetic prehistory of human instincts. which nature. fromhistory to fantasy. exist in the mode of feeling. nor can it ever be destroyed except in the illusions of ascetic self-mortification. regression from reason to feeling.26 At least at firstglance. As such. Nietzsche. For Hegel's recurring claim that a sacrifice and renunciation of particularity and "the heart" is necessary in order for universality and reason to emerge is not in fact a call for the annihilation of nature. but for itsAufhebung and sublimation. is the emergence of disease. 111.must also. "Everything spiritual." The lifeof feeling is in thisway a sort of heralds of decadence. or to incorporated. and hence as an invitation to disease itself. Hegel insists. . the "slanderers of nature" (GS ? 294) who sacrifice the body and fightagainst instinct as a sickness. Hegel says. and Freud here. subjectivity. or "taken up" (auf-gehoben) in the transition from feeling reason. standpoint requires.

" seething" and inchoate "babbling.190." (IL 376) More generally.. For Hegel. material. . art frees us from the enslavement to not by eliminating the body but by transfiguring it." (PCR ? 29)28 The fact is that all three writers insist on the need for a sublimation of feeling. made incandescent. (A 409) Passion unsublimated ."29 Rather. "calling forth a response and echo in the mind from all the depths" of the unconscious. anxiety." to find itself "reduplicated" or mirrored in the external world. clay. aesthetic "expression is the clarification of turbid emotion. Art is the expression of the human "impulse to produce [irjself. lifeof feeling. this isperhaps seen most clearly inhis aesthetics.253. "appropriates as in madness we are "imprisoned" in the particular passion" (A 419). effecting a "deflection" of instincts from their originally egoistic and often destructive aims. just mirror of art. forged. . which allows for its "purification" or sublimation. excess. sublimation is the only healthy alternative to repression and neurosis. but not through any direct discharge?not through what John Dewey calls "an instantaneous mere a "inner emission. "Every artist knows how far from any feeling of This content downloaded from 193. and as they know themselves they are transfigured. a psychical state that often develops into madness." by broken. (A 419) What was previously shut up in the privacy and subjectivity of the unconscious becomes an "address" or "summons" or "question" posed to the conscious mind (A 427). so entire that he has no will outside this the man. fragment. and self-distrust. . 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . quote Dewey again.To the body?again.. (BGE ? 188) "In man creature and creator are united: in man there is man there is also creator. burnt.MADNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 205 "self-deception" that pursues a "false tranquility. And like Hegel and Freud. Nietzsche regards the sublimation of passion and instinct as as to crucial health well. The artist "knows how to link so large a yield of pleasure to [the] representation[s] of his uncon scious [that]. but in artistic the force which chaos the of nature is "formed. and purified. By sublimating passion. .150 on Tue." (BGE ? Finally. form-giver. chaos." but "sinks into helpless ness. our appetites know themselves when they are reflected in the lettinghimself go his 'most natural' state is"?the goal isnot a "laisser aller" but rather an "education" and "discipline" of the passions. he looks to art as a paradigm of sublimation. torn. repressions are outweighed and liftedby it. art is the objectification and reconstruction of passion. self-transcendence. self-elevation. (A 401) This expression is the representation of human feelings and passions. not a crude reveling in nature but self-conquest."30 Freud also sees art as the sublimation of instinct. .

"(EH I ? 8) insists on the contrary that history is the slaughter bench of happiness." (WP ?? 382. It is contrasted with repression in that sublimation is a form of "employing" and "econo mizing" "those impetuous torrents of the soul that are so often dangerous and overwhelming. "every being.190. He history. First. a "return idealization of the Second.206 DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND 225) Sublimation is the refinement." unhealthy." whereby it (PS 19) Our social being isnot easily won."31 Hegel isnot ignorant of the force of the death instinct. somewhere. precisely because it demands so much by way of sacrifice. healthy of sublimation an social culture" and of every 9).253. There the desire genuinely heart of desire. sometime 'com mon. his "citadel of secrecy. We must be careful. sublimation is a middle path between the laisser aller of nature and its repression. Nietzsche's psychology of sublimation is committed to preserving and nourishing this privacy. while Hegel sees the sublimation of feeling as entailing a movement them dryup. a will to universal construct French revolution." which can be cured only by solitude." Hegel is reallymuch closer toNietzsche and Freud in his interpretation of the feeling soul than appears at first glance: For all three. while Freud does not share Nietzsche's of a genuinely is the of he individual. the destructive power that lies so close to the This content downloaded from 193. that spirit exists only in "the power of the negative" must confront itselfagain and again "in utter dismemberment. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .'" "unclean. and "spiritualization" (Vergeistigung)of nature. and to leave this path in either direction is to risk illness. and Hegel knows fullwell the in the possibility of pathology arising in civilization. who lives in "the desolate regions.150 on Tue. (BGE ? 284) Nietzsche's great "nausea" is in fact his "nausea over man. not to reduce Hegel to the sort of cartoon image that compares his optimism to that of "Voltaire's Doctor Pangloss [who] sees only the harmony of all things. 383-84) rather than "enfeebling" them and "wanting tomake who needs his masks and concealments. channeling. cultivation. seeing the human struggle forcommunity and social synthesis as a genuinely achievable goal." tomyself. integration. as. 289) "All community makes men?somehow. for example. The real differences lie elsewhere. however. assimilation. and indeed as a goal that has been achieved in every great epoch of world away from the particularity and privacy of the heart. possibility skeptical equally private our individual is For social construction of Freud. (BGE ?? 26. Nietzsche idealizes the hermit. enemy (FI virtually instinct is inherently unstable. (IL 23) Hegel ismore optimistic here." who prizes interiorityover community and silence over language.

lost but still recollected trace (as in a dream) of its rationality. . as we should expect.The mad self is "driven out of its [rational] mind. has two centers"?the displaced. the reality of thisworld with the superstition of another world.. and a resulting sever ing of the connections to reality. since he effects an erasure of the distinction between waking Freud also sees mental wishes of the unconscious and dreaming. . The objective. but knows himself [only as] . neurosis. ID 561) Nietzsche. shifted out from the center of its actual world and . (IL 216.190. illusion. which seeks to replace the reality of the earth with the myth of between heaven." illness as situated within a doubled center of which the ego has withdrawn but still retains a the world from reality. the reality of the body with the illusion of the eternal soul. superstition." the one representing the and the other thewishes of the censoring agency of consciousness and the reality principle. and the new center constructed by the life of feeling. PM ? 408 Z) CONCLUSION: THE DOUBLE CENTER OF MADNESS resulted in the law of the guillotine and the reign of terror Hegel's and Freud's basic characterization ofmental illness as a withdrawal or retreat into the lifeof feeling and the unconscious. Thus there are certain givens of reality forNietzsche. It is in this sense that Hegel refers to madness as a double personality: "The insane subject is therefore in communion with himself in a subject the negative of himself. . . and the substitution formations enacted by the projec tions of unconscious wishes. tenuous relation to. is "abolished" byNietzsche and can no longer serve as a standard by which tomeasure its "other. Freud compares the neurotic to the dreamer: Both are like "two separate people. Nietzsche partly restores the distinction two centers of reality in his diagnosis of neurotic illness. and between reality and appearance. which is displaced by the fantastic realities ofmadness. On the other hand. . leads to a view of madness as entailing what Hegel calls a "double center" of reality. But there is an even deeper sense in which Nietzsche may be seen to This content downloaded from 193." the reality projected by the mind. decentered.253.MADNESS of the people AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 207 whichhe explicitly diagnosesasmadness. Similarly. On the one hand. against which a kind of mental in be the described may projection language ofmyth.150 on Tue. the idea of a double center of reality becomes questionable. (PS 355-63. two into different 408 ? (PM Z) disrupted personalities. For he anticipates themajor features of Freud's analysis of religion as a example. external reality of which Hegel and Freud speak so confidently.. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . holds a more ambiguous position.

is repeated in my nature in every respect: I am aDoppelganger. . . this double strand of two faces... And Hegel's phenome a "notwendige nology is committed to what Friedrich Grimmlinger calls to The self mind. series of years signifies recovery for me. decay. . nor sees health as an overcoming of this duality. ling This content downloaded from 193. I am both. When he turns to a description of the dialectical relation between his own health and illness. . this access to apparently separate worlds. (EH I ?? 1-3) intimate interweaving of health and illness...Now I know dence?in . Illness that isnot simply a neurotic denial of instinct brings us closer to the world of the body and nature and also to the source of all human creativity. Ihave a 'second' face in addition to the first. A long. Nietzsche directly appropriates the language of a "dual series of experiences" and a corre sponding double personality: For a [truly]healthy person. . double perspectives.. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . all too long. . it is in the gesture of self externalization.253. being sick can even become an energetic stimulus for life. . conversely. unfortunately italso signifies . and the subsequent doub our center of of the experience. and defines neurosis as the repression of instinct.32 is all internal that and "Doppeltheit" Zweideutigkeit" This discovers itselfonly in its relation to itselfas other . ... Looking periodicity relapse. to reverseperspectives. Like them. and separate worlds of personality?these both Nietzsche's closeness to and his departure theDoppelganger?reveals from Hegel and Freud.. . that the self exists. from the perspective of the sick toward healthierconcepts and values and.208 DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND model share the Hegelian and Freudian notion of a double center of reality as a for understanding illness. dual series of experiences. iswhy it is "impossible to be an artist and not to be sick." (WP ? 811) Neither Hegel nor Freud denies an essential ontological duality of consciousness. But while Hegel and Freud diagnose this as pathology. Nietzsche sees a double center of reality This as entailed by the descent into illness. . a dynamic interplay between conscious and unconscious structures. for livingmore. looking again from the fullness and self-assurance of a rich life down into the secret work of the instinct of deca this I have had the longest training. . I have a subtler sense of smell for how This the signs of ascent and decline . I know both. . . a of the kind of decadence. Freud's whole psychoanalytic theory insists on a basic doubleness of the lifeof the mind.190. Enuau$erung becoming-other.150 on Tue. Nietzsche sees it as the potentiality for a great health.

and hence essentially pre-human level of life. we certainly must not minimize the differences? for example. and the crucial role of sublimation. nor does he give his theory of the uncon scious the central place it is accorded in the works ofNietzsche and Freud.150 on Tue. uncon Feeling must be integrated into rationality. the structures of nostalgia. Hegel does not explicitly integrate his theory of Verrucktheit into the larger project of his philosophy. Still. and instincts?are interwoven with conscious intentions in every human action. so that a reversion to the domain of instinct will be an imprisonment in a pre-rational. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ." (PS 220) The unconscious.33 We cannot remove the warp of history from its is one of the central elements of the selfs Further. isour internal riddle. Hegel and Freud. Nietzsche sees this going-under as the to a casting off of the constricting shackles of necessary propaedeutic socially constructed norms and a revaluation of decadent values. he only has to explain that he has nothing more to say to anyone who does not find and feel the same in himself. "is finished and done with anyone who does not agree. duality intentions?the motive forces of our desires." Hegel writes. What Hegel and Freud both deny is that the reversion or Untergang into nature is the key to genuine health. Nietzsche's and Freud's reversal of the values of consciousness and the essential negativity of life. the characteristics of withdrawal and the decentering of reality. the conflictual duality of instinct or desire. and Hegel no more sees the than does solution to this riddle to be the denial of the unconscious woof: Nietzsche or Freud. the unconscious as is for Nietzsche it and Freud."(PS 43) In comparing Hegel's theory ofmadness and the unconscious with those ofNietzsche and Freud. and the death instinct. passions. nature. as the warp and woof of our history.MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS 209 scious" feature of action (RH 35) that accounts for the "double meaning" of the deed with the result that the self "become[s] a riddle to itself. (RH 26-31) There is always a "latent. Unconscious for just Hegel. Nietzsche's revaluation of the relation between illness and health and his idealization of seclusion. and Hegel's relative optimism about our social being. the unconscious. narcissism. such a comparison shows thatHegel anticipates many of the themes thatwere to occupy Nietzsche and Freud in their new psychologies of the depths: the view ofmadness as a response to This content downloaded from 193.253. see our social being as our trulyhuman essence. the importance of dreams as a model forunderstanding the unconscious and illness.190. pre-social. nature must be sublimated into the lifeof spirit.The person who "makes his appeal to feeling. on the other hand.

Nietzsche.. 1978? tr. Religion. In the anthropology section of the Phibsophy of Mind. 3 of the Encyclopaedia of thePhilosophical Sciences.Glenn Gray.. are to sections (?). vol. Bard College NOTES 1. 1977. V. theory of and the Role Verrucktheit." (PM ? 408 Z) Hegel's point isnot. PN Hegel's Phibsophy ofNature. V. Miller. Christian Religion. and in J. no. PS Phenomenology of Spirit. PCR The Positivity of the Press. tr." Phenomenological between Hegel's I have explored a number of the connections 356-78. New York: Humanities 1969. that we will all necessarily become insane. section 408. Press. "The Decentering Hegel's Theory of Madness. 6k 1970. See "The Theory ofMental Derangement in Hegel. 8.We get a good sense of the impor tance of an understanding of madness when we read that "insanity [is] a necessarily occurring form or stage in the development of the soul. Oxford: Clarendon of the Encycbpaedia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 139 inMiller's one of the very few scholars to have written on Hegel's 2. References to the works ofHegel. tr. tr. V. Miller. 3 (1968): project in a recently completed companion theory of madness and his larger philosophical article of Reason: to the present essay. New York: Row. ed. Harper Philosophy. where madness has its origin. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .A. in and Freud will be given parenthetically 3. Press.. LL Hegel's Science of Logic ("larger" Logic). T.. 1977.. Knox. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Oxford: Clarendon PM Hegel's Philosophy ofMind.210 DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND And yet a close reading of his largely overlooked thoughts on madness and the unconscious shows that these themes are more important than the space he allots to them might suggest. but rather that the possibility of a pathological reversion to nature is constantly prepared forby the encounter with the essential negativity of lifeand the presence in consciousness of the nostalgic face of desire. Works cited are as follows: HEGEL References 'Z' designates A Selections to the three volumes of the Encyclopaedia (SL. makes this point as well. Press. and "Hegel's and Function of Subjectivity International Philosophical Quarterly Analysis and Freud's Psychoanalysis." forthcoming in International Studies in Philosophy. and Zusatz (122 translation: see fh 3 below). of course.150 on Tue. Miller. the text and abbreviated. inHegel's Early Theological Writings. 2 This content downloaded from 193." The Personalist 49 (1968): 433-53. from Hegel's lectures on aesthetics.. 1970?vol. Hence also the importance of a knowledge of the "infernal regions" of the uncon scious.190.A. Darrel Christensen. ed.A.253. SL) additions (Zusatze) to the original text.William Wallace. M. On Art. PN.

. 1966. D Daybreak. This citation is taken from Karl Jaspers'sNietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding ofHis Philosophical Activity.. SE vols. Lincoln NE: University ofNebraska Press. 1984). PEL The Psychopathology ofEveryday Life. W. 1975? Introduction SL Hegel's Logic ("shorter" Logic). William tr. which I have been unable to locate. This content downloaded from 193. SE vol.. ed. 4. BPP Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 16. 1953fY. 19. text 1965). 15. Wallace.. Schmitz (Chicago: Henry Regnery. ed. 18. C. The Basic BT The Birth Writings. Kaufmann. tr. For Hegel's theory of the List der Vernunft.Marion Faber.." and "Ethical Action. 24 vols. Leipzig: Kroner Verlag. in The Portable Nietzsche. 1916-17.. Clark Butler. NIL New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis.. to Power. Law: Man and Woman. see LL 746. Kaufmann. HH Human. 1 of the Encyclopaedia. Guilt and in intentionality. SE vol. 1920. Hartman. 115.in University Press. 18. 1923. Civilization and its Discontents. ]. James Strachey. Indianapolis to the Lectures on thePhilosophy ofHistory." For more general passages on the role of the unconscious 6. Hollingdale.SE vol. see especially PS 267-289. (the so-called Kleinoktavausgabe. W. The translators omit all of Jaspers's references. New York: Random House. tr. Symptoms and Anxiety. SE vol. Kaufmann. Oxford: NIETZSCHE All (?) unless otherwise noted.. BGE references are to sections ed. in his edition of Hegel's Letters (Bloomington Press. FREUD references are to the Standard Edition of theComplete Psychological Works Freud. 1926.RH 26-36. in The Basic Writings. R.SE vol. PS 33. 20. IN: Indiana University 4. 14. 5. 1919. F. GS House. tr. SE vol. 21. J.SE vol. All CD of Sigmund ID The Interpretation of Dreams. see PS Destiny. New The Gay Science.W. ofTragedy. SE vol. in The Basic Writings ofNietzsche. IL Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. EI The Ego and theId. ISA Inhibitions. On "The Ethical World. 1914. EH Ecce Homo. RH 44. tr. PA/RO Psychoanalysis and Religious Origins. 20. 22. vol.MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS RH Reason inHistory.1927. 1974.Hollingdale. Jaspers refers to the early edition of the collected works prepared by Nietz Verlag. 407. 1899-1912). 6. and in the original German de Gruyter (Nietzsche: Einfuhrung in das Verstdndnis seines Philosophierens. Human and Divine guilt and intentionality. sche's sister Elizabeth 16 vols. 1933. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .253. Wallraff and F. 5.. R.249. Clarendon 211 1953?the Press. London: Hogarth Press. York: Random House. AS An Autobiographical Study. SE vol. SL ? 209. IN: Bobbs-Merrill. Tl Twilight of the Idols. S. 1968. 17. W. tr. Nar On Narcissism: An Introduction. Kaufmann WP The Will New York: Random and R.. FI The Future ofan Illusion. 1901. Beyond Good and Evil.. 1923. Since Jaspers nowhere specifies which of 220f. GM The Genealogy ofMorals. Cambridge: Cambridge in The Basic Writings. All Too Human. SE vols. SE vol. 1925. 1900.150 on Tue.190. Human and Divine Knowledge. 1984. 1967. tr. Berlin: Walter 1936). 1982. New York: Viking Press. J.

11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .." That is. to power and denial. ISA 99f. . 15." meant to be entirely "free and ." (PA/RO 94) Both the events in the world philosopher and the paranoid schizophrenic share "the belief that the real take the course which our thinking seeks to impose on them. the line of is consciousness conscious is too strictly drawn to account for the motivation of the developed demarcation on Mental ness to give up its rationality and sink back into madness. Kleinoktavausgabe.190.. p. becomes conscious becomes by the same token thin. described variously as the will also argues that Hegel's theory of Verrucktheit is substantially paralleled by is particularly Christensen interested in Analysis"). have "The delusions of paranoics 18. 1971). inHegel's Theory of Desire. ("Hegel's Phenomenological a illness (see PM ? 408 Z) anticipates threefold typology of mental showing how Hegel's similar typology in Freud (hysteria. herd signal. . e.. . 159. 10. . reduction to . . Jaspers. 64. Steinkraus. for those more fortunate in their search for Elizabeth's to volume and page numbers of that edition. . Freud in fact compares metaphysical systems to paranoia: an . general. that Nietzsche develops his view in a significantly different way than do Hegel and Freud. The present citation is from Kleinoktavausgabe. Derangement.150 on Tue. 1. view of anxiety is very similar to Freud's notion of 12. 112. who lives among the most conscious Europeans even knows that it is a disease." object of fear. 193." 11. Kleinoktavausgabe view and those of such modem writers as Thomas Foucault. and. Iwill refer the reader to pages in Jaspers's text. 1930. the growth of consciousness becomes a danger. and transference. Kleinoktavausgabe 16."(BGE ? 9) This content downloaded from 193. Note the similarity between Nietzsche's 17." which sees anxiety as more basic than its attachment to any particular 364f." tr. and anyone Ultimately. Jean Hyppolite. relatively stupid. . growth and decadence." in and Psychoanalysis. .1 believe thatNathan since the rational. See Freud's notion of "secondary gain" and the "need for illness.253.. the will to health and the will to nothingness.Albert Richer. psychosis). falsification. Analysis. 112. that Hegel and Freud offer shared analyses of such themes as anxiety and guilt. developed fact of the existence of insanity [is] a great problem forHegel. or spiritual factors inmind. "Hegel's Views refers to his own illness he is I have been careful to select passages where he vol. however. 15. vol. Szasz. 2). EL 49. We will see. pp. Nietzsche's works correspond to the different volumes of the collected works." (perhaps a pathological 8.212 DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND vol. and Michel "Mental illness for the "medical model": who substitute a "labelling theory" of mental illness" isnot a medical condition but a socially constructed label for deviance from accepted norms. See. One factor is that when Nietzsche complicating sometimes has mental speaking of purely physical pains. "Hegel's Phenomenological Fialko is getting at the same point when he writes that "the very 13. Nietzsche also often presents a basic duality of instinct. projection. 7. dreams. sign.not subject to disease. 259f. affirmation and the will to life and the "will to death" (GS ? 344). New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy (New York: Holt. See my "Evolution and Nostalgia forthcoming inClio." IL 382ff. "Hegel's Phenomenology Warren E." Also BGE ? constitutes only one state of our spiritual and psychic world 357: "What we call consciousness state). 14. ed. BGE ? 354: "Whatever shallow. Christensen Freud its repression. 9. 5. . Jaspers. Rinehart and Winston. 47. Christensen argues that Hegel's "free-floating anxiety.g. obsessional neurosis. . internal kinship to the systems of our philosophers. D. p. Laing. and in demonstrating Journal ofAbnormal and Social Psychology 25 (no. superficialities. R." (NIL 165f) Compare own Nietzsche's description of philosophy as the "tyrannical drive" to "create the world in its image.

For a fuller discussion of Hegel's revaluation of truth. Oldenbourg 1972). Fialko goes so far as to say that "the system of Hegel modern psychiatry has evolved." 28. in which the spiritual is still that constitutes the domain where insanity is generated [forHegel]. in his analysis of the "Unhappy Consciousness. EL 36-38. a man rediscovers his own and mankind's prehistory. 55. See Fialko. see my Hegel's Grand 213 : Synthesis A "Hegel's Theory of Truth. Derangement. culture and put a means at our disposal for understanding them better. 1989. hrsg. 199. Verlag." 23. shows how Hegel's key concept of the Aufhebung "is compatible with the 27. Geburtstag. "Zum Begriff des absoluten Wissens in Hegels Phanomeno logie. "Insanity. Nietzsche?A Fantastic Commentary?" 1985. Art as Experience. scious. Thought." This content downloaded from 193. and Evil inGreek Thought (New York: Harper & Row.253. 96. 11 Feb 2014 15:20:17 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . See Nietzsche's discussion of what he calls Hegel's idea of an "ontological uncon See also Robert Herrera's "Freud on 548f (where Freud refers to his debt to Nietzsche). 1976)." And D ? 312: "In the fantasizing of dreams and insanity." 20. eds.190." Hegel describes ascetic "a personality brooding over itself. "Theory of Mental Derangement." initiating a "total breakdown and ID See. appears in an otherwise splendid book byWilliam Moira: Fate. CD 13f." on many occasions. FI17. Friedrich Grimmlinger. all the ideas that view of "fixation" in his article Social Theory and Practice 15 (no. a similar point when he argues that "the unconscious makes is the is potential for the individual. Dewey. Kuhns." in Geschichte und System: Festschrift fur Erich Heintel zum 60. 226. 32. Timo Airaksinen gives a nice analysis of Hegel's andHistory (Albany:SUNY Albany Press. 440. Winter 26. 48-49." undifferentiated. 262: "It is the moment of corporeity.MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS 19. inA." of relationship. 604-6. See Hyppolite's that "withdraws to itself analysis of the position of the consciousness as the and rejects all communication. Christensen in something like the Freudian way.. 213. 29. 29If. contains. 614.g." (263) 21. Hofstadter and R.210-11." "Theory ofMental notion of an unconscious conceived 434ff. 31. Crime and the Structure of Freedom inHegel. e. Similarly. as wretched as it is mortification as a will to nothingness.. 1989). 1963). Philosophy Today. notion of "the artists of decadence. Good." und Erhard Oeser (Miinchen: R. John Dewey. 30." 444. 22. in fact.Chapter Two: Study ofBeing. 341. Christensen (PS 135f) impoverished." 2). This quotation Chase Greene. 156-58. See Hyppolite's (59-60) 24. Philosophies ofArt and Beauty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.150 on Tue. IL 179-81. von Hans-Dieter Klein 33. Freud speaks of the archaic phylogenetic heritage of the unconscious epitome of the death instinct (70)." (WP ? 852) HH ? 13: "Dreams take us back again to distant conditions of human 25. See Nietzsche." and that Hegel subjective ground of the integrity which would entirely agree with Freud's view of the unconscious having "a continuing function in even the normal and mature consciousness.

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