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Peifoimance & Effectiveness of Lawmaking anu 0veisight:

The 6
0ganuan Pailiaments

Nelson Kasfii
Baitmouth College

Stephen Bippo Twebaze
Nakeieie 0niveisity

Naich 2u1S

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A stiong legislatuie is an impoitant coineistone foi a iobust uemociacy. In
0ganua, Pailiament's challenge has been to oveicome a histoiy of executive
uominance that uates back to the eaily Piotectoiate peiiou. To help oveicome
0ganua's histoiy of political instability, the 199S Constitution gave Pailiament
gieatei poweis to iestiain the Executive. In paiticulai, two coie missions foi all
legislatuies, Pailiament's lawmaking anu accountability functions, weie

This iepoit examines quantitative measuies of Pailiament's peifoimance
uuiing its fiist 1S yeais aftei these constitutional changes. It compaies the 6

(1996-2uu1), 7
(2uu1-2uu6) anu 8
(2uu6-2u11) Pailiaments, yeai-by-yeai anu
by theii five-yeai teims. In assessing Pailiament's legislative functions, this iepoit
piesents uesciiptive statistics foi the numbei of bills, anu the numbei anu type of
amenuments consiueieu by committees anu the whole Bouse. In measuiing
Pailiament's accountability functions, it looks at anu compaies the time oveisight
committees took to examine the Auuitoi-ueneial's iepoits, the use of oial questions,
ministeiial statements anu matteis of national impoitance. Since the no-paity
system was in opeiation uuiing the fiist two of these Pailiaments anu the multi-
paity system uuiing the thiiu, the iepoit compaies uiffeiences in Pailiament's
peifoimance between these two foims of uemociacy.

0n aveiage, appioximately 21 bills weie intiouuceu pei yeai acioss the thiee
Pailiaments. Nost of these bills become law, although the annual peicentage of bills
passeu ueclineu uuiing the 8
Pailiament. The length of time it took a bill to pass
vaiieu significantly. Buiation lasteu much longei in the 8
Pailiament by
compaiison with the 6
anu 7
, suggesting that the piesence of paities may iesult
in longei consiueiation of bills. Piivate Nembeis intiouuceu 2S of the S17 bills in
the thiee pailiaments, the numbei uoubling uuiing the 8
. NRN NPs initiateu most
of them anu most passeu. Theie was a uistinct iegulai uecline in the numbei of
lapseu billsthe 8
piouucing only half the numbei of lapseu bills as the 6


Committee ieview of bills is an impoitant innovation intiouuceu by the 199S
Constitution. The iesults inuicate that total committee activity was twice as high in
the 7
as in the 6
oi the 8
. But when committee pioposals aie measuieu pei bill,
the numbei of theii iecommenuations in the 6
anu 7
is about the same, while
theie weie only slightly moie than half as many in the 8
. Thus, committee
iecommenuations occuiieu moie fiequently uuiing the no-paity peiiou than uuiing
the multi-paity phase.

Committees consiueieu many moie bills in new legislative aieas than those
amenuing existing statutes. Coiiesponuingly, committees maue moie
iecommenuations on bills in new legislative aieas uuiing all thiee pailiaments.
When these activities aie measuieu pei bill, the figuies show a steauy uecline in
numbei of committee pioposals on both types of bills fiom one pailiament to the
next. Committees also iecommenueu moie substantive changes to bills than minoi
claiifications. Bowevei, theie was a steepei uecline ovei time in substantive
committee pioposals than in minoi ones.

When Pailiament sat as a Committee of the Whole Bouse (CWB) anu
consiueieu the same bills clause by clause foi its seconu ieauing, its oveiall activity
measuieu as the total numbei of amenuments the Bouse auopteu baseu on
committee iecommenuations was almost twice as high in the 7
as in eithei the 6

oi the 8
Pailiamentsthe same pattein that occuiieu in the committees. Bowevei,
the numbei of CWB amenuments pei bill ueclineu steauily ovei the thiee
pailiaments. As tiue foi committees, the CWB showeu a highei iate of amenuments
auopteu in the no-paity peiiou by compaiison to the multi-paity pailiament. The
piopoition of CWB auoption of committee iecommenuations (its iate of selectivity)
was much lowei foi bills amenuing existing statutes than foi bills in new legislative
aieas. The CWB also auopteu moie substantive (changing) than minoi (claiifying)
amenuments in paiallel with the committees. The pei-bill CWB peifoimance also
showeu a steauy uecline in the numbei of auoptions fiom the 6
thiough the 8

Pailiaments. Bowevei, its iate of selectivity of substantive committee
iecommenuations is constant ovei all thiee pailiaments, suggesting that the CWB
tenueu to agiee with its committees when they pioposeu ueviations fiom the
oiiginal bill. The CWB also auopteu fai fewei new amenuments pioposeu on the
flooi than its committee iecommenuations.

0veisight of the Executive is also an impoitant legislative function. It is
achieveu moie iesponsibly by having membeis of the opposition chaii
accountability committees. Buiing the no-paity pailiaments, seveial NPs who hau
uemonstiateu theii opposition to policies of the Executive weie chosen to chaii PAC.
In the 8
Pailiament, NPs fiom opposition paities foimally chaiieu oveisight
committees. Pailiament authoiizeu 19 special investigations by committees fiom
199S to 2u11. It auopteu almost half of them without amenument anu a quaitei
with amenuments. The Public Accounts Committee's (PAC) statements ieviewing
the Auuitoi-ueneial's annual iepoits weie completeu foi the 6
anu 7

Pailiaments, but none weie tableu oi auopteu foi the 8
. The length of time until
auoption vaiieu fiom S.S to seven yeais. The uoveinment iesponueu to a
consiueiable piopoition of substantive PAC iecommenuations thiough Tieasuiy
Nemoianua. The length of time Pailiament took to auopt Local uoveinment
Accountability Committee (LuAC) iepoits fell steauily fiom 7.S to 4.S yeais.

0ial questions to ministeis iose fiom the 6
to the 7
anu fell in the 8
. 0vei
the 1S-yeai peiiou, only slightly moie than half the questions askeu ieceiveu an
answei. The time taken to answei took fai longei than the two-week limit.
Ninisteiial statements giew thiough all thiee pailiaments until 2uu8 when theii use
abiuptly ueclineu. Natteis of National Impoitance giew fiom the 7
to the 8

pailiament with opposition NPs iaising two-thiius of the Natteis in the lattei.

In geneial, legislative activity incieaseu fiom the 6
to the 7
anu ueclineu in the 8
. Legislative behavioi uiffeieu between the two no-paity
pailiaments anu the multi-paity pailiament. Committees maue fiequent
iecommenuations that changeu uoveinment bills anu the CWB auopteu the
majoiity of them, a healthy contiibution to the balance of legislative anu executive
poweis. The initiative foi special investigations began insiue Pailiament in the 6

anu then came as fiequently fiom outsiue in the 7
anu 8
. The uuiation of time
befoie pailiamentaiy appioval of PAC statements on the Auuitoi-ueneial's annual
iepoits gieatly incieaseu, but then appioval unfoitunately uisappeaieu altogethei
in the 8
. Ninisteis iesponueu to only a little ovei half the questions NPs poseu to
themanothei unfoitunate failuie in oveisight.

Bata foi this iepoit came piimaiily fiom Pailiament's iecoius available in
the 0ffice of the Cleik to Pailiament, the 0ffice of the Beputy Cleik foi Legislative
Seivices, !"#$"%& anu the '"()**). Tieasuiy Nemoianua came fiom the 0ffice of the
Accountant-ueneial in the Ninistiy of Finance. 0nfoitunately, seiious gaps in
Pailiament's iecoius hampeieu uata collection. In some cases, newspapei accounts
anu extia copies of iecoius kept by Pailiamentaiy officials filleu gaps. But many
iecoius aie missing. Bettei iecoiukeeping by Pailiament woulu help it analyze its
peifoimance anu effectiveness. Pailiament shoulu establish a system ensuiing full
uocumentation of eveiy official action it unueitakes.

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A stiong legislatuie is one of the impoitant coineistones foi a iobust
uemociacy. Nany new uemociacies inheiit a tiauition of uniestiaineu executive
powei. Thus, one of the cential issues foi any new uemociacy is finuing techniques
to limit executive powei without cieating goveinment paialysis. Powei stiuggles
often iesult in pooi policy outcomes. But so will the failuie of institutions anu
inuiviuuals to fulfill theii functions. Naintaining uemociacy involves complex
inteiactions involving inuiviuual paiticipation anu stiuctuial balance among electeu
anu appointeu officials. Finuing a successful institutional balance is just as
impoitant foi builuing uemociacy as holuing fiee anu faii elections. Bemociacy
iequiies constant attention to both institutional piomotion anu institutional

Beveloping that balance has inwaiu anu outwaiu-looking aspects foi both
the legislative anu executive bianches. Inteinal uimensions incluue the effective anu
efficient peifoimance of cential missions. Exteinal conceins involve accepting
piopei ielations with othei institutions. Togethei they iequiie the establishment of
a uelicate equilibiium between asseition anu iestiaint within iules iespecteu by all
actois. In olu as well as new uemociacies theie is an ongoing stiuggle to make
institutions woik anu coopeiate with each othei piouuctively. Neasuiing the
activities of uiffeient actois facilitates assessment of uemociatic peifoimance.

In conventional opinion, the job of the legislatuie is to make laws. But
nowheie touay is that task left solely to legislatuies. In auuition, foi a legislatuie to
contiibute piouuctively to builuing anu maintaining uemociacy, it must accomplish
seveial othei fiequently conflicting tasks. Its membeis must iepiesent uiveigent
social inteiests, solve pioblems of theii constituents anu pioviue oveisight of
executive action, while also analyzing, uebating anu passing legislation (Baikan
2uu9, 6-7). When caiiieu out successfully, these ioles can pioviue both the veitical
anu hoiizontal accountability that a well-peifoiming legislatuie shoulu contiibute
to a successfully functioning uemociatic system. While all of these tasks aie
essential foi the legislatuie to play its iole in uemociacy, in this iepoit we focus on
measuiing the peifoimance of the two functions in which the legislatuie must act
collectivelyconstiucting legislation anu pioviuing oveisight ovei the executive.

The legislatuie's iole in lawmaking thiusts it into a uilemma. To fulfill its
function as a "stiong" anu autonomous lawmaking bouy, a legislatuie must be
inuepenuent. But in the contempoiaiy woilu, the legislatuie nevei acts alone in
ueveloping new laws anu amenuing oi iepealing olu ones. Because policy-making
has giown incieasingly complex, executive ministiies have become the senioi
paitnei in pioposing bills.

We aie most giateful foi the suppoit we ieceiveu fiom the Bemociatic uoveinance
Facility, Kampala that enableu us to caiiy out this ieseaich anu piepaie this iepoit.

That was not always so. Befoie the 19
centuiy, the Biitish Bouse of
Commons was laigely a collection of inuepenuent NPs who intiouuceu most of the
public policy legislation. They acteu thiough Piivate Nembei bills, coulu intiouuce
them without notice, filibustei ones they peisonally uiu not like anu even call foi
aujouinment at any time (Cox 1987, 4S-46). The Cabinet's contiibution to
lawmaking consisteu mostly of financial bills to enable the ministiies to pay the
costs of the Ciown's oiuinaiy business. Buiing the 18uus, this ielationship ieveiseu
itself. So much so, that by the beginning of the 2u
centuiy, the Biitish Cabinet
contiolleu the intiouuction of almost all legislation anu NPs hau to suppoit oi
oppose uoveinment's choices whethei they appioveu of them oi not.

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0ganua's Pailiament has always confionteu anu continues to confiont
seiious challenges to accomplishing its legislative anu oveisight ioles. Thioughout
its histoiy it hau been fateu to be a weak anu ineffectual actoi until the passage of
the 199S Constitution. Executive uominance ovei policy-making has been a
tiauition in 0ganua since the founuing of the Piotectoiate, haiuly uiluteu by the
foimation of the Legislative Council in 1921. The intiouuction of a Westminstei
style legislatuie shoitly befoie inuepenuence, contiaiy to its uesigneis' intentions,
enueu up stiengthening uoveinment at the expense of the National Assembly.
Nilton 0bote iesponueu to his political enemies by foicing NPs to auopt the 1966
Constitution without even giving them a chance to ieview it. As a membei of the
piesent Cabinet obseiveu, "Pailiament was nevei the same again" (inteiview, 1 }uly
2uuS). A yeai latei, the 1967 Constitution tiansfeiieu a consiueiable poition of
legislative authoiity fiom the National Assembly to the Piesiuent. Be acquiieu
uncontiolleu powei to uissolve it anu coulu make laws when it was not in session.
The countiy's continuing expeiience with political instability anu violence aftei
inuepenuence fuithei entiencheu executive supiemacy

The legislatuie uisappeaieu entiiely eaily in Iui Amin's iegime, ietuining as
the unelecteu National Consultative Council in 1979. The questionable 198u election
uiu little to legitimize the NPs it installeu in office, iesulting in Pailiament exhibiting
little inuepenuence uuiing the 0bote II iegime anu uisappeaiing again with the
0kellos' coup u'tat in 198S. The fiist uecaue of National Resistance Novement
(NRN) iule uiu little to stiengthen the legislatuie as an inuepenuent institution. The
National Resistance Council began as a bouy entiiely appointeu by the Executive,
leaveneu by new membeis selecteu in inuiiect open-vote elections in 1989.
Neveitheless, it was chaiacteiizeu by consensus uecision-making baseu on fiee
uiscussion by its membeis, often chaiieu by the Piesiuent.

The 199S Constitution cieateu the most significant change in the position of
the legislatuie within the goveinment since the cieation of the Legislative Council.
In contiast to the wholesale auoption at inuepenuence of the Westminstei tiauition
of the Executive acting thiough a majoiity in the legislatuie, the new constitution
moie effectively sepaiateu the poweis of goveinment by cieating Pailiament as one
of seveial counteivailing institutions. The unueilying iationale foi this change,
auopteu by both the Constitutional Biafting Commission (CBC) anu the Constituent
Assembly (electeu on the fiist seciet ballot anu univeisal fianchise in the NRN
peiiou), was that bettei lawful iestiaint of the Executive was an impoitant antiuote
to fuithei political instability (0CC 199S, 292-29S).

Boluing the Executive to account, while in theoiy always pait of the
legislatuie's iesponsibility, now took on a moie significant iole. In auuition, its
lawmaking iole was stiengtheneu. The 199S Constitution put a new, laigei, moie
active anu bettei-iesouiceu committee system into place that woulu sciutinize both
legislation anu ministeiial action. "Pailiament must be fiee to set up whatevei
committees it sees as necessaiy at the time. Committees must be fiee to make
iepoits to, anu even to piopose bills foi the consiueiation of Pailiament. They must
be pioviueu with sufficient iesouicesincluuing expeit peisonnel anu financesto
caiiy out theii functions effectively" (0CC 199S, Su9). Committees weie given the
powei to compel testimony, incluuing fiom Ninisteis, anu obligateu to expose
uoveinment wionguoing. In auuition, the constitution explicitly iecognizeu the iight
of Piivate Nembeis to intiouuce bills anu iequiieu goveinment uepaitments to help
them (Constitution 2uu6, Sec. 94(4)).

With the 6
Pailiament, the fiist following the 199S Constitution, NPs gave
substance to seveial aspects of the new constitutional enlaigement of pailiamentaiy
poweis. They began immeuiately to impiove its capacity to fulfill its collective
functions. Nany of the constitutional piovisions weie auopteu in Pailiament's new
Rules of Pioceuuie (Kasfii anu Twebaze 2uu9, 87-88). The thiee most impoitant
changes that incieaseu the inuepenuence of Pailiament fiom the Executive weie the
eneigetic activities of both lawmaking anu accountability committees anu the
passage of both the Auministiation of Pailiament Act 1997 (APA) anu the Buuget
Act 2uu1 (BA) (Kasfii anu Twebaze 2uu9, 81-8S, 89-91). The APA ueteimineu that
Pailiament contiolleu its own buuget, officials anu its goveinance thiough the
Pailiamentaiy Commission. The BA gave Pailiament a statutoiy iole in ueteimining
the goveinment's annual buuget (anu the thiee yeai piospective buuget) as well as
limiting supplementaiy appiopiiations. Both statutes weie ueeply significant not
only because they stiengtheneu Pailiament, but also because both weie Piivate
Nembei bills passeu ovei initial uoveinment opposition.

A few of the amenuments to the Constitution that Pailiament auopteu in
2uuS affecteu the opeiation of Pailiament. Two of them, iecognition of the Leauei of
the 0pposition anu the Pailiamentaiy Commission stiengtheneu Pailiament's
institutional capacity (Constitution 2uu6, Secs. 82A anu 87A). Bowevei, one 2uuS

The uiaft iepoit to the Constituent Assembly saiu "it is . vital that membeis who
aie not ministeis be peimitteu anu, in eveiy possible way, assisteu to submit bills
foi consiueiation of the Pailiament" (0CC 199S, Su7).
ueletion appeaieu to weaken it by iemoving the constitutional status of five
functions of stanuing committees. Aftei 199S, committees coulu make
iecommenuations on all bills, initiate bills, assess activities of uoveinment, caiiy out
ieseaich anu iepoit to Pailiament (Constitution 199S, Sec. 9u (S)). But the 2uuS
amenument leaves it to Pailiament to piesciibe the functions of the committees,
allowing a futuie Pailiament uominateu by a paity contiolling uoveinment to
weaken the poweis of committees (Constitution 1996, Sec. 9u (2).

The most impoitant constitutional change in 2uuS was the uecision by
iefeienuum to change the political system fiom no-paity to multi-paity competition.
Buiing the two uecaues of NRN iule befoie 2uuS, paities weie legal, but coulu not
nominate, campaign oi iaise money foi canuiuates. voteis weie expecteu to make
theii choices on the basis of inuiviuual meiit. In the absence of paities, NPs chose to
make theii uecisions on bills inuepenuently. Bespite the absence of paity labels,
NPs' piefeiences foi the Novement (the constitutional name foi the NRN at the
time) oi the opposition (unofficially calleu the "multipaitists" uuiing the 6
anu 7

Pailiaments) weie geneially known. A laige majoiity favoieu the Novement. That
uiu not pievent them fiom joining multipaitists to pass bills opposeu by the
uoveinment anu to attack publicly coiiuption by Ninisteis in the 6
Pailiament anu
in the fiist yeais of the 7th (Kasfii anu Twebaze 2uu9, 9S-94). The auvent of paities
iestiaineu NPs. With a two-thiius majoiity anu insistence on stiong paity
uiscipline, the NRN was able to uominate the 8
Pailiament. But in the fiist yeais of
the 9
, many NPs in the NRN again iebelleu against uoveinment positions on
seveial issues (ICu 2u12, SS).

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In geneial, this iepoit pioviues uata to help ueteimine whethei Pailiament
has become moie oi less effective in its lawmaking oi accountability functions ovei
the past 1S yeais. It analyzes Pailiament's peifoimance since the 199S Constitution.
Among othei questions, it asks whethei Pailiament's woik habits have changeu
between the beginning of the 6
Pailiament anu the enu of the 8
, whethei it
intiouuceu anu passeu moie bills anu whethei NPs intiouuceu moie Piivate
Nembei bills. It offeis uata about changes ovei time in the numbei of amenuments
its committees have pioposeu anu the plenaiy's iesponses to committee pioposals
foi amenuments.

Similai questions about Pailiament's attentiveness to its oveisight uuties can
be analyzeu by counting the numbei of accountability committee iepoits sent to
Pailiament since the 199S Constitution anu what Pailiament has uone about them.
In auuition, less noticeu tools of oveisight can be enumeiateuNPs' questions to
Ninisteis, Natteis of National Impoitance anu ministeiial statements to explain
issues. In auuition, extiaoiuinaiy measuies such as censuies anu impeachment neeu
to be mentioneualthough they aie too few to be subjecteu to statistical analysis..

In this iepoit, we take a pieliminaiy step in the stuuy of the peifoimance of
the 0ganuan Pailiament ovei time. We iuentify impoitant phases in the piocess of
both legislation anu oveisight anu attempt to count all instances that can be tiaceu
at impoitant stages ovei the past 1S yeais. Foi many of oui uatasets, we
supplementeu iecoius available in the 0ffice of the Cleik to Pailiament anu the
Beputy Cleik foi Legislative Seivices with examination of !"#$"%& anu the
uoveinment '"()**). We also examineu files in the 0ffice of the Accountant-ueneial
in the Ninistiy of Finance anu filleu some gaps with newspapei accounts. To the
extent that iecoius weie available, we pioviue uesciiptive statistics foi the univeise
of cases containing complete uata foi each of the legislative actions we investigateu.

0nfoitunately, Pailiament has not maue iecoiukeeping a high piioiity. Nany
iecoius, paiticulaily committee iepoits, cannot be founu in Pailiament's Libiaiy oi
the Cleik's 0ffice. 0theis weie locateu only because inuiviuual Pailiamentaiy
officials took the piecaution of keeping an extia copy. This situation occuiieu moie
often foi the 6
Pailiament, but we have been unable to finu some iepoits foi latei
Pailiaments as well. Sometimes the "Recoiu of Business Tiansacteu" contains the
only iefeience we coulu finu to establish that an agency of Pailiament took a
paiticulai action. In auuition, up-to-uate volumes of !"#$"%& aie often not available
in the Pailiamentaiy Libiaiy until long aftei they have been publisheu.

We piesent eviuence of the volume of Pailiament's activity anu change ovei
time in its woik habits anu in its legislative anu oveisight piocesses. In geneial, we
supply a basis foi compaiison to some of the inuicatois that the Pailiamentaiy
Commission is consiueiing foi the measuiement of the peifoimance of the 9

Pailiament (Inuicatois 2u12). We analyze othei measuies that the Pailiamentaiy
Commission may also wish to consiuei auopting.

In auuition, the 2uuS constitutional change in political systems pioviues a
plausible natuial expeiiment. In this iegaiu, we analyze the uata foi uiffeient
legislative stages by bunuling the no-paity 6
anu 7
Pailiaments togethei anu
compaiing them to the multipaity 8
. This exeicise allows us, although only in a
pieliminaiy mannei, to examine whethei the type of paity system affects ceitain
specific aspects of the legislative oi oveisight piocesses.

By itself, oui uata cannot answei causal questions about whethei Pailiament
has become moie effective oi moie efficient. Noi can it uistinguish Pailiament's
significant fiom its insignificant substantive achievements. That woulu iequiie a
moie qualitative analysis than we have attempteu heie. Neveitheless, oui uata
allows us to uiaw some mouest initial qualitative conclusions fiom oui quantitative
analysis. Foi example, if Pailiamentaiy committees oi the Bouse uuiing the
committee stage offei moie amenuments on bills ovei time, Pailiament may be

We iecognize that cases we aie unable to count intiouuce potential pioblems of
selection bias in oui finuings.
sciutinizing bills moie caiefully, although it coulu also be the case on occasion that
amenuments weie offeieu to uelay oi uefeat a bill iathei than impiove it.

0ui uata uoes not peimit us to uiaw the conclusion that eithei committees oi
the plenaiy chose to focus theii time on substantively moie impoitant bills.
Bowevei to take one example, if the numbei of questions NPs askeu anu the
numbei that Ninisteis answeieu iose oi fell thioughout the thiee Pailiaments, we
woulu have iuentifieu a iough measuie of the use of Pailiamentaiy questions as a
foim of oveisight. Again, oui uata uoes not put us in a position to say that the
questions poseu oi the answeis given claiifieu, oi even focuseu attention on, the
most impoitant issues facing the nation.


Nany innovations in legislative piocess weie intiouuceu into Pailiament by
the 199S Constitution. Whethei NPs weie able to mastei the new featuies of
Pailiamentaiy piactice immeuiately, oi took time to leain them is an impoitant
issue we exploie in this section. We estimate the size of Pailiament's woikloau anu
whethei it changeu ovei the yeais. In paiticulai, since committee action on bills was
initiateu unuei the new constitution, we examine how active committees weie in
making substantive anu minoi changes to bills. We also consiuei how active
Pailiament was in making amenuments to bills at the seconu ieauing when they
ieceiveu them fiom the committees.

6C ?*//2 *#$%&'().' 3#' <322.'+ #(4D.%E $5<. 3#' '(%3$*&#

A useful initial step in analyzing legislative peifoimance is to ask how many
bills weie intiouuceu anu how many weie passeu yeai-by-yeai anu Pailiament-by-
Pailiament. We also inquiieu how long it took a bill to be passeu, uefeateu oi lapse
at the enu of each Pailiament. We ueteimine how many of the bills tableu weie
intenueu to amenu existing statutes, iepeal them oi foimulate legislation in new
aieas. Fuithei, we count how many of each type of bill passeu oi faileu. Foi each of
these questions, we also want to know whethei theie weie changes ovei time.

The figuies foi passeu anu faileu bills aie piesenteu in Table 1. The fiist point
to notice is that the intiouuction of bills is almost constant at appioximately 21 pei
yeai. The numbei of those intiouuceu that pass vaiies only slightly moieeight to
nine of eveiy 1u bills pass. Bowevei, as uiscusseu below, many bills change
significantly uue to committee iecommenuations oi plenaiy amenuments auueu
befoie Pailiament accepts oi iejects them. If we compaie the no-paity 6
anu 7

Pailiaments with the multi-paity 8
, we finu little uiffeience in the oveiall
peicentage of bills passeu. Neveitheless, theie is a noticeable uecline in the
peicentage of bills passeu annually in the 8
Pailiament, falling steauily each yeai
fiom 1uu% in 2uu7 to S9% in 2u1u.

The aveiage uuiation pei yeai it takes a bill that passes between its
intiouuction at its fiist ieauing anu its auoption at its thiiu ieauing vaiies
But when this uiffeience is aveiageu among Pailiaments, it uoes not
appeai to be notewoithy. A somewhat stiiking uiffeience in uuiation appeais in
compaiing the two no-paity Pailiaments with the multi-paity Pailiament. Passeu
bills took about 6u% longei in the 8
. This iesult suggests that the piesence of
paities may leau to longei peiious foi consiueiation of bills.

In compaiing types of bills that passeu oi faileu, thiee points seem
impoitant. Fiist, few of these bills weie intiouuceu to iepeal statutes (none in the
), but all of them passeu. Seconu, somewhat moie bills in new legislative aieas
weie intiouuceu than those amenuing existing laws in all thiee Pailiaments, but the
numbeis weie only stiikingly uiffeient in the 6
in which twice as many bills in new
legislative aieas weie intiouuceu than those that amenueu existing laws. Thiiu, in
the no-paity 6
anu 7
Pailiaments, it seemeu easiei to pass new legislation than to
amenu piesent statutes, the multi-paity 8
, on the othei hanu, uemonstiateu the

FC 9%*;3$. 4.4D.% D*//2 *#$%&'().' 3#' <322.'

The totals in Table 1 incluue bills intiouuceu by piivate membeis.
constitutional entienchment of this iight was intenueu as one of the checks on the
Executive. In this section, we inquiie into theii passage oi uefeat, type of bill,
whethei the uoveinment took them ovei, anu the genuei, age anu political
affiliation of the oiiginal Piivate Nembei sponsoi. The numbei of Piivate membei
bills was too small to waiiant a yeai-by-yeai analysis, but it is woith noticing that
they weie intiouuceu thioughout each Pailiament. The figuies aie piesenteu in
Tables 2 anu S.

The 2S bills intiouuceu by Piivate Nembeis constitute about 8% of the S17
bills initiateu in all thiee Pailiaments. The numbei iemaineu small in the 6
anu 7

Pailiament anu then uoubleu in the 8
. That suggests theie may be an incieasing
tenuency foi the intiouuction of Piivate Nembei bills. uoveinment auopteu only
two of these bills, both in the 7
. Foi the most impoitant of them, those that gave
Pailiament gieatei institutional poweis, uoveinment uioppeu its opposition uuiing
the thiiu ieauing, but uiu not take them ovei. Nost of those on which we founu uata
passeuin fact, we coulu only confiim one (the Constitution Amenument Bill 1999)
that was uefeateu. Piivate Nembeis tenueu to intiouuce new bills iathei than
amenu existing legislation. In auuition, theie was one Piivate Nembei bill that
iepealeu a statute (in the 7
). Compaiing no-paity anu multi-paity pailiaments, we

We measuie uuiation in calenuai uays, not legislative business uays. This uecision
unuoubteuly incieaseu vaiiance gieatly. Some bills took seveial yeais befoie they
passeu, which affecteu the aveiage foi ceitain yeais.
Committees also have the powei to intiouuce bills.
finu that twice as many bills weie intiouuceu in the lattei, while bills in new
legislative aieas continueu to pieuominate ovei bills amenuing cuiient laws.

The genuei, age anu political affiliation of the NPs who intiouuceu Piivate
Nembei bills aie of inteiest. Nost of these bills (thiee quaiteis) weie intiouuceu by
male NPs, although in the 8
, women initiateu one thiiu of them. By uiviuing NPs
into age gioups, we uiscovei that young NPs (unuei 4u) intiouuceu half the Piivate
Nembei bills uuiing the 6
, the 7
was evenly uiviueu in iespect to age, while
"miuule-ageu" NPs (4u-49) intiouuceu two-thiius of these bills in the 8

The political affiliation of the oiiginal sponsois was somewhat suipiising.

We expecteu that NPs opposeu to the uoveinment woulu intiouuce most of them.
But oveiall, membeis of the Novement oi NRN NPs intiouuceu appioximately
thiee-quaiteis of them. While the numbeis aie too small to uiaw conclusions, theie
was a shift fiom Novement NPs intiouucing two-thiius of the Piivate Nembei bills
in the 6
to opponents of the goveinment intiouucing two-thiius in the 7
. This
shift may be connecteu to maneuveis in the 7
as opponents tiieu to pievent the
auoption of the multi-paity system. In a fuithei suipiise, NPs in the NRN, the
goveining paity, intiouuceu almost all of the Piivate Nembei bills in the 8
. We hau
assumeu that the gieatei paity uiscipline imposeu by the NRN caucus woulu have
ieuuceu the numbei of these bills. Thus, in spite of both the "inuiviuual meiit"
ciiteiion useu by NPs in the no-paity peiiou to justify theii voting choices
iegaiuless of the uoveinment's inteiests, anu theii willingness to act inuiviuually in
biinging new bills, the intiouuction of paities leu to an inciease in bills that
oiiginateu in Pailiament. Neveitheless, the cential tenuency iemains bills sent ovei
by the Executive.

GC A3<2.' D*//2

Since lapseu bills take up the time of NPs, they must be incluueu in
Pailiament's woikloau. They aie bills that have been intiouuceu, but weie neithei
passeu noi uefeateu within the five-yeai life of a Pailiament. At that point, they lose
theii claims foi Pailiament's consiueiation. The iationale foi uiopping a bill iathei
than automatically continuing consiueiation in the next Pailiament is that it uiu not
commanu sufficient inteiest. But it woulu be a mistake to assume that lapseu bills
measuie the legislatuie's inefficiency. Some bills may not ieceive auequate
consiueiation within the peiiou of a single Pailiament. uoveinment oi an NP may
ie-intiouuce any of them in the succeeuing Pailiament. Foi example, all 2S bills that
lapseu at the enu of the 8
weie tableu in the 9
(+), ./$/0# S1 0ctobei 2u11).

The uata foi lapseu bills aie piesenteu in Table 4. Compaiing Pailiaments
shows a uistinct iegulai uecline in lapseu billsthe 8
piouucing only half as many

We uiviue NPs in the two no-paity Pailiaments into Novement anu opposition
categoiies baseu on theii stateu positions. 0f couise, Novement NPs often voteu foi
bills opposeu by the uoveinment uuiing the no-paity peiiou.
as the 6
. This pattein was not iepeateu yeai-by-yeai. In the 6
anu 8
, as might be
expecteu, lapseu bills in new legislative aieas consiueiably outnumbeieu those
intenueu to amenu existing legislation. Bowevei in the 7
, the two types weie about
the same.

HC I)%($*#5 &0 D*//2 *# )&44*$$..2

Committee ieview of bills is a significant featuie of the 0ganuan Pailiament's
constitutional uuties foi making laws. vigoious committees expanu the capacity of
the legislatuie. Committees can pioviue inuepenuent souices of knowleuge to
evaluate bills (Kiehbiel 1991, S). 0vei time NPs on committees often uevelop
special expeitise in paiticulai aieas anu can challenge Ninisteis anu civil seivants
about the impact of legislation the Executive wants Pailiament to pass. Committees
facilitate Pailiament's ability to countei-balance the Executive bianch effectively.

As alieauy noteu, the use of committees to sciutinize legislation closely is an
innovation intiouuceu by the 199S Constitution. NPs have become moie familiai
with the opeiations of committees uuiing the past thiee Pailiaments. By the 7

Pailiament, an opposition NP obseiveu that "now the bulk of the woik of
Pailiament is uone in committees" (inteiview, 6 }uly 2uuS). 0nlike the pie-199S
Pailiaments, committees changeu bills uiamatically befoie ietuining them to the
plenaiy. Ninisteis accepteu many mouifications to theii bills, sometimes uuiing
uiscussion in committee sessions (Kasfii anu Twebaze 2uu9, 84).

We measuie the impact of committees by counting the numbei of changes
they pioposeu in theii iepoits to Pailiament on bills piioi to theii seconu ieauing.

A simple tally of pioposals foi mouifying bills is a ciuue measuie of committee input
since it cannot captuie the ielative impoitance of uiffeient iecommenuations oi of
iecommenuations on uiffeient bills. Bowevei, simple counts may aleit obseiveis to
impoitant tienus. Since the numbei of changes is also a function of the numbei of
bills sent to committees (anu available foi analysis), which uiffeis among
pailiaments, we also measuie the numbei of changes pei bill. We intiouuce two
subcategoiies, type of bill anu type of pioposeu change, in oiuei to inspect foi
possible patteins that might otheiwise go uniecognizeu.

Fiist, we consiuei oveiall patteins since 1996. Seconu, we compaie total anu
pei bill counts by sepaiating bills in new legislative aieas fiom those that amenueu
existing laws. Thiiu, we compaie total anu pei bill counts by uistinguishing between
"substantive" anu "minoi" iecommenuations the committees offeieu. We iuentify a
pioposeu mouification as substantive when it changes the meaning of a bill anu as
minoi when it ietains the intention of the bill's sponsoi. Fouith, we bieak uown

We also examineu committee sciutiny of Piivate Nembei bills foi each Pailiament,
but uiscoveieu that too few of them hau been iepoiteu by committees to make this
analysis woithwhile.
these two vaiiables into the foui subcategoiies to inspect foi any unusual
uiffeiences among the thiee pailiaments.

0ui iesults aie summaiizeu in Table S. It shows that committee activity
measuieu in total numbei of iecommenuations was twice as high in the 7
as it was in eithei the 6
(824) oi 8
(8S9). But when we measuie committee
iecommenuations by numbei of bills, we uiscovei theie weie appioximately 18
iecommenuations pei bill in the 6
, 17 in the 7
anu 1u in the 8
. That suggests a
significantly highei iate of iecommenuations pei bill in the no-paity phase by
compaiison to the multipaity peiiou. The uecline in iecommenuations uoes not
necessaiily show that committees in the 8
faileu to sciutinize legislation. Bills
submitteu to committees uuiing the 8
may have been bettei wiitten than those in
eailiei pailiaments. Committees piesumably uo not make iecommenuations when
they ueciue bills uo not iequiie changes.

0ne possible explanation is that uuiing the no-paity peiiou, NPs acteu moie
inuepenuently (that is, iesponueu moie to the noim of "inuiviuual meiit") than was
the case uuiing the multi-paity peiiou. Thus, the uecline in committee
iecommenuations foi changes in the multipaity peiiou coulu be attiibuteu to the
emphasis placeu on paity uiscipline by all paities in the wake of the National
Resistance Novement (NRN) paity's oveiwhelming electoial success in the 2uu6
pailiamentaiy elections. With uominant contiol ovei Pailiament, anu thus ovei the
committeeswith the possible exception of those conceineu with accountability
anu chaiieu by membeis of the oppositionthe NRN was able to maintain the
cohesion of its NPs on most issues. So fai, uespite an equally impiessive showing in
the 2u11 elections, the NRN has not been neaily so successful in maintaining paity
uiscipline in the 9
. Bowevei, theie weie specific bills in each Pailiament that
attiacteu an unusual numbei of committee iecommenuations, so the uiffeiences in
numbei of committee iecommenuations among Pailiaments may tuin out to be
bettei unueistoou as ianuomthe consequence of ieactions to specific bills that
weie uniquely contioveisial.

Table S also inuicates that committees consiueieu many moie bills in new
legislative aieas than those pioposing to amenu existing statutes. With the
exception of only two yeais, this pattein holus thioughout all thiee Pailiaments. 0f
the 47 bills ieceiving committee iepoits that we coulu analyze in the 6
, SS (7u%)
pioposeu legislation in new aieas anu 14 (Su%) conceineu changes to existing laws.
0f 1uS such bills analyzeu in the 7
, 6S (6S%) weie in the foimei categoiy anu S8
(S7%) in the lattei. Foi the 8
, theie weie 9u such bills uiviueu into S7 (6S%) in
new aieas anu SS (S7%) amenuing cuiient statutes.

Thus, it is not suipiising that the numbei of committee iecommenuations on
bills in new legislative aieas fai exceeus those on bills pioposeu to amenu existing
statutes in all thiee pailiaments. In the 6
, committees maue a total of 614
iecommenuations foi bills in new aieas anu 21u amenuing existing laws. In the 7
the numbei iises to 1S81 anu S49 iespectively. In the 8
, the figuies ueclineu to 7u6
anu 1SS, numbeis moie closely iesembling committee iecommenuations in the 6

Bowevei, the numbei of committee iecommenuations pei bill foi each type
pioviues a moie iealistic compaiison. Foi bills in new legislative aieas, the aveiage
numbei of committee iecommenuations pei bill amounteu to 19 in the 6
, 21 in the
anu 12 in the 8
. The coiiesponuing pei bill figuies foi bills amenuing existing
statutes aie 1S in the 6
, 9 in the 7
anu only S in the 8
. The fiist obseivation is
that committees in succeeuing pailiaments followeu uiffeient patteins in making
iecommenuations foi each bill type, but the uiiection suggests a uecline in
committee activity. The seconu is that committees offeieu foui iecommenuations
foi each bill in new legislative aieas foi eveiy thiee foi each bill amenuing an
existing statute in the 6
, but seven foi eveiy thiee in the 7
anu almost six foi
eveiy thiee in the 8
. Without moie ieseaich, we can offei no explanation why
numbei of committee iecommenuations ovei time shoulu uiffei so substantially
ovei uiffeience in bill type.

0veiall, committees also pioposeu moie substantive iecommenuations in
which they changeu the meaning of a clause than minoi ones in which they meiely
claiifieu its language. This pattein occuiieu in 1u of the 1S yeais examineu. Foi the
oveiall, committees maue S4u substantive anu 284 minoi iecommenuations. In
the 7
, they maue 972 substantive to 7S8 minoi iecommenuations. In the 8
, they
pioposeu 47S substantive anu S84 minoi changes in bills.

We also compaieu substantive as opposeu to minoi committee
iecommenuations pei bill acioss the thiee pailiaments. The aveiage numbei of
substantive iecommenuations pei bill ovei both bill types is 11 in the 6
, 9 in the 7

anu S in the 8
. The equivalent figuies foi minoi iecommenuations pei bill aie 6 in
the 6
, 7 in the 7
anu 4 in the 8
. Thus, the oveiall uecline in iecommenuations
fiom the 6
to the 8
is moie noticeable in the steepei uiop in substantive iathei
than minoi iecommenuations.

Bieaking uown these uiffeiences into all foui categoiies acioss the thiee
pailiaments piouuces vaiiation, but not a pattein we can explain. Foi each
pailiament, we sepaiateu type of iecommenuation against type of bill anu aveiageu
each of the foui totals foi a pailiament by uiviuing by the numbei of bills of that
type incluueu in oui analysis. 0ui iesults aie piesenteu below in Figuie A.

Figuie A: Biffeiences in pei bill compaiisons foi committee iecommenuations

Pailiament 7
Pailiament 8

Type of bills
new existing new existing new existing
aieas laws aieas laws aieas laws

substantive 11 12 11 7 7 S
minoi 7 4 1u 2 6 2

In the 6
, the aveiage numbei of substantive committee pioposals pei bill is
similai foi both bill types while new bills hau almost twice as many minoi pioposals
as bills amenuing cuiient laws. The pattein changes in the 7
, wheie the aveiage
numbeis of substantive anu minoi iecommenuations pei bill foi bills in new
legislative aieas aie both similai anu laigei than those foi bills intenuing to amenu
existing statutes (consiueiably laigei foi minoi pioposals foi bills amenuing). In the
, both substantive anu minoi committee iecommenuations in new legislative
aieas aie laigei than those in bills amenuing existing statutes. The 8
also shows a
maikeu uecline in all iecommenuations, aveiageu by bill, fiom the 6
anu the 7

While we uo not have the uata necessaiy to analyze the ieasons foi these
uiffeiences in committee iecommenuations, we can speculate about some possible
explanations. The gieatei numbei of total committee pioposals foi changes in bills
in new aieas iathei than in bills amenuing existing statutes is most likely the iesult
of the gieatei intiouuction of the foimei type of bill in all thiee pailiaments.
2%/0%/, the iange of possible outcomes of bills in new legislative aieas woulu seem
wiuei than potential choices in aieas in which legislatois alieauy have knowleuge
about how existing statutes have functioneu. Thus, committee membeis anu bill
sponsois may uiffei moie on topics in new aieas than on those in which they aie
familiai with the opeiation of a law. That coulu help account foi the gieatei numbei
of committee pioposals on bills in new legislative aieas.

Substantive committee iecommenuations uemonstiate uisagieement with
clauses of bills. The gieatei emphasis on substantive iathei than minoi
iecommenuations by committees may ieflect the piefeience of many committees to
exploie alteinative appioaches to policy within a bill to those put foiwaiu by
ministiies. If this pioposition weie establisheu, it woulu be a contiibution towaiu
builuing a system of checks anu balances between Pailiament anu the Executive.

JC 93%/*34.#$3%5 2)%($*#5 &0 D*//2 %.).*;.' 0%&4 *$2 )&44*$$..2

That only iaises the question of why moie bills of one kinu than the othei weie
intiouuceu in the fiist place.
Aftei Pailiament ieceives a iepoit fiom a committee, it sits as a Committee of
the Whole Bouse (CWB) to sciutinize the bill clause-by-clause. This ieview, also
calleu the "committee stage", is the seconu ieauing. The CWB votes on each
committee iecommenuation as well as on new amenuments pioposeu by NPs fiom
the flooisponsois anu otheis who uiu not seive on the committee. Wheie clauses
aie contioveisial, the Speakei may ueciue they shoulu be "stoou ovei" (uefeiieu to a
latei uate) to allow time foi moie ieflection. Aftei the iepoit of the CWB, any NP
can iequest that the whole bill oi a specific clause be iecommitteu foi moie uebate.
The new amenuments pioviue an inuicatoi of how much the CWB mouifieu a bill
beyonu the pioposals in the committee's iepoit. The numbei of clauses stoou ovei
anu iecommittals give iough measuies of the uegiee of contention in a bill.

We collecteu uata on the CWB's iesponses to committee iecommenuations
uuiing the committee stage anu piesent oui tabulations in Table 6. In auuition, we
counteu the new amenuments that NPs not on the committee pioposeu to bills on
the flooi uuiing the CWB's uelibeiations anu actions to uelay consiueiation of
contioveisial pioposeu amenuments. In Table 7 we piesent the totals of the CWB's
new amenuments, uiviueu by bill type anu by the numbei of clauses stoou ovei as
well as those iecommitteu. We uiscuss oui finuings fiom Table 6 fiist anu then tuin
to the analysis of Table 7.

We begin with the CWB's uecisions to auopt pioposals in committee iepoits
foi each yeai in each pailiament bioken uown by bill type anu by substantive anu
minoi committee iecommenuations that the CWB accepteu. We follow the same
analysis of patteins since 1996 as we uiu in oui uiscussion of committee iepoits.
Thus, we consiuei oveiall iesponses (auoption of iecommenuations) by the CWB to
committee iepoits by pailiament anu then aveiage them by bill. Following that
analysis, we bieak them uown, fiist by bill type (new anu amenuing), anu then by
type of iecommenuation (substantive anu minoi) both foi total auoptions anu foi
aveiage by bill. Finally, we compaie the aveiages foi the foui subcategoiies pei bill
foi all thiee pailiaments.

In Table 6, we iestiict oui analysis to the same bills we analyzeu in Table S.
Thus, the aveiage numbei of CWB iesponses pei bill in these tables is uiiectly
compaiable to the numbei of committee iecommenuations iepoiteu in Table S. This
pioceuuie allows us to calculate how selective the CWB was oveiall in its iesponse
to committee iecommenuations foi each pailiament as opposeu to amenuments it
auueu &) #030 on the flooi.

0ui iesults iepoiteu in Table 6 uemonstiate that CWB activity calculateu as
the total numbei of amenuments auopteu in iesponse to committee
iecommenuations was almost twice as high in the 7
(1,uuu) as in the 6
(S6S) anu
(SS8). This is not suipiising since we obseiveu the same pattein in total
iecommenuations foi committee iepoits. Bowevei, the aveiage pei bill foi all CWB
amenuments in iesponse to committee iecommenuations (foi the bills we analyze)
amounts to 12 amenuments auopteu foi the 6
, 1u foi the 7
anu 6 foi the 8
steauy uecline ovei time. Appaiently, the committees in the 7
woikeu haiuei, but
the uiffeiences aie mostly attiibutable to the gieatei numbei of bills they
consiueieu iathei than theii woik on each bill.

The significantly highei iate foi committee iecommenuations that we founu
uuiing the no-paity eia by compaiison to the multipaity peiiou is iepeateu foi the
whole pailiament in the committee stage. That the same pattein iepeats fiom the
small committees to the plenaiy stiengthens the obseivation of a basic uiffeience in
legislative behavioi between no-paity anu multi-paity pailiaments in 0ganua.

The piopoition of committee iecommenuations accepteu by the CWB acioss
the thiee pailiaments pioviues a plausible measuie of the selectivity of the CWB.
The aveiage peicentage of committee iecommenuations pei bill accepteu by the
plenaiy vaiies acioss the thiee pailiaments. We finu a iate of 68% acceptance in the
that ueclines to S8% in the 7
anu 6S% in the 8
. Without moie ieseaich, we aie
not in a position to explain why the CWB iejecteu its committees' iecommenuations
at a highei iate in the 7
anu 8

Committees iepoiteu on many moie bills in new legislative aieas than bills
amenuing existing statutes, as the bieakuown of bills piesenteu in the pievious
section inuicateu. As one might expect, that iesulteu in CWB auoption of moie
iecommenuations of the foimei than the lattei. Fiom Table 6, the figuies show that
the 6
Pailiament auopteu 47u committee iecommenuations on bills in new
legislative aieas anu 9S on bills amenuing existing statutes. In the 7
, the figuies
weie 8S2 anu 168 iespectively. In the 8
, they weie 4S7 anu 1u1. Aveiaging by the
bill foi bills in new legislative aieas, we finu the numbei of CWB acceptances of
committee iecommenuations is 14 in the 6
, 1S in the 7
anu 8 in the 8
. The
equivalent pei bill aveiages foi the CWB involving only bills pioposing to amenu
existing statutes amount to S in the 6
, 4 in the 7
anu S in the 8

The piopoition of CWB auoption of committee iecommenuations is much
lowei foi bills amenuing existing statutes than foi bills in new legislative aieas. But
the extent of CWB auoptions (its selectivity) foi bills amenuing existing statutes is
even lowei when compaieu to the numbei of committee iecommenuations foi that
type of bill. In examining the iate of selection foi bills in new legislative aieas, we
finu that it amounts to 77% auoption of iecommenuations in the 6
, falls to 6u% in
the 7
anu 62% in the 8
. By compaiison, the iate of auoption by the CWB foi bills
pioposing amenuments of existing statutes is only 44% in the 6
, 48% in the 7
iises to 66% in the 8

We woulu want to test this obseivation against uata fiom the 9
because the level of inuepenuence fiom paity uiscipline exhibiteu by NPs so fai
appeais to iesemble the noim of inuiviuual meiit chaiacteiistic of the no-paity
Table 6 also shows that the CWB auopteu moie substantive than minoi
committee iecommenuations. Compaiing oveiall substantive as opposeu to minoi
committee iecommenuations auopteu by the CWB (foi all bills we analyze), we
uiscovei that the 6
auopteu S11 substantive anu 2S2 minoi committee
iecommenuations. In the 7
, the CWB auopteu S76 substantive to 424 minoi
committee pioposals. In the 8
, it accepteu 274 substantive anu 264 minoi
committee iecommenuations.

We also examineu the aveiage numbei of substantive as opposeu to minoi
CWB auoptions pei bill foi all bills analyzeu acioss the thiee pailiaments. The figuie
pei bill foi substantive acceptance of committee iecommenuations is 7 in the 6
, 6
in the 7
anu S in the 8
. The figuie foi acceptance of minoi committee
iecommenuations is S in the 6
, 4 in the 7
anu S in the 8
. Both substantive anu
minoi amenuments show steauy ueclines in the aveiage numbei of auoptions pei
bill fiom the 6
thiough the 8
. But the pattein foi the plenaiy is somewhat similai
to that of total committee iecommenuations in showing a gieatei uecline in
substantive than in minoi committee iecommenuations auopteu.

The iate of selection foi auoption by the CWB of substantive committee
iecommenuations is S8% in the 6
, S9% in the 7
anu S8% in the 8
. Foi minoi
iecommenuations, the iate of selection is 89% in the 6
, S6% in the 7
anu 69% in
the 8
. The piopoition of substantive iecommenuations accepteu by the CWB is
constant ovei all thiee pailiaments. The auoption of minoi iecommenuations vaiies
consiueiably. The fiist obseivation is moie significant because substantive
iecommenuations change the meaning of a bill. Beie we obseive that pailiament as
whole tenueu to agiee with its committees to the same uegiee thioughout. The
vaiiation in iate of auoption of minoi iecommenuations, those intenueu to claiify
the meaning of a clause, appeais less Impoitant to us.

As we uiu with committee iecommenuations, we also analyzeu these
vaiiables by compaiing the foui subcategoiies ovei the thiee pailiaments. Thus, we
sepaiateu type of auoption against type of bill anu aveiageu each of the foui counts
by uiviuing by the numbei of bills of that type. 0ui calculations aie uisplayeu in
Figuie B below.

Figuie B: Biffeiences in pei bill compaiisons foi CWB auoption of committee

Pailiament 7
Pailiament 8

Type of bills
new existing new existing new existing
aieas laws aieas laws aieas laws

Type of substantive 8 S 7 S 4 2
minoi 6 S S 2 4 1

In the 6
, the aveiage numbeis of substantive anu of minoi CWB auoptions
in bills in new legislative aieas is uouble oi moie the numbeis in both types of
auoptions foi bills amenuing existing statutes. That iatio continues in the 7
anu the
, although the aveiage numbeis uecline steauily ovei time. It seems uifficult to
uiscein a pattein to the aveiage pei bill changes ovei time othei than the gieatei
attention paiu to new aieas anu uecline in both types of auoptions. 0ui conclusions
about these patteins iemain tentative. We make the same aiguments foi the
auoptions by the CWB that we maue foi committee iecommenuations at the enu of
the pievious section. The similaiity between the plenaiy's iesponses to its
committees anu the committees' iecommenuations suggest that the committees anu
the laigei bouy shaie some noims of legislative behavioi. Foi now, that must
iemain a tentative geneialization. Neveitheless, the lack of ueviation between
committees anu plenaiy stiikes us as a healthy tenuency foi the uevelopment of
legislatuie-wiue noims.

Tuining to actions the plenaiy took on bills that weie unielateu to committee
iecommenuations, we summaiize oui finuings in Table 7.
The most obvious
finuing is that the plenaiy intiouuceu fai fewei new amenuments than the
committee iecommenuations it auopteu. That is not suipiising since it chaigeu its
committees to heai witnesses, consiuei each bill at length anu uiscuss its
consequences among its membeis. Neveitheless, this inuicatoi calls attention to an
impoitant obseivation. Pailiament ielies on its committees to impiove legislation. It
is woith iemembeiing that committees only staiteu to play this iole in 1996.

Seconu, amenuments fiom the flooi to bills in new legislative aieas
outnumbei those to bills pioposing amenuments to existing statutes, but this
uistinction is muteu when the gieatei numbei of the foimei type of bills is taken
into account. The numbeis of plenaiy amenuments aie too small to waiiant close
analysis. Still, the gieatei numbei of iecommenuations pioposeu by committees on
the foimei iathei than the lattei type of bill as well as the gieatei numbei of
amenuments auopteu by the CWB on the foimei is not ieflecteu in the aveiage
numbei of amenuments auopteu &) #030 on the flooi.

Thiiu, the numbei of amenuments on both bill types incieases fiom the 6
the 7
anu then ueclines in the 8
following the same pattein we noticeu foi
committee iecommenuations anu theii auoptions by the CWB. That fuithei
substantiates the uistinction we uiew above between the no-paity anu multi-paity
pailiaments. In auuition as also uevelopeu in oui uiscussion of Tables S anu 6, the
Pailiament is chaiacteiizeu in this iespect also by the paucity of new
amenuments, especially if they aie measuieu pei bill.

0nfoitunately, we weie unable to incluue exactly the same bills in Table 7 as we
uiu in Tables S anu 6. While the uata oveilaps to a gieat uegiee, it is not stiictly

Fouith, we woulu hazaiu a guess (theie aie too few instances to waiiant a
stiongei claim) that wheie eight oi moie amenuments weie put foith on the flooi
foi a paiticulai bill, the ieason may have been its highly contentious natuie.
Bowevei, theie weie also bills we believe weie iegaiueu as contentious that uiu not
attiact many flooi amenuments. We examineu two othei techniques to iuentify
possible points of contentionclauses stoou ovei anu those iecommitteu foi
auuitional uiscussion. We finu extiemely few uses of eithei technique to uampen
tempeis on contentious clauses. The numbei of each iose in the 7
anu fell in the
, but given the thousanus of clauses, the numbei iemaineu almost impeiceptible.
But we woulu not assume theie was little contention! Rathei, we think othei moie
infoimal methous weie useu to uefuse it in getting bills passeu.


Stiengthening the ability of Pailiament to holu the Executive to account was
a high piioiity foi the Constituent Assembly. The accountability committees aie the
piincipal agencies intenueu to accomplish this goal. While the 199S Constitution
explicitly incluueu the uuties "to assess anu evaluate activities of uoveinment anu
othei bouies" among the iequiieu functions of stanuing committees (Sec. 9u(S)c),
the 2uuS constitutional amenuments iemoveu this woiuing, leaving it up to
Pailiament to piesciibe its functions, as noteu above (2uu6, Sec. 9u (2).

Neveitheless, these committees, most noticeably the Public Accounts
Committee (PAC), have continueu to peifoim oveisight functions eneigetically.
0veisight is achieveu moie iesponsibly by having membeis of the opposition chaii
accountability committees. Buiing the no-paity pailiaments, seveial NPs who hau
uemonstiateu theii opposition to policies of the Executive weie chosen to chaii PAC.
In the 8
Pailiament, NPs fiom opposition paities foimally chaiieu oveisight

Pailiament has also uevelopeu a numbei of lowei piofile mechanisms to
compel Ninisteis anu public seivants to explain theii behavioi in public. The best
known of these othei instiuments is the iule iequiiing Ninisteis to answei NPs'
questions about policy. 0theis incluue the oppoitunity foi NPs to ask questions in
iesponse to ministeiial policy statements anu to iaise "Natteis of National
Impoitance" foi uiscussion in the plenaiy. Petitions by NPs on two impoitant
occasions have foiceu a special session to uebate issues the Executive woulu have
piefeiieu to avoiu. Finally, anu most spectaculai although too iaie foi uata analysis,
Pailiament censuieu two Ninisteis in the 6
while seveial otheis iesigneu iathei
than face the possibility of censuie.

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The foui stanuing committees of Pailiament peifoiming oveisight aie PAC,
the Local uoveinment Accounts Committee (LuAC), which foimeu at the beginning
of the 7
, the Committee on Commissions, Statutoiy Authoiities anu State
Enteipiises (C0SASE) anu the Committee on uoveinment Assuiances. The Buuget
Committee coulu also be iegaiueu as an oveisight committee thiough its ioles of
consulting with uoveinment piospectively on the buuget anu ieviewing
supplementaiy iequests latei in the financial yeai.

In auuition, Pailiament appoints select anu au hoc committees to investigate
issues that uo not fall entiiely within the juiisuiction of a stanuing committee. Aftei
the ie-intiouuction of multi-paity competition, Pailiament accepteu the tiauition of
peimitting NPs fiom opposition paities chaii these committees. In auuition to
hanuling ceitain special investigations, one of the iesponsibilities of stanuing
committees is to ieview the Auuitoi-ueneial's annual iepoit on public accounts anu
make iecommenuations foi iectifying accounting issues to Pailiament. Auopteu
iecommenuations then go to the Ninistiy of Finance which issues the goveinment's
iesponse in the foim of a Tieasuiy Nemoianuum.

We lookeu at special investigations involving both stanuing anu select
committees anu at the ieview of Auuitoi-ueneial iepoits by PAC anu LuAC. The uata
is piesenteu iespectively in Tables 8 thiough 1u. We founu iecoius foi 19 special
investigations between 199S anu 2u11 anu have uisplayeu the uata in Table 8. The
numbei of special investigations incieaseu somewhat ovei the thiee Pailiaments,
but the numbei is too small to allow us to suggest a tienu. We investigateu whethei
souices foi initiating investigations came fiom insiue oi outsiue Pailiament. The
classic case is piessuie fiom outsiuepublic outciy ovei seeming wionguoing, such
as puichase oi lease of lanu oi public coiiuption. We consiueieu investigations
unueitaken in iesponse to specific issues iaiseu by an Auuitoi-ueneial's iepoit as
coming fiom outsiue. Nany investigations weie initiateu by NPs calling foi inquiiies
that aiose fiom pailiamentaiy uebate oi theii suspicions ovei goveinment iepoits.
In oui uata, we notice that investigations oiiginate in equal numbeis fiom both
outsiue anu insiue souices, except foi the 6
wheie they mostly began fiom insiue

0vei the thiee Pailiaments, a few moie investigations weie assigneu to
stanuing as opposeu to select committees, but the pattein was not pionounceu anu
uiffeieu among the thiee Pailiaments. uiven that opposition paities chaii the
stanuing committees, the fact that six of eight special investigations went to those
committees in the 8
is a little suipiising. It might be an inuicatoi of a futuie tienu.
We founu no pattein in the length of time it took the plenaiy to auopt iepoits on
these investigations, noi whethei Pailiament was moie pione simply to auopt these
iepoits, amenu them oi iefei them foi auuitional uiscussion.

Tuining to the PAC iepoits on the Auuitoi-ueneial's annual iepoits on
goveinment accounts, we have uata foi the 6
anu the 7
only (Table 9).
counteu how long aftei the fiscal yeai enueu Pailiament auopteu the PAC iepoit foi
that yeai. The length of time vaiieu fiom S.S to 7 yeais, tenuing towaiu a longei
uuiation aftei the fiist two yeais of the 6
. We noticeu that in the 7
Pailiament the
timing foi tabling these iepoits was long uelayeu anu then "buncheu togethei"
suggesting a piactice of oveilooking them until the Pailiament was coming towaiu
its enu. As noteu, the 8
uiu even woise. We coulu uiscein no pattein in uuiation
between tabling anu auoption. The piocess eithei took a few uays oi it took a yeai.

We weie also inteiesteu in uoveinment's iesponse thiough Tieasuiy
Nemoianua to substantive PAC iecommenuations. This is a complex issue, uifficult
to measuie, since both committee iecommenuations anu goveinment iesponses can
be substantive, minoi oi inconclusive (cieating nine possibilities foi each
iecommenuation!). We piesent uata looking only at substantive PAC
iecommenuations anu substantive goveinment iesponses (the goveinment may
iesponu substantively to a minoi iecommenuation). We took it as a goou sign that
uoveinment iesponueu to a consiueiable piopoition of PAC iecommenuations. This
piopoition iose fiom less than half to a iange of mostly two-thiius to foui-fifths.
Neveitheless, we uiu not uiscein a pattein in its fluctuation ovei time.

Finally, we lookeu at the LuAC iepoits on issues iaiseu by the Auuitoi-
ueneial's Repoits on public accounts that fell in that committee's juiisuiction. We
piesent uata foi the 7
Pailiament in Table 1u.
The uata show that the length of
time fiom the enu of the fiscal yeai until the auoption by Pailiament of the LuAC
iepoit on the auuit of public accounts foi that yeai fell steauily, although not
spectaculaily fiom 7.S yeais to 4.S yeais. Pailiament uefeiieu consiueiation foi
some time befoie beginning uebate these iepoits. Seveial weie only auopteu uuiing
the 8
Pailiament. All weie auopteu without amenuments. As with the PAC iepoits,
the uuiation between tabling anu auoption was eithei a few uays oi close to a yeai.
Buiation steauily incieaseu ovei the life of the 7
. We also lookeu at how long it
took foi the Finance Ninistiy to piouuce a Tieasuiy Nemoianuum aftei the
auoption of an LuAC iepoit. That time peiiou became steauily shoitei uuiing the 7
falling fiom almost two yeais to a little less than onea healthy tienu.

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uiving NPs the authoiity to compel Ninisteis to answei theii questions
about policy is an impoitant tool of accountability. It allows a highly efficient means

Buiing the 8
, PAC iepoits weie tableu, but none of them weie uebateu, much
less auopteu.
Buiing the 8
, the LuAC committee nevei agieeu on any of its iepoits on the
Auuitoi-ueneial's Repoits anu uiu not even wiite them foi its last two yeais, so
none weie tableu aftei 2uuS. As mentioneu above, the LuAC was cieateu at the
beginning of the 7
to gain piompt anu specific answeis to impoitant policy questions. Its piesence is
intenueu to help uetei Ninisteis who might authoiize uubious activities. It also may
aiu legislatois in ueveloping bills in paiticulai aieas, as well as pioviuing a useful
methou of iepiesentation by iesponuing to constituents' conceins. An impoitant
test of the capacity of Pailiament to check the Executive is whethei Ninisteis
answei questions iaiseu on the flooi in a timely manneioi at all. Foi example, in
the 7
, Ninisteis weie expecteu to answei an NP's question within two weeks
(Rules of Pioceuuie 2uu2, Rule 2S(S)).

We piesent the uata we collecteu on questions anu answeis in Table 11.
0nfoitunately, the iecoius weie not complete, paiticulaily in iecoiuing uates of
iegistiation of questions. While the total numbei of questions askeu by NPs uiu not
vaiy gieatly among pailiaments, the aggiegate iose fiom the 6
to the 7
anu then
fell to its lowest level in the 8
. It aveiageu 1S7 questions pei pailiament. We weie
suipiiseu by how many questions went unansweieu. 0nly 6u% of the questions
poseu in the 6
ieceiveu iesponses fiom Ninisteis. The peicentage ueclineu in the
to 4S%, iecoveiing somewhat to S6% in the 8
. 0vei the past 1S yeais, only
slightly moie than half the questions ieceiveu any answei at all.

The next issue is whethei, in those questions they uiu answei, Ninisteis
iesponueu substantively oi evaueu them. We juugeu that a high piopoition of the
answeis iesponueu ielevantly to at least one pait of the question an NP hau
poseumany ieplieu to all paits. About 78ths of the answeis Ninisteis gave to
questions in each of the thiee pailiaments seemeu ieasonable answeis pioviuing
specific uetails about the policies iequesteu. Bowevei, it often took these Ninisteis a
long time to answei, fai longei than the two-week iule. The aveiage uuiation
between question anu answei foi the cases we coulu check was S9 uays in the 6

The aveiage inteival moie than uoubleu to 1S4 uays in the 7
anu incieaseu by
almost half again to 189 uays in the 8
. This meant the length of time befoie ieply
was moie than thiee times as long in the 8
as it hau been in the 6
. In all thiee
Pailiaments, some questions weie answeieu piomptly, while otheis took moie than
two yeais.

We also lookeu into NPs' supplementaiy questions on the flooi following the
Ninisteis' answeis to piincipal questions. 0veiall, supplementaiies incieaseu by a
thiiu fiom Su2 to 4SS fiom the 6
to the 7
anu then ueclineu by half to 218 in the
. The figuies foi supplementaiies coiielates with the numbei of piincipal
questions poseu foi each pailiament. Thus, the aveiage numbei of supplementaiies
foi each piincipal question uiu not vaiy much, ianging fiom foui to six ovei the
thiee pailiaments. In geneial, the fall in numbei of questions askeu anu answeieu
anu the inciease in time taken befoie answeiing suggest a uecline in the use of this

Infoimation about the missing cases might affect these figuies. Bata on uuiation
was missing foi S2 of 79 questions in the 6
, 41 of 74 questions in the 7
anu S2 of
66 questions in the 8

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Ninisteiial statements piesent an oppoitunity foi oveisight that ieveises the
stiategy foi using NP questions foi accountability. Insteau of the Ninistei
iesponuing to the NP, the Ninistei makes a statement, often on an uigent topic, anu
NPs may ask questions about it. The Ninistei chooses the topic anu makes the
uoveinment's case, but "all statements maue by Ninisteis shall be uebateu" (Rules
of Pioceuuie 2uu2, Rule SS (2)). As an effoit to explain policy, Ninisteiial
statements offei accountability, but it is the iesponses of the Ninistei to follow-up
questions that focus issues anu pinpoint iesponsibility. Thus, this kinu of oveisight
is naiiow anu only exists if the Ninistei chooses to make a statement.

In most cases, the Ninistei makes a statement because it is in the
uoveinment's inteiest, but on occasion the Speakei may oiuei a ministeiial
statement. Since, in many cases, the issue is contioveisial, NPs have the chance to
insist on infoimation that the uoveinment may be ieluctant to uivulge. 0nlike
questions geneiateu by NPs, the answei, in theoiy, comes immeuiately oi the
Ninistei confionts the embaiiassment of avoiuing the question in public. Bowevei,
theoiy uoes not always ueteimine piactice.

We counteu the numbei of Ninisteiial statements, noteu whethei Ninisteis
iequesteu giving them oi the Speakei oiueieu them, anu ueteimineu how many
questions NPs askeu anu how many Ninisteis answeieu. We also uiviueu the
questioneis who iesponueu to statements into NPs suppoiting the uoveinment anu
those opposing it. While NPs hau no official affiliation uuiing the no-paity peiiou,
the 6
anu 7
, it was ielatively easy to ueteimine whethei they geneially suppoiteu
uoveinment's positions oi not. 0ui uata is uisplayeu in Table 12.

The ueliveiy of Ninisteiial statements giew steauily thiough each of the
thiee pailiaments until 2uu8 anu 2uu9, when theii use abiuptly ueclineu.
Neveitheless, each Pailiament witnesseu moie Ninisteiial statements than its
pieuecessoi. Ninisteis volunteeieu almost all statements, although the small
numbei of statements maue by Speakei's 0iuei also giew. The numbei of questions
put to Ninisteis in iesponse to theii statements aveiageu about 6u a yeai oi Suu pei
pailiament. We expecteu moie opposition NPs to pose questions than suppoiteis of
uoveinment. That was not the case in the 6
in which moie than twice as many
questions weie poseu by Novement suppoiteis than by multipaitists.
that pattein ieveiseu in the 7
with opposition NPs asking a gieatei piopoition of
the questions anu that tenuency became moie pionounceu in the 8

It is woith keeping in minu that the numbei of Novement NPs was piobably
uouble that of the opposition in the 6
. Bowevei, affiliation was piobably most fluiu
uuiing that peiiou.
While a ielatively high piopoition of questions weie answeieu in the 6

almost seven of eveiy eight, we weie suipiiseu to uiscovei a iapiu uecline in the
willingness of Ninisteis to answei questions aftei theii statements in the 7
. In its
fiist yeai, the peicentage answeieu was alieauy lowei than in the 6
anu fell until
less than half weie answeieu by 2uu4. Although the peicentage iose again in 2uuS,
that coulu have been an acciuent iesulting fiom unexpecteuly few statements. The
staiteu well, but ueclineu piecipitously in 2uu8 anu 2uu9. 0veiall, theie was a
steauy uownwaiu tienu in questions answeieu ovei all thiee pailiaments. It may be
that Ninisteis no longei felt they hau to take NPs' questions on theii statements
seiiously. If this is tiue, we wonuei whethei it might be ielateu to the unusually
high uegiee of uiscipline in Pailiament the paities imposeu as 0ganua ietuineu to
multipaity competition.

HC N3$$.%2 &0 #3$*&#3/ *4<&%$3#).

Backbencheis iaise matteis of national oi public impoitance when they feel
issues have uigent iepeicussions that iequiie the attention of Pailiament anu
immeuiate iesponses fiom uoveinment. This instiument of oveisight, which began
in the 7
Pailiament, appeais to aiise fiom an exception to notice iequiiements
(Rules of Pioceuuie 2uu2, Rule 29 (1)).
As a measuie of oveisight, it uepenus on
gaining the attention of Ninisteis anu on eliciting theii answeis on the flooi. The
flexibility cieateu by lack of notice, howevei, also means that Ninisteis may not be
piepaieu to answei, oi may simply take auvantage of the suipiise to avoiu making
an immeuiate ieply in oiuei to evaue iesponsibility. This opening foi evasion uilutes
the effectiveness of matteis of national impoitance to seive as oveisight. 0ften
Ninisteis piomiseu to ietuin to Pailiament with answeis. But uigent questions that
have not been iegisteieu can faue fiom memoiy. We uiu not ueteimine how
fiequently Ninisteis maue goou on theii piomises to pioviue infoimation latei, oi
how long it took them.

While iaising matteis of national impoitance may seive othei impoitant
enus, auuitional pioblems fuithei weaken its potential foi oveisight. Fiist, the lack
of notice, even if impelleu by uigency, coulu leau to pooi policy foimulation, causing
many Ninisteis ieasonably to uefei ieply. Seconu, NPs sometimes iise to matteis of
national impoitance without uiiecting any questions to Ninisteis, although the
lattei sometimes ieply anyway. When they aie auuiesseu to the Speakei, his oi hei
iesponse is usually to iefei the question to the appiopiiate Ninistei without
iequiiing a iesponse on the flooi. Again, this is often a ieasonable ieaction. It was
the ieply invaiiably taken by Piime Ninistei Apolo Nsibambi uuiing the 7
anu 8
In auuition, the mattei NPs iaise is often not of national impoitance, but of gieat
impoitance to that NP's constituents. The instiument often seives the function of
iepiesentation iathei than oveisight.

The NP, at least in 2uu2, hau to gain "piioi leave of the Speakei".
In oui analysis, uisplayeu in Table 1S, we focuseu on whethei Ninisteis
iesponueu immeuiately to questions askeu in matteis of national impoitance anu
whethei they uiu so substantively. We also lookeu at the genuei anu political
affiliation of the NPs who iaiseu matteis of national impoitance. We uiscoveieu that
the numbei of matteis iaiseu incieaseu fiom the 7
, moie than uoubling in the 8
Less than one thiiu of the matteis iaiseu (excluuing statements not iequiiing a
iesponse), ieceiveu an immeuiate substantive iesponse on the flooi fiom Ninisteis.

Nale NPs iaiseu almost all matteis of national impoitance in the 7
, but
female NPs maue much gieatei use of this instiument in the 8
, piesenting moie
than a quaitei of them.
We expecteu that opposition NPs woulu iaise moie
matteis of national impoitance than Novement oi uoveinment NPs. The numbeis
weie equal in the 7
, while opposition NPs iaiseu two-thiius of the matteis in the
, even though they amounteu to only slightly moie than one sixth of the voting
membeis in the lattei. This ieveisal fiom uoveinment to 0pposition NPs asking
moie questions ieflects the similai shift that occuiieu in NP questions on
Ninisteiial statements (see Table 12).


Pailiament has hau to foige an unpieceuenteu path ovei the past 1S yeais in
its effoits to become an inuepenuent political institution. Tiacing changes in some of
its lawmaking anu oveisight activities pioviue some inuicatois of what it has
accomplisheu ovei the 6
- 8
Pailiaments. This iepoit iuentifies seveial measuies
that illuminate its peifoimance. In geneial, we iepoit that legislative activity
incieaseu in many iespects fiom the 6
to the 7
Pailiament anu then sloweu uown
uuiing the 8
. We conjectuie that this tienu may be associateu with aujustments in
legislative behavioi causeu by the change fiom the no-paity to the multi-paity

0ui effoits at uata collection weie hampeieu by gaps in Pailiament's iecoius
of its own actions. If oui iepoit peisuaues Pailiamentaiy on no othei point than to
impiove its iecoiu-keeping, it will have peifoimeu a valuable seivice. Pailiament
shoulu establish a system ensuiing that it has full uocumentation of eveiy official
action taken by Pailiament, its committees anu its inuiviuual NPs anu a pioceuuie
to confiim that all uocuments listeu aie actually locateu in theii piopei places. In
othei woius, Pailiament shoulu enact a statute cieating a piopei iefeience system.

In law making, one of oui most stiiking finuings is that legislative behavioi in
the two no-paity pailiaments vaiies in many iespects fiom that in the multi-paity
pailiament. In geneial, both committees anu the committee of the whole house

It is impoitant to iemembei that uespite the unusually high iepiesentation of
women in the 0ganuan Pailiament, they amounteu to only a quaitei of the 7

Pailiament anu moie, but still less than one-thiiu of NPs in the 8
sciutinizeu bills by making moie changes uuiing the no-paity phase. Committees
fiequently maue iecommenuations that uisagieeu with the intention of uoveinment
anu the CWB auopteu the majoiity of these iecommenuations. These patteins
suggest legislative willingness to mouify executive inteiests in law making
potentially a healthy contiibution to ieuucing executive uominance. The iepetition
at the level of the CWB of patteins obseiveu in committees pioviues an inuicatoi
suggesting that committees anu Pailiament as a whole shaie a common legislative

The volume of bills intiouuceu iemains constant thioughout, but the high
peicentage of those that pass ueclines steauily anu successful bills take longei
uuiing the 8
. The numbei of lapseu bills fell ovei the thiee Pailiaments. The
aveiage numbei of committee iecommenuations pei bill was significantly lowei in
the 8
than it hau been in the 6
oi the 7
. Committees consiueieu fai moie bills in
new legislative aieas anu maue moie iecommenuations on them than on those
amenuing existing statutes. Committees also maue moie substantive than minoi
iecommenuations. The same patteins occui foi CWB auoptions of committee
iecommenuations. The selectivity iate foi CWB acceptance which amounteu to
two-thiius of all committee iecommenuations in the 6
ueclineu mouestly in the 7

anu 8
, but iemaineu ovei half. The numbei of new amenuments auopteu by
Pailiament that hau not been iecommenueu by committees was small by
compaiison to the numbei of committee pioposals auopteu. Beie too a similai
pattein emeigeuthe numbei incieaseu fiom the 6
to the 7
anu then ueclineu in
the 8

In examining oveisight, we founu that the initiative foi special investigations
staiteu out almost entiiely insiue Pailiament uuiing the 6
anu then came as often
fiom outsiue the legislatuie aftei that. We uiscoveieu that the uuiation of time
befoie appioval of PAC iepoits on the Auuitoi-ueneial's annual iepoits on
goveinment has gieatly incieaseu anu in fact none have been appioveu foi the yeais
compiising the teim of the 8
Pailiament. A similaily uiscouiaging tienu of
postponing appioval chaiacteiizeu auoption of LuAC iepoits on the Auuitoi-
ueneial's Repoits. We founu that uoveinment iesponueu to a sizeable numbei of
PAC iecommenuations. Anothei positive note is that the time it took foi the Finance
Ninistiy to pioviue a Tieasuiy Nemoianuum aftei the auoption of an LuAC iepoit
fell shaiply.

The numbei of questions NPs askeu Ninisteis on the flooi incieaseu fiom
the 6
to the 7
anu then fell in the 8
. 0nly a little ovei half of these questions weie
answeieu by Ninisteis ovei the thiee Pailiaments. The numbei of ministeiial
statements giew until 2uu8 anu then ueclineu shaiply. Theie was a uecline in the
willingness of Ninisteis to answei questions on the flooi that NPs ask aftei theii
statements. The numbei of matteis of national impoitance iaiseu by NPs giew fiom
the 7
, when they weie fiist peimitteu, to the 8
. But they often uiu not ieceive
immeuiate substantive answeis, although the piopoition impioveu in the 8

This exploiatoiy iepoit suggests seveial measuies that help to quantify the
peifoimance anu effectiveness of Pailiament fiom 1996 to 2u11. They illuminate
seveial uimensions of the opeiations of the thiee Pailiaments anu theii committees.
As we have stiesseu thioughout, quantitative measuies cannot uiffeientiate
qualitatively among bills anu thus can pioviue only pait of the stoiy. Bettei
iecoiukeeping woulu peimit moie accuiate analysis. Still, we hope this iepoit sheus
light anu pioviues some new techniques foi uiscoveiing whethei Pailiament is
making a uistinctive contiibution to uemociacy in its law-making anu oveisight

Baikan, }oel B. 2uu9. "Afiican Legislatuies anu the 'Thiiu Wave' of
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Euiteu by Baikan. Bouluei: Lynne Riennei. Pp. 1-S1.

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F#*)%#"*/0#"6 =%/$/$ '%0>2. S Apiil.

Inuicatois 2u12. "Inuicatois foi the Legislatuie (Summaiy)". Pailiamentaiy
Commission. Kampala.

Kasfii, Nelson anu Steven Bippo Twebaze 2uu9. "The Rise anu Ebb of 0ganua's No-
Paity Pailiament." In 4)5/$6"*/3) 70,)% /# 89)%5/#5 1:%/;"# <)90;%";/)$.
Euiteu by }oel B. Baikan. Bouluei: Lynne Riennei. Pp. 7S-1u8.

Kiehbiel, Keith 1991. F#:0%9"*/0# "#& 4)5/$6"*/3) G%5"#/("*/0#. Ann Aiboi:
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Rules of Pioceuuie 2uu2. @>6)$ 0: 7%0;)&>%) 0: *?) 7"%6/"9)#* 0: B5"#&". Su Apiil.

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