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Chris Ajemian

To cite this Article Ajemian, Chris(2007) 'ENERGY FOR SECURITY:', The Nonproliferation Review, 14: 2, 329 — 349 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/10736700701379401 URL:

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ENERGY FOR SECURITY: A Natural Gas Pipeline Solution to the North Korean Security Threat
Chris Ajemian

Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010

Though North Korea agreed to partial denuclearization in February 2007, achieving that goal is at best a long way off. A natural gas pipeline linking all of Northeast Asia and promising energy and economic help could help convince the isolated nation to step away from its nuclear programs entirely; it could also provide the nonproliferation and energy security benefits that have eluded the region for so long. These economic benefits could motivate the other nations involved in the six-party talks to deal with North Korea more than if only nuclear reactors were offered. KEYWORDS: North Korea; Natural gas; Pipeline; Energy resources; Northeast Asia

North Korea’s nuclear weapon test on October 9, 2006 illustrates the extreme danger and difficulty of dealing with states that are isolated, paranoid, and desperate. Were North Korea to attack one of its neighbors or U.S. forces in South Korea, or supply a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group, the world would face the prospect of nuclear war. North Korea has posed a complex and grave problem for the international community since the end of the Cold War. It blocks reunification with the South, resists significant economic reform within its own borders, and maintains a hostile and unpredictable posture toward the international community. It is an impoverished police state led by Kim Jong Il, who appears willing to sustain any hardship to further the survival of his regime, including famines during the 1990s that took the lives of more than a million in his country. U.S. policy toward North Korea has spanned numerous approaches. The Clinton administration tried resolving North Korea’s security threat with policies that alternated between engagement and confrontation that almost led to war. The efforts culminated in the 1994 Agreed Framework’s Korean Economic Development Organization (KEDO), which proffered nuclear power assistance in exchange for North Korea’s decommissioning of its weapons programs. The Bush administration created the six-party talks (with South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia) to coax North Korea out of isolation. The first several rounds of talks seemed fruitless, but the fourth round produced the September 2005 Joint Statement of Principles, in which North Korea agreed to denuclearize in exchange for light water nuclear reactors and other energy assistance, similar to the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea temporarily withdrew from talks, however, after the United States imposed financial sanctions on it. Pyongyang conducted its test nuclear detonation Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, July 2007
ISSN 1073-6700 print/ISSN 1746-1766 online/07/020329-21 – 2007 The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies DOI: 10.1080/10736700701379401

when mistrust between North Korea and the United States was also extremely high. negotiator at the six-party talks has made statements conveying his belief that North Korea intends to denuclearize.330 CHRIS AJEMIAN approximately a year later in October 2006.S. but nothing on the order of a glasnost or perestroika.4 These positive steps notwithstanding. It referenced the September 2005 Joint Statement. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited North Korea from March 12 Á 15 and concluded that it intends to denuclearize. A successful policy must promise to significantly improve North Korea’s basic well-being. its occurrence still represents a major failure of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has likely boosted North Korea’s confidence. some may prefer the subject never to come up. After returning from a trip to North Korea a month after the test.3 Additionally. North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon within 60 days. There are some limited signs of economic reform being reported by recent delegations. While there is much to be accomplished before provision of nuclear reactors can realistically be entertained. It needs a new source to replace the oil imports that were severely curtailed after the end of the Cold War. wrote that the test ‘‘will make it much more difficult to convince [North Korea] to give up its nuclear weapons. then the question becomes what will motivate him to entirely denuclearize. an agreement seemed to rescue the process. Finally. While only partially successful. the clock has only been turned back to 1994. Besides assurances of security from the United States. to keep North Korea on Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 . it must also be fully supported by the United States and all the states within Northeast Asia. Moreover. North Korea may believe it will be eventually regarded as a default nuclear weapon state. If a solution is sought that preserves Kim Jong Il as North Korea’s leader. On February 13. the overriding development since the current standoff between the United States and North Korea began in 2002 was North Korea’s test nuclear detonation. returning to the terms of the Joint Statement 18 months earlier. despite recent progress. But discussion of supplying the reactors has been pushed far into the future. Most significantly. February’s agreement promised heavy fuel oil assistance to North Korea in exchange for steps toward denuclearization. during the last phase of the fifth round of talks. which promises energy assistance in the form of light water nuclear reactors similar to the 1994 Agreed Framework.2 The United States said it would resolve its financial sanctions against North Korea.6 The prospect of North Korea retaining any nuclear capability is just too threatening. 2007. and peacefully join the international community? Change from within North Korea is not apparent. there is nothing North Korea would like more than a stable supply of energy with which to rebuild its crippled economy. substantially demilitarize. much as India and Pakistan are years after their tests. several positive signs have followed February’s announcement. or its leadership will not risk lowering its defenses.’’5 Thus. However. The February 2007 agreement does not address North Korea’s potential arsenal of several nuclear devices or whether it has a uranium enrichment program.1 At the time of this writing. It is safe to assume that North Korea also seeks the survival of the Kim Jong Il government and revitalization of its economy. a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. the lead U. Siegfried Hecker.

The 1994 Agreed Framework and the September 2005 Joint Statement both supported the principle of Western nuclear power assistance in exchange for North Korean disarmament. As part of a comprehensive regional agreement. It first examines the region’s energy economies. in fact. there have already been calls for development of enrichment and reprocessing technologies in response to North Korea’s nuclear test. Mochizuki’s article. The resolution of the North Korean nuclear threat is of paramount concern to Japan. This article explores how a natural gas pipeline could obtain the nonproliferation and energy security benefits that have eluded Northeast Asia for so long. some major incentive will need to be proposed that will ensure a permanent energy source and that does not raise concerns about nuclear weapons.) However. The North Korean Security Threat North Korea presents a unique international security threat.10 (For more on Japan’s nuclear debate. and concludes with recommendations for policy and a natural gas pipeline. The direct economic benefit to the region as a whole from such a pipeline could motivate the other nations in the six-party talks to pursue this solution in a way that reactors would not.) The delivery of pipeline gas is one possible solution. notes projected growth and rising energy demand for the region. and it has engaged in terrorism in the past. summarizes existing development options.7 Japan and (to a lesser degree) South Korea and Taiwan may determine they need to develop their own nuclear weapons to deter the North Korean threat. Japan’s assertiveness in pressing for sanctions against North Korea demonstrates just how vulnerable it feels in the wake of the North Korean test.8 Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo ¯ has stated it would not be illegal for Japan to develop nuclear weapons. see Mike M. in South Korea. Japan is unlikely to exercise the option. alliance and nuclear umbrella are in place. If it has functional nuclear weapons * and that status is unclear * it can use them as a deterrent to invasion of its territory. Analysts have studied the feasibility of delivering Russian natural gas to the Korean Peninsula by pipeline for years. it could entice North Korea to negotiate seriously about complete denuclearization and could provide a basis for the region to cooperate in resolving the wider North Korean security threat. a pipeline seems an obvious answer. ‘‘Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo. Similarly. The potential for a regional nuclear arms race exists in Northeast Asia.ENERGY FOR SECURITY 331 Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 track to denuclearization and to ultimately improve the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. or as tool of terrorism (by its own act or through a non-state group).11 . as long as the U. integral to the February 13 deal. With some of the world’s largest gas reserves geographically proximate to its fastest growing economic region.’’ in this issue.S. as an offensive military weapon.9 While it is no longer taboo to discuss the prohibition on Japanese possession of nuclear weapons that Prime Minister Sato ¯ Eisaku enunciated in 1967. (Promises of energy assistance were. It is a sovereign state that possesses both some minor level of nuclear capability and a significant level of conventional military force. A natural gas pipeline would deliver a non-nuclear energy source that has little or no potential for military use.

The massive conventional forces that North Korea maintains are in some ways as threatening as its nuclear weapons potential. energy demand is rising worldwide. Brazil. Seoul. In case of war or governmental collapse. It contributes practically nothing to these economies.15 The drag on the regional economy caused by North Korea is an often overlooked factor of North Korea’s security threat. North Korea constitutes a dead zone. China may also fear having to participate in a North Korean civil war if a coup or other event abruptly removes Kim Jong Il from power. Belarus. More than 70 percent of this increase comes from developing countries. Iran may be studying the international response and weighing whether to proceed with its own nuclear weapons program. Within this vibrant region. and South Africa either foregoing weapons programs or actual weapons * a new wave of countries contravening international nonproliferation goals could signal the end of the NPT. Imports of oil and gas in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries and developing Asian nations are growing even faster. the number of North Korean refugees could reach the hundreds of thousands. The International Energy Agency (IEA) recently predicted that global demand would increase by 53 percent by 2030. The IEA predicts world oil demand will reach 116 million barrels a day (mbd) in 2030. up from 84 mbd in 2005. energy shortages create obstacles to growth and threaten political stability. North Korea is a nation of approximately 23 million people with a per capita income of only $1.17 The rest of the region stands in contrast. Kazakhstan.19 Within China. North Korea in particular suffers from extreme energy shortages. North Korea’s destitution presents a significant refugee threat to both China and South Korea. Even Russia has recovered from the shocks of its conversion from communism and is rebuilding its economy. Other factors complicate the North Korean security situation. Worse. which for South Korea would be a major strain but for China could have a destabilizing effect in the poor and already politically unstable region bordering North Korea. China has lifted a large portion of its population out of poverty since allowing market economics and should enjoy strong 6 Á 7 percent growth for the next two decades. led by China and India. yet could stimulate better performance in all of them if politically rehabilitated. and Japan remains the world’s second-largest economy.14 Additionally. Ukraine.800. the capital of South Korea.13 After the nonproliferation successes of the last two decades * with Argentina.18 South Korea is an economic powerhouse.20 Japan and South Korea have mature economies that must constantly seek out new energy supplies.16 Its economy is estimated at growing at a rate of only 1 Á 2 percent a year. Energy Insecurity in Northeast Asia Energy insecurity is a region-wide problem in Northeast Asia. Most of the increase in oil supply will be met by a small number of major .12 Egypt and Saudi Arabia could also change their postures if they see nothing done about North Korea or Iran. Led by this region. In the Middle East.000 North Korean rocket and artillery systems that effectively hold it hostage.332 CHRIS AJEMIAN Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 The effect of North Korea’s test may extend outside the region as well. is in range of approximately 10.

despite maintenance problems and the seasonal nature of river flows.22 The early 1990s saw a series of poor grain harvests in North Korea.24 Thermal power generation capability in North Korea has significantly eroded. through either a pipeline originating in Russia or shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG). its economy is presumed to be stagnating at little more than the subsistence level. If gas consumption increased and a local pipeline network began to form. and serious famines. Power from these plants could also be used to operate other coalburning power plants in the short term while hydroelectric plants are repaired and modernized. North Korea The dire state of North Korea’s economy shows how much it has to gain from a new energy supply. it will be necessary to begin introducing gas to the population of North Korea several years before in order to generate the necessary demand to justify a major infrastructural investment.23 The flooding contributed to deforestation. If an adequate basic number of thermal electric plants could be built along a pipeline delivery system. Little or no gas is used in North Korea at present. These trends also make it important to evaluate which energy sources might meet the diverse needs of Northeast Asia.21 These trends indicate growing vulnerability to a severe supply disruption and resulting price shock. Its per capita electricity demand in 1990 was about 1. They also promise to amplify the magnitude of global climate change. North Koreans still lack basic food sources and are thin and malnourished. While reliable data are hard to find. hydroelectric plants have shouldered the burden of power generation in North Korea.27 If gas imports are to present a feasible alternative. and public transportation. homes. The following section explores the energy needs of various countries in the region. If local distribution systems can be established.400 kilowatts (South Korea’s was 2.25 As a consequence. One initial step could be the construction of small demonstration power plants that used liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) imported to small storage facilities for residential fuel within a limited area. North Korea is not expected to be able to grow sufficient amounts of food for its people for years. an international pipeline could be Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 . Compounding these difficulties. Non-OPEC conventional crude oil output will peak by the middle of the next decade. and is believed to be much lower today.26 Natural gas. North Korea could provide electricity for factories.200 kilowatts). Even 10 years after the famines of the mid-1990s. The fuel with which North Korea rebuilds its economy could be natural gas. according to the IEA. in 1995 and 1996 severe floods in many areas of North Korea washed away topsoil from higher elevations and buried many areas of crucial lowlying farmland. and those that are still in use operate at low efficiency and low capacity factors due to maintenance problems and lack of fuel. much basic infrastructure has either been worn out or is in advanced disrepair. In virtually all of its large power stations.ENERGY FOR SECURITY 333 Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) producers. it may be possible to build a small LNG terminal. only selected boilers and turbines are operating. generally poor harvests.

Within Asia. North Korea reportedly has oil and gas reserves in offshore areas. consisting mainly of anthracite and brown types. Currently. these ceased when the Cold War ended. David von Hippel and Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute have argued that this approach would provide significant opportunities to regionally and internationally engage North Korea. In 2030.34 In recent years.9 Á 10. China’s import dependency will continue to grow with imports reaching 75 percent of total consumption. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) World Energy Outlook 2004 forecast Chinese hydrocarbon demand in 2030 at just under 14 mbd. North Korea possesses substantial domestic reserves of coal. The amount reached 50 billion cubic meters in 2005. about one-third less than current demand in the United States.5 percent in 2006.29 Higher levels of imports could only be attained at world market price. the EIA expects China to import as much oil as the United States did in 2004. it is seen generally as a positive force because it provides a source of cheap labor for Japanese and South Korean manufacturing and a market for low-cost exports. up from 30. North Korea’s economy was essentially built on subsidized oil imports from the Soviet Union.28 Oil. Economic forecasts remain strong for China.S. By 2010. They vary in quality. causing considerable . but the country lacks the technology to develop these resources and has yet to secure an international partner to aid in such an effort.35 China’s leaders believe constant economic expansion is essential to maintain internal order and stability. with real gross domestic product (GDP) expected to have increased 9. Some are very low in heating efficiency. according to the EIA’s assessment.334 CHRIS AJEMIAN considered as the next step in energy relations between North Korea and its neighbors. China’s natural gas consumption has risen sharply. China has provided North Korea with 80 Á 90 percent of its imports. especially those of Southeast Asia. relocation of jobs.36 Its growing dependency on Middle Eastern oil imports has made the Chinese economy vulnerable to events outside its control. Since then. The EIA also predicted that in 2006 China’s increase in oil demand would represent 38 percent of the world total increase in demand. and it has the added advantage of being strongly in the interests of Russia and South Korea. and major changes in energy markets. and the figure is estimated to reach 210 billion in 2020.32 Moreover. coal is the least clean-burning fossil fuel.5 billion cubic meters in 2003. but a North Korean priority is to decrease its coal share in an attempt to diversify.33 The U. China The growth of China’s economy is being felt around the world through inexpensive imports. something that North Korea so far has been unable to afford. whether crude or refined.31 Modern mining techniques may be able to increase these reserves. China’s natural gas demands are expected to exceed 110 billion cubic meters per year. all of the hydrocarbon products used in North Korea are imported.30 Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 Coal. The lack of viable energy alternatives supports natural gas as a primary fuel source.

which will be discussed in the next section. China has constructed or is building several national and international oil pipelines. a narrow thread of water through which roughly 80 percent of China’s Middle Eastern oil travels. Despite recovering from the brief 2003 recession. and natural gas is high among its priorities. although as of March 2007 no formal decision had been made on whether to proceed with the project. South Korea’s economy was expected to rebound to a healthy 5. South Korea is the ninth largest oil consumer and fifth largest net oil importer in the world.41 In May 2006.43 China is also pursuing pipeline options from Russia. when President Hu Jintao reportedly expressed concern over the ‘‘Malacca dilemma. If such a line were built.9 percent in 2006. China is also looking to lay transnational natural gas pipelines with several neighboring countries. In order to reduce its reliance on the Strait of Malacca. The fears over this vulnerability found a high-level voice during the central economic work conference on November 29. China began receiving crude oil imports from its first transnational oil pipeline. In general. the two leaders reportedly agreed to move ahead with the proposed Kovykta pipeline by 2011. the country’s economic growth in 2004 and 2005 was slight due to weak growth in demand for exports. China’s energy insecurity is spurring it to develop all energy resources.38 It could also become a chokepoint on China’s economy in time of war because China does not possess the naval forces to guard shipping lanes so far from its mainland. connecting Atasu in northern Kazakhstan with Alashankou in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Two major gas sources are the enormous Siberian Kovykta fields and the Sakhalin Island fields. and hydrocarbons accounted for 52 percent of its primary energy consumption in 2003.42 China has undertaken an effort to expand its natural gas delivery system as well. When Russian President Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao met in March 2006. which was caused mainly by a tightening of requirements for consumer credit. KMG officials have said that it could be operational as early as 2009 and supply natural gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. for example. 2003.44 South Korea imports all of its crude oil. Many of China’s largest natural gas fields lie in remote basins in the western part of the country.’’39 While China has attempted to diversify over the last decade. Most of its oil imports come from the Persian . including significant investment in nuclear power infrastructure. Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 South Korea After posting 4 percent real growth in GDP for 2005. Either could support China and Korea by pipeline or LNG shipment.ENERGY FOR SECURITY 335 anxiety among its leadership. Kazakhstan’s state-owned KazMunaiGas (KMG) was reportedly conducting a feasibility study of a natural gas pipeline to China in partnership with China National Petroleum Company. and the gas must be piped to eastern population centers. it is still reliant upon the Middle East. In February 2005.40 Pipelines. The strait is prone to frequent pirate attacks and vessels in transit are vulnerable to hijacking.37 Much of this anxiety is focused on the Strait of Malacca.

but it is the world’s third largest oil consumer (after the United States and China). led by exports to China. Kogas continues to sign contracts for additional supplies to increase the flexibility of its import options. or a combination of the two.48 Japan is important to the world energy sector as one of the major exporters of energy-sector capital equipment. most of Japan’s natural gas (97 percent) is imported. Japan Moderate economic growth continued in 2005. South Korea currently relies on imported LNG for most of its natural gas.46 With demand surging. particularly Persian Gulf countries like the United Arab Emirates. KNOC is pursuing equity stakes in oil and gas exploration worldwide. Demand for natural gas is rising due to increases in thermal power generation. continuing a pattern of rapid growth that has been interrupted only once. Domestic consumer spending in Japan also has been strengthening. In the short-term. depending on how far existing lines go and if others are built. The upturn over the last three years partially reflects a surge in export demand. but could only practically commit to one in the next decade. Imports of LNG began in 1986 after the founding of the state-owned monopoly Korea Gas Company (Kogas). Kogas’s most recent supply agreement was signed in July 2005 with Sakhalin Energy. Japan has almost no oil reserves of its own. Most of the oil consumed in Japan (75 Á 80 percent) comes from OPEC. a joint venture with Russian companies backed by Shell. with 30 percent from Indonesia. Qatar. for supplies from the Sakhalin-2 project for 20 years beginning in 2008.6 percent in 2004 and was projected to rise by 2. Its access to the shortest routes from Siberia is determined by China. and engineering. with Saudi Arabia supplying about one-third of its import requirements in 2005. 21 percent from Malaysia. and project management services.45 Adding pipelines into the balance of its increasing natural gas imports is its long-term strategy. utility gas consumption. during the Asian financial crisis of 1997 Á 1998. and Iran. maintaining the recovery that began in 2003 after a decade of economic stagnation.336 CHRIS AJEMIAN Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 Gulf region. LNG.47 South Korea still has a market for natural gas that justifies the investment of a pipeline from either Russian source. Imports grew by nearly 17 percent in 2004. Saudi Arabia. which sits between it and Siberia. Japan is the largest importer of LNG in the world. which is managed by the state-owned Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC). South Korea has sought to diversify its supply. South Korea could receive Sakhalin gas either by pipeline. it has developed a strategic petroleum reserve. and 11 percent from . attributable to the recovery of Japan’s nuclear power industry after a series of plant shutdowns in 2003 that had caused utilities to maximize the use of oil-based generating capacity. Japan’s real GDP rose by 2. 13 percent from Australia.50 Like South Korea. construction. Kuwait.49 This was a decrease in oil consumption. though it began producing a small quantity of natural gas from one offshore field in early 2004.3 percent in 2005. it has both a short-term and a longterm approach to fulfilling its oil needs.51 Most of Japan’s LNG comes from Southeast Asia and Australia. Japan has worked * with relatively little success * to diversify its oil import sources away from the Middle East. and natural gas Á fueled cars. The EIA estimated that in 2006 Japan would consume 5.3 mbd of oil.

35 percent of GDP. in 2004 Russia was the world’s largest natural gas producer (22. Although the six-party talks rejuvenated the light water nuclear reactor concept this February. Gazprom’s monopolistic control over the industry.8 billion. which promised two light water reactors and fuel oil shipments for North Korea’s denuclearization and acceptance of IAEA inspections. Much of Japan’s urban area is not served by a natural gas distribution system. other than nuclear reactors. How can this supply meet demand? Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 Natural Gas Pipeline Dynamics There has been much discussion among policy analysts about a possible energy for security deal with North Korea. Russia’s natural gas industry has not been as successful as its oil industry. as well as the world’s largest exporter (7. The effort was controversial and ultimately failed.3 percent) by 2008. such as a regional pipeline.56 Russia’s natural gas sector has been limited primarily due to aging fields. fueled primarily by energy exports. involves the delivery of pipeline natural gas. Many analysts cite the absence of an effective natural gas distribution system as a key reason for Japan’s high retail energy prices.ENERGY FOR SECURITY 337 Brunei. Moreover.55 Accordingly.57 Some have constructed scenarios after a security resolution is achieved but leave the work of resolving the security issues to others. which the country is considering expanding. Russia’s national natural gas company.58 Other viewpoints marry the economics and security realms but were written before North Korea’s nuclear test. or $1. making it vulnerable to fluctuations in world oil prices. the production forecast of Gazprom. with 1.54 Russia holds the world’s largest natural gas reserves.59 There has been little consideration of North Korea’s interests in a possible energy for security settlement. with both natural gas production and consumption remaining relatively flat since independence. However. The energy portion of energy-for-security concepts with North Korea to which analysts have given perhaps the greatest amount of consideration.1 tcf). but some have attempted to collect this information despite the difficulty of assessing a closed society.53 Russia’s economy is heavily dependent on oil and natural gas exports. a $1 per barrel increase in Urals oil prices for one year would raise federal budget revenue by 0.4 tcf).52 Japan uses most of the LNG either for electric power generation or in petrochemical plants. The majority of the discussion on this option has focused on economics and investment risk. Thus. Japan has strong incentive to seek inexpensive options for natural gas imports.680 trillion cubic feet (tcf) * nearly twice the reserves of the next largest country. and insufficient export pipelines. This section has shown that natural gas demand in Northeast Asia is high and that a large supply is nearby. Russia Russia’s real GDP grew in 2004 by approximately 7. Iran. anticipates only modest growth (about 1.60 Preliminary work on . nuclear technical assistance is not within the current focus of the talks and will not be for some time. The first attempt was the 1994 Agreed Framework. According to an International Monetary Fund study.1 percent. state regulation.

338 CHRIS AJEMIAN Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 the financing of North Korean development does exist. a specialist on Sino-Russian oil and gas issues. This early vision of a circular natural gas pipeline loop serving all of Northeast Asia endures as the basic goal of what a pipeline scheme should resemble in order to achieve North Korean denuclearization as well as FIGURE 1 Northeast Asia Natural Gas Pipeline Concept . political. the private sector is free to make decisions based on maximizing profit. In 2000. Profit motives are tempered by the risk of major investments potentially going wrong. emphasizes the private sector’s role in natural gas pipeline development. In short. and environmental risks. To understand why government action is crucial. Also. the private sector is not motivated * at least not directly * by the future payoff of North Korean denuclearization. it is important to first understand how the private sector is approaching the natural gas supply problem. and Sakhalin Island’s offshore fields to the northeast.62 (See Figure 1. not on public interest. he proposed a circular route using Russian gas to supply the entire region.61 Yet none of these development approaches emphasizes the need for regional governmental collaboration and coordination with each other and the private sector. The work of Keun-Wook Paik.) The map shows the two major Russian natural gas sources that could supply North Korea by pipeline: the Kovykta gas fields near Irkutsk to the northwest of the Korean Peninsula. Transnational pipelines are huge infrastructural projects that face numerous financial.

67 Gazprom might even prefer to route the pipeline completely around northeastern China. . A route concession from either Russia or China through Mongolia. it also leaves South Korea stranded in the interim. China and Gazprom cannot agree on price. China may not be able to absorb its 20 billion until about 2010. which caused the Roh Moo-Hyun government to reconsider the Kovykta gas option.64 This gives Beijing bargaining room in negotiating price. where a link could then proceed south through the Korean Peninsula. Paik fears the United States.65 A second route would go through Daqing. Though South Korea is ready to consume 10 billion cubic meters. north of Beijing. Route. undeveloped part of Siberia to the west of Lake Baikal. this second route could also economically stimulate China’s impoverished and unstable northeastern region. Russia wants LNG rates. wary of any such integration. if South Korea made a commitment to the Kovykta gas project now * before the remainder of its market is set with additional LNG contracts * it could facilitate a Russia-China-Korea route. As for the Mongolian route. which have remained high due to strong LNG demand from the United States and high oil prices. This alternate path puts South Korea in a difficult position because the greater length raises the price for consumers. North Korea could receive supply from a branch that connected Dandong (on the China-North Korea border) to Pyongyang and then stretched to the South. Gazprom is considering an equity purchase the TNK-BP partnership.63 Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 Price. but will not allow any export from the Kovykta fields until it decides whether it wants an equity stake in them.66 Gazprom dislikes Chinese pricing tactics and prefers a longer route that circumvents China. viewing Mongolia as too pro-United States. discussed below. which would make it even longer and more expensive.ENERGY FOR SECURITY 339 supplying natural gas to all the region’s countries. Russian action might be hastened if Gazprom sees its potential Asian customers increasing their imports from the Middle East. a breakthrough is possible if approval is given by the Chinese and Korean governments. Now follows an examination of how the private sector has progressed in filling in this map. Pipeline gas then loses its competitive advantage over LNG. However. one of the world’s largest. going through Nakhodka. The Irkutsk Kovykta Fields The Kovykta complex of six gas fields. The United States has not supported a pipeline to South Korea that involves the North. Gazprom has authority to regulate the export of Russian gas. However. but has not announced any decision. could make pipeline gas pricing competitive. Authority. The shortest and least expensive route a pipeline could travel from the Kovykta fields to North Korea is southeast through Mongolia. to Nakhodka near Vladivostok. China objects to this route for political reasons. A number of fundamental issues will need to be addressed before any pipeline connecting the Kovykta fields with North Korea can be constructed. is located in a remote.

and questionable returns. Kim Jong Il is reportedly very interested in Sakhalin gas. Kim discussed the subject each of the three times he has met with Russian president Vladimir Putin since 2000.’’75 This is probably because of North Korea’s history with China’s delivery of hydrocarbon exports. When the KEDO reactors were under active consideration for electricity supply. North Korea was reluctant to consider pipeline gas.70 Both Japan and South Korea have well-developed natural gas markets and are interested in a pipeline from Sakhalin Island to temper their Middle East dependency. a Sakhalin-originating . three Japanese utilities representing most of the Japanese gas market placed long-term orders for Sakhalin LNG that could eliminate the need for pipeline delivery from Sakhalin to Japan until 2013 or 2014.74 This preference for a Sakhalin pipeline may be.69 The Sakhalin-2 project is the largest gas and oil development venture in the world. he views Kovykta gas as the best longterm source for the Korean Peninsula. Consumer groups in Japan seek a separate Sakhalin pipeline directly south to Japan to compete with the more expensive LNG that Japanese utilities have provided by monopoly for many years. but because of uneasy relations between the former Soviet Union and Japan.72 Likewise. flows from both Kovykta or Sakhalin Island could travel through the Korean Peninsula to supply Japan. A Sakhalin pipeline to North Korea has two route choices. South Korea’s long-term Kogas contract for Sakhalin LNG could postpone any route for a Kovykta pipeline until 2010 Á 2015. because of the feasibility work previously done and the size of the Kovykta fields. Alternatively.68 Nevertheless. It is now thought to be able to produce enough gas to be exported throughout Northeast Asia either by pipeline or LNG. One indication of Pyongyang’s interest in Sakhalin pipeline delivery is that it gave rights to three Dutch companies to build the North Korean section of the pipeline from Russia to the South Korean border. A western line could track Russia’s mainland coast through Nakhodka to Pyongyang. In 2003.76 Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 Energy Security: A Complete Loop The ideal pipeline network would be a complete loop similar to Figure 1. did not gain momentum until the early 1990s.73 However. Sakhalin Island The alternative source of natural gas for North Korea is the offshore fields of Sakhalin Island. which would increase energy security throughout the entire region.340 CHRIS AJEMIAN would not support such an option. Their development has been discussed since the 1960s. A circular route would comprise a minimum level of redundancy. Japan’s main island. ‘‘given China’s burgeoning demand for gas. The crucial link would connect South Korea and Japan. because North Korea is skeptical that Kovykta flow through China will be reliable. this line would reach as far as the western tip of Honshu.71 The efficacy of both the Russian and Japanese Sakhalin routes is threatened by LNG contracts in Japan and South Korea. as longtime security analyst Selig Harrison argues. If such a line is built. Ideally.

precluding pipeline options for North Korea. LPG is more expensive than natural gas.77 This project lessens the urgency of quick private sector action for a pipeline being built farther into Japan but does not preclude it. Setting up LPG networks can be a first step toward use of natural gas in North Korea. where it will be liquefied and shipped to Japan. In short. Now that a South Korean natural gas pipeline network has been completed where the LPG market has saturated. if in a disorganized fashion. It would be a collectively interdependent and reinforcing system. only one would conceivably be needed for this link. What could become the Japan line has begun. the threat of shutoff from China or Russia to both North and South Korea and Japan could be reduced. South Korea will not need to seek pipeline gas for 10 Á 20 years. everyone’s energy security is increased. The pipeline could link either to ExxonMobil’s Sakhalin-1 project or to Royal Dutch Shell’s Sakhalin-2 venture. as South Korean utilities have already concluded one long-term LNG contract from Sakhalin Island and may conclude more. by linking all the customers to the seller.ENERGY FOR SECURITY 341 Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 flow could be sent westward to the Korean Peninsula. the South Korean LPG industry can transfer its services to the North.81 This can be accomplished by cooperation with South Korea. Gazprom risks losing the Korean market. Infrastructure Very little gas is currently used in North Korea. South Korea. and the United States. but it is much easier to use where piped-distribution networks do not yet exist. Since pipelines can be built to have bidirectional flow. If it delays too long. and two from Sakhalin Island’s offshore fields (west to Russia’s Pacific coast.79 As a result. Sakhalin2 gas will be transported through an 800 kilometer (km) pipeline to Prigorodnoye. or south to Japan and the Korean Peninsula). the Korean Peninsula may not know for several more years whether or how fully it can access this source. Currently.80 David von Hippel and Peter Hayes stress introducing LPG networks before the largescale quantities of energy from projects such as natural gas pipelines or LNG delivery systems. Seoul is also eager to make progress on reunification. northeast China. and LPG storage and transfer facilities are available in smaller capacities than for LNG. which possesses technology and expertise that can aid the North’s energy infrastructure. Like other natural gas forms. Gazprom is considering building an 850 km natural gas pipeline from Sakhalin Island to northern Japan. a variety of potential routes exist to bring pipeline gas to North Korea: three of varying lengths from Siberia’s Kovykta fields (through Mongolia. on the south of Sakhalin Island. or around China). The infrastructure required to import LPG by oceangoing tanker is also cheaper than for either piped or liquefied natural gas. LPG is a clean-burning fuel with limited military potential.78 Thus. If so. Consequently. . without expedited action on Russia’s part. Gazprom has delayed its decision over the development of the Kovykta fields due to indecision over whether to acquire a controlling interest and disagreement with China over price. In fact.

but these reserves are not yet sufficiently explored. if they are never produced.342 CHRIS AJEMIAN The Benefits of a Comprehensive Regional Solution Most perspectives on natural gas or other energy pacts with North Korea assume they cannot be achieved until a security resolution with North Korea is achieved first. an economically productive North Korea would accelerate the economic performance of an already dynamic region. North Korea’s nuclear test cannot have done anything to make nuclear power assistance toward it more politically palatable to the region. or more easily used in military equipment. Offshore oil drilling may someday be a possibility for North Korea. The resulting benefit to the surrounding economies would more than recoup investments for a pipeline. Despite the renewed promise for light water nuclear reactors in the February agreement of the six-party talks. However. There would also be an immense traditional security and economic payoff for resolving the North Korean crisis * a circular loop pipeline network will increase the entire region’s energy security. the process of connecting Northeast Asian energy demand with Russian supply has progressed far enough to view it from the opposite perspective * that the energy should be used as an incentive to North Korea to gain the political resolution. The test should not preclude nuclear-generated electricity being transmitted from a bordering country. This step would also be required for distributing energy benefits from in-country reactors or any scaled energy scheme due . What are the reasons for which a natural gas pipeline might provide a comprehensive regional security/ energy solution to the North Korean threat? Improved Nuclear/Traditional Regional Security The nonproliferation benefit of a North Korea that gives up all of its nuclear weapons programs would be measured regionally and globally with the mending of the NPT and forestallment of a regional nuclear arms race. but this form of energy assistance does require the expensive prior infrastructural step of building a modern electrical grid in North Korea. The pipeline itself would also act as a face-saving trophy that it could accept as substitute for the KEDO nuclear reactors. Combined with some guarantee for the security of the Kim Jong Il government. Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 An Economically Active North Korea Even if it remained predominantly socialist. An Optimal Fuel Other hydrocarbon fuels are more expensive. Together. these incentives would demonstrate to North Korea that the international community is serious about peaceful coexistence and that the time for it to denuclearize has come. The transit fees North Korea would gain as a result of transporting natural gas through its territory would provide a means to finance its section of the pipeline. polluting. access to a substantial energy supply would provide North Korea with the means to rebuild its economy.

It has the highest energy to weight ratio of any known fuel. fusion and fuel cells. the United States must act quickly. First. has reached its point of widest opening and is beginning to close. A Political Window of Opportunity North Korea needs a reliable source of energy with which to rebuild its economy. hydrogen has the potential to create an ubiquitous energy source that is emissions-free. Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 Recommendations for Policy The urgency for maintaining engagement with North Korea could not be higher. Its walkout from talks in March over the delay in the release of North Korean funds. Some believe hydrogen is the key to a clean energy future.82 Their goal is to generate clean and renewable energy where hydrogen is produced from hydropower and solar energy in Siberia and China and wind power in areas from Kamchatka through the Kuril Islands to Sakhalin. The Bush administration has roughly six months before it . but the prospect of only having to build a single pipeline that carries natural gas today and hydrogen in the future substantially raises the value of investing in a natural gas pipeline. Combined with other technologies such as carbon storage. To prevent North Korea from becoming a default nuclear weapon state. progressively replacing natural gas as it depletes.84 As a consequence. The political window of opportunity to construct a regional natural gas pipeline within Northeast Asia. however. Further.ENERGY FOR SECURITY 343 to the eroded nature of the North Korean electrical grid. biomass. which could create bases for regional cooperation.83 Hydrogen technology may be two decades or more away. Investment in Hydrogen An added benefit for investing in a natural gas pipeline system is the possibility that it will someday be used as part of a larger hydrogen delivery system. It produces effectively zero emissions and can be produced from abundant resources including natural gas. it is at the zenith of pride and confidence and expects the United States to grant it the respect it feels it deserves. renewable energy. North Korea has the attention of the United States and perhaps also its greatest incentive to date for a political solution. is evidence of this. coal. with its test of a nuclear weapon. or water. frozen in a Macao bank. There are two factors. After its nuclear test. Industry leaders and analysts have proposed a far-reaching regional energy infrastructure network that can distribute natural gas throughout Northeast Asia in the near term and renewable-source gaseous hydrogen in the long term. it may opt to become a default nuclear weapon state and endure whatever sanctions the United Nations applies in the short term. countries such as Japan and South Korea have technical capacity and experience. if it does not believe the United States will address more central issues such as its security. The hydrogen produced in these regions could be transmitted by natural gas pipelines built now.

North Korea should accept a non-nuclear energy for security settlement and begin denuclearization and substantial demilitarization along a phased time schedule. . comprehensive and coordinated governmental action will be required.344 CHRIS AJEMIAN loses the influence in the region to orchestrate a deal that would resolve the North Korean nuclear threat. Only the political authority of governments can act on regional energy initiatives within the window of political opportunity to prevent North Korea from becoming a default nuclear weapon state. they must receive direct instructions from their government. and preferably also Japan. If South Korean or Japanese utilities sign additional long-term LNG contracts in the next six months. Only governments can dissuade their utilities from making long-term LNG arrangements while the potential of pipelines is considered. To gain competitive pipeline terms. Specific government action could include the following (some recommendations overlap with actions taken in the February 13 agreement): The United States should begin talks with North Korea immediately. These lines should meet in a loop configuration that provides for continuous flow throughout Northeast Asia. The United States should support the Kovykta Mongolian route to accelerate development of those large fields and lower the natural gas price for China and the Koreas. so as not to alienate North Korea. The prospect of resolving the North Korean nuclear threat should be the impetus for regional governments to act. they must see a favorable business climate in Japan. Such talks should be done in addition to any other discussions on energy or infrastructure. China and Russia should agree to the Mongolian route for pipeline development of the Kovykta fields. focusing on a natural gas regional pipeline network and engaging all members of the six-party talks. utilities may tire of waiting for pipeline options either from the Irkutsk Kovykta fields or Sakhalin Island. if natural gas pipelines are to be built as part of a security settlement with North Korea. Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 Government Action Ultimately. Only government financial guarantees can create umbrella protection to manage pipeline construction risk and stimulate pipeline development. For Gazprom or ExxonMobil to construct a pipeline serving Japan. A pipeline is of course not mutually exclusive of nuclear assistance. For South Korean utilities to wait any longer. Second. The pipeline concept should support at least one route from each Russian source. in South Korea and Japan. Japan and South Korea should enact a short-term moratorium on further LNG contracts to increase the demand for political resolution with North Korea. must negotiate pipeline gas prices with Gazprom as a bloc. These utilities may agree to longterm LNG contracts that would satisfy their customers’ demand for natural gas in their developed natural gas markets. a pipeline will probably not be built in Kim Jong Il’s lifetime. China and South Korea. They should also guarantee their national energy companies’ investment outlays in regional pipeline projects. which could be enhanced by governmental guarantees. including the promised two light water reactors. and Russia should do more to guarantee Gazprom’s investment outlays and draw its decisionmaking process over the Kovykta fields to a conclusion.

2005. 2007. This could only 80479. these financial and information-sharing conditions will need to be satisfied at some point because donor governments will most likely want development bank standards met before they give political and development aid. Supporting both Siberian and Sakhalin pipelines would balance power in the region. on the February 2007 deal. ‘‘North Korea * Denuclearization Action Plan. On the Joint Statement.state.85 As an interim step. if extensive transparency conditions were met by North Korea. Whether a natural gas pipeline is built alone or in conjunction with light water reactors is unimportant. but all the pieces are in place: sizeable markets. According to Bradley Babson. and coordinate operations after gas begins to flow. grant commercial rights. then larger.ENERGY FOR SECURITY 345 Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 The World Bank. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author is indebted to Keun-Wook Paik and to his wife. diversify energy supply. special trust funds administered by the World Bank * often useful in post-conflict situations * should be considered for North Korea. however. see DOS. see Department of State (DOS). could act as a project authority. The United States could assist on all of these fronts. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head Mohamed ElBaradei said the DPRK ‘‘was very clear they are ready to implement the February 13 agreement once the other parties implement their part of . more ambitious goals can be initiated. With umbrella coverage. 2. the private sector could participate in a security settlement with North Korea. the project authority could expedite the financial guarantees that would justify the huge private outlays required for transnational pipelines. perhaps an expanded KEDO-type organization. for their assistance with this article. and create powerful incentive for engaging North Korea on total denuclearization. ‘‘Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks. Media Note. It would oversee the financial processes and pipeline construction. The ‘‘results transition matrix’’ is a mechanism for coordinating the planning of activities and assistance provided by donors in a phased manner. negotiate leases. All that remains is for the governments of Northeast Asia and the United States to provide leadership. Most critically. and a project with economic incentive for the entire region holds the best chance for success. Megan Bowman.’’ Beijing. NOTES 1. The project authority would coordinate multinational policy. The dialogue for a natural gas pipeline settlement must happen quickly. What is important is keeping North Korea on track toward denuclearization. Conclusion If the six-party talks can freeze North Korean nuclear programs and permit inspections. energy company interest.htm. September 19. or a newly constructed international corporation. Bwww.’’ February 13. and the political impetus from North Korea’s nuclear test.

‘‘North Korea continues to position forces into the area just north of the [Demilitarized Zone] * in a position to threaten Combined Forces Command and all of Seoul with little warning.html. Japanese Foreign Minister Aso Taro’s calls for debate on the country’s prohibition against nuclear weapons led opposition parties to push for his 2006.pdf. 1.’’ Seattle. 7.shtml. 6.’’ IAEA Press Release. Howard French. people. Provided they were limited in number and for self-defense. when you look at the North Koreans and see that they make a threat and carry through * and on the whole that has not been a losing approach for them?’ ’’ Former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn. World Factbook . For a regime that increasingly stakes its political 3. Seventy percent of their active force.’’ Staff Report. South Korea. Hecker.html. ‘‘Korea. generally. A23. p.html. quoted in Dafna Linzer. November 10. 15. 2006.could undermine the country’s economic growth and thus seriously jeopardize job creation. June 9. Pyle. 2006.S.’’ People’s Daily .’’ New York Times . Bhttps://www. Another Hawk Leaves.cia. A5. ‘‘Report on North Korean Nuclear Program. 2007.’’ Asia Policy . March 21. See James Clay Moltz.’’ New York Times .cn/200311/10/ 3 (January 2007). Sanger. June 23. ‘‘U. November 9.’’ New York Times . Jung Sung-ki. quoted in Howard LaFranchi. ‘‘Japanese Opposition Parties Seek Aso’s Ouster. 19.htm. is postured within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. 12. ‘‘Optimism Turns to Anxiety On Curbing Nuclear Arms.’’ March 8.’’ NBR Analysis 17 (October 2006). Central Intelligence Agency. ‘‘Is Iran Studying North Korea’s Nuclear Moves?’’ Christian Science Monitor . 2007. ‘‘Sensing Shift in Bush Policy. Bnbr. 16. March 20. ‘‘With Eye on Iran.globalsecurity. Bwww. Kenneth B. Steve Weisman. Kenneth Lieberthal. 2003. June 2006. Bwww. 2007.’’ Global Security Newswire . . 20.’’ Joseph Kahn.washingtonpost. and Taiwan. p. 8.’’ Excerpted from ‘‘Korean People’s Army. 2002.html#sect2. see ‘‘North Korea’s Economy Economic Data. ‘‘Seoul Should Secure Nuclear Technology. p.S. 17.’’ Nautilus Institute. November 3. February 12.htm. ‘‘Economy to Maintain High Growth: Economists. cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn. On the nuclear umbrella. . Anna Policy Forum Online. April 15. 1. p. November 14. 10. March 19.000 artillery systems. over 8. A5.’’ New York Times. 2006/11/02/AR2006110201581_pf.’’ Korea Times . Bwww.hankooki. For the 2 percent figure. 18. 20. 2007. Ashton Carter. including approximately 700. March 24. Others such as Christopher Hughes acknowledge the potential for a ‘‘nuclear cascade’’ in Northeast Asia but argue it is unlikely for the time being. Slide 2.’’ PowerPoint Presentation. November 15. Btimes. p.iaea. Korea Economic Institute. North. Bwww. ‘‘North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan. 8.html. 4.html. 06-97A.’’ Washington Post . ‘‘U. Sanger. 75 Á 104. ‘‘China’s leaders fear that domestic energy shortages.nautilus. .org.ft. ‘‘Future Nuclear Proliferation Scenarios in Northeast Asia. Bwww. and 2. A1. Rivals Also Want Nuclear Power.’’ Financial Times . 20. Bwww. November 17. 14. Ibid. ‘‘Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Change of 2007.’’ Treasury Official to Help Free Up North Korean Funds. See. and North Korea Are Said to End Frozen Funds Impasse.’’ GlobalSecurity. Broad and David E. Siegfried S.346 CHRIS AJEMIAN the deal. public statement at the National Bureau of Asian Research conference: ‘‘Pursuing Security in Dynamic Asia.html#7BE4AC70.000 troops.nbr. p. 591 Á 604.csmonitor. pp. Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 9. ‘‘Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Change of Course.000 tanks. ‘‘IAEA Director General Concludes Trip to the DPRK. see Pyle. p. pdf. See also William J. Bwww.’’ New York Times . Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill said that North Korean officials ‘‘made it very clear that they have begun their tasks for the purpose of denuclearization. ‘‘I wouldn’t be surprised if [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad and other hardliners in the regime say. 2003. 2007. pp.’’ Nonproliferation Review 13 (November 2006). 5. ‘Why do we back down at the last minute. 11. 2006. David E. ‘‘Energy Critical Power Source within N Korea. ‘‘Taboo Against Nuclear Arms Is Being Challenged in Japan.

28. China Country Analysis Brief. 11. Von Hippel and Savage. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 347 21.pdf . et al. ‘‘Hu Jintao Urges Breakthrough in ‘Malacca Dilemma.asp?PRE SS_REL_ID 187.S. Ibid..S.. Lieberthal and Herberg. Bo Kong. Japan Country Analysis. 2. et al. September 26. 39. 48.uofaweb..eia. July 21.’’ Brookings 2006 (University of Alberta.’’ November 6.’’ SinoCast China Business Daily News .’’ p. Ibid. 46. ‘‘Redevelopment Priority’’). Bwww. EIA. p.eia. and 6. World Factbook .iea. 37. 26. ‘‘South Korea’s Power Play at the Six-Party Talks’’ (hereafter ‘‘South Korea’s Power Play’’). Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 publications/factbook/geos/ch.html#15E6CBE5. ‘‘North Korean Energy Needs?’’. Bwww. Bwww.pdf.nautilus. p. 11. EIA. 6. Ibid.cfm?nav03 50936&nav02 43590&nav01 Korea/pdf. Bwww. p. 2006. David von Hippel and Timothy Savage.pnl. 24. 26.3. Bhttps://cia. 42. Ibid. p.9 percent figure. South Korea Country Analysis Brief. Ibid. 32. Nautilus Institute Report (see sections 6. 34. 11. 27. p.. EIA. Ibid. China Country Analysis Brief. Ibid. ‘‘The DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy Balance And Suggested Approaches To Sectoral Redevelopment’’ (hereafter ‘‘Sectoral Redevelopment’’). see U.2.3. 44. 36.’’ p.. the threat of economic stagnation raises real risks of social instability. ‘‘Kim Reportedly Promises Not to Conduct Another Nuclear Weapon Test. 47. ‘‘Sectoral Redevelopment. China profile. updated November 2005. 27. 2006. ‘‘An Anatomy of China’s Energy Insecurity and Its Energy_Aid.’ ’’ James Tang. For the 9. ‘‘China Likely to Slow Down Progress in LNG Project. 9.nti. 50. On small demonstration power plants and local distribution.doe. updated August 2006. p. ‘‘China’s Search for Energy Security: Implications for U. Bwww. 37. 3. December 2005.eia. Bwww. p. see ‘‘Pipelines and Shipping.. updated March 15. Ibid. 43. Policy. 97. 29. David von Cleverer.. Ibid.ualberta. 36. 41. Bwww. see ibid. 5.. Bpnwcgs. 9.5 percent figure. and More Competitive Energy Future. ‘‘With the Grain or Against the Grain? Energy Security And Chinese Foreign Policy in the Hu Jintao Era. EIA. Ibid. Lieberthal and Herberg.nautilus. for the 10.pdf.. 2003).doe. 31. October 20. 33. p. Nautilus Institute (revised March Bwww.’’ p. revised. 40. .gov/Newsletter/otherdocs/anatchinaenergy. footnote 61. which could in turn threaten the continued political monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party. html. Ibid..’’ Global Security Newswire . Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security. China Country Analysis Brief..’’ p. 45. 118. International Energy Agency.pdf.doe. p. 22. 49.html. Ibid. 2007. Peter Hayes. 30. 35.’’ NBR Analysis 17 (April 2006). Ibid. ‘‘The World Energy Outlook 2006 Maps Out a Cleaner.’’ Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL).’’ Kenneth Lieberthal and Mikkal Herberg. Report Prepared for the Korea Energy Economics Institute. ‘‘China’s Search for Energy Security. ‘‘China’s Search for Energy Security. pp.pdf. 38. Ibid. updated May 2006. China Institute Web Site).ca/chinainstitute/ nav03. October 2006.ENERGY FOR SECURITY right to rule on economic performance and rising standards of living. 25. et al. see CIA.

8. 68. Keun-Wook Paik. 63.’’ No Answer Received.’’ p.. Ibid. Bwww. ‘‘Pipeline Gas. updated January 2006. 2 (July 2006) ‘‘Gazprom in Japan’s Pipeline.’’ Japan Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. For a discussion of pipeline and private sector dynamics. ‘‘Pipeline Gas.’’ Asia Times Online. Hayes and von 2006. Ibid. 16. 58. ‘‘Gas and Geopolitics in Northeast Asia Pipelines. 27. ‘‘Gas and Geopolitics.. Full. p. Chatham House Report. footnote 73. Ibid.’’ Bwww. ‘‘TNK-BP Offers Gazprom 51% of Shares in Kovykta Project. . 75. Bradley O. 71. 81. p. 12. Global Strategy Institute. Gazprom is expected to respond positively this year to TNK-BP’s offer. ‘‘Gas and Geopolitics. ‘‘South Korea’s Power Play. 65..’’ pp. and the Korean Nuclear Crisis. Paik.. 30. June 20.php?action_id 2&story_id 17953. 61. ‘‘Gas and Geopolitics.html. On perception of Mongolia. 67. p. Bwww.’’ p. Harrison. but there had been no official decision at the time of writing.’’ in Eberstadt and Ellings.’’ Leighty Foundation. ‘‘Russian Energy Roulette Spooks Japanese. Harrison.pdf. Ibid.leightyfoundation. Bwww. Ibid. See the Introduction by Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Petersburg Times (Russia).atimes.pdf.’’ p. 15. index. 12. January 2005.tnk-bp.nbr. pp.’’ Asia Policy .enecho. ‘‘Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Pipelines: The Reality and Implications. 66. 74.. November 30 Á December 1.pdf. ‘‘What If?’’ Keun-Wook Paik and Kengo Asakura envisioned a circular natural gas pipeline system for Northeast Asia around the same time in 1999 Á 2000. p. 70. 26.. Regional Stability. See Selig Harrison. 2006. htm. 62. 2 Á 8.html. Kazuhiko Ohashi. pp. ‘‘Proposal for a Northeast Asian Hydrogen Highway: From a Natural Gas-Based to a Hydrogen-Based Society. 23-36. p. 82. October 24.’’ 53.’’ World Policy Journal. 26. Ellings.’’ p. 10 Á 12. 26. ‘‘What If? Economic Implications of a Fundamental Shift in North Korean Security Policy. Bwww. ‘‘Pipeline Gas. ‘‘Hydrogen: The Fuel of the Future?’’ Center for Strategic and Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 80.’’ Paper Prepared for the Second Colloquium on ‘‘Eurasian Pipelines and East Asia: A Path to Integration or a Marriage of Convenience?’’ Columbia University. ‘‘Visualizing a North Korean ‘Bold Switchover’: International Financial Institutions and Economic Development in the articles/wpj02-4/harrison. Russia Country Analysis Brief. 76. 34. 18.’’ p. ‘‘Gas and Geopolitics. 56. 17.’’ p. ‘‘Trends in Natural Gas: Outlook. Ibid. Hayes and von Hippel. p.go. Ibid.pdf. Bwww.. 77. 64. On China’s objections.worldpolicy.’’ St.chathamhouse. Hisane Masaki. Bwww. Ibid. 73. 25. p. ‘‘Pipeline Gas.doe. 79. see Keun-Wook Paik. Bwww. Masaru Hirata. et al. ‘‘Pipeline Gas Introduction to the Korean Peninsula’’ (hereafter ‘‘Pipeline Gas’’). 27. Babson.html. see Harrison. See Harrison. 2006. 2006.’’ p. 83.348 CHRIS AJEMIAN 51. meti. 27. and William Leighty. Paik.’’ Press Release. Winter 2002 Á 2003. See Paik.harriman institute. EIA. 59. Ibid. Bwww. ‘‘Pipeline Gas. ‘‘Energy Sources: Hydrogen. March 15. August 2005. Department of Energy.pdf. No. 72. Bwww. 41.. see Paik. ‘‘South Korea’s Power Play.’’ p. 78. 69.sptimes. Ibid.

2007. David Lague. ‘‘Visualizing a North Korean ‘Bold Switchover. 7A.2551/ 349 Downloaded By: [Syracuse University] At: 14:08 31 May 2010 .ENERGY FOR SECURITY International Studies.’ ’’ p. October 12. ‘‘China Ends North Korea Talks Amid Delay in Return of Funds.’’ New York Times . 84.com_csis_pubs/task. 18. p. 85. Babson. Bwww. March 23.view/ id. 2005.

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