ALBANO Note: These questions are patterned from the sample questions by the SC in this year’s Bar Examination. The answers were intended to be lengthen inorder that the reason behind the law and the decision may be reflected to guide the Bar Candidates. The candidates can shorten the answers to make it convenient for the examiners to correct. FAMILY LAW Adultery of a woman. Q – Is the adultery of the woman a ground to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity? Explain. Answer: No. The adulterous acts of a woman do not even rise to the level of the “psychological incapacity” that the law requires. Her act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated wit h a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The husband must be able to establish that the wife's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. Doubtless, the woman was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had some character flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations. (Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272; Silvino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinhug, et al., G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010; Ochocoso v. Alano, et al., G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011; Villalon v. Villalon; Rosalino Marable v. Myrna Marable, G.R. No. 178741, January 17, 2011). Refusal to have sex with husband. Q – A and B are married. The man contended that the wife refused to consummate their marriage by refusing to have sexual intercourse with him during the marriage. He alleged that their last intercourse was prior to their marriage. He contended that the wife was suffering from psychological incapacity. Is the contention correct? Explain. Answer: No. The husband’s evidence merely established that the wife refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. There must be proof that the psychological disorder renders her “truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligati ons. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. In Marcos v. Marcos, it was ruled that Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. (Noel Baccay v. Maribel Baccay, et al., G.R. No. 173138, December 1, 2010).

Effect of a foreign divorce. Q – A former Filipino citizen got married to a Filipina. Due to work and other personal commitments, the man returned to Canada after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines to surprise his wife, but he was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. He filed a petition for divorce in Canada which was granted. Wanting to marry his girlfriend, he registered the Canadian divorce with the Civil Registry of Pasig but despite the registration of the same, the Local Civil Registrar refused to issue a license for him to remarry. He filed a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign judgment which was denied by the RTC, holding that he was not the proper party to file the petition as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only Filipinos can avail of the remedy under the second paragraph of Article 26, Family Codeand in accordance with the legislative intent as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114 (2005), to “avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse”. He contended that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. Is the contention correct? Explain. Answer: No. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right established is in favor of the Filipino spouse. As held in Van Dorn v. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139 and Pilapil v. Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 74 SCRA 653: “To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.” The provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.” The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; (Art. 17, NCC) Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. (Gilbert B. Corpus v. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas, et al., G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010). Judgment declaring a spouse presumptively dead is immediately final and executory; remedy is Rule 65, not Rule 45. Q – Yolanda Granada and Cyrus Granada got married in 1991. In 1994, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment but since then, he never communicated with Yolanda. After nine (9) years of waiting, she filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead which the RTC granted. The Republic of the Philippines appealed from the decision contending that Yolanda failed to prove earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus, failed to prove well-founded belief that he was

G. the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. (Rep. July 13. the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. Answer: The CA is correct. 2012). 2011). 41. it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. subsequent execution of SPA perfects the contract. and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. No. G. (Art. The CA granted the motion. because the execution of the SPA can be considered as acceptance of the mortgage by the other spouse that perfected the contract or continuing offer. In sum. both provisions also state that “the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person. the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She issued checks as partial payments but the same were dishonoured. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. 2012. From the decision of the CA. Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code provide that the powers of the administration do not include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. No.already dead. Sereno. 247. From the decision of the Court of Appeals. . Mortgage of conjugal property without consent of spouse is void. Is the ruling correct? Why? Answer: No. Since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding. However. v. F. Q . the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. Family Code was a summary judicial proceedings in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and. 187512. Is the dismissal of the appeal correct? Explain. Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void.R. The RTC decision is immediately final and executory and not subject to ordinary appeal. No. By express provision of law. however. To be sure. Granada. July 13. 187512. not appealable. J). April 13. hence. The RTC however ruled that the subsequent execution of the SPA cannot be made to retroact to the date of the execution of the real estate mortgage. Enrico & Edna Lindo.C. in rendering judgment thereon. 183984. the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.).On October 31. that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Sps. 1995.” (Arturo Sarte Flores v. Yolanda C. the creditor filed a complaint for Foreclosure of the Mortgage with damages. The RTC dismissed the case as the mortgage was executed without the consent of the husband even as it noted that he executed a Special Power of Attorney for the wife to execute the mortgage on November 4. (Rep. the woman obtained a loan secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a real proper under their names but without the consent of the husband.R. As a matter of course. under Article 41 of the Family Code. The appropriate remedy is a special civil action for certiorari if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Yolanda Granada. It goes without saying. thus. such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.R. 1995. G. Yolanda moved to dismiss the appeal contending that the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death based under Art. the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that. v.

R. They have a family home. void. They did not invoked the exemption from levy of the family home. it was said that at no other time can the status of a residential house as a family home can be set up and proved and its exemption from execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction: While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code.” Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at public action.512 Phil. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. G. but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. Sale of conjugal property by a spouse without consent of the other. Failure to do so estop them from . No. such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Explain. G. they were sued for ejectment where judgment was rendered. They however renamed as lessees but for failure to pay the rentals. even if separated in fact. v. Interdimensional Realty. among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. Is the ruling correct? Why? Answer: No.Note: This is an example of a void contract that can be ratified. No. (Siochi v. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. Gozon.R. the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such.. State the effect of such failure. it must be claimed not by the sheriff. Answer: Their failure to invoke and prove that the house and lot was a family home is a waiver of such defense or right. 2010). they now are barred from raising the same. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that “[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43. Inc.. 169977. what is forfeited in favor of their daughter is not his share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property. et al. (See: Art. It was ruled by the CA that the ½ undivided share of the offending spouse in the property was already forfeited in favor of their daughter based on the ruling of the RTC that the offending spouse in an action for legal separation is deprived of his share in the net profits of the conjugal properties.” Clearly. 5. In Honrado v. et al. NCC). which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2). He was convicted with civil indemnity. Q – A and B are married. there was an action for legal separation. No. 657 (2005). under Article 63 of the Family Code. (2). It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. In the execution. the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. Thus. A issued a check which was dishonored. If there is a decree of legal separation. The family home’s exemption from execution must be set u p and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. (2) and 63. Siochi. March 18. 169900. No. CA. It is only the share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of their daughter. Q – In a case. they invoked the exemption of the family home from levy but the plaintiff contended that the spouses did not assert and prove that their house and lot was a family home prior to the public auction conducted by the sheriff. the judgment creditor was the purchaser in sheriff’s sale. The family home was levied upon and sold where C.

R. Family Code. Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child. G. He denied being the father of the child and that the signature appearing in the child Certificate of Live Birth is not his signature. Reyes. et al. February 6. 195. Article 172(1) and any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Tayag v. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child. 2008. 165016. CA. G. No. Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. there is no basis to order support. 1990. Before a child may be entitled to support. And “while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document.R. Family Code). 2012. One such proof is the record of birth appearing in the civil register. G. he must be recognized by the alleged father. this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. March 24. No. 172(2)(2). 2010). Just like in a birth certificate. Alternatively. She alleged that respondent is the father of her child.R. The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action for compulsory recognition. as the father of the child without the signature of the alleged father. if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. G. 2008. first establish the filiation of the child. Tayag-Gallor. the bases were the record of birth although unsigned by the alleged father and the baptismal certificate identifying the alleged father. petitioner must. No. 77867. The object of RA 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that there is no prior judgment establishing the filiation of the child hence. where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved. 182367. The RTC granted the support based on those documents.R.” The Rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code. in proper action. Acero. (De Mesa v. illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. If filiation is beyond question. 549 SCRA 68). G. 181 SCRA 861. . A child must establish filiation before support may be granted. “It is settled that “[a] certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. January 16. (Art. 185064. 554 SCRA 513). Vallecera. she may directly file an action for support. No. Vasquez. Is the decision correct? Why? Answer: No. Q – In a complaint for support alleging that a child is an illegitimate child of the alleged father. support follows as matter of obligation. Q – Petitioner filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against the respondent for alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262 and asked for financial support. “Time and again.” The baptismal certificate is not a good proof paternity. until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. (Montefalcon v. June 17. because the two (2) documents are not proofs of filiation. the lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity. No. (Art. this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him. J).R. Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. In short. Dolina v. 174680. Is the dismissal correct? Why? Answer: Yes. December 15. An order for x x x support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.. To be entitled to legal support. (De la Puerta v.later claiming the said exemption.

She further contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition. 180 SCRA 576). 146 SCRA 250 (1986). an action for partition was filed. therefore. hence. et al. Indubitably. 128004. . J. Notarte.R. G. December 22. 78 Phil. Respondent contended that the properties were acquired out of his personal funds.R. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition. March 21. G. 196 (1947). the complaint will not even lie if the claimant. and C are the co-owners of a real property having inherited from their parents. they were able to organize a manpower services company where petitioner owned 3. CA. 1996. x x x baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence. 1989.R. Answer: Yes. recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. they are estopped from denying the existence of an oral partition. August 15. September 25.. They orally partitioned the same. (Catapusan v. Thus. et al. See: Gotardo v. Bayani Samoy. Respondent maintains otherwise. Q – Parties lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage despite the fact that respondent was legally married. G. August 29. Q – A.R. it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. 172471. Garcia. 296 SCRA 445. The determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition.R. G. (Hernandez can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity. but respondent refused. Notarte. v. 180614. No. 2012). hence. 2011).” (Antonio Perla v. 1998. the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. 165427. Lim. Brion.. It is not required that the partition agreement be registered or annotated in the title to be valid. 165166. Mirasol Baring. On appeal. Is the agreement valid? Explain. the RTC ruled that respondent was the sole owner. Existence of partnership necessary in cases of partition. No. Answer: The contentions are not correct. November 12. Tan v. After exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the contested estate. PROPERTY Oral partition is invalid. she contended that she was a pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties and that the court’s decision subjected the certificates of title to collateral attack.R. G. hence. petitioner admitted that the properties were acquired from the income of the manpower services company. No. During their coverture. No. Buling. 2010. 264 SCRA 534. Decide. No. No. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid or enforceable at law. or petitioner in this case. Five (5) properties were acquired by them and registered under their names ostensibly as husband and wife.R. No. B. (Fabrica v. At the trial.33%. Jr. Petitioner demanded for some more. 2012. (Municipality of Biñan v. equity will in proper cases. CA. More importantly. they agreed to divide the properties. until and unless this issue of coownership is definitely and finally resolved. J). Betty Lacbayan v. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. 109262. But the relationship did not last long. Brion. Andal. does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties. G. 69260. November 21. where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of their respective portions set off to each other. G.

Del Rosario v. G. dismissed the same. That before his death. (Javier v. (Aluad v. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. 91 Phil. 10 October 1994. that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive.” Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Sps. Veridiano II. . 237 SCRA 565. Is the dismissal correct? Why? Answer: No. It had no attestation clause. September 1. et al. it is void. No. this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. 823 (1952)). but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed. 48050. Aluad. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. The writ of demolition can be granted only as an effect of a final judgment or order hence. 176943. DONATION Designation of donation as mortis causa is not controlling. 2008. ruled it to be one of mortis causa and since it did not comply with the formalities of a will. In Austria-Magat v. the property must be identified. or. it was held that “irrevocability” is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa. 426 SCRA 263 (2002). Q – There was a donation by the spouses to their children and granddaughter denominated as “Donation Mortis Causa” stating that it is irrevocable. The CA. If a donation by its terms is inter vivos. 187056.Action publiciana or reinvindicatoria is the remedy if a property is encroached upon. 569 SCRA 697. the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will. the donation was submitted to probate but the RTC ruled it to be a donation inter vivos due to its irrevocability. The designation that it is a Donation Mortis Causa is not controlling. where “revocability” is precisely the essence of the act. Sevilla. No. there was a complaint for a writ of demolition filed by the owners of a property alleging that they discovered that their lot was encroached upon by the structures built by the adjacent owner without their knowledge and consent. 450 SCRA 598 (2003)). No. Sps.R. Q – In a case. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor. 2. and had only two (2) witnesses. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donee’s acceptance of the donation.R. Concepcion. the other party refused to remove the structures hence. (Concepcion v. Court of Appeals. After the death of one of the donors. what amounts to the same thing. G. it was immediately operative and final. 2010). The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated. The CA reversed holding that a complaint for recovery of possession should have been filed. (Heirs of Sevilla v. Elegio and Dolia Cañezo v. Bautista. ad nutum. No. Is the ruling of the CA correct? Why? Answer: No.R. Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos. 170189. on appeal.R. and 3. 2010). September 20. While inaccurately captioned as an action for a “Writ of Demolition with Damages” is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code which provides that in an action to recover. the complaint was filed. October 17. Such encroachment was confirmed by the relocation survey of the property. Ferrer. G. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff directing the removal of the structures. G. and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendan t’s claim. Despite demands. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics: 1.. The donees accepted the donation.

Bustamante. (Gonzalo Villanueva represented by his heirs v. No. Laureta v. Branoco. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. July 13. (4) The done accepted the land donated. City Gov’t. Gancayco. (2) the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her upon my demise. (Emilio Gancayco v. or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others. or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x” (Puig v. omission. The fact that he was given an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisance per se. In 1996 the City Council gave him an exemption from constructing an arcade. (Tolentino v.” signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate. Geraldez. 517 SCRA 448 (2007)). may transfer. (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.. G. or its demolished portion. G. (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street. the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor. but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ. defies or disregards decency or morality.R. 823. NCC) which. not in futuro. 168 Phil 404. 592 SCRA 552. the same land will not be reverted to the Donor. Concepcion. 734. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act.R. she could have easily stipulated. NUISANCE A structure if declared illegal does not mean it is a nuisance per se. had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the property. Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her. that “the donor. 44 Phil. People. et al. G. Mata. Is it a nuisance per se? Why? Answer: No. Tayabas v. being reflected in the Deed. Answer: It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building. as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient. who bought it from Alvegia Rodrigo in August 1970. What is the nature of the donation? Explain. condition or property. (Alejandro v. waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclai m title. or.Donation inter vivos. establishment. 91 Phil. or any body of water. Rodrigo stipulated that “if the Donee predeceases me. (3) shocks. . No. sell. but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez. 2011). The respondents answered and claimed that they purchased the property from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom Rodrigo donated in May 1965. Sps. MMDA v. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti. business. Indeed. 668). when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. First. January 24. took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. when is it one. Peñaflorida) or used words to that effect. G. as the testator did in another case. The deed of donation stated among others: (1) a property was given to the done. 182567. 2009. 177933.R. to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. Instead. October 11.R. Q – The petitioner filed an action to recover a property claiming that they purchased it from Casimiro Vere in July 1971. (2) annoys or offends the senses. 2011). (3) if the Donee predeceases me. No. 177807. of Quezon City. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition (Art. No. 172804. Clearly. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. his heirs and successors. Concepcion v. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity. Q – MMDA claimed that the wing walls of a building constructed by Justice Gancayco on his property was a nuisance per se.

et al. Laxa. 2012. The bank contended that it has already prescribed since 30 years have already lapsed. Yet. While the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a property for more than 20 years. 179859. Is the condition in the will valid? Why? Answer: No. (Baltazar. There was no showing that she was one month or less. PRESCRIPTION 10-year prescriptive period for reconveyance does not apply if the contract is void. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. v. August 9.There was an application for a renewal and increase in their loan using a title but the bank disapproved it without returning the title.SUCCESSION Effect if will provides for indivision of property among heirs. Article 1410 of the . (Torres & Lopez de Bueno v. Q – After the will was admitted to probate. G. or that his mind be wholly unbroken. a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the will (Art. injury or other cause. NCC). NCC) and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. (In Re: Petition for Probate of Last Will & Testament of Basilio Santiago. The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. The owner filed an action for reconveyance. however.. the proper objects of his bounty. v. 174489. No. Ma. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. April 11. before making the will. Del Castillo. and the character of the testamentary act. Q . The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a will. did not present medical evidence to show that she was of unsound mind. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being unsound mind. Pilar Santiago. contrary to public policy. 728 (1933)). or unshattered by disease. unimpaired. Answer: Yes. G.R. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of. the children. 728 Phil. the 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the reconveyance is based on fraud which makes a contract voidable (and that the aggrieved party is not in possession of the land whose title is to be actually reconveyed). 772 (1926). Petitioners. No. But while this is true. petitioners appealed and contended that the testator was “magulyan” or forgetful. et al. J). Zoilo Santiago. it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code. so much so that it effectively stripped her of her testamentary capacity. Q – The will of Basilio Santiago stated that a house and lot in the City of Manila shall be transferred in the names of Maria Pilar and Clemente. 48 Phil. 2010). When a will provides for indivision of a property. et al. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. 870 and 1083. 494. Is the admission of the will to probate correct? Explain. Besides.R. Article 799 of the New Civil Code states that to be of sound mind. Abella. It does not apply to an action to nullify a contract which is void ab initio. More importantly. it is contrary to law and public policy. Lopez. it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties. (Arts. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states: The burden of proof to show that the testator was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies in the oppositors. she was publicly known to be insane. there was foreclosure and sale of the property. it is subject to statutory limitation as the law provides that the prohibition to divide a property in a coownership can only last for twenty (20) years. She was likewise suffering from paranoia. for purposes of administration only but no one shall be the owner of the same. Sancho v. Title was issued. 800.

may be rescinded. a definitive judicial determination with respect to the thing subject of litigation is not a condition sine qua non before the rescissory action contemplated under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code may be instituted. there is the possibility that the same may had already been conveyed to third persons acting in good faith. Darapa. T-1. the petition raising such issue. On appeal. hence. even if it should be valid. to secure the reparation of damages caused to them by a contract. 2011). rendering the sale and the subsequent issuance of TCT in DBP’s name void ab initio and subject to attack at any time conformably to the rule in Article 1410 of the Civil Code. Sps. there was a complaint for partition filed by one of the heirs as the other refused to partition the properties. without approval of the court. While the action was pending. but by reason of injury or damage caused to either of the parties therein or to third persons are considered defective and. after learning that there was a Donation Inter Vivos. et al. Accordingly. by means of the restoration of things to their condition at the moment prior to the celebration of said contract. It is a remedy to make ineffective a contract. The RTC ordered the rescission of the deed of donation as it was done without the knowledge and approval of the other parties or plaintiffs or the Court. one of them donated a property belonging to the co-ownership to one of her nephews. No. March 23. The donee opposed the Supplemental Pleading contending that rescission under Article 1384(1). G. (Abalos. v. Q – After the death of their predecessor-in-interest. Recovery of Possession and Damages.Civil Code categorically states that an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. Moreover. this would only bring about the very predicament that the said provision of law seeks to obviate. validly entered into and therefore obligatory under normal conditions. The primordial purpose of Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is to secure the possible effectivity of the impending judgment by a court with respect to the thing subject of litigation. rendering .997 without any legal right to do so. NCC applies only when there is already a prior judicial decree on who between the contending parties actually owned the properties under litigation. the CA reversed the judgment on the ground that before an action for rescission may be filed there must first be a judicial determination that the same actually belonged to the estate of the donor. the action was an action for “Annulment of Tile. they filed a Supplemental Pleading praying that the donation be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. thus. The petitioners’ right to institute the action for rescission pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is not preconditioned upon the RTC’s determination as to the ownership of the said parcels of land.R. The assertion that rescission may only be had after the RTC had finally determined that the parcels of land belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon does not intrinsically amiss. conceding that the right to bring the rescissory action pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is preconditioned upon a judicial determination with regard to the thing subject litigation. The right to ask for the rescission of a contract under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is not contingent upon the final determination of the ownership of the thing subject of litigation. Assuming arguendo that a rescissory action under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code could only be instituted after the dispute with respect to the thing subject of litigation is judicially determined.” grounded on the theory that the DBP foreclosed their land covered by TCT No. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS Rescission is the remedy for reparation of the damage done. the heirs became the co-owners of several parcels of land. Decide. by reason of external causes resulting in a pecuniary prejudice to one of the contracting parties or their creditors. Answer: Rescission is a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties and even to third persons. It seeks to protect the binding effect of a court’s impending adjudication vis-à-vis the thing subject of litigation regardless of which among the contending claims therein would subsequently be upheld. Contracts which are rescissible are valid contracts having all the essential requisites of a contract. Hence. In this case. 164693. Some of them took possession of the properties hence.

principle of mutuality of contracts. It is a purely executory contract and at most confers a right to obtain a renewal if there is compliance with the conditions on which the right is made to depend. The lessor argued that the renewal of the contract cannot be made to depend upon the sole will of the lessee. Licuanan it was ruled that demand made before the foreclosure is effected is essential. Ding Velayo Sports Center. August 13. but it was foreclosed even as there was no demand for payment. 182435. et al.R. second. and third. The right of renewal constitutes a part of the lessee's interest in the land and forms a substantial and integral part of the agreement. (MIAA v. There was no provision on extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage without need of demand. G. After all. GMC should have first made a demand on the spouses before proceeding to foreclose the real estate mortgage. valid. Q – An obligation was contracted secured by a mortgage. Mutuality obtains in such a contract and equality exists between the lessor and the lessee since they remain with the same faculties in respect to fulfillment. Their rights and obligations become mutually fixed. GMC proceeded to foreclose the mortgage. is fundamentally part of the consideration in the contract and is no different from any other provision of the lease carrying an undertaking on the part of the lessor to act conditioned on the performance by the lessee. December 14. Is the foreclosure valid? Why? Answer: No. a complaint to compel the lessor to renew it was filed.any judicial determination with regard to the thing subject of litigation illusory. (Lilia Ada.R.. Will the action prosper? Why? Answer: Yes. Inc. the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtor’s performance. As the contract carries no such provision on demand not being necessary for delay to exist. the lessor is free to give or not to give the option to the lessee. hence. This option. 161718. The lessee cannot thereafter escape liability even if he should subsequently decide to abandon the premises. if demand . the debtor delays performance. v. Q – The parties entered into a lease contract over a parcel of land granting unto the lessee the exclusive option to renew the contract subject to the condition that it should comply with a 60-day notice of the intention to exercise the option to renew the contract which the lessee did. Thereafter. and the lessor may hold him liable for the rent therefor. and the lessee is entitled to retain possession of the property for the duration of the new lease. Florante Baylon. And while the lessee has a right to elect whether to continue with the lease or not. The act of asking to go to the office for a possible settlement of the account is not the demand required. then they were already in default and foreclosure was proper. which is provided in the same lease agreement. First. both parties are thereafter bound by the new lease agreement. because of the principle of mutuality of contracts. J). 2012. no default. this paradoxical eventuality is not what the law had envisioned. There are three requisites necessary for a finding of default. When it was foreclosed. An express agreement which gives the lessee the sole option to renew the lease is frequent and subject to statutory restrictions. the same would be void for being a potestative condition. 2011). The fact that such option is binding only on the lessor and can be exercised only by the lessee does not render it void for lack of mutuality. The lessor refused to renew the contract. Reyes. Provision in contract of lease granting the lessee exclusive right to renew. Foreclosure of mortgage void for lack of demand. However. the mortgagor contended that it was void. G. otherwise. No. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. What was done was for GMC to request the debtors to go to their office and discuss the settlement of their account. No. the obligation is demandable and liquidated. because there was no delay. Surely. valid and binding on the parties. once he exercises his option to continue and the lessor accepts. If demand was made and duly received by the respondents and the latter still did not pay.

The reason is that. NCC. The public use was not pursued. The NHA’s right of action accrued on February 18. No. 2007. but the petitioner contended that it is not bound by the oral assurance that it would be resold. No. like sale of property within the prohibitory period is a ground for rescission. here at least within five years from the time he acquired it free from any encumbrance. NHA sought annulment/rescission of the sale because they violated the five-year restriction against such sale provided in their contract. especially so that it has been converted to a commercial area. Is the sale valid? Why? Answer: No. July 1.R. 1992 when it learned of the forbidden sale of the property. The essence of the government’s socialized housing program is to preserve the beneficiary’s ownerships for a reasonable length of time. then the loans had not yet become due and demandable. hence. The NHA filed the action after four (4) years. Q – The property of the respondent was declared condemned for public use to expand the Lahug International Airport. No. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. the prohibition against resale remained even after the land had been released from the mortgage. The five-year restriction against resale. (Lalicon. 185440. Is the defense proper? Why? Answer: No. The restriction clause is more of a condition on the sale of the property to the beneficiaries rather than a condition on the mortgage constituted on it. 2011). The statute has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud. 193723. the contention is that it has already prescribed. 516 SCRA 644. G. July 20.R. if a contract has been totally or partially performed. there was a compromise to stop the respondent from pursuing with the appeal. Q – It was claimed that under Article 1389 of the Civil Code the “action to claim rescission m ust be commenced within four years” from the time of the commission of the cause for it. but with an oral assurance that if the purpose would not be pursued. 2011). (Lalicon. Substantial breach. et al. (G. within the prohibitory period. hence. 2011). they have the right to dispose of the same. The Statute of Frauds operates only with respect to executory contracts. it did so well within the 10-year prescriptive period. et al. v. February 26. there was a demand for the resale of the property. measures out the desired hold that the government felt it needed to ensure that its objective of providing cheap housing for the homeless is not defeated by wily entrepreneurs. Since the NHA filed its action for annulment of sale on April 10. 185440. the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or . This meant that respondents had not defaulted in their payments and the foreclosure by petitioner was premature. Foreclosure is valid only when the debtor is in default in the payment of his obligation . On appeal. and does not apply to contracts which have been completely or partially performed. 1998. Such violation comes under Article 1191 where the applicable prescriptive period is that provided in Article 1144 which is 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. G. STATUTE OF FRAUDS Statute of frauds is inapplicable if oral compromise has been performed. July 1. NHA. No. However. The resale without the NHA’s consent is a substantial breach. in executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. The beneficiaries contended that as owners.was not made. General Milling Corp. Sps. V. 150097. Ramos. Q – NHA sought to rescind the sale made by housing beneficiaries of a property they bought from it within the prohibited period of five (5) years from the date of release of the mortgage without prior written consent of the NHA.R.R. G. Period to file action for rescission under Article 1191. void. NHA. using the Statute of Frauds as defense. Indeed. The beneficiaries sold the same to their son. counted from the release of the property from the NHA mortgage. hence. V. the property would be resold to him.

evade the obligations. which is void. for. their assigns and heirs. there was no money involved in the sale. November 14. (Arsenal v. An action to declare the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe. (Heirs of Ureta. although the contract states that the purchase price of P2. (Montecillo v. Thus. Lozada. x x x and the defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected. they have no personality to question its validity. it has been proven that such was never in fact paid as there was no money involved. while it appears to be supported by a valuable consideration.. where a contract is absolutely simulated. et al. It is recognized in our jurisprudence that a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title. responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him thereby. Sr.. it is void.. the heirs of a decedent sought the annulment or nullity of a deed of extrajudicial settlement and sale upon a claim that the signatures of some of the heirs had been falsified and that the remaining signatories could not have signed the deed as they were already dead.. for lack of consent. 176625. No. et al. 36 (1986)). Q – The contract provided for a consideration of P2. it passes no right. the deed of sale is null and void for lack of consideration. hence. 1421. 434 Phil.000. follow that the Deed of Sale is void for lack of consideration. In this case. 227 Phil. A forged deed is a nullity.No. the oral compromise settlement having been partially performed.R.R. the heirs of an owner of a property whose signature was forged in a contract of sale filed an action to declare it void. February 25. 2010). (Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority. hence. v. Article 1311 and Article 1421 of the Civil Code provide that contracts take effect only between the parties. It must. v. No. at the same time. Q – In a case. but heirs. and other cases. Reyes. v. a simulated contract. It was further contended that defense of illegality of a contract is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected (Art. it is held in trust. It is well-settled that where a deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid. September 14. The Statute of Frauds cannot apply. as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts. Heirs of Liberato Ureta. 2008. 174012. et al. respondents relied on the same by not pursuing their appeal before the CA. for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already delivered by him from the transaction in litigation. It was contended that since the heirs of a party were not privies to the contract of sale.000. 571 SCRA 165). it is extended to third persons who are directly affected by the contract. but no money was involved. therefore. The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties.bad faith. even third persons who may be prejudiced thereby may set up its inexistent. Q – In a case. et al.R. G. By reason of such assurance made in their favor. Is the sale valid? Why? Answer: No. 456 (2002)). Thus. Sr.. but no money was involved. G. IAC. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. . No. et al. the parties are not strangers to the parties to the contract. respectively. and. Tudtud. May the action prosper? Why? Answer: Yes. Heirs of Ureta. 2011). 165748. (Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Sr. G.00 in the sale of 6 parcels of land.00 was paid to the seller for the subject properties. subject to attack anytime. (Heirs of Policronio Ureta.. NCC). Effect if document states that there was consideration.R. G. hence. because the deed is void. they have the right to question the same. Even third persons may file an action for nullity if they directly affected. 165748). et al.

the presumption will not apply. Q – A property was wrongfully included in the title of another. and as long as the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens system is still in the name of the person who caused such registration. the bank foreclosed the mortgage and eventually the property was transferred to the bank. The rule is not absolute. However.When there is a showing of such illegality. if property is acquired through mistake or fraud. but the lessee contended that since the lessor was no longer the owner. The action for the purpose is also imprescriptible. considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. an action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property to the real owner. v. neither could it validate a deed which is null and void. if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. Fernando. and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent. G.R. For failure to pay the rentals. 171129. In order to do this. . as what the tenant did in this case. No. He alleged that he was in possession of the property all the time even if registered under the name of the other party. What a tenant is estopped from denying x x x is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. The conclusive presumption found in Sec. 2011) ESTOPPEL Tenant cannot deny the title of the lessor due to estoppel. (Sps. et al.” It is true that the tenant cannot assert ownership of the property by a third person. by force of law. who contended that the action has already prescribed. the property registered is deemed to be simply held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered. same held in trust. Rule 131 of the Rules of Court known as estoppel against tenants provides the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.R. No. it is merely the evidence of such title. 191889. Fernando. The lessor contended that the lessee is stopped from questioning the title of the lessor. the person obtaining it is. such title could not vest upon them ownership of the entire property. TRUST Fraudulent acquisition of property. Is the contention of the lessee correct? Explain. Answer: Yes. The titled owner even acknowledged such error. January 31. a tenant in proper cases such as this. For failure of the lessor to pay the loan. because he is holding it under the rule of implied trust for the benefit of the true owner. he had not right to sue for ejectment. (Enrico Santos v. While a certificate of title was issued in respondents’ favor. G. National Statistic Office. Q – There was a contract of lease over a property but the lessor did not inform the lessee that there was a mortgage over the property subject of the lease contract. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. the tenant must essentially assert that title to the leased premises already belongs to a third person who need not be a party to the ejectment case. NCC. Registration does not vest title. 2011). Under Article 1456. may show that the landlord’s title has been conveyed to another. and the former then has the right to sue for the reconveyance of the property. except if passed to an innocent purchaser for value. 2(b). demand was made to pay and vacate. action for reconveyance.” Hence. The owner filed an action to recover the erroneously included property. Will the action prosper? Why? Answer: Yes. exception. “the tenant may show that the landlord’s title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation. April 6.

its terms and its validity. PNB. (Barcellano v. 2011). It was contended that the sale is void. et al. inadequacy of the price at a forced sale is immaterial and does not nullify a sale since. 532 SCRA 747. 1623. Green.000. Unlike in an ordinary sale. The written notice was obviously exacted by the Code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale. 491. and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. does not start. No. Court of Appeals. Jr. No. acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner. 930. Bank of PI v. A complaint for legal redemption was filed but it was opposed on the ground that he complied with the requirement of notice under Article 1623. 442. where there has been strict compliance with all the requisites marked out by law to obtain the highest possible price. NCC). v. La Urbana vs. No. . Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. Q – The owner of a real property offered the sale to the adjoining owners and one of them agreed to the sale to take place after the harvest season. is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. 695 (1966) where the SC said that such notice is indispensable. February 1. and that. Guerrero vs.. (Government of the Philippines vs.. 182769. 2007.R. 498 (1939)). 2012). G. (New Sampaguita Builders Construction. NCC but they failed to exercise the right of redemption. Bank of the Philippine Islands v . G. the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property. September 14. September 3. 156364. does not satisfy the statute. Without a written notice. Belando. 479 Phil. No. the period of thirty days within which the right of legal pre-emption may be exercised. An action for reconveyance of registered land based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years. April 12.R.00. The fact that a property is sold at public auction for a price lower than its alleged value. PR Builders. Banas.. 161030. G. Inc.. The contention that he action has already prescribed because of the lapse of ten (10) years is not correct.. R. The heirs of one of the adjoining owners learned about the sale a day after it was sold and conveyed their intention to redeem the property but the seller answered.R. 123 Phil. v. The ten-year prescriptive period applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. Hulst v. Guerrero. 165287. in view of the terms in which Article of the Philippine Civil Code is couched. does not prescribe. Meneses. SALES Q – In a foreclosure sale of a property worth P5M. in a forced sale. 1939. Inc.The party thus aggrieved has the right to recover his or their title over the property by way of reconveyance while the same has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value. Written notice to prospective redemption is mandatory. De Asis. The indispensability of a written notice had long been discussed in the early case of Conejero v. Reyes. 236 SCRA 420 (1994)). 57 Phil. But he later sold the same to another.. the method of notification prescribed remains exclusive. G. 45483. (Huang v. 54 Phil.R. G. the right to seek reconveyance. it was sold for only P900. The National Loan and Investment Board v. The statute not having provided for any alternative. because of the lack of written notice to the prospective redemption. The reason is that the one who is in actual possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. a low price is more beneficial to the mortgage debtor for it makes redemption of the property easier. saying that there was already a contract of sale executed with the buyer and that they never tendered the redemption amount. is not of itself sufficient to annul said sale. 67 Ph il. et al. mere knowledge of the sale. (Fernando. There was likewise no need to comply with the written notice requirement since they already knew of the sale. A. 453 (2004). 2010). (Art. 52 Phil. Acuña. et al.. and where there is no showing that a better price is obtainable. Such written notice is mandatory. No. September 30.

(503 Phi. however. they sold the same to several buyers. alleging that their predecessor bought the properties from Cobarde.. one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for one to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor. Limbaco. Cobarde made representations that he owned the lots and sold the same to Cabigas. its requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner. this fact should have put the Cabigas spouses on guard and prompted them to check with the Registry of Deeds as to the most recent certificates of title to discover if there were any liens. The terms and conditions of the contract only affected the manner of payment. the execution of a notarized deed of sale is equivalent to the delivery of a thing sold. The terms and conditions pertained to the performance of the contract and not the perfection therefore or the transfer of ownership. In Abad v. and did not even bother to perform the most perfunctory of investigations by checking the properties’ titles with the Registry of Deeds.R. or other attachments covering the lots in question. the land was registered not in Cobarde’s name.00 upon the execution of the deed of sale with the balance payable directly to the mortgagee bank within a reasonable time. 2010). 175291. July 27. G. Revilla v. although no title was shown to him. By itself. as a rule.000. 07 Phil. Sps. Corollarily. Ouano sold the lots to National Airport Authority for the use of the Cebu-Lahug Airport but when the use fell. The buyer contended that it was a contract of absolute sale. 2011). After obtaining titles. because their predecessors in-interest are not buyers in good faith and for value. not the immediate transfer of ownership upon the execution of the notarized contract. Their failure to exercise the plain common sense expected of real estate buyers bound them to the consequences of their own inaction. No. While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title. (2005). The heirs of Cabigas sought to recover the properties. they would easily have learned that Cobarde had no legal right to the properties they were acquiring since the lots had already been registered in the name of the National Airports Corporation in 1952.R. Whose contention is correct? Why? Answer: The contention of the buyer is correct that it is a contract of absolute sale. No. although the land object of the transaction is registered. Guimba. et al. 321. (De Leon v. the Cabigas spouses relied completely on Cobarde’s representation that he owned the properties in question. 480 (1960)). Had the Cabigas spouses only done so. Q – There was contract of sale where the seller sold properties in a manner absolute and irrevocable requiring the buyer to pay P415. In this regard. . Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that. or in the capacity to transfer the land. Instead. Are the heirs of Cabigas entitled to recover the properties from the buyers from NAA? Why? Answer: No. but in Ouano’s name. Nothing in the contract showed that the seller reserved the right of ownership. encumbrances. February 2. et al. G. Ong. 170405.Obligation of seller to transfer ownership. Mirror doctrine once again applied. They never alleged that NAA was in bad faith in purchasing the same from Ouano. Q – Real properties were sold by Ines Ouano to Salvador Cobarde although the same was never registered and titles were never obtained by the latter. There was a conflict between the buyer and seller since the seller sold it again on the contention that the first contract was a contract to sell. At the time of the sale to the Cabigas spouses. Ouano’s heirs were able to get back the properties. Galindez. Settled is the rule that the seller is obliged to transfer title over the properties and deliver the same to the buyer. v. it was said that the law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself. (Heirs of Nicolas Cabigas.

The property was however sold to PUP by NDC upon order of the President. the contract expired without exercising the right. Huang Chao Chun. Petitioner however. There was. between petitioner and respondent. 181126.. It states that a lessee that commits any of the grounds for ejectment cited in Article 1673. she already acquired possession and thus. 665 (2002) Moreover. 877 (2001). Gasis.R. It was contended on the other hand by the lessor that since the contract has already expired. June 15. has a better right. there was no violation. The lessee contended that NDC. . 457 Phil. the two sales were not registered with the Registry of Property.R. (Ten Forty Realty & Dev. however. Admittedly. Q – The owner of a titled property sold it twice to different buyers. v. the next question is who. February 9. Before however the sale was made. G. 428 Phil. the lessee wrote a letter to the lessor manifesting the exercise of the option to buy. April 22. G. Yet. 179641. the price to be negotiated and determined at the time the option to purchase is exercised. considering that the execution thereof took place ahead of the actual possession by the respondent. hence. No. the lessee lost sight of the restriction provided in Article 1675 of the Civil Code. Since there was no inscription. ASB Realty Corp. Samano. LEASE Extension of lease cannot be done if lessee committed grounds for ejectment. but respondent took possession of the property. Dev. It is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. Indeed. the lessor violated its right of first refusal by the sale of the property to PUP. Lease with option to buy. v. Is petitioner correct? Why? Answer: No. In asking for an extension of lease under Article 1687. the extension in Article 1687 is granted only as a matter of equity. cannot avail of the periods established in Article 1687. 2011). There was no inscription of both documents. she has a better right. Cruz. v. CA. 50501. Umale. As aptly held by the trial court. first took possession of the subject property in good faith. Q – The lessee failed to pay the rentals for fourteen (14) months. therefore. it was asking the court to extend the lease. & Agro-Industrial Corp. (Beatingo v. However. because the right of first refusal was exercised before the contract of lease expired and before it was sold to PUP by the lessor. but petitioner did not because of the presence of tenants. 1991. G.Execution of public instrument is equivalent to delivery. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. Q – There was a contract of lease with option to buy. The law simply recognizes that there are instances when it would be unfair to abruptly end the lease contract causing the eviction of the lessee. 196 SCRA 114. It is only for these clearly unjust situations that Article 1687 grants the court the discretion to extend the lease.R. including non-payment of lease rentals and devoting the leased premises to uses other than those stipulated. extension is a matter of equity. (Lo Chua v. 2011). Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. contended that upon execution of the public instrument. no action on the offer to buy. No. An extension will only benefit the wrongdoer and punish the long-suffering property owner. the execution of a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing that is the object of the contract. it was respondent who took possession of the subject property and. with the right of first refusal not being carried over into the impliedly renewed contract. Corp. the execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. No. (LL & Co. et al. 408 Phil. Guiang v. 603 (2003)).

it is doubtful if such importance can be used to confiscate private property such as the right of first refusal granted to a lessee. G. While education may be prioritized for legislative and budgetary purposes. 183612.R. Golden Horizon Realty Corp. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. Not even the avowed public welfare or the constitutional priority accorded to education. v. March 15. Co. (Carcellar v.R. Is there a consideration in the grant of a right of first refusal such that it cannot be withdrawn at any time? Explain. Q – It was contended that the right of first refusal was not impliedly renewed when the lease contract expired. should it sell the leased property. Only after the lessee has failed to exercise his right of first priority could the lessor sell the property to other buyers under the same terms and conditions offered to the lessee. Since the stipulation forms part of the entire lease contract. would serve as license for the Court. 124791. Q – In a lease contract over a parcel of land. or under. Golden Horizon Realty Corp.. 134971. the lessor has the legal duty to the lessee not to sell the leased property to anyone at any price until after the lessor has made an offer to sell the property to the lessee and the lessee has failed to accept it. No. 2009. or which gives to the owner of the property the right to sell or demand a sale. 302 SCRA 718.An option is a contract by which the owner of the property agrees with another person that the latter shall have the right to buy the former’s property at a fixed price within a certain time. G. of the Phils. 2010). Lacson. to enter into such contract with the one to whom the option was granted. citing Tayag v.R. Prohibition against subleasing of land does not include the building constructed by the lessee.. No. The lessor however sold the property to another without offering the property first to the lessee.R. Golden Horizon Realty Corp. Apeles. if the latter should decide to use the option. 426 SCRA 282. It is a condition offered or contract by which the owner stipulates with another that the latter shall have the right to buy the property at a fixed price within a certain time. G. There was an exclusive option to renew the contract of lease granted to the lessee. No. who has given the option. Polytechnic Univ..R. and any party for that matter. the lessee shall be given the right to match the offered purchase price and to buy the property at that price. No. G. 1999. v. to destroy the sanctity of binding obligations. Co. G. No. v. then. the lessee is in effect stating that it consents to lease the premises and to pay the price agreed upon provided the lessor also consents that. Co. not to enter into the principal contract with any other person during the period designated. Sued. because the right was exercised before the contract of lease expired. G. but the lessor refused to . v. 184260. No.. No. the lessor violated the right of first refusal. Golden Horizon Realty Corp. v. Hence. invoked by petitioner PUP in the Firestone case. Golden Horizon Realty Corp. v. No. February 10. In entering into the contract. whether it was carried over into the impliedly renewed contract is irrelevant. 184260. March 15.R. It binds the party. Court of Appeals.. within that period.R. or in compliance with certain terms and conditions. January 20.R. 2010). or under terms and conditions more favorable to the lessor. When a lease contract contains a right of first refusal. (Polytechnic Univ.. G. No. 2010). (Polytechnic Univ. 576 SCRA 561. he contended that the right of first refusal provision is not binding upon him as there was no consideration. of the Phils. Answer: Yes.R. March 25. 724. 183612. National Dev. G. March 15. the consideration for the lease includes the consideration for the grant of the right of first refusal. the agreement was that the lessee shall establish a sports center and parking area to ease the parking congestion at the Domestic Airport. of the Phils. National Dev. (Eulogio v. 184260. It is not correct to say that there is no consideration for the grant of the right of first refusal if such grant is embodied in the same contract of lease. Golden Horizon Realty Corp. 2004. G. 167884. Basic is the rule that a party to a contract cannot unilaterally withdraw a right of first refusal that stands upon valuable consideration. Q – There was a contract of lease with right of first refusal. 304). As the right was still existing when it was exercised and when the property was sold to PUP. National Dev. 183612. and.

(c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor. Answer: By the inaction of the lessor. This was denied by the lessee. 170509. Manotok Services. 1200 (2000)). Before the SC. and the contract is deemed to have expired at the end of that month. Inc.R. J).. The lessor did not give a notice to vacate the premises upon the expiration of the lease and the lessee continued to possess the same for more than 15 days without objection from the lessor.renew on the ground that it violated the prohibition against subleasing of the premises. 2012. CA. Q – The contract of lease between the parties commenced on January 1. Later. 2. it . Inc. the lessee’s right to continue in possession ceases and her possession becomes one of detainer.) When there is implied renewal of a contract of lease. G. Samelo v. CA. Inc. because the prohibition against subleasing the premises refers only to the subject property. Brion. (Tagbilaran Integrated Sellers Assn. 1998. It was contended otherwise by the lessor. Q – In case of an impliedly renewed contract. The lessor sent a letter to the lessee terminating the contract and demanding the vacation of the premises and settlement of unpaid accounts. Answer: The contention of the lessor is correct. the period of lease is considered to be from month to month. Q – General Milling Corporation is the owner of a property which was leased to Cebu Autometic Motors. What is the effect of the inaction of the lessor? Explain. The lessor contended that the lessee violated the contract by subleasing and for failure to deliver the required advance rental and deposit. the tacita reconduccion was aborted. 2012. (b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate. The lessee was not leasing the improvements from the lessor. Sec. June 27. Being the builder of the improvements on the subject property. 84154-55. Whose contention is correct? Explain. 170509. It was stipulated that it shall be used as garage and repair shop for vehicles. In a complaint for ejectment. Rule 70 is belated. G. hence. Samelo v.R. J). (Lim v. “A lease from month to month is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor. March 19. When the lessor sent a notice to vacate to the lessee on August 5. it was subleased without the consent of the lessor. No. 154 (1997). 95771. 486 Phil. the land. Brion. After such notice. the lessor may simultaneously eject the lessee and demand for rescission of the contracts. Veterans Bank. 339 Phil. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. but allegedly. thus.. June 27. (Paterno v. No. the lessee contended that the period is the same as that of the original. Manotok Services. Since the rent is paid on a monthly basis. there can be no inference that it intended to discontinue the lease contract (Bowe v. 1997 and expired on December 31. v. said improvements are owned by it until the turn over to the lessor at the end of the contract.R.R.” (Arquelda v.. supra. Inc. then it is not subleasing the same to third persons. The CA ruled that the claim of failure to comply with Sec. No. 1998. 385 Phil. 1997. G. G. it filed a complaint for unlawful detainer alleging that it terminated the contract for violation of the terms of the same and continued to do so despite repeated demands and reminders for compliance that the lessee refused to vacate the premises. 1993. An implied new lease or tacita reconcluccion will set in when the following requisites are found to exist: (a) the term of the original contract of lease has expired. 220 SCRA 158). 2010. CA. There was an impliedly renewed contract. The MTC rendered a judgment ordering the lessee to vacate. CA. 386 (2004)). 2. Nos. “A notice to vacate constitutes an express act on the part of the lessor that it no longer consents to the continued occupation by the lessee of its property. July 20. Ding Velayo Sports Center. Phil. but the RTC reversed the judgment holding that the lessor failed to comply with the requisite demand under Rule 70. it cannot be entertained anymore. in accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil Code. (MIAA v. The notice to vacate was given only on August 5.

v. The letter did not demand compliance with the terms of the contract. not of Article 1169 of the Civil Code but. August 25. apparently overlooked that what is involved is not a mere mora or delay in the performance of a generic obligation to give or to do that would eventually lead to the remedy of rescission or specific performance. et al. Implemented in accordance with Section 2.. G. The business of banking is impressed with public interest and great reliance is made on the bank’s sworn profession of diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable service. 2007. Was the termination of the credit line proper? Why? Answer: No. In this instance. but may ask the court to do so and simultaneously seek the ejecment of the lessee in a single action for unlawful detainer. Hence. General Milling Corp. (Solidbank Corporation/Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Gonzales. and observe honesty and good faith.” This is the basis of the principle of abuse of right which. Merit Phils. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that unless otherwise stipulated. in turn. April 2. 2008. 520 SCRA 123. It contended that since the lessor never sent a proper demand letter. give everyone his due. a bank should exercise extraordinary diligence to negate its liability to the depositors. 176324. G. Section 2. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Explain. (Cebu Autometic Motors. such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee. and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. Due to failure to pay the interest on the loan. It may not wantonly exercise its rights without respecting and honoring the rights of its clients. the lessee cannot be considered in default and the lessor had no cause to terminate the lease. a lessor may judicially eject (and thereby likewise rescind the contract of lease) the lessee if the latter violates any of the conditions agreed upon in the lease contract. the lessor is not required to first bring an action for rescission. (Abaya Investments Corp. Rule on the contention of the lessee. Rule 70. He sued for damages for the unjust dishonour of the check but the RTC found no fault of the bank in the termination of the credit line as the dishonour of the check was proper considering that the credit line had already been terminated or revoked before the presentment of the check. No. 167346. No. the bank is sorely remiss in the diligence required in treating with its client. It must inform the client of the aggregate amount due and the dates they became due. v. Like a common carrier whose business is imbued with public interest. 129-130). No. in invoking Article 1169. April 14. This situation calls for the application. Brion. NCC. 551 SCRA 646).R. 2012. Based on this provision. is based upon the maxim suum jus . The lessor did not send the proper demand letter.R. J). one imbued with public interest. or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises.. a check was dishonoured resulting in great embarrassment and humiliation especially that he had a heated argument with a friend and their falling out. it cannot be considered in delay invoking Article 1169. It was not enough to apprise petitioner of his default and outstanding dues..was contended that there was no proper demand since the letter merely stated that the lessor expected the lessee to vacate the premises and pay the unsettled accounts. hence. Article 1673 states that the lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract. Answer: The lessee is correct. Inc. 151168. The lessee.. Inc. 19 of the New Civil Code clearly provides that “[e]very person must. What is involved in the case is a contract of lease and the twin remedies of rescission and judicial ejectment after either the failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease. Q – Petitioner had a credit line with the bank.R. the bank terminated the credit line but without notice to petitioner. or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. of Article 1673 in relation to Section 2. G. act with justice. Art. DEPOSIT Nature of liability of banks. Tan.

provided that notice was given to them. 171868. The keepers of hotels or inns shall be responsible for them as depositaries. No. Yap v. G.summa injuria (the abuse of right is the greatest possible wrong). Sps. Dy. De los Reyes. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract.. or to their employees. ( Sps. (Art. because there was a contract of deposit with the hotelkeeper. they take the precautions which said hotel-keepers or their substitutes advised relative to the care and vigilance of their effects. 1962. et al. NCC). GUARANTY/MORTGAGE Indivisibility of mortgage does not apply after it is extinguished by complete foreclosure. on the part of the latter. The deposit of effects made by travellers in hotels or inns shall also be regarded as necessary. the guest gave notice to the doorman and parking attendant of the hotel when he entrusted the ignition of his car to the latter.R. (Art.00 to redeem a property. The mortgagee contended that there must be complete tender of the amount of the price since mortgage is indivisible. Sr. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another. It provides that a pledge or mortgage is indivisible. (Art. . February 23. Inc. it is liable for damages for the loss of the car.R.. v. Inc. of the effects brought by the guests and that. Dy. (Abad. No. No. No. 179419. it is provided that the debtor who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied. 180257. PCIB. Answer: Yes. G. notwithstanding the fact that there has been a partial fulfillment of the obligation. (Arlegui v..What is the meaning of the indivisibility of a mortgage? Explain. No. secured has been fully paid. G. No. Hence. Q – Upon arrival of guest at City Garden Hotel. G. Sps. 2011. 171991.R. v. Is the hotel management is liable for damages for the loss of the car? Explain. J)). even though the debt may be divided among the successors in interest of the debtor or of the creditor.040. Dy. the doctrine of indivisibility of mortgage does not apply once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof. when he handed over the keys to his vehicle with the parking attendant with the obligation of safely keeping and returning it. NCC. Sr. Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. Sps. 2089. 1989. Q – After the foreclosure of a mortgage. hence. Q . NCC). 2011).000. Sr. v. 2011). 171868. there can be piecemeal redemption. Yap v. G. 46898-99. 179 SCRA 619. G.. G. 1998. the entire auction price must be paid.. Dy. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. CA. No. 171991. there is no deposit but some other contract. 378 SCRA 322 (2002). with the obligation of safety keeping it and returning the same. Dumaguete Rural Bank. where the amount of the auction sale was P216.R. As held in the case of Philippine National Bank v. Sps. July 27.R. January 12. This also means that the debtor cannot ask for the release of any portion of the mortgaged property or of one or some of the several lots mortgaged unless and until the loan thus. Answer: What the law proscribes is the foreclosure of only a portion of the property or a number of the several properties mortgaged corresponding to the unpaid portion of the debt where before foreclosure proceedings partial payment was made by the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation.R.R. Deposit in hotels. Hence.Dumaguete Rural Bank. 2011). November 28. (Durban Apartments Corp. Sps. The contract of deposit was perfected from the owner’s delivery. Sr.93 there was tender of P40. The attendant issued a valet parking customer claim stab and parked the car at the Equitable PCI Bank parking area which the latter allowed as parking space for vehicles of the hotel guests in the evening after banking hours.. Gonzales v. July 27.

348 Phil. This provision is customary in mortgage contracts. 15 (1998)). The reason for this is that the mortgage credit is a real right. 2008. CA.R. QUASI-DELICT and DAMAGES Employer is liable for the loss of cargo due to acts of its employees. et al. J). there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. and (2) There should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period. G. G. 575 SCRA 82) More. 605 SCRA 659.. The power of attorney provision did not provide that the ownership over the subject property would automatically pass to mortgagee upon the mortgagor’s failure to pay the loan on time.. No. which reads: Art. 675. Answer: Yes.R. The employer should be made answerable for damages. (DBP v. G. Mortgagee’s purchased of the subject property did not violate the prohibition on pactum commissorium. (Garcia v. November 25. Explain.Q – May the mortgagor sell the property mortgaged without the consent of the mortgage? Explain. C & A Construction. 151903. 183198. Q – A and B entered into a contract for the delivery of cargo. 2012. Answer: B’s contention is not correct. The contract cannot absolutely forbid the mortgagor. A sued B for damages. and is in conformity with Article 2087 of the Civil Code. 2012). Instead. 603 SCRA 108. which follows the property wherever it goes. G. What it granted was the mere appointment of Villar as attorney-in-fact. Inc. No. 181672. No. v.R. The following are the elements of pactum commissorium: (1) There should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation. SSS. No.R. Villar. the option of collecting from the third person in possession of the mortgaged property in the concept of owner. the mortgagor-owner’s sale of the property does not affect the right of the registered mortgagee to foreclose on the same even if its ownership had been transferred to another person. Metrobank. 2010. as there was no automatic appropriation of the thing mortgaged. citing Delsan Transport Lines. but there was failure to deliver because the employees were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. September 20. December 23. from selling the same while her loan remained unpaid. Antonio & Leticia Vega v. Sps. Such stipulation contravenes public policy. CA. with authority to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject property. but. No. Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another.R. Inc. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. 162333. G. June 27.R. (Cinco v. June 27. . Rule on the contention. 2009. 158891. Jam Transit. It was contended that there was a violation of the prohibition on pactum commissorium. 2009. October 9. 2087. even if its ownership changes. the things in which the pledge or mortgage consists may be alienated for the payment to the creditor. being an undue impediment or interference on the transmission of property. It is also of the essence of these contracts that when the principal obligation becomes due. when a mortgagor sells the mortgaged property to a third person. 158891. and to apply the proceeds to the payment of the loan. but B contended that the employees alone are liable. (Teoco v. Del Castillo. to sell the property in case of default in the payment of the loan. Pactum commissorium Q – In a mortgage contract there was a stipulation appointing the mortgagee as the mortgagor’s attorney-in-fact. as owner of the mortgaged property. it was sold to her. The latter is bound by the registered mortgage on the title he acquired. G. (Tan v. Pablo Garcia v. Article 2129 of the Civil Code gives the mortgagee. the creditor may demand from such third person the payment of the principal obligation. No. Yolanda Villar.

179446. In Aguilar Sr. The bank was made liable for damages for the accident as said provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor vehicles. Jepte. January 10. 357 Phil 703 (1998): x x x. No. 2011). they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone. Glodel Brokerage Corp. 426 Phil. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the damage would not have resulted. where the car of the bank caused the death of a victim while being driven by its assistant vice president. (Loadmasters Customs Services. G. would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. 179446. although acting independently. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. even if not used for public service.Inc. an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. hence. without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Glodel Brokerage Corp. 834 (2001). v. Sued for damages. even partially. Answer: Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered. the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case.. Aguilar v. are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person. What is the extent of the respective liabilities of several parties if the cause of loss is due to their negligence? Explain. The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its operation.. he alone should be liable. The contention is no longer novel. (St. (Loadmasters Customs Services. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened. 156 (2003)). 412 Phil. an employer’s vicarious liability for the employee’s fault under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to him. January 10. The RTC ruled in favor of B. 102 Phil. Commercial Savings Bank. Erezo v. 103 (1957)). 878 (2002). Commercial Savings Bank. v. Q – A is the owner of a motor vehicle which met an accident resulting in injuries to B. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. In this regard.e. Q – There was a head-on collision of two (2) vehicles belonging to A and B resulting in the injuries to C who sued both A and B. No. A contended that B was negligent. 2011). et al.R. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. i. and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. regardless of whether the employee drove the registered owner’s vehicle in connection with his employment. 412 Phil. the owner of the vehicle contended that Allan drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus.. G. a party is not relieved from liability.. Effect if there are several causes for the resulting damages. v.. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages. Mary’s Academy v. 459 Phil. 834 (2001). Carpetanos.R. et al. The court had already ratiocinated that: . that the registered owner of any vehicle. it may appear that one of them was more culpable. Inc. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons.. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party. Court of Appeals. Inc. As stated in the case of Far Eastern Shipping v. it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Loadmasters failed.

it was held that there is much greater reason to apply the same if not greater degree of care and responsibility when the lives and personal safety of their guests are involved. That would be absurd. Q – A hotel guest of Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort. Bayot. No. The evidence shows that the management practice before the murder had been to deploy one security or roving guard every three or four floors of the building which its witness admitted to be inadequate considering the L-shape configuration of the hotel that rendered the hallways not visible from one or the other end and that despite his recommendation. The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Bersamin. No. the registered owner. or with very scant means of identification. in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways. April 25. It is to forestall these circumstances. J). and Article 2002 of the Civil Code (all of which concerned the hotelkeepers’ degree of care and responsibility as to the personal effects of their guests). judgment was rendered holding the defendants liable for damages. responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual. 102 Phil. CA. Inc. the management did not approve it because the hotel was not doing well at that time as it was only half-booked. it contended that it was the guest’s fault for having allowed other people to enter his room. it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been .R. 67 Phil. hence.. (Oscar Del Carmen. for failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee. Inc. It was well established that the driver was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed required by law. he was driving at the speed of 70 kilometers per hour. When sued for damages. Harper. G. Geronimo Bacoy. 2012. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to the persons and belongings of their guests. Otherwise. his own negligence was the proximate cause of his own death as the hotel is not an insurer of the safety of its guests. 255 Phil. Catering to the public. (Erezo v. Answer: Yes. was murdered inside his room. without being held liable should anything untoward befall the unwary guests. Article 2001..The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens. so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public. G. or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways. et al. Is the employer liable? Explain. Jepte. CA. the vehicle owner cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeep’s use. 103 (1957)). 126780. that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained. Q – There was a collision of a car and a shuttle bus along Katipunan Road (White Plains) in Quezon City resulting in the dragging of the car about 12 meters from the point of impact. Liability of hotel for the death of a guest. Applying by analogy Article 2000. (YHT Realty Corp.R. Under the New Civil Code. Is the contention of the defendant-hotel correct? Why? Answer: No. August 29. the hotelkeepers would simply stand idly by as strangers have unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors of the guests. Actions for damages were filed against the defendants where the defendant employer proved that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers. unless there is proof to the contrary. The car burst into flames and burned the passengers to death beyond recognition. 2005. At the time of the accident the vehicle belonging to the petitioner was travelling at the speed of 70 kilometers per hour. 2012). Driving beyond required speed limit is negligence. (Makati Shang-ri La Hotel & Resort. The allowed rate of speed for the vehicle was 50 kilometers per hour. G. After trial. something that no good law would ever envision. 470 (1989)) which are valid defenses available to a registered owner. v. February 17. V. It showed the driver’s proficiency and physical examinations as well as NBI Clearances as well as daily operational briefings. Jr. Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use (Doquillo v. 451 SCRA 638). v. 173870. No.R. (RA) 4136)). et al. 189998. (Section 35 of Republic Act No. 121 (1939)) or that the subject vehicle was stolen (Duavit v.

. As a matter of practice. (Nunn v. The respondent sued petitioner for damages contending that the check was postdated hence. bank tellers would not receive nor honor such checks which they believe to be unclear. and as promptly as possible.2d 471) which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and. 2010). 510 SCRA 259. the bank has a duty not to release the deposits unreasonably early after a third party makes known his adverse claim to the bank deposit. 2009. hence. He subsequently issued two (2) checks but were dishonored because of insufficient funds. Inc. 587 SCRA 348.R. The proximate cause of the damage done was the bank’s negligence in debiting the account prior to the date as appearing in the check which resulted in the subsequent dishonour of several checks. Banks are required to exercise higher degree of diligence in dealing with the accounts of clients. G. No. 165339. confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever he directs. v. Co. NCC) Apparently. December 6. (Equitable Bank v. 152033. No. Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corp. VIII. Q – Respondent issued PCIB check dated “5/3/0/92” in the amount of P34. 2004.72 in favour of Sulpicio Lines.2d 630. therefore. Tan. 361. citing Foster v. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. People. 147437. This has to be done if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can dispose of as he sees fit. The bank must record every single transaction accurately. Inc. (Art. 436 SCRA 402.. No..R. 670 So. August 13. it should not have debited the amount immediately. practice and procedure in all courts. to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway.negligent if at the time of the mishap. Constitution)). Financial Indem. May 8. 694 So. To adopt the foreign rule. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. he created confusion on the true date of the check by writing the date of the check as “5/3/0/92”. the bank debited the amount from the account of respondent leaving a balance of only P558. (Art. G. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed. 5(5). however. ConAgra Poultry Co. Acknowledging that no such duty is imposed by law in this jurisdiction. a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered (Caminos. indeed. In the absence of a positive duty there could be no breach. v. he was violating any traffic regulation. is more than that of a good father of a family. 421) In every case. the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost fidelity. Cabilzo. The diligence required of banks. 270) From the foregoing.87. G. If.R. The rule reflects a matter of policy that is better addressed by the other branches of government . March 16. Q – The spouses Serfino invoke American common law that imposes a duty upon a bank receiving a notice of adverse claim to the fund in a depositor’s account to freeze the account for a reasonable length of time. sufficient to allow the adverse claimant to institute legal proceedings to enforce his right to the fund. no liability for damages. G. Far East Bank and Trust Company. Sec. In other words. Wilfredo delos Santos. et al. 2011). without the counter-signature of its drawer. . goes beyond the power of the Court to promulgate rules governing pleading. v.588. in order to settle the confusion.R. No. down to the last centavo. Petitioner should have exercised the highest degree of diligence required of it by ascertaining from the respondent the accuracy of the entries therein. Jr. 2006.. it is clear that petitioner bank did not exercise the degree of diligence that it ought to have exercised in dealing with its client. instead of proceeding to honor and receive the check. petitioner was confused on whether the check was dated May 3 or May 30 because of the “/” which allegedly separated the number “3” from the “0. No. Petitioner contended that it was not postdated and in fact. G. August 23.” petitioner should have required respondent drawer to countersign the said “/” in order to ascertain th e true intent of the drawer before honoring the check. 154469. (Samsung Construction Company Philippines.R. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. the driver's violation of the traffic rules does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of the collision. 129015. the spouses Serfino asked the Court to adopt this foreign rule. whenever necessary. 2185.

at least. they first require either a court order or an indemnity bond. (Gendler v. and which has the power to issue “rules of conduct or the establishment of standards of operation for uniform application to all institutions or functions covered. as the American experience has shown.particularly. To adopt this rule will have significant implications on the banking industry and practices. (Serfino v. which is the agency that supervises the operations and activities of banks. In the absence of a law or a rule binding on the Court. No. As current laws provide. 136371. In the absence of any positive duty of the bank to an adverse claimant. 62 F. the bank’s contractual relations are with its depositor. there could be no breach that entitles the latter to moral damages. Essentially. The General Banking Act of 2000). 805 (1945) “a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care and always to have in mind the fiduciary nature of its relationship with them. J). No. G. FEBTC. not with the third party. Brion. 511 SCRA 100). Sibley State Bank. et al. October 10. 4. It likewise rejects the adoption of a judicially-imposed rule giving third parties with unverified claims against the deposit of another a better right over the deposit. G. these statutes do not impose a duty on banks to freeze the deposit upon a mere notice of adverse claim. Lim. .R. Recognizing that the rule imposing duty on banks to freeze the deposit upon notice of adverse claim adopts a policy adverse to the bank and its functions. Supp. 2005. and opens it to liability to both the depositor and the adverse claimant. 171845.R.” (Sec. the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.. equalized the burden. A 8791 .” (Prudential Bank v.1. it has no option but to uphold the existing policy that recognizes the fiduciary nature of banking. 2012. many American states have since adopted adverse claim statutes that shifted or. November 11.