A History of Spain and Portugal
Vol. 2

Stanley G. Payne Chapter 19 The War ! In"epen"en#e an" L$%eral$&'
()1*+ The Reign of Carlos IV (17 !1 " # The Old Regime in Spain ended with the reign of Carlos IV, which collapsed beneath the weight of French Napoleonic imperialism. Spain seemed a comparativel peacef!l and progressive land when Carlos IV came to the throne in "#$$. The order and decor!m shown b the man tho!sands of Spaniards who crowded into %adrid for the official coronation the following ear contrasted sharpl with the revol!tion that was developing in France. The new &ing was abo!t fort ears old, good' hearted b!t wea& and simple'minded. (e hoped to contin!e the general policies of his father)s reign and retained as chief minister the %!rcian law er *os+ %o,ino, Conde de Floridablanca, a strong'minded regalist who had long served Carlos III capabl . The beginning of the French Revol!tion in "#$- drasticall altered the polic of the Spanish crown. Floridablanca adopted a sharpl hostile co!rse and imposed censorship on all news from France. The atmosphere was even more tense after the attempted assassination of Floridablanca b a demented Frenchman in "#-. and a ta/ revolt b the overb!rdened 0alician peasantr in "#-.'"#-". The nascent Spanish press was also s!b1ected to severe censorship, and the progress of the Spanish enlightenment was bro!ght to a near halt. 2arl ()1,+ in "#-3, Floridablanca)s enemies, both personal and political, combined to force him from power. Carlos IV replaced him with the now elderl Conde de 4randa, who while no s!pporter of the French Revol!tion, was a liberal and a Francophile, convinced of the importance of the French alliance. (e rela/ed the censorship, allowing Spanish p!blicists and reformers to contin!e their prosel ti5ing activities. 6efore the end of the ear, however, 4randa was shoved o!t b palace intrig!es, replaced as first secretar b a handsome, st!rd o!ng g!ards) officer from 2/tremad!ra, %an!el 0odo , friend of the ro al famil and sometime social escort 7cortejo8 of the Italian 9!een, %aria :!isa di ;arma. Carlos IV considered him a tr!e friend, one of the few reliable co!nselors among a bev of fops and intrig!ers, and made him <!9!e de 4lc!dia. For most of fifteen ears "#-3'"$.$ 0odo was the real r!ler of Spain. (e was not a politician or administrator of great ed!cation or mental power, b!t considered himself a man of the new generation, a reformer and contin!er of the policies of Carlos III. Thro!gho!t these ears, the overriding concern of the Spanish crown was the challenge presented b revol!tionar France and its s!ccessor, Napoleonic imperialism. Spain 1oined the alliance of legitimac against the French revol!tionar regime in "#-=' "#-> and scored some initial s!ccesses, occ!p ing (enda e and ;erpignan. <espite a ma1or effort b the French to in!ndate northeastern Spain with revol!tionar propaganda, the anti'French str!ggle was 9!ite pop!lar among the Spanish people, whose religio!s and patriotic sentiments were f!ll aro!sed. This was most of all the case in Catalonia? there anti'French feeling was intense, pop!lar vol!nteers were n!mero!s, and the conflict was called la guerra gran. 6!t the 4nglo'Spanish fleets failed before To!lon, and the Spanish arm lac&ed the cadres, e9!ipment, training, or leadership to resist the new French militar masses. The French briefl occ!pied San Sebasti@n and northern Catalonia. ;eace was made in "#-> on the basis of the stat!s 9!o ante, the French regime not pressing its terms, beca!se of its interest in detaching Spain from the 6ritish antirevol!tionar alliance.

The war against revol!tionar France helped to open the first serio!s political fiss!res in the eighteenth'cent!r 6o!rbon regime in Spain. 4lmost from the start, 0odo was resented as no minister of Carlos III had been beca!se he was obvio!sl a o!thf!l favorite and his appointment was a throwbac& to the old s stem of validos which had alwa s been !npop!lar. 4t a time of great stress, the vacillating and conf!sed Carlos IV proved incapable of em!lating his father, who had &nown how to choose professionall competent ministers and arbitrate among them himself. :ibello!s stories abo!t 0odo and the 9!een bro!ght the ro al famil !nder fire for the first time in a ()1-+ cent!r , and lowered respect for the crown. Resentment became more intense after the crown awarded its first secretar the !n!s!all prestigio!s title of prince after he concl!ded peace in "#->. Nor did 0odo )s !ndeniabl reformist meas!res win him s!pport among the progressivist and critical'minded. (e was still acc!sed of being !nderhanded and too a!thoritarian in government. The reformist and progressivist c!rrents of preceding decades all the while gathered force rapidl !nder the stim!l!s of the French e/ample. Ahile onl a few small revol!tionar cli9!es were formed in Spain, the scope of critical opinion among the !pper and middle classes increased considerabl . <iscontent first fo!nd p!blic e/pression in mid'"#-B, after an increase in ta/es and the apparent ineptit!de of the Spanish arm . In %adrid there were p!blic demonstrations of s mpath for the French ca!se for the first time, and b the following ear several small secret prorevol!tionar 1!ntas had been formed in %adrid and in the provinces. 4fter peace was made, these were dissolved and some of the ringleaders arrested. In the meantime, the In9!isition had attempted a wartime crac&down on the dissemination of s!bversive ideas, decreeing in "#-B the abolition of all Spanish !niversit chairs in p!blic ()1.+ and nat!ral law. S!ch meas!res had little effect, however, for after "#-> restrictions on p!blications were rela/ed once more, and after French press!re a Spanish edition of the Encyclopedia was allowed to be p!blished. The crown res!med its enco!ragement of ed!cation, and in the last ears of the eighteenth cent!r reformist and progressivist ideas were circ!lating more widel than ever before. The beginning of a n!cle!s of political liberalism, 9!estioning complete ro al sovereignt ''

beca!se of French press!re. In "#->. the crown)s principal attempt to contin!e and e/pand reform policies came in the fields of ta/ation and commerce. This trend toward the e/pression of critical political ideas bro!ght a reimposition of censorship on boo&s at the beginning of "#-$.$. %ariano :!is de Dr9!i1o. 4s prices increased.. since the luces''the critics and progressivists''remained his committed enemies.. Conservatives among ch!rchmen and aristocrats la!nched a co!nteroffensive against the new reform government of "#-$' "$. Ro al finances were s!fficientl strong to permit Spain to enter the war of "#-='"#-> on a fairl so!nd footing''so!nder than that of . and d!ring the s!bse9!ent ears f!rther levies were agreed to b the ch!rch to meet militar e/penses. 0odo ret!rned to de facto control of Spanish government at the end of "$. real wages fell. a new propert ta/ was levied on the wealth . These meas!res ro!sed the ire of aristocrats and the clerg . Th!s within less than a decade the press!res of the French revol!tionar wars had completel bro&en the !nit of the Spanish polit . 4fter two ears absence. and there were several minor riots in "#-#'"#-$. In ()19+ "#-$. This was the first time that entailed propert was sei5ed and a!ctioned b the state to pa for war e/penses.. Eet 0odo s!ccessf!ll maintained a reform program in some areas and re1ected a gen!inel reactionar polic . <!ring the ne/t few ears. as in the case of two significant new decrees iss!ed in "#-#. <!ring his second period in power he followed a more moderate line than before. For the first time. This was a fatef!l step toward the !ltimate independence of the colonies. (e was replaced b the secretar of finance. .C. The second recogni5ed the effectiveness of the virt!al 6ritish naval bloc&ade b s!spending commercial restrictions within the Spanish 4merican empire. after signing an alliance with France. Spanish commerce s!ffered grievo!sl as the fleet !nderwent ma1or reverses. and this e/plains part of the opposition to the government in central Spain. 0odo )s government too& the step of abolishing the special servicio ta/ on peasants that had first been levied in si/teenth'cent!r Castile. as well as of all remaining !nsold *es!it propert . 4side from its semiliberal polic on ed!cation and printing. One ma1or reform was the partial abolition of the señorío eclesiástico in "$.". 0odo himself bro!ght in a new gro!p of liberal appointees at the end of "#-# b!t. and the crown became increasingl conf!sed b the p!lling and ha!ling of factions. *ovelianos.. ma&ing the b!rden somewhat less ine9!itable. This was the last great step of eighteenth'cent!r regalist . in t!rn s!cceeded a few months later b the anticlerical and regalist foreign minister. when the government decided to raise mone b a!ctioning off s!rpl!s b!ildings owned b m!nicipalities. when the government allowed itself to be mane!vered b French press!re and its longstanding trans'4tlantic rivalr with the 6ritish into declaring war against the latter in October "#-C. This necessitated drastic changes that portended far'reaching conse9!ences. Ta/es on salaried officials and on the ch!rch were raised. One permitted foreign craftsmen of Christian religions other than Roman Catholic to enter Spain and open shops or factories with a g!arantee of freedom of religion. and held that infl!ence !ntil the whole Spanish regime was overthrown in the spring of "$. and new iss!es of paper mone were bac&ed b special levies on landowners and on the ch!rch.apal permission was obtained to sell one'seventh of ch!rch properties in ret!rn for state bonds. the government also decreed the sale of the propert of most ch!rch charitable fo!ndations. while discontent increased among the lower classes. the aristocrac was bro!ght directl !nder ta/ation. was forced to retire as first secretar in %arch "#-$. The financial sit!ation contin!ed to deteriorate. The econom too& a t!rn for the worse after "#-C.. earl in "$.r!ssia. 4nother important precedent was set in "#-$. then that of the eminent progressivist and reformist minister of 1!stice.however enlightened''was starting to form. for e/ample''b!t after a ear of f!ll'scale war fiscal press!res mo!nted. Francisco de Saavedra. In "#--. permitting all ne!tral nations to trade freel . for it admitted that at least for the time being Spain co!ld not maintain its pretended monopol . bringing first the dismissal and imprisonment of Dr9!i1o at the end of "$.

C.>8 completed the virt!al destr!ction of the Spanish nav . dragged the prestige of the ro al famil in the m!d. R!mors abo!t 0odo and the 9!een. Eet all domestic problems had become secondar to the irresistable press!re of French imperialism. deport both Carlos IV and <. The Napoleonic vise grew all the tighter with the signing of the Treat of Fontaineblea! in October "$. In "#--. Commerce declined catastrophicall .". 0odo was imprisoned b a riot at the winter palace of 4ran1!e5 in %arch "$. The res!ltant ()/1+ brea&down of Spanish government.$ that had been enco!raged b dissident fernandista aristocrats. 0odo )s final effort was a desperate plan to remove the ro al famil to 4merica. Fernando to France. deepl 1ealo!s of 0odo and eager to s!cceed his father as soon as possible.polic and opened the wa to all'o!t disamorti5ation of ch!rch lands b the s!cceeding liberal regime thirt ears later.3'"$. !nemplo ment grew in the towns. 1!st as.ort!g!ese crown was attempting to do from Rio de *aneiro. 6 "$.ort!gal. who was hated for his wea&ness and for the reformist fiscal policies of his government. the prince <. b!t French press!re forced Carlos IV to pardon his son almost immediatel .# providing for the partition of .B helped to revive the faltering econom briefl . The latter fo!nd a rall ing point in the heir to the throne. provided Napoleon with the e/c!se to intervene directl .$. 6oth the elite elements and the ro al famil itself had th!s been divided b political rivalries.#. Carlos IV was forced to abdicate. and the s!bse9!ent 6ritish domination of the 4tlantic. the government)s financial sit!ation became almost hopeless. co!pled with the imposition of Napoleon)s French' controlled economic FContinental S stemF the following ear. Ahen peace was temporaril signed with 6ritain. whose militar dominance of the western half of the continent had held Spain in satellite stat!s since "#-C. Spain was able to &eep the 2/tremad!ran border district of ()/0+ OlivenGa it had sei5ed b!t lost the island of Trinidad to 6ritain. Fernando. 4 fernandista plot of vag!e dimensions was precipitated and aborted late in "$.ort!gal and the entr of a si5able French arm into the penins!la. 6efore this scheme co!ld be p!t into effect. the Napoleonic empire in western 2!rope as a whole clima/ed the entire era of eighteenth'cent!r a!tocralic reformism. 0odo had been mane!vered b France into the pett border FAar of the OrangesF against pro'6ritish . The regime of F<on *os+F was. precipitated as it was b a s!icidal fe!d in the ro al famil . co!pled with the ineptit!de of Carlos IV. an arbitrar imposition of French arms and bro&e inevitabl with the Catholic legitimist spirit of the 6o!rbon monarch . who was tr ing to follow a do!ble game in a f!tile attempt to free Spain of French domination. and real wages for wor&ers contin!ed to decline. Napoleon meanwhile had himself become eager to eliminate 0odo . and install his brother *oseph 7*os+ I8 as &ing of Spain. This completed the discrediting of the government.>'"$. The conservative fernandista opposition began to intrig!e with Napoleon to enco!rage removal of 0odo and of the &ing hiimself. 4 high vol!me of trade was momentaril regained with Spanish 4merica. The $onapartist Regi%e of 1 " !1 12 The transitor monarch of *oseph 6onaparte achieved the clima/ of enlightened despotism in Spain. whence an independence str!ggle against French domination might be led 1!st as the . It was based on Napoleon)s 6a onne Constit!tion of "$. The peacef!l ears of "$. and the co!ntr )s domestic prod!ction reached a new pea& in "$. Napoleon forced the cession of the vast :o!isiana territor in North 4merica that the Spanish crown had gained from 6ritain onl si/teen ears earlier. . however. The regime drew the opposition ali&e of progressivists and of !ltra'conservatives within the aristocrac and ch!rch. according to a common arg!ment. inflation mo!nted. (owever. the res!mption of war with 6ritain !pon Napoleonic dictates mar&ed the beginning of the end. and the !npop!larit of 0odo increased ear b ear !ntil he became the target of almost !niversal e/ecration. which stip!lated for Spain a legislat!re composed of a lifetime appointive senate and a three'estate assembl ''clerg . The naval disaster of Trafalgar 7"$. threw the Spanish econom into profo!nd depression.

-. 6 *!ne "$.$.. Aellesle proved a master of defensive tactics in holding his position against heav odds for three ears. and the Spanish forces were increased to more than 3.nobilit ... in part appointed b the &ing... and commons''in part elected. 6ritain never committed more than >. Napoleon concentrated his attention on Spain.. the 6onapartist administration tried to enact the same reforms bro!ght b French r!le to other lands. %adrid was sei5ed. troops to the Fpenins!lar war. establishing greater !niformit and opport!nit for the middle classes. Eet the 6onapartist regime.$... and dispatched an e/peditionar corps !nder Sir 4rth!r Aellesle 7later the <!&e of Aellington8 to establish a firm redo!bt in . center. . The so!thern contingent !nder 0eneral Casta. <!ring the final two months of the ear. That s!mmer.. personall leading an invading force of =.and were hard p!t to maintain that strength for the remainder of the war.. and Aellesle )s strateg proved ca!tio!s in the e/treme...F as 6ritish commentators have termed it...ort!gal. ref!sing opport!nities to sei5e the strategic initiative after French forces had grown wea&er. Once in power.. providing mone and man of the militar s!pplies !sed b the Spanish and . men from his best !nits.... The organi5ed Spanish field forces dwindled to no more than ". however... the French arm of occ!pation was nearl swept from the penins!la. Some of the afrancesados were mere opport!nists interested in positions. French troops at 6ail+n 7north of CHrdoba8 in *!l "$.epe 6otellas 7*oe 6ottles8 beca!se of his s!pposed fondness for drin&.. 6ritain)s other main contrib!tion was economic. Eet for m!ch of the co!ntr these were mere paper reforms that co!ld not be p!t into effect beca!se of the warfare that raged thro!gho!t the brief ears of French dominion. and above all save their homeland from the anarch and destr!ction that threatened it in "$.. <espite a conscientio!s effort b the new Corsican monarch. who referred to him sneeringl as . s!pporters of Napoleonic'st le enlightened despotism. most monasteries were abolished and their properties sei5ed.os scored the first clear'c!t field victor over a Napoleonic arm in 2!rope b defeating and capt!ring <!pont)s corps of nearl 3. were concerned patriots who chose to serve the new regime o!t of a desire to (ispani5e it.. In Spain. The whole e/perience was incomprehensible to Napoleon. who were no more than twelve tho!sand or so in a pop!lation of more than ten million. and northeast. to save national independence and also to save the primac of traditional religion.ort!g!ese forces. On the other hand.. and in "$. 6ritain immediatel 1oined hands with the Spanish governing 1!nta.$''the broadest pop!lar !prising an where in 2!rope d!ring that era.the French occ!pied most of the &e points in the north. even before Napoleon had officiall imposed a 6onaparte &ing.. the ch!rch was bro!ght !nder closer state reg!lation. men. ()//+ The &ar of Independen'e The reaction of the Spanish people to French domination was the great revolt of %a "$.$.. It was s!pported b all classes of the pop!lation 7tho!gh the nobilit were the most tepid8. the Spanish resistance fielded an arm with a nominal strength of "=. The rebellion started on %a 3 in %adrid as the last member of the ro al famil was being h!stled into French e/ile. and spread thro!gho!t the co!ntr within a few wee&s. imposed b force. Others. even the !pward'striving middle classes''among the elements that elsewhere seemed to have most to gain from Napoleonic reform''were part of the bac&bone of resistance. he was re1ected b the great ma1orit of Spaniards.. the In9!isition was abolished.. The onl real s!pport for the regime carne from a small minorit of the afrancesado intelligentsia. and d!ring "$. b the close of "$. The legal and administrative s stems were reorgani5ed. however.. however. in part chosen b town co!ncils.. for nothing of the sort had happened in an other area occ!pied b French troops. moving into the so!th and east in "$". reform the co!ntr along more modern lines.. remained alwa s at the merc of militar events and never effectivel controlled as m!ch as half the co!ntr .

and on the other. highlighted b the two spectac!lar sieges'to'the'death of Iarago5a in "$.. ()/)+ The Cadi( Cortes and the 1 12 Constitution Collapse of the Spanish monarch !nder the press!res of French imperialism opened the wa for the first brea&thro!gh of modern Spanish liberalism. from "$"3... for the proponents of drastic reform and a more or less representative s stem of government had slowl been gathering strength for twent ears. The main s!ffering..-. who probabl lost no more than 3>. To the destr!ction of the Spanish state was added the devastation of the penins!la)s econom . Spanish affairs were left in the hands of a small Regenc Co!ncil that ref!sed to recogni5e the abdication of the Spanish throne s!bse9!entl wr!ng from Carlos IV and his heir <. It became the first great people)s war of modern histor . and that after the collapse of monarchist government. The French fo!nd themselves a beleag!ered island in a hostile ocean. controlling no more than the main towns. Conversel . representatives of the people had the d!t to ta&e charge of affairs.ort!g!ese field arm . The 1!ntas were composed of local notables. the main b!rden of the war was carried b irreg!lar forces waging a guerrilla 7little war8. most notabl in 0erman . On the one hand there was concern to prevent the sit!ation from degenerating into anarch . where the post'"$.$ and "$. Tho!gh the final o!tcome was complete victor . and the French dared move thro!gh the co!ntr side onl in great force.$. b!t the also e/pressed the conviction of the middle' and !pper'class elite in most of the co!ntr that government rested !pon the sovereignt of the people as well as of the crown.. the cost was heav . and the main heroics.$'"$"= la ()/1+ not in the mane!verings of the field armies b!t in the massive pop!lar resistance of all classes.$ res!lted in the formation of town and regional 1!ntas in almost ever ma1or district. The final victorio!s campaign of "$"= bro!ght a stead retreat b the shr!n&en French forces. and tho!sands of civilians were shot merel as e/amples. Representatives of the principal 1!ntas in t!rn delegated a!thorit to a national *!nta . the brea&down of the Spanish s stem !nder French dominion gave reformers the opport!nit to p!t their ideas into practice. The Aar of Independence was in the long r!n a str!ggle of attrition in which the French were gro!nd down b constant harassment and.patriotic awa&ening was directl stim!lated b the Spanish revolt. In the long r!n. In t!rn. b!t Aellesle )s overweening ca!tion wasted the opport!nit . over a five' ear period''res!lted from the wor& of the guerrilleros.. widespread e/pression among elite elements of the need for representative leadership to provide necessar reforms while g!iding pop!lar resistance. of the war belonged to the Spanish civilians. or more combattants.. the most vivid s mbols of the Spanish will to resist were given b the pop!lace as a whole. with the nobilit predominant. Fernando. the b!l& of the French arm of occ!pation was limited to garrison and s!ppl d!ties. b the commitment of Napoleon)s main strength to eastern and central 2!rope. the Regenc Co!ncil was !nable to f!nction as the government of Spain. French occ!pation polic was harsh. The depletion of French forces in that ear made possible a strategic co!nteroffensive b the reg!lar 4nglo'Spanish'. The simplest comm!nications became ma1or problems of militar logistics. Tho!gh the Spanish field forces were no match for the Napoleonic armies.. Ahole towns were sac&ed. Small detachments and stragglers were relentlessl c!t down. of their own activists.op!lar resistance in Spain served as an inspiring e/ample to other peoples held s!b1ect !nder Napoleonic imperialism. and savage reprisals were e/acted in cities that resisted or in areas closel associated with g!errilleros. no longer able to contest ma1or battles in the main part of the penins!la. for the pop!lar revolt of %a '*!ne "$. .. Ahen the ro al famil crossed into France to meet Napoleon in the spring of "$. Rather.. This was not the prod!ct of French intervention.. This guerra de partidas 7war of irreg!lar partisan bands8 was a spontaneo!s creation of the Spanish peasantr and ma have involved 3. %ost French cas!alties''possibl as man as "$. No other co!ntr in 2!rope s!ffered so heavil from the francesada..The heart of the Spanish Aar of Independence of "$. riot and rape b the French soldier were not !ncommon..

and other theorists. it was the res!lt of the predevelopment of Spanish liberalism that had been ta&ing shape d!ring the reign of Carlos IV. the co!ntr )s leading 4tlantic port. The most stri&ing thing abo!t the social composition of the Cortes delegation was the overrepresentation of the clerical and la intelligentsia. %ontes9!ie!. These districts. it was impossible to carr o!t elections in a n!mber of districts.. acco!nted for onl >= o!t of =. appointed from C@di5 b local a!thorities. the *!nta Central resigned its e/ec!tive a!thorit to the Regenc Co!ncil b!t at the same time called for the selection of representatives to a new Cortes''a potentiall revol!tionar act of political representation. based on political ideas derived from :oc&e. the most liberal cit in the penins!la at that time.$'"$".$'"$. Catalonia. Ahat had happened was that amid the civic brea&down and conf!sion of "$. a sit!ation rather similar to that of the 0erman assembl at Fran&f!rt nearl fort ears later. Social revol!tionar riots bro&e o!t in both town and co!ntr side. The national *!nta Central meanwhile fled so!th in "$. dep!ties. and fo!nd itself increasingl hard p!t to establish e/ec!tive a!thorit on the e/isting ad hoc basis. Reformist leaders in local 1!ntas demanded thro!gho!t "$. was !nderrepresented. to organi5ed modern revol!tionar conspiracies. the C@di5 environment gave a decisive thr!st to constit!tional reformism. Since part of the co!ntr was !nder French occ!pation.riests n!mbered nearl twice as man ''-#''almost one'third of the total. . were represented b s!bstit!tes.$.to escape the French advance. . The regions most heavil represented were 0alicia.. S!plentes. and 4ndal!sia.'">3". The liberal Cortes and its res!lting constit!tion co!ld probabl have ta&en the shape the did onl in C@di5. giving disproportionate voice to C@di5 liberalism. mostl !nder French occ!pation.that a representative national Cortes assembl be s!mmoned to reorgani5e the govern'()/*+ ment and restr!ct!re national instit!tions. positing a parliamentar FSpanish tradition of libert F that had been c!t short b the imposition of (absb!rg despotism after the defeat of the comuneros in ">3. Valencia. The seat of Spanish government d!ring the greater part of the Aar of Independence was C@di5. This was not merel a sp!r'of'the'moment attempt to fill the gap left b captivit of the ro al famil in France. suplentes.. to the e/cl!sion of representatives of concrete social and economic interests. and in this region the most revol!tionar o!tb!rsts of the Aar of Independence occ!rred. living off the 4merican trade. while the conservative north'central part of the co!ntr .. however. protected and provisioned b the 6ritish and Spanish fleets. It was a liberalism derived from a somewhat romantici5ed conception of Spanish histor that tended to e/aggerate the achievements of the medieval Cortes. led mostl b a middle class that had made its mone from commerce and not landed dominion.Central in September "$. as well as the 4merican colonies. an intermittent phenomenon since ancient times. Open to foreign infl!ence. activists among the intelligentsia had come to the fore and asserted themselves in a societ in which most elements lac&ed e/plicit political conscio!sness. The scene of the greatest social ferment d!ring the reign of Carlos IV had been Valencia. separated from the mainland b a narrow penins!la easil defended from French assa!lt. Aithin the span of a few ears. 4t the end of *an!ar "$". Onl "B of the dep!ties were titled aristocrats.. Valencian political societ moved from the traditional bread riots of the !rban poor. <ep!ties to the C@di5 Cortes were nominall to have been chosen b a s stem of indirect !niversal male s!ffrage in which the votes of twent 'five' ear'old heads of ho!seholds were channeled thro!gh district electoral co!ncils. and several revol!tionar local 1!ntas were formed before the a!thorit of the captain general and the more moderate regional 1!nta co!ld be reimposed over the district.

"> ". seigne!rial ()/-+ 1!risdiction. as m!ch as possible. Co%position of the Cortes of C*di(+ 1 1" Clerg :aw ers 0ov)t emplo ees %ilitar Intellect!als :andowners %iscellaneo!s -# C. :ocal administration was placed !nder central control. as all aristocratic legal privileges. p. half of whose members wo!ld be appointed and half elected.ort!gal partic!larl . Catholicism was recogni5ed as the official religion of the state and of the people. The dep!ties immediatel re1ected the idea of forming a traditional three'estate Cortes and met as a !nicameral assembl .()/. with traditional Spanish val!es. :iberal elements sei5ed the initiative and set the pace of deliberations from the start. The dominated press and propaganda and incl!ded most of the elo9!ent spo&esmen in the chamber. It was the most advanced doc!ment of its time in 2!rope. Dniform reg!lations for m!nicipalities were created and the archaic g!ild s stem abolished. to deliberate on provincial affairs. s!pported b most of the middle and part of the !pper classes. and. The constit!tion of "$"3 was the wor& of the middle'class political intelligentsia.+Ta)le 2. =. In s!bse9!ent reg!lations of "$"=. It established a !nicameral legislat!re with general control over legislation. $3. while drawing on both 2nglish and French ideas. Fern@nde5 4lmagro. completed in "$"3. the highl !neven and indirect provincial ta/ str!ct!re was replaced with a series of direct ta/es on b!siness and propert . 4t that time the onl written representative constit!tion an where in the world was that of the Dnited States.= So!rceJ %. The Cortes immediatel set to wor& to provide a progressivist written constit!tion for Spain which wo!ld embod both the social and economic ideals of eighteenth'cent!r monarchist reform and the political norms of parliamentar liberalism. and the C@di5 dep!ties were pro!dl aware that the were ta&ing the lead in continental 2!ropean liberalism. leaving the crown onl a s!spensive veto. Ch!rch censorship was still !pheld. The degree of s!pport in the co!ntr at large is !ncertain. "-3$8. and the right of entailment were abolished. was based on the principle of national sovereignt rather than ro al a!thorit . b!t provision was made for provincial co!ncils. Orígenes del régimen constitucional en España 7%adrid. b!t the In9!isition''in part an arm of the government''was officiall abolished. Scarcel more than ". >> BC 3. Sweeping social reforms were established. 2lectoral provisions for !niversal male s!ffrage b ho!seholders) votes on an indirect basis made this theoreticall a more democratic constit!tion than that of either the Dnited States or 2ngland. and heres in religion remained a nominal crime. and infl!enced liberal aspirations in Ital and . nearl three times as man as an s!bse9!ent Spanish code of government. The constit!tion contained =$B articles. and represented an attempt to wor& o!t a thoro!gh new liberal scheme of government and societ in harmon . For the ne/t 9!arter'cent!r it stood as the classic doc!ment of constit!tional liberalism in western continental 2!rope. percent of the pop!lation were literate at the beginning of the nineteenth . The new constit!tion. it tried to form a !ni9!el Spanish s nthesis of old beliefs with new rights and liberties.

4bsol!te monarch proved completel !nable to meet its own obligations. b aristocrats who feared the loss of seigne!rial dominion. s!spicio!s.cent!r . and all the changes wro!ght b the C@di5 Cortes were swept awa . the average length of ten!re for cabinet ministers was appro/imatel si/ months.$. growth of state control. The had not e/pected an instit!tional revol!tion of s!ch dimensions. Spain was an arena of sharp political strife between s!pporters and opponents of the constit!tion. Fernando VII tho!ght onl of ret!rning to the sit!ation as it had been before "$. against which there was increasing protest. altho!gh it withheld all 1!ridical rights that had formerl been attached. Conservatives were o!tn!mbered. (e proved in man wa s the basest &ing in Spanish histor . o!tmane!vered. and he reg!larl failed to bac& !p his own government appointees. The C@di5 Cortes had wanted to e/tend parliamentar representation to the colonies. advanced anticlerical liberals demanded that priests be e/cl!ded from sitting in Cortes. 4 decree of "$"B restored seigne!rial domain. %eanwhile. and o!ttal&ed at C@di5. who ret!rned from French e/ile in 4pril "$"B to begin his reign as Fernando VII. and the danger of renewed attac&s on ch!rch propert . The regime was not at first blood . man were imprisoned or harried o!t of the co!ntr . most of Spanish 4merica was lost to the independence movements that had emerged in ma1or areas thro!gho!t the colonies at a time when the Spanish ()/9+ government was s!ffering virt!al atroph amid war and reactionar absol!tism.$. b!t opposition to the new constit!tion grew rapidl . administrativel inefficient. Fernando seemed almost incapable of an perception of the commonweal. b!t insisted on contin!ed centrali5ation of government and administration while ref!sing f!rther de 1!re liberali5ation of trade. it was clear eno!gh that in a n!mber of regions the peasants stood directl behind liberal reforms insofar as the bro!ght the abolition of seigne!rial e/actions. The liberals were persec!ted. recogni5ing onl territorial and economic 7b!t not 1!dicial8 1!risdiction. Tho!gh originall re9!ired to swear lo alt to the constit!tion. There was one attempt at ta/ reorgani5ation in "$"#. (e tho!ght onl in terms of his power and sec!rit and was !nmoved b the enormo!s sacrifices of Spanish people to retain their independence and preserve his throne. Th!s absol!te monarch reached its height !nder Fernando VII between "$"B and "$3. It was led b the officeholders of the government of the old regime.ernandine Rea'tion+ 1 1-!1 2" The immediate f!t!re of the Spanish political s stem depended on the attit!de of the heir to the throne. b senior members of the militar hierarch 7who felt their a!thorit was being !ndermined8.+ The . <. The %adrid rabble was aro!sed to paro/ sms of enth!siasm for its restored sovereign. and tho!gh e/ec!tions were largel avoided. societ . In the electoral campaign for the first reg!lar Cortes in "$"=. and vengef!l. 6 the time the last French troops had deserted the penins!la. and b most ch!rch leaders. c!tting across seigne!rial d!es and rents.'"$3. he fo!nd as his tri!mphant homeward 1o!rne led him nearer %adrid that powerf!l forces in the arm . ()/. grasping. selfish. b!t it was t rannical. The treas!r la in a state of total disarra and the debt increased steadil . and former b!rea!crac wo!ld s!pport a ret!rn to absol!tism. the overthrow of the constit!tional s stem b the arm command in 4pril "$"B. On the other hand. s!spicio!s. more enlightened west 2!ropean r!lers strove to forget past grievances and come to terms with change. d!ring the decade "$". when provision was made for a simplified single contrib!tion on land b all classes. and above all. 6etween "$"B and "$3. opposed to loss of ch!rch seigne!rial 1!risdiction 7abadengo8. 4t a time when other. and the lower classes lac&ed political conscio!sness.. giving vent to cries of F:ong live the absol!te &ingF and even a few of F:ong live chainsKF 4bsol!te monarch was restored on the terms of "$. b!t it was not effectivel implemented. In t!rn. most of the clerg sw!ng into the ran&s of the antiliberal opposition. ch!rch.. (ence he gave his blessing to the first direct militar intervention in modern Spanish government. Fernando VII)s onl tr!sted association was with a narrow and capricio!s co!rt camarilla. In most regions . Cowardl .

his forces slowl dwindled.ablo %orillo restored Spanish control over the northern part of So!th 4merica. *!st as the si/teenth'cent!r con9!est had been a largel private enterprise that received onl marginal assistance from the ro al government. 4cc!stomed to great power and respect d!ring the war. a ellow fever epidemic in the so!th. Their discontent was given an ideological and moral content b vag!e notions of liberalism and constit!tionalism. 4s Riego led his detachments in a meandering march northward to rall bac&ing. <!ring the ne/t si/ ears a series of minor. whose chief leader was %a1or Rafael del Riego. The . Riego)s rebels received almost no s!pport elsewhere''b!t neither was there an show of enth!siasm for the absol!tist regime. abortive co!nter'revolts b nominall liberal officers in vario!s provincial garrisons was finall clima/ed b the rebellion of the ma1or e/peditionar corps that was painf!ll being assembled at militar camps o!tside of C@di5. and foreshadowed what became the standard tactic of militar revolt in nineteenth'cent!r Spain. however. the financial prostration of the government. <espite the long association and the importance of the empire to national commerce in the eighteenth cent!r . o!ng officers co!ld not resign themselves to secondar stat!s and miserable pa . Their efforts event!all failed in a str!ggle of attrition that drew no f!rther s!pport from the mother co!ntr . so the nineteenth'cent!r independence movements met onl marginal opposition from the Spanish homeland. and the disma felt b a large part of the politicall conscio!s over the capricio!s. was led b a new element'' dissident sectors of the arm officer corps. Aith certain e/ceptions. The empire was lost mainl b defa!lt. . 4fter "$"B. was the first to !se the term pronunciamiento. Fernando. however. whose government was e/ha!sted b financial deficits and. Spanish people were not activel identified with the empire..!erto Rico. and the island possesions in the . This was a radicall new development.. Onl the collapse of the Spanish state !nder the weight of the French invasion had made it possible for the revolts to achieve s!ccess. 4fter "$3>. The s!ccess of this revolt. renewed political conflict. after "$3. for the one notable e/pedition dispatched !nder 0eneral . !nder the ramshac&le Fernandine regime. It had. inept r!le of <. 4t one point even that was almost eno!gh to thwart them.i)eral Trienniu% of 1 2"!1 2/ 6etween "$"B and "$3. been swamped b the Aar of Independence. man of whom were demoted or left witho!t ()10+ assignment when the old hierarch was restored in "$"B. for the eighteenth' cent!r arm had been a well disciplined if not alwa s efficientl trained militar force.the Spanish'4merican independence movement was limited mainl to a Spanish creole or Spanish' mesti5o minorit of the landed !pper classes and commercial elite who insisted !pon the right to cond!ct their affairs independentl . was d!e not to its own strength b!t to the general malaise that gripped Spain in "$3. %oreover. while an imperial vicero held fast the Spanish bastion of the 4ndean regions. The pron!nciamiento did not rel on caref!l planning or the !nified s!pport of the arm . 4ctive opposition. all that remained of the empire was C!ba. The rebellion of *an!ar "$3. 4t first. Fernando)s corr!pt and incoherent regime was incapable of a ma1or effort to restore Spanish control. which bro!ght in a whole new cadre of middle class officers. the liberal opposition was limited mainl to the small middle'class intelligentsia of the provincial capitals. elements of the senior command had alread set the e/ample of political revolt b the overthrow of the constit!tional regime in "$"B. Several other provincial garrisons came o!t in revolt. the lower classes in 4merica tended to be ne!tral or even pro'Spanish. Fernando was finall left with no alternatives save to accede to rebel demands and restore the constit!tion of "$"3. or none at all. and one of the more notable things abo!t its loss was how little attention it attracted in Spain. There were several so!rces of this dissatisfactionJ the postwar economic depression. b!t so did whatever s!pport remained for the regime in %adrid. and <. %ost classes and regions had never had direct contact with 4merica. %ore often than not it was the wor& of a comparativel small gro!p of senior or middle'ran& officers who did not attac& the government in a .acific.

ista 7"$"38 liberals who had gained e/perience at C@di5. The had profited from the events of the past decade. where !nemplo ed te/tile wor&ers and artisans engaged in a :!ddite t pe of destr!ction of new machiner in te/tile factories. <. the first violent labor protest bro&e o!t in the :evantine town of 4lco . led to signs of hostilit partic!larl among peasants in some so!thern districts. and insisting on direct democrati5ation of the s!ffrage.istas were rather !ncomfortable with their own ()11+ "$"3 constit!tion and not !nwilling to reform it in order to give the crown somewhat greater a!thorit .orLos and abadengo dominion. together with the right of entail. press!re came from the exaltado faction of radicals.istas soon fo!nd themselves challenged on both the left and the right. who were especiall strong in the provincial capitals among the middle class intelligentsia and some small b!sinessmen. !ntil "$#B. Fernando ref!sed to f!ll accept his role of constit!tional monarch and wo!ld not cooperate in the b!ilding of a viable moderate liberal s stem. conspirac . This was a ma1or political motive for professional and white'collar elements in a societ whose . and restrict the s!ffrage to the propertied elements. 6 "$3". The sectors of the arm led b e/altado officers were praised as a necessar pretorian g!arantee of the liberal s stem. their *acobin st le of politics did not scr!ple at terrorism. Indeed. instit!tional. The government soon began p!blic sale of monastic lands. 4 main factor in cementing the factional !nit of the radical political intelligentsia itself was the intense desire for more government 1obs. demanded a complete change of instit!tions from absol!tism to constit!tionalism. where loss of comm!nit propert wo!ld deprive the r!ral lower classes of practicall their onl so!rce of economic assistance. !ndergro!nd liberals had become !sed to f!nctioning b means of secret organi5ation and conspiratorial societies. <!ring the si/ ears of the Fernandine reaction. These changes were accompanied b considerable agitation b the peasants of Valencia and several other regions against the remnants of seigne!rial domain. however. Separate ecclesiastical legal 1!risdiction was done awa co!p b!t simpl Fprono!ncedF or raised the flag of revolt against e/isting government polic . The pron!nciamiento of "$3. however. Finall . Se. tho!gh no immediate sol!tion was in sight for the government financial crisis. b!t s!bse9!ent pron!nciamientos were often aimed at lesser changes of polic or simpl a shift in personnel. man of the docea. :ocal chapters of Spanish %asonr had become a common conspiratorial vehicle. and proved moderate men eager to conciliate national interests. and economic reforms of "$"3'"$"=. Aithin the ran&s of liberalism. demanding red!ction or abolition of the depised consumos 7e/cise ta/es8. From the ver beginning. state control over ch!rch orders established. F!rther plans to divide !p village common lands. The new liberal government repeated the social. reenforcing common hatred of militar conscription 7and the rel!ctance to fight the incomprehensible campaigns in 4merica8. and the practice of clandestine sectarian plotting was not given !p after "$3. man of the latter s!ppressed. the In9!isition abolished. mostl to monied middle class interests. The pron!nciamiento then !s!all had to rel !pon s!pport from other 9!arters or the willingness of the government to compromise.. From the ver beginning. partic!larl on the local and provincial level. These claims formed the basis of the radical liberal program that tended to dominate the politics of man provincial towns 7tho!gh not the co!ntr side8 for half a cent!r . add a second chamber to the legislat!re. were once more abolished. and e/altados insisted that s!ch sectors be allowed to f!nction almost as an independent instit!tion. The e/altados rallied s!pport b pla ing on the local interests of ()1/+ provincialism. the territorial reorgani5ation of Spain which the Cortes of C@di5 had beg!n was completed in "$3" b the redistricting of the co!ntr 7incl!ding the 6alearics and Canaries8 into fift 'two administrative provinces. 4 beginning was made at monetar reform and the debt was reorgani5ed. or riot. The docea. and most monastic lands confiscated. Restored constit!tional government was at first placed in the hands of veteran docea.

and a broad sense of resentment in some areas against the primac of !rban economic interests. 4fter the "$33 elections. One historian has co!nted a total of "33 local revolts against the liberal regime in these ears. and Spain in fact led in the process of political democrati5ation in western 2!rope !ntil "$B=. for the government of "$3. and in the end tal&ed of resisting b means of a guerrilla. in association with %asonic and other liberal secret societies. was em!lated in both . b!t direct opposition to liberalism was centered in the conservative north and more especiall in the partic!larist northeast. 4ll of this was a spontaneo!s response to Spanish liberalism. For both . In the wa&e of Riego)s s!ccessf!l rebellion. . Fernando were occasionall whipped !p to riot for the e/altados. b!t there the mob co!ld be mobili5ed on occasion.'"$3" relied on 1!nior officers and the provincial middle classes.econom co!ld not provide ade9!ate emplo ment. Thro!gho!t "$33. The Se'ond Rea'tion+ 1 22!1 2Violent reaction and reprisal as a response to political change was introd!ced into Spanish politics b Fernando VII in "$"B. the "$"3 constit!tion served as an inspiration to liberals in Ital and in . attac&ing the ch!rch iss!e head on. for it was led b giunte 71!ntas8. essen'()11+ tiall the same social base as in Spain.ista moderates were willing to forgive and forget past e/cesses against themselves when the ret!rned to power in "$3.ort!gal and Ital . It even !sed a (ispani5ed political vocab!lar . as the same lower class strata that had cheered <. S!bse9!entl . c!lminating in a separate ro alist Fregenc F in the hills of northern Catalonia in "$33. while s!pporters of absol!tism rallied the northeastern co!ntr side and prepared for civil war. !sed the terms of liberali and servili 7em!lating the Spanish word serviles applied to s!pporters of absol!tism8. the Fernandine reaction had some effect in inspiring Italian !ltraconservatives d!ring the postwar ears. while man peasants feared liberal c!rtailment of traditional peasant comm!nal land rights in favor of middle class. To these were added broad dissatisfaction with the contin!ed economic depression. Of abo!t e9!al importance were an increasing hostilit in the foral regions of the northeast to political centrali5ation in %adrid. the e/altados gained control of the government and forced a more radical line.ort!gal. Influen'e of Spanish . In %adrid. the first and onl pron!nciamiento in Italian histor was carried o!t b liberal officers in the &ingdom of the Two Sicilies. the same social elements were less radical. 6 that time the northeastern 9!arter of Spain was in a state of virt!al civil war. hostilit between moderate and radical liberals increased. and conservative ro alist rebel 1!ntas were set !p at var ing times in three different regions. the other orders bro!ght !nder strict reg!lation. and plans were drawn !p for a general e/propriation of ch!rch land. This in t!rn stim!lated the reaction of !ltra'conservatives. Its own polic in 2!rope was p!rel and strictl defensive. appointed local capi politici 71efes polLticos8. Conversel . the Spanish constit!tion of "$"3 remained the standard doc!ment of reference.ort!g!ese and Italian liberals of these ears.arts of the co!ntr side had been in a phase of social and economic dist!rbance since "$. The docea. :anded aristocrats !s!all resented abolition of seigne!ries.i)eralis% on Italy and Portugal Spain had first capt!red the imagination of patriots and reformers in central 2!rope with the national rising against Napoleon. b contrast. b!t the e/altados demanded revenge and seemed determined to instit!tionali5e a st le of reprisal and atrocit in several spectac!lar political &illings. compo!nded b protraction of the state financial crisis !nder liberal r!le.'"$3= was based on the same interests as it had been in "$"3'"$"B.'"$3= did nothing to intervene in the affairs of either co!ntr . private ownership.. . Italian liberalism in "$3.$. The Spanish'st le militar conspirac also helped to inspire the beginning of the R!ssian revol!tionar movement with the revolt of the <ecembrist arm officers in "$3>. The *es!it order was again dissolved in Spain. The Spanish pattern of conspirac and revolt b liberal arm officers. perhaps beca!se emplo ment opport!nities were greater. Opposition to liberalism d!ring the trienni!m "$3.

losing French militar bac&ing to . It was not !ntil after the rise to power of the e/altados. French invaders and a smaller Spanish Farm of faithF of right'wing peasant militia. The apostólicos or negros.. The ch!rch was at first disposed to accept constit!tional government in "$3. 1!st as it had initiall in "$". that a French e/peditionar force entered the penins!la in "$3=. et his behavior embarrassed conservative French militar and political leaders. Indeed. and political s!bversion. that a strong !ltraro alist faction of r!ral !pper class and ch!rch leaders had emerged who insisted on stringent reorgani5ation of government to s!ppress liberalism totall . who tried !ns!ccessf!ll to moderate the Spanish reaction. :ocal F*!ntas de la feF 7Committees of the Faith8 were organi5ed in man districts. in so doing. 2ven in the elections of "$33 that were won b the e/altados. however. percent of the dep!ties chosen were clerg . after the restoration of absol!tism. which had contrased so sharpl with that of the restored 6o!rbon crown in France. man h!ndreds arrested. with the beginning of the s!ppression of the monasteries. and the force of FRo alist Vol!nteersF that had s!pplanted the arm in "$3= was event!all e/panded to "3. save the In9!isition. There was no resistance to the French in the Spanish co!ntr side. bringing the ret!rn of seigne!ries. partic!larl in the northeastern regions of the co!ntr . it has been s!spected that <. b the abolition of ecclesiastical 1!risdic'()1)+ tion and the restrictions on orders and their propert .. Fernando)s onl program at first was the complete restoration of absol!tism. where liberalism was more often than not viewed with hostilit . <!ring the ne/t two ears the arm officer corps was temporaril dissolved.. This transigent attit!de was sharpl reversed.. attended b new e/treme meas!res. soon collapsed. b his blindl reactionar and vindictive co!rse in "$"B. The docea.'"$"3. 4 considerable proportion of these were s!pporters of moderate liberalism who s!bse9!entl had to go into e/ile. however. The also wanted to place government completel in the hands of their own reactionar ministers. indicating that as late as "$33 the liberal clerg who had pla ed a ma1or role at C@di5 were still infl!ential. and a n!mber of priests were m!rdered b liberals in the civil strife of "$33'"$3=. and tho!gh 4!strian troops intervened in Ital to s!ppress liberal government there in "$3". and scores of e/ec!tions carried o!t. The Spanish &ing had lost prestige. Fernando VII insisted that French militar detachments remain in the co!ntr to protect him.. even among conservative 2!ropean leaders. Fernando first agreed to appoint an e/altado ministr in %adrid in order to complete the polari5ation of Spanish politics and invite conservative intervention.. and ()1*+ nearl all the laws and instit!tions that had been abolished. 4lmost from the start of the constit!tional trienni!m. 4t an rate. For the first two ears there was little disposition on their part to do so. entailments. that was based on general recognition of a distinct (absb!rg sphere of infl!ence in the Italian penins!la. nearl 3. beset b ". also demanded restoration of the In9!isition as a chec& on p!blic moralit . with the liberals divided among themselves there was little will to resist. men. . and the forces of constit!tionalism. There was no similar determination b France to meddle in Spanish affairs..Religio!s sentiment pla ed a ma1or role in this opposition. as the !ltraro alist reactionaries came to be called.. tho!sands of liberals driven into e/ile.. considerable propert confiscated.i)eralis%+ 1 2-!1 // The &ing)s main concern was to preserve absol!te a!thorit for himself. and the o!tbrea& of virt!al civil war in Spain. 2/altados came into power on a flood of anticlerical propaganda. (ence his alarm on discovering.. anticlericalism. the ecclesiastical f!ero. et he had to govern thro!gh ministers whom he was rarel disposed to tr!st and so contin!ed to rel on personal favorites.ernandine A)solutis% )et0een 1ltra!Royalis% and . Fernando VII came more and more to fear becoming a prisoner of the negros and.ista cabinet of the first part of the trienni!m did not !nd!l alarm the conservative powers. The reaction of "$3= far e/ceeded in scope and ferocit that of "$"B. Fernando VII tried to enco!rage intervention b the conservative 2!ropean powers of the M!adr!ple 4lliance to save him from constit!tional government.

Old state loans were largel rep!diated. and repeated the revocation b ro al decree. whose econom had been even more depressed than !s!al d!ring the past twent ears. <. a reversion to enlightened despotism. The formative elements of the s!bse9!ent Carlist movement were ta&ing shape. seems to have been instigated b a coterie of !pper'class r!ral reactionaries and apostHlico ch!rch leaders. s!bse9!entl recovered and reprom!lgated the revocation. b!t it did introd!ce into ro al government a sense of the need for economic reform and some concern to conciliate the interests of the more moderate elements of Spanish societ . and destr!ction of all remnants of liberalism. as some have said. the g!erra dels malcontents gave voice to the first formal appeal b the negros for the ()1.+ leadership of <. three times a widower. apostHlico <. personal. Fernando relied on a small gro!p of practical absol!tists d!ring the last nine ears of his reign. still not 9!ite fift ears old. restoration of the In9!isition as a g!arantee of tr!e religion. which had earlier pla ed a ma1or role in the str!ggles of Spanish constit!tionalism d!ring the trienni!m "$3. The last cabinet appointed b Fernando VII wor&ed to prepare for the s!ccession of the infant princess Isabel b . <on Fernando. Carlist leaders sei5ed the opport!nit to force the ro al government to cancel the revocation. b!t the government)s own financial organi5ation was somewhat improved. Their aim was to spar& a general r!ral ins!rrection that wo!ld demand absol!te monarchist r!le. (is rel!ctance to give complete control of affairs to the negros led to several !ltrareactionar militar revolts in "$3B'"$3>. Carlos remained 9!iet after "$3# in part beca!se it seemed that the s!ccession of their candidate to the throne of the ph sicall ailing. nominall !nder Fernando VII b!t act!all !nder complete control of the apostHlicos. Fernando VII. not s!rprisingl . b!t failed to complete final ratification b the traditional Cortes. (is repression of dissidents was so savage that it greatl enco!raged a new growth of liberalism in the Catalan capital. Carlists immediatel emphasi5ed the Salic :aw of the 6o!rbon monarch .ort!g!ese e/ile. This period was mar&ed b the five' ear reign of the sang!inar Conde de 2spa. s!pposedl bro!ght to Spain with Felipe V. Nonetheless. wanted to be s!cceeded b his own da!ghter rather than b a rival and antagonis'()1-+ tic brother. This was not. and was s!ppressed after several months b the newl reorgani5ed ro al arm .s!stain his government against the liberals. Eet even in its final ears. and the first r!dimentar stoc& e/change was set !p. This somewhat artificial !prising never spread be ond r!ral Catalonia. The apostHlico faction was absol!tel doctrinaire with regard to its reactionar program? the capricio!s. the pio!s. %inor border inc!rsions b liberal e/iles both from France in the north and 0ibraltar in the so!th were meanwhile t!rned bac& with ease. increased tariff protection was provided for Catalan ind!str . The Su''ession Crisis and the Royal Statute of 1 /The apostHlico s!pporters of <. %ore serio!s was the o!tbrea& of the guerra dels malcontents in the western districts of the Catalan co!ntr side in "$3#. Carlos %arLa Isidro. The local sec!rit commissions organi5ed b the reaction had internal affairs in most districts well !nder control. Fernando)s o!nger brother and pres!med heir. dr ing !p Spanish credit in the international financial mar&ets. The &ing)s marriage to the o!ng %aria Cristina of Naples did not alarm them. <omestic prod!ction was enco!raged. Ahen he s!ddenl fell ill in "$=3 and was virt!all incapacitated. childless Fernando. according to which the ro al s!ccession co!ld not pass thro!gh the female line. opport!nist absol!tism of Fernando VII seemed to them little more than the prel!de to another ro!nd of liberal r!le. Fernandine absol!tism made no gen!ine concessions to liberalism. To avoid the cl!tches of the negros. then earl in "$== forced his ambitio!s brother into . 2fforts were made thro!gh p!blicit and propaganda to create a positive p!blic attit!de toward the ro al regime. was almost inevitable. b!t the birth of a da!ghter to the ro al co!ple was more dist!rbing.'"$3=. The crown had revo&ed this in "#$-.a as captain general of 6arcelona 7"$3#'"$=38. This revolt among poor peasants in the Catalan bac&lands.

0overnment and militar CC. p. The legislat!re wo!ld have little more than a cons!ltative f!nction. The elections of "$=B were then FmadeF from %adrid.rogressivist control. who had served briefl as prime minister d!ring the trienni!m. spontaneo!s. as distinct from clerics. and the senate to be composed of grandes. good'nat!red o!ng princess lac&ing in special ed!cation or intelligence b!t determined to hold the throne for her da!ghter. 4t the beginning of "$=B. and the radical intelligentsia. It was an attempt b %artLne5 de la Rosa to replace the C@di5 constit!tion with a new charter fo!nded on a juste milieu between traditionalism and liberalism. %oreover. The new Spanish doc!ment was not a cop of the French Charter of "$"B.rogressive faction. b!rea!'()1.ista liberals. initiating what became a common nineteenth' cent!r!cing the Ro al Vol!nteers f!rther and eliminating as m!ch of the local administrative infl!ence of the apostHlicos as possible. and was also based in part on the st!d of the limited post' "$"> constit!tions of several west 0erman principalities. In most towns the %ilitia fell !nder . Professional $a'2grounds of Cortes 3e%)ers Eear of election "$3. 4nticlerical violence reappeared almost immediatel . and ro al appointees. b!t regional f!eros were still recogni5ed. Ta)le /. ///iv. as the lower chamber was called. 6 September "$=B the newl emerging . electors 7appro/imatel . ch!rch hierarchs. "$=#8. the lower ho!se to be chosen b the indirect s!ffrage in two stages of some "$. >= Clerg => 3$ > B "$=C -$ $C So!rceJ FermLn Caballero. and freedom of the press were !sed to disc!ss iss!es e/tensivel . To accomplish this and beat bac& the e/pected assa!lt of the apostHlicos. No bill of rights was incl!ded and administration was centrali5ed in %adrid.. nor was it a gen!ine constit!tion. In *!l "$=B several monasteries in %adrid were . El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto 7%adrid. Eet even !nder so restricted a s!ffrage. as has been alleged. This attempt was to some e/tent s!ccessf!l. did not merel form a safe.+ crats. It provided for a bicameral legislat!re. One ob1ective of government manip!lation was to get more of the middle class interests of the co!ntr represented.. The death of Fernando VII at the close of "$== left the throne to a three' ear'old da!ghter !nder the protection of the o!thf!l 9!een mother.."> of " percent of the pop!lation8. the 9!een regent appointed a new ministr headed b the most prominent of the moderate docea. progovernment bloc. *os+ %artLne5 de la Rosa.roc!radores. The stat!te was th!s a compromise between a real constit!tion and the mere reform of traditional laws. %arLa Cristina. "$33 "$=B 6!siness and professional B> C" "=. co!nted ## of the "$$ votes in the lower ho!se and bro!ght !p cens!re votes against the government. heirs of the e/altados of the trienni!m. it wo!ld be necessar to reno!nce Fernandine e/tremes of absol!tism and reach a compromise that wo!ld gain the s!pport of moderates. as indicated b table =. the were given armed strength in man parts of the co!ntr b reorgani5ation of the middle class Drban %ilitia first formed d!ring the trienni!m. The debates of an open chamber. This res!lted in prom!lgation of the Ro al Stat!te of "$=B. for the crown retained absol!te veto powers and the government was responsible to it alone. f!ll p!blicit . the dep!ties in the new 2stamento de . This Neapolitan regent was a 1oll .

and in the more bac&ward and r!ral areas of 4ragHn and the :evant. manpower. The first Carlist contingents were based on former members of the Ro al Vol!nteers and local patriots of the mo!ntain areas. and a small field arm began to ta&e shape. gentr . and man of them operated as g!errilla forces. The were led b priests. Carlist !nits in Catalonia and the east were more loosel organi5ed. There were a n!mber of o!tstanding Carlist militar leaders. Rafael %aroto. Irresol!te and incompetent as a militar chief. and the were alwa s considerabl wea&er in manpower and s!pplies than the government forces. was &illed in "$=>. and its &e note was reaction. in r!ral mo!ntaino!s Catalonia. partiall threatened b liberalism. ()19+ There was also a following in other parts of northern Spain. and in "$=. Eet the Carlists were !nable to win over the cities. The rioters were inflamed b the o!tbrea& of a cholera epidemic''apparentl blamed on the religio!s''and b the armed depredations of clerical Carlists in the northern co!ntr side. The terms of this FCompromise of VergaraF pledged to eschew reprisals. became involved in a death str!ggle with the clerical and civilian apostHlico leaders. <!ring the s!mmer of "$=> similar o!tb!rsts appeared in 6arcelona and several provincial cities. witho!t a clearl and f!ll artic!lated program save ret!rn to absol!te monarch . the professional 0!ip!5coan officer I!malacarreg!i. religio!s 5eal and respect for traditional leadership ma have been even stronger in enco!raging the movement. and village notables. It never developed m!ch offensive strength. and material needed to fight campaigns of attrition against regional forces.set afire and a n!mber of mon&s were m!rdered b a mob. !nable to generate the considerable reso!rces of mone . the best of whom. their stronghold. In parts of the Catalan co!ntr side the rebellio!s propensities of peasants and gentr . their morale was !s!all better than that of government draftees of so!th and central Spain.accepted a genero!s peace offer from the liberal 0eneral 2spartero.F the traditionalist leader. conscription was introd!ced and reg!lar discipline b!ilt !p. Carlos soon after receiving news of the death of Fernando VII and the planned Isabeline s!ccession !nder %arLa Cristina at the close of "$==. and respect 6as9!e privileges. he also lac&ed political perception and was dominated b a narrow coterie of priests and apostHlicos. t!rned o!t to be destr!ctive to his own ca!se. In some of the more bac&ward r!ral areas of the northeast there was general resentment of the new !rban' dominated econom and the interests fostered b liberalism. Fighting in or near their home region.irst Carlist &ar of 1 //!!1 -" 6ands of g!errilleros were formed in the northeast in s!pport of the ca!se of the e/iled <. Eet the Carlist arm was most s!ccessf!l on the defensive. resentf!l of the o!tside world and given to semi' anarchist o!tb!rsts of banditr in an earlier time. were once more revived. the ba onet charges of the Carlist infantr proved to be the most effective single tactic in the war. <on Carlos FV. incorporate Carlist officers in the reg!lar arm . The last fighting ended when Carlist forces in the east were r!n across . rel ing partl on g!errilla !nits. The common denominators of the movement were localism. and to some e/tent r!ralism. a professional general commanding the main Carlist force. In the 6as9!e core area. In the 6as9!e provinces the regard for regional f!eros. It gro!ped the provincial elements that were most strongl opposed to liberalism. and tho!gh the remained deficient in more sophisticated e9!ipment. Carlis% and the . In Navarre. termed brutos b the professional Carlist officers. religio!s and political traditionalism. the str!ggle too& on the dimensions of civil war. as the ())0+ traditionalists were worn down b attrition and government forces closed in. a split developed between the fanatical apostHlico elements and the more practical regional traditionalists. and the climactic e/pedition to the o!ts&irts of %adrid in "$=# was !nable to la!nch an assa!lt on the capital. was a ma1or factor. In less than a ear Carlist vol!nteers were formed into reg!lar battalions in Navarre and the 6as9!e co!ntr . <!ring "$=B. The Carlist ca!se was strongest in the three 6as9!e provinces and Navarre. In the end. even in that region. That the civil war lasted nearl seven ears was d!e in large meas!re to the disarra of the nascent liberal regime.

i)eralis%+ 1 /4!1 -" 6 the mid'"$=.the border in "$B. what reall &ept the movement alive was the strength of religio!s traditionalism and the insistence on regional identit and privileges. and the government had little choice b!t to strengthen itself b moving to the left. . The moderate government of %artLne5 de la Rosa soon fo!nd itself between two fires. In September. 9!alifications were lowered so as to do!ble the s!ffrage.. In %arch "$=C the government declared all monastic lands to be national propert and began their sale immediatel at p!blic a!ction. the %oderate elements were almost completel eliminated and a strongl . The so'called Second Carlist Aar of "$BC'"$B. The need for allies to s!pport the Isabeline s!ccession had provided for a smooth governmental transition !nder the Stat!te of "$=B. %eanwhile %endi5@bal moved to solve two problems sim!ltaneo!sl J financing of the civil war against Carlism and the disposing of monastic properties 7restored to the ch!rch b the Fernandine reaction8.. and his cabinet was charged with the tas& of amending the Stat!te in a more liberal direction. (owever. lower'middle'class.. e/ceeding an thing in "$33'"$3=. raising it to between =. and it was hoped b some that it wo!ld create a stable. the spread of liberal ideas and a growing rev!lsion against Fernandine absol!tism. all pla ed a part in this.. b!t the halting development of the co!ntr left archaic interests intact. The liberal regime in %adrid tended to !s!rp local privileges witho!t offering the advantages of a modern central government. and legal sanctions were ta&en against some gro!ps in the clerg for political reasons. not et integrated into the liberal social and economic s stem.rogressive chamber was elected. <!ring the following ear plans were made for the confiscation and sale of all ch!rch lands. the fr!stration and relative fail!res of representative government d!ring the middle decades of the cent!r made it diffic!lt to create real !nit and overcome the t!g of localism and c!lt!ral traditionalism. <!ring the ens!ing debate the split between %oderates and . The beginning of economic recover d!ring the last ears of Fernando VII.. electors. Tho!gh a few bishops s!pported the %oderates..rogressives became clearer than ever. Eet Carlism did not die after its militar defeat. The aim of this broad disamorti5ation of formerl entailed ch!rch propert was not simpl to dispossess the ch!rch and finance the civil war? it was meant to strengthen the middle classes economicall . Tho!gh the Carlist movement la largel dormant !ntil after "$C-. tho!gh so sweeping a meas!re was not immediatel enacted into law. Aith the assistance of a degree of government manip!lation from %adrid.s.was no more than a rising of the Catalan bac& co!ntr . 4 wave of radical revolts in man of the leading provincial towns bro&e o!t in *!l "$=>. most ch!rch leaders became completel committed to Carlism. For new elections that were held in %arch "$=C.. liberal.. The Triu%ph of . Spanish liberalism had become distinctl stronger than d!ring the trienni!m. 4 more d namic societ than that of the Spanish middle classes might have been able to integrate the interests of vario!s parts of the penins!la. 1!st as its predecessor had d!ring the trienni!m. the financier *!an 4lvare5 de %endi5@bal replaced %artLne5 de la Rosa as prime minister. The e/cesses of Spanish radicalism in a later generation also contrib!ted to the revival of traditionalism after it had seemed to be losing m!ch of its s!pport. 4s a res!lt of this tension between ch!rch and state. and >.. b!t d!ring "$=B and "$=> the Carlist reaction ())1+ gathered strength in the 6as9!e co!ntr and other northeastern regions. The beginning of the great disamorti5ation of ch!rch land completed the total estrangement of the Spanish Catholic Ch!rch from liberalism. it &ept m!ch of its latent appeal in the conservative r!ral areas of the northeast. propert 'owning peasantr . Tho!gh the d nastic iss!e of Salic male legitimac remained the central Carlist claim. thirt 'two of the si/t 'two sees in Spain were vacant b "$B. which sw!ng &e regions s!ch as the !rban districts of Catalonia on the liberal side..

and the more moderate elements of the . with the senate to be appointed b the crown from among names proposed b wealth electors..rogressive ministr too& power !nder *os+ %aria Calatrava. and it has been estimated that d!ring the first decades of liberalism appro/imatel one'third reno!nced their vows altogether. and then held elections''the third in less than a ear''in October "$=C.. on the basis of the "$"3 s stem of !niversal male ho!seholders) s!ffrage in a three'stage indirect process. was almost !n&nown. The res!ltant constit!tion of "$=# was a conciliator and balanced doc!ment. the government alliance won abo!t eight seats.. (ence a secondar provision gave the vote to an peasant farmer who owned a o&e of cattle. 4fter more disorders and m!ch intrig!ing b the %oderates..> to . m!nicipal governments were placed !nder local control thro!gh pop!lar elections b a broad s!ffrage and were also given 1!risdiction over local !nits of the reorgani5ed National %ilitia. forming an alliance with nonradical .rogressives in preserving strong ro al prerogatives in Spain. and even the %oderates protested the wa it was done more than the act of ())/+ disamorti5ation itself. with the former retaining ma1or powers. voters were enfranchised directl . as the government forces were nearl paral 5ed b m!tin and the traditionalist arm came close to sei5ing %adrid. These c!lminated in a pron!nciamiento b noncommissioned officers at the ro al s!mmer palace of :a 0ran1a in 4!g!st. for there was also concern to enfranchise peasant smallholders who paid little in the wa of direct ta/es. starting at %@laga on *!l 3>.. 4ppro/imatel two'thirds of the new electorate made !se of the ballot... she dismissed %endi5@bal in %a "$=C and replaced him with a %oderate leader. 6 that time the b!l& of the p!blic were growing wear of t!rmoil. were arm and national g!ard officers.Tho!gh nearl all Spaniards remained nominal Catholics. of whom abo!t C. The 9!een regent. forcing the 9!een to restore the C@di5 constit!tion of "$"3.. In the first ro!nd of voting. b!t the %oderate factions also relied on more effective organi5ation. The radical sectors had no intention of being eliminated from power. and religio!s or spirit!al anti'Catholicism. In the elections of *!l "$=C some government infl!ence was no do!bt emplo ed.. lowering propert 9!alifications to enfranchise appro/imatel >. The ear "$=# was a cr!cial one in the First Carlist Aar.rogressives... who f!nctioned as head of state. the Cortes was occ!pied with preparing a new constit!tion to s!persede that of "$"3. She reali5ed that the %oderates were m!ch more interested than the . The legislat!re was made bicameral.rogressives gained control of the Cortes. the . For the elections to be held in *!l the s!ffrage was broadened b decree. %aria Cristina. Finall . 4t the same time. was a comparativel simple woman b!t b no means lac&ing in common sense. amo!nted to .C of " percent of the Spanish pop!lation. IstNri5. as distinct from political anti'clericalism. which carried most of the larger cities. government a!thorit was shared b crown and parliament. ed!cated men and officials 9!alified as capacidades 7those who are speciall 9!alified8. to fift 'si/ for the opposition. which had no provision for capacidades. The semidemocratic voting provisions of "$"3 were dropped in favor of a censitar s!ffrage onl slightl broader than that of "$=C.. This total of C>. of the wealth and ">. 4 . Eet the s!ffrage provisions in general were m!ch broader. and was act!all a greater proportion than were enfranchised at that time in France. %iddle class Catholic b!sinessmen saw no spirit!al contradiction in despoiling the ch!rch of its lands. the middle decades of the cent!r mar&ed the nadir of Spanish Catholicism)s p!blic position and infl!ence on the elite. Tho!gh the principle of national sovereignt ())1+ was restored.. It mobili5ed new militar and financial reso!rces for the civil war.. b!t provision for capacidades was considerabl red!ced b comparison with the "$=C law. 4ppro/imatel #$. 6efore the second ro!nd of voting co!ld be held. %an mon&s and priests of !ncertain vocation left the clerg .rogressives began a series of revolts in provincial capitals. In some provinces of the northwest this incl!ded man . b!t government ministers were to be s!mmoned and dismissed b the crown alone. The new constit!tion stated that the crown co!ld not r!le witho!t the parliament...

that. and to the poor organi5ation of the liberal forces and the relative wea&ness of the interests on which the were established.. That militar leaders pla ed s!ch cr!cial roles was d!e first of all to the instit!tional vac!!m in which liberalism was reintrod!ced after the final decade of Fernandine absol!tism. beg!n in "$=B b moderate arm liberals who became spo&esmen for a more representative polic .rogressives)s C. b!t bro!ght new tension and drastic polarit to liberal politics. !nder the "$=" electoral law in France. The %oderates held power for nearl two ears. the s!ffrage list for the co!ntr as a whole was increased to 3C>. In the campaign for the ne/t elections 7September "$=#8.... in one of the fairer elections to be held in nineteenth'cent!r Spain. thro!gh direct pron!nciamientos in "$=> and "$=C. radical . %ost officers felt a patriotic responsibilit to s!pport the liberal ca!se with which the established national government was becoming identified. to more indirect forms of s!asion behind the scenes. whose constit!tion the deno!nced as too conservative..comparativel poor peasants. res!lting in 33. b!t of the minorit who became involved. co!ld not even agree !pon r!les of the game. the %oderates and . s!ch as poor pa 7and after the war. Dnder the broader s!ffrage. The latter finall bro!ght the crown to dissolve the Cortes once more and hold new elections in "$=.. the res!lted in a new victor for the %oderates. and the %oderates organi5ed a Central Commission to give them official leadership in new elections at the beginning of "$B..rogressives abstained in man of the larger cities in protest against the government leadership of the more moderate . 9!alified voters in . This amo!nted to " voter for ever B$ inhabitants.. Th!s the pla ed the role of a moderni5ing middle class elite in a societ in which the core of the middle classes were not et read to ta&e f!ll charge. partic!larl .. This intervention was e/pressed in a variet of forms. The %oderates deno!nced the "$=# constit!tion as too radical. compared to " for ever 3. 29!all important was the fact that liberalism was being established d!ring a ma1or civil war in which the militar leadership was of cr!cial significance and hence pla ed a disproportionatel infl!ential role. %ost were of middle class bac&gro!nd? the leaned toward liberalism beca!se of its m sti9!e of moderni5ation and new opport!nit . ranging from o!tright m!tin .. The 3ilitary in Politi's+ 1 /-!1 -" It was d!ring the First Carlist Aar that the basic pattern of militar intervention and leadership in politics was established. who then prepared to safeg!ard the tri!mph of moderate liberalism b new instit!tional changes that wo!ld eliminate the bases of .rogressive Cortes was then in t!rn dissolved. personal rivalries. The two main rival factions. the developed the first appro/imation of a reg!lar political organi5ation in Spain b forming coordinated committees of 1o!rnalists and other activists to promote their propaganda. the greater n!mber reinforced either %oderate or . in 4st!rias. there was onl >C percent participation.. The . felt 1!stified in s!mmoning both civilian mobs and armed intervention b s mpathetic militar elements." percent of the pop!lation8. 73. partic!larl in "$=#. seats to the . The won 3. %oreover. and .rogressive liberalism.rogressive victor . co!pled with the abstention of the %oderates. %ore m!ndane factors were also involved. res!lted in a radical . These ma not have been so relativel free of governmental interference as the preceding contests of "$=# and "$=-.rogressives.rogressives.ontevedra and "$.. 4ltogether. a pattern that persisted for at least fort ears. The %oderates gained primar s!pport from the larger landowners of central and so!thern Spain and benefited both from the radicals) abstention and from a general rightward swing among the middle and !pper classes after the recent series of revolts and m!tinies. !nemplo ment8.rogressives.rogressive strength. b!t on increasingl poorer terms with the liberal leaders of the reg!lar arm . 4t an rate. This coincided with the end of the primar phase of the civil war and the tri!mph for ()))+ the liberal ca!se. This proliberal orientation can be e/plained b a n!mber of factors. and the . %ost of the arm and its officers remained aloof from politics.

.rogressive ca!dillo was the son of a Castilian wheelwright..the fact that the liberal ())*+ government was so ill organi5ed d!ring the war that commanding officers sometimes had to intervene in government administration simpl to care for the needs of their troops. (is political ideas were limited to vag!e notions abo!t the c!rrent of the times and pop!lar sovereignt . the voting lists had increased to >. (e had little ed!cation and scant political !nderstanding or talent.rogressive interests in opposition to rivals in the militar who s!pported the %oderates..> percent of the pop!lation8.. in "$B. The .. 5spartero and the . and that the appointive jefes políticos in charge of provinces wo!ld choose all officials for smaller towns from among those elected in them.rogressive crowds and en1o ed the stat!s which politics had bro!ght him. and he ref!sed to sanction the new laws. The %oderate government that regained control in "$B. and "# in . 4t this point the 9!een regent tried to gain the s!pport of the commander'in'chief of the arm .ontevedra''the broadest 2!ropean s!ffrage of the period. 2spartero then became interim regent in October "$B. in "$=.rogressives to be their savior. and his infl!ence was in large meas!re responsible for the dissol!tion of the %oderate Cortes and the brief ret!rn of the . and moved to c!t the base from !nder . The onl significant initiative of the government in "$B" was to begin to p!t the lands of the sec!lar clerg as well as monasteries on the mar&et for private p!rchase. l for ever "B in 0!ip!5coa. and the . 7=. 6!t 2spartero was even more vehementl implored b the .. Their imposition amo!nted to a civilian pron!nciamiento. (e had become identified with . while stressing his s!pport of the 9!een regent and the o!ng 9!een. and was given to bo!ts of indolence alternating with periods of activit . (e had not so!ght a political career b!t had been eagerl pressed into service b the .. and de facto head of state. or more.. Ahen she ref!sed to sanction ann!lment of the m!nicipalities law. the first and onl time that a militar fig!re held that position !ntil "-=C. Tho!gh the principle of pop!lar election of provincial assemblies and m!nicipal co!ncils was retained. who commanded the government forces in the north d!ring the climactic campaign that concl!ded with the compromise peace of Vergara in "$=-. Than&s to the yuntero 7cattle owner8 cla!se of the "$=# constit!tion. (ence %arLa Cristina offered to appoint 2spartero prime minister as the onl hope of finding a compromise that wo!ld s!pport the throne.and B3B. (e was gratified to be hailed b . This amo!nted to " voter for ever "= inhabitants of 4lava. then passed legislation raising propert 9!alifications for the vote. and co!ld not be instit!ted simpl b ma1orit vote of parliament.rogressives as the onl means of ass!ring their tri!mph.rogressives) own terms. and !ltimatel drove %aria Cristina to abdicate the regenc . however. This forced appointment of 2spartero as prime minister on the .rogressive strength in the provincial towns. however. "C in Orense. a new law stip!lated that the ministr of interior in %adrid wo!ld alone have the right to appoint ma ors and other officials of provincial capitals from among all those local co!ncilors elected.. the . These laws were in fact constit!tional amendments. The onl wa in which Spanish politics became more liberal !nder 2spartero was in the s!ffrage.ailure of Progressi6is%+ 1 -"!1 -/ The dominant fig!re in the Spanish arm at the close of the First Carlist Aar was 0eneral 6aldomero 2spartero..rogressives threatened revolt.. 6 "$B=. later e/pressed in his pop!lar catchphrase F:et the national will be f!lfilledF''a slogan witho!t content adopted in lie! of a program. 2spartero. "> in Iamora. who was in 6arcelona. the n!mber of electors had risen to =B=.rogressives bro&e into two months of protracted street demonstrations and minor disorders in provincial capitals all over Spain.. b!t he had little in the wa of p!rposef!l leadership to offer.rogressive victor and ratification b the new Cortes of 2spartero as regent for life.+ overwhelming ...rogressives to power in "$=-'"$B. New elections in "$B" nat!rall bro!ght an ()).

rogressive pron!nciamiento that overthrew the regenc .rogressive opinion had long since ended. which feared that affairs in Spain were getting o!t of hand. It was also s!pported b a significant n!mber of the . replaced b a temporar compromise ministr faced with the tas& of restr!ct!ring liberal .rogressives 7as the anti'2spartero sector of the . 6 this time 2spartero)s hone moon with . from m!ch of the clerg . 6efore it was forcibl s!ppressed. Their conspirac drew s!pport from the more moderate Carlists. while the wor&ers were disgr!ntled over the uinta s stem of general militar recr!itment''a comp!lsor draft for certain elements of the poor''and over the high level of e/cises. and from the French government of :o!is . led b 0eneral RamHn %arLa Narv@e5. 4fter the government insisted on !nconditional s!rrender.rogressives called themselves8. as 2spartero bombarded the cit . Not strong eno!gh or s!fficientl !nited to govern thro!gh civilian politics. it was clima/ed b a s&irmish ()). he was dominated b a cli9!e of militar associates 7nic&named 4 ac!chos b their enemies. Aithin fort 'eight ho!rs a ta/ riot of sorts had flamed into a broad pop!lar revolt. Spanish .op!lar that demolished the Ci!dadela. b!t the did want to force a change in polic and get rid of the 4 ac!cho gro!p.+ o!tside %adrid between a rebel force and a few !nits still lo al to 2spartero. it demanded government protection for domestic ind!str and collaborated with the first significant efforts to organi5e trade !nions in Spain. The strongest opposition to 2spartero was being coordinated b a gro!p of %oderate senior officers in e/ile. in November "$B3. (e paid little attention either to the .rogressives themselves were loo&ing for an alternative sol!tion.rogressivism had proved invertebrate and ineffective. One ear later.rogressives. This was easil 9!ashed. it had relied on a militar strong man who was incapable of providing leadership. Reaction to the attempted %oderate pron!nciamiento served as catal st in a new . Ahen 2spartero dispatched an arm to red!ce 6arcelona b force. It did bring the elimination of 6as9!e f!eros. The Cortes elections of "$B= were won b a coalition of %oderates and Fp!reF .rogressive conspirators did not necessaril want to overthrow 2spartero. . The *!nta .rogressive o!tb!rst in 6arcelona. There a *!nta de Vigilancia was set !p to defend against the danger from the right. who fo!nd themselves !nemplo ed !nder the c!rrent scheme or o!t of favor with the r!ling cli9!e. 6arcelona)s fortress b!ilt b Felipe V as a s mbol of centralist sovereignt in the Catalan capital. b!t this merel served as the spar& to to!ch off the 1oint %oderate'Fp!reF . 6 that time his power had melted awa ? he was defeated and forced into retirement. b!t within a month it had been converted into a *!nta . the more restrained middle class elements formed a Conciliation *!nta to wor& o!t a compromise sol!tion.rovincial governments were established in place of the traditional 1!ntas. The rebels raised the first blac& flags of total defiance seen in 6arcelona. 6as9!e tariff privileges were abolished.rogressive Cortes or to the wants and demands of the provinces. 4fter winning ma1or militar s!pport in *!ne. 6 "$B=. whose hands were on the levers of power. 2spartero dissolved it.op!lar too& over the government.op!lar represented a broad mobili5ation of elements of the middle and also the lower classes. it was s!pplanted b a new radical 1!nta of the lower classes. The possessing classes were alien'())-+ ated b 2spartero)s free'trade polic . Some of these . the str!ct!re of government in 6arcelona bro&e down altogether. for it drew no s!pport from the temporaril e/ha!sted Carlists. Incapable of governing effectivel himself. man of the . It was a snowballing revolt that started late in %a in several of the 4ndal!sian provincial capitals. and s!ppressed newspapers to protect himself from criticism. and reg!lar conscription was introd!ced.The response of one gro!p of the %oderates to the 2spartero regime was a co!nter'pron!nciamiento b a handf!l of militar and civilian fig!res in the 6as9!e co!ntr in October "$B". then occ!pied it b militar force and carried o!t a severe repression. and a new *!nta <irectiva . Finding himself !nable to control the new assembl .hilippe. since some of them had been present at the final Spanish defeat of 4 ac!cho in So!th 4merica in "$3>8.

and "$=B. Spanish representatives pla ed no role at the Congress of Vienna and were almost completel ignored. It lac&ed clear leadership or program b!t made demands for greater democrati5ation and for social and economic concessions from both the government and propert owners. The domestic division res!lting from civil war and political stalemate was s!ch that the principal effort to sec!re more h!mane treatment of prisoners d!ring the First Carlist Aar was not arranged b Spaniards b!t was negotiated thro!gh 6ritish intermediaries in the 2lliott Convention of "$=>. the Spanish government was able to enter a phase of more fr!itf!l diplomatic relations. 6ritain s!pplied m!ch of the e9!ipment and mone for the government tri!mph. factor wor&ers. The third pop!lar revolt in 6arcelona within two ears occ!rred d!ring September "$B=. This was the almost inevitable res!lt of being deprived of the b!l& of Spanish 4merican reso!rces and the trade and reven!e accr!ing from them. especiall at a time when the ())9+ co!ntr was s!ffering from heav war losses and the administrative s stem had fallen into deca . The pett . French diplomac ass!med a stronger role after the overthrow of the . however. The ma1or effort which his government e/erted in "$"$ to elicit help from other 2!ropean powers to repress the Spanish 4merican revolt was a complete fail!re. and in the latter ear the fo!r powers signed a M!adr!ple 4lliance. the revolt in 4merica. Spain. . the *amancia was s!ppressed b force 7November "$B=8. and . b!t the res!lting economic prostration. e/traordinaril narrow'minded Fernando en1o ed no esteem even among other conservative r!lers. and the Dnited States adhered to this position in its %onroe <octrine. 4mbassadors of these two powers tried fre9!entl to intervene in domestic affairs d!ring the "$=. when the cit was dominated b a new radical 1!nta representing artisans. Spain became a debtor nation for the first time in its histor .s and "$B. <!ring Fernando)s reign. The wea&ness and dependenc of the first half of the Fernandine regime was then clima/ed b reliance on French troops to restore absol!te monarch .F indicating its identification with the lowest social strata. b!t as a res!lt of these loans the foreign debt do!bled between "$3B and "$=B. :i&e its predecessors. France. from the g ps !sage jamar meaning Fto eat. The heroic resistance of the Spanish people preserved national independence. The revolt ac9!ired the slang name of the !amancia. and merel ina!g!rated a phase of 6ritish and French t!telage. and government reliance on foreign loans accent!ated this relative dependence. Tho!gh 6ritish infl!ence seemed predominant for a time. the 6ritish government stood read b "$3= to bloc& an marshalling of s!pport for the Spanish repression in 4merica.ort!gal all 1oined the ran&s of constit!tional monarch alongside 6ritain. vengef!l. There was some improvement in the handling of the national debt d!ring the second half of the reign. The last ro!nd of this conflict was fo!ght b the radical left in 6arcelona. and the !nemplo ed. Spain had s!n& into the h!miliating role of a Napoleonic satellite.rogressives and the French toward the %oderates. . This was not an association of e9!als.rogressives in "$B=.government in Spain. which also represented victor for the polic of the two main western powers and was viewed !nfavorabl b the conservative governments of central and eastern 2!rope. insofar as it was better administered and new loans were negotiated. nor did Spanish diplomac fare better in s!bse9!ent ears. where the pop!lar militia ref!sed to disband after the new government had been formed. b!t this time there were no fearf!l reprisals. and the total ineptness of the Fernandine regime placed the co!ntr in a position of diplomatic impotence after "$"B. the 6ritish government leaning toward the less radical of the .s. In addition.oreign Affairs+ 1 14!1 -/ <!ring the decade that preceded the Aar of Independence. 6etween "$=. 4fter the death of Fernando VII.

and mo!ntain areas. 4 brief revival began d!ring the liberal trienni!m. Self'contained regions of local artisan prod!ction were still almost more the r!le than the e/ception in the geograph of Spanish man!fact!res. man of the r!ral districts of Spain still lived largel o!tside the orbit of the commerce and ind!str of a new and developing nineteenth'cent!r econom . propert titles to small towns !nder former Seigne!rial domain. and land from which onl marginal d!es were collected. where the formed a s!bclass easil stirred !p b . . The ears "$"B'"$3. %!ch of the mone bro!ght in b foreign loans between "$3= and "$3# was simpl stolen b the co!rt camarilla. Some nobles lost the economic benefits of most of their seigne!ries almost entirel .rogressive agitation. for the henceforth held in absol!te title what had previo!sl been restricted b a &ind of condominial relationship. remained bones of contention. Nevertheless. b!t incl!ded a degree of monetar deval!ation. :arge landholders and proto' ind!strialists favored the %oderates. and the new settlement of propert rights was at first not f!ll clear. Nevertheless.. Revival of Catalan man!fact!res was hampered b the flow of French te/tile e/ports that !ndersold Catalan prod!ction inside Spain. <!es and rights had been conf!sed ever since the start of the Aar of Independence and in some cases were not entirel settled !ntil decades after the act!al abolition of seigne!ries in "$=C.rogressivism. and this was et another factor that made the social and economic mobili5ation of a cohesive liberalism 9!ite diffic!lt. The polic of liberal government d!ring the trienni!m and after "$=B also stressed bringing in mone thro!gh foreign loans. Tho!gh some aristocrats who formerl held e/tensive domains were recogni5ed as private owners of these h!ge tracts. which apparentl stim!lated prod!ction. 0eneral recover in Spain did not get !nder wa !ntil "$3#. villages. Seigne!rial territorial 1!risdictions were often transferred into private propert rights. 6 "$=B those with social and economic power were in fair agreement on the desirabilit of liberal constit!tionalism. an enormo!s boon to the landholding aristocrac . then was cho&ed off b international depression. the state began to wor& in greater cooperation with private finance. b!t disagreed among themselves abo!t the e/act form. 6eginning in "$3#. This ()*0+ financial polic was reversed d!ring "$3"'"$3= b!t was restored !nder the second Fernandine reaction. achieving a higher level of honest and coherence in its financial operations. and Catalan te/tile prod!ction increased mar&edl after abo!t "$=. were a time of !nrelieved postwar depression. and certain dispossessed lords were event!all awarded pensions or other compensations. reenforced depression. :aws!its went on for ears.5'ono%i' 7e6elop%ent+ 1 14!1 -/ The political cleavages and fail!res of the 9!arter'cent!r that followed the Aar of Independence wo!ld !ndo!btedl have been m!ch less severe had the period not been one of economic doldr!ms. while commercial interests and smaller entrepene!rs and shop&eepers s!pported . The general !pswing owed comparativel little to government polic J the program of hard mone and general deflation that was followed in "$"B'"$3. Seigne!rial 1!risdiction over r!ral properties was not definitivel eliminated !ntil after "$=C. economic distress enco!raged the drift of marginal elements to the towns. and this assisted the importing of machiner for te/tile prod!ction. In t!rn. s!ch ownership normall co!ld not be e/tended over small towns.

The transfer and sale of ch!rch lands was not completed for several decades.BC>.#3$ 0rand total ".B-3 :ands of reg!lar clerg >. The disamorti5ation was a comparative political s!ccess b!t a distinct economic fail!re.rosper %erim+e.-"3..s. for the first time in modern 2!ropean c!lt!re.()*1+ Ta)le -.s and after. The heavil !nbalanced agrarian str!ct!re of modern Spain. :and rents from peasants rose. while bracero wages remained stagnant. The most val!able lands transferred to private ownership were in New Castile. the regions of the great thirteenth'cent!r endowments. g!aranteeing higher grain prices that lowered the standard of living b!t maintained the principal so!rce of income for the new elite.F Foreign writers who tavelled in Spain''Th+ophile 0a!tier. The first phase was carried o!t in "$=C'"$=# amid great haste to complete the first ro!nds of sales to . percent down. "->>8. with ten ears to pa .#B> $. one of the first acts of restored constit!tional government in "$3.-.B33 33. and the sale of the properties of the sec!lar clerg was not f!ll cons!mmated !ntil the "$>.rogressive s!pporters before the %oderates co!ld intervene.s. 4ll ch!rch properties were not thrown on the mar&et !ntil the new r!lings b the 2spartero regenc in "$B".-C# B>. :ands were sold at little more than ". and %oorish resid!es which in its e/treme form was more 4ndal!sian than Spanish.C.3"" So!rceJ :. Aashington Irving. The central fig!re in this was Francisco 0o a :!cientes 7"#BC'"$3$8.. This violated Spain)s cent!ries'old tradition of cheap food imports. contrib!ting to a m sti9!e based on one'sided glimpses of g psies.-3>. and others''elaborated this image in the literar world of the "$=. Tho!gh the state gained the s!pport of a new elite. "$=C'>C Cost of common and wastelands sold. BC=. p. Sales of Chur'h and Co%%on . Change in the perception of the Spanish esthetic was also the res!lt of a reval!ation b art critics and historians of western 2!rope. Rates were often well !nder the fair mar&et val!e. 2/tremad!ra. "$=C'>C :ands of sec!lar clerg =--. Concentration of landholdings accelerated after "$=C. Eet with this there came. an appreciation for the positive as well as the negative 9!alities of the !ni9!el (ispanic. . had ass!med its f!ll dimensions b the "$B. who began earl in the cent!r to pro1ect the image of a FRomantic Spain. had been to contradict its nominal doctrines of the free mar&et b setting rigoro!s import restrictions on grain.3>$. its finances deteriorated.>-=. S@nche5 4gesta.=. and 4ndal!sia. flamenco dancing. ()*/+ Spanish Ro%anti'is% For the first time in more than one h!ndred ears Spanish esthetics. whose finest achievements were his later paintings done in the nineteenth cent!r . . "istoria del constitucionalismo español 7%adrid. bandits.B.C =>B.B$= >"-."$=. Since the new liberal elite was f!ndamentall land'based. gripped the 2!ropean imagination. partic!larl in the center and so!th.=$.->" ".>#". e/pressed in the romantic art of the earl nineteenth cent!r .ands+ 1 /8!1 48+ 6alued in reales (4 reales e9ualled one peseta# Eears "$=C'BB "$B>'>B "$>B'>C Total cost of ch!rch lands sold."C$.=>3.

Several &e aspects of the str!ggle are st!died in the s mposi!m -a Guerra de la +ndependencia española y los sitios de &arago%a 7Iarago5a. 6 mid'cent!r there were also evidences of more pop!lar c!lt!ral forms in the Catalan' spea&ing regions. -a España de 4ernando . with wor&ing class choral gro!ps in 6arcelona and pop!lar theatricals in both 6arcelona and Valencia. El ocaso de la +n uisición 7%adrid.. deal with the politics of the "#-.rinceton. 6 the end of the nineteenth cent!r . "-C38? RamHn Solis. "-#.'"$3= 7. . on the other hand. and V. 0enov+s 4morHs. "-C38.s. "->. "$=>'=#8. devoted to capt!ring regional st les and mores.ntiguo (égimen 7%adrid. "->$8. "->$8. "3C 7Nov. compo!nding the diffic!lties of integrating a liberal s stem. "-C#8. (evolución y reacción en el reinado de Carlos +. The best wor& on the 9!arter'cent!r of Fernando VII is %ig!el 4rtola. no. "->$8? the special vol!me devoted to the "$"3 constit!tion b the (evista de Estudios :olíticos. The growth of regionalist c!lt!re did not at first challenge Spanish !nit or the broader hegemon of Castilian Spanish c!lt!re. The classic Spanish narrative is the Conde de Toreno)s "istoria del levantamiento8 guerra y revolución de España. Gesc#ic#te $paniens %ur &eit der fran%'sisc#en (evolution 76erlin. -a incorporación de señoríos en la España del . Salvador de %o/H. see two wor&s b %ig!el 4rtola. 7New Eor&. treats meas!res to red!ce seigne!ries. 7%adrid. > vols. "$C"8. deals with the . "-C$8. 0eneral st!d of nineteenth'cent!r Spain sho!ld begin with Ra mond Carr)s $pain /010*/232 7O/ford. "-CC8. El Cádi% de las Cortes 7%adrid. 7%adrid. "-C-8.++ 7%adrid. 4ntonio 2lor5a. 3 vols. and -os afrancesados 7%adrid. )#e Eig#teent#*Century (evolution in $pain 7. 4 sense of the individ!alit of Catalan societ was intensified. "-C$8. provides a descriptive acco!nt of Spain d!ring the Aar of Independence. -a ideología liberal en la +lustración española 7%adrid.'"-C#8 7%adrid.'<ec. :!is 4lonso Te1ada../011*/0<1= 7%adrid. "->$8. it helped to inspire dissociative regionalism. and -os realistas en el primer trienio constitucional. the sense of romanticism was more conservative and was associated with historical themes and infl!enced b 2nglish and 0erman writers. The last chapters of Richard (err. "->$8. "-C>8. 4 recent brief acco!nt is Carlos Corona.There was a romantic generation in Spanish literat!re and criticism as well. -os afrancesados en la Guerra de la +ndependencia 7%adrid. "->-8. -os orígenes de la España contemporánea 7%adrid. In Catalonia.8. 0abriel :ovett)s 5apoleon and t#e 6irt# of 7odern $pain. "-C=8? and %an!el 4rdit)s boo&let. Els valencians de les Corts de Cadis 76arcelona. B$%l$ 2raphy ! r Chapter 19 (-0)+ The most detailed acco!nt of Spanish government from "#$> to "#-> is still (ermann 6a!mgarten. "->-8. headed b the essa ist %ariano *os+ de :arra and lin&ed with the liberal political movement in %adrid and the provincial capitals of the so!th.al9ncia contra 5apoleó 7Valencia. "istoria política de España 7"$. "$3.8. "->=8? (ans *!retsch&e.amplona. "$"B'"$3. . On the rise of Spanish liberalism d!ring the war. gives e/amples of the passage from 2nlightenment reformism to political preliberalism. This reawa&ening of pop!lar c!lt!re was reinforced b the costumbrista trend in the literat!re of the ne/t generation. The conflict between traditionalism and liberalism has been reinterpreted b Frederico S!@re5 Verdag!er in -a crisis política del . The development of (ispanic romanticism had the effect of reviving regional lang!ages and 9!ic&ening their literar !se? the hegemon of Castilian that had end!red for three cent!ries was challenged.olitical histor is s!pplemented b <iego Sevilla 4ndr+s. 7%adrid. however. partic!larl Scott. "-C$8. treats the conflict in the :evant.ntiguo (égimen en (-0*+ España . *os+ :!is Cornelias has written two important wor&s in the same veinJ -os primeros pronunciamientos en España.

Iavala. See also :. RodrLg!e5 0arra5a. %.mérica. 7%adrid. "istoria del )radicionalismo español. "-B. The revolt of "$3C'"$3# is st!died b *aime Torras 2lias. shows the infl!ence of earl Spanish liberalism in Ital . "-C#8. 0iorgio Spini. 3d ed. 7asones8 comuneros y carbonarios 7%adrid. "-=. "istoria del Carlismo 7%adrid. 2. and *. 5avarra de (eino a provincia . b!t see Rom@n O ar5!n. "->=8. (omanti ue EspagneD -E+mage de lEEspagne en 4rance entre /011 et /0B1 7. +ndependencia de . "-3B'"-3C8. Spanish %asonr can be approached thro!gh Vicente de la F!ente. *aime <elgado. "-C"8.aris. "-C$8. "-#"8. = vols. "-C. *esNs . 2nciso Recio. T. eds.graviados 76arcelona. "istory of t#e (omantic 7ovement in $pain 7:iverpool. and Iris %. . =.s. . see *!lio F. = vols. "-==8.'"$B>. "->. El sistema politico del Estatuto (eal . "-B. "->.' "->-8. is an able st!d . R.. = vols. There is no ade9!ate histor of Carlism. -a guerra de los . 4llison . "istoria de las sociedades secretas antiguas y modernas. -a opinión española y la independencia #ispanoamericana8 /0/2*/0?1 7Valladolid. 7ito e realtF della $pagna nelle rivolu%ioni italiani del /0?1*/0?/ 7Rome. is an e/cellent st!d of the Spanish 4rm and its political activities for those ears. 7Seville.abHn. The standard histor of Spanish foreign relations in the nineteenth'cent!r is *erHnimo 6ec&er.. "-C$8. is a classic. Salvador de %o/H. See also :eon'FranGois (offmann.8.8. )#e Origins of 7ilitary :oAer in $pain8 /011*/0B< 7O/ford. "-C#8. "-C>8.8.e/treme right in the last decade of Fernando VII. On the emancipation of the mainland colonies. is a brief descriptive acco!nt. and %elchor Ferrer et al. "-C>8. 76arcelona. "-C#8./0?0*/0</= 7. 4 thoro!gh st!d of the initial political str!ct!re of the Isabeline monarch has been made b *. Villarro a. 7%adrid. deals mainl with the ears "$3.amplona.8.'"->=8. "-C"8.eers. 2dgar (olt. treats Navarrese politics in the "$=. Costumbrismo y novela 7Valencia. "istoria de las relaciones exteriores de España durante el siglo C+C. F. -a otra legitimidad 7%adrid. 0!ill+n. 7%adrid. is a caref!l st!d of the claims of d nastic legitimac . The best s nthesis on an region of nineteenth'cent!r Spain is *aime Vicens Vives)s Cataluña en el siglo C+C 7%adrid. España y 7exico en el siglo C+C. vols. "-C#8./03<*/03@= 7%adrid. -a disolución del régimen señorial en España 7%adrid. %ontesinos. )#e Carlist >ars in $pain 7:ondon. 2ric Christiansen.