Exploratory Study of the 2014 Panama Canal Expansion Regarding Two East Coast Ports (Charleston/Savannah): Can

the “Business Case” be Made?
Walter Kendall Joanna Shaw Lynn Kendall
Abstract The Panama Canal expansion, expected to be completed in 2014, continues to bring forth questions regarding the necessity of changes with U.S. ports, especially East Coast and Gulf ports. Currently the questions are shifting to look at those ports and their ability to accommodate the New Panamax (NPX) ships that will now be able to access these ports more readily from Asian locations. This article looks specifically at the question of will the net income to the ports likely be greater than the net direct costs? Keywords: Panama Canal, Port Expansion, Panama Canal Business Case Relevance to Marketing Educators, Researchers and/or Practitioners: By examining the business case (profitability) of deepwater expansion of East Coast ports to accommodate New Panamax (NPX) vessels, we may better understand the transport economics implications of the expansion of the Panama Canal. This has importance to marketers and logistics/supply chain people due to the potential lower costs of distribution, both inbound and outbound from the U.S.

LITERATURE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION History of the Panama Canal The Panama Canal expansion, expected to be completed in 2014, continues to bring forth myriad questions for United States Transportation Policy. Currently the questions are shifting to look specifically at East Coast ports (and to a lesser degree Gulf ports) and their ability to accommodate the New Panamax (NPX) ships that will now be able to easily access these ports. It is noted that the East Coast and Gulf Coast ports could gain up to 25 percent of traffic currently coming into the West Coast (CanagaRetna, 2010). Are East Coast ports prepared for these new opportunities, and if not, what are the costs for preparing for the larger, post-expansion shipping which will transit the Panama Canal?
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Presently there is but one port, Norfolk, which appears to be largely able to handle NPX ships, with one or two others which are marginally ready, depending how you define “ready.” (CanagaRetna, 2010). See Table 1 as an illustration of Charleston’s partial readiness.
Table 1 Tidal Limitations of Port of Charleston Vessel Draft

Hours per day available for Inbound or Outbound Transit 24 16 12 8 6 2

Vessel Draft up to 43’ 44’ 45’ 46’ 47’ 48’

Source: South Carolina Ports, Channel Specifications http://www.port-of-charleston.com/Cargo/Marine/channelspecs.asp

Up to nine or ten East Coast ports are making lots of noise about deepwater expansion to be ready for NPX shipping, but, by and large, construction has not begun. Thus, the opportunity for rational analysis of the business case for deepwater expansion at various ports is now. Two potential East Coast ports that have aggressively sought to take action to secure a greater proportion of the cargo volumes entering and departing the United State are the Port of Savannah in Georgia and the Port of Charleston in South Carolina. They will be the focus of our exploratory research. The Panama Canal joins the Atlantic and Pacific oceans across the isthmus of Panama. The Canal opened in 1914 following 34 years of construction and a cost of $639 million and is nearly 50 miles long (CanagaRetna, 2010). Since its opening the Panama Canal has played a major role in global trade. Due to an increase in global trade from China and the growing number of vessels utilizing the Canal, coupled with increased blockages and delays, a call for expansion was declared (Morrison, 2012). A decision to expand the Panama Canal was reached in 2006 by the Panamanian government. Expansion of the Panama Canal The literature on the Panama Canal expansion is extensive. The expansion itself will include several key elements:  Creating a new lane of traffic along the Canal by constructing two lock complexesone on the Atlantic side and one of the Pacific side.  Excavating new access channels to the new locks and widening the existing navigational channels.  Deepening the navigation channels and elevating Gatun Lake’s maximum operating levels (CanagaRetna, 2010) (Fountain, 2011). The expansion of the Panama Canal is expected to be completed by 2014, (the
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centennial anniversary of the canal) will likely bring larger ships directly to East and Gulf Coast markets. Historically West Coast ports are the closest entry points for Asian Cargo (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). About 70% of the Asian cargo that arrives via West Coast ports is destined for markets east of the Rocky Mountains. Upon arrival the cargo is predominately transshipped by rail. It appears that employing an all-water route via the Panama Canal when shipping goods from Asia to East Coast ports should cost less even with increased transit times (Johnson, 2008). Impact of Expansion on Gulf and East Coast Ports The race to be ready by East and Gulf Coast ports by 2014, or within a few years thereafter, has initiated infrastructure changes in more than a dozen ports that have hopes of competing for the added trade that will be brought their way in the aftermath of the Panama Canal Expansion (Johnson, 2008). Port improvement projects range in scope from building new container terminals, to adding new cranes, and new infrastructure regarding highway and rail connections. But, the most common improvement, and arguably the most important, involves dredging to increase and maintain the depth of these channels. Table 2 shows the depths of some of the major ports on the East Coast (Morrison, 2012).

Table 2 Current Depths of Major East Coast Ports

United State East Coast Ports Boston New York/New Jersey Philadelphia Baltimore Norfolk Wilmington Charleston Savannah Jacksonville Miami Source: (Morrison, 2012).

Mean Low Water (MLW) Depth 38’ 43’ 38’ 40’ 48’ 42’ 47’ 42’ 38’ 39

Ports require a minimum channel depth of 40 feet to handle the largest ships currently coming through the canal. However, a loaded 8,000 TEU vessel (i.e. NPX vessel) sits 46 to 47 feet deep in saltwater and a foot deeper in fresh water (Spivak, 2011). A TEU (TwentyFoot Container Equivalent Unit) refers to 20-footlong intermodal containers. TEU serves as a unit of measurement for cargo capacity.

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Table 3 Key Characteristics Current Panamax and New Panamax (NPX) Panamax (1914-) Beam 32 m (106 feet) Length 294 m (965 feet) Draft 12 m (40 feet) Container Vessel 4,500 TEUs Capacity Bulk Carrier 52,000 dead weight tons (DWT) Capacity

New Panamax (2014) 49 m (160 feet) 366 m (1,200 feet) 15.5 m (50 feet) 12,000 TEU 119,000 (DWT) Rolling gates Two lock systems 3 Atlantic Locks and Pacific Locks $5.25 billion (estimated) 16,000

Locks

Miter gates Three lock systems Gatun Locks Pedro Miguel Lock Miraflores Locks

Cost $387 million Annual Capacity (# 13,500-14,000 of ships) (Rodrigue, 2010)
Figure 1

Comparison between Panamax and New Panamax NPX) Container Vessels Source: http://www.pancanal.com/eng/plan/documentos/propuesta/acp-expansion-proposal.pdf

Presently the largest vessels that are able to traverse the Panama Canal are known as a “Panamax” vessel. Current Panamax vessels can transport approximately 4,500 TEUs. A larger class of vessel now in use (i.e., “Post-Panamax” or New Panamax (NPX)) has the capacity to move between 5,000 and 12,000 TEUs. Expansion of the canal was a prerequisite to accommodate this new class of enormous vessel (Morrison, 2012). Table 3 and Figure 1 above show comparative characteristics of the Panama Canal Expansion.
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The issues of the larger NPX ships calling on ports are not just scheduling issues, but also physical issues. Larger container ships require longer docks, more cranes, and deeper water (Mitchell, 2011). The Army Corps of Engineers and Port Plans In 1824 the federal government established the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). The primary role for this agency is to oversee the nation’s navigation system. Ports have working in partnership with the USACE to maintain waterside access to port facilities (Morrison, 2012). A USACE study determined that insufficient navigation channel depths restrict nearly 30% of port vessel calls; thus necessitating the need for ports to dredge in order to incorporate larger vessels (Spivak, 2011). Currently East and Gulf Coast port expansion plans total almost $20 billion. Nearly half of these projects are scheduled for completion in the next five years. With the Great Recession and current economic conditions (viewed from 2012) there is much speculation on the need for this spending. Sean Connaughton, administrator of the United States Maritime Administration, states port improvement projects are necessary. Connaughton suggests that those ports that put the money into expansion will be [best] positioned to capture additional market share when the canal expansion is complete (Johnson, 2008). Two specific ports examined within this document are the Port of Savannah and the Port of Charleston. These two ports have made significant changes to their infrastructure to prepare for the completion of the Panama Canal Expansion. The Georgia Ports Authority’s ambitious and well thought-out strategic development plan has positioned its ports as the most accessible, efficient, and best equipped in the nation (CanagaRetna, 2010). The Port of Savannah has made plans for dredging and widening the available turning radius to ensure the larger ships can use the port, an estimated $551 million project. In 2009 the Port of Charleston handled 1.37 million TEUs. Charleston’s break-bulk cargo totaled 549, 008 tons. Top commodities across Charleston docks include agricultural products, consumer goods, machinery, metals, vehicles chemicals and clay products (CanagaRetna, 2010). The Port of Charleston is one of the busiest container ports along the Southeast and Gulf Coasts and is recognizes as one of the nation’s most efficient and production ports (www.port-of-charleston.com). The South Carolina State Ports Authority is constructing a new terminal at the Port of Charleston to increase the capacity to handle containerized cargo by up to 50 percent. The expected completion date is 2018. The Port of Charleston also seeks funds to study a dredging project in the channel leading to the port. Currently, the port can handle Post-Panamax ships, but only at high tide (National Association of Development Organizations, 2012).

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
 Can a “Business Case” be made for deepwater expansion of the ports of Charleston and Savannah in order to handle NPX ships. By Business case, we mean: Is the likely net income to the ports greater than the net direct costs? Putting a point on it: Are the ports at least as profitable as they would be without the expansion?
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If the “Business Case” cannot be made, what would the incremental increases in revenue need to be?

CONTRIBUTION
It is important to look at the basic business question of does it make economic sense on a port by port basis to change the infrastructure of the individual ports to accommodate the NPX vessels? Making good economic decisions with regard to potential port expansion affect many factors, including, but not limited to, the following:  The ability of the port to operate profitably in the long run.  The ability of the port to market itself vis-à-vis competing ports.  The ability for shippers, and ultimately marketers and consumers, to operate with the lowest supply chain costs.

METHOD
Extant literature provides the basis for our work. Much work has been done solely on the Panama Canal Expansion itself, but little academic inquiry regarding the effect on these two East coast ports (Charleston/ Savannah) has been found. The goal, and therefore the structure, of our work is to answer the basic business question does it make economic sense on a port-by-port basis to expand to be able to accept these NPX (New Panmax ships) at their ports. This will be done by: 1. Through analysis of existing literature to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the Panama Canal expansion and what that expansion will require of east coast ports to initially change and maintain in order to be able to accept these new NPX (New Panmax ships). 2. To fully examine the two east coast ports that the literature shows could be ready the soonest to accept these NPX ships. 3. Suggest ways, via the literature, and our analysis, to potentially show that it does or does not make economic sense for these two east coast ports to make these changes.

ANALYSIS
As previously examined, expansion of the Panama Canal is well underway, with an expected completion date sometime in 2014. A number of researchers have attempted to make prognostications about the likely impact that completion of the project will have for East Coast, as well as Gulf Coast ports, in the United States. (Morrison,2012) (Rivera and Sheffi, 2011) (Rodrigue,2010). We tend to believe that the impact will occur largely in one of three areas:  A shift of freight which now is offloaded primarily in Long Beach or Los Angeles harbors for further shipment via rail to points in the eastern U.S. With the NPX limits on ships, the vast majority of ships will be able to transit the Panama Canal. Even given longer total transit times, the cost savings of through shipment to east coast ports will likely be favorable when compared with offloading and onward shipment
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by rail. In a relatively small number of cases ships which cannot presently transit the Panama Canal are making the longer (both in miles and days) voyage via the Suez Canal, the Cape of Good Hope, the Straights of Magellan or the Drake Passage/Cape Horn. Most of this traffic is likely to divert to the Panama Canal, with NPX. A general shift toward larger ships bound for East Coast ports with the advent of NPX. This would likely happen over some years, rather than overnight.

Figure 2 Main Competitive Routes vis-à-vis the Panama Canal

Source: http://www.pancanal.com/eng/plan/documentos/propuesta/acp-expansion-proposal.pdf

Any or all of these shifts can affect the tonnage which will pass through East Coast ports. As we will show, the size of these shifts may be crucial in making the business case for preparing any of the ports which cannot handle NPX traffic, or can only handle it in a marginal way, as with Charleston’s ability to handle NPX ships for about two hours per day at high tide (Kissel, Gron and Heck, 2012). What is Wrong with the Army Corps Cost and Benefit Projections? In our view, the Corps of Engineers projections are flawed in that they do not make a rational business case for the preparation of any port. In every case we have examined, the benefits accrue almost exclusively to shipping companies. See Table 4 as an example for the Port of Savannah. Or, in a very macroeconomic sense infer “returns to the nation.” Further, the Corps examines the case for each port in isolation from the others. We have to think that is not a reasonable approach, as in reality changes in port traffic due to NPX is likely to be more of a zero sum game, with interactions and competition between the ports.

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Table 4 Benefits Summary for Port of Savannah

Source: http://www.sas.usace.army.mil/shexpan/reports/GRR/Appendix%20A%20Economics,%20In cluding%20Attachments.pdf This is all well and good; however, it does not address the questions which each of the ports must really face: Is there a legitimate business case for port preparation to meet NPX requirements? Simply put, can the port turn a profit? The Business Case As noted above, can a port make the necessary investment to meet, or partially meet, the requirements of NPX ships profitably? To the best of our knowledge, the extant literature does not adequately address that crucial question. We find the Army Corps of Engineers estimates of preparing a port for NPX shipping to be largely sound. The major items include initial dredging and mitigation of various impacts of dredging. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2012). To their credit, they have computed the probable costs to the best of their ability and used sound financial principles to, essentially, compute average annual costs. (AAC) Average annual costs are, if you will, a mortgage payment that the port will need to meet for 50 years. One could argue with the assumed interest rates over 50 years, but they do not seem to us to be unreasonable given the likely involvement of federal and/or state governments in developing financing. Undoubtedly, most ports will invest in additional infrastructure of various kinds if the decision is made to move ahead with meeting, or partially meeting, NPX requirements. Our purpose is not to examine other infrastructure needs. We trust that good port managers will make sound business decisions in that regard. The results of our analysis are contained in Table 4. Findings with regard to the analysis may be found in the next section.

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Table 5: Analytical Results

2011 TEUs (000) 2011 Operating Revenues ($000) 2011 Operating Expenses ($000) 2011 Operating Income ($000) 2011 Operating Revenues/TEU 2011 Net Income/TEU Average Annual Cost of deepwater expansion Additional TEUs required to maintain 2011 Operating Income (000) Additional Revenues/TEU to maintain 2011 NI/TEU (based on 1st year post expansion forecast TEU volume) % Increase in base year revenues/TEU required to maintain 2011 NI/TEU Forecast TEUs (000) for 1st year post-expansion (base year)

Charleston 1,384 $124,649 $108,006 $16,643 $90.06 $12.03 $19,400 1,613 $9.65 11%

Savannah 2,920 $266,514 $194,604 $71,910 $91.27 $24.63 $39,000 1,584 $10.40 11%

2,011

3,751

Table 4 Notes: 2011 TEUs, operating revenues, expenses, income from relevant Ports Authority 2011 financial statements Deepwater port expansion details:  Base year is the first year of port’s deepwater expansion operations  Charleston - Charleston Harbor Navigation Improvement Project, US Army Corps of Engineer report Section 905(b) (WRDA 86) Analysis, July 2010 o Average annual cost of deepwater expansion: Table 3, page 20. 50’ project cost estimate includes interest and amortization of proposed project costs ($15.4 mm/yr and increased annual operation and maintenance costs $4 mm/yr) o Forecast TEUs for 1st year post expansion: Corps of Engineers report (pg 19) states that base year volume is forecast to be 2.011 mm TEUs.  Savannah – Final General Re-Evaluation Report, Savannah Harbor Expansion Project, January 2012, US Army Corps of Engineers o Average annual cost for deepwater expansion: Table 14-1, page 261. 47’ project cost estimate includes interest and amortization of proposed project costs ($34 mm/yr and increased annual operation and maintenance costs $5 mm/yr). o Forecast TEUs for 1st year post expansion: Corps of Engineers report (Table 5-14, pg 77) states that base year volume is forecast to be 3.75 mm TEUs.  NI/TEU is Net income per TEU,  Additional revenues/TEU to maintain 2011 NI/TEU = Average annual cost of deepwater expansion/net income per TEU  +% increase in revenues/TEU required to maintain 2011 NI/TEI = (Additional revenues/TEU)/(2011 NI/TEU)

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FINDINGS
It appears that neither Charleston nor Savannah can make the case for planned deepwater expansion ceteris paribus. As mentioned before, the Corps of Engineers analysis is, in our opinion, seriously flawed, in that each port is analyzed in a competitive vacuum, and the implied savings of their analysis do not accrue to the ports, but rather to other entities, mainly shipping companies. Given the increased annual expenses involved with deepwater expansion, current TEU growth estimates by the ports and projected revenues, the ports will be profitable even with expansion. However, our analysis shows that they will be less profitable than if they did not expand.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Should Savannah or Charleston undertake deepwater expansion? The answer lies in other parts of our analysis shown in Table 4. Savannah Savannah will need to increase revenues (we are making the assumption that cost savings are improbable) by the amount of their Average Annual Cost (AAC) $39 million per year in 2011 dollars in order to be as profitable as they would be without expansion. Additionally, they would need to recover any amortized costs associated with other infrastructure investments. Looking only at the cost of deepwater expansion, revenues must be increased by an amount sufficient to offset the costs by increasing the number of TEUs handled by the port by about 1,584,000 per year1, increasing the revenues per base year TEU by $10.402 or some combination of the two. This would represent an 11% increase in revenue per TEU3 or a roughly 42% increase in TEUs4 during the base year, the first year that Savannah is projecting their deepwater expansion to be in place. Given probable competition between ports and the established economic relationship whereby increased prices result in decreased demand, managers will likely have to look more heavily on the side of increasing TEUs (Demand) for the deepwater expansion to make business sense (Georgia Ports Authority, 2011).
2011 Savannah net income (revenues – expenses) was $71,910,000. With an additional expense of their annual repayment of the expansion loan and the increased operating maintenance costs of $39,000,000, this would require an additional 39,000,000/24.63 $ NI/TEU) or 1,584,000 TEUs in order to maintain this net income level. Savannah’s base year forecast volume is 3,751,000 TEUs. To maintain 2011’s average Net Income/TEU of $24.63, revenues would need to increase by 39,000,000/3,750,792 or $10.40/TEU to cover the increased cost of paying for the annual expansion costs. Current revenue/TEU = 266,514,000/2920,000 = $91.15. Taking the $91.15 and adding the $10.40 = $101.55, representing an 11% increase over the 2011 revenue/TEU. Projected TEUs for first year of Savannah’s deepwater operations are 3,751,000 and if increased volume alone “paid” for the expansion costs, this volume would need to be 3,751,000 + 1,584,000 as noted in footnote 1. That would be a 42% increase over the currently forecast Savannah volume.
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Charleston Likewise, Charleston will need to increase revenues (we are making the assumption that cost savings are improbable) by the amount of their ACC $19.4 million per year in 2011 dollars in order to be as profitable as they would be without expansion. Additionally, they would need to recover any amortized costs associated with other infrastructure investments. Looking only at the cost of deepwater expansion, increased revenues sufficient to offset the costs could come from increasing the number of TEUs handled by the port by about 1,613,000 per year, increasing the revenues per base year TEU by $9.65 or some combination of the two. This would represent an 11% increase in revenue per TEU or a roughly 80% increase in TEUs during the base year, the first year that Savannah is projecting their deepwater expansion to be in place. Once again, given probable competition between ports and the established economic relationship whereby increased prices result in decreased demand, managers will likely have to look more heavily on the side of increasing TEUs (Demand) for the deepwater expansion to make business sense (Charleston Harbor Navigation Improvement Project, 2010). Is deepwater expansion advised? Based on our exploratory analysis of only two East Coast ports, Savannah and Charleston, the answer is maybe. In our opinion both Charleston and Savannah cannot make their business decision for or against deepwater expansion in a vacuum. They must find a way to include competitive factors in the decision calculus. East Coast ports are, of course, competing for cargo traffic now. The problem is that major spending to allow the transit of NPX ships to some degree or other is not likely to be uniform across the ports contemplating such an investment. Some ports will be able to expand more efficiently than others, if for no other reason than their geographic advantages with regard to deepwater access. While not an exhaustive list, the ports will also have to look at such factors as:  The cost of other infrastructure expansion  The efficiency with which ground transportation networks can expand to accommodate increased demand, as well as economic service areas of such networks. Note that this is not a cost directly borne by the port, but will play a crucial role in analyzing the competitive structure between ports.  The cost of additional labor to run any additional infrastructure. The bottom line Should some East Coast ports expand to fully or partially meet NPX requirements? Yes. Should all, or even most, east coast ports expand? Probably not. What will actually happen is anyone’s guess, as exact projections about total port capacity under NPX conditions may not be reliable. If careful business and competitive analysis rule, we predict that relatively few port expansions will take place. The danger of course, is that many ports are government or quasi-government operations. The danger, then, is that ego will prevail over business logic. Everyone wants to be able to tout the ability to handle larger ships. With taxpayer money, it may be all too easy to ignore the business case which should be made prior to expansion.

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We are not fans of government regulation or intervention. That said, this may be a case where national transportation policy requiring sound business analysis to prove the case for expansion may be appropriate. The results may be a more efficient system than may otherwise develop.

References
CanagaRetna, S.M. (2010, June). The Panama Canal Expansion and SLC State Ports. Retrieved from Southern Legislative Conference Website: http://www.slcatlanta.org/Publications/EconDev/ports_web.pdf Charleston Harbor Navigation Improvement Project, US Army Corps of Engineer report Section 905(b) (WRDA 86) Analysis, July 2010, Retrieved from: http://www.sac.usace.army.mil/assets/pdf/Charleston%20Harbor%20Post%2045%20905( b)%20Analysis%20Report.pdf Final General Re-Evaluation Report, Savannah Harbor Expansion Project, January 2012, US Army Corps of Engineers, Retrieved from: http://www.sas.usace.army.mil/shexpan/GRR.html Fountain, H. (2011, August 16). Panama Adding a Wider Shortcut for Shipping. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/ 2011/ 08/ 17/ science/ 17canal.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all Georgia Ports Authority Annual Report for fiscal year 2011 http://www.gaports.com/corporate/AboutUs/AnnualReport.aspx Retrieved from:

Johnson, B. (2008). U.S. Ports Battle for Trade. Retrieved from National Real Estate Investor website: http://nreionline.com/ property/ industrial/ real_estate_us_ports_battle_0601/ Kissel, C., Gron, C., and Heck, A. (February, 2012). Freight Transportation and Economic Development: Planning for the Panama Canal Expansion. National Association of Development Organizations Research Foundation (NADO). Retrieved from http://www.nado.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/panama.pdf Mitchell, C.W. (2011). Impact of the Expansion of the Panama Canal: An Engineering Analysis. Retrieved from University of Delaware at http://dspace.udel.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/handle/19716/10097/Charles_Mitchell_thes is.pdf?sequence=1 Morrison, B.C. (2012). Race-to-the-Top: East and Gulf Coast Ports Prepare for a PostPanmax World. Duke Universities Libraries. Retrieved from http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/5201 National Association of Development Organizations (NADO). (February 2012). Freight Transportation and Economic Development: Planning for the Panama Canal Expansions.
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Retrieved from http://www.nado.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/panama.pdf Rivera, L. and Sheffi, Y. (2011). Impact of the Panama Canal expansion. MIT Research Working paper, Cambridge. Rodrigue, J.P. (2010). Factors Impacting North American Freight Distribution in View of the Panama Canal Expansion. The Van Horne Institute. Retrieved from http://vanhorne.info/research-publications/supply-chains South Carolina State Ports Authority, Financial Statements June 30, 2011 and 2010 Retrieved from: http://www.port-of charleston.com/About/statistics/financials/SCSPA_Financial_Statements_2011.pdf Spivak, J. (2011). Battle of the Ports. Retrieved from American Planning Association website at http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/Battle%20of%20the%20Ports%20%20Planning%20mag%20-%20May_June%202011.pdf U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (2012). Dredging http://www.ndc.iwr.usace.army.mil//dredge/dredge.htm Program. Available at

U.S. Census Bureau. (2011). Top Trading Partners-Total Trade, Exports, Imports. Retrieved from Foreign Trade Division website: http://www.census .gov/foreigntrade/statistics/ highlights/ top/ top1012yr.html

Author Information
Kendall, Walter R., D.B.A., CGBP Dr. Kendall is an Associate Professor in the College of Business Administration at Tarleton State University. He teaches in the areas of Marketing Management and research and logistics/supply chains. His research interests are eclectic. Shaw, Joanna R., Ph.D. Dr. Shaw is an Assistant Professor in the College of Business Administration at Tarleton State University. She teaches in the areas of General Management and Human resource management. Her research interests are varied in topic, but she specially enjoys research on blended learning environments, academic integrity, and emotional intelligence. Kendall, Lynn, M.B.A. Ms. Kendall is a Teaching Fellow and Doctoral Student in the College of Business, Department of Finance, at the University of North Texas. Ms. Kendall teaches Financial Management and is Director of the Finance Department Tutoring Lab.

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