Knowledge: By Examples Author(s): Colin Radford Source: Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Oct., 1966), pp.

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I think it was. that P. inspectionson aircraft. Example 2. Even so. But she knows everything about this library.. Rea: Well. It was several Terc. I'd bet money on it. Mr.) So what this example suggests is that a man could know that P and yet not be sure that P. providing he has locked his car. ? Mr. it is not absolutely clear whether he is sure that he has or has not.192. why is she so. and yet not be sure that P. Man:Look.. Perhapsit's her age-she isn't sure about anything. isn't it darling? And this is a tough neighbourhood.. nor does it imply or requirethis to make his action rational. that's what'll have happened. Miss Tercy? Miss Tercy: Oh!-I'm not absolutely sure. you may be certain that's what'll have happened to them.. I am sure. And since it would be disastrousif I hadn't locked it. the man knows that he has done so. J.1 OCTOBER 1966 KNOWLEDGE-BY EXAMPLES By COLIN RADFORD Example I. (We should need to know more about him and his relationship with his wife to say. I think we may have sold them for pulp. Securityproceduresat banks. vk.. that P. Still-I'll go back and make absolutely sure. I know I locked the car. Mr. viz. Gee: Oh.. 1It also suggests that checkingup on somethingdoes not invariably requireor imply doubt on the part of the checkerwith regardto what he checksup on. routine daily etc.ANALYSIS 27. Rea (the new librarian): What did we do with our copies of W. no. She's got a memory like an elephant. I might as well go and check. What did she say-they may have been pulped? Well. Gee: Anxious? Uncertain? I don't know. Rea: ? Mr.50. Wife(irritated): Aren't you sure? Man: Well-yes.55 on Mon.show that this is so. (She leaves) Mr. so. This conversation piece shows that a person may be judged both to know something to be the case. We may safely assume that.: years ago-well. Mr.. 3 Feb 2014 12:44:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Rea. Still.. I thinkwe did. I won't be long. Shall I just go and .1 The next example is less equivocal. not really. Wife(surprised): Oh! Man: Yes. It's possible. Locke's novels.. Rea: But you're not sure? Miss Well. 1 This content downloaded from 190. I could be mistaken... Mr.

We didn't do all these kings and queens. First question. Tom: It's easy. for sixpence: when did Williamthe Conqueror land in England? Jean(hesitantly): Ten sixty-six. when did James the First die? Jean: James the First? This content downloaded from 190. perhaps. Example 3.. (Pause. Frederick? bob. really. I don't know. .2 ANALYSIS For although Miss Tercy's lack of certainty is. Elizabeth. Tom: Right. Kids' stuff. You won the noughts-and-crosses. Jean: They don't teach English history at French-Canadian Tom: Really? Well. Jean: Oh! No! I don't knowany English history. (Pause). For Tom: Frederick? No. It isn't that she is simply prone to hedge. Tom: There you are! Jean: Well. She really isn't sure. Elizabeth. Now we'll have a quiz: English history. Ready? Jean: O. well! Ten sixty-six and all that? Tom: Yes! Yes-for a shilling: whom did he defeat and kill when he landed? Jean: Oh! Oh. What about Elizabeth? Jean: Oh! Ah .192.55 on Mon. . (Pause. . Then I'll ask you some questions on FrenchCanadianhistory! Tom: Yes. You must have done some at school? schools. ? Sixteen-oh-three Tom: Yes! Now tell me you haven't done any history! jean: No. I'll just guess. Anyway-you owe me .) Fifteen seventy-seven? Tom: Bad luck! Fifteenforty-seven. neurotic and treated as such. 3 Feb 2014 12:44:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Tsst! Ooh . ? Tom: You owe me-four bob take away two and six-one and six. this will be educationalfor you. . Mmm . .) Oh-1 don't know. I don't know. Jean: I told you. For three bob.K.. Tom(sarcastically):That was just a guess. And it's time I won something. shilling on the second. everyone does. Perhaps I picked that up on a Shakespeare course or somewhere. it is also treated as real. Harald Hadraga. was it? Jean: Well. That's-ah?-two another two bob-um?-um? Well-moving on a bit then: When did Henry the Eighth die? Jean(pause): He had six wives? Tom: Yes. The next example is more ambitious. one and six on the third and so on up to five bob? Jean: Why not? Tom: Right. Jean: Oh. Tom: Don't be silly. . Tom: Harold! Whom had Harold himself defeated just before the battle of Hastings? Jean: I'm glad this isn't for real money. Well: sixpence on the first question.50.

KNOWLEDGE-BY EXAMPLES 3 Tom: James Stuart. . . you must have done these people! Jean: Well. Sixteen-oh-three. When did she die? Jean: Ah! Ah .. the Sixth of Scotland and the First of England. You're slipping. For five shillings: Edward the Seventh came to the throne in nineteen-oh-one. I don't suppose . to . Jean: Well. if it could and did. As a punishment I think it was. That's the last three wrong. Jean: Ah. i. you know-come to think of it-I think I rememberI did once have to learn some dates. the Victorian Age.sixteen twenty-five -sixteen forty-nine? Tom: Well. 3 Feb 2014 12:44:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . So he's sixteen-oh-three to. Victoria. Tom: OhJean: Yes. whether This content downloaded from 190.. sixteen twenty-five? to . Victoria? Victoria.. really. Nineteen-ten.. that's true. All right then. no. You know you must have done them at some time.55 on Mon. (Pause).. Last question. When did she ascend the throne? Jean: Ah . Well-this is giving you a chance: Charlesthe First? Jean: When did he get on and off this English throne? Tom: Yep.e. Oh! Easy: Victoria. I certainly don't remember.. Jean(reflectively): Yes. As far as I can tell I'm just guessing.. I expect. He came after Elizabeth. James the First. But I'd quite forgotten about it. He's the next. Tom: Hmm. The first Stuart. the next? Charlesthe First? So that's sixteen.. yes! Tom: No. Let's see. though? Tom: Yes. Eighteen ninety-eight? Tom: No. that's four bob. . Sixteen twenty-five? Tom: Yes! Look here. Um (thinks). And don't think you're going to get me to double up or anything like that! Tom: I wouldn't dream of it. Jean Some kings and queens. What was it..192.. I think it was these-but Tom: Ah. But besides ten sixty-six. She's eighteen thirty-seven to nineteen-oh-one... there you are. Jean: Oh .. you got all the questions right about the Tudor and Stuart kings -apart from Henry the Eighth. Now do you believe me? Tom: Well.. IJean: Is that right? Tom: You wouldn't like to double your stake on that? Jean: Oh no! Is it right. . Um . You don't know much. four and six. and this time we should consider whether it is a possible one. Perhaps it was these. sixteen-oh-three. . No more clues.. and. Ah . take away five bob-nine and six. no-I believe you. When did he die ? Jean(thinking): Nineteen-nineteen? Tom: No. really- Like the others this is not of course a real-life example. This is for three-and-six.. whether it is a conversation that could take place.. Freudianforgetting.. five bob.50. could you? Jean: No. no. Jean. I owe you one-and-six. Tom: And even there you got a kind of near mnemonic miss.. Yes. You couldn't just have been guessing. About eighteen twenty? Tom: What date? Jean: Eighteen twenty..

when we are quite sure about such matters. and was. confidence that p is nevera necessary condition of knowledge that p. he had quite forgotten that he had done so.. that P! This perhaps is surprising.e. And yet of course. i. 46. and indeed fairly sure that not-P. can be necessary conditions of knowing that P. as he was not aware of them. that James I had died in 1625. .' (p. my italics). he would have no right.55 on Mon. no good or adequate reason or justification for being sure that it was 1625 or whatever-unless. But cf. This content downloaded from 190. then we should have to say about our hypothetical example that prior to the quiz. as they do. Moreover. Moreover it raises 1 That is not to say that one is not characteristicallyor paradigmatically sure of what one knows. etc. or at very least during the quiz but before hearing Tom's comments on each correct answer.. 3 Feb 2014 12:44:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .1 Indeed. etc. etc. he was not certain. Jean would not have had any grounds for being sure-or. he knew that James I died in 1625. that his answer was right.. and I shall temporarily assume that the participants' conclusion would be correct if it did.-he would not have been justified in being sure. e. that William landed in 1066. (Of course. For although he had at some stage learned that P. But if being sure is a necessary condition. he knew. we must have learned though we have forgotten doing so. Jean did know some English history... etc. or confident that P. though he was not sure that P. that P. viz. had he been sure. I shall also assume for the sake of simplicity that Jean was sincere in everything he said and that the questions about the Tudor and Stuart monarchs that he got right he would have got right without any prompting. of having learned that P. viZ. or clues at all. if. Vol. nor justified in being sure. it shows that a man may know that P even though he is neithersure that P. indeed. one cannot know unless one is sure. Clearly such a conversation might take place. e. although in this situation Jean knew that P.192. In particular. Soc. Certainly it contradicts most of what philosophers have had to say about knowledge. and he knew this. . Arist. but cannot remember learning about them.. or sure. Cohen's remark. cues. XXXVI (1962). that is to say. quite sure that he had not. his 'intuitions' about such matters invariably turned out to be right. But if Jean were both sure. Supp. since we are sure. the date of James I's death.g. and yet sure that he had never learned or heard of or read the date. since he believed it to be a pure guess in a situation where only one of many such guesses could be correct. 1625. Indeed he was fairly certain that his answer to the question was wrong..g.e.. 'Claims to Knowledge'.) So if Example 3 is a possible one it shows that neither being sure that P nor having the right to be sure that P. that not-P. at least.50.4 ANALYSIS its participants would be right in concluding. we characteristically infer that. For if we allow this as a possibility. i. viz. . Elizabeth died in 1603. for whatever reason. that P. that the Jean-figure did know some English history. '.

e.g.g. After some discussion they agree (i) that Jean's answers show that he has-he must have-learned some English history.55 on Mon. For. and is thereforecorrect. that similarlyplaced English speakerswould make.. sparse. I want to consider whether and. the date of James' death. more probably. Of course. why. that Jean did know some English history. at some stage he must have learned that James I died in 1625. uncertain.. all the dates. then. viz. For he produces various correct dates when asked. unwitting. including. 3 Feb 2014 12:44:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . whether he 'knows' is a question of what 'know' means. and hence he knows some (iii) So he remembers history. which in turn is very much a matterof when. He did not get these answers right by sheer fluke or chance (or-a possibility they did not even bother to rule out-as a result of some mysteriousintuition). Since the exampleis a fabricatedone we may properly assume that are right as to the facts. whether we say Jean does or does not know is not simply a matter of appealing to one's intuition and then checking this against the result of some Naessian survey. James died in 1625. etc. Jean's knowledge of English history is a poor thing.e. the conclusion that Jean did know some English history is correct. if the conclusion that Jean knew is one that English speakers who shared this information would generally tend to come to. which seems to be. almost exclusively.e. i. the dates of the Tudor and Stuart monarchs. Tom's conclusion. e. that Jean had learned this at some time. We can provide reasons for our judgment that he knows-and weigh considerationswhich seem to tell against it-and this is what Tom and Jean do. some history. that which constitutes or. if so. However. etc. (ii) They also show that he has notforgottenall the history.e. that they are right in thinking the participants that. includes the answers to those questions he got right. I. and does so in such a way and sufficientlyoften to preclude the possibility that he might simply be guessing and not remembering-even though he is inclined to think that he is guessing. that P. ultimately. that he must have learned-even though he hasforgotten that he has learned them (it). in what situations.g.50..English speakers say or would say that someone knows or does not know. and therefore unimpressive and of little This content downloaded from 190. So.. is one. which Jean himself finallyaccepts.KNOWLEDGE-BY EXAMPLES 5 furtherproblems. did know. I think.viz. Jean did indeed know and this conclusion is correct. Given this.192. before concludingby discussinga couple of these problems.

I have argued. For to say that being sure and having the right to be sure are not necessaryconditions without satisfying these conditions for any value of '0'. but he did not know that he knew this. by Michael Clark (ibid.. 65). he does not know that he knows any until after Tom has told him that certain of his answers are correct. that it does not exist. the account above of why Jean did not know that he knew. the dates of some of the Tudor and Stuartmonarchs. having forgotten that he had learned it. But that is not to say that. including.becausehis answers. and queried e. is not to say that it is possible to know that 0 one value of '0'...50.g.g. i.). In fact. as he was.2 (December 1955. Jean knew the date of James I's death. and. he did not have the right to be sure that he knew this date. that P. But although this conclusion is correct. is incomplete. had he been sure that he knew the date.. and indeed being quite sure that he had never learned it.192. e. December 1963 p. that he had never learned it (and sure that if he hadever seen or heard or read it. by Richard Taylor.etc. and yet still sure. 3 Feb 2014 12:44:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . That it does sometimes appear is suggested by remarks made when the gap closes. no paradox is involved here.g. But that it can has been denied e. it had left no 'impression'. 48).. cf.g. of course. ANALYSIs.viZ.though 1Hence a gap can appear between knowing that P and knowing that one knows that P. of knowing that . at the time of the quiz. Although the quiz reveals that Jean does know some English history. the account of why Jean does not know that he knows any English history. when asked. .g. 16. totally forgotten. is incompleteand in such a way as to seem paradoxical.1 E. that the molecular weight of oxygen was sixteen'. 'I didn't know I knew that-you know.55 on Mon. For it appears to reintroduce at the second level (knowing that one knows that P) preciselythose conditions for knowing which.g. Moreover. Jean was not sure that he knew the date of James'sdeath for he was sure that he did not know it. e.he would certainlyhave had no right to be sure that he knew the date. . are not necessary conditions for knowing at the first level (knowing that P) or at any level at all. e.had not 'registered'. (Cf. p. 4.that P. and we can remove the air of paradoxby seeing both why we want to say that Jean knows at the first level-even though he is not sure and does not have the right to be sure (that P) and that these considerationsdo not exist case.e.6 ANALYSIS use. but only that one can know that b without satisfying these conditions for at least Even so.) This content downloaded from 190. p. that P. 'Knowing what one knows'. For he did not think that he knew the date of James' death and was indeed quite sure that he did not and that he would thereforehave to make a guess at it. it is wholly gone. or operateat the second level in this particular We conclude that Jean knows some English history. Footnote 1. But this last point is a complication.

quite sure that he does not know any.. i. he had no rightto say that he knew. I think we should have to say of such a man that he did know a little history.. 'Do you know when . that P.55 on Mon. but pretty sure that he did not? Apparently not. But this does not mean that a man could not know that he knew that . or his not having the right to be sure. that he knew. sometimes after a little hesitation. he knows some..i. he says at the beginning of a historyquiz.e. they persuadeus that he has learnedsome history and has remembered some. quite modestly but firmly. date. or even his not believing that he has the right to be sure. since he rememberssome. I'll guess... before he realised--before he knew--that he knew some. ?'. In contrast. unless he was sure that he knew and he had the right to be sure. that he knew that James died in 1625. That is not to say that differentcircumstances could not excuse.. evenwhendid he know the slightly differently. . therefore. that he knows any history.had the questions in the quiz been framed a guess)?'.50. and would say that he did not know the answer to any particularquestion in the quiz even when he did. For let us consider a slightly differentcase in which a man is not sure that he knows any English history and does not have the right to be sure that he knows any as it is years since he did any history. Despite this.and on the four occasions that he does know the date he says.. have been improperfor him to say. Was it . a few dates. vik.are right sufficientlyoften and in such a way as to persuade us that he has learned these dates and not simply guessed them. (or are you going to have Of course Jean would talk in this way precisely because he is sure that he has never come into contact with any English history and is. . 3 Feb 2014 12:44:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . e. 1But could a man know that he knew some history if he were not merely unsure that he did. realize.that he doesknow a little history. that he knows the answersto any of the questionsthat Tom asks him.192. It would.e. that debarshim from knowing that he knows any English history.) So it is perhapsnot merely Jean's not being sure. But why not? This content downloaded from 190. and that he knew that he knew a little history. he does not know. I don't know. prior to his learning that this was indeed the case. ?' questionswrong does not (and certainof the dates right) that we say that he is not aware.g. (We could hardly say of him that he didn'tknow that he knew any history.. e. And.e. in some way. or knowing that he knows. It is rather that (being quite sure he does not know any) he says at the beginning of the quiz that he does not. and when he does not know he says that he does not. that he does know it and gives the correct date. He is then askedten questions. i.' Secondly: although at the time of the quiz Jean knew some English history. Jean would have consistentlyand no doubt wearily replied 'No. It is becausehe gets or would get the answersto the 'Do you know .KNOWLEDGE-BY EXAMPLES 7 different. even though he is not sure. etc.g.

They can say that had Jean claimed that he knew that P. assert. sure. etc. since although he did know that P he did not know that he knew that P nor did he believe that he knew that P (for he was neither sure that P. This may be true. cit. Why? The answer is of course simply that. unless he believes that he does know that what he says is true. it would have been true. or believe that he had the right to be sure that P). that P. he believes. Jean did know the date of James' death. an incorrect one. or whatever. states or concedes. on my thesis. to claiming that one knows that P when one is not sure that P or does not believe that one knows that P. or that P. whatever he does state or concede (without qualification. although Jean did know that P. certain. It is this prima facie impropriety. for that matter.192.. and propositions (I am unable to make the latter distinction). and.e. well-grounded or reasonable. but only that. whatever the circumstances.50. 'as if it were a fact'). or whatever. nor did he have the right. that he is confident that this is so. make Jean's claiming that he knew that P morally justifiable. that is not to say that the Irima facie objection would not remain to his doing so or that it would not have to be met and overcome if his action were to be morally justified. 39).e. that he knows that P. But.. etc. which of course is correct. or that he knows that P.55 on Mon. i. and yet it would nonetheless have been improper for him to say this. And for him the only other question of justifiability that can arise is whether the proposition that is 'uttered' when the statement is made is true or not. etc. had he said this. etc. But although special circumstances could.). Cohen (loc. etc.. who distinguishes statements as acts. and his belief that he knows this is confident. which Cohen misses or dismisses and which remains even when what Jean says happens to be true. concede. his doing this implies in some way that he believes that what he says is true. i. e. that I want to explain. i. I have argued. agree. statements as the contents of a sub-class of such acts.8 ANALYSIS justify. admit. In exactly the same way.. or even make praiseworthy Jean's saying this. claim-or.g. and that he believes that he has the right This content downloaded from 190.. Jean would have had no right frima facie to state. but how so? Well: (i) if a man states.that P either. 3 Feb 2014 12:44:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . etc. morally unjustifiable (p. a Irima facie objection remains. what he said would have been improper in that it would have been false. This account presupposes that it is frima facie improper for a man to state.e. argues that a man's lack of confidence that P does not eo izso render his act of 'making the statement' that he knows that P unjustifiable. he neither knew that he knew that P nor did he believe that he knew. Those who claim that being sure and having the right to be sure are necessary conditions of knowledge can give a clear explanation though.

it is not likely that he does know that This content downloaded from 190. the guesser.nor is it alwaysmorallywrongto misleador to intendto mislead him.So his guessing would not tend to persuadeor suggest to a listener who knew what the guesser was doing.that he knows that P. would have been 1rima facie 1 Of course. that the guesser did know that he knew that P. it implies that he at least believes knows that what he says is true. and. But Jean did not believe that he knew that P. like Jean. or P. ceterisfaribus. what he says is likely to be false either because it is not the case that P or because he does not know that P.50.) Thus a man's stating.. would tend to suggest to others that what he says is true. and so his stating.. the guesser. it is something which. But not only is what is implied by his stating that he knows that P. does not imply that he.) I. and hence would have been frima facie improper in this sense. or sure that he knows thatnot-P.he should that he qualifywhat he says.. that P would have implied something false. or whatever. etc. the speakerdoes know that P. or whatever.. etc. But it is primafacie wrong.' (ii) if a man does not believe that he knows that P.etc. false. remains so even if. what he says is likely to be improperin this sense. of course. (For if he is not sure. His doing this. or not sure that he has the right to be sure that P.e. this may be because he is not sure that P.his doing this implies that he at least believes that he knows that what he says is true. with someone's guessing that he. knows that P. knows or thinks he knows that what he guesses is true. more than anything else he could imply by what he does. Au contraire. viz. I think this does explain how Jean's stating. So if a man does not believe that he knows P and entirely problematic(for most values of 'P') that P. that he knew that P. that he knows that P. So not only does he say something that may very well be false. etc. So if he says that he knows that P. then. etc. 3 Feb 2014 12:44:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .55 on Mon. Such behaviour is intentionally misleading.. or sure that he does not know that P.what is impliedin this kind of way is not alwaysbelievedby a hearer. (Comparewhat he does.. or P. that he knows that P when he does not believe that he knows this has implications that are themselves false and which suggest to the naive hearer that he may accept as true what may very well be false. Hence. Moreover. when he did not believe this. guessing that he knows that P. that the speaker knows that P. if a man states. viz. his doing this implies that he at least thinks he knows that what he says is true. and as we have already seen. etc. guessing. It would suggest instead that the guesser was not at all sure that he knew that P. vig.192. which is to state.KNOWLEDGE-BY EXAMPLES 9 to be confidentthat this is so. etc. and this is certainlyfalse. that P.

'asserting'.e. asserting. that there could it entails For incorrect.and precisely the same account.e. even though one did not believe the speaker at that in which someone's stating that P did not imply least thought he knew that what he said was true. It is temptingto saythatthereis a convention. as their analogue of our saying 'I don't know whether P or not'. 3 Feb 2014 12:44:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .55 on Mon. 'claiming'. if someone did state that P without believing that he knew that P. that he that P. a language P. The explanation. in English and perhapsin other languagestoo. and if he breaksit deliberately.e. fundamentally to one allowed which be a language with a convention state. 'conceding'.a linguisticconvention. i. also has the advantageof offeringan account. his saying that P is at leastprima facie improper. if thatis what he says. if we could understand it at all.though attractive. and hence a language in which.then he is being deliberatelymisleading.192.which has the advantageof allowing that Jean could know without believing that he knew. but since it is interestingand difficult. I shall very briefly try to say something about it.etc.e. therefore. but. I suspect.. The reason for this is that stating etc. saying that something is the case. perhaps. etc. as that. etc. the rival explanationhas no applicationhere and so cannot knows possibly explain the impropriety.10 ANALYSIS improper even though he did know that P. that P when he does not believe that he knows this.50. that that knew one that P. their saying that P without qualification a fact. properly confident that one knows that P. it may now be asked. how does it do this?' This is not perhapsa question that I ought to try to answer within the confines of this paper.e. that one does not state..and a problem that the paper leaves me with. that is misleading. This content downloaded from 190. i. Now as in this case the man does not state or claim or assert. 'even if it is true that a man's stating. is not just inadequate But this sketchof an account. i. his doing so would not be regardedas misleadingor frimafacie improper. Thus we cannot construe something that a person does as his stating. he believes.. etc.. We should ratherunderstandit. and. 'But'. does something.. is essentially something that we do to inform. without thinking that either he at least believes he knows what he is talking about and so knows thatP. and as if it were etc. but this of course is not a way of saying that P. we could not understandits users' 'stating'.or he is misleadingus and. properlyconfidentthat he knows that P. i. etc. of the precisely similar impropriety of a man's stating. have knowledge. etc. that P unless one is confident and. that P. that P somehow implies that he is confident that he knows. So anyone who breaks this convention says something or. as his saying that something or other is the case. that P. i. one feels.. The difficultyhere is that if there were such a language. But we cannot hope or try or intend to inform unless we at least believe that we are ourselves informed.

rather that being sure that P.however.MORE ABOUT KNOWING AND FEELING SURE 11 To briefly summarisemy negative conclusions: neither believing that P nor. or have adequategrounds for being sure that P. but I shall say nothing about it here.g.55 on Mon.e. Nor is it a that one has the right to necessary condition that one should believe be. and believing that one has the right to be surethatP. LET it be granted that there is a range of situations in which at least of the form 'X know(s)thatf' are not true unless statements (i) it is true that P (ii) X believe(s)that5f. being confident. Truth and Evidence'.. sure that P. ANALYSIS xxV recently'. modification has been extensively discussed in Radfordclaims. wrong to think he's just guessing and wrong therefore to think he doesn't believe thatf. ANALYSIS (1956) p. afortiori. But if he really knows f. though X thinks he does not know that f. yet when questioned he eventually replies that]. In 1 Cf. quite sure. But this thesis is not tenable. or admits of. It is.is not a necessary condition of X's knowing thatf in at least some situations. 'Knowledge. 3 Feb 2014 12:44:38 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . or be justified in being. where X is an examinee and it is clear that X has learned thatf5. that he's believe that]. 168ff. arenecessaryconditions of believing that one knows.50. etc.192. The problem whether (iii) also requires.thateven (ii). Confusion or errorcan easily arisehere if we are temptedto apply longterm criteria of knowing and short-term criteria of believing. perhaps. or certainthat P is a necessarycondition of knowing thatP. and This content downloaded from 190. Universityof Kent at Canterbury MORE ABOUT KNOWING AND FEELING SURE By L. The problem I wish to discuss is whether there is a sub-classof those situations such that (ii') X feel(s) sure that] could be written in place of (ii) above. and hence of having theIrima facie right to say that one knows that P. No doubt the examinee thinks he's merely guessing that and therefore thinks he doesn't ]f. Nor is it a necessarycondition of knowing that P that one should have the right to be. sure. JONATHAN COHEN S. and (iii) X's belief thatf is adequatelygrounded. the references cited there. Keith Lehrer. let alone(ii').

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