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SECURITY BRIEFING The Iran Nuclear Threat Paradox, a peaceful nuclear program?
The Iranian Nuclear Dilemma, going in circles
To date, the UN Security Council has adopted six resolutions in response to Irans nuclear program. The council first demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities with the adoption of resolution 1696 in July 2006. Developments in Irans ballistic missile program have been prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 since June 2010 (UN Security Council, 2010). However, Islamic Republic has continued to undertake research, development, and testing activities. The Islamic Republic has modified the warhead of its Shahab-3 variants in ways that would make it easier to mount a nuclear weapon. The IAEA reports for May 24, 2011 noted seven major areas of concern that covered every major aspect of a nuclear-armed missile program. The 2011 IAEA report stated there is "credible" evidence that "Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear device."

By Stephen E Hughes Senior Analyst Association of Geostrategic Analysis 1/1/2014

Introduction: The Nuclear Puzzle The Core of the Islamic Republics nuclear scientists, research and development was created during the Mohamed Reza Shah Era. Recent declassified files , The Shah looked at India who tested its atomic bomb in 1974 an event the CIA thought was not possible The Shah of Iran dreamed of creating a Persian Super Nuclear Power During the Shah era, an elite Iranian Nuclear Physics cadre trained, of which much remains to this day. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran signed special contracts with prestigious universities and technical centers throughout the international communitys leading institutions of education. Today as well as during the Shah era are the implications that a nuclear weapons production might not be far away. Recently declassified documents disclose striking details about the bitter U.S.-Iranian nuclear negotiations from 1974 to 1978. In the 1970s, the Shah of Iran argued, like contemporary Iranian leaders today, for a nuclear energy capability on the basis of national rights.
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Iran Watch Iran's Nuclear Timetable September 18, 2013 Based on International Atomic Energy Agency Research Findings: with its thousands of gas centrifuges, and its growing stockpile of enriched uranium, Iran now has the ability to make fuel for nuclear reactors or, by enriching the uranium further, for nuclear warheads. This is based on reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency, The 2011 IAEA report stated there is "credible" evidence that "Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear device." Each IAEA report since then has emphasized Irans continuing refusal to address the IAEAs evidence and Tehrans refusal to allow IAEA inspector s into the Parchin complex, where evidence shows strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development. Iran is already capable of making weapon-grade uranium and a crude nuclear explosive device The IAEA reports from May 24, 2011 to 2013 noted Seven Major Areas of Concern, from a nuclear weapon dimensions to nuclear-armed missile programs. The military annexes to the November 2011 IAEA report indicated that Iran has made major progress in assembling all the technology and developing the manufacturing skills and equipment necessary to design a fission warhead.

2012 Office of the Director of National Intelligence declassified file, Annual Report on Military Power of Iran, Iran continues to develop technological capabilities applicable t o nuclear weapons. It continues its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor activities in violation of multiple United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions and also continues to develop ballistic missiles that could be adapted to deliver nuclear weapons.
Unclassified Annual Report on Military Power of Iran April2012 Executive Summary

THE OVER LOOKED ISSUES, From Strategic to Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW), TNWs and Iran, the weapon no one is seriously discussing, nuclear delivery options and growing capacities, Irans Russian Professor Danilenko Vyacheslav Multipoint Initiation System for a Nuclear Weapon, Weapon of Mass Electrical Destruction & Disruption EMP, Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), The Tinner Files Nuclear Black-market Designs for smaller more sophisticated nuclear weapons, Irans Physics Research Center (PHRC), Parallel Military Nuclear Programs, The Telexes, Purchasing & Nuclear Procurement Documents and more


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The Center of the Storm, Israel, the Islamic Republic of Iran has spent several billion dollars in its Asymmetrical Wars with Israel
Why would a country with a peaceful nuclear program develop intercontinental ballistic missiles, whose sole purpose is to deliver nuclear warheads? Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.

The tiny country of Israel not much bigger than a breadbox, about the size of the US State of New Jersey, and is home to over seven and half million souls. No other country in modern history was had to suffer the siege of Asymmetrical Rocket Warfare, as the tiny state of Israel. No other country in the world is openly and continually threatened with genocidal intent. No other country in the world must employ an active missile defense system 7 days a week 24hrs a day to prevent rockets from falling into communities.

Israel is the only country in the world where ever man woman and child is issued a gasmask. For nearly three decades, almost 365 days a year the state of Israel has endured and suffered rocket and mortar attacks. Since 1981, the state of Israel has suffered over 13,000 rocket attacks. The majority of these rockets are from the pockets of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Under the Shah of Iran, Israel was a friend of Persia. Iran was the first Islamic country to recognize the tiny state. All that changed when Ayatollah Khomeini came to power, the Jews and Israel became a hated enemy.
Dr. Gregory Stanton, the founder and director of Genocide Watch, the worlds first organization to deal exclusively with the issue of Genocide. All cultures have categories to distinguish people into us and them by ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality: German and Jew, Hutu and Tutsi. Bipolar societies that lack mixed categories, such as Rwanda and Burundi, are the most likely to have genocide. The main preventive measure at this early stage is to develop universalistic institutions that transcend ethnic or racial divisions, that actively promote tolerance and understanding, and that promote classifications that transcend the divisions. Genocide is a process that develops in eight stages that are predictable but not inexorable. At each stage, preventive measures can stop it. The process is not linear. Logically, later stages must be preceded by earlier stages. But all stages continue to operate throughout the process.

Genocides, unlike hurricanes are predictable, and Iran is following the pattern and Iran has taken six of the eight steps on the path to genocide. Iran has classified and symbolized Israel through exclusionary ideology and hate speech; dehumanized it overcoming the normal human revulsion against murder by portraying the potential victims as a cancer in need of eradication; organized fanatical militias (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps); polarized the society by repressing dissent and arresting moderates; prepared for the killing by denying a past genocide and by constructing weapons of mass destruction; and, through global terrorism, even begun the seventh of the eight stages: extermination .


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IRANS ARMING OF HEZBOLLAH At the onset of the next war Hezbollah will fire its heaviest and most accurate cruise missiles and rockets (including M-600 missiles Hezbollah received from Syria, which are fitted with GPSaided inertial navigation) on the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, as well as on critical infrastructure installations. A tidal wave will be fired at the fastest pace possible in attempt to overpower Israels missile defense systems and cause the greatest amount of destruction as possible. The Scud-D has a range of up to 700 -750 kilometers (466 miles), meaning it can hit almost anywhere inside Israel. The missile can carry some 1,000 kilos (about 2,200 pounds) of explosives. Theoretically, Scud-D can be armed with chemical warfare agents. According to Israeli military intelligence the Hezbollah has over 60,000 various types of rockets and these are supplied by way of Tehran.

IDF Says Hezbollah Weapons Cache Exceeds 60,000 Rockets, All Israel in Range JULY 12, 2013


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IRANIAN ARMED HAMAS Some Israeli families have less than 30 seconds to find shelter after a Gaza missile warning .. Israeli school children have chemical warfare attacks drills.. No Other Country in the World but Israel, Missile Attack Simulation in All Israeli Schools 2013 The Home Front Command and Education Ministry are carrying out a simulation of a missile attack in the nations schools this morning (Thursday). The exercise will help authorities assess the level of readiness of each educational institution in the country, including those in both the public and religious sectors. The drill, set to launch at 10:00 a.m., is expected to last till about 12:00 noon, and begins with the wail of the Color Red rocket alert siren to simulate a missile attack during recess. The siren will sound for 90 seconds, and will be heard across the country, officials said. Personnel from Home Front Command, Israel Police, Magen David Adom emergency medical service and local Fire Departments will all participate in the exercise Israel National News Posted on February 14, 2013 by editor


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POLICY FOCUS 121 Nuclear Iran: A Glossary of Terms Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen

Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics: Established in 1989, The Islamic Republic of Iran has developed two distinct Armed Forces, Both have parallel structures, as Air Forces, Naval, and etc., the Artesh (Regular Military) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Artesh and the IRGC have their own subservices (the ground forces, air force, and the navy). In addition, the IRGC maintains several special-operations forces the Qods force being the largest. IRGC has an internal Iranian police light infantry component, the Basij. Each service and subordinate branch is headed by its own commander in chief and has an independent staff; both the Artesh and the IRGC have their own top joint staff. MODAFL encompasses the regular military (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Pasdaran). MODAFL also controls Irans Defense Industries Organization and its subsidiary, the Aerospace Industries Organization, both of which are involved in the nuclear program. Defense Industries Organization: The DIO (in Persian: Sasadjah Sazemane Sanaye Defa) is a conglomerate of Iranian companies that provides the military with its own manufacturing capacity and boost its technical abilities. The DIO is controlled by Irans Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), and in recent years, the DIO has also sought export markets. Some of its workshops have been involved in production of centrifuge components.


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Introduction: The Nuclear Puzzle ................................................................... 2 The Center of the Storm, Israel, the Islamic Republic of Iran has spent several billion dollars in its Asymmetrical Wars with Israel ........................................... 3 Dr. Gregory Stanton, the founder and director of Genocide Watch ..................... 3 Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics: ............................................. 6 Defense Industries Organization: The DIO ...................................................... 6 THE IRAN NUCLEAR PARADOX, A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAM ............. 12 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ................................................................... 12 In October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom ............................................................................. 13 To date, the UN Security Council has adopted six resolutions in response to Irans nuclear program. The council first demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities with the adoption of resolution 1696 in July 2006...................................................................................... 13 Satellite imagery from June 7, 2012 showing considerable vehicle and earth moving activity near the building at the Parchin complex ............................... 14 The November 8, 2011: the IAEA released a comprehensive and scathing report on Iran's nuclear program. ......................................................................... 14 The 2011 IAEA report stated there is "credible" evidence that "Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear device." ...................... 14 The Parchin Military Complex ...................................................................... 15 The IAEA Reports For May 24, 2011 Noted Seven Major Areas of Concern That Covered Every Major Aspect Of A Nuclear-Armed Missile Program: .................. 16 Nuclear Weapons Modeling and Calculations ................................................. 17 The IAEA 2011 report summary noted that, The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Irans nuclear program .................... 17 From a 2012 Office of the Director of National Intelligence declassified file ....... 17 Professor Danilenko Vyacheslav IAEA 2011 Iran Safeguards Report: ............... 18 R265 Shock Generator System: .................................................................. 18 Developments in Irans ballistic missile program have been prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 since June 2010 (UN Security Council, 2010). ......................................................................................... 20 Nuclear Cruise missiles the Kh-55 ............................................................... 21 Uranium Basics ......................................................................................... 22


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Heavy-water-reactor-related projects ..................................................... 22 Heavy-Water Reactor................................................................................. 22 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Iran Watch Iran's Nuclear Timetable September 18, 2013 Based on International Atomic Energy Agency Research Findings: .................................................................................................. 23 Technical Aspects: Amount of Fissile Material Need to Build a Basic Fission (NonBoosted) Weapon Highly Enriched Uranium HEU ........................................... 24 Issue: Uranium metal document A.Q. Khan .................................................. 25 Understanding the Two Paths to a Nuclear Bomb: ......................................... 25 Implosion Design ...................................................................................... 25 But the Islamic Republic has been screaming LOOK AT ISRAELI NUKES!!. ..... 26 Arak IR-40 Heavy Water Reactor (Heavy Water Production Plant [HWPP]) ........ 26 The Islamic Republic kept its heavy water project secret, and until it was forced to admit it. ............................................................................................... 27 Radioisotopes ........................................................................................... 27 Cruise Missiles: ......................................................................................... 30 Tehran has adopted North Koreas "Songun Chongch'i" or military-first Policy, .. 31 Songun Chongch'i and Tehrans Economic Reform Program of Privatization ...... 32 Through privatization Khamenei has transferred control of Irans Commerce, Industry, Oil, Gas and Public Services Sectors to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. ............................................................................................................... 32 The Beginnings of the Persian Nations Quest for Nuclear Weapons ................. 34 The Core of the Islamic Republics nuclear scientists was created during the Mohamed Reza Shah Era. ........................................................................... 35 Evidence obtained by the IAEA indicates that the Islamic Republic made its first decision to research and develops nuclear weapons in the mid-to-late 1980s 36 ISIS NuclearIran Project, The Telexes, Purchasing & Procurement Documents: . 37 Physics Research Center (PHRC) in the public debate over Irans military nuclear programs, the Physics Research Center (PHRC) is a critical case. .................... 38 Irans nuclear plants do not make fiscal sense .............................................. 38 The country of Iran rests on some of the most active earthquake fault zones in the entire world ........................................................................................ 39 Tehran does not even have the infrastructure or the water resources to contain and resolve a nuclear plant catastrophe ....................................................... 39


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Nuclear Waste, Iran does not have the infrastructure for safe transportation and storage of nuclear waste ............................................................................ 40 Several Billions of Dollars More, Uranium Mines, Waste and tons of water wasted ............................................................................................................... 40 Pakistan, for example, developed a nuclear warhead for its Ghauri medium-range missile in just one year, after its first nuclear test in 1998 .............................. 44 Tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) and Iran, the weapon no one seems to talk about. The Distinction between Strategic and Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons.... 45 Tactical nuclear weapons (TNW).................................................................. 46 Naval Variants for Tactical Nuclear Weapons Delivery .................................... 48 Weapon of Mass Electrical Destruction & Disruption ....................................... 50 The Lethality of Electromagnetic Warheads ................................................... 50 Tehran has been conducting Cargo ship launched SCUD missiles into the Caspian Sea. A Cargo ship would be a deadly stealth weapon and impossible to detect ...................................................................................................... 52 High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) ................................................. 53 The Tinner Files, Nuclear Black-market Designs for smaller, more sophisticated nuclear weapons ....................................................................................... 54 Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) ........................................... 55 The Iranian Space Agency (ISA).................................................................. 56 Hezbollah in Latin America & the bombings of Jewish Communities ................. 60 Tehrans Once Top International Operative & Hezbollah Military leader the late (assassinated in 2008) Imad Mughniyah ...................................................... 60 Pakistan, for example, developed a nuclear warhead for its Ghauri medium-range missile in just one year, after its first nuclear test in 1998. ............................. 62 The Islamic Republic Irans Open Irregular War with America in Iraq & Afghanistan .............................................................................................. 66 Explosively formed penetrators ................................................................... 67 Understanding the Syrian, Iranian and Hezbollah Alliance............................... 72 Sinjar Records .......................................................................................... 76 Iran Suicide Martyrdom.............................................................................. 77 Online Iranian Suicide Bomber Recruitment News Video with English Subtitles .. 77 Understanding Iraq Irans Relationship........................................................ 83


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Iranian Appeasement Policy, President Obamas grand overt acts of consolatory gestures for Tehran. .................................................................................. 84 2012 Treasury Places Sanctions on al Qaeda Operatives in Iran ...................... 87 General Mattis ........................................................................................ 105 In 2009 Obama turned over virtually all responsibility and authority for foreign policy negotiations with Iran to Trita Parsi and his National Iranian American Council (NIAC) ........................................................................................ 107 Setad, a Hidden 98 Billion Dollar Empire: Setad Ejraiye Farmane Hazrate Emam, Headquarters for Executing the Order of the Imam. ........................ 111 The trends in Irans current medium and long-range missile efforts are summarized in the declassified version of a report the US Secretary of Defense sent to the US Congress in April 2012 ........................................................ 114 Irans Religious Ideology & Strategic Defense Planning, Defense planning in the Islamic Republic is driven by four principal factors: ..................................... 116 2013 November Interim Geneva Agreement ............................................... 121 Medical Isotope Production Without Highly Enriched Uranium" June 13, 2013, rev. ............................................................................................................. 123 The promise of inspections does not extend to the Parchin military site .......... 126 The 2013 November Interim Geneva Agreement allows Iran to rebuild its air forces. ................................................................................................... 127 Tehran Advances Across Redlines:............................................................. 131 IRGC OF elements target Bahrain Officials & US Fifth Fleet ......................... 136 Tehrans Maritime Imports is the corner stone in acquiring black-markets military and nuclear materials, missile components and other forms of advanced technology ............................................................................................. 138 The Failure of International Sanctions & Shell Games................................. 139 Obamas White House is establishing relations with Iran on two vital economic but separate fronts ....................................................................................... 144 Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz stated that the sanctions relief package offered to the Islamic Republic could be worth as much as $40 billion to Tehran ................................................................................................... 146 Behind Khomeinis Wall of Islamic Totalitarianism ........................................ 147 Irans Ministry of Intelligence and Security ................................................. 147 The reality is the Islamic Republic of Iran is on trajectory in becoming an International super power along the same lines as poverty stricken Pakistan .. 150


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Obamas approach to the clerical dictatorship in Tehran has been a policy of foreboding exsanguinate intimidation......................................................... 152 Israel Stands Alone?............................................................................. 154 The Stability-Instability Paradox .......................................................... 155 There Is No Evidence In The Past 100 Years Of Sanctions History To Support Its Premise As A Viable Tool .......................................................................... 155 Iran Must Attack Israel by 2014 ................................................................ 159 Asymmetrical war of Attrition: The rocket warfare being conducted against Israel very much reflects a blending of strategic bombing and an overall war of attrition ............................................................................................................. 165 Israeli Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been labeled a warmonger, a wolf-crier and an opponent of peace at any price because of his policies on Iran ........... 168 The Center of the Storm, Israel ................................................................. 168 Misreading the Islamic Republic of Iran ...................................................... 171 The Lost Peace movement of Iran 1988 ..................................................... 174

WEBSITE WWW: IRANTHREATASSESSMENTCBRN.COM THE IRAN NUCLEAR PARADOX, A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAM? ISBN: 978-0-9889851-5-5 (ePub edition) Copyright 2014 by Stephen E Hughes, Association of Geostrategic Analysis


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By Stephen E Hughes Senior Analyst for the Association of Geostrategic Analysis

you can't know where you're going until you know where you've been, unknown It commenced as a peaceful nuclear program, they proclaimed objective was for creating cheap clean electrical energy, .. three nuclear bomb tests later and more coming. Under the umbrella of the Soviet Atoms for Peace program and the Soviet/North Korea 1959 nuclear cooperation treaty, led to the construction of a small North Korean research reactor (the IRT2000). Into the 1960s, many other key nuclear facilities were built. During the second phase, in the 1970s and 1980s Pyongyang built an indigenous nuclear capability. On 12 December 1985, North Korea became a signature party to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT). On 10 April 1992 its NPT safeguards agreement entered into force. In May 1992, North Korea submitted its initial report to the IAEA under that agreement, and IAEA inspections began. However from that point onwards North Korea became a hostile International entity and IAEA nightmare, aggressive missile launches, war threats and dancing nuclear negotiations [1].
Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) parties to the NPT have the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes if they comply with the other articles of the NPT, in particular articles II and III. Article II stipulates inter alia that a NNWS "undertakes not to manufacture and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and Article III provides that IAEA safeguards shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities. Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT or NNPT) Iran is a party to and has concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements. Such agreements are designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material. Safeguards include agency inspections and monitoring of declared nuclear facilities. Although comprehensive safeguards agreements give the IAEA the authority to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to it to do so, under such agreements, are limited. [2] Tehrans Safeguards Agreement. Article 48 of that agreement states that the IAEA may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to the IAEA Agency; [3] On 26th February 2003, Iran accepted changes to the Subsidiary Arrangement. Before then, Iran had to inform the IAEA of the existence and features of a facility only 180 days before the planned arrival of nuclear material to that facility. Now, Iran must inform the IAEA as soon as it decides to build a nuclear plant and keep the agency regularly updated. On 18th December 2003 Iran signed the Additional Protocols to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The understanding is the IAEA would therefore be able to carry out anywhere-anytime inspections in Iran. [4]


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In October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,

collectively known as the E3, to suspend its enrichment activities, sign and implement an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, and comply fully with the IAEAs investigation. As a result, the agencys board decided to refrain from referring the matter to the U.N. Security Council. On 18th December 2003 Iran signed the Additional Protocols to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The understanding is the IAEA would therefore be able to carry out anywhere-anytime inspections in Iran. Tehran signed this Additional Protocol in December 2003, but has never ratified it.
To date, the UN Security Council has adopted six resolutions in response to Irans nucle ar program. The council first demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities with the adoption of resolution 1696 in July 2006.

The following three resolutions, 1737 adopted in December 2006, 1747 adopted in March 2007, and 1803 adopted in March 2008, imposed incremental sanctions on Iranian persons and entities believed to have been involved in Irans nuclear and missile programs. Resolution, 1835, adopted in September 2008, reiterated the demands made in resolution 1696 without imposing additional sanctions. The UN Security Council significantly expanded sanctions in June 2010 with the adoption of Resolution 1929. [5] The problem with the Islamic Republic is since 2002, the IAEA and the international community keeps tripping over secret and hidden nuclear faculties, heavy water production and strange nuclear military aspects of its peaceful nuclear program. Many of these programs have roots going as far back as the 1980s. In the 10 years since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) first confirmed that Iran had secretly built a uraniumenrichment plant, Tehran has expanded its enrichment program and other sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle activities. [6] May 1979 a Khomeini adviser tells energy specialist Dr. F ereydoun Fesharaki, It is your duty to build the atomic bomb for the Islamic Republican Party. January 1987: Fereydun Fesharaki, who headed the Shah's secret nuclear weapons program, returns to Iran after a seven-year exile; all of his expenses are paid by the government. January 1987: At a secret meeting, Iranian officials decide to allocate additional funds toward developing nuclear weapons. Cordesman & Al-Rodhan: Iranian Nuclear Weapons? 2/21/06 Page 63 The Threat from Irans WMD and Missile Programs


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Parchin Military Complex Satellite imagery from June 7, 2012 showing considerable vehicle and earth moving activity near the building at the Parchin complex that the IAEA suspects was used in high explosive tests related to nuclear weapons development. The November 8, 2011: the IAEA released a comprehensive and scathing report on Iran's nuclear program.

The report is based on intelligence received from more than 10 different countries; interviews with foreign scientists who helped Iran develop their program, and the IAEA's own investigations and analyses. This report underscored the Islamic Republic covertly built several facilities for uranium enrichment and only declared them to the IAEA once the agency became aware of their existence from outside sources. [7]
The 2011 IAEA report stated there is "credible" evidence that "Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear device." Each IAEA report since then has emphasized Irans continuing refusal to address the IAEAs evidence and Tehrans refusal to allow IAEA inspectors into the Parchin complex, where evidence shows strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development. [8] Iran is already capable of making weapon-grade uranium and a crude nuclear explosive device


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The Parchin Military Complex (PMC) is a sprawling installation run by Irans Ministry of

Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). One of Tehrans clever intentional misdirection tactics, in 2005 Tehran allowed IAEA Inspectors into the site Parchin site area, for inspections. This was only partial access to two sites in the vast Parchin military complex. However these sites were located 3miles away, on the opposite site of the Parchin facilities complex. Not even close to the Parchin facilities of nuclear weapons concerns. IAEA inspectors were not permitted to take soil samples or visit areas of the base where prohibited nuclear weapons testing suspected of having been carried out. [9] The Parchin Military Complex has undergone major sanitizing, according to Institute for Science and International Security. Interpretation of satellite imagery shows buildings have been razed and soil bulldozed and carried away. Recent commercial satellite imagery of the Parchin Military Complex reveals extensive new paving as well as far-extending other alternations undertaken over the past year and a half starting in February 2012.
Earlier imagery from May 25, 2012 showing demolished buildings near the suspected high explosive testing building.

Tehran appears to be in the final stages of sanitizing the suspected high explosive test site at the Parchin facilities and area having recently asphalted large sections of the site. [10]


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The IAEA Reports For May 24, 2011 Noted Seven Major Areas of Concern That Covered Every Major Aspect Of A Nuclear-Armed Missile Program:

Neutron generator and associated diagnostics: experiments involving the explosive compression of uranium deuteride to produce a short burst of neutrons. Uranium conversion and metallurgy: producing uranium metal from fluoride compounds and its manufacture into components relevant to a nuclear device. High explosives manufacture and testing: developing, manufacturing and testing of explosive components suitable for the initiation of high explosives in a converging spherical geometry. Exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonator studies, particularly involving applications necessitating high simultaneity: possible nuclear significance of the use of EBW detonators. Multipoint explosive initiation and hemispherical detonation studies involving highly instrumented experiments: integrating EBW detonators in the development of a system to initiate hemispherical high explosive charges and conducting full scale experiments, work which may have benefitted from the assistance of foreign expertise. High voltage firing equipment and instrumentation for explosives testing over long distances and possibly underground: conducting tests to confirm that high voltage firing equipment is suitable for the reliable firing of EBW detonators over long distances. Missile re-entry vehicle redesign activities for a new payload assessed as being nuclear in nature: conducting design work and modeling studies involving the removal of the conventional high explosive payload from the warhead of the Shahab-3 missile and replacing it with a spherical nuclear payload. [11]
FROM: Rethinking Our Approach to Iran's Search for the Bomb by Anthony H. Cordesman MAY 7, 2012


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Nuclear Weapons Modeling and Calculations

Intelligence data provided to the Agency by two Member States related to modeling studies of spherical geometries alleged to have been conducted in 2008 and 2009 by Iran. Modeling studies of spherical geometries is of particular nuclear weapons security concerns for the IAEA and the international community. According to that information the Iranian research involved the modeling of spherical geometries, consisting of components of the core of an HEU nuclear device subjected to shock compression, for their neutronic behavior at high density, and a determination of the subsequent nuclear explosive yield. This was Tehrans Project 110 Spherical device Power supply. Project 110 was connected to project 111. Project 111 appears to have consisted of a structured and comprehensive program of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile.

The IAEA 2011 report summary noted that, The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Irans nuclear program. After assessing carefully and

critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured program, and that some activities may still be ongoing. [13]
From a 2012 Office of the Director of National Intelligence declassified file, Annual Report on Military Power of Iran, Iran continues to develop technological capabilities applicable to nuclear weapons. It continues its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor activities in violation of multiple United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions and also continues to develop ballistic missiles that could be adapted to deliver nuclear weapons. Unclassified Annual Report on Military Power of Iran April2012 Executive Summary

The military annexes to the November 2011 IAEA report indicated that Iran has made
major progress in assembling all the technology and developing the manufacturing skills and equipment necessary to design a fission warhead. The annexes indicated that Iran is closer to building a warhead small enough to mount on a missile and test it through simulated explosive testing than has previously been publically reported. IAEA reporting since that time has provided more indicators that Iran is close to being able to test a Uranium fission device once it obtains weapons grade Uranium, and key US experts indicate that Iran may have acquired more weapons design and passive test data than the IAEA has yet announced. The Gulf Military Balance Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions and Options for Deterrence, Defense, Containment, and Preventive Strikes By Anthony H. Cordesman and Bryan Gold July 18, 2013 page 77,


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Professor Danilenko Vyacheslav IAEA 2011 Iran Safeguards Report: Irans Work and Foreign Assistance on a Multipoint Initiation System for a Nuclear Weapon. Most of that evidence surrounds one Professor Vyacheslav Danilenko, a high explosives expert from the Cold War era. The IAEA solidly confirmed that he was in Iran from 1996-2002 and returned to Russia. The IAEA verified through three separate sources, including the expert himself that he was in Islamic Republic during that time. Reuters reported that from the 1950s until his retirement, Danilenko worked at the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF), which is a top secret Soviet nuclear weapons complex research center in the Ural Mountains. persists in claiming I am not a nuclear physicist".

Yet it is strange he

Russia is considered the worlds leader in the development of experimental explosive devices and techniques for the study of shock waves. It was not until the early 1990s that the actual details of these devices were first described in the open scientific literature. Professor Danilenko worked with many of the greats of Russian nuclear weapons scientists including Zababakhan, Krupnikov & Kuzl. Krupnikov, who helped develop the electrical contact shock wave diagnostics for the first Russian nuclear weapon, According to Professor Danilenko he worked in the Islamic Republic f or ostensibly to assist Tehran in the development of a facility and techniques for making ultradispersed diamonds (UDD), where he also lectured on explosion physics and its applications. To note , nanodiamond process is strikingly similar to the process that leads to the miniaturization of nuclear weapons detonators . He told the IAEA that he lectured and constructed an explosive firing cylinder which was not designed for experiments on spherical systems. Professor Danilenko worked with leading Cold War era explosives experts in the Soviet nuclear weapons program and developed understanding of the fundamentals of detonation, including shock compression. He also has experience in the important area of the diagnostics of high explosions. His publications include work on high-speed photography and describe optical techniques by which fiber optic cables are used to capture the time of arrival of explosive shock waves. R265 Shock Generator System: The IAEA also obtained from member states details of the design, development, and possible testing of what is called in IAEA information the R265 shock generator system, which is a round multipoint initiation system that would fit inside the payload chamber of the Shahab 3 missile tri-conic nose cone. This device involves a hemispherical aluminum shell with an inside radius of 265 mm and wall thickness of 10 mm thick. Outer channels are cut into the outer surface of the shell, each channel one by one millimeter, and contain explosive material. Each channel terminates in a cylindrical hole, 5 mm in diameter, that is drilled though the shell and contains an explosive pellet. The geometrical pattern formed by channels and holes is arranged in quadrants on the outer hemispheric surface which allows a single central point of initiation and the simultaneous detonation of explosives in all the holes on the hemisphere. This in turn allows the simultaneous initiation of all the high explosives under the shell by one exploding bridgewire (EBW). If properly prepared, the R265 constitutes the outer part of an explosively driven implosion system for a nuclear device. The outer radius of the R265 system is 275 millimeters, or a diameter of 550 millimeters, less than the estimated diameter of about 600 millimeters available inside the payload chamber of a Shahab 3 (or the Sejjil-2 missile). Institute for Science and International Security Washington D.C .
[16] [15]


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The 2013 Geneva Six Month Interim between Islamic Republic of Iran and the international powers known as P5+1, In no part of the agreement is there a requirement for transparency of Irans program of manufacturing explosive devices. President Obama and Secretary Kerry have said that a permanent agreement which will defuse Irans nuclear and military ability will take hold after this six month periodsomewhere down the track.


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Developments in Irans ballistic missile program have been prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 since June 2010 (UN Security Council, 2010). Iran's Revolutionary Guards test-fired a number of intermediate range ballistic missiles as part of large-scale training exercises

The Islamic Republic has modified the warhead of its Shahab-3 variants in ways that would make it easier to mount a nuclear weapon, and that Iran is constantly testing variants of its existing missiles and claiming it is producing new types, as well as using alleged satellite launches as a vehicle for research and development into ballistic missile technology. [17] Developments in Irans ballistic missile program have been prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 since June 2010 (UN Security Council, 2010). However, Islamic Republic has continued to undertake research, development, and testing activities. [18] Supposedly in economic dire straits, in 2011 and 2012, Tehran conducted a number of tests on its Shahab-1,-2, and-3 liquid-fueled missiles. The Sajjil-2 missile, which has a maximum range believed to be around 1367 miles (2,200 kilometers), has been under development since around 2000. Tehrans research & development entities have engineered a number of variations to the original Shahab 3 missile, with a confusing international list of alternate names. These have been referred to by various intelligence and media sources as the Shahab 3A, Shahab 3B, Shahab 3D, Shahab 3M, Ghadr-1, and Qadr-1. The Shahab 3 has also been used as the basis for an Iranian space program, and these rockets have been called Kavoshgar-1, IRIS, and Safir. [19] Known and estimated missile modifications have led experts to conclude that the newer missiles have a ranges of 932 to 1118 miles (1,500 to 1,800 km). Other intelligence reports indicate that later versions are capable of reaching 1553 miles (2,500 km). Most intelligence reports the maximum payload of Shahab 3 variants around 800 kg. Given Reentry Vehicle (RV) (warhead) design requirements, an 800 kg payload could be expected to carry a 500 kg warhead. The combination of reduced fuselage weight and increased fuel capacity provide the Shahab 3 variants with about the same launch weight as the original Shahab 3. The increased fuel may increase overall launch weight by as much as 1,000 kg, but the extra ten seconds or so of burn-time give the missile a significantly increased range.
Missile Nose Cone / Reentry Vehicle (RV) The original Shahab 3 had a separating RV-unit

that gave the missile a standard, conical nose cone. The Shahab 3 variants employ a modified RV that gives the missiles a baby bottle-shaped nose cone. More exactly, the baby bottle-shaped nose cone RV consists of a small cone attached to a cylinder that connects to the body of the missile (the single stage engine) with metal skirting. Changing the


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configuration an RV is not trivial. It impacts on the controllability of the entire missile during its boost phase, and on the trajectory, dynamics and viability of the RV during re entry. It also stands to reason that the payload is not a simple charge of explosives - such a charge could simply be cast into the front end of the previous warhead, rather than undertaking the complicated route of reshaping the RV to fit the weapon and discloses a respectable degree of proficiency in missile engineering. This radical new design is potentiality capable of faster re-entry speeds, thus making it more difficult to target and intercept with anti-ballistic missile systems. These new features also make it possible for the warhead to detonate high above a target, airburst detonation.
EMP Feature: An airburst detonation improves a ballistic missiles ability to disburse chemical

or biological weapons, or a flue air bomb. However its most deadly and its most effective use is with a nuclear warhead. A nuclear warhead, when detonated high in the atmosphere, creates an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that is potentially more devastating than a conventionally employed nuclear warhead. [20]
Nuclear Cruise missile the Kh-55 In 2001, , it was uncovered the Islamic Republic acquired

on the military arms black-market a number of the cold war era Ukrainian Kh-55 nuclear cruise missiles. The Kh-55 was designed as a strategic system capable of delivering a nuclear warhead 1553 miles (2,500 km). Payload: Single warhead, 410 kg, Warhead: 200250 kT nuclear. However, it was and still is down-played in America and International news media, as no less as an Israeli MOSSAD conspiracy, with the American CIA. This media spin claims the Kh-55 conspiracy is to persecute, provoke sanctions / war with Iran. [21] However March 31st, 2005 Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko confirmed that about six Kh55 nuclear-capable cruise missiles was illegally sold to Iran and six to China. In an interview with USAs NBC News, Yushchenko offered the highest-level acknowledgement that the sales of Kh-55 nuclear capable cruise missiles had indeed taken place. [22] Also in 2005 Ukrainian Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk reported several hundred of his country's missiles were unaccounted for, some 32 billion dollars worth of military hardware. The missing military weapons of note were 575 of the Kh-55 and Kh-55M nuclear cruise missiles. [23] April 2005: A Washington Times report reveals that Iran paid $49.5 million for the six Kh-55 missiles it received in an air shipment from Ukraine between May and June 2001. The shipments had been misleadingly identified as oil-pipeline material. The Japanese Government lodged an official protest with Ukraine Government over the sales of the Kh-55 cruise missiles, saying that they could enhance rival Chinas nuclear weapons delivery capability. [24] The last question of the 575 nuclear cruise missiles where did they go ? And more importantly did Tehran acquire more than just six?


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Uranium Basics In its natural state, mined uranium is made up of 99.3% U-238 and 0.7% U-235. If we begin with an arbitrary amount of natural uranium, say 1,000 atoms, it will therefore contain 993 atoms of U-238 and seven of U-235. At 3.5% enrichment, the ratio becomes 193:7; i.e., 800 atoms of U-238 have been removed. Removal of just another 165 U-238 atoms affects a ratio of 28:7, or 20% enrichmentthe level Iran currently achieves. Comparatively little work is needed to remove another 27 U-238 atoms to reach 90% enrichment, suitable for an atomic bomb, and a ratio of 1:7. High-enriched uranium (HEU): Uranium containing 20 percent or more of the fissile isotope U-235. Weapons-grade uranium is usually enriched to 90 percent or higher levels of U-235.
Uranium Enrichment: To enrich uranium so that the percentage of fissile isotope U-235 increases from 0.7% to 90%, UF6 gas is passed through four processes: (1) through two groups of 12 cascades of centrifuges, each having 164 machines, taking the enrichment level to 3.5%; (2) through eight cascades each of another 164 machines to increase the level from 3.5% to 20%; (3) through four cascades of 114 machines increase from 20% to 60%; (4) through two cascades of 64 machines each, to increase from 60% to 90%. At each stage, gas depleted of U-235 is passed back to the previous stage or out of the system completely. As the schematic suggests, the process becomes relatively easier.

Recycled uranium: When low-enriched uranium has been irradiated in a reactor and removed for reprocessing, it still contains more than 1 percent U-235, along with an additional isotope (U-236) not present in natural uranium. High U-236 content has been found in samples taken from Iranian centrifuge equipment. Tehran states the High U-236 originated in purchased used Pakistani nuclear equipment. Heavy-water-reactor-related projects: UN Security Council resolutions have called on Iran to suspend all of its heavy-water-reactor-related projects, including heavywater production, construction of the IR-40 reactor, and manufacture and testing of fuel for that reactor. Heavy water: Water containing more than 99 percent of the hydrogen isotope deuterium (D2O). It is used as a moderator in reactors fueled by natural uranium. Heavy-water production plant (HWPP): Iran commissioned the HWPP at Arak in 2006. It can produce sixteen metric tons of heavy water per year for use in the IR-40 heavy-water reactor, which is currently under construction. Heavy-Water Reactor: A reactor using heavy water (deuterium) as the moderator. A prominent example is the Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactor, which is moderated and cooled by heavy water and fueled with natural uranium. Spent fuel rods from such facilities contain significant quantities of plutonium, a nuclear explosive. Iran decided in the mid-1990s to build its IR-40 heavywater reactor, the 40 denoting its power output in megawatts. Located at Khondab in central Iran, the plant is intended for use in research and development as well as radioisotope production, at least according to Iran. It is expected to become operational sometime in 2013. Such a reactor produces Weapons-grade plutonium sufficient for at least one nuclear device annually. IAEA reports indicate that Iran also tried unsuccessfully to acquire a 27-megawatt heavy-water reactor from China.
POLICY FOCUS 121 Nuclear Iran: A Glossary of Terms Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen


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Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Iran Watch Iran's Nuclear Timetable September

with its thousands of gas centrifuges, and its growing stockpile of enriched uranium, Iran now has the ability to make fuel for nuclear reactors or, by enriching the uranium further, for nuclear warheads. This is based on reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency,
18, 2013 Based on International Atomic Energy Agency Research Findings: By using the approximately 9,200 first-generation centrifuges operating at its Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, Iran could theoretically produce enough weapon-grade uranium to fuel a single nuclear warhead in about 1.6 months. The more advanced centrifuges being installed at Natanz would allow Iran to produce weapongrade uranium more quickly. Iran's stockpile of low-enriched uranium is now sufficient, after further enrichment, to fuel approximately six nuclear warheads. This assessment assumes that Iran would use 16 kg of weapon-grade uranium (~90 percent U-235) in the finished core of each nuclear weapon. Sixteen kilograms are assumed to be sufficient for an implosion bomb. This was the amount called for in the implosion device Saddam Hussein was trying to perfect in the 1980s, and the design for such a device has circulated on the nuclear black market, to which Iran has had access. Some experts believe that Iran could use less material, assuming Iran would accept a lower yield for each weapon. According to these experts, Iran could use as few as seven kilograms of this material if Irans weapon developers possessed a medium level of skill, and if Iran were satisfied with an explosive yield slightly less than that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. If Iran chose to use an amount smaller than 16 kg, the time required to make each weapon would be less than estimated here. Or, in the amount of time estimated here, Iran could make a greater number of weapons. Iran could decide not to use such a smaller amount of weapon-grade uranium if Iran wanted to have more confidence that its weapons would work, or if it wanted to reduce the size of its weapons by reducing the amount of high explosive required. If 1,053 kg of low-enriched uranium are required to produce a bombs worth of weapon-grade uranium, the 6,774 kg of low-enriched uranium in Irans stockpile as of August 2013 might be sufficient to fuel about six first-generation implosion bombs. This number takes into account the conversion of almost one third of Irans low-enriched UF6 stockpile to 20% enriched uranium gas In October 2013 Institute for Science and International Security issued a report stating that Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear bomb in as little as one month
Iranian Breakout Estimates, Updated October 24, 2013 By Patrick Migliorini, David Albright, Houston Wood, and Christina Walrond

The IAEA estimates the conversion time for low-enriched uranium to weapon-grade uranium metal to be approximately 3-12 months


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Technical Aspects: Amount of Fissile Material Need to Build a Basic Fission (Non-Boosted) Weapon Highly Enriched Uranium HEU (90% U-235)
Amount of Fissile Material Need to Build a Basic Fission (Non-Boosted) Weapon Highly Enriched Uranium HEU (90% U-235) Simple gun-type weapon 90-110 lbs./40-50 kg Simple implosion weapon 33lbs/15 kg Sophisticated implosion weapon 20-26lbs/9-12kg Weapons Grade Plutonium Simple implosion weapon 14lbs/6 kg Sophisticated implosion weapon 4.5-9lbs/2-4 kg

The Gulf Military Balance Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions and Options for Deterrence, Defense, Containment, and Preventive Strikes By Anthony H. Cordesman and Bryan Gold July 18, 2013 page 68 In October 2013 David Albright, a physicist and founder of the nonprofit Institute for Science and International Security testified before Congressional Committee, Iran has invested heavily in nuclear industries in the last thirty years. However, its investments, often made in secret and dominated by black market purchases, have not been consistent with a strictly peaceful nuclear program. Despite many setbacks over the last three decades, Iran has found suppliers to provide the wherewithal to build many nuclear facilities. One of the most important suppliers was A.Q. Khan and his network of business associates in Europe, Asia, and Africa. In Albrights Senate testimony, he noted that Iran has been careful to convert sufficient 20% LEU to keep its stockpile below 240-250 kg, the amount considered necessary to produce enough weapons-grade uranium to build a nuclear weapon and the red line drawn by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Testimony of David Albright Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Reversing Irans Nuclear Program: Understanding Irans Nuclear Program and Technically Assessing Negotiating Positions October 3, 2013

It is worth noting that Pakistani A.Q. Khan nuclear market forged Pakistan into the 5 th largest nuclear arsenal in the world. [25] In a 2007 International Institute for Strategic Studies Report , Nuclear Black Market Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan & the rise of Proliferation networks page 52, Today Iran remains the most active customer in the international nuclear black market The brevity required for this report does not allowed to cover more important details. But to glimpse the tip of Tehrans nuclear black-market. In one of the most significant cases to date in U.S. efforts to combat Irans i llicit nuclear trade, the Department of Justice on July 13, 2012 announced the arrest of an Iranian national for directing an illicit nuclear procurement ring. Parviz Khaki, an Iranian national, is alleged to have bought or attempted to buy from U.S. companies large quantities of dual-use equipment and raw materials for Irans gas centrifuge program. According to the indictment, the goods sought by Iran through affiliates in China, goods that can be used to construct, operate, and maintain gas centrifuges to enrich uranium, included 20 tons of C-350 maraging steel (enough for several thousand centrifuges, or a plant the size of Fordow), 20 tons of 7075-T6 aluminum alloy 150 mm rods, mass spectrometers, magnetic tape, measuring instruments, pressure transducers, and vacuum pumps.


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Issue: Uranium metal document A.Q. Khan Iran secured a 15-page document that describes the procedures for reducing uranium hexafluoride into uranium metal and machining enriched-uranium metal into hemispheres. This process may be used to make the fissile core for nuclear weapons. Tehrans Explanation: Iran claims that they received this document in 1987 from the A.Q. Khan network, but that they did not request it. Iran declared that a small uranium hexafluoride to uranium metal convention line was designed to be in the Uranium Conversion Facility, but the IAEA verified that this line has not been built. The document did not include dimensions or other specifications for machined pieces for such components. [26a] Understanding the Two Paths to a Nuclear Bomb: The most simplest and easiest to construct is the Gun-type (nuclear) weapon. This does not require sophisticated explosive or electronic components. The design uses highly enriched uranium (HEU) as fissile material, which is obtained by concentrating atoms of the U-235 isotope. Two or more pieces of fissionable material, each containing half of a critical mass are brought together very rapidly. Like a gun, it fires a HEU projectile down a gun barrel which directs the projectile into another piece of HEU. The collision of these two HEU materials ignites a nuclear explosion. Chemical explosions at two ends of the bomb drive the two hemispheres together. When the critical mass (the full sphere) is formed, and a small influx of neutrons is introduced at the right time, a fission explosion occurs. This method was used in the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima at the close of World War II. For technical reasons, the guntype assembly cannot be used in a plutonium bomb. The exact amount of HEU depends on the level of enrichment of the uranium used in the weapon, the explosive yield desired, and the technical sophistication of the bomb design. Yet a large amount of fissile material is required to ensure that a nuclear chain reaction will take place. Therefore, gun-type weapons will necessarily be heavier and bulkier than other types of nuclear weapons. Generally it is believed the Islamic Republic does not have any long range missiles capable of delivering this type of nuclear weapon. A weapon of this type is usually too large to be mounted on a long-range missile, but it could be dropped from an aircraft or delivered in a truck or a shipping container. A drone / UAV type of aircraft would work as well. (I would rather not discount Iranian engineer and missile technology, if Iran earmarks 3 times the U235 it would use in an implosion warhead to a single device, then a double-gun uranium warhead would easily fit the space and weight requirements of the smaller missile warhead) .

Implosion Design (Plutonium or HEU) Plutonium is produced by irradiating uranium fuel in a reactor and then processing the spent fuel chemically, in a reprocessing plant to separate the plutonium from the unused uranium and unwanted radioactive byproducts. Unlike a gun-type device, an implosion-type device can employ HEU or plutonium because the speed of assembly is fast enough to allow the use of plutonium. An improvised implosion-type weapon would probably require approximately 25 kg of weapons-grade HEU or roughly 8 kg of plutonium in the highest density. An implosion-type fission weapon is more sophisticated than a gun-type design. The nuclear implosion weapon uses a complex arrangement of explosives to rapidly compress one or more spheres of fissile material into a critical mass. They are more difficult to design and build than gun-type weapons, because they often require advanced explosive components and sophisticated fusing systems. Implosion weapons can use either plutonium or HEU to create nuclear explosions with yields in excess of 10 kT. Also, they typically require much less fissile material than gun-type weapons, because they use the fissile material available in the core more efficiently. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with 25 kg of HEU or 8 kg of plutonium, "the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded," but sophisticated, advanced designs could require less fissile material. Some sources estimate lower thresholds of 12-15 kg of HEU and 4 kg of plutonium. The Islamic Republic would need access to and knowledge of high-speed electronics and high explosive lenses, a particularly complex technology. This equipment is necessary to result in a fast and smooth squeezing of the fissile material into a supercritical state. [28] Does Professor Vyacheslav Danilenko, ring a bell?


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But the Islamic Republic has been screaming LOOK AT ISRAELI NUKES!!. This Iranian proganda shell game has

sadly gained traction and creditability. Tehran has successfully diverted attention away from its other nuclear weapons production facilities it help fund in Syria, Al Kibar (aka Dair Alzour), Marj as Suln and other questionable sites. Syria is incapable of operating a large-scale program without significant external assistance. It has a weak industrial infrastructure, poor scientific capabilities, and lacks the trained engineers and other personnel needed to run a major civilian or weapons-oriented program. In May 2011, after years of investigations, the IAEA Director General's report to the Board concluded that the facility at Dair Alzour, destroyed by Israel in 2007, was "very likely a nuclear reactor" and should have been declared to the IAEA. A Financial Times article raised concerns about the security of about 50 tons of natural uranium alleged to still be in Syria, which would have been intended for use in fuel for the Al Kibar reactor. Fifty tons of natural uranium would be enough, if enriched to weapon-grade, for 3-5 nuclear weapons, depending on centrifuge efficiency and cascade operations. As of June 2012, Syria has seven active, national-level technical cooperation projects and is involved in another 32 regional and inter-regional projects with the IAEA, primarily involving the production of radioisotopes. Medical isotopes contain 2 isotopes, uranium 238 (U 238) and uranium 235 (U 235). In the process of making medical isotopes, about 97% of the bomb-grade material remains unused, these ever-increasing leftovers, sufficient to make several Hiroshima-sized bombs. [29] Iran has been a long time ally of Syria and has funneled several billion dollars into the country. May 25, 2010: Iran and Syria agreed to set up a joint bank in Damascus. July 15, 2011: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei expressed support for Assad and pledged to provide Syria with $5.8 billion in aid.

Arak IR-40 Heavy Water Reactor (Heavy Water Production Plant [HWPP]) Near the city of Arak are Irans heavy water production plant and a heavy water reactor, which according to the Islamic Republic remains under construction.
United Nations Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), Iran was to suspend all work on heavy water related projects. However, Iran has not halted this work and maintains that it has no legal obligation to do so under its safeguards agreement. Under traditional safeguards, heavy water production facilities are not subject to IAEA safeguards or inspection. Under the IAEA Additional Protocol, however, they are subject to declarations and complementary access. The IAEA monitors the status of the facility via satellite imagery. Reprocessing plants are large buildings with thick walls, construction of which could be detectable from overhead satellites unless they are built underground. While in operation, reprocessing plants emit detectable gases, but the IAEA needs an Additional Protocol to be in place for it to have the access and tools to detect such emissions.


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Heavy water reactors are of proliferation concern because they are optimal for the production of high quality, weapons-grade plutonium. These types of reactors do not require enriched uranium to produce weapons-usable material, as they are fueled by natural uranium. According to the Islamic Republic original intent was to build a hot cell facility at Arak for the separation of long-lived radioisotopes, believed to be a euphemism for plutonium. In May 2013, Tehran informed the IAEA that it would begin operating the IR-40 in the third quarter of 2014. However, just a few months later, Iran said it would no longer meet that schedule, although it gave no explanation for the delay.
[ 29b]

The Islamic Republic kept its heavy water project secret, and until it was forced to admit it. Tehran decided to begin a heavy water research and development program in the early 1980s. Sometime in the 1990s, following laboratory-scale experiments to produce heavy water at the Isfahan (Esfahan) Nuclear Center, Iran decided to construct the HWPP at Khondab. The facility remained secret until 14 August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed the construction of at least two secret sites related to Iran's nuclear weapons program. The allegations prompted the IAEA Director General, Mohammed El-Baradei, to question Iranian authorities about the existence of a heavy water program. During El-Baradei's visit to Iran in February 2003, Iran officially declared that it was constructing the HWPP. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

Iran Nuclear Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) estimates that if operated efficiently, the IR-40 will be capable of producing 9kg of plutonium annually, enough for approximately one-and-a-half nuclear weapons per year.
Key Talking Points From: The Plutonium Track: Implications for the Completion of Iran's

Heavy Water Reactor at Arak, Discussion Meeting Dr Ephraim Asculai Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Arundel House, London Wednesday 11 September 2013
Radioisotopes Radioisotope is a radioactive isotope which is used in physical and biological

researches and therapeutics. According to Iran the radioisotopes which are produced in Iran are mainly used for diagnosis and treatment of various cancers or are used to alleviate cancer-related pains.
46 countries have research reactors, which are used for training, research and prod uction of radioisotopes for medical, industrial and other civil purposes. But only four of these countries Canada, India, France and Algeria use heavy water reactors for isotope production. Most others use light water-moderated reactors that are easier to operate. And most countries simply purchase medical isotopes from the international market (This would greatly reduce Irans economic burden for medical isotopes, rather than wasting hundreds of millions of dollars in production facilities. It begs the question, how much are sanctions really hurting Iran? Author)


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A key feature of Arak is that it runs on natural uranium fuel, comprised of mainly 99.3% U238 isotope and 0.7% U235 isotope. Plutonium is produced by the irradiation of the U238 isotope, so the higher the percentage of this isotope, the more Plutonium is produced. The other key feature of Arak is its size: 40MWt. Fitzpatrick noted that this is larger than necessary for isotope production and is the approximate size of the natural-uranium-fuelled reactors that India and North Korea used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. With North Korea's help, Syria had also begun to construct a plutonium-production reactor of about that size (before it was destroyed by Israel in September 2007) In May, Iran told the IAEA it planned to begin pre-commissioning Arak in the fourth quarter of 2013 using dummy fuel assemblies and regular water, and that commissioning using real fuel assemblies and heavy water would begin in the first quarter of 2014, with start-up planned for the third quarter of 2014. In August, however, Iran informed the IAEA that this schedule was not achievable. One reason is probably that Iran has had problems producing the fuel assemblies. Asculai said the fuel assemblies were based on a Russian design that was not ideally suited for Arak. The plan to use dummy rods and regular water to test Arak is very strange, Asculai said, noting that he had no information that this has been done before elsewhere. After such testing, the facility would have to be thoroughly dried before it could be operated normally, because heavy water has to be 99.75% pure. The contamination from even a small amount of regular water would make it unusable. Asculai, therefore, could not eliminate the suspicion that the pre-commissioning plan is a ruse, and that real rods and heavy water would be used from the start. This would be in violation of Iran's pledge to provide six months' notice to the IAEA of introducing fuel, but it could be a way for Iran to render the reactor invulnerable. But sanctions are working right? Well they did not work very well with North Korea, hardly

an economic hub for the International community. If we venture into the Iranian economic landscape the detrimental economic effects are just passed onto the people. Lets look at the political haggling, countries simple go to President Obama and ask for a waiver to purchase oil for Tehran. Obama has provided over 20 countries with oil waivers. [30] Some countries like Turkey openly ignore sanctions and restrictions with Tehran. Iran increasingly depends upon Turkey to alleviate pressure from sanctions. In the first nine months of 2012 Turkey swapped approximately $7 billion in gold with Iran in exchange for oil and gas. The gold trade allows Iran to avoid sanctions on dollar transactions. Turkey borders Iran and is one of the few countries Iranians do not need a visa to visit. This in turn helps to make it attractive to Iranians to set up businesses and conduct trade with Turkeys. Trade with Iran has increased from $1.25 billion in 2002, to over $20 billion a decade later. [31] Germanys exports to Iran have totaled over 25 billion Euros in from 2005 to 2012. [32] In 2013 the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) took delivery of four new supertankers for oil and gas exports.[33] Tehran is also Launching Largest Floating Oil Storage Terminal in Persian Gulf. [34] Again this hardly scratches the surface of the issue of sanctions and the International community business transactions with the Islamic Republic.


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Armed Forces: Of all the Gulf States Iran has the lowest reported GDP/ military spending.

Yet it has created the largest armed forces, ballistic & cruise missile forces in the Gulf region and the largest production faculties for these weapons. At present, Tehran is assessed to have the largest deployed ballistic missile & cruise missile forces in the Middle East with around 1,000 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. [35]
Tehran is the only country not in possession of nuclear weapons to have produced or flight-tested Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with ranges exceeding 1242 miles (2,000 kilometers), which are used in the worlds nuclear delivery arsenals from America to Pakistan.

Irans existing missile forces give it the capability to attack targets in the Gulf and near its border with conventionally armed long-range missiles and rockets, and Tehran can attack targets in Israel, throughout the region, and beyond with its longest-range ballistic missiles. [35a] The Islamic Republic has obscured its economy and military industrial complex expenditures through a contrived labyrinth called Privatization. [36]
We judge Iran would likely choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon, if one is ever fielded. Irans ballistic missiles are capable of delivering WMD. In addition, Iran has demonstrated an ability to launch small satellites, and we grow increasingly concerned that these technical steps along with a regime hostile toward the United States and our alliesprovide Tehran with the means and motivation to develop larger space-launch vehicles and longerrange missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community Senate Select Committee on Intelligence James R. Clapper Director of National Intelligence March 12, 2013


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Cruise Missiles: Iran has acquired a variety of anti-ship cruise missiles, both through foreign sources and domestic production. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko confirmed in 2005 that Iran illegally procured six Kh-55 cruise missiles from Ukraine four years earlier. The Kh-55 is an air-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers. China has also provided Iran with cruise missiles and technology. A 2011 report from the Director of National Intelligence stated that despite export control legislation, Chinese firms and individuals continued to supply Iran with missile technology. Iranian made missiles include the Nasr-1, claimed to be capable of destroying warships and military targets up to 3,000 tons. Iranian officials have also announced the large scale production and deployment of short-range cruise missiles including Zafar and Qader missiles. In September 2012, Iranian Brigadier General and Director of the Defense Ministry Aerospace Organization Mehdi Farahi announced that Iran has or is developing fourteen different cruise missiles. Iran's cruise missile program began in 2001, when Tehran imported the Kh-55. Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Iran Updated: October 2013


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The Islamic Republic of Iran has developed two distinct Armed Forces; both have parallel structures, as Air Forces, Naval, and etc., the Artesh (Regular Military) IRIA and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC. The Artesh and the IRGC have their own subservices (the ground forces, air force, and the navy). In addition, the IRGC maintains several specialoperations forces the Al Qods force being the largest. These forces total (estimate) about 545,000 active personnel, 650,000 reserve (not including the Law Enforcement& Basij Forces) [37]

Tehrans navy has acquired a fleet of approximately twenty-four submarines, ranging in size from the 4000-ton displacements Russian Kilo class submarines to the 150-ton displacement Ghadir class mini submarines. The Iranian industrial base is producing small submarines at a rate of four to five per year. Iran can manufacture a wide array of ships, ranging in size from small patrol boats to long range destroyers and min subs. Its naval forces have 30,000 speedboats armed with anti-ship cruise missiles. [37a] Purchase and production of sea mines is estimated to be around 5,000, putting Tehran in 4th place worldwide. [37b] The Islamic Republic military industry produces a variety of drones and UAVs. To note being mass produced and in service was a captured (reverse engineered) ScanEagle. This is a small, low-cost, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle built by Insitu, a subsidiary of Boeing. As standard payload ScanEagle carries either an inertially stabilized electro-optical or an infrared camera. The gimbaled camera allows the operator to easily track both stationary and moving targets, providing real-time intelligence. The other UAV the Shahed 129 was first seen in the 2012 military war games, Great Prophet 7. The Shahed 129 can carry eight Sadid missiles at the same time, and hit both stationary and mobile targets up to 1056.3 miles or 1,700 km. away. Its Tehr ans second weapons capable UAV after Karrar. IRGC General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' aviation wing, said the drone has a range of over 1,200 miles and can stay airborne for up to 24 hours. This range includes just about anywhere in the Middle East, as well as Israel. [37c]

Democratic People's Republic of Koreas Songun Chongch'i" Tehran has adopted North Koreas "Songun Chongch'i" or military-first Policy, emphasizes the people's military over all

other aspects of state and society.

Military-First Politics (Songun): Understanding Kim Jong-ils North Korea September 2007. Volume 2. No 7 by Han S. Park Songun prioritizes the Korean People's Army in the affairs of state and allocates national resources to the armed forces first. Military first as a principle guides political and economic life in North Korea, with military first politics dominates the political system, a line of military first economic construction acting as an economic system, and military first ideology serving as the guiding ideology.


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However, Iran has two foremost military armed forces, the Regular Military or Artesh, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Supreme Leader Khamenei administration of military first integrates the IRGC into the economic and political framework of Iran, not the Artesh. The military first policy applies to both Armed Forces equally in the area of combat readiness. The Artesh armed forces military first policy is parallel to the IRGC solely based on the ascendancy of combat force structure, modernization and military readiness. Songun elevates the Korean People's Army within Pyongyang as an organization and as a state function, granting it the primary position in the North Korean government and society. It guides domestic policy and international interactions. It is the framework for the government, designating the military as the supreme repository of power. The North Korean government grants the Korean People's Army the highest economic and resourceallocation priority, and positions it as the model for society to emulate.

Songun Chongch'i and Tehrans Economic Reform Program of Privatization

Through this touted economic reform program of privatization Khamenei has transferred control of Irans Commerce, Industry, Oil, Gas and Public Services Sectors to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. [38] In 2011 IRGC officer, Brig. Gen. Rostam Ghasemi became Iran's Minister of Petroleum. [39] Since 1989, IRGC has had a dominant position in the Iranian economy through lucrative energy, construction, and foreign trade government concessions, which has resulted in monopolizing significant sectors of the economy. Beginning around 2000, the IRGC's hand further extended into new and far more lucrative sectors of the economy. IRGC became measurably active in the Iranian stock market in 2005. Most significantly, noted in 20002007 IRGC was awarded billions of dollars in contracts in the oil, gas and petrochemical industries, as well as major infrastructure projects. The IRI (Islamic Republic of Iran) started awarding some of the no-bid contracts directly to the IRGC engineering arm, Khatam Al-Anbia. Other times, the link is more indirect.

Through privatization Khamenei has transferred control of Irans Commerce, Industry, Oil, Gas and Public Services Sectors to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard.

Militarization Rather than Privatization: the so-called privatization scheme that enables the IRI leadership to transfer ownership from relatively transparent parts of the public sector to parts of the public sector shielded from public scrutiny. Purchases of the IRGC and its subordinate volunteer militia, the Basij, are conducted by their credit and finance institutions, such as the IRGC and Basij Cooperative Foundation and their subsidiaries,
No. 3 June 2010 American Enterprise Institute The Revolutionary Guards Looting of Irans Economy By Ali Alfoneh pg.4


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Since 2009, analyses of Iran have stressed the centralizing takeover of the countrys economy by a single state institution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps . At the same

time, however, Irans factionalized political elite uniformly advocate for rapid privatization of state-owned enterprises. Underneath this puzzling contradiction is a complex shift of economic ownership away from the state toward a variety of parastatal organizations including banks, cooperatives, pension funds, foundations, and militarylinked contractors. The result is not a praetorian monolith but a subcontractor state. This article draws on interviews conducted in Iran during 2009 and 2010, primary data from parliamentary and governmental reports, and secondary sources to show how interrelate conflict and nonelite claims have structured the process of privatization. Framed comparatively with privatization outcomes in other middle-income countries, Irans subcontractor state can be seen as a consequence of the way in which politics and society shaped the form of capitalism that has taken root in the Islamic Republic.
The Rise of the Subcontractor State: Politics of Pseudo-Privatization In The Islamic Republic Of Iran Kevan Harris Int. J. Middle East Stud. 45 (2013), 4570 doi:10.1017/S0020743812001250


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The Beginnings of the Persian Nations Quest for Nuclear Weapons

The prevailing Iranian nuclear crisis did not have its genesis from the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nor did Washingtons initial concern with Tehrans quest for nuclear weapons begin with the Radical Islam of Ayatollah Khomeini. From recent Washington declassified records, it commenced with the Shah of Iran and his passion to fashion his nation into a nuclear superpower. Mohamed Reza Shah initiated Iran's nuclear program during the 1950s with assistance from the U.S. Atoms for Peace Program. He Established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974; the Shah had ambitious plans to construct 20 nuclear power reactors, a uranium enrichment facility, and a reprocessing plant for spent fuel.
The Shahs nuclear related statements raised questions about weaponization intentions. When asked whether Iran would pursue nuclear weapons during an interview with a French journalist, the Shah was quoted as saying, Certainly and sooner than one would think,.

Uranium enrichment capacity as now was the same major point of controversy between Tehran, Washington and the international community. However, during the 1970s, Washington's greatest concern was also that Iran sought a capability to create weapons grade plutonium. Highlighting this concern was Indias 1974 surprise atomic bomb detonation (India succeeded in another surprise test in 1998 too), declassified documents report the U.S. Intelligence Community failed to provide warning of the 1974 test. [40] Today as well as during the Shah era are the implications that a nuclear weapons production might not be far away. Recently declassified documents reveal striking details about the bitter U.S.-Iranian nuclear negotiations from 1974 to 1978. During the 1970s the Shah of Iran argued, like current Iranian leaders today, for a nuclear energy capability on the basis of national rights .The same issues that have caused the current nuclear showdown between the Islamic Republic and the West access to sensitive technology, fuel stockpiles, and additional safeguards were in contention then as today. When no accommodation could be attained, the U.S. government banned American companies from marketing nuclear technology to Shahs Iran. [41]


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Irans Atomic Energy Organization agencys expenditures and the annual budget skyrocketed from $30.8 million in 1975 to $1.3 billion in 1976 and over $3 billion (corresponding to more than $11 billion in 2012 dollars) in 1977. A huge sum of fiscal spending the organization had the second-highest budget in the country following the National Iranian Oil Company. Its employees were among the highest paid in Iran. The 1970s nuclear negotiations have other parallels with the current situation. When officials from Oak Ridge National Laboratory received briefings on the planned Esfehan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTEC), they concluded that the "bears watching" because "unusually large" size of the facility "makes it theoretically possible to produce weapons-grade material (plutonium)" and the ENTEC plans include a "large hot lab," the first step toward reprocessing. Questioning U.S. efforts to restrict Tehran's freedom of action, the Shahs Iranian officials argued that "Iran should have full right to decide whether to reprocess" and the "right to effective control of the management and operation of nuclear reprocessing facilities."

Tehran Research Reactor: Initially, the TRR was a five-megawatt thermal-pool-type light-

water research reactor that ran on 93 percent high-enriched uranium. Washington supplied the reactor to Tehran in 1967, together with hot cells for the production of medical isotopes and 5.58kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. In 1988, with IAEA assistance, the Islamic Republic paid Argentinas Applied Research Institute to convert the reactor to run on 19.75 percent enriched fuel. The reactor is located at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center in the north of the city. It is still important hub for Tehrans nuclear activities.

The Core of the Islamic Republics nuclear scientists was created during the Mohamed Reza Shah Era.

During the Shah era an elite Iranian nuclear science cadre was trained, of which much remains to this day. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran signed special contracts with prestigious universities and technical centers throughout the international communitys leading institutions of education. The shahs insistence on mastering the complete nuclear fuel cycle and on possessing plutonium reprocessing capabilities at the time an easier way to fuel a nuclear weapon than enriched uranium intensified U.S. concerns about Irans proliferation intentions. Among these prestigious institutions was the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which received a $20 million endowment from the Shah in return. Many of the future decision makers in the Islamic regimes nuclear program, including Ali Akbar Salehi, the current foreign minister and former head of Irans Atomic Energy Organization, were among the trainees of this program. By 1977, with exceptional royal support, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran had undergone a stunning expansion and employed more than 3,800 experts, engineers, technicians, and interns. Students sent abroad for training returned home as nuclear experts. The organization witnessed a twelvefold increase in the number of its nuclear scientists, from 67 in 1974 to 862 in 1977. In the last years of the Pahlavi monarchy, the organization had the second-highest budget in the country following the National Iranian Oil Company. Its employees were among the highest paid in Iran. For the Shah of Iran it was clear that Iran Washington was treating his country as a second-class country, he decided to engage alternative nuclear vendors. France and West Germany filled the gap. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran commissioned the German firm Kraftwerk Union (a joint venture of Siemens AG and AEGTelefunken) to build two 1,196 MWe pressurized water reactors.


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The turnkey contract, which would deliver the power plate in a completed state, was worth $4.3 billion (nearly $21 billion in 2012 dollars). Construction began in August 1975, with a planned completion date of 1981. However, after the 1979 Iranian Revolution deposed the Shah, Ayatollah Khomeini deemed the nuclear program "un-Islamic" and ordered it terminated. In 1984, during the height of the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran suffering tens of thousands of casualties from Saddams chemical warfare Khomeini reversed course on the issue of nuclear power and sought international partners to [42] continue building the Bushehr reactors.
Evidence obtained by the IAEA indicates that the Islamic Republic made its first decision to research and develops nuclear weapons in the mid-to-late 1980s, and it ordered the development of a parallel military nuclear fuel cycle. According to information received by the IAEA and included in its November 2011 report, the Physics Research Center (PHRC) appears to have been created in 1989 as part of an effort to create an undeclared nuclear program, likely aimed at the development of a nuclear weapon. PHRC in turn may have evolved from a project at Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) in the late 1980s that may have sought to research a nuclear warhead for a ballistic missile. [43]

Post-Revolution Endeavors & Resumption of Nuclear Energy Program

Soon after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the development of the countrys nuclear energy program ground to a halt. Siemens/Kraftwerk Union stopped work in Bushehr under US pressure. One of the nascent reactors was 50 percent complete while the other was 85 percent complete. The foreign firms involved in the exploration of uranium deposits in Iran left as well. Out of 150 Iranian and foreign personnel involved in the project, only 16 remained. However, as the foreign contractors had almost completed their work, they eventually handed over their data to the AEOI.

Resumption of Nuclear Energy Program::: In 1981, a year after the

beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran decided to resume its efforts to develop nuclear energy. It sought to benefit from local expertise and manpower to build nuclear reactors and develop the technology required to master the full nuclear fuel cycle. The IAEA was informed about Irans intentions in 1983 and offered it assistance in chemical aspects of reactor fuel fabrication, chemical engineering and design aspects of pilot plants for uranium conversion, corrosion of nuclear materials, LWR fuel fabrication, and pilot plant development for production of nuclear grade uranium oxide (UO2). However, the US government intervened to stop the IAEAs assistance in Iranian production of UO2, in addition to UF6 the feedstock for gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Left without Western assistance, Iran turned to the Chinese. In 1984, Iran opened a nuclear research center in Esfahan with Chinas assistance. The two countries further signed a nuclear cooperation protocol in 1985. Meanwhile, the Iranian nuclear energy program came under physical attack. The first Iraqi strike on the unfinished Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant was carried out in March 1984. Iraq bombed the site again in February and March 1985. In 1986, Iraq attacked the plant for the fourth time. Moreover, in November 1987, the Bushehr complex was bombed for the fifth and sixth times. Iran notified the IAEA of the attacks, objecting to Iraqs use of French-made missiles and inaction by the international community. In 1988, the AEOI paid Argentinas Applied Research Institute (INVAP) $5.5 million to alter the Tehran Research Reactor so it could run on uranium enriched to slightly less than 20 percent U-235, just below the cutoff point for highly enriched uranium (HEU). The reactor had originally been designed to run on weapons-grade uranium, which was provided by the United States prior to the Islamic Revolution in Iran. After the end of its eight-year war with Iraq, Iran also intensified its cooperation with China and reached out to Russia for cooperation in the nuclear field.

Salehi has academic and administrative pedigrees in Iran as well as extensive experience with the outside world. Born in Karbala, Iraq in 1949, he earned an undergraduate degree in physics from the American University of Beirut in 1971. He then spent five years at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology working on a doctorate in nuclear engineering. In Tehran, Salehi climbed the academic ladder quickly. He worked at Isfahan University then moved to Tehrans Sharif University of Technology, which is widely considered Irans MIT. He served for seven years as chancellor in the 1980s and early 1990s. "Salehi knew about or was involved in efforts to create a parallel military nuclear program that is of great interest to the IAEA now. [44] This parallel military nuclear program has its roots going back to Mohamed Reza Shah nuclear endeavors. . He served as head of AEOI from 2009 to 2010 and was appointed to the post for a second time on 16 August 2013. Before his appointment of his current position, he was foreign affairs minister from 2010 to 2013. He was also the Iranian representative in the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1997 to 2005.



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On February 23, 2012, Nuclear Iran is a project of the Institute for Science and International Security The Washington DC (ISIS) that seeks to make available in a single location a broad array of based Institute for information about Iran's nuclear program. ISIS was founded in 1993 on a belief that scientists have an obligation to play an active role in finding Science and solutions to important national and international security problems. Since its International Security inception, ISIS has produced internationally recognized technical assessments of proliferant-state efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition to (ISIS) released the Congressional reports and testimonies, ISIS has an established record of report, The Physics distributing its findings and analysis widely among government officials, scientists, experts, the media, and the general public. In two decades of Research Center and experience, ISIS has demonstrated its ability to employ science in the pursuit Irans Parallel Military of international peace. ISISs effectiveness as a non-governmental Nuclear Program, based organization was recognized in the 2011 and 2012 Global Go -To Think Tanks rankings, which placed ISIS in the top 25 Science and Technology Think Tanks on a set of about 1,600 in the world. telexes which contained a set of procurement data about Irans Physics Research Center (PHRC) and its head Sayyed Abbas Shahmoradi-Zavareh. These telexes support that the PHRC was part of a chain of secret organizations, the long-term aim of which was to lay the basis for nuclear weapons development. (

ISIS NuclearIran Project, The Telexes, Purchasing & Procurement Documents:

A treasure trove of 1,600 formerly secret telexes was obtained by nuclear researchers seeking to unearth the early history of Irans clandestine pursuit of nuclear technology. The telexes, which cover a period from the late 1980s through the early 1990s, come from a time when Tehran was first beginning in earnest to assemble and test components for a uranium enrichment plant.
Many of the telexes were ostensibly orders from Sharif University of Technology, a prestigious school in the Iranian capital. Yet, the fax number and post office box on the return address belonged to the PHRC.

The telexes confirm what IAEA officials believe was a lavish, global shopping spree that continued throughout the 1990s and beyond. Besides the fluorine gas, Iranian officials ordered mass spectrometers, crucial for analyzing the enrichment level of uranium hexafluoride gas, as well as highly specialized types of motors, pumps, valves and transducers used in manufacturing gas centrifuges.The fact that so many items are of the type used in centrifuges, and organized under one specific heading, stands out in the data. Iranian officials obtained blueprints for gas centrifuges the machines used to make enriched uranium from Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan and then set about secretly acquiring the equipment they needed from Western companies. Intelligence agencies routinely intercepted the orders and analyzed them for clues to Irans true intentions. [45]


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Physics Research Center (PHRC) in the public debate over Irans military nuclear programs, the Physics Research Center (PHRC) is a critical case. PHRC is the Islamic Republics most important and least understood military nuclear organizations, the Physics Research Center, which operated in the 1990s and was consolidated into successive military nuclear organizations Lavisan-Shian, located in north Tehran, housed the Physics Research Center from the late 1980s to at least 1998. In addition, the site housed other institutions alleged to have b een involved in Irans parallel military nuclear program. In 2002 the Applied Physics Institute (IAP) was located at the site. Controlled by the Ministry of Defense, it was housed at an industrial compound in the Lavisan Shian neighborhood of north Tehran from 1989 until at least 1998. PHRC is the Islamic Republics most important and least understood military nuclear organizations, the Physics Research Center, which operated in the 1990s and was consolidated into successive military nuclear organizations. PHRC had departments focused on a wide range of nuclear technology, including gas centrifuges and laser enrichment, radiation protection, uranium conversion, uranium exploration and possibly mining, and heavy water production. The PHRC first emerged publicly as nuclear related in early 2004, at a time when Iran had said it had already come clean about its secret nuclear activities. Commercial satellite imagery showed the razing of this industrial site. The destruction of the Lavizan site before IAEA inspectors was part of an Iranian cover-up to hide its weaponization efforts. IAEA environmental samples taken at Lavisan showed no evidence of nuclear material, although the IAEA pointed out in the November 2004 safeguards report that the detection of nucle ar material in soil samples would be very difficult in light of the razing of the site. This hidden nuclear program was under the oversight of supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, handpicked by Ayatollah Khomeini as his successor. (Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who came to power in 1989) The telexes and other records show Iranians using subterfuge and deception to obtain the parts they needed, and afterward issuing vigorous denials to U.N. nuclear officials, even when confronted with evidence. [45a] These indisputable Iranian historical clandestine nuclear weapons programs beginning with Mohamed Reza Shah, to Ayatollah Khomeini and continuing with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet the Islamic Republic protests its hidden nuclear faculties and programs are for peaceful nuclear endeavors!? The overt razing and sanitizing of the Lavizan military site, again repeated with the Parchin military site could have been for one reason only, to obscure evidence of nuclear weapons research and development. At one, point does Tehrans activity, economic expenditures not point to an evolutionary and comprehensive clandestine nuclear weapons enterprise. With such overwhelmingly evidence, believing anything else is senseless. Irans nuclear plants do not make fiscal sense . It estimated Bushehr's

price tag over four decades at $11 billion, making it one of the world's most expensive nuclear plants. [46] Tehran is planning four to five nuclear reactors; it just signed a new contract with Russia. [46a] October 25, 2013 Tehran announced plans Iran plans to build as many as 34 nuclear plants with atomic reactors along its coastlines with the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea. [46b] The Islamic Republic holds the worlds fourth-largest proven oil reserves and the worlds second -largest natural gas reserves. Currently the Tehran has the second largest untapped oil and natural reserves in the world. Its highest oil output production was in 1979. Tehran has neglected its petroleum infrastructure, it has become antiquated, requires almost 2 billion dollars for renovation. Tehrans claims for nuclear technology are not credible. The burdens of nuclear infrastructure expenditures are void of any reasonable principles of sound economics. [47]


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The country of Iran rests on some of the most active earthquake fault zones in the entire world. Sitting on multiple fault lines, the Islamic Republics seismic map looks like a spiders

web of crisscrossing and intersecting fault lines. Tehran is prone to severe and deadly earthquakes, some of which occur on a daily basis. Let alone any competent long term storage faculties for nuclear waste. A report published in 2013 by U.S. think-tanks the Carnegie Endowment and the Federation of American Scientists said that, "ominously", the Bushehr reactor sits at the intersection of three tectonic plates, and that warnings about the threat of earthquakes had "fallen on deaf ears". [48]
Tehran does not even have the infrastructure or the water resources to contain and resolve

Nuclear power stations require vast amounts of water for operation and are therefore, usually located near immediate abundant water sources. The vast amounts of water are for cooling purposes typically through the use of a direct cooling or closed cycle cooling system. Nuclear plants demand 40% of freshwater usage in America. The common ocean side nuclear reactor needs 59 billion gallons of seawater and 136 billion gallons of freshwater per day for operations. [49]
a nuclear plant catastrophe.


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The water shortage in Iran is a reaching a crisis point, reported by member of Iran's Chamber of Commerce, Mohammad Hossein Shariatmadari reported in 2013. Data collected between 2003 and 2010 from NASA reinforce what is already known Iran has and is suffering from several decades of serious drought, depleted underground & fresh water resources. Global scarcity of vital water resources and the onset of extreme punishing climate change are already beginning to converge. Tehran like many of the countries in the region is failing to meet the demand for water for its 74 million people. In a 2013 report released during the UN climate talks in Qatar, the World Bank has also concluded among the most critical problems in the Middle East and North Africa will be worsening water shortages. The region already has the lowest amount of freshwater in the world. [50]
Nuclear Waste, Iran does not have the infrastructure for safe transportation and storage of nuclear waste. : Not only does this add to overall economic burden of nuclear power plants,

but also additional expenditure for construction nuclear waste storage. This cost further escalates in building volatile earthquake zones. This can easily escalate into billions of dollars. At fraction of these nuclear costs, Iran could simply and safely tap into its vast untapped oil and gas reserves. [51]
Irans deadly transportation Highways, unsafe for nuclear waste transport

In the past, UN agencies, the World Bank and Iranian experts issued reports stating that accident rates and consequent deaths constituted a socioeconomic crisis in Iran. In 2012, the World Health Organization (WHO) stated in a report that Iran had the highest number of deaths caused by road accidents in the world. Globally, road traffic accidents kill 1.2 million people, and the fact that Iran has 1% of the world population; the rate of traffic fatalities is disproportionately high in Iran. From an economic point of view, according to the MRC report, road accidents and consequent fatalities lead to damages equaling 8% of the Iranian gross domestic product (GDP). UN reports put the figure at about 6% of the countrys GDP. In other words, damages resulting from traffic accidents amounted to a minimum of $20 billion in the Iranian year. [52]
Several Billions of Dollars More in Costs, Uranium Mines, its deadly waste and tons of water requirements :Since 1988, Iran reportedly opened as many as 10 uranium mines,

including the Saghand uranium mine in Yazd province, as well otherwise unspecified locations in Khorasan, Sistan va Baluchistan, and Hormozgan Provinces, and in Bandar-eAbbas and Badar-e-Lengeh Provinces along the Gulf. In 2013 Tehran announced the opening of two additional uranium mines, the Saghand 1 and 2 uranium mines in the central city of Yazd and the Shahid Rezaeinejad yellow cake factory, capable of producing 60 tons of yellow cake annually.[53] Uranium mining ore is crushed and made into a fine powder and then chemically leached to remove other elements to make yellow cake. Yellow cake consists of 80 percent uranium oxide which can be used in nuclear power plants or nuclear weapons.
Poisonous and radioactive tailings are left behind from uranium milling. Uranium mining is very ecologically damaging, for every ton of uranium oxide produced hundreds of thousands of tons of waste created know as tailings. Past events as proven inevitably the tailings are mismanaged and are dumped on the land near the mine.


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Here, these tailings are exposed to weather, rain waste spills and erosion. These uranium mine wastes still contain about 80 percent of the radioactivity of the original ore. Uranium 238 the most prevalent isotope in the ore has a half-life of about 4.5 billion years, only half the atoms will decay in that amount of time. Radioactive dust as well as radon gas found in the tailings and carried great distances by the wind. Mines and people subjected to these conditions suffer from increased rates of lung cancer.
Uranium mining and milling require a great deal of water. BHP Billiton's Olympic Dam mine

in South Australia, the driest state in the worlds driest continent, uses 33 million liters of water per day. A proposed expansion of the mine would increase this to up to 162 million liters per day. This water becomes radioactive waste, which is placed into evaporation ponds that are not always adequately secured from leaking and flooding. Contaminated rainwater can and does enter the soil and, eventually, the food chain, endangering health. Uranium mill tailings are normally dumped as a sludge in special ponds or piles, where they are abandoned.. Seepage from tailings piles is another significant hazard. Seepage poses a risk of contamination to the ground and surface water. Residents are also threatened by radium226 and other hazardous substances like arsenic in their drinking water supplies and fish from the area. The seepage problem is very important with acidic tailings as the radionuclides involved are more mobile under acidic conditions. In tailings containing pyrite, acidic conditions automatically develop due to the inherent production of sulfuric acid, which increases migration of contaminants to the environment. When radium undergoes natural radioactive decay one of the products is radon gas. Because radon and its decay products are radioactive and because the tailings are now on the surface, measures are taken to minimize the emission of radon gas. During the operational life of a mine, the material in the tailings dam is often kept covered by water to reduce surface radioactivity and radon emission (though with lower-grade ores neither pose a hazard at these levels). [54]
In November 2013 it was Reported that of 77 some dams in Iran, water dropped by 70 percent [55]

The Islamic Republic now ranks 114 of 132 countries evaluated on 22 environmental indicators, including water resources, air pollution, biodiversity and climate change, according to the 2012 Environmental Performance Index compiled by Yale and Columbia Universities. More than two-thirds of the countrys landup to 118 million hectaresis rapidly turning into desert, Irans F oreign Range and Watershed Management Organization reported in mid-2013. Irans fresh water supplies are now under unsustainable strains . Ninety percent of the country which is slightly smaller than Alaska is arid or semi-arid and an estimated two-thirds of its rainfall evaporates before it can replenish rivers. As a result, Iran provides more than half of its water needs by drawing from underground aquifers, but public usage is rapidly draining the subterranean reservoirs.
At current rates of overuse, twelve of Irans thirty-one provinces will exhaust their groundwater reserves within the next 50 years. Irans water problems now risk undermining the national economy.


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The agricultural sector produces 10 percent of Irans GDP and employs a quarter of the labor force. Yet Irans food security is now imperiled because agriculture accounts for more than 92 percent of the countrys water use but only produces about 66 percent of the food supplies for 79 million people. Tehran has to import some 40 percent of agricultural products.. Mismanagement has contributed to Irans environmental problems. Its cities lose one-third of their water supplies in leaky pipes. Irrigation is also highly inefficient; more than half of Irans renewable water used in agriculture is lost. [56]
Iranian agriculture has suffered from a low level of investment as well as confusing government policies. In fact, alarming data points toward mismanagement: 30% of the countrys agricultural production goes to waste due to inappropriate production, storage and distribution technologies. Another worrying fact is the low rate of water-use efficiency which, according to experts, is 40%; this can be increased through new know-how and equipment. Furthermore, Iran is a major importer of wheat, meat, rice and other basic food products. Though the country is also exporting foodstuffs in other categories, the overall situation can be described as undesirable, particularly considering the regimes objectives. Iran has to import 7.5 million tons of wheat this year, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said in September, in what international traders had said was a surprisingly large upward revision of initial market projections. [56a] Iran has imported some $12 billion worth of staple food in the past 18 months, head of the Imports Commission of the Iran Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Majid Reza Hariri said, the IRNA News Agency reported on December 28, 2013

Irans Lake Uromiyeh, the largest in the mid-east, the third largest salt water lake in the world.. is drying up. The slow death of Lake Uromiyeh signals a warning for the future. Lake Uromiyeh is between the Iranian provinces of East Azerbaijan and West Azerbaijan, west of the southern portion of the similarly shaped Caspian Sea. It is the largest lake in the Middle East, and the third largest saltwater lake on earth, with a surface area of approximately 5,200 km (2,000 mile), 140 km (87 mi) length, 55 km (34 mi) width, and 16 m (52 ft) depth. Recently, at a meeting in New York, President Hassan Rouhani acknowledged the Islamic Republic water crisis by specifically mentioning this lake in northwestern Iran which was once also the worlds largest saltwater lake. The lake is drying up at an alarming rate. It is possible that what is happening to Lake Uromiyeh it is following the destruction of the Aral Sea. Once (in 1960) the worlds fourth largest inland water body the Aral Sea lost 92% of water volume by 2011. During the past two decades the surface area of the lake has shrunk from 5,000 square kilometers to 2,000 square kilometers. But this seeming shrinkage to 40 per cent of the original size still masks a greater loss in water volume because the average depth of water when the lake was 5,000 square km was 6 metres.

The Deadly Earth Quake Zone a Closer Look :Iran is one of the most seismically active countries in the world, being crossed by several major fault lines that cover at least 90% of the country In August 2012, two quakes struck northern Iran killing upwards of 250 people. Scientists have cautioned about the vulnerability of the Middle East region in terms of earthquake activity. In a 2007 study, scientists discovered a prominent fault line bordering the Mediterranean coast. Over 62, miles in length, the scientists ascertained that the fault may be the cause of past quakes as well as future ones, including Irans most recent one. On April 10 a 6.3 earthquake struck about 100 miles south of the Bushehr nuclear reactor. An international red alert sounded, fearing the worst Te hrans Bushehr nuclear reactor. The Persian Gulf States was able to breathe a collective sigh of relief after it became apparent that the quake would not cause a Fukushima-replay in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Six days later on April 16, an even more powerful 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck near the Iran-Pakistan border.


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The following is a chronology of major earthquakes in the past: April 16, 2013 - A powerful quake, measuring 7.8 magnitude, on the Iran-Pakistan border has killed at least 34 people in Pakistan. The quake was felt in India, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. April 9, 2013 - A powerful 6.3-magnitude earthquake struck close to Iran's only nuclear power station, killing 37 people and injuring 850 as it destroyed homes and devastated two small villages. August 11, 2012 - Two strong quakes, measuring 6.4 magnitude and 6.3 respectively, killed at least 250 people and injured 2,000 near the city of Tabriz, East Azerbaijan province, a mountainous region that neighbors Azerbaijan and Armenia. February 22, 2005 - A strong earthquake of magnitude 6.4 in south-east Iran killed 612 people and injured more than 1,000 in and around the town of Zarand in Kerman province, about 700km southeast of Tehran. December 26, 2003 - An earthquake measuring 6.6 magnitude devastated the city of Bam, 1,000 km (600 miles) southeast of Tehran, killing about 31,000 people. June 22, 2002 - An earthquake measuring 6.5 magnitude razed dozens of villages in north Iran's Qazvin province, killing 261. May 10, 1997 - A quake measuring 7.3 magnitude killed 1,567 people in rural areas of eastern Iran near the Afghan border. June 21, 1990 - 50,000 died and 100,000 were injured in the worst recorded disaster in Iran. The quake, magnitude 7.4, devastated the Caspian regions of Gilan and Zanjan. About 500,000 were made homeless. June 11, 1981 - A quake measuring 6.9 magnitude destroyed the town of Golbaf, 800km southeast of Tehran, killing about 3,000 people and injuring more than 800. September 16, 1978 - 15,000 people were killed by an earthquake measuring 7.8 magnitude, which leveled the eastern desert town of Tabas and many nearby villages. April 10, 1972 - An earthquake measuring 7.1 magnitude struck southern Iran around Ghir Karzin, killing 5,074 people.

Since Ayatollah Khomeini took power in 1979, more than 78,000 Iranians have died in hundreds of powerful earthquakes. The vast majority of those killed were crushed by their own poorly constructed homes, with earthquakes flattening entire villages in Tehrans neglected and impoverished rural areas in several instances.[58] Irans path of nuclear power plants alone does not constitute any form of coherent economical or ecological governmental policy. In fact, there is no evidence of a rational or reasonable national policy; clearly nuclear power for Iran is a road of self destruction. There is only one premise that we can conclude it is a drive for a nuclear weapons arsenal there is no other possible explanation.


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Pakistan, for example, developed a nuclear warhead for its Ghauri medium-range missile in just one year, after its first nuclear test in 1998.

We must hold the Islamic Republic to prior agreements instead of these insufferable numerous political concoctions. It is time to stop going in circles and have Tehran adhere to and ratify past agreements. Iran, whose uranium enrichment program is at the heart of International trepidation, now has more than 10,000 centrifuges churning out enriched uranium, which can be used either to power reactors or as the fissile core of a nuclear weapon(s).. Continually the Islamic Republic portrays outrage, claims it is unfairly singled out, unfairly and unjustly persecuted, for no valid reasons As negotiators try to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear impasse, the Beirut Lebanon bombings serve as a timely reminder that tensions with Iran go beyond the nuclear issue. Thirty years ago, on Oct. 23, 1983, a delivery van filled with 18,000 pounds of explosives slammed into the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. Seconds later, another car bomb hit a French military building four miles away. A total of 241 American and 58 French soldiers lost their lives, all members of the Multi-National Forces in Lebanon. The attacks, perpetrated by the Iranian controlled Hezbollah under orders from Tehran. The attack on the Marine barracks was not only the singlelargest nonnuclear explosion since World War II, it was also the deadliest terrorist attack against Americans up to that time. Today, Hezbollah targets Israeli tourists around the world -- in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Thailand, Nigeria -- not out of any Lebanese interest but at Iran's command.

The U.S. State Department concluded in its annual Country Reports on terrorism that 2012 represented "a marked resurgence of Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism" in which "Iran and Hezbollah's terrorist activity has reached a tempo unseen since the 1990s."

For the past 30 years, this has proven to be a mutually beneficial relationship. From Iran, Hezbollah gets tens of thousands of rockets, hundreds of millions of dollars a year, training and operational logistical support from Iran.
30 Years of Terror Sponsored by Iran Matthew Levitt Matthew Levitt directs The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and is author of Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God.


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Tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) and Iran, the weapon no one seems to talk about. The Distinction between Strategic and Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are designed to have a long-range rather than immediate effect on the enemy and its military forces. In contrast with the longer-range strategic nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in Cold War policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft. Using the Hiroshima bomb yield (15 kilotons) as a yardstick, TNW yields range from small (0.1 kiloton) to huge (1 megaton = 1,000 kilotons). TNWs are generally not the subject of arms control treaties and are not physically controlled by the sophisticated mechanisms employed for strategic weapons. As such they may represent an increasing danger of proliferation and of acquisition by terrorists. Most international nuclear and military experts argue even if the Islamic Republic possessed a strategic nuclear weapon, it would never use it. However few address the issue of Tehran using a non-strategic nuclear weapon these are termed, Tactical nuclear weapon. These can fit inside a 155mm artillery shell, various rocket artillery, a submarine torpedo and more. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed thousands of nonstrategic nuclear weapons intended to be used in support of troops in the field during a conflict. Tactical nuclear weapons are ideal for both surprise attack and preemptive strike.


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In June 2002, when concern about Iran's nuclear weapons program was just beginning in the West, Russian General Yuri Baluyevsky, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, declared: "Iran does have nuclear weapons, these are non-strategic weapons (TNW). How did General Baluyevsky know so much about Iran's nuclear weapons program, and why was he so complacent about Iran already having tactical nuclear weapons? After the fall of the USSR, in 1995 a military think tank called INOBIS, that serves the Russian General Staff, wrote a paper recommending that Russia deliberately proliferate missile and nuclear weapon technology to nations hostile to the United States.

Tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) :In the early years of the Cold War, when the USSRs overwhelming conventional superiority in Europe posed a threat, US President Harry Truman told his clo se advisers: nuclear weapons were all that we had. The 1950s: Eisenhowers New Look The militarys ambivalence about nuclear weapons changed abruptly in October 1953 with the promulgation of NSC 162/2, the Basic National Security Policy (popularly known as the New Look): Within two years, the study of how to employ nuclear weapons in land combat became the principal focus of the U.S. Army. By 1955, nearly 50 percent of the instruction and training at Fort Leavenworth was devoted to tactical nuclear battlefield situations.[61] US Army FM-100-30 Nuclear Operations 1996 Maneuver and firepower are inseparable and complementary elements. While one might be more important in one phase of an operation, both are characteristic of all operations. The commander combines them to maximize relative combat power. Nuclear weapons greatly enhance the flexibility of maneuver. They also have the potential to be the principal means of destroying a threats will to fight. When a commander nominates nuclear weapons, maneuver exploits their effects.

Under Maxwell Taylor, who became chief of staff in 1955, they added an argument about deterrence: the Soviet nuclear arsenals growth undermined the credibility of massive retaliation. Threats leading to a nuclear holocaust against the mammoth Soviet Cold War machine would not be credible enough to deter attacks, especially conventional probes against allies. More limited responses to aggression were needed. Those responses could include tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons, which the Army widely deployed in this period, and, initially, Jupiter missiles, which the Army sought to make accurate enough to discriminately strike tactical targets. To the Army, flexible response most of all meant more U.S. conventional forces in Europe and a larger Army.
The End of Over Kill, Reassessing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy Benjamin Friedman, Christopher Preble, and Matt Fay 2013 by the Cato Institute. nd_of_overkill_wp_web.pdf

At the strategic level of war, the perspectives are worldwide and long-range. At the operational level of war, military forces attain theater strategic objectives through designing, organizing, and conducting campaigns and major operations. The concern at the tactical level of war is the execution of battles and engagements. The tenents of Army operations, combined with the activities in the area of operations, express where nuclear support applies to combat operations in both the offense and the defense. The nomination of nuclear weapons enhances the characteristics of offensive weapons. Weapons effects influence the various characteristics of the offense. In the forms of tactical offense, the probability of the nomination of nuclear weapons ranges from very low to high. The discussion also includes nuclear-weapons effects on forms of maneuver. Such effects range from fixing the defender during an envelopment to having little to no applicability during infiltration At the strategic level of war, the perspectives are worldwide and long-range. At the operational level of war, military forces attain theater strategic objectives through designing, organizing, and conducting campaigns and major operations. The concern at the tactical level of war is the execution of battles and engagements. Battlefield nuclear operations support the operational- level commanders concept and intent. FM-10030 Nuclear Operations 1996 .


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Less well-known is that Pakistan has one of the fastest growing battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons program in the world today. The Pentagon developed the capacity to put miniaturized nuclear bombs on short-range rockets, artillery and tank shells in the 1950s. The economically challenged country Pakistan is apparently doing now and very successfully. The most significant development in recent years has been Pakistans militarys creation of a battlefield nuclear force in being that provides Pakistan the option of batt lefield use of nuclear weapons, even if Pakistani decision-makers have not fully incorporated such thinking into their doctrine. The net result of this and other developments has been more weapons at heightened levels of readiness, posing a greater nuclear threat in peacetime, crisis, and war. Indias massive military modernization program has eroded the conventional military balance that Pakistan has traditionally relied on to deter war. Pakistan countered built a credible deterrence capability at the nuclear operational and tactical levels, which could possibly be described as a Strategy of Assured Deterrence. This deterrence primarily consists of short - and intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Pakistans nuclear program began for purely peaceful purposes. Pakistan produced two power reactors to generate electricity. In the eyes of most Pakistanis, Khan was the father of the countrys nuclear bomb. The Europeaneducated metallurgist was considered his nations greatest scientistthe hero who had rescued Pakistan from the domination of nuclear-armed India, Islamabads archenemy. A. Q. Khan has stated that Pakistan began enriching uranium in 1978 and produced HEU in 1983.China has been the most important state contributor to the Pakistani nuclear program,(as Iran) though the extent of its assistance is difficult to assess. Nuclear cooperation with China is one of the most closely held state secrets in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic. In May 1998, Pakistani officials announced that they had tested six nuclear devices, completing a round of reciprocal nuclear tests that had begun two weeks earlier when Indian representatives announced five nuclear tests. After having bombs in the basement for so long, the period of overt weaponization in South Asia began. Before the eventful month of May 1998, both states had unproven designs; Pakistan had conducted no overt nuclear tests, and Indias 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion device was viewed as unreliable and as massive as to be undeliverable. Both states had uneven delivery dyads in 1998, relying primarily on manned aircraft and secondarily on ballistic missiles. These missiles were mostly in development and had undergone only a handful of flight tests. Both India and Pakistan likely had very small arsenals at the time of the tests, with warheads perhaps numbering in the single digits. [61] The Future of Pakistans Nuclear Weapons Program Christopher Clary second Nuclear Age Oct 2013 Pakistan developed a variety of cruise and short range missiles capabilities for delivering low-yield, very small tactical nuclear warheads. Retired Pakistani officers and nongovernmental Pakistani analysts participating in Track 1.5 and Track 2 forums now regularly discuss developing nuclear artillery to further diversify the delivery means available to it in battlefield missions. Tactical nuclear weapons are cost efficient as compared with building a huge conventional military force to confront India. Pakistans blending of conventional military forces with tactical nuclear weapons; their strategists have created a nuclear exchange dilemma Indias leadership. This has become a template for Irans Mosaic Military Doctrine, however largely unrecognized by military analysts.


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Indias use of any kind force or military confrontation with Pakistan could lead to a nuclear war. The Islamic Republic of Iran is traveling the route with its diverse arsenal of cruise missiles, rocket artillery and long range ballistic missiles. Tehran already has the delivery means; its missile and rocket artillery arsenals only require the tactical nuclear warheads. Both Tehran and Pakistan developed both solid- and liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, based extensively on foreign systems, including those from China and North Korea. Pakistan motivated by ongoing hostilities with India embarked upon an intense ballistic missile development program in the early 1980's. In 2011, Pakistan tested its Nasr (Hatf-IX) short-range tactical nuclear ballistic missile, Nasr, with a range of 60 km, (37 mi) carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes. The 2011 test demonstrated that Pakistan has succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear weapon designs to the extent that these can be launched by tactical and cruise missiles. By 2013, the Pakistani Military claimed Hatf-IX specially designed to defeat all known anti-tactical missile defense systems inflight maneuver capability. It has a quick response system, which can fire a four missile salvo TNW to ensure deterrence against threats in view of evolving scenarios. Hatf-IX deployed with a mobile multi-barrel launch system that has shoot and scoot attributes, or the ability to fire at a target and immediately relocates to another position to avoid enemy counter-fire. Pakistan has graduated from the less sophisticated uranium-based weapons design to more miniaturized and lethal plutonium-based warheads. Pakistan has also reportedly mastered the art of fission-boosted fusion devices while it may have supplied the device design for a recent nuclear test conducted by North Korea. If that is the case, a Pakistani thermonuclear capability may not be far behind. [62] Mobile missiles, especially noted in the 1991 Gulf war with Saddam Husseins mobile SCUD missile launchers, are a bigger counterforce Challenge U.S. forces still struggle to track and destroy such targets. Russia is reportedly developing a new mobile ICBM, augmenting the 36 it now supposedly deploys. China has also been increasing its mobile ICBM capability and now has estimated 10-20 mobile DF-31A missiles. Mobile missiles are by nature soft targets. When their location is not precisely known, to locate and destroy them requires painstaking time and commitment of large amounts of military assets. It is important to note the bulk of Tehrans missile forces are mobile. [63] Naval Variants for Tactical Nuclear Weapons Delivery: The final area of major development in the Pakistani arsenal involves submarine- or ship-launched nuclear-capable cruise missiles. Feroz Khan reports that Pakistans Maritime Technology Organization is nearing completion of a naval variant. He further states that such a project, upon completion, would fall under the Naval Strategic Forces Command and complete the third leg of the triad complementing the existing aircraft and ground-based missile delivery options. [64]


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In the five domains where our military forces operate - on land, in the air, on the sea, beneath the sea, and in space - undersea operations are the least visible. For this reason, they offer the ultimate in stealth and surprise while influencing events in all five domains with minimal risk. Unfortunately, because submarine operations are virtually invisible and highly secretive, they are least understood and most frequently under-valued by the public at large
The Case for More Submarines by CDR Mark L. Gorenflo, USN, and CDR Michel T. Poirier, USN tml

Submarines remain one of the most unrecognized tools of warfare; it is an ultimate mobile stealth weapon. As a tactical nuclear weapons platform, it takes only one nuclear tipped torpedo or cruise missile to destroy an aircraft carrier. As limited as Irans submarines are, their small size and growing numbers make them a deadly asset, armed with tactical nuclear weapons and operating close to home, opens up an unprecedented nuclear strike capability. Irans 20-year outlook plan from the year 2005 seeks to make Iran a top regional power. Among other objectives, its current five-year plan seeks to expand bilateral, regional, and international relations, strengthen Irans ties with friendly states, and enhance its defense and deterrent capabilities. Commensurate with that plan, Iran is seeking to increase its stature by countering U.S. influence and expanding ties with regional actors while advocating Islamic solidarity. It also seeks to demonstrate to the world its resistance to the West. Iran is attempting to secure influence in Iraq and Afghanistan while undermining U.S. efforts by furnishing lethal aid to Iraqi Shia militants and Afghan insurgents.

Irans Military Power Statement before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate 14 April 2010 Lt. General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., United States Army Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Page 3

The Persian Gulf Ideal Place for Tehrans Submarine Forces: There are numerous places where a single submarine could hide. The Persian Gulf is 615 miles (990 km) long and between 40 and 210 miles (65338 km) wide, covering an area of approximately 92,600 square miles (240,000km2). Its average depth is 164 feet (50 m), with a maximum depth of 197328 feet (60100 m) at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. Numerous coves and inlets on the Gulfs shoreline serve as small boat harbors and anchorages, as do Irans seventeen islands. At the Gulfs northern end, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers join to create the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which is 2,950 feet (900 m) wide and up to 98 feet (30 m) deep as it enters the Gulf. Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf is one of the most important bodies of water on earth. It is approximately 120 miles (193 km) long, 60 miles (97 km) wide at its eastern end, 24 miles (38.4 km) wide at its western end, and has an average depth of 164 feet (50 m) It is near vital components of Irans mainland infrastructure, including the countrys largest seaport and naval base Bandar Abbas and a major spur of Irans national railway system. More than 40 percent of the worlds internationally traded oil, around 17 million barrels per day, passes through the strait. Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare Fariborz Haghshenass Policy Focus #87 | September 2008 Washington Institute for Near East Policy .

Why would a country with a peaceful nuclear program develop intercontinental

ballistic missiles, whose sole purpose is to deliver nuclear warheads? asked Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.


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Weapon of Mass Electrical Destruction & Disruption Studies related to the effects of electromagnetic weapons have been published infrequently, or remain classified.

Electromagnetic bombs are Weapons of Electrical Mass Destruction with applications across a broad spectrum of targets, spanning both the strategic and tactical. As such their use offers a very high payoff in attacking the fundamental information processing and communication facilities of a target system. The massed application of these weapons will produce substantial paralysis. In this context the ability of electromagnetic bombs to achieve kills against a wide range of target types allows their general application to the task of inflicting attrition upon an opponent's electronic assets, be they specialized air defense assets or more general Command-ControlCommunications (C3) and other military assets.
The Electromagnetic Bomb - a Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction by C Kopp

The Lethality of Electromagnetic Warheads: The issue of electromagnetic weapon lethality is complex. Unlike the technology base for weapon construction, which been widely published in the open literature, lethality related issues are published much less frequently. While the calculation of electromagnetic field strengths achievable at a given radius for a given device design is a straightforward task, determining a kill probability for a given class of target under such conditions is not. E-bombs can cause hard electrical kills over larger areas than conventional explosive weapons of similar mass they offer substantial economies in force size for a given level of inflicted damage and are thus a potent force multiplier for appropriate target sets. Electromagnetic Pulse Weapon or EMP device is a generic term applied to any device, nuclear or conventional, which is capable of generating a very intense but short electromagnetic field transient. (EMP) It is an immediate, intense energy field burst that can overload or disrupt at a distance numerous critical electrical systems. An EMP attack is lethal to electronic and electrical equipment and high technology microcircuits, which are especially sensitive to power surges. The non-lethal nature of electromagnetic weapons makes their use far less politically damaging than that of conventional munitions and broadens the range of military options available. A nuclear EMP burst would cover the wide geographic region within line of sight to the nuclear weapon. It has the capability (as do most EMP weapons) to produce significant damage to critical infrastructures and thus to the very fabric of a country society. [65]


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An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event caused by a highaltitude nuclear explosion, for instance, could flip the visual-a real black hole sucks matter inward toward a central "spacetime singularity," but a high-altitude nuclear explosion would emit a pulse of gamma rays 360 degrees (line of sight) from the blast toward the earth, forming an "ejected" event horizon determined largely by the altitude of the blast. Thus, a single nuclear detonation approximately 275-300 miles above Kansas City would form a land-based "black hole" (the area within which the electric grid and other infrastructure elements collapse, long-term) with an event horizon that could encompass the entire United States, the north of Mexico, and southern portions of Canada.
EMP Event Horizon: The Point of No Return? by Cynthia E Ayers May 23, 2012

Washington EMP Commission reports that, certain types of relatively low yield nuclear weapons can be employed to generate potentially catastrophic EMP effects over wide geographic areas, and designs for variants of such weapons may have been illicitly trafficked for a quarter century .49 I 49 Report of the Commission To Assess
the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, Volume 1: Executive Summary, op. cit., p. 2.

The non-lethal nature of electro-magnetic weapons makes their use far less politically damaging than that of conventional munitions, and therefore broadens the range of military options available. EMP weapons can be an affordable force multiplier for military forces. EMP munitions can be applied to UAVs, to cruise missile and aerial bombs.

About EMPACT America, Inc.

EMPACT America is a bipartisan, non-profit (with IRS 501(c)4 status) organization for citizens concerned about protecting the American people from a nuclear or natural electromagnetic pulse (EMP) catastrophe. 2013 Electromagnetic Pulse Weapon Iran It is why Iran wants the bomb. We know that from the EMP commission because, in their open source-military writings, they describe using a nuclear weapon to eliminate the United States as an actor from the world stage by means of an EMP attack, Dr. Peter Pry [66] Dr. Pry is President of EMPACT America, and has served: on the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States; as Director of the United States Nuclear Strategy Forum; on the EMP Commission; as Professional Staff on the House Armed Services Committee; as an Intelligence Officer with the CIA responsible for analyzing nuclear strategy; and as a Verification Analyst at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

27 Oct 2013 15 minute VIDEO EMP THREAT: Dr. Peter V. Pry ACD Published on Oct 27, 2013 Dr. Peter V. Pry, President of EMPACT America and former Director of U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, on Nuclear and WMD Proliferation


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Tehran has been conducting Cargo ship launched SCUD missiles into the Caspian Sea. A Cargo ship would be a deadly stealth weapon and impossible to detect.

The Islamic Republic has performed several flight-tests of their Shahab-3 medium-range missile, detonating it at apogee. This fusing model is consistent with developing capability and training for EMP attack. The sea/ ocean launch mode is so inaccurate as to be suitable only for EMP attack, or nuclear attack. Launching a missile from a Cargo ship is problematic, as to military experimentation indication and direction. Testing an EMP or chemical weapon offshore provides a considerable safety buffer zone for a deadly weapon of various sorts. This mode of testing also provides an important layer of espionage security. A ship-launched missile is required only if Tehran desires to make a per-emptied attack. This mode of sea born warfare could be conducted anywhere in the worlds coastlines and shipping lanes. A cargo ship attack would allow a nuclear strike without the secrecy issues, complexities and cost of an intercontinental ballistic missile. [67]
If Iran earmarks 3 times the U235 it would use in an implosion warhead to a single device, then a double-gun uranium warhead would easily fit the space and weight requirements of the smaller RV. [68]

In 2012 Dr. Peter Vincent Pry Iran openly talks about using an EMP to attack Israel or America, Dr Pry, who is currently executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, a privately funded US group that seeks to educate the public and government leaders about the EMP threat to the US. According to Pry, Iran is actively preparing for an EMP attack. Tehran has undertaken offshore exercises using Scud missiles fired and positioned in such a way that they exploded in the atmosphere exactly the method you would use for an EMP attack, he said. From Israel, Dr. Emily Landau, director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Program at Israels Institute for National Security Studies and a lecturer at Tel Aviv University. Landau, an expert on Irans nuclear program, believes that Iran could very well be planning an EMP attack on Israel, based on statements the Iranian regime has made, and actions it has taken. In 2012 she stated, Iran would be capable of delivering an EMP attack if it acquired a nuclear weapon. Iran has tested several of their Shahab-3 ballistic missiles, which exploded in mid-flight. While these explosions could have been the result of a missile self-destruct mechanism, Iran has officially described the test as fully successful. The Claremont Institute's Brian Kennedy reminds us, "Twice in the last eight years, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP." Iran has also tested high-altitude explosions of the Shahab-III, a test mode consistent with EMP attack, and described the tests as successful. Iranian military writings explicitly discuss a nuclear EMP attack that would gravely harm the United States. [69]


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High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)

A smaller-scale HPM weapon requires a relatively simple design, and can be built using electrical materials and chemical explosives that are easy to obtain. It is estimated that a limited-range suitcase-sized HPM weapon could be constructed for much less than $2,000, and is within the capability of almost any nation, and perhaps many terrorist organizations. A large scale EMP effect can be produced by a single nuclear explosion detonated high in the atmosphere. This method is referred to as High-Altitude EMP (HEMP). A similar, smallerscale EMP effect can be created using non-nuclear devices with powerful batteries or reactive chemicals. This method is called High Power Microwave (HPM). Microwaves are characterized by electromagnetic energy with wavelengths as small as centimeter or millimeters, and can be used at moderate power levels for communications or for radar. High Power Microwaves can be produced as a weapon when a powerful chemical detonation is transformed through a special coil device, called a flux compression generator, into a much stronger electromagnetic field
CRS Report for Congress High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) Devices: Threat Assessments Updated March 26, 2008 Clay Wilson Specialist in Technology and National Security Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Reza Kahlili, the only CIA operative to successfully penetrate the scientific wing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, reports that Iran acquired several tactical nuclear warheads from Russia including a neutron warhead. A neutron or Enhanced Radiation Warhead would be well suited for making an EMP attack. In June 2002, when concern about Iran's nuclear weapons program was just beginning in the West, Russian General Yuri Baluyevsky, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, declared: "Iran does have nuclear weapons. These are non-strategic weapons. [70]
Neutron or Enhanced Radiation Warhead? More than 6 million cargo shipping containers enter U.S. seaports annually. The U.S. maritime system consists of over 300 sea and river ports with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals. The United States and global economies depend on commercial shipping as the most reliable, cost efficient method of transporting goods, with U.S. ports handling approximately 20% of the maritime trade worldwide.

Tehran already has demonstrated the capability to launch a ballistic missile from a freighter at sea. An EMP attack launched from a ship is a worst case nightmare scenario according to the EMP Commission. It would leave no "fingerprints" and could be accomplished anonymously, with little or no fear of U.S. retaliation. The Islamic Republic, aided by North Korea, has also launched several satellites on polar orbits using its so-called Space Launch Vehicle, which is really a disguised ICBM, potentially to practice a surprise nuclear EMP attack. A nuclear warhead disguised as a satellite that approached the U.S. from the South, where the U.S. has no ballistic missile early warning radars or interceptors, would blind side us. For these reasons, the Congressional EMP Commission warned: "Therefore, terrorists or state actors that possess relatively unsophisticated missiles armed with nuclear warheads may well calculate that, instead of destroying a city or military base, they may obtain the greatest political-military utility from one or a few such weapons by using them or [71] threatening their use in an EMP attack."


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Miniaturizing a Nuclear Warhead for Missile Delivery We also know from our own experience, and from that of other nations such as India and Pakistan, that it does not take 20 years to miniaturize a nuclear warhead for missile delivery. The Tinner Files, Nuclear Black-market Designs for smaller, more sophisticated nuclear weapons : A simpler nuclear weapon design/blue prints was found in Libya after Colonel Qaddafi had renounced his nuclear weapons effort in late 2003 and allowed U.S., British, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigators into his country. These Libyan nuclear schematics were put under IAEA seal and moved to Washington for safekeeping. Qaddafi had bought a nearly complete set of blueprints and instruction manuals for a nuclear warhead for a ballistic missile from A.Q. Khan. This design was from a Chinese warhead tested in 1966 that Pakistan had acquired from the Chinese in the early 1980s for its own nuclear weapons program. This design, which had no obvious Pakistani fingerprint, was ideal for Khans smuggling ring to offer its customers as an incentive to buy the more expensive gas centrifuges able to make highly enriched uranium, a nuclear explosive material used in nuclear weapons. Khan sought to offer one stop shopping for a nuclear arsenal. In 2004, Swiss investigators seized computer files and documents from the Swiss nationals Friedrich, Marco, and Urs Tinner. The computer files, containing over 1,000 megabytes of information, were encrypted and difficult to decipher. Nonetheless, Swiss investigators found the designs of smaller, more sophisticated nuclear weapons than the design found in Libya. Why did these smugglers associated with the notorious Pakistani nuclear engineer Abdul Qadeer Khan have these designs, unless they had sold or intended to sell them for Khan? These would have been ideal for two of Khans other major customers, Iran and North Korea. Moreover, these computers were unlikely to be the only place where the Tinners stored the designs. A senior IAEA official doubted that the Tinners were the only ones who had the designs found on their computers. A very scary possibility, he said. Others were bound to have received the digitized designs, he added. But who has them and what have they already done with them? [72]

In 2004, the Washington Congressional Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission was informed by a delegation of Russian generals that Russia during the Cold War had developed a "Super-EMP" nuclear warhead, and the design information for this weapon had leaked to North Korea. A SuperEMP warhead is a nuclear weapon specially designed to produce an enormous burst of gamma rays that generates an extraordinarily powerful electromagnetic pulse, capable of destroying even the best protected electronics, thereby paralyzing military forces and blacking out power grids and collapsing critical infrastructures everywhere across an entire nation the size of the United States. One signature of a Super-EMP weapon is that it has a very low explosive yield, just several kilotons, or even less if it is more efficient, because the weapon is converting the energy of the nuclear warhead into gamma rays. The 2004 Russian delegation of military generals also told the EMP Commission that North Korea was getting help developing a Super-EMP nuclear weapon from contractors from Russia, China, Pakistan and elsewhere, and could probably test such a weapon "in a few years."
A Black-market Super-EMP Nuclear Warhead Design ?

A few years later, in 2006, North Korea tested its mysterious "nuclear device" that produced an explosive yield of only several kilotons, and so was derided by the Western press as a failure but hailed as a success by North Korea. [73]


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Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW): One cold war era design type of a Super-EMP warhead was a modified neutron bomb, more accurately an Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW) because it produces not only many neutrons but also many gamma rays. Gamma rays cause a powerful EMP effect. One U.S. ERW warhead (the W-82) deployed in NATO during the Cold War weighed, including its heavy casing, weighted less than 50 kilograms (110 lbs). Since the EMP attack entails detonating the warhead at high-altitude, above the atmosphere, the warhead does not even need a heavy re-entry vehicle and heat shield. Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS): During the Cold War, the Soviet Union

scientists experimented with a secret weapon, the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), used an ICBM as a Space Launch Vehicle to put a nuclear warhead into orbit, liken to a satellite. Instead of using the ICBM to lob the warhead on a more accurate arcing ballistic trajectory, flying along the shortest range to target, like an artillery shell, the FOBS lofted the warhead into a "fractional" or partial orbit, sacrificing accuracy for limitless range. FOBS major features, inexpensive, a single warhead could render America helpless, and it did not accuracy. For Soviets military planners it was weapon to be used a gainst NATO, and American mainland. A weapon FOBS could reach any nation or threaten any target anywhere on Earth.
Deadly First Strike Capability FOBS is stealthy as it can strike from every global direction,

as an unexpected preempted strike, it does not require the shortest direction or necessitate a missile launch trajectory that would be normal for an ICBM. Because FOBS looks like a Space Launch Vehicle, not an ICBM launching a nuclear attack, this disguise optimizes chances for achieving surprise.
North Korea, during the successful test of its ICBM on December 12, 2012, orbited a satellite weighing 100 kilograms (about 200 pounds). From a military perspective

Pyongyangs 2012 December test resembled an FOB test. A Super-EMP warhead does not weigh much, about the size of Norths Koreas and Irans satellite program. The EMP field is so large that detonating anywhere over the U.S. would have catastrophic consequences. North Korea orbited its satellite around the Earth at an altitude of about 500 kilometers. The trajectory of North Korea's satellite is no accident they deliberately aimed for and achieved this orbit and altitude, as announced before their launch. An altitude of 500 kilometers would be ideal for making an EMP attack that places the field over the entire lower 48 United States. North Korea or Iranian ICBM does not have to be accurate to make an EMP attack against the United States. During the Cold War, Moscow experimented with a stealthy way of delivering a nuclear attack on the United States using a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System to elude radar detection. This would entail launching an ICBM southward, away from the United States, so it appears non-threatening, and delivering the warhead like a satellite on a south polar orbit, so the nuclear attack comes at the U.S. from the south.
Iran may already have a FOBS capability, as it has successfully launched two satellites on polar orbits, assisted by North Korean missile technology and North Korean technicians.


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launched its satellites southward, over the Indian Ocean, flying them over the polar region to approach the U.S. from the south. Like North Korea, the ISA did not fly its satellites over America. But a slight adjustment in trajectory would have sent them over the geographic center of the lower 48 United States. Like Pyongyang, ISA orbited its satellites at about 310 miles (500 kilometers) altitude, optimum for placing an EMP field over the entire contiguous continental United States.
The Iranian Space Agency (ISA) According to press & intelligence reports Iranian scientists were present at all three North Korean nuclear tests. North Korean scientists are known to be present throughout the

Islamic Republic military and civilian industry. North Korea has been denounced by the United Nations for selling a facility to Syria for developing nuclear weapons, which was bombed by Israel in 2007. So if North Korea has sold nuclear weapons technology to Syria, why not Iran? Conceivably, both Tehran and Pyongyang could already have or be close to developing a Super-EMP warhead. Both countries have cruise missile capacities which could easy be adapted for an EMP weapon. The Obama administration and its Pentagon allies believe North Korea's current "nuclear devices" are not a real threat because of their low explosive yield, only a few kilotons. It is peculiar that Washingtons Top military experts did not even bring forward North Korea could be building a tactical nuclear arsenal. Pyongyang nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and recently in 2013 were all strangely low yield. Various other intelligence reports claim the 2013 test might have been as much as 10 kilotons. However the National Director of Intelligence Lt. General James Clappers official report is that the 2013 North Korean test yielded only "several kilotons." In contrast, the primitive U.S. Little Boy bomb that destroyed Hiroshima had a yield of 10-15 kilotons. In the 1970s, a Princeton physics student named Aristotle Phillips proved that even he could design, as a college project, a nuclear weapon like Little Boy, an experiment he described in his 1978 book Mushroom. Does North Korea not have internet accesses? It does have some of the most lethal cyberwarfare capabilities in the world.
The lethal radius of "several kilotons" is small therefore seems to support the premise of a tactical nuclear weapons program or a radiological bomb.

In 2010, according to some reputable European analysts, radioisotope data indicates North Korea may have conducted two clandestine nuclear tests of a very low yield "nuclear device" of sophisticated fusion design. This is indicative of a weapons program that is very technologically advanced, and consistent with development of a Super-EMP warhead. In 2012, a military commentator for the People's Republic of China told a Hong Kong journal that North Korea has Super-EMP nuclear warheads, was this just political proganda? Yet North Korea is happy with its mysterious "nuclear device," has declared all its tests successful, and weaponized it into warheads. North Korea is obviously arming its missiles with something nuclear, is Washington that stupid? [74]


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Iranian Space Agency/ Iranian Satellite Launch Sites: These are

located in the north central part of Iran in order to prevent any missile tests flying over other local countries. Missile flight paths are out over the Indian Ocean parallel and west of Indias west coast. Flight testing has so far come out of the south eastern Semana and Shahroud (emamshahr) region flying south over Tabas tracking station region and for satellite launchings would be expected to fly out over the Indian ocean east of Humedan, Giving satellites a higher inclination polar orbit . Military launch test have also come from the Qoms North East and North Western ranges, and Mushhad regions near part of the Dasht-ekabir (Salt-Desert missile test range). In 2013 Jane's Intelligence Review reported that DigitalGlobe satellite images taken on July 6 show the launch pad and tower at Iran's new facility located in the northern province of Semnan. Jane's also identified a third rocketlaunching site being constructed near the southeast of the city of Shahrud. "The revelation that Iran has invested significant resources to rapidly build two, possibly three space centers at a time of mounting economic pressure is likely to be interpreted by some observers as evidence that it intends to use them as launch facilities for crude intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) armed with nuclear warheads," Jane's wrote. But the journal noted is "more likely that the three sites reflect the scale of Iran's ambitious space program." [75] One must also consider several space launch sites could me a means to hide Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) tests and capabilities. Simorgh SLV Role: Single Use Satellite Launch Vehicle Notes: Announced in 2010 as space delivery system that could deliver heavier payloads than the Safir into low earth orbit. Tests of its engine systems were carried out in 2010 and the system will reportedly carry an experimental communications satellite for its maiden voyage some time in 2013. Name: Safir SLV Role: Single Use Satellite Launch Vehicle Notes: Developed as a satellite launch vehicle, it is a two-stage rocket that has its first stage based upon a modified Shahab-3C. Testing for the system began in 2007. In February 2009, Iran used a Safir-2 to successfully launch the Omid satellite (a Russian firm launched Irans first satellite in 2005). Iran con tinues to upgrade this system, producing a second generation that has already proven to be much more capable in terms of payload capacity and is able to deliver payloads to much higher orbits.
Iranian Ballistic Missiles Chris Smith and Matthew Wallin August 2013


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Irans vast and every expanding Space Agency, faculties and missile research & development, requires tremendous economic resources. Can we honestly believe international sanctions have been detrimental for Islamic Republic?
The Islamic Republic Continually portrays outrage, claims it is unfairly singled out, unfairly and unjustly persecuted, for no valid reasons a very successfully international media ploy, playing the victim of Israeli and American aggressors.

As negotiators try to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear impasse the Lebanon Beirut bombings serves as a timely reminder that tensions with Iran go beyond the nuclear issue. Thirty years ago on Oct. 23, 1983, a delivery van filled with 18,000 pounds of explosives slammed into the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. Seconds later, another car bomb hit a French military building four miles away. A total of 241 American and 58 French soldiers lost their lives, all members of the Multi-National Forces in Lebanon. The Hezbollah perpetrated these suicide truck bombing attacks under orders from Iran. The attack on the Marine barracks was not only the single-largest nonnuclear explosion since World War II, it was also the deadliest terrorist attack against Americans up to that time. Today, Hezbollah targets Israeli tourists around the world, in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Thailand, and Nigeria not out of any Lebanese interest but at Iran's command.
The U.S. State Department concluded in its annual Country Reports on terrorism that 2012 represented "a marked resurgence of Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism" in which "Iran and Hezbollah's terrorist activity has reached a tempo unseen since the 1990s."

For the past 30 years from Tehran, Hezbollah has received tens of thousands of rockets, hundreds of millions of dollars a year, training and operational logistical support. The Hezbollah founded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps soon after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Hezbollah always maintained an intimate relationship with Iran based on a shared ideological foundation. Today, Hezbollah is no longer just a proxy of Iran; it is in a "strategic partnership" with Iran, as National Counterterrorism Center director Matthew Olsen put it. Or, in the words of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Hezbollah and Iran are in "a partnership arrangement...with the Iranians as the senior partner." [76]


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Hezbollah in Latin America & the bombings of Jewish Communities

Hezbollahs presence in Latin America is nothing new. Together with Iran, the group was responsible for the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy. In the early afternoon of March 17, 1992, a pickup truck driven by a suicide bomber and packed with explosives rammed through the gate of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and detonated. Twenty-nine Israelis and Argentineans were killed and more than 220 were wounded, among them members of the Israeli diplomatic staff. Hezbollah, using the pseudonym "Islamic jihad," claimed responsibility for the attack. Two years later, On July 18, 1994, at 09:53 in the morning, a powerful blast shook the Jewish community center (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people in and around the building wounding more than 300. The investigation revealed that the explosion had been caused by a suicide bomber driving a Renault van packed with about 400 kilograms (880 pounds) of explosives. Hezbollah traces its origins in Latin America back to the mid-1980s, long before the Buenos Aires bombings, when its operatives set up shop in the tri-border area (TBA) of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina. At the height of the Lebanese civil war, Hezbollah clerics began planting agents and recruiting sympathizers among Arab and Muslim immigrants in the TBA, according to a study conducted for U.S. Special Operations Command. A region routinely called the United Nations of crime, a classic terrorist safe haven and a counterfeiting capital, the TBA made a natural home for operatives seeking to build financial and logistical Hezbollah support networks within existing Shia and Lebanese diasporas communities An investigation carried out , whose results were made public showed that the highest levels of the Iranian regime orchestrated the attack and authorized Hezbollah to carry it out.
The following are the seven members of the Iranian regime and the Hezbollah terrorist operative (as of October 2006) who were involved in the AMIA bombing and for whom international arrest warrants were issued: 1) Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, then president of Iran 2) Ali Fallahian, minister of intelligence and security 3) Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign minister 4) Mohsen Rezai, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards 5) Ahmad Vahidi, commander of the Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force 6) Mohsen Rabbani, cultural attach in the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires 7) Ahmad Ashgari (aka Mohsen Reza Randjbaran), third secretary of the Iranian embassy [77] Tehrans Once Top International Operative & Hezbollah Military leader the late (assassinated in 2008) Imad Mughniyah, (pictured right) before 9/11 was the worlds most wanted terrorist. Mughniyah appeared on the initial list of the FBI's top 22 Most Wanted Terrorists, with a reward of up to $5 million offered for information leading to his arrest. Imad Fayez Mughniyah, otherwise known as Hajj Radwan, was a senior member of the Hezbollah organization. He was alternatively described as the head of its security section, a senior intelligence & military commader . This man, who before the 9/11 attacks, had killed more Americans than any other terrorist. To note one of his most infamous missions was in Lebanon, the 1983 Beirut barracks suicide truck bombing of U.S. Forces.


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According to the State Departments annual Country Reports on Terrorism (previously known as the Patterns of Global Terrorism report), Iran, designated a terrorist sponsor since 1984, remains the worlds leading state sponsor of terrorism as it continues to

undermine international efforts to promote peace and democracy and threatens stability, especially in the Middle East and South Asia. The emphasis on Islamic Republic from the State Department came on the same day a New York City Federal Court sentenced a 58year-old naturalized American citizen, Manssor Arbabsiar, to 25 years in prison for participating in an Iranian plot to assassinate Saudi Arabias ambassador on US soil in 2011. Today, Iranian leadership fully embraces Khomeinis radical Islamic interpretation of revolutionary export rooted in violence. In a 3 May 2008 speech, former President Mohammad Khatami, often labeled a reformer by Western analysts, suggested that Iranian officials redefine the concept of revolutionary export in terms of soft power. Iranian Parliamentary authorities countered with a full-throated declaration that the mandate to export revolution was to be conducted militarily. A critical objective for the regime is to export the Islamic Revolution once led by Khomeini. It was Khomeini who famously decried the United States the Great Satan and Israel the Little Satan soon after seizing power in 1979. For the Islamic Republic to export the Revolution is to do more than merely help radical Islamists undermine or usurp other Muslim regimes. Khomeinis Iran commonly stated objectives include the destruction of the U.S. and Israel. The task of spreading the Revolution abroad is in the purview of Irans Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), which is also tasked with neutralizing internal threats to the Revolution . Of the IRGCs five branches, it is the special operations division known as Quds Force (IRGC-QF) that has been assigned responsibility for exporting the Islamic Revolution beyond Irans borders. [78]
However the Islamic Republic Continually portrays outrage, claims it is unfairly singled out, unfairly and unjustly persecuted, for no valid reasons ? You can fill an entire library with books concerning the Islamic Republic and its terrorism. It is lamentable far too many do not perceive nor comprehend the militant radical regime of Tehran. It is paradoxical how Washington and the IAEA continually handle the Islamic Republic with blind innocence. In October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known as the E3, to suspend its enrichment activities, sign and implement an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, and comply fully with the IAEAs investigation. On 18th December 2003 Iran signed the Additional Protocols to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The understanding is the IAEA would therefore be able to carry out anywhere anytime inspections in Iran. Tehran signed this Additional Protocol in December 2003. Why is there this propensity in repetitive actions and issues with Tehran? There already exists a reliable framework of existing nuclear safety protocols the only issue is the Islamic Republics adherence. This 2003 agreement has laid a true course, why is it being disregarded, rendered impotent, when this simple 2003 IAEA E3 could resolve the entire Iranian nuclear dilemma?


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Pakistan, for example, developed a nuclear warhead for its Ghauri medium-range missile in just one year, after its first nuclear test in 1998.

Both of Indias atomic tests, 1974 and 1998 came to a shock of Washingtons CIA .North Korea achieved a nuclear weapons capability during the Clinton administration in 1994, and not during the Bush administration with their first test in 2006. We know from our own experience, and from that of other nations, that nuclear testing is not necessary to develop a nuclear weapon. Little Boy, the first nuclear weapon ever built, was developed and used successfully by the U.S. to destroy Hiroshima, without nuclear testing. Hiroshima was the test. India tested its first atomic bomb in May 1974, and in a second in 1998. Both of these atomic tests came to a shock Washingtons CIA. Yet wasnt until about 2000 that intelligence agencies uncovered India hand by 1986 was a nuclear weaponscapable state, and possessed full nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. According to the 2012 SIPRI Yearbook, the Indian arsenal comprises 80 to 100 warheads. The ranges of such estimates are generally dependent on analyses of India's stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium, estimated at 0.54 0.18 tons. Although India has also stockpiled roughly 2.4 0.9 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), some of this material is most intended for use in nuclear submarines and research reactors. Indias nuclear weapons program, as the same with Pakistan was covertly created out of their peaceful nuclear power facilities. Pakistan with the 5th largest nuclear arsenal in world is busy building an even larger one. The Islamic Republic of Irans secret nuclear programs was totally unknown by the international citadels of intelligence until 2002. Yet Washingtons White House insists that US intelligence agencies are capable of detecting nuclear breakout break-out in Iran? It has been a small handful of Iranian dissents that has been the key factor in revealing Tehrans nuclear secrets, not American agencies. Indias 1974 nuclear test was condemned by many countries as a violation of the peaceful-use agreements underlying U.S. and Canadian-supplied nuclear technology and material transfers. No substantial steps were ever taken against Indians nuclear violations. No doubt, just about as much would happen to Tehran and the Islamic Republic understands this and counts on it. Of course having International economies dependant on Tehrans oil and gas supplies, it is a pretty safe gamble on Irans part. [79] We must hold the Islamic Republic to prior agreements instead of these insufferable numerous political concoctions. It is time to stop going in circles and have Tehran adhere to and ratify past agreements. Iran, whose uranium enrichment program is at the heart of International trepidation, now has more than 10,000 centrifuges churning out enriched uranium, which can be used either to power reactors or as the fissile core of a nuclear weapon(s)..


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One man and one man controls the politics, sets the course and activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Guardianship of the Jurisprudent

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the Supreme Leader is commander-in-chief of the armed forces The Islamic Republic of Iran is a revolutionary theocratic Totalitarian state- Stratocracy is a form of military government in which the state and the military are traditionally the same thing and government positions are always occupied by military leaders. The military's political power is supported by law and the society. As such a stratocracy does not have to be autocratic by nature in order to preserve its right to rule. An autocracy is a system of government in which a supreme political power is concentrated in the hands of one person. His decisions are neither subject to external legal restraints nor regularized mechanisms of popular control.
Autocracy is any form of government in which one person is the supreme power within the state. It is derived from the Greek : ("self") and ("rule"), and may be translated as "one who rules by himself". Iran.. Supreme Leader or Ayatollah Khomeinis theocratic government principle of guardianship of the jurisprudent was kept hidden until after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The idea that the ruler of the state must be the person best qualified to interpret Islam and enforce Muslim law upon the people is enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic, which vests full power in the jurisprudent (faqih) at its head in the position commonly known as Supreme Leader The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the most powerful and influential individual in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In short the Islamic Republic of Iran is controlled by one man, Khamenei. In truth there are no real elections in Iran, Khamenei says who can and who cannot run and hold governmental positions period. [80] Supreme Leader of Muslims: In line with Irans ambitions as a nation, it is notable that on Khameneis official website he is referred to not as the Supreme Leader of Iran but as the Supreme Leader of Muslims. While several years ago such a declaration appeared fanciful. page 22 Reading Khamenei: The World View of Irans Most Powerful Leader Karim Tehrans Supreme Leader has the final say on nuclear decision making. He is not constrained by his previous fatwas, which he can alter or reverse, or the opinions of other mujtahids (Islamic jurists). And if he believes that expediency calls for the acquisition, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons, WMDs religious principles would not prevent or constraint him from doing so. In reality the Islamic Republics true directions, conatus making, flows through one mans personality and politics unaffected by the will of other men, the decisions of other institutions, or even the moral scruples of religion.
Nuclear Fatwa Religion and Politics in Irans Proliferation Strategy Michael Eisenstadt and Mehdi Khalaji Policy Focus #115 | September 2011


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2013year of a Nuclear Iran Negotiations Breakthrough?

Unfortunately we have been lead to believe that an era of moderation has eclipsed the radical Islamic world of Iran and a period of political detente is breaking. Tehran holds a yearly observance of its Khomeinism revolutionary ideals, and anniversary of the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Iran. This event falls around the 4th of November know as National Day against the Global Arrogance. This is a special day for celebration hate for the America, The Great Satan, and the lesser Satan, Israel . This year Supreme Leader or Ayatollah Khamenei added an additional day which falls on the 2nd of November. The November 2 event, whose Farsi title literally translates to The Great Conference of Death to America,. The conference will also award its First Major Inter national Award of Down with America, which gives the first prize winner 100,000,000 rials ($4,000 USD). Demonstrations were organized across the face of the Islamic Republic, tens of thousands of Iranians shouted death to America and death to Israel. The protests were unprecedented in their scale and scope, reported as the biggest anti-U.S. and anti-Israel rally in years. According to Irans official media, millions of people participated in these protests and demonstrations around the country, the largest turnout in years. The burning of American and Israeli flags permeated throughout the cities. Considering rapprochement between Washington lead by Obama and American leaders, tens of thousands of Iranian demonstrators packed the streets outside of the former U.S. embassy in Tehran this year. Hundreds of thousands also demonstrated against Israel and the U.S. in other cities across Iran. Khamenei of course gave a speech, America is the most hated power among nations, Experience has proved that every nation and government which trusts the US, will sustain damage, even if it is a friend of the US, the Leader told a large gathering of Iranian students here in Tehran, on the eve of the National Day against the Global Arrogance. [81]
Asqar Ab-Khazar, the vice chairman of the Iranian Islamic Propaganda Coordination Council, and the head of the 2013 November 4th US-embassy celebrations explains, In view of the unreasonable, arrogant and illogical positions taken by the West, led by the US, against the Iranian nation, this years November 4th ceremony will be held with more fanfare than previous years and the aware and brave Islamic Iranian nation will show that the celebration this year will be a big day for Death to the America. [82]

From special reports and news media we are continually bombarded with Washingtons rough and unnecessary harsh treatment of Iran, for example: Since President Obama took office in 2009, his administration has been remarkably tough on Iran, imposing crippling sanctions beyond the Bush administration's, securing global support to contain Iran's economy and repeatedly stating his willingness to use military force against an Iranian nuclear program. But Congress has often found a way to be even tougher . [83]
However nothing could be further from the truth.


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2013 witnessed the highest White House National Security Council officials feverishly working, covert conclaves, secret telephonic communications, convening an assortment of Gulf Countries, Iranian expatriates and previous U.S. diplomats who clandestinely carried proposals between Washington and Tehran. Obama personally reached out to Rouhani last summer. Obama penned a letter to the new Iranian President, stressing Washington's desire to end the nuclear dispute peacefully. Irans Rouhani responded with similar sentiments. While running for president, Barack Obama promised to meet the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran without preconditions. In order to jump-start diplomacy upon taking office, Obama recognized the countrys right to enrich uranium. Rather than enable diplomacy, his concession poisoned it. With a single statement, Obama unilaterally stripped of authority three hard-fought UN Security Council Resolutions forbidding enrichment. Iranian authorities responded by ramping up enrichment and flatly rejecting to negotiate.

Obama wrote, we should not hesitate to talk directly to Iran. In exchange, Obama offers diplomatic relations with Iran, economic engagement and security assurances, removing the notion of regime change from Americas Iran policy. "Barack Obama supports direct diplomacy with Iran without preconditions," The Obama administration further diminish sanctions on Iran after the election of Irans new president Rouhani, months before the current round of nuclear talks in Geneva or the historic phone call between the two leaders. A review of Treasury Department notices reveals that the U.S. government had all but stopped the financial blacklisting of entities and people that help Tehran evade international sanctions since the Iranian Presidential elections. President Obama reached out in unprecedented diplomatic action in September he called President Hassan Rouhani. After a threedecade freeze in relations between Washington and Tehran, speaking by phone in the first conversation between an American and Iranian president since 1979.Obama said he believes the two countries can reach a comprehensive solution on Irans nuclear program, and said he and Rouhani had both directed their diplomats to pursue an agreement. Presidents Obama White House tenure was marked by several Diplomatic grand policy gestures in a quest for a nuclear detente with Tehran. The first significant and largely unrecognized grand gesture in 2009 wherein President Obama acknowledged the Islamic Republic right to enrich uranium. At the height of the of the 2009 Iranian contested presidential elections riots, executions and unlawful imprisonments, President Obama quietly closed (defunded) Washingtons Iranian Human Rights Watch, remains closed to this day . [86] As discussed, Obama signed Iranian oil purchase waivers for over 20 countries thus circumventing sanctions. The White House looks the other way while its NATO ally Turkey in defiance does billions of dollars of business with Tehran. Obama has openly pressured US Congress against Iranian sanctions. Because Obama relaxed sanctions in November China agreed to finance $20 billion in development projects in Iran using oil money not transferred to the Islamic Republic because of international sanctions. China is Iran's biggest oil customer, second goods supplier and first non-oil commodity importer in the world. [87]


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Obamas Grand Policy Gestures, Diplomatic initiatives in a quest for a nuclear dtente with Tehran to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue sweeping aside, an epic white wash of the Islamic Republic of Irans bloody path, decades as the Infamous State Sponsor Of International Terrorism. The Islamic Republic Irans Open Irregular War with America in Iraq & Afghanistan The Supreme Leader of Iran

Khamenei directed IRGC QF (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Quds Force) General Qassem Suleimani to form a Task Force to conduct irregular military operations against American & Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Western military circles it became known as the Ramazan Corps. The Ramazan Corps is based out of the Ramazan Command Center in Tehran. Tehran set up the Ramazan Corps as a sophisticated command structure to coordinate military, intelligence, terrorist, diplomatic, religious, ideological, propaganda, and economic operations. [88] Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani was appointed chief of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) sometime between September 10, 1997, and March 21, 1998, during the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Suleimani remains in that position to this day. " General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qassem Suleimani control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan," wrote in the spring 2008 by IRGC -Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani in a message to General David Petraeus, commanding general of the Multi-National ForceIraq, . [89]
WikiLeaks thousands of documents of secret field reports from the battlegrounds of Iraq. The archive is the second such cache obtained by the independent group WikiLeaks and made available to several news organizations. Scores of documents made public by WikiLeaks, which disclosed classified information about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, provide a ground-level look at least as seen by American units in the field and the United States military intelligence at the shadow war between the United States and Iraqi militias backed by Irans Revolutionary Guards. The reports make it clear that the lethal contest between Iranian-backed militias and American forces continued after President Obama sought to open a diplomatic dialogue with Irans leaders and reaffirmed the agreement between the United States and Iraq to withdraw American troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. Leaked Reports Detail Irans Aid for Iraqi Militias By Michael R. Gordon And Andrew W. Lehren Published: October 22, 2010

Pentagons field reports revealed by WikiLeaks were never intended to be made public underscore the seriousness with which Irans role has been seen by the American mili tary. These leaked reports indicate a struggle at the White House, to keep Tehrans war obscured and out of the news media. Moreover to prevent the American people from becoming outraged at the deaths of their military sons and daughters, and the mangling and crippling of thousands more of them by the hand of Iran.


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Iraq Explosively formed penetrators

WikiLeaks citing the testimony of detainees, captured militants diary and numerous uncovered weapons caches, along with other intelligence, the field reports recount Irans role in providing Iraqi militia fighters with rockets, magnetic bombs that can be attached to the underside of cars. EFPs explosively formed penetrators, which are the most lethal type of roadside bomb in Iraq, capable of destroying armored vehicles even tanks. WikiLeaks, Iraqi militants went to Iran to be trained as snipers and in the use of explosives, the field reports assert, and Irans IRGC-QF collaborated with Iraqi extremists to encourage the assassination of Iraqi officials. A June 25, 2009, report about an especially bloody E.F.P. attack that wounded 10 American soldiers noted that the militants used tactics being employed by trained violent extremist members that have returned from Iran. The purpose of the attack, the report speculated, was to increase American casualties so militants could claim that they had fought the occupiers and forced them to withdraw. [90] President Obama clearly realized if these Pentagon field reports were not kept classified the American public would have clamored for massive military retaliation against the Islamic Republic. The war Tehran was conducting (and still is) spanned from Lebanons Hezbollah and Assads Syria. President Obama believed as he still clearly does today , any kind of military strike on the Islamic Republic would explode across the Middle East and North Africa. NATOs ally who borders Syria and Iran would have been fallen into this Armageddon abyss, Turkey. The Obamas White House is consumed with fear of this war to this day, clearly reflected in Obamas Iran and Middle East policies to diplomatic initiatives.
Improvised explosive devices are the leading killer of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq 2013 6,750 U.S. service members have died in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom IEDs death toll , have exacted a bloody toll on Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan killing more than 3,000 and wounding more than 31,000, according to the Defense Department -- mines are an indirect but effective tactic for Iran to use against a more powerful opponent. 2012 Among the wounded are some 16,000 severely injured, casualties who would have died on the battlefield just a generation ago. According to the U.S. Army surgeon general's office, military surgeons have performed 1,653 major limb amputations since 2001. The wounded also include the growing number of American troops whose genitals were damaged or destroyed by roadside bomb blasts (IEDS). Since 2005, almost 1,900 have suffered genital wounds, according to Defense Department data through July 2012.


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An improvised explosive device (IED) is a homemade bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than in conventional military action. It may be constructed of, any kind of explosive material to plastic explosives, conventional military explosives, such as an artillery round, attached to a detonating mechanism. Roadside bombs are a common use of IEDs. An explosively formed penetrator (EFP), also known as an explosively formed projectile, a selfforging warhead, or a self-forging fragment, is a special type of shaped charge designed to penetrate armor effectively at standoff distances. The EFP munition is somewhat like a traditional shaped charge, but it incorporates a metal liner with less of an angle. So, instead of a cone, the liner is more of a concave lens or dish shape. The EFP also uses a heavier liner, which, when the device is detonated, is formed into a slug or "penetrator." The penetrator, then, is propelled at the target at an extremely high velocity. This difference in the shape and weight of the liner allows the EFP to be deployed from a greater distance than a traditional shaped charge.

The IRGC has developed an international black-market to procurement sophisticated components for their IEDs & EFPs. One uncovered trail lead to an American company that unwittingly had provided Iran with thousands of essential parts. On October 25, 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that five individuals and four of their companies have been indicted as part of a conspiracy to defraud the U.S. that allegedly caused thousands of radio frequency modules to be illegally exported from the United States to Iran, at least 16 of which were later found in unexploded improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq. [92] The first decade of the war on terror killed 6,300 American troops, most of them (71 percent) in Iraq. The most common (47 percent) cause of death overall was IEDs , roadside bombs and mines. [93] In the second Iraq War, IEDs were used extensively against US-led Coalition forces and by the end of 2007 they had become responsible for approximately 63% of Coalition deaths in Iraq . Iranian made EFPs (explosively formed projectiles) Coalition officers began to publicly highlight Iranian support for Shia militants in 2005, complaining that a type of improvised explosive devices (IED) known as explosively formed projectiles (EFP) were being smuggled in from Iran. A US government intelligence analyst who focuses on the Qods Force told Jane's that Iranian support for Iraqi militants increased in the second half of 2006, when Brig Gen Soleimani was "riding high" in the aftermath of the war between Hezbollah and Israel and given "a blank check and carte blanche" to push the US out of Iraq. The number of EFP attacks in Iraq began to rise after the end of the war in Lebanon in July 2006. According to figures from security company Olive Group, there were 42 EFP attacks on average a month from August to October 2006. By July 2007, the monthly total had risen to 88 attacks per month. Coalition and Iraqi security forces also began to find more Iranian-provided weapons. The Combating Terrorism Center report noted that nine caches of Iranian weapons were found from July to December 2006, while 43 major


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caches were discovered in the first half of 2007. Weapons intelligence imagery seen by Jane's confirms that the caches included large quantities of weapons that US and UK intelligence analysts assessed to have been produced by Iran in 2006 and 2007. The weapons included many 107 mm artillery rockets with closely clustered Iranian Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) lot numbers and production dates between 2005 and 2007, as well as rounds and fuses for 60 mm and 81 mm mortars with DIO lot markings and 2006 production dates. Significant quantities of newly produced plastic explosives that coalition technicians chemically matched to the Iranian version of C4 were found with production dates from 2006. [94]
TERRORISM & INSURGENCY 30-Sep-2011 Jane's Intelligence Review Shia strength - Iraqi militants adapt to the US drawdown s/opeds/4e8b0eba7c0a2.pdf

Iraq, by June 2003, 3 months after the initial intervention, the IED had emerged as the enemys weapon of choice. In 2003 Reporting on the IED crisis, then U.S. Central Command commander General John Abizaid, USA, declared IEDs his No. 1 threat. From the summer of 2005 until the spring of 2008, the IED threat was responsible for 50 to 80 percent of U.S. fatalities . In short, IEDs emerged early in the war and remained the most effective weapon used against U.S. forces through 2008. The EFPs arrived in Iraq as early as 2004. They were provided to Iraqi insurgents by Iran and Hezbollah and were used almost exclusively by Shia insurgent groups such as the Iraqi Mahdi Army. The sophisticated EFPs never amounted to more than 5 to 10 percent of the IEDs employed by insurgents, but they caused 40 percent of IED casualties. [95] The Iraqi Mahdi Army formed by Muqtada al-Sadr and one of the worlds most wanted terrorist, Iranian operative, Imad Mughniyah in April 2003.

Three hundred recruits were found in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and then sent to Lebanon to be trained by Hezbollah and IRGC-QF. Mahdi Army is funded and supported by Tehran and criminal enterprises in Iraq. The group rose to international prominence on April 18, 2004 when it spearheaded the first major armed confrontation against the U.S.-led forces in Iraq from the Shia community. After this battle and as late as 2008, the Mahdi Army was regarded as "the most powerful force on the streets of Iraq after the American military. Syria is believed to have cooperated in helping linking the Mahdi Army to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Tactics used by the group include improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombs, and kidnappings. Muqtada al-Sadr is a fiercely anti-American messianic cleric His


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father was among the most powerful Shiite clerics in Iraq in the late 1990s. After Sadiq al-Sadr and two sons were killed in a spray of gunfire in 1999 likely on orders from Saddam Muqtada inherited a network of schools and charities built by his family. [96]
The Islamic Republic hand has been visible in rocket attacks across Iraq Iranian-backed groups like Mahdi Army in Iraq have specialized in the use of long-range rocket attacks on coalition bases. Tehran's support has not been subtle: Iran has supplied bulky Fajr-3 240 mm rockets, positively identified by Multinational Forces technical specialists as newly constructed missiles, not old Saddam Hussein-era BM-24 240 mm rounds. [97]

Former U.S. Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell told in June 2007 there is "overwhelming evidence" that Iran supports terrorists in Iraq and "compelling" evidence that it does the same in Afghanistan. Iran has repeatedly denied involvement in attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, though in October 2008, a top Iranian military commander did acknowledge Iran supplies weapons to "liberation armies" (AP) in the Middle East. Western intelligence officials insist Iran's malfeasance is widespread. [98] All source reporting since 2004 indicates that Irans Islamic Revolutionary CorpsQuds Force is providing professionally-built EFPs and components to Iraqi Shia militants, notes a still-classified American intelligence report that was prepared in 2006.Based on forensic analysis of materials recovered in Iraq, the report continues, Iran is assessed as the producer of these items.

2010 Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Irans Support for Terrorism Treasury Announces New Sanctions Against Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force Leadership 8/3/2010 Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 which is aimed at freezing the assets of terrorists and their supporters, thereby isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems Treasury today designated: Four Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) senior officers: Hushang Allahdad, Hossein Musavi, Hasan Mortezavi and Mohammad Reza Zahedi for their roles in the IRGC-QF's support of terrorism


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IRGC and IRGC-QF Support for Terrorist Organizations:

The IRGC-QF is the Government of Iran's primary arm for executing its policy of supporting terrorist and insurgent groups. The IRGC-QF provides material, logistical assistance, training and financial support to militants and terrorist operatives throughout the Middle East and South Asia. It was designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2007 for its support of terrorism. The Government of Iran also uses the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and IRGCQF to implement its foreign policy goals, including, but not limited to, seemingly legitimate activities that provide cover for intelligence operations and support to terrorist and insurgent groups. These activities include economic investment, reconstruction, and other types of aid to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon, implemented by companies and institutions that act for or on behalf of, or are owned or controlled by the IRGC and the Iranian government.
In Afghanistan, the IRGC-QF provides select members of the Taliban with weapons,

funding, logistics and training. In Iraq, the Government of Iran trains, equips, and funds Iraqi Shia militant groups. In the Levant, the IRGC-QF continues to support designated terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas. Hizballah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial aid, training, and weaponry; and Iran's senior leadership has cited Hizballah as a model for other militant groups. Iran also provides training, weapons, and money to Hamas, bolstering the group's ability to maintain its armed resistance and opposition to Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. In December 2010 NATO reported the capture an IRGC-QF Officer by US Special Forces. A NATO spokesman described the IRGC-QF officer as "a key Taliban weapons facilitator", supplying weapons to the Taliban in Afghanistan for attacks on British and American troops. He was apprehended in Kandahar province. "The joint security team specifically targeted the individual for facilitating the movement of weapons between Iran and Kandahar through Nimroz province," a NATO statement said. [99]
2012 US Department of State, the IRGC- QF trains Taliban elements on small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect fire weapons, such as mortars, artillery, and rockets. Since 2006, Iran has arranged arms shipments to select Taliban members, including small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, and plastic explosives. Iran has shipped a large number of weapons to Kandahar, Afghanistan, aiming to increase its influence in this key province.
Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 Report May 30, 2013

The greatest producer of causalities on the battlefield in the 20th century was artillery, and my assessment is the IED is the artillery of the 21st century. Lt. Gen. Michael Barbero, director of the Joint IED Defeat Organization


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Understanding the Syrian, Iranian and Hezbollah Alliance IRGC -QF Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani is central to Tehrans military operations in Syria. The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned Suleimani for his role in supporting the Assad regime, and for abetting terrorism." Suleimanis boots on the ground commander in Syria was the late IRGC-QF Brigadier General Hassan Shateri Hassan Shateri, he was assassinated in Syria on

Iran, Syria & Hezbollah, A Historical Backdrop

Links between Syria and Iran preceded the 1979 Islamic Revolution and involved Lebanon. Iranian revolutionaries were put in contact with Damascus through Imam Musa al-Sadr, who had recognized Syrias ruling Alawite minority as Shia Muslims and effectively legitimized their rule. In the early 1980s, therefore, Damascus permitted the establishment of an IRGC - QF base in the Syrian town of Zabadani, close to the border, and permitted the transit of IRGC personnel to the Beqaa Valley. . The Iranian Embassy in Damascus played a major role in the relationship, and Ambassador Mohtashami-Purs main contact was Brigadier-General Ghazi Kanan, the chief of Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) in Lebanon Syria was the dominant partner in the Hezbollah-Iran-Syria relationship during the 1980s. Syria benefited from proximity and control of a major land border with Lebanon, giving it the power to impede Irans direct contacts with and provision of supplies to Hezbollah. [1] Under a mutual defense pact signed between Syria and Iran in 2005, Syria agreed to allow the deployment of Iranian weapons on its territory. On June 15, 2006, Syrias defense minister, Hassan Turkmani, signed an agreement with his Iranian counterpart for military cooperation against what they called the common threats presented by Israel and the United States. Our cooperation is based on a strategic pact and unity against common threats, said Turkmani. We can have a common front against Israels threats. In December 2009, Syria and Iran signed an additional defense agreement aimed to face common enemies and challenges. In praising the agreement, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi said, it is natural for a country like Syria which has an inhumane and menacing predator like Israel in its neighborhood - to be always prepared [against possible foreign aggression. Syria supplied Hezbollah with weapons used in the war fought with Israel in July 2006 and has been resupplying the organization in defiance of the UN since the war ended. Those rockets used in 2006 had ranges of 20 to 60 miles. In April 2010, the U.S. and Israel accused Syria of delivering shipments of long-range Scud missiles to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Scuds have a range of more than 435 miles - placing Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel's nuclear installations at risk. Syria harbors in Damascus representatives of ten Palestinian terrorist organizations including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine all of which are opposed to advances in the peace process between

February 13, 2013.The response of Irans senior leaders to Shateris killing demonstrates both his rank and his personal importance of Tehrans ongoing military efforts in Syria. Major General Qassem Suleimani, the Quds Force commander and head of Iranian strategy in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf, personally delivered the news of Shateris death to his family and wept at his memorial ceremony. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei invited Shateris family to his home to console them. Shateri is the senior-most member of the Quds Force known to have been killed outside of Iran in the organizations three-decade history. He had deep connections with Lebanese Hezbollah and Irans global force projection network. His death is a serious blow to the IRGC-QF, and his very presence in northern Syria shows the depth of Irans involvement in that conflict.

Israel and the Palestinian Authority. These groups have launched terrible attacks against innocent Israeli citizens, which have resulted in hundreds of deaths. Syria also supports the Iranianfunded Hezbollah. [2]
1) A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-Iran-Syria Relationship MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL M Volume 62, No. 1, WINTER 2008 DOI: 10.3751.62.1.12 Abbas William Samii 2) Military Threats to Israel updated Oct 2013 to_Israel/Syria.html

An assessment of Shateris post-war external activities and the network of external operators with whom he was affiliated indicates that he was far from a mere Iran-Hezbollah interlocutor as the media currently seems to suggest; rather, Shateri was a senior official within Irans global force projection network. At some point after the Iran -Iraq War, Shateri gave up his domestic IRGC role and began deploying abroad.


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Shateri was first sent to Afghanistan where he worked alongside Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. There is little information on Shateris activity in Afghanistan. At some point after leaving Afghanistan, Shateri moved on to Iraq Shateri was picked to establish and lead the Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon (ICRL), an organization established to rebuild Southern Lebanon in the wake of the 2006 IsraeliHezbollah war. ICRL construction activities built covert bunkers and rocket launching sites as part of civilian housing reconstruction. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned ICRL and Shateri in August 2010 for providing financial, material, and technological support to Lebanese H ezbollah. While in Lebanon, Shateri operated covertly under the alias Hessam Khoshnevis, apparently concealing his identity even from the U.S. Treasury Department, which did not list Hassan Shateri among his aliases. It is likely that Shateri also operated in Afghanistan and Iraq under different aliases, contributing to the dearth of information on his activities in those two countries. Shateris apparently close relationship with Kazem Darabi, an Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) agent involved in the 1992 assassination of Kurdish dissidents in Berlin, Germany. Darabi, identified as a friend and colleague of Shateri, spoke to reporters about him on the day of his assassination. Darabi participated prominently in Shateris February 14 and 15 funerals in Tehran and Semnan, and two separate ceremonies on February 21 in Tehran. Other notable attendees at the numerous events commemorating Shateris death provide further evidence of Shateris senior standing in Irans global force projection network. Im ad Mughniyehs father attended a February 19 mourning ceremony in Tehran, and was greeted warmly by former Quds Force Commander and current Minister of Defense Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, and was seated next to IRGC Commander Major General Jafari. The Representative of the Supreme Leader to the Quds Force Ali Shirazi, former IRGC-QF Ramazan Base Commander Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Said Jalili also attended this event. Attendees of Shateris Semnan funeral include Quds Force Deputy Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, the Supreme Leaders Representative to Southern Lebanon, Hojjat al -Eslam Yousef Tabatabaei, and the aforementioned head of the Ahul Bayt World Assembly Ayatollah Akhtari, who notably attended the service as a representative of the Supreme Leader.
The Assassination of Iranian Quds Force General Hassan Shateri in Syria By Will Fulton February 28, 2013


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The IRGC-QF, Al Quds Force controls many of Irans training camps for extremists and guerilla warriors in Iran and countries like the Sudan and Lebanon. These include the Al Nasr camp for training Iraqi Shiites and Iraqi and Turkish Kurds in northwest Iran, and a camp near Mashhad for training Afghan and Tajik revolutionaries. US experts report that these camps or other facilities also provide specialized training in bomb making, use of IEDs, use of computers, sabotage, and use of ATGMs and MANPADSs. This training has been extensive for Iraqi Shiite militias.
US-IRANIAN COMPETITION: THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE I The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions TENTH EDITION By Anthony H. Cordesman, Alexander Wilner, Michael Gibbs, and Scott Modell Revised January 6, 2013 Pages 141 -143 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

Syria continues to be categorized as a state sponsor of terrorism, since its first designation in 1979. According to the State Department, Syrias government supports U.S.-listed terrorist groups and allows some of these organizations to actively remain in the country. Iran & Syrian Civil War

Syrias expansive porous border with Iraq was Tehrans main battle line against US Forces in Iraq. From Syria Tehran would strike US Forces with impunity. Syrian Gen. Assef Shawkat, Imad Mughniyah his Lebanese Hezbollah aid Ali Mussa Daqduq, General Qassem Suleimani, Ahmed Forouzandeh, a Brigadier General in the IRGCQF and little recognized IRGC former commander Dr Hassan Abbasi, was Supreme Leader Khamenei war department against the Great Satan, America. The Islamic Republic recruited, trained and weaved Geo-Strategic Islamic Militant Forces, many from nonaligned militant Islamic extremists groups Iran advocating Islamic solidarity, Tehran funneled a tidal wave of Islamic extremists into Iraq.
For example, the cell of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, was based in Syria. Zarqawi's group was responsible for the October 28, 2002 assassination of U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman, Jordan, as well as numerous killings of U.S. soldiers in Iraq. [100]

During Syrian Civil war The Islamic Republic of Iran has conducted an extensive, expensive, and integrated effort to keep their most viable ally President Bashar al-Assad in power. Tehran has deployed thousands of its armed forces assets, mainly IRGC and Hezbollah from Lebanon and tons of military supplies to Syria. The Ministry of Intelligence and National Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran (MISIRI) are advising and assisting Bashar alAssads military forces. These efforts have evolved into an expeditionary training mission using Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces, Quds Force, intelligence services, and law enforcement forces. The head of Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite militant group whose armed followers are fighting in Syria on the side of President Bashar al-Assad, pledged that his forces would remain there as long as necessary. Regional security officials told Reuters news in 2013 there are now between 2,000 and 4,000 Hezbollah fighters, experts and reservists in Syria. One Lebanese security official said a central command in Iran led by the Revolutionary Guards directs Hezbollah operations in Syria in close coordination with the Syrian authorities. Another source said Hezbollah had "hit squads" of highly trained fighters in Syria whose task is to assassinate military leaders among the Sunni rebels.
Syrian conflict underlines the strategic importance of Syria to Iran. By Alan Cowell and Anne Barnard November 14, 2013 ria.html?_r=0 Special Report: Hezbollah gambles all in Syria By Samia Nakhoul BEIRUT Sep 26, 2013 7:00am EDT


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From 1995 to 2006, Imad Mughniyah shuttled between Tehran, Damascus, and Beirut. From that point on Imad mainly stayed in Syria. Hezbollah leaders blamed Syria for Mughniyeh's death, citing lax security and the incompetence of Syrian Gen. Assef Shawkat, Assad's brother-in-law, who was personally responsible for Mughniyeh's safety. The world saw only a handful of pictures of Assef Shawkat. Few knew what he really did, or what power he wielded. President Bashar alAssads 62-year-old brother-in-law, killed in a suicide attack in Damascus on 2012, was one of the pillars of Assad family rule. After years as deputy head and then chief of military intelligence, he had become deputy defense minister. Shawkat has been a key architect of Syrias domination of Lebanon, substratum of Hezbollah as well as a fundamental contributor to Syrias long standing policy to foment terrorism against Israel and America the U.S. Treasury . [101]
In 2007, the US military released information on some 400 captured Iraqi terrorists documents. These records exposed more than 1,300 suicide bombers had infiltrated Iraq from Syria since 2003. , these became to be known as the Sinjar Records. Operatives in Syria met the volunteers from Damascus International Airport, took them to safe houses in Damascus and Aleppo and briefed them on their mission. The briefings include pep talks by Islamic clerics as well as those who provide volunteers with new identities for the journey to Iraq.

Most damning for Syrian government denial of culpability for facilitating terror was the Sinjar record's notation that recruiters reached several Syrians through the Internet. Given strict Syrian monitoring of electronic communication, Syrian statements that they did not know of such recruiting activities on their soil are not credible. Underlining the extent and intensity of these recruitment efforts was the fact that almost two-thirds of the Syrian nationals who volunteered for jihad in Iraq and all those who reported initial recruitment by the Internet became suicide bombers. Syrias Path to Islamist Terror By Michael Rubin Middle East Quarterly November 23, 2009
Sinjar Records; In October 2007, U.S. forces captured a collection of documents on foreign

fighters in Iraq kept by an Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) cell in the town of Sinjar, along Iraqs northern border with Syria, believed to be an entry point for many of Iraq's foreign fighters. What came to be known as the Sinjar Records contained biographical information on approximately 750 male foreign fighters recruited from August 2006 through August 2007 and included such information as names, telephone numbers, monetary contributions to Al Qaeda in Iraq, and how the fighter was recruited. The records were translated into English

The Islamic Republic of Iran was origin of the Islamic Suicide Bomber, which began in the Iran Iraq War, My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing Christopher Reuter, 2006 page 11


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and released with analysis by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point in 2008. In July 2007, the US military estimated the flow to be 60-80 foreign fighters entering Iraq per month, primarily through the Iraq Syria border. [103] The Sinjar documents describe a network of Syrian coordinators who facilitate travel through Syria, receiving between $19 and $34,584 for their services, the differential apparently dependent both upon the nationality of the jihadists as well as the demands of specific Syrian fixers. [104]
Iran Suicide Martyrdom The most volatile and diplomatic

Suicide Brigades: To avoid International criticism the Islamic Republic ceased to advertise creation of the IRGC suicide divisions after and passed this responsibility to a nongovernmental organization called The International Headquarters for Honoring Muslim Martyrs. This group openly to recruits volunteers from all walks of life.
An Iranian View of US Psychological Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 2007 By Njdeh Asisian spring07_asisian.pdf

nightmare, which no one wants to address, the Islamic Republic of Iran recruits Internationally for suicide bombers, both men and women. Tehran is the only country in the world that maintains a military force of suicide bombers, some estimates as high as 60,000. Suicide martyrdom belief originated with Ayatollah Khomeini it is now part of the educational and social fabric of the Islamic Republic. Suicide Martyrdom Operations, Evolved Out of the Iran Iraq War & Played a Pivotal Role in Stopping Saddams Invasion of Iran. This has become such an international caustic and detrimental issue for the Islamic Republic, it no longer openly discusses it. [105]
The Lovers of Martyrdom Garrison, Mosaic Warfare Doctrine & Suicide Brigades The IRGC suicide

garrison formed in mid-2000 by IRGC former commander Dr Hassan Abbasi, at the IRGC military & strategy research facility the Doctrinal Analysis Center for Security without Borders. Hassan Abbasi currently he is the chief of Irans National Security & Strategic research center. [106]
Suicide Brigades Tehrans Female Suicide Bombers: Olive Daughters In April 2005, the semi-official

Daily Iran announced the formation of a unit of female suicide bombers nicknamed the Olive Daughters. The Baztab news website, which is associated with Mohsen Rezai, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (from 1981 to 1997) and since secretary of the Expediency Council, cited one Firouz Rajai-Far, who said, "The martyrdom-seeking Iranian women and girls are ready to walk in the footsteps of the holy female Palestinian warriors, realizing the most terrifying nightmares of Zionists." [107]
Supreme leader Ali Khamenei, Martyrdom-seeking operations mark the highest point of the greatness

of a nation and the peak of is epic. A man, a youth, a boy, and a girl who are prepared to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the interests of the nation and their religion is the symbol of the greatest pride, courage, and bravery [108] Online Iranian Suicide Bomber Recruitment News Video with English Subtitles


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In 1994 it was the Islamic Republic that began the waves of suicide bombings in Israel through its proxies the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The first Palestinian suicide bombing occurred in April 1994 in the Israeli town of Afula. This took place at the height of the Oslo Peace Process, just as Israel was withdrawing from the Gaza Strip. Since 1994, over 120 suicide attacks have taken place against Israel. Then as now Tehran is against any form of Palestinian peace with Israel. One of the founding principal Khomeini, Israel is enemy of Islam and Mankind and must be destroyed.


In March 2007, coalition forces in Iraq captured Ali Musa Daqduq, a Hezbollah veteran who was working with IRGC-QF to train Iraqis in high-grade weapons, intelligence, sniping, and

kidnapping operations. According to the U.S. military in 2005, Daqduq "was directed by senior Lebanese Hezbollah leadership to go to Iran and work with the IRGC-QF to train Iraqi extremists." In May 2006, Daqduq "traveled to Tehran with Yussef Hashim, a fellow Hezbollah member and head of the organization's operations in Iraq." US Brig Gen Bergner explained. Daqduq began to train Iraqis inside Iran. Groups of 20 to 60 recruits were trained in the use of Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs), mortars, rockets, and sniper rifles, and instructed on how to conduct intelligence and kidnapping operations."These Special Groups are militia extremists, funded, trained and armed by external sources specifically by Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force operatives," said Brig Gen Bergner. "In addition to training, the Qods force also supplies the Special Groups with weapons and funding of 750,000 to three million U.S. dollars a month. Without this support, these Special Groups would be hard pressed to conduct their operations in Iraq ." Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner is quoted as confirming that Iranian forces helped plan one of the most sophisticated insurgent attacks against US forces in Iraq. In January 2007, up to a dozen terrorists impersonating U.S. security personnel infiltrated an American base in Karbala, killed one U.S. serviceman and captured and later executed four other U.S. troops. Bergner explained Tehran is using its Hezbollah militant proxy, backed and supported by its own Al Quds force, to support terrorist activity in Iraq. The following four paragraphs are verbatim from the article: Bergner said a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative, Ali Mussa Dakdouk, was captured March 20 in southern Iraq. Dakdouk, a 24-year veteran of Hezbollah, was sent to Lebanon "as a surrogate for the Iranian Quds Force" to finance and arm militant cells to carry out attacks on U.S. and Iraqi troops, he said.


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The general also said that Dakdouk was a liaison between the Iranians and a breakaway Shiite group led by Qais al-Khazaali, a former spokesman for Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Bergner said al-Kazaali's group carried out the January attack against a provincial government building in Karbala and that the Iranians assisted in preparations. Al-Khazaali and his brother Ali al-Khazaali were captured with Dakdouk. Dakdouk told U.S. interrogators that the Karbala attackers "could not have conducted this complex operation without the support and direction of the IRGC-QF force," Bergner said. [110]
Abdul Reza Shahlai, a deputy commander in IRGC-QF and the Karbala Attack

The most serious attack traced back to Shahlai was the Jan. 20, 2007 attack on the Karbala Joint Provincial Coordination Center. Five US soldiers were kidnapped and then murdered during the sophisticated attack. The January 20 attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center by the IRGC -QF backed Iraqi Qazali Network, [111]
2007 Satellite imagery linked Iran to the Karbala attack. "U.S. reconnaissance spacecraft

spotted a training center in the Islamic Republic that duplicated the layout of the governor's compound in Karbala, Iraq. An American military officer confirmed to us the report is accurate, but did not disclose the location of the training camp. In early January, Strategic Policy Consulting confirmed a two year old report by the British Ahwazi Friendship Society that Iran was using the "Arab populated city of Ahwaz, southwestern Iran, as a base of operations." The city of Ahwaz is in Khuzestan province, which borders the southern Iraqi province of Basra. It is not publicly known if Ahwaz is the location of the Karbala mockup.

Ali Musa Daqduq is a Lebanese Shi'ite, since 1986 a senior Hezbollah operative in Lebanon. In May 2006, he was sent by the Hezbollah leadership to support the IRGC-QF. Ali Daqduq did not only train Iraqi recruits in Iranian training camps, he was also sent by the IRGC-QF on four operational missions in Iraq. On his return to Iran after the fourth mission he was instructed by his Iranian handlers to establish "special groups" of Shi'ite operatives in Iraq using the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to a 2007 briefing given by BrigadierGeneral Kevin Bergner, then United States Army spokesman in Iraq, He said that Iran also trained them in the use of sophisticated roadside bombs (explosively formed projectiles, and the deadly EFPs, which caused many casualties among the American and Iraqi forces. Brig Gen Bergner said three training camps for the "Special Groups" have been identified inside Iran. . "Our intelligence reveals that the senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity." Brig Gen Bergner further explained it "would be hard to imagine" that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, would not be aware of Qods Force's role in the Iraq violence. Qods Force reports directly to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. [113]


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America and Iraqi forces captured several high-level Qods Force officers inside Iraq by 2006. Among those captured were Mahmud Farhadi, one of the three Iranian regional

commanders in the Ramazan Corps; Ali Mussa Daqduq, a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative; Qais Qazali, the leader of the Qazali Network which is better known as the Asaib al Haq or the League of the Righteous; and Azhar al Dulaimi, one of Qazali's senior tactical commanders. The US Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on Major General Ahmad Forouzandeh, the former IRGC-QF Force commander, and Abdul Reza Shahlai, a deputy commander in Iran's Qods Force, for backing Shia terror groups inside Iraq. In 2008 US forces captured three members of IRGC-QF, Iran's special operations branch, during a raid in Diyala province. By late 2008 Iraqi and US forces killed one Qods Force operative and captured 14 others during raids throughout southern and central Iraq. A Dec. 19, 2008 raid in the town of Qastin in Diyala province netted a senior IRGC-QF officer and his associate. The officer was described as a "commander of Iranian special operations in Iraq who is also believed to be involved in facilitating training of Iraqi militants at Iranian IRGC-QF training camps." [114]
2008 Treasury Undersecretary Stuart Levey, "Iran and Syria are

Syria-based Mish'an AlJaburi provides financial, material, and technical support for acts of violence that threaten the peace and stability of Iraq. Iran trains, funds, and provides weapons to violent Shia extremist groups, while Syria provides safe-haven to Sunni insurgents and financiers," said Stuart Levey, then Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. " Today's action brings to light the lethal actions of these individuals, and we call on the international community to stand with us in isolating them from the global economy." , By committing, directing, and supporting violent attacks in Iraq, these extremists threaten peace and stability and undermine efforts to promote economic reconstruction in Iraq. Today's action follows President Bush's issuance of E.O. 13438 on July 17, 2007, which targets insurgent and militia groups and their support. Designations under E.O. 13438 are administered by Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control and prohibit all transactions between the designees and any U.S. person and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction . [115]

fueling violence and destruction in Iraq.

Assef Shawkat, Director of Syrian Military Intelligence, and President Assad possessed detailed knowledge of the activities of AQI facilitator Abu Ghadiyah, who was using Syrian territory to bring foreign fighters and suicide bombers into Iraq.

The Assad regime has American blood on its hands. Then US

General Petraeus pointed the finger of blame directly at Assad and Shawkat, who knew full well what al Qaeda was up to on Syrian soil. 2008 Leaked State Department cables show that Shawkat was one of al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) most important patrons. And he [117] played this role on behalf of his brother-in-law, Bashar al Assad.


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2008 US Commando Raid Syria General David Petraeus and other U.S. officials visited Syrias neighbors in an attempt to put pressure on Assad to give up his support for AQI. These efforts were fruitless. Thus, the U.S. military decided to take matters into its own hands and executed the unprecedented raid on al Qaeda inside Syria in October 2008.

In October 2008 then President Bush commissioned a commando raid into Syria. The objective was a highest al Qaeda facilitator known as Abu Ghadiyah. Earlier that same year, the US Treasury Department designated Ghadiyah, a native Iraqi, and three of his family members as significant al Qaeda members. They operated a pipeline in Syria for foreign fighters and suicide bombers traveling to Iraq. Several US helicopters penetrated the town of Sukkariya near Abu Kamal in eastern Syria, merely five miles from the Iraqi border. US commandos from the hunter-killer units of Task Force 88 assaulted the buildings sheltering [118] Ghadiyah and his staff.
Captured Documents; During the operation, US forces found numerous documents and

electronic files that detailed "the larger al-Qaeda effort to organize, coordinate, and transport foreign terrorists into Iraq and other places. The 2008 Treasury Designates Members of Abu Ghadiyah's Network Facilitates flow of terrorists, weapons, and money from Syria to al Qaida in Iraq, "Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, Syria has become a transit station for al Qaeda foreign terrorists on their way to Iraq," said Stuart Levey, then Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. "Abu Ghadiyah and his network go to great lengths to facilitate the flow through Syria of money, weapons, and terrorists intent on killing U.S. and Coalition forces and innocent Iraqis." Today's action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing financial or material support to terrorism.

IRGC-QF Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani and Imad Mughniyah nurtured four separate but interconnected proxy organizations in the Levant in the Syrian, the Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The first two have allowed or facilitated the positioning of Iranian headquarters, intelligence bases, training camps, and weapons depots in Syria, Gaza and Lebanon. Iranian support to each has ranged from high-end weapons to trainers to economic assistance programs aimed at enhancing the stature of each organization among its own target population from Iraq to Israel.


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Understanding Iraq Irans Relationship, Prime Minister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki is Iraq's head of government. From 1979-1980 he was sentenced to death for opposing Saddam Hussein and the Baathist party, (Iran Syria Connection), al-Maliki flees Iraq and finds refuge in Iran and later Syria. In 2003 he returns to Iraq from Syria. From 20032004, he was a member of the de-Baathification Commission, which worked to rid former Baathist from Iraq's military and government. January 2005 - Is elected to the new parliament as a member of the Dawa Party and serves as the head of the Security and Defense Committee of the National Assembly. April 22, 2006 - Is chosen by the Shiite-dominated coalition United Iraqi Alliance to replace Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim alJaafar, where he remains PM of Iraq. [119] After failing to win the 2010 Prime Minster elections Nouri al-Maliki seized power. His open support of Assads Syria and allowing the Islamic Republic free access through Iraq to Syria is an open secret. His support for Assad have facilitated separated the Iraq people, and the Sunni Radical Islamists are pouring into Iraq to fight Malikis government. His seizure of power, purging of Sunni and other Iraq officials plugged Iraq into chaos. Maliki employed a wide range of dictatorial methods to crush Iraqi Sunni leadership. Between his attacks and their counterattacks, many Sunni leaders arrested or driven from politics, including some of the most nonsectarian, non-violent, practical and technocratic. [120] Now in 2013 with over 7,000 civilian casualties so far, 2013 has already become the deadliest year in Iraq since 2008. Following the withdrawal of US troops in December 2011, instead of engaging in post-war and occupation recovery, Iraq has been with each day plunging deeper into inter-ethnic violence, prompted by ever-growing tensions mostly between the countrys majority Shiite community and the Sunni minority. 201 3 saw the situation aggravate to its worst, with almost daily deaths of civilians becoming the harsh reality the country is facing today. [121]

In 2011, with U.S. elections in sight and the presidents popularity flagging, the Obama Administration decided to ditch its military commitment to Iraq. Technically speaking, the Administration offered to keep roughly 3,000 troops. They were a far cry from the 20-25,000 troops that the U.S. military felt were still needed for several more years to do those jobs. Few Iraqi politicians were willing to fight for such a meaningless presence. In 2011 Prime Minister of Iraq Nouri alMaliki convened in Washington for an official meeting with President Obama.
Accompanying Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki was his transportation minister Iranian Hadi Farhan al-Amiri. Hadi just happened to be a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Commander

For many in the Arab world, the Syrian civil war and the Iraqi civil war are merely two fronts in the same conflict, a Sunni-Shia struggle for the Arab heartland. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Jordan and other Sunni states have been funneling money, supplies, weapons and Jihadist fighters to the opposition in Syria, who are overwhelmingly Sunnis, fighting a regime coalition built around Assads own Alawi (Shia) community. One of the ways that they have been doing so is to use the Sunni tribes of Western Iraq, which span both the Saudi-Iraqi and Syrian-Iraqi borders. Inevitably, the Iraqi tribes have been keeping a certain amount of this largesse for use against their own Shia oppressors, something that many in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Jordan seem to encourage. Likewise, opposition fighters from Syria and Iraq flow back and forth across the border, just as AQI aids the Nusra front in Syria.
The Fall And Rise And Fall Of Iraq Kenneth M. Pollack July 2013 /files/papers/2013/07/30%20fall%20rise%2 0fall%20iraq%20pollack/pollack_iraq.pdf


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This meeting was an event at which President Obama trumpeted the end of the Iraq War. Accompanying Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki was his transportation minister Hadi Farhan al-Amiri. Hadi just happened to be a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Commander, according to FBI records played a role in a 1996 terrorist attack that killed 19 U.S. servicemen. But during the rule of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Amiri served as a commander of the Badr Corps a group backed at the time by the IRGC. Transportation Minister Hadi Farhan al-Amiri was in the IRGC during the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers, an apartment complex housing U.S. soldiers in Saudi Arabia. American law enforcement officials believe the IRGC-QF played a role in that attack. Former FBI Director Louis Freeh said agents would like to find out what al-Amiri knew about the Khobar attack that killed 19 U.S. servicemen. "As a senior leader, Amiri would have to have known about Khobar, and he would know Gen. Ahmad Sherifi, who was the IRGC general that conducted the operation," The FBI "would love to sit down and talk to him, show him photographs, and ask him questions" about fugitives named in the Khobar Towers indictment. Freeh said. [122]

Iranian Appeasement Policy, President Obamas grand overt acts of consolatory gestures for Tehran. The Irbil Five In 2007 US Forces captured 5 IRGC-QF Officers northern

Iraqi city of Irbil in 2007. These were senior Al Qods Force commanders, acting on orders from the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. They were responsible for providing Iranian-manufactured EFPs Explosively Formed Projectiles) to terror militias in Iraq to maim and kill Americans. Further, these five IRGC-QF commanders not only coordinated the supply of Iranian EFPs but also acted as terror liaison and military advisors to local Iraqi radical militants. Multinational Forces 2007 Iraq press release stated the Iranian office in Irbil was not a consulate or diplomatic mission. [123] The Irbil five were held by US Forces in Iraq, in 2009 President Obama had them released to the Iraq government who released them to Iran . The story that was floated was these senior IRGC Officers were only Iranian diplomats. [124]
Also released in 2009 was Qayis Khazali

the leader of the Asaib al Haq (AAH)or the League of the Righteous. He was set free by the US military and transferred to Iraqi custody in exchange for the release of British hostage Peter Moore.


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Moore and four members of his personal bodyguard were kidnapped at the Finance Ministry in Baghdad in May 2007 by a group that calls itself the Islamic Shia Resistance, which is in fact a front for the League of the Righteous. The group had always insisted that Qais, his brother Laith, and other members of the Asaib al Haq be released in exchange for Moore and the others. Three of Moore's bodyguards were executed while in custody, and the fourth is thought to have been murdered as well. Qais Qazali was the commander of the League of the Righteous before US forces captured him and several other Shia terrorists in 2007. Qais commanded a large Mahdi Army faction which later broke off and became the AAH. Qayis Khazali served as a spokesman and senior aide to Muqtada al Sadr. The AAH receives extensive financial and military support from the IRGC-QF. Qayiss forces was directly implicated by General David Petraeus as being behind the January 2007 attack on the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala as well as other high-profile terror attacks in Iraq. Five US soldiers were killed during the Karbala attack and subsequent kidnapping attempt. The US soldiers were executed after US and Iraqi security forces closed in on the assault team. As discussed the attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center was a complex, sophisticated operation. The assault team, led by tactical commander Azhar al Dulaimi, was trained in a mock-up of the center that was built in Iran. The unit had excellent intelligence and received equipment that made them appear to be US soldiers. [125] Some of the members of the assault team are said to have spoken English.
Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), also known as the League of the Righteous, has re-emerged 2012 in Iraq, with deadly results. This Iranian-backed, Shia militant

organization has claimed responsibility for over 6,000 attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq since its creation in 2006. AAH carried out spectacular and highly sophisticated operations during the peak of the Iraq War, including the October 10, 2006 mortar attack on American Forward Operating Base Falcon; the May 6, 2006 downing of a British Lynx helicopter in Basra, resulting in five British fatalities; the January 20, 2007 attack on the Karbala Provincial Headquarters, resulting in the capture and then murder of five American soldiers; and the May 29, 2007 attack on the Iraqi Finance Ministry, which ended in the kidnapping of five British contractors, four of whom were killed in captivity. Along with Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and the Promised Day Brigades (PDB), AAH is an Iraqi Shia militant group funded, armed, and trained by the Qods Force, the external Special Operations branch of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. Qais al-Khazali reported to the Qods Force Deputy Commander, Abdul Reza Shahlai (AKA Hajji Yussef) through Qais liaison Ali Mussa Daqduq. During their peak, these Shia militant groups were Irans primary proxy weapons against the United States presence in Iraq, defined by their widespread use of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), improvised rocketed-assisted mortars (IRAMs), and high-profile kidnappings and executions. They were characterized as a principal threat stream during the Iraq War, making their recent resurgence particularly alarming.
The Institute for the Study of War The Resurgence of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq Sam Wyer 2012


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The US military has catalogued large quantities of enemy weapons in Iraq that had imprints showing they were recently manufactured in Tehran. In particular, highlylethal explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) are made from special copper disks manufactured with highlycalibrated machine tools. They have been used by Hezbollah in Lebanon, with Iranian military assistance. Many of the EFPs found in Iraq from 2005-2007 had the markings that indicated that they were manufactured in Iran as recently as 2006. [126]
By October of 2009 President Obama had released more than 100 members of the, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) or League of the Righteous. Obama also released several senior IRGC-QF Officers, including Mahmud Farhadi, the leader of the Zafr Command, one of three units subordinate to IRGC-QF Ramazan Corps. Farhadi was among five Iranians turned over to the Iraqi government and then subsequently turned over to the Islamic Republic. [127]

In 2012 Obama had released Ali Mussa Daqduq, the elite combat commando Hezbollah operative. Ali Musa Daqduq is a Lebanese Shi'ite, a senior Hezbollah operative in Lebanon since 1983. In May 2006, he was sent by the Hezbollah leadership to support the IRGC- QF Ramazan Corps.

Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), also known as the League of the Righteous has close connections to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Lebanese Hezbollah operative Ali Mussa Daqduq, who was detained by coalition forces in 2007 and released from Iraqi custody in November 2012, provided organized training to AAH fighters. He reported to Youssef Hashim, the head of Lebanese Hezbollah Special Operations; the latter reported to Abdul Reza Shahlai (AKA Hajji Yussef), the director of Iranian Qods Force External Operations. Abdul Reza Shahlai was the mastermind behind the disrupted 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States in Washington, DC. All reported to Qassem Soleimani, the head of the IRGC-QF Ramazan Corps .
The Institute for the Study of War The Resurgence of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq Sam Wyer 2012 http://www.understandingwar. org/sites/default/files/Resurge nceofAAH.pdf

Daqduq conducted lethal training, organized and directed terrorists actions of Iraqi Shi'ite militias fighting the US and coalition forces. He and other Lebanese Hezbollah instructors trained Iraqi Shi'ite operatives in Iran. He was also sent by the Quds Force on a mission to aid the Shi'ite militias in Iraq, entering the country with forged documents. Hezbollah in Lebanon (which for Iran is the best example of its success in exporting the revolution) is directed by the IRGC-QF for subversion and terrorism not only in Lebanon and in the Middle East, but worldwide as well. [128]
Ironically, the US Treasury Department added Daqduq to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists just days after he was released from Iraqi custody. The FBI was actively seeking to prosecute Daqduq, but the Obama administration refused to transfer Daqduq to Guantanamo Bay for a military trial. [129]


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Currently the Islamic Republic is providing top Al Qaeda militants a center of operations in Iran here training camps established. Extremist Islamic militants attack and kill US Soldiers from Iraq to Afghanistan. This filthy secret the Obama administration carefully avoids and obscures. Since 2005 An Iran-based al Qaeda network led by Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil funnels Gulf money and personnel for al Qaeda from Iran to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. The network, operates under an agreement between al Qaeda and the Iranian regime, has personnel in Kuwait and Qatar, and is connected to Pakistan through al Qaedas top commander in Pakistans tribal areas, Atiyah Abd al Rahman. Rahman was previously appointed as al-Qaidas emissary in Iran by Osama bin Laden. Iranian involvement with al Qaeda and other Sunni jihadist groups is nothing new. The 9-11 Commission Report was explicit about Iran's connections with al Qaeda. "The relationship between al Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations." Contacts between Iran, Hezbollah and al Qaeda were established in Sudan in the early 1990s. "Al Qaeda members received advice and training from Hezbollah," according the 9-11 Commission report.

2012 Treasury Places Sanctions on al Qaeda Operatives in Iran Treasury Further Exposes Iran-Based Al-Qa'ida Network 10/18/2012 Action Targets Key Al-Qaida Facilitator Supporting Terrorist Activities in South Asia and the Middle East ,Washington The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of Adel Radi Saqr al-Wahabi al-Harbi (al-Harbi), a key member of an al-Qaida network operating in Iran and led by Iran-based al-Qaida facilitator Muhsin al-Fadhli (al-Fadhli). Today's action, taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, follows Treasurys designation in July 2011 of Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil (AKA Yasin al-Suri) and five other al-Qaida members, and underscores that Iran continues to allow al-Qaida to operate a core pipeline that moves al -Qaida money and fighters through Iran to support al-Qaida activities in South Asia. This network also sends funding and fighters to Syria. Todays action, which builds on our action from July 2011, further exposes al Qaidas critically important Iran-based funding and facilitation network, said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. We will continue targeting this crucial source of al-Qaidas funding and support, as well as highlight Irans ongoing complicity in this networks operation. Todays designation freezes any assets Al-Harbi holds under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with this individual. E.O. 13224 targets terrorists, terrorist organizations, individuals and entities owned or controlled by or acting for or on behalf of designated terrorists or terrorist organizations, and those providing financial, material, or technological support or financial or other services to designated terrorists or terrorist organizations, or for acts of terrorism. Al-Harbi is an Iran-based al-Qaida facilitator who serves as the deputy to al-Fadhli. AlFadhli took over the Iran-based facilitation network from Yasin al-Suri in late 2011. In his capacity as the deputy to al-Fadhli in Iran, al-Harbi facilitates the travel of extremists to Afghanistan or Iraq via Iran on behalf of al-Qaida, and is believed to have sought funds to support al -Qaida attacks. Before joining the Iran-based al-Qaida network in early 2011, al-Harbi appeared on the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Interior's Most Wanted List and was charged with traveling to Afghanistan to join al-Qaida and providing technical support on the Internet to the terrorist group. Al-Fadhli is a veteran al-Qaida operative who has been active within the terrorist network for years. Treasury previously designated al-Fadhli pursuant to E.O. 13224 in February 2005 for providing financial and material support to the al-Zarqawi Network and al-Qaida. At that time, al-Fadhli was considered an al-Qaida leader in the Gulf and provided support to Iraq-based fighters for attacks against U.S. and multinational forces.


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Al-Fadhli was also considered a major facilitator for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and prior to that was involved in several terrorist attacks that took place in October 2002 including the attacks on the French ship MV Limburg and against U.S. Marines on Faylaka Island in Kuwait. Al-Fadhli began working with al-Qaidas Iran-based facilitation network in 2009 and was later arrested by the Iranians. He was subsequently released by the Iranians in 2011 and went on to assume the leadership of the facilitation network from Yasin al-Suri later that year. In addition to providing funding for al-Qaida activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, this network is working to move fighters and money through Turkey to support al-Qaida-affiliated elements in Syria. Al-Fadhli also is leveraging his extensive network of Kuwaiti jihadist donors to send money to Syria via Turkey. Treasury previously took action against this al-Qaida funding and support network in July 2011 when it designated Yasin al-Suri and five other al-Qaida members pursuant to E.O. 13224. This network uses Iran as a critical transit point and operates under an agreement between al-Qaida and the Iranian government. Under the terms of the agreement between al-Qaida and Iran, al-Qaida must refrain from conducting any operations within Iranian territory and recruiting operatives inside Iran while keeping Iranian authorities informed of their activities. In return, the Government of Iran gave the Iran-based al-Qaida network freedom of operation and uninhibited ability to travel for extremists and their families. Al-Qaida members who violate these terms run the risk of being detained by Iranian authorities. Yasin al-Suri agreed to the terms of this agreement with Iran with the knowledge of now-deceased al-Qaida leader Atiyah Abd al Rahman. The Treasury Departments action today against al-Harbi is taken in coordination with the State Departments announcement that it is offering multi-million dollar rewards for information on al-Harbi and al-Fadhli under its Rewards for Justice Program. In particular, the State Departments Bureau of Diplomatic Security has announced a reward of up to $7 million for information leading to the location of al-Fadhli and $5 million for information leading to the location of al-Harbi. Previously, the State Department announced a $10 million reward for information leading to the location of Yasin al-Suri. That reward remains available. The Rewards for Justice Program administered by the State Departments Bureau of Diplomatic Security has helped target terrorists and prevent terrorism worldwide.

The Enemies of Islamic who must be destroyed Jews, Americans, British, Russian, and any and all the NATO countries, Al-Suri Abu Musab al-Suri with all the turmoil and

global crisis, one event for the most part has escaped the attention of the International Intelligence Community was Syrias release of al Suri. After his arrest in Pakistan in 2005, they turned him over to the CIA who in turn under a controversial American rendition program handed him over to Syria in 2006 where he was a wanted man. Bashar al-Assad in his anger to the Americas support for the rebels released him. More than likely Abu Musab al -Suri fled to the safety of Tehran. He was first reported to have been released by Syrian's security services along with his deputy, Abu Khalid, in late December 2011, by the Sooryoon Syrian news website. [131]


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1999-2001 CBR (Chemical Biological Radiological) Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan / Abu Musab al-Suri Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan conducted chemical, biological, and radiological basic training courses for hundreds of extremists. The organizations Durante & Tarnak Farms training courses were led by Abu Khabab al-Masri (aka Midhat Mursi al Sayid Umar), a chemist and alleged top bomb maker for al Qaeda, who was part of Osama bin Ladins inner circle and Abu Musab al-Suri (aka Setmariam), a Spanish citizen born in Syria
Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? By Rolf Mowatt-Larssen Foreword by Graham Allison 2010 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

His real name was Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Sitt Maryam Nasar, (aka Umar Abd al-Hakim) Al-Suri 1959, in Syria where he joined the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, an affiliate organization of Bin Ladens right hand man, Al Zawahiri Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. While not a household name like Osama bin Laden, al Suri had an immense influence on the global jihadist movements, shaping asymmetrical warfare and particularly using CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) is waging Jihad against Israel and the West.
Al-Suri is best known for his 1,600-page treatise Dawat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah alAlamiyyah (Call of Global Islamic Resistance), which articulates a strategy of decentralized jihad, rather than one that depends on clandestine organizations.

Al-Suri is one of the leading developers of geopolitical strategies for al-Qaeda and the jihad movement in general. He urged jihadists to strengthen their position in Central Asia and to use Yemen as a launching pad against the neighboring Gulf States. The current flow of fighters to their home countries in Central Asia from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region as well as the presence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen shows the influence of al-Suris ideas. While it is true that jihadists are driven by conditions on the ground, such ideas have nonetheless played a major role in shaping the movements ideology.
Syrias Surprising Release of Jihadi Strategist Abu Musab al Suri Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 3 February 10, By: Murad Batal alShishani

Al-Suri was recognized one time as Al Qaeda leading theoretician and strategic thinker; he is particularly credited for being its post 9/11 principal architect. Prior to his arrest in November 2005, the Al Qaeda veteran was purportedly Osama bin Ladins top aide, His 1,604-page book, Call to Global Islamic Resistance (GIR), has often been likened to a manifesto, and occasionally been referred to as the Mein Kampf of the jihadist movement, in fact it invites its readers to self-recruit and become independent terrorists.

Al-Suri played a key role in the 1990s in establishing alQaidas presence in Europe and forging its links to radical jihadism in North Africa and the Middle East, the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, South and East Asia. He was a spokesman for the Algerian Groupe Islamique Arm, a press attach for Osama bin Laden in London and an adviser to Mullah Omar in Kabul, and he appears under a variety of aliases in books by foreign correspondents.
Journal of Strategic Security Volume 6 Number 1 Spring 2013 Article 4 An Analysis of Abu Musab al-Suris Call to Global Islamic Resistance M.W. Zackie University of Cambridge pp. 1-18 cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1230 &context=jss


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At the same time that Al-Suri was released, security sources revealed that the Syrian government had also released dozens of other known radical militants, many with ties to Al-Suri and others to AQI.
Middle East Security Report 6 | Jihad In Syria | Elizabeth OBagy | September 2012 The 9/11 Attacks Were a Mistake Afghanistan should have been built into an International base of operations from which to strike out at the world using decentralized cells, & CBRN attacks. - Al- Suri

Al- Suri had a great

fascination with the destructive impact of Weapons of Mass Destruction. His training in the 1980s, including time in Saddam Husseins Iraq, had allowed him to build up a certain expertise.
Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda Paul Cruickshank Center on Law and Security NYU School of Law New York, New York, USA Mohannad Hage Ali Al-Hayat London, UK

Al- Suri criticized the 9/11 attacks because he believed that Afghanistan, which was being used as a base by the Taliban, was crucial to the global Islamic resistance. "The outcome of the 9/11 attacks as a I see it, was to put a catastrophic end to the jihadi current," Suri noted. "The jihadism entered the tribulations of the current maelstrom which swallowed most of its cadres over the subsequent three years." [132]

As a prominent trainer, military instructor and jihadist lecturer, al Suri had a large network of top-level contacts in many jihadist organizations, and he is believed to have trained militants who later returned to Europe as sleeper cells, especially in Spain, Italy and France, according to Spanish authorities. A review videotapes of his complete lecture series discovered in Afghanistan reveal that as early as 2000, al-Suri was pressing a future generation of operatives and recruiters toward a new modus operandi, one that bears striking similarity to the evolution of the structure and strategy of Al Qaeda after 9/11. The GIR outlines future strategies for the international jihadist movement. Al Suris book begins by dictating that armed jihad must be supported through a background of Islamic political thinking, understanding and Jihad warfare. Al-Suri then describes the "third generation of Mujahideen" as a generation currently in the process of being defined, born after the "September happenings, the occupation in Iraq, and the Palestinian Intifada". While exhorting the third generation to keep to their roots in the international movement, al-Suri describes his 1990 decision that jihadist groups cannot hope to confront America and its allies until weakening these enemies though decentralized jihad. [133] Once the jihadist groups have created a sustainable civil society, they can begin al-Suri's three stage battle: first, all forms for war presence of the enemy in our land other world countries second, and at their homeland third". Throughout his book, al-Suri names these enemy countries as the " Jews, Americans, British, Russian, and any and all the NATO countries, as well as any country that takes the position of oppressing Islam and Muslims". He further provides a clear indication that only by carrying out terrorist attacks and decentralized urban warfare, CBRN tactics would the jihadi network win. AlSuri explicitly calls for attacks on all sectors of the enemy's influence, both civilian and military. According to his book, the "political, military, economical, educational, missionary, and tourist presence etc in our countries" are the primary targets of jihad.


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It is estimated over one million injured American veterans from the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. All that can be said with any certainty is that as of last December more than 900,000 service men and women been treated at Department of Veterans Affairs hospitals and clinics since returning from war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan. The monthly rate of new patients to these facilities as of the end of 2012 was around 10,000. From a directive from President Obama, in March the VA ceased to disclose this data. Removed information about the is the number of soldiers that have sought government medical help and about the types of injuries they suffered. Washington Congresss policymakers and health care professionals are becoming hamstrung, bound in red tape for making decisions about funding for crucial veterans' health programs. This would involve physical therapy, to other medical treatments and diagnostic tools that should be researched and targeted. The reliability of future military strategies could be in jeopardy as well.
VA's actions are "a gross injustice to veterans and the taxpaying public," stated Anthony Hardie, a Gulf War veteran and veterans' advocate who has testified before the House Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation. [135]


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Moving through this international Persia labyrinth, collecting the pieces of the puzzle, these clearly define that the Islamic Republic is at war with its Great Satan, America and the lesser Satan, Israel.
Khomeinis doctrine (the destruction of Zionism is almost a necessary condition for solving the problems of Islam in our time) continues to guide the second generation of the revolution, a sort of delusional preoccupation about which there can be no deviation, questioning, or disagreement, and that one must constantly and actively strive to fulfill. This doctrine does not view the struggle against Israel as a separate matter but as part of the ongoing battle between the Wests, which, Iran asserts, planted the Zionist entity in the heart of the Muslim world, and the world of Islam,
Iran Ramps Up Its Genocidal Rhetoric Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall, August 28, 2012

It is simple common sense you cannot make peace while the other is waging war. IRGC- QF and its militant forces IEDS and EFPs raging scythes are harvesting American lives every day. With all these grand Washington gestures of appeasements, Tehran has not ceased its killing of Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. Tehrans Hamas & Hezbollah militant forces are still firing rockets into the families of Israel. As we have seen the Supreme Leader was still hosting and promoting, Death to America, still furiously ranting Israel must be wiped off the map. Neither has the Islamic Republic taken any definite steps in the nuclear dialog. Tehran surreptitiously replicates the same standoff tactics, holds discussions about nuclear talks, these are no more than, what are you going to give me if attend a nuclear discussion? It is in this arena of pre-talks Tehran soft petals prerequisite demands, concessions and litters them with expected quid pro quo gratuities. Iran only finally agrees to hold nuclear discussions when it believes it has gathered in the best payments for just being there gambit. Once Tehrans officials attend this conference i t is a long painfully drawn-out exhausting affair. In these arduous nuclear meetings, in reality nothing is agreed upon. Iranian negotiators deceptively will openly praise these talks as meaningful, "body language" showed that the sides were ready for a deal, positive. Once quid pro quo gratuities payments have been pocked by Tehran, Iranian negotiators slowly start becoming annoyed, claim the Islamic Republic is being disrespected, unfairly treated, and singled out, persecuted . Then the Islamic cyber -proganda machine begins slowly dissecting, eroding the worth of the nuclear negotiation. Eventually Tehran will throw in the towel over issues of justice, innocence and irreconcilable differences. The Islamic Republic has been known to manufacture distracting one or more international crisis during these nuclear negotiations. The major card Tehran consistently plays is its Hamas card. This Iranian entity will begin increasing the tempo of rocket attacks to any kind of military or political gave endeavor which would necessitate American and International intervention. Another is an IRGC naval spokesmen will threaten to close the Persian Gulf, reminding the global community it holds their oil & economic highway hostage.


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So far Khamenei has pursued a sophisticated strategy. He expresses doubt about United States willingness to reach an agreement and distances himself from the overt gestures President Rouhani has made to the West, like the telephone conversation with President Obama. Publicly he supports the renewal of the talks, but attributes the initiative to Rouhani and his government. By adopting this strategy, Khamenei has created a win-win situation for himself: if Rouhani succeeds in lifting the international sanctions in exchange for compromises that will allow Iran to preserve its nuclear capabilities, the Supreme Leader can take the credit; if Rouhani fails, Khameneis anti -Western stance would be validated, thereby justifying more of the resistive economy and gaining more time for Iran to advance its military nuclear program. The advanced state of Irans nuclear infrastructure can let Khamenei have Iran weather the sanctions if he manages to divert his peoples frustration from a failure of the talks.
The Iranian Strategy: Solution or Delusion? INSS Insight No. 483, November 7, 2013 Avner Golov

The Supreme Leader Khamenei policy of military first is the real reason why the Iranian people are suffering. Khamenei and Tehrans cyber propaganda has shaped the international community vision into believing sanctions are having detrimental effects, the Iranian people and the children are needless being persecuted. However what is bewildering the international community refusal take into account the measure of Human Rights abuses in the Islamic Republic as a measure of character of Irans government. Moreover the kind of government it would mean to the world if the Islamic Republic obtained a nuclear arsenal.
Iran has the highest number of executions in the world of men, women and children. Rape of women in prison is an institutionalized practice of punishment.

Allegations of rape and sexual violence of political prisoners by authorities began to emerge after the Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979 and have continued, to varying degrees, to the present. However, not surprisingly, there is no reliable estimate of the number of prisoners raped in the Islamic Republics prisons; no data or comprehensive report has ever been compiled that portrays the full scope of sexual violence in Irans prisons. The reasons are simple: few rape victims are willing to speak about their experiences due to (1) government pressure and acquiescence, and (2) social stigma. Iranian authorities have and continue to acquiesce to rapes of prisoners by guards and interrogators who use rape to crush detainees' spirits, inflict humiliation, discourage their dissent, force them to confess to crimes, and ultimately to intimidate them and others. The heinous and barbaric practice of stoning is conducted. Rape is perpetrated against both men and women, and often results in severe injuries, including death. Shadi Sadr and blogger Mojtaba Samienejad have written about the long history of prison rape in Iran, pointing out that it goes back as far as the 1979 Islamic Revolution.


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Even pregnant women are not spared, and hundreds have been executed with their unborn children. Many defenseless women prisoners are held in what are euphemistically referred to as "residential quarters" in prisons, where the Guards systematically rape them in order to totally destroy them. In the Islamic Republic it is illegal to execute a young woman, regardless of her crime, if she is a virgin. Therefore a wedding ceremony is conducted the night before the execution; the young girl is forced, to have sexual intercourse with a prison guard. [136] The human rights situation in Iran continues to arouse concern from the world's leading watchdog groups, with reports of ongoing abuses since the disputed 2009 presidential election provoked mass protests.
A March 2013 report by a UN Special Rapporteur cites "widespread and systemic" torture, harassment, arrest, and attacks against human rights defenders, lawyers, and journalists. Under an increasingly repressive regime focused on survival amid internal strife and external pressures, experts say prospects for reform are bleak, and urge the international community to keep the spotlight on Iran's human rights violations. A 2013 report by the UN Special Rapporteur notes an increase in executions, both official and secret. It says 297 executions were officially announced by the government and about 200 secret executions were confirmed by family members, prison officials and members of the judiciary in 2012. [137] According to reports from UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) ranks third out of countries with the highest number of refugees fleeing to Turkey, only outnumbered by neighboring Syria and Iraq. The political crackdown and executions following the 2009 election protests is said to have created an unending refugee exodus of Iranians. Iranian deputy Foreign minister, Hassan Ghashghavi said that about 50,000 to 100,000 Iranian citizens have left the country since the 2009 presidential election protests, Shargh newspaper reported on Dec. 29. [138] Since the beginning of the Islamic Republic of Iran, tens of thousands of Iranian have slaughter in a political correctness frenzy, thousands more imprisoned, Upon returning Ayatollah Khomeini almost immediately set up a revolutionary court set to work in the school building in Tehran where he had set up his headquarters in 1979. Revolutionary courts were established in provincial centers shortly thereafter. The Tehran court passed death sentences. By 1982, Amnesty International had recorded well over 4,400 executions since the time of the Revolution. This count is the official count; it is well believed the number of executions was much higher. [139] Another 3000 and perhaps as many as 20,000 -30,000 political prisoners were executed between 1988- 1989. This was no more than continuing the mass genocide fratcide which began in 1979. This was halted do to Saddam Hussein 1980 invasion of Iran and ended in 1988. Accompanying these executions was a systematic political elimination opposition and international assassinations of Iranians who fled Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini had a particular hatred for the Iranian Kurds that made up 12 percent of Irans population. The Ayatollah Khomeini government banned their periodicals and arrested their leaders. Pro-government Islamist thugs beat their protestors, and smashed and looted their newsstands, bookstores, and offices.

Khomeini did not issue a fatwa for Jihad (Holy War) against the Shahs monarchist government. Nor did he issue one during the eight long years his regime fought Saddams Baathist regime. But he issued a fatwa for Jihad against his own Iranian Kurdish, Muslim countrymen. P.9 Haunted Memories, The Islamic Republic Executions of Kurds 1979 Iran Human Rights Documentation Center 129 Church Street New Haven, Connecticut 06510, USA September 2011


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Children as young as 13 were hanged from cranes, six at a time, in a barbaric two-month purge of Iran's prisons on the direct orders of Ayatollah Khomeini, reported in a book by his former deputy. More than 30,000 political prisoners were executed in the 1988 massacre - a far larger number than previously suspected. Secret documents smuggled out of Iran reveal that, because of the large numbers of necks to be broken, prisoners were loaded onto forklift trucks in groups of six and hanged from cranes in half-hourly intervals. These Gruesome details are from the book, The Memoirs of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, one of the founders of the Islamic regime. He was once considered Khomeini's anointed successor, but was deposed for his outspokenness, (deceased). The most damning of the letters and documents published in the book is Khomeini's fatwa decree calling for all Mojahedin (as opponents of the Iranian regime are known) to be killed. [141]

Seven years ago, the Security Council ordered Iran to halt its entire nuclear program. We should not change course now and reward the Islamic Republic for agreeing to do something far less. Now it appears nothings at all other than their word.
We should not forget that Iran is actually in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty currently The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in early November released its quarterly report on Iran's nuclear program. According to the IAEA report, Iran has stopped expanding its uranium enrichment capacity since Hassan Rouhani became president. This was a grand gesture; it addressed Middle East concerns, and lessened the global tension surrounding Tehrans nuclear weapons enrichment issues. However the Islamic Republic simply threw this act of kindness back into the face of the IAEA, and burned it to the ground. Spokesman of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Behrouz Kamalvandi has dismissed any "decline or shutdown" in Iran's nuclear activities, ISNA news agency reported on Nov. 18. He went on to note that Iran's nuclear facilities have not decreased activity. Iran's Message: There is a Way Forward November 19, 2013 The Islamic Republic Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif issued an internet video titled, Iran's Message: There is a Way Forward, Zarif's YouTube video, which has been translated into several languages, was sent to the minister's 76,000 Twitter followers on Tuesday, one day before key talks on Iran's nuclear program resume in Geneva. In a deceptively innocent presentation he asked viewers to understand Tehran's insistence on a right to enrich uranium, portraying the Islamic Republic as a champion of developing countries that want to stand up to world powers. With flawless English he spoke like an American Congressional Leader addressing crisis situation, clearly the audience of this message was aimed Washington, and the US Public.
Iran's demand for recognition of the right to enrich is one of the key issues being disputed as it resumes talks with the six-nation United Nations contact group. The United States, a key member of the group, says there is no such right for any country, but nations can have nuclear programs if they are verifiably not trying to build a nuclear bomb, the choice our country faces is not submission or confrontation, With a Zen like presentation against background soothing music, the video opens with Zarif posing rhetorical questions. What is dignity? What is respect? Are they negotiable?" he asks. "Is there a price tag?


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Kelsey Davenport, a Nonproliferation Analyst at the Washington-based Arms Control Association, says while Iran and other countries believe a right to enrichment is enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is difficult for the Islamic Republic to claim such a right. We should not forget that Iran is actually in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty currently," she said. "So it does need to sort of answer for those past noncompliance issues before we can talk about whether or not it is in good standing with the treaty moving forward. Iran has enriched uranium far beyond what is needed for nuclear power and research, to a level close to what is used in nuclear weapons. 20th Nov Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said Iran would not step back from its nuclear rights and his negotiating team had been set limits for talks over Iran's disputed nuclear program, "Death to America," the militiamen chanted in response, repeating one of the main rallying cries for supporters of the Islamic Republic. [142] Nuclear rights "in the international framework, including uranium enrichment, on its soil," Iranian President Rouhani said, are not negotiable. "For us red lines are not crossable." [143]
Secretary of State John F. Kerry has said, a "bad deal is worse than no deal, President Obama is clearly following

The NPT itself never explicitly mentions enrichment. Article II of the treaty prohibits signatories, like Iran, from manufacturing nuclear weapons. The Iranians always cite Article IV which states: "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty." Clearly, if a state is violating Article II by developing a nuclear weapons program, it cannot claim a right of enrichment, which would not be used for "peaceful purposes.
The Emerging Geneva Agreement with Iran Dore Gold, November 12, 2013

this self defeating strategy, but why? These pages open the carnage, the torrential path of destruction of death perpetrated by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Why is President Obama sweeping aside IRGCQF butchering of so many Americans? In a Presidential White House meeting with senators Obama, along with Secretary of State John Kerry and National Security Adviser Susan Rice, personally appealed to senators in a White House meeting to hold off on seeking additional Iranian sanctions. As we look at the depth and breadth of Obamas concili atory policies, and commitments these alone should have been more than enough to bring the Islamic Republic to the nuclear table. President Barack Obama is plunging ahead in search of a nuclear agreement with Iran despite obvious opposition from American allies in the Middle East and extensive skepticism if not open hostility, from Congress. [144]


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Obamas reckless inflammatory policy to embrace a nuclear pact with the Islamic Republic that falls short of Security Council demands for Tehran to halt uranium enrichment has pushed his administrations already contentious relationship with Israel to the brink, strained ties with Gulf Arab states and exacerbated tensions with Democratic and Republican lawmakers.
UN Security Council adopted six resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that called on Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment and its activities for the eventual production of plutonium. Chapter VII resolutions are binding international law. But what if the West now says that the suspension is no longer necessary? What does that mean for the binding nature of Chapter VII resolutions?

Any decision taken in to allow Iran to continue to enrich uranium to any level stands in contradiction to UN Security Council Resolution 1696 as well as five other resolutions that followed which prohibited Iran from enriching uranium. Resolution 1696, which was adopted on July 31, 2006, stated that the Security Council: "Demands, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA." [145]
The Islamic Republic now controls the nuclear fuel cycle and can, whenever it decides, break out to build a bomb , (if it has not already) while maintaining its past conduct of exploiting the bumbling and appeasements of the White House, the irresolution and divisions that prevail in the IAEA and International Community. Developing nuclear weapons, or the ability to produce them within a short time, continues to be a central goal of the Iranian regime. After ten years of talks in various settings, Tehran remains determined to maintain and advance its unwarranted nuclear expansions across the face of Iran. Iran has produced enough enriched uranium with which it can produce nuclear weapons fuel for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. Iran has produced 6,063 kg of reactor-grade (<5% enriched) uranium. Some of this material, which is threequarters of the way to bomb fuel, has been converted into 219 kg near-weapons grade (~20% enriched) uranium; only a small fraction of this material has been used to fuel a research reactor. The remaining quantity of ~20% enriched uranium can be rapidly converted to fuel for one weapon,
The Iranian Nuclear Program: Timelines, Data, and Estimates V7.0 By Maseh Zarif July 10, 2013

The Islamic Republic global network of terrorism will obtain a protective nuclear umbrella, allowing its organizations to strike with complete impunity. Finally, given Iran's increasing propensity in recent years to remove any constraints on the supply of state-of-the-art conventional weapons to its terrorist proxies, the flow of nuclear technologies to these groups cannot be dismissed.


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The IRGC-QF and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) have snatched control of drug trafficking throughout the Islamic Republic, using the multibillion dollar trade to establish links with a global crime network. [146]

The Islamic republic and Afghanistan share a 582-mile (936-km) border along a plain in western Afghanistan. The Iranian-Afghan border crosses through several deserts and marshlands. The Afghan provinces of Herat, Farah, and Nimruz border Iran. These geostrategic conditions make the Revolutionary Guards a major player in the Afghani heroin industry and, according to American classified intelligence assessments, indicate the involvement of the IRGC-QF in several of the drug smuggling routes going to Western markets from Iran. The United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that some 140 tons of heroin percent of the Afghani heroin trade are transported through Iran annually. Today, Tamara Makarenko, Terrorist Use of Afghanistan has a virtual monopoly on the illicit Organized Crime: Operational Tool or Exacerbating the Threat? in Defining production of the drug. Heroin is also the illicit drug and Defying Organized Crime: most highly associated with a single source: some Discourse, Perceptions, and Reality, ed. 90% of the worlds heroin comes from opium grown in Felia Allum (London: Routledge, 2009 just a few provinces in Afghanistan. Some 380 tons of heroin are produced from Afghan poppies and exported all over the world. A major motivating factor take part in the drug industry is its tremendous potential for profit, which stems from the industrys enormous consumer base worldwide. [147] According to assessments made by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the international drug market is worth some $320 billion annually Despite executing hundreds of people each year for drug trafficking and possession, Irans hardline stand against narcotics conceals a lucrative business smuggling heroin, opium from Afghanistan to cocaine from Latin American. The 2013 annual Worldwide Threat Assessment Report produced by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) rated terrorism and transnational organized crime as the second most severe threat to the United States security. [148] Hezbollah has been involved in the drug trade in Latin America since the mid-1980s. The group is primarily located in the tri-border area Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. There are two major Hezbollah networks operating in the Americas under the direction of the IRGC-QF. The first is the Nassereddine network, operated by a former Lebanese citizen that became a Venezuelan and is now the second-ranking diplomatic official to Syria. He currently resides on Margarita Island and runs money laundering operations for the group. The other network is purportedly run by Hojjat al-Eslam Mohsen Rabbani, a culutral attach from Tehran who is involved in various recruitment activities and frequently travels under false papers in Latin America. The two networks together make up the majority of Hezbollahs activity in the Americas. In 2012 members of Congress were briefed on the growing influence of Hezbollah in the region. One report indicated that the threat to the US border is already here, operatives were already infiltrating the southern border with Mexico as well as Canada.

Makarenko describes the link between political terrorism and organized crime as a single axis comprises the various players that progress according to developments in their goals and operational tactics. This axis includes phenomena such as alliances between terrorist and criminal organizations that further specific interests, the appropriation of criminal tactics by terrorist organizations and the creation of organic criminal mechanisms within them, the founding of hybrid entities that unify terrorism and organized crime tactics to advance political goals and to maximize profits (coalescence), and the transition of some organizations from one type of activity to another (transformation).


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December 15th 2012 US indictment, Iranian backed Hezbollah has a substantial drug connection to the Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas. The Lebanese druglord Ayman Joumaa was indicted in absentia for, conspiring to smuggle over 90,000 tons of cocaine into America and laundering over $250 million for the cartels. The druglord has close ties to Hezbollah and functioned as a middle man between the terrorist organization and the cartels. Los Zetas is considered to be one of the best trained and violent groups in Latin America. Los Zetas are the cartel equivalent of Hezbollah in Latin America. The Zetas are described as, highly trained, highly motivated commandos formerly with the Mexican military.

The collapse of Lebanese Canadian Bank in 2011 and its designation by the U.S. Treasury Department as a money-laundering "financial institution tied to global drug trafficking and to Hezbollah. It follows the trajectory of two Hezbollah-associated drug kingpins: Ayman Joumaa, who facilitated trade between Hezbollah and the Zetas, and Maroun Saade, who was apprehended attempting to connect Hezbollah to the Taliban .A five year DEA Investigation of a suspicious Lebanese-Colombian hotel owner named Ayman Joumaa had uncovered a network that coordinated the transportation, distribution, and sale of multi-ton shipments of cocaine from South America, operating in Lebanon, West Africa, Panama, and Colombia. Acting on DEAs findings, on J anuary 26, 2011, the U.S. Treasury Departments Office of Foreign Assets Control labeled Joumaa as a Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker, along with nine individuals and nineteen entities affiliated with him. Lebanese Canadian Bank, present a fascinating view into a global web of illicit activity linking geographically distant and ideologically distinct terrorist groups. is network explains both the extraordinary resilience of Hezbollah and the Taliban, and the meteoric rise of the Zetas. [150] In March 2012, the American Treasury Department declared IRGC-QF Brig. Gen. Gholamreza Baghbani, the commanding officer of the al-Quds Forces in the city of Zahedan on the Iranian-Afghani border, to be a kingpin of heroin exports to the West. Similar accusation were also leveled against Brig. Gen. Abdullah Araqi, the deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards ground forces and the former commander of Tehran Province, who was suspected of maintaining contact with Albanian, Bulgarian and Romanian crime organizations involved in transporting Afghani heroin to the West.
US Department of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Iranian Quds Force General Overseeing Afghan Heroin Trafficking Through Iran, March 7, 2012, Over the past 40 years, the federal counterdrug budget has ballooned from $100 million to $25 billion in 2012. Yet, the availability of most illicit drugs remains at an all-time high, and the United States has an estimated 10 times as many hardcore users as it did in 1969. The 2012 global illicit drug industry now accounts for 1 percent of all commerce on the planet about $320 billion annually. An estimated 40,000 Americans die each year, from drug-related causes; another 500,000 Americans are incarcerated for nonviolent, drug-related crimes; and, in purely economic terms, the cost of illicit drug use is nearly $200 billion per year. [151]

European Union has historically been reluctant to work inconcert on foreign-policy matters, particularly in such contentious areas as Iran.


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The challenge of a nuclear Iran will be among the most difficult the United States has faced. Iran will not soon pose an existential threat to the United States in the way that the Soviet Union did from the 1960s until its collapseat least, not in the sense that it will have a nuclear arsenal capable of literally annihilating the United States. But Iran will reach another threshold by acquiring nuclear weaponsthe ability to keep America and its allies in constant fear. For a state that has formed its national security policy largely around terrorism, that is quite an accomplishment. It will unquestionably change American foreign and national security policy profoundly for the foreseeable future and introduce a source of permanent unease into a region and a world already suffering from more than enough worry and distress.
Containing and Deterring A Nuclear Iran Questions For Strategy, Requirements for Military Forces Thomas Donnelly, Danielle Pletka, And Maseh Zarif with A Foreword By Frederick W. Kagan December 2011 A Report By The American Enterprise Institute

It is unimaginable how Tehran successfully white washes such a bloody and grotesque government on a regular basis. Irans cyber-propaganda sophisticated networks have contrived an architectural facade of innocence. It presents itself as unjustly singled out as if the ghoulish gallows were empty and its covertly hidden nuclear faculties disclosures are trivial. The international community leaders in what can only be described as economical induced oil addiction coma embraces the Islamic Republic. Their embrace echos through media, articles and even intelligence reports. There is distinct obvious, measurable and historical verifiable political landscape of Islamic Republics destruction and sabotage of nuclear negotiations. To put it bluntly Tehrans flushes them down the toilet and walk away. Yet the White House is insistent, with pathological absurdity to only obtain an Iranian signature to a worthless and dangerous nuclear document. President Obama and his policy-makers, their allied mainstream media corporations, and even academicians have been perversely reluctant to confront the Islamic Republic of Irans grisly and grotesque features.


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Obama said, I do believe that there is a basis for a resolution. Irans Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons.

The problem with that basis is that theres not a single piece of evidence that the fatwa even exists beyond Khameneis words. Yigal Carmon, president of the Middle East Media Research Institute, points out that a regime-linked website published almost 500 fatwas from Khamenei dating back to 2004 in July. Not a single one relates to nukes.

Almost 200 general officers have resigned from what Obama calls "my army" in the last few years, consider the possibility that they simply could not tolerate Obama's strategic perversity in the Middle East. These general officers have been telling Obama not to do it. His response was to fire them. [153]


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U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom Hannah Fischer Information Research Specialist February 5, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 The report notes the following: During the Iraq War, 4,475 U.S. service members were killed and 32,220 were wounded; Afghanistan, 2,165 have been killed and 18,230 wounded through Feb. 5, 2013. Among service members deployed in these conflicts, 103,792 were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) over the period 2002 to December 2012. Over that same period, 253,330 service members were diagnosed with a Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) of some kind. As a result of battle injuries in the Iraq War, 991 service members received wounds that required amputations; 797 lost major limbs, such as a leg. In Afghanistan, 724 have had to undergo amputations, with 696 losing a major limb.


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General Mattis no war is over until the enemy says it's over. We may think it over, we may declare it over, but in fact, the enemy gets a vote,
It was Lincoln who said "Give me a General who will fight!" That was after the North was defeated over and over again by Robert E. Lee's smaller and more agile armies. Lincoln was therefore forced to find generals who would fight, and he found Sherman and Grant, who wreaked terrible destruction on the South. He could see no alternative. In stark contrast to Lincoln, who demanded to know the truth, Obama is now firing our most successful fighting general, Gen. James Mattis -- for telling the truth. Dangerous Times: Gimme a General Who Won't Fight! By James Lewis January 26, 2013 ml#ixzz2lRmOFDNW

In January 2013 General Mattis was traveling and in a meeting when an aide passed him a note telling him that the Pentagon had announced his replacement as head of Central Command. It was news to him he hadn't received a phone call or a heads-up from anyone at the Pentagon or the White House. President Obama simply decapitated General Mattis, a summary execution delivered on a piece of paper. He opposed the Iranian reconciliation policy of President Obama, said international sanctions on Tehran were not stopping Irans nuclear weapons program. In his dealings with the White House, Gen. Mattis also tried to change the strategic framework, insisting that we need to plan not just for what we assumed Iran might do, but also for what Iran was capable of doing, this was not a welcome thought. In Obamas view, apparently was that Mattis was too hawk ish, he took a firm stance on confronting the Islamic Republic. The message the Obama Administration is sending is that it doesn't like tough, smart, skeptical generals who speak candidly to their civilian superiors. In fact, that is exactly what it (and every administration) should want. President Obama now has removed the two Marine generals who are culture heroes in today's Corps: Mattis and Anthony Zinni.
They called him Mad Dog, or the Warrior Monk, and he might be the most popular general among Marines since the legendary Korean War Lt. Gen. Lewis Chesty Puller. By any name, Mattis has spent the past two years as head of U.S. Central Command, overseeing U.S. military activity in the worlds most volatile region. He is regarded as one of the militarys top intellectuals and visionaries. With then-Army Gen. David Petraeus, he co-authored the militarys modern counterinsurgency manual. as the commander of the US Central Command from 2010 to 2013, responsible for military operations involving more than 200,000 US soldiers, sailors, airmen, Coast Guardsmen, and Marines in Afghanistan, Iraq, and eighteen other countries in the Middle East and south-central Asia. He commanded at multiple levels, from second lieutenant through four-star general, including Task Force 58 for the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the First Marine Division in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He commanded the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and was the executive secretary to Secretary of Defense William Perry. General Mattis retired on May 22, 2013 after more than 41 years of service. [153b]

With his final words at Senate Armed Services Committee on 5 March 2013, General Mattis sought to warn Washington, the Armed Forces and the America people the grave threats we face from the Islamic Republic and the dire consequences if we failed to act. It was his last round he could fire as a soldier, his last bullet he could shoot at the enemy that was trying to destroy America and plunge the Middle East into war. As the outgoing U.S. military commander, and head of U.S. Central Command in an assessment that disputed that of the intelligence community, warned that Iran was moving steadily


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toward nuclear weapons capability. Severe sanctions against Iran are not working, then top U.S. commander in the Middle East Gen. James Mattis of Central Command made the statement at a Senate Armed Services Committee 5 March 2013, Gen. Mattis said he feared that Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon would be the "most destabilizing event that we could imagine for the Middle East." When Mattis was asked whether the current diplomatic and economic efforts to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear capability were having their desired effect, he answered simply, No, sir. The general said the regime in Iran knows it cant win the affection of its own people, was worried that sanctions could cause its citizens to turn against it, and might actually be willing to forsake its nuclear program if it seriously feared its ability to remain in power. I think we have to co ntinue sanctions, but have other options ready, Mattis commented.
Strategic Risks to U.S. Interests: The most serious strategic risks to U.S. national security interests in the Central region are: Malign Iranian influence: Despite significant economic sanctions and increased diplomatic isolation within the global community, Iran continues to export instability and violence across the region and beyond. There are five main threats Iran continues to develop: the potential nuclear threat; counter maritime threat; theater ballistic missile threat; the Iranian Threat Network to include the Qods Force and its regional surrogates and proxies; and cyber-attack capabilities. Potential nuclear threat. Iran continues to expand its nuclear enrichment capabilities, which enable Iran to quickly produce weapons-grade nuclear material, should Tehran make that decision. Counter Maritime threat. Iran is improving its counter maritime capabilities (mines, small boats, cruise missiles, submarines) to threaten sea-lanes vital to the global economy. The occasionally provocative behavior of the Revolutionary Guard Navy is an issue with which we deal and we refine our operational approaches in sustaining our stabilizing maritime presence in the Persian Gulf. Theater Ballistic Missiles. Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East and is increasing medium and short range ballistic missile inventories and capability with ranges up to about 2,000 kilometers, sufficient to strike targets with increasing precision throughout the region. While Iran has previously exaggerated its capabilities, there is consensus that Tehran has creatively adapted foreign technology to increase the quality and quantity of its arsenal. Iranian Threat Network. Malign influence and activities (illicit weapons, financial aid, trained personnel and training) in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Gaza, Lebanon and Yemen along with the 2011 attempt here in Washington to assassinate the ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, indicate a long-term trend that has clear potential for murderous miscalculation that could spark a disastrous regional conflict. Iran continues to seek to establish nodes throughout the region through which to advance its destabilizing agenda. Cyber. Given Irans growing capabilities in this sensitive domain, the U.S. must recognize and adapt now to defend against malicious cyber activity. Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs): The focus of our military efforts over the past decade has largely been on Al Qaeda, its adherents and affiliates (AQAA), and we have achieved measurable successes in combating them. The AQAA franchise remains a threat however. An equally concerning long-term threat continues to emanate from the Iran-sponsored Shia brand of extremism wielded by groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah. Full Transcript Statement of General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps Commander U.S. Central Command Before The Senate Armed Services Committee On The Posture Of U.S. Central Command 5 Mar 2013

"You cannot allow any of your people to avoid the brutal facts. If they start living in a dream world, its going to be bad, " US Marine General James Mattis [153c]


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In 2009 Obama turned over virtually all responsibility and authority for foreign policy negotiations with Iran to Trita Parsi and his National Iranian American Council (NIAC).

This was the same year Obama closed down the Washington s longtime Iranian Human Rights Department. Mr. Parsi has been called to the White House, lectured at the CIA and visited Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Today he is considered the White House top expert on Iran. He has become one of the interviewed and sited authority concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran. He is also a key player Task Force Iran. Since its launch in February 2010, the Task Force has hosted 25 events addressing key issues, including briefings with experts, and has released six issue briefs on key topics related to Iran. Major publications include: Irans Internal Politics: The Supreme Leader Grows Ever Lonelier at the Top, Iran Sanctions: Preferable to War But No Silver Bullet, How Reliable is Our Intelligence on Irans Nuclear Program, and The Iran Stalemate and the Need for Strategic Patience. [155]
In a 2013 Atlantic Council, Task Force Iran Report, Time to Move from Tactics to Strategy on Iran This report not only seeks removal of sanctions provide America aid to Iran ! Sanctions are having other negative effects on Iranian society. They are further decreasing the transparency of the Iranian economy, concentrating resources in the hands of the regime, and hurting the very constituenciessuch as the middle classpredisposed to like the United States, the Task Force recommends designating a small number of US and private Iranian financial institutions as channels for payment for humanitarian, educational, and public diplomacy-related transactions carefully licensed by the US Treasurys Office of Foreign Assets Control. Sanctions do have the potential to produce human suffering that could be morally repugnant and that could undermine international support for sanctions, hurt the United States global image and credibility, and contribute to further alienation of the Iranian public, page 10. Sanctions imposed so far are having a deleterious effect on the health and well-being of many Iranians by reducing the availability of medicine and medical supplies. Iranians suffering from cancer and hemophilia are particularly at risk Page 10 Trita as part of the Atlantic Council Task Force Iran, he was one of the main contributors and author of the study. This is the primary Report President Obama presents to Congress, media, world leaders and other concerned entities of Tehran. It was also the tool used bludgeoned the Prime Mister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu, Netanyahu continues to prepare the Israeli public for a possible attack on Iran in the future and to use the threat of force to persuade other countries to enact and implement harsh sanctions against Iran. page 11


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Specific recommendations in the report include: Stopping and reversing Irans progression toward a nuclear weapons capability through negotiations, including direct bilateral talks. The Obama administration should lay out a step-by-step reciprocal and proportionate plan that ends with graduated relief of sanctions on oil and eventually on the Iranian Central Bank. While it may be difficult to engage Iran on Syria, the Obama administration should include Iran in talks on Afghanistans future. [156] Founded by Parsi in 2003, the Washington-based NIAC is a powerful lobbying group that is widely considered the de facto lobby for the Islamic Republic Regime in America and for good reason. A ruling handed down on September 13th 2012 by the D.C. District Federal Court has finally made clear what many have known for years that the Obama Administrations Iran policy was initiated and advanced by a group with illicit, hidden ties to the Iranian Regime. The U.S. district court ruling lent credence to the charge that Parsi is an agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Much of NIACs less public work has come to light through e -mails, documents, board of directors meeting minutes and strategy memos that were made public as part of the discovery process during a current defamation lawsuit against a critic of the group. Law enforcement experts who reviewed some of the documents, which were made by the defendant in the suit, say e-mails between Mr. Parsi and Irans ambassador to the United Nations at the time, Javad Zarif - and an internal review of the Lobbying Disclosure Act - offer evidence that the group has operated as an undeclared lobby and may be guilty of violating tax laws, the Foreign Agents Registration Act and lobbying disclosure laws. Neither Mr. Parsi nor anyone else at NIAC has registered as a lobbyist or filed papers with the Justice Department as a local agent of the Iranian government or Iranian companies. Mr. Parsi was shown and read the documents cited in this article. In a 1999 presentation at a conference held in Cyprus, NIAC founders Trita Parsi and Siamak Namazi, a U.S.-trained lawyer, called for the creation of an Iranian-American lobby to create a balance between the competing Middle Eastern lobbies. According to Hassan Dailoleslam, an IranianAmerican political activist who has researched the Tehran ties of NIACs founders, Namazi controls the Atieh Bahar company in Tehran, the leading consulting firm for foreign oil companie s dealing with Tehran, and has close, ongoing contacts with the top leaders in Iran. Daioleslam calls Namazi a member of Irans oil mafia, because of his companys role as an intermediary for companies such as Norways Statoil and Frances Total. Public and court documents show how the Iranian regime was able to infiltrate, manipulate and high jack some of American anti-war groups and use them in a vast lobby campaign to influence public opinion and US policy with Iran. Not only did recovered emails reveal that Parsi had held numerous secret meetings with top level IRI (Islamic Republic of Iran) officials, Court documents show the NIAC was guilty of: lying to members of Congress, fraudulent membership numbers, tax law violations and evasions, Lobbying Disclosure Act violation, the Foreign Agents Registration Act violations, foreign bank accounts, defrauding of federal funds, bribing of eye witnesses, etc [157] In Trita Parsi book, Treacherous Alliance: the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the U.S., New York: Yale University Press, 2007 Based on the Johns Hopkins University doctoral thesis of Trita Parsi. According to his thesis Israel is the reason there is chaos in the Middle East , the heart of the cause of the animosity between Iran and America, Parsi begins, for example, by stating that neoconservatives "desperately wish" for a U.S. war with Iran. He argues that Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's call for Israel to be "wiped off the map" was mistranslated and instead renders the phrase more benignly that Israel should be "eliminated from the pages of history." But the Iranian state-controlled news agency used the former translation. Parsi suggests that in 2003 Tehran offered to disarm Hezbollah, but this is false.


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About That Medicine Shortage in Iran...

In a nutshell, Parsi says that Israel and Iran have been working secretly together and against one another from time immemorial in a regional struggle for power that brings in the Arab world (Baghdad) and the superpowers, too. Parsi claims Islamic terror was in most ways a fulfillment of Israeli rhetoric. When the Cold War ended, the Israelis understood that they would be losing value to the United States as an ally against the Soviet Union in the Middle East. "There was a feeling in Israel that because of the end of the Cold War, relations with the U.S. were cooling and we needed some new glue for the alliance And the new glue was radical Islam. And Iran was radical Islam." And the Israel lobby went to work in the U.S. to push this idea; and it became the American religion under Bush. He omits the role of Ziama Divon, the first Israeli to visit the shah and confidential assistant to Israeli Prime Minister David BenGurion. [158]

Iran wants the West to believe that a sanctions-induced medicine shortage is causing the death of thousands of Iranian citizens, and they're using Western reporters to help spread the word. Never mind the fact that this purported medicine shortage in Iran is actually a crisis by design, intentionally foisted upon the Iranian people by a regime intent upon diverting funds to it illicit nuclear program. Western journalists are only too eager to report the Iranian spin. For example, former Iranian minister of health, Marzieh Vahid Dastjerdi noted that government mismanagement of medicinal imports was a reason for the problem. She alleged that U.S. $2.4B in funds earmarked for the import of medicine had never been made available to her ministry; it went instead toward the subsidized import of luxury cars. Dastjerdi was not the only official calling foul. Other senior Iranian officials conceded that the health crisis was self-imposed. In an interview with the Revolutionary Guard-controlled news agency Fars News, Iran's new minister of health, Seyed Hassan Ghazizadeh Hashemi recently stated, "the medicine problem is caused by ourselves, it is not related to sanctions at all." Through his network of tax-free investment holdings, Mr. Khamenei directly controls 23 percent of the publicly traded pharmaceuticals on the Tehran Stock Exchange; the equivalent, at current market prices, of $290 million. Altogether, the supreme leader controls two thirds of the Iranian pharmaceutical industry. Iran's government controls 14 other companies, too. In fact, of the 27 pharmaceutical companies publicly traded on Tehran's Stock Exchange, only 7 are controlled by the private sector. And Khamenei is not the only one getting rich. Ayatollah Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani, head of the Assembly of Experts and secretary general of the Combatant Clergy Association, controls a pharmaceutical company worth $21 million. Iran's ruling elite is getting wealthy from the medicine trade. If there is a pharmaceutical shortage, it has been created by the government's monopoly on production, negligent mishandling of foreign currency and misallocation of general healthcare funds. And while it is too soon to draw conclusions, the data indicates that the Iranian government may actually be leveraging the stress caused by sanctions to rake in whopping profits from the medicine shortage, since scarcity drives up prices. Contrary to some reports from the West, the medicine shortage is not proof of the cruelty of sanctions. It is conclusive evidence of the callous and rapacious nature of Iran's rulers. Iran's leaders made the choice to prioritize nuclear progress over the wellbeing of its people. They should not be rewarded for their malice.

NIAC pushes the Obama Administration & Washington to proceed with negotiations Emanuele Ottolenghi is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of The NIAC opposes sanctions Democracies. Saeed Ghasseminejad is a Ph.D. Candidate at Baruch on Iran, soft-pedals any College, NYC. controversial events in October 27, 2013 About That Medicine Shortage in Iran... By Emanuele Ottolenghi & Saeed Ghasseminejad Islamic Republic, and counsels patience dicine_shortage_in_iran.html regarding Irans stance towards its nuclear program. And if it was not for Israel there would hardly be any Middle East problems. The Iranian call for Death to America can hardly be compared with the insults the Israel & US hawks hurls at the Islamic regime, according to the NIAC. In his two books, numerous articles and through his work as NIAC president, Trita calls on Western policy makers to accommodate the mullahs rather than confront them over the IRIs sponsorship of terrorism, illegal pursuit of nuclear weapons, and abhorrent human-rights record. [159]


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Trita Parsi has tried to depict Israel as the main hurdle preventing any possible rapprochement between Iran with America and the International community. Parsi has always tried to frame his lobby as a battle against AIPAC, David versus Goliath: a smaller grassroots Iranian-American movement (NIAC) on one side and the hawkish American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) mega-lobby on the other. NIAC and Parsi have justified the Iranian regime's hatred toward Israel and have paled its flagrant anti Semitism. NIAC's anti-Israeli crusade has effectively helped institutionalization of anti-Semitism in different ways: In an effort to acquit Iran and blame Israel for US-Iran standoff, Parsi uses deceptive myths about Israeli extraordinary power to impose its will on the entire civilized world. The US, Europe and United Nations seem to be forced to fulfill Israeli dictate. Parsi and NIAC's indulge in relentless PR efforts to pale and justify the Iranian regime's anti-Semitism, legitimizes the anti-Jewish hatred. His Jewish & Israeli hatred is carefully contrived professional sounding educational paradigms, in reality is rooted in the radical Islam of Khomeini. He presents Iranian regime as a victim rather than partly responsible for the Middle East turmoil and hostilities toward United States, Parsi has influenced US policy towards easing pressure against Tehran. This has tremendously assisted Iran to advance its nuclear program and its hegemonic drive in the region. This has resulted in the spread of fundamentalism and anti-Semitism in the region. [160] President Obamas Next Great Policy Disaster, The Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ) policy, a road to nowhere. The current political mantra that is being

proclaimed as an answer to the Islamic Republic of Irans nuclear weapons question and being proclaimed as the savior the Middle East is a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone (MENWFZ) . [160a] Iran supports the establishment of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and backs efforts to dispose of existing ones in the region .Tehrans newly elected president Rouhani is even calling for nuclear-free zone. [160b]

In theory such a zone would strengthen the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), would help to promote global nuclear disarmament and would also help the Middle East peace process as substantial confidence-building measures. However it has been done before failed and succeeded in only fueling more crises.

A Grand Bargain Offer a Nuclear Weapons Free Korean Peninsula. In September 1991, U.S. President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States would withdraw its all its nuclear weapons from South Korea, and on 18 December 1991, President Roh Tae Woo declared that South Korea was free of nuclear weapons. North Korea and South Korea then signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsul a, whereby both sides promised they would "not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons." The agreement additionally bound the two sides to forgo the possession of "nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Signed: 20 January 1992, Entered into Force: 19 February 1992.


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Under the Joint Declaration, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) agreed not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons; to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes; and not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment.
Verification and Compliance: According to the Joint Declaration, the two sides were to

conduct inspections of locations chosen by the other side and mutually agreed upon by both sides. The two Koreas also established the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) as an implementing mechanism of the Joint Denuclearization Declaration (JDD) in March 1992. The JNCC has not been able to reach agreement on the reciprocal inspection regime and has been stalled since 1993. Three North Korean nuclear weapons tests later, but South Korea is free of all nuclear weapons. [160c] It is an unusual paradox, wherein Washington and the IAEA doomed to repeat past mistakes and travel in circles. It is as no one has paid attention to where they have been and going. For the most part, the struggle with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the nuclear issue has been adhering to wishing and hoping, no reality based coherence, a blindly journey to nowhere.
Setad, a Hidden 98 Billion Dollar Empire: Setad Ejraiye Farmane Hazrate Emam, Headquarters for Executing the Order of the Imam. This multi-billion dollar covert empire Setad secretly channels billions of dollars into military and nuclear programs. Reuters reporters identified nearly 300 properties that Setad put up for auction in May 2013 alone, many worth millions of dollars. Ayatollah Khamenei commanded the formulation of a powerful body of legal decrees and executive orders that authorized and safeguarded Setad's asset acquisitions. "No supervisory organization can question its property," said Naghi Mahmoudi, an Iranian lawyer who left the Islamic Republic in 2010 now resides in Germany. Reuters team of investigation journalists in 2013 was able to identify about $95 billion in property and corporate assets controlled by Setad. That amount is roughly 40 percent bigger than the country's total oil exports last year. It also surpasses independent historians' estimates of the late Shah's wealth.

Reuters team of investigation journalists in 2013 was able to identify abou t $95 billion in property and corporate assets controlled by Setad. That amount is roughly 40 percent bigger than the country's total oil exports last year. It also surpasses independent historians' estimates of the late Shah's wealth.


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In June 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Setad and 37 companies it commands over the organizations alleged role in "assisting Ayatollah Khamenei's Government's circumvention of U.S. and international sanctions." The Treasury also said Setad played a part in "generating revenue for the Iranian leadership," and that one of its investment companies alone was worth about $40 billion in late 2010.

However the June action covered just a fraction of Setad's corporate holdings. According to a Treasury spokesman, sanctions only apply to subsidiaries if the targeted entity "owns 50 percent or more of a company." The name refers to an edict signed by the Islamic Republics first leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, shortly before his death in 1989. His order spawned an entity intended to manage and sell properties abandoned in the chaotic years after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Setad was created to help the poor and war veterans of the Iran Iraq War and was meant to exist for just two years. Almost a quarter-century on, Setad has morphed into a business juggernaut with real estate, corporate stakes and other assets. While Setad controls a charitable foundation, its not clear how much money goes to charity. In 2013, a team of Reuter's reporters in the Middle East spent six months examining how Setad, a little-known organization controlled by Supreme Leader Khamenei, grew into one of the most powerful property and corporate empires in the Islamic Republic. Their investigation opened with an internal organizational chart. One branch labeled "Real Estate and Properties Organization." They soon learned that many of the properties Setad constrained were confiscated from Iranians, whom the journalists began tracking and interviewing across the Middle East, Europe and North America. Reuters reporters uncovered that Setad systematically sold off seized properties, and it is more than likely these financial resources help fund military and nuclear programs. Using Iranian auction websites and newspapers, they documented how in May 2013 alone, Setad had auctioned nearly 300 properties. Setad's business dealings are among the most carefully guarded secrets of Khamenei. But through internal Setad documents, interviews with former employees, data published by the Tehran Stock Exchange and on Iranian company websites, and information from the U.S. Treasury Department, the reporters were able to assemble a picture of Setad's immense corporate portfolio. Setad has built its empire on the systematic seizure of thousands of properties belonging to ordinary Iranians members of religious minorities, Shiite Muslims, business people and Iranians living abroad. Setad has amassed a giant portfolio of real estate by claiming in Iranian courts, sometimes falsely, that the properties are abandoned. The organization now holds a court-ordered monopoly on taking property in the name of the supreme leader, and regularly sells the seized properties at auction or seeks to extract payments from the original owners. While Jews and Christians were recognized as religious minorities in the 1979 constitution, Baha'is were not. Hundreds of Baha'is was expelled from universities or had their businesses attacked or their properties confiscated. Dozens of Baha'is were killed or jailed in the years immediately following the Islamic revolution in 1979. Billions of dollars worth of land, houses, shops and other Baha'i belongings were seized in subsequent years by various Iranian organizations, including Setad, the organization overseen by Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The United Nations office of the Baha'i International Community, a non-governmental organization, estimates that more than 2,000 homes, shops, orchards and other properties were seized from its members in Iran up to 2003, the most recent figure available. The property was then worth about $10 billion. The Setad Ejraiye Farmane Hazrate Emam holds a court-ordered monopoly on taking property in the name of the Supreme Leader Khamenei, and regularly sells the seized properties at auction or seeks to extract payments from the original owners. [161]


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The Islamic Republic driving desire nuclear negotiations, Tehrans painful pleas for sanction relief for suffering people of Iran, in reality is more about obtaining advanced technology.

The removal of international sanctions will a be a breech in the wall that helped contained not only critical areas of nuclear development, but also in modernizing its mostly antiqued ground forces and military aircraft. Iran stands to gain billions of dollars in frozen assets. Recently, there has been talk of a plan that would allow Iran to recover billions of dollars in frozen overseas assets in the US, which some put at between $50 to $75 billion. [162]In Irans five-year incremental economic development plan from March 2005, the Iranian parliament published a document titled, Irans 20-Year Economic Perspective", outlining a roadmap for the countrys financial, governmental, social and cultural advancements during the next two decades. The Perspectives preamble declared that by 2025, i.e., after the conclusion of four five-year development plans, the Islamic Republic would be a fully advanced country, rising to the number-one rank in economic, scientific and technological progress among 28 nations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. By that time, Iran was to be a nation with an Islamic and revolutionary identity, offering a guiding light for the Islamic world while involved in effective and valuable cooperation with the rest of the global community. The widely publicized document called for (a) achievement of fast-paced and sustainable economic growth; (b) creation of durable employment opportunities; (c) enhancement of factor productivity; (d) active presence in regional and international markets; (e) development of a diverse, knowledge-based economy free of inflation and blessed by food security; and (f) establishment of a market environment conducive to domestic and international business entrepreneurship. [163] The Economic Perspective plan for the Armed Forces of Iran, they are to become equal to or surpass the Shahs military forces. Unless Iran can correct the weaknesses in its land-based air defense systems, it will remain a hollow conventional force that cannot deny its airspace to outside air and cruise missile threats, with little hope of surviving an intense, long-run air and missile campaign. IRIs major surface ships are all old vessels with limited refits and either aging weapons and fire-control systems or systems based on Iranian upgrades and Chinese weapons. With the exception of its submarines and some missile patrol boats, its larger ships are outdated and vulnerable to US and Gulf naval forces in a conventional campaign. Iran depends heavily on its coastal, island, and ship-borne anti-ship missile forces to make up for its lack of airpower and modern major surface vessels. Iran is still dependent on 209 US and French aircraft that date back to the 1970s, have never been properly modernized, and had extensive wear in the Iran-Iraq War. Its 44 F-14s are difficult to maintain and the readiness of many of its more than 70 F-4s is uncertain as well as many of its US-supplied combat and other helicopters. Irans only modern, high capability, post-Shah combat aircraft include 35 aging export versions of the MiG-29, 30 aging export versions of the Su-24 fighter, and 13 Su-25 tank killers. [164] Tehrans Armed Forces does have a large order of battle relative to the Arab Gulf states, and notable holdings of primary ground force weapons. Tehrans a ctive force has 1.9 times the manpower of the GCC and over twice that of Saudi Arabia, with 523,000 active Iranian military and IRGC personnel versus 233,500 for Saudi Arabia.


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The Islamic Republic has high-quality Special Forces, marine units, and IRGC elements it can use for assaults in the Gulf and along the Gulf coast, it does not have an advantage in heavy armor. Only 480580 of Irans 1,600+ main battle tanks can be described as modern by current standards. This total includes some 480 aging T-72s and its indigenously-produced, T72-based Zulfiqars. Iran has some 730-860 other operational armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and 550640 armored personnel carriers (APCs). These Iranian capabilities for asymmetric warfare cannot be separated from Irans importance on missiles & cruise missiles and drones, CBRN warfare - weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Both compensate for the limits of its conventional forces and act as a substitute. Moreover, if Tehran does obtain or is perceived to acquire nuclear weapons, particularly tactical nuclear capability this will have critical impact on preventing any response to Irans use of asymmetric hostilities.
The Pentagon, European, GCC, and Israeli policymakers and military experts agree that Iran possesses a large and growing rocket missile force, with a growing number of missiles capable of hitting Israel and Europe. They agree that Tehran has begun developing longerrange and solid fuel missiles, and already possesses a sufficient number to pose an economic and psychological threat to Gulf States.
Securing the Gulf Key Threats and Options for Enhanced Cooperation Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy February 19, 2013

The trends in Irans current medium and long-range missile efforts are summarized in the declassified version of a report the US Secretary of Defense sent to the US Congress in April 2012,
Regular Iranian ballistic missile training program continues throughout the country. Iran continues to develop ballistic missiles that can range regional adversaries, Israel, and Eastern Europe, including an extended-range variant of the Shahab-3 and a 2,000-km medium-range ballistic missile, the Ashura. Beyond the steady growth in its missile and rocket inventories, Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems by improving accuracy and developing new submunition payloads. During the last two decades, Iran has placed significant emphasis on developing and fielding ballistic missiles to counter perceived threats from Israel and Coalition forces in the Middle East and to project power in the region. Iran may be capable of flight-testing an intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015 Regular ballistic missile training program continues throughout the country and mainly confined to the IRGC forces. The IRI continues to develop ballistic missiles that can range regional adversaries, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Eastern Europe, including an extended-range variant of the Shahab-3 and a 2,000-km medium-range ballistic missile, the Ashura. Beyond the steady growth in its missile and rocket inventories, Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems by improving accuracy and developing new submunition payloads. Irans missile force consists chiefly of mobile missile launchers that are not tethered to specific launch positions. In 2011, Iran launched several missiles during the NOBLE PROPHET 6 exercise, including a multiple missile salvo.


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Short-range ballistic missiles provide Tehran with an effective mobility to strike partner forces in the region. Iran continues to improve the survivability of these systems against missile defenses. It is also developing and claims to have deployed short-range ballistic missiles with seekers that enable the missile to identify and maneuver towards ships during flight. This technology also may be capable of striking landbased targets. Iran has also developed medium-range ballistic missiles to target Israel and continues to increase the range, lethality, and accuracy of these systems. [165]

The Persian Gulf is only 186 mi (300 km) wide at its widest point, and only 31 mi (50 km) wide at the Strait of Hormuz. With maximum ranges in the 124-186mi (200-300 km) range, the Zelzal and Fateh-110 rocket are of limited utility, but still a danger within the Gulf. All the Gulf States have a substantial portion of their petroleum infrastructure located on the Gulf coast. The vast majority of GCC oil fields are located on or near the Gulf, with most major infrastructure for production, refining, and transportation within 62 mi (100 km) off the coast. This places them within the range of Irans Shahab -1 and 2, and the shorterrange Zelzals and Fateh-110s as well in the cases of Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar. While Iran could likely only target four to 10 critical pieces of infrastructure with its Shahabs, adding in the smaller but potentially more accurate Zelzals and Fatehs would give it the ability to strike dozens of targets with a higher confidence of success. The most vulnerable state is the UAE, with Dubai probably within range of Zelzal-2s and Fateh-110s. If Tehran can base missiles off its islands in the Gulf, it will be able to target all the petroleum and desalination facilities that provide roughly a quarter of the UAEs GDP, along with a portion of Saudi Arabias northeastern oil fields. While launchers on Gulf islands would be vulnerable to airstrikes, they provide Iran with the possibility of at least one volley of direct attacks on its Gulf neighbors. The UAE is vulnerable to attack even without Tehran emplacing missiles on its islands. Mobile launchers inland are more likely to survive and launch additional volleys of strikes, meaning the Emirates may face the most sustained missile campaign should hostilities break out. Kuwait presents special problems. The IRGC rocket forces has enough short and medium-range rockets and missiles to potentially allow it to overwhelm Kuwaits anti -missile defenses and target the main port, desalination plants, military bases, petroleum facilities, and other crucial pieces of infrastructure. At such close range, and with so many targets to choose from, Iran is able to threaten Kuwait with volleys of different or stacked missile systems that might be able to inflict severe economic damage. Kuwait lacks the air strike and surface-to-surface missile capacity to respond and would have to rely on surface-to-air missile/theater ballistic missile (SAM/TBM) capacity to defend itself. Should the Islamic Republic seek to pressure Kuwait, Irans short-range systems could be the primary component of its threat. Under these circumstances, Kuwait is obliged to rely on external partners to guarantee its security both to upgrade its anti-ballistic defenses and provide retaliatory capabilities.


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It is believed Tehrans rocket capacities still lack any systems with the accuracy or terminal homing capability to hit more than broad area targets with accuracies largely in kilometers rather than meters. However the Islamic Republic could instead rely on its more accurate cruise missile inventory. Experts note that to date, Iran has rarely fired missiles at maximum range although two Shahab-3s were fired into the Indian Ocean, evidently more as a test of range than as part of a well-structured effort to determine accuracy. Iran also tends to fire off its older missiles, rather than its latest inventory. A medium and longrange missile warhead closes with extremely high velocity. Reliability is an issue, particularly if the warhead has complex fusing designed to affect the height of burst or dispense cluster munitions. This combination of accuracy and lethality problems will sharply limit Irans ability to use its missiles as more than weapon s of intimidation or terrorism until it can give them nuclear warheads or warheads with some form of terminal guidance. Of course accuracy is not a real issue if using an EMP, Radiological or chemical weapon.
Various experts believe Tehran needs nuclear or precision-guided warheads to make its medium and longer-range missiles truly effective and major war fighting threats, and will also need nuclear warheads to increase the threat a limited number of successful airstrikes can pose. The key longerrange elements of Irans missile program are also in flux and many of Irans missile systems are still in a development phase where their range, accuracy, warhead, and reliability are impossible to predict. There is no agreement as to when Iran may acquire missiles with homing warheads and the kind of terminal guidance that can hit point targets effectively with conventional warheads. There is no agreement on the reliability and accuracy of Irans missiles under operational conditions, and there is no agreement on Irans ability to deploy systems with countermeasures to missile defenses. Finally, there is no agreement on whether Iran yet has mastered production techniques for ballistic missiles, allowing it to further build and refine its force even without additional technology proliferation.

To note, it is hotly debated whether the Islamic republic has already obtained a number of homing warheads or guidance systems. Russia sold Saddam Hussein sophisticated submarine ICBMs guidance systems, these were labeled scrap metal. Acting on an intelligence tip, on November 10, 1995 the Jordanian government intercepted a shipment of 240 Russian missile-guidance gyroscopes and accelerometers bound for Iraq. [166a] Irans Religious Ideology & Strategic Defense Planning, Defense planning in the Islamic Republic is driven by four principal factors: Transform the IRI into a regional Islamic military power capable of projecting influence throughout the Middle East and beyond; To avoid a repeat of the tragic deterrence failure that led Iraq to invade Iran in 1980, and; defeat International (America) Zionists (Israel) velvet revolution. (Velvet Revolution, the peaceful overthrow of a government, especially a communist government as seen in Czechoslovakia in late 1989) A Nuclear Arsenal Umbrella Destruction of the, Great Satan (America) and its right -hand the, lesser Satan, (Israel)


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Status and Influence: Tehrans leadership believes that the Islamic Republic plays a key role in world affairs as the standard bearer of Khomeinis revolutionary Islam and the guardian of oppressed Muslims everywhere. Accordingly, they believe that the fate of the ummah (the Islamic community) depends on Irans ability to transform itself into a world power that can defend and advance the interests of that community. This perception also leads Tehran to support radical Islamic movements throughout the Middle East to undermine U.S. influence in the region, reshape the international environment in a way that is conducive to Iranian interests, and to burnish the regimes revolutionary Islamic credentials at home and abroad.
The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran Operational and Policy Implications Michael Eisenstadt Middle East Studies Monograph Series Aug 2011 US Marine Corps page 3

The Near-Term Impact of the Iranian Missile Threat :Irans existing missile forces give it the capability to attack targets in the Gulf and near its border with conventionally armed long-range missiles and rockets, and Iran can attack targets in Israel, throughout the region, and beyond with its longest-range ballistic missiles. However, the short term risks posed by Irans current conventionally armed rockets and missiles should not be exaggerated. The limited lethality of Irans current warheads, the severe limits to their accuracy and the uncertain reliability of Irans longer-range systems all combine to limited the impact of such strikes to almost random hits somewhere in a large area with casualties that would most probably be limited to those resulting from a single 1,000 pound unguided bomb. If Iran is to make a major advance in lethality using missiles and rockets without nuclear weapons, it would have to make advances in two other areas: precision guidance and terminal homing and biological weapons. Iran has already said it is seeking to provide its missiles and rockets with precision guidance and terminal homing warheads and with countermeasures to ballistic missile defenses. It has also claimed to have shown it has a near precision strike capability, although satellite photos of the target area indicate it simulated missile hits by using explosive devices at the scene.
A precision strike capability would radically alter the lethality of Irans longer -range systems against high value military targets and civil targets like key oil product facilities and desalination plants - creating the equivalent of weapons of mass effectiveness. A nuclear-armed Iran could destroy any military target or city in the region, and pose an existential threat to many states. A regional war could have a far more radical and lasting impact on the global economy, which gets some 20% of the worlds oil supply through the Gulf, and while few experts feel Irans leaders would act irrationally or without regard to the risks, the history of war and diplomacy is often the history of mistakes, miscalculations, and unintended conflicts.
The Gulf Military Balance Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions and Options for Deterrence, Defense, Containment, and Preventive Strikes By Anthony H. Cordesman and Bryan Gold July 18, 2013

The Islamic Republic desperately seeking state-of-the-art critical militarily technologies meet operational requirements, not only for its Armed Forces but infrastructure research and development. The majority of the worlds major conventional defense companies already operate in one of the most regulated markets in the world. However, this global industry does not operate in a global market. Every country has its own rules, providing for system shopping on the one hand and confusion on the other. When defense industries consider their markets, there is no one standard, no one list. Rather, there is a global patchwork of systems ranging from very comprehensive to barely functioning. [168]


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Irans strategic missile & cruise missile forces are now vital to its deterrence strategy, in part because they are implicitly linked to CBRN, weapons of mass destruction programs. The IRGC, which has operational control over Irans missile forces, continues to extend the range and improve the performance of its ballistic missiles, several classes of which can range Israel and the Gulf countries. Their limited accuracy suggests they are probably intended for strategic targets such as cities, oil production and export facilities, ports and water desalinization plants. The expense and sophistication of modern military weapons systems & development, and barriers are melting away for Iran. As new tools enters Tehrans inventory its battlefield capability will expand. It is both real and virtual, it is urban and rural. As the Islamic Republics warfare lethality continues to evolve, it will become more complex and devastating. With removal of sanctions, sufficient foreign assistance, access to the international military procurement, gaining precision guidance technology for its missile & cruise missile forces, and billions of dollars at its disposal in just a few short years the Islamic Republic of Iran will leap into the modern military era. Its armed forces will be one of most capable and lethal in the region. This deadly military capability will filter to Syria, to Hamas, Hezbollah and any other radical Islamic military force that beckons to the call of Iran.


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*Spread = Radius of circle formed by lethal zones of bomblets ** = Radius of lethal circle formed by unitary warhead *CEP =Circular error probability measure of accuracy / the radius of a circle that 50% of all projectiles fired, will fall into. The most common payload is a unitary HE warhead, though cluster munitions are also likely in the Fajr-series, and possible in the TBMs. With regard to the behavior and specifications of the submunitions,

For comparison, here are the total threatened areas created by each permutation: What's clear is how much more efficient cluster munitions are as the warhead increases in size, from 434% more efficient at the level of the Fajr-3, up to a whopping 962% more efficiency at the size of the Zelzal-3. Also important is the size of the volley. The Fajrseries have multiple rockets that can be launched in close proximity to another. The TBMs on the other hand are restricted to using larger formations of TELs to increase fire power with the exception of certain prototype Zelzal launchers but these shall be ignored for now. A full volleys worth of rockets is represented by the 2 nd, parenthetical number in the entry's below. Fajr-3 Unitary: 3,972 sqm (47,664 sqm) Cluster: 17,278 sqm (207,336 sqm) Percent Change: 434% Fajr-5 Unitary: 6,189 sqm (24,756 sqm) Cluster: 33,737 sqm (134,948 sqm) Percent Change: 545% Zelzal-3 Unitary: 19,110 sqm Cluster: 183,868 sqm Percent Change: 962% Zelzal-3B Unitary: 14,070 sqm Cluster: 116,741 sqm Percent Change: 829% sqm = Square Meters


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Assuming Iran can actually hit an aircraft-carrier with sub-munitions however, what kind of damage could they do? After all, sub-munitions increase the chance of hitting the target, but they necessarily degrade the power due to the obvious fact that they fragment the warhead. The hypothetical target in this case is CV-75 / USS Harry S Truman, a Nimitz-class supercarrier as a stand in for a similarly sized carrier passing through the Persian Gulf. It doesn't look very impressive considering each only weighs around half a kilo. However bomblets are often deadlier then they appear, a .45 kg AP bomblet similar to the US BLU-77/B could likely, if only just, penetrate the flight deck of the carrier. Of course, this wouldn't deal permanent damage to the ships but could heavily damage any aircraft which are on deck at any given time. Furthermore, the shrapnel could damage radars, communication masts, kill personal and spray FOD over the flight deck which would require cleanup efforts that would further prevent combat sorties. Shahab Ballistic Missiles While China might be sweeping the headlines for their famed carrier killer ballistic missile, Iran similarly may deploy their ballistic missiles in an anti-ship role. In November, 2006, Then-General of the IRGC, Yahya Rahim Safavi had this to say on the subject in an interview on Iranian channel 2 TV: "The Shahab-3 missiles has a cluster warhead and and consequently, it's destructive power exceeds several kilometers, because the warhead spreads into bomblets. It can be used against large bases, large concentrations of people, aircraft carriers, even against aircraft carriers because it explodes from above so it can completely destroy an aircraft carrier with its planes." So, while it's not the same as China's program for sure, it still represents an interesting strategic choice. Furthermore, given China and Iran's cooperation in the anti-ship weapon development, one shouldn't be quick to ignore the 'coincidence' that both countries are pursuing roughly the same path. The Shahab-3, a relative of the SCUD family, has two main variants that Safavi could have been talking about in 2006. The Shahab-3A with either a 1,000 kg or 1,200 kg warhead, as well as the smaller, 800 kg warhead on the Shahab-3B. Now thanks to other comments by Safavi during the interview, we know that the cluster warhead on the Shahab3 has 1400 bomblets. This is in turn indicates that bomblet weight is somewhere between .42 kg - .64 kg either equal to, or slightly greater to the RAND model bomblets of .45 kg each.
Beyond the infrastructure and material it has at its known facilities, Iran also possesses an indigenous centrifuge production program and uranium mining operations that are not under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The IAEA may see the centrifuges Iran has installed at its known enrichment facilities, but it does not have visibility into how they got there or how many centrifuges of what variety are being built, stored, and deployed elsewhere. Iran has similarly refused to open up its operation of uranium mines to the IAEA. These mines will provide at least 50 tons of uranium per year at full operation. This lack of transparency presents a separate problem, especially given Irans history of covert activity. Iran has never proactively declared a nuclear-related facility to the international community. Its current declared facilities were all detected and exposed by U.S. and allied intelligence efforts, which forced the Iranians to acknowledge their existence. The IAEA can only request access to inspect facilities it knows about. Any deal relying primarily on IAEA safeguards or inspections is based on the assumption that the Iranians will not try to deceive inspectors. There is no credible trust but verify feature to such a deal no matter how stringent any monitoring schedule is; it would be based entirely on the hope of goodwill from Irans leaders. Opening the Door to a Bad Iranian Nuclear Deal By Maseh Zarif October 15, 2013

*CEP =Circular error probability measure of accuracy / the radius of a circle that 50% of all projectiles fired, will fall into. The most common payload is a unitary HE warhead, though cluster munitions are also likely in the Fajr-series, and possible in the TBMs. With regard to the behavior and specifications of the submunitions, Sunday, January 16, 2011 Artillery Rockets and Ballistic Missiles as Anti-Ship Weapons


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According to a 2012 Report by Riad Kahwaji, CEO of INEGMA, The U.S. Fifth Fleet base in Bahrain is 250-km from the Iranian coast, while the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters at Camp As Sayliyah and the nearby U.S. Air Force Central Command (AFCENT) in Al-Udaid air base in neighboring Qatar are just under 250-km. The U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) base in Kuwait is less than 120-km from the Iranian coast. So, Iran does not really need to resort to its ballistic missiles to hit any of the U.S. bases and other strategic coastal targets in the region. Iran technically can launch a surprise attack with cruise missiles and artillery rockets at all U.S. bases and naval assets in the Arabian Gulf region. Tehran considerable offensive capabilities that would require its opponents to remain constantly on high alert to avoid a major "Pearl Harbor" scenario. The distance between the Iranian side of the coastline (on the east) and the Arabian side (on the west) varies. It narrows on the edges and widens in the middle. However, it places some of the United State's most important military facilities in the region within range of Iran's cruise missiles and artillery rockets. Iran claims that its Noor and Al-Qader surface-to-surface anti ship cruise missiles have a range of 200-km with high accuracy. It also claims that these missiles are undetectable by radar. It has also built the Zilzal-3 artillery rocket with a range of 250km. It is hard to ascertain Iranian claims with the absence of independent verification. But it appears that with every exercise the moral and self-confidence of the Iranian military, especially the Revolutionary Guards, grows greater.
INEGMA outlines scenario of an Iranian Preemptive Attack to Control Gulf Waters 5 January 2012

2013 November Interim Geneva Agreement

Geneva, Tehran and six major powers agreed on 23 November 2013, to what has been regarded as a historic deal which was to freeze key parts of Irans nuclear program in exchange for temporary relief on some economic sanctions . Ben Rhodes, President Barack Obamas deputy national security adviser, t old The Associated Press that implementation of the Geneva deal will begin in a matter of days, adding: Youll begin to see much more intrusive inspections of the Iranian program. [170] However now we are told the Iran interim deal wasnt quite finalized. In addition Tehran's non-compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 (2006) ordering the country to suspend its uranium enrichment program and the IR-40 project has been thrown out.
In principal the agreement signed in Geneva is a preliminary and partial

agreement only, with limited steps required of each side and valid for six months, during which time the P5+1 and Iran will attempt to reach a final, comprehensive agreement. Both sides have promised to finalize a comprehensive and binding agreement that will ensure Iran doesn't and cannot have a capability to turn peaceful nuclear energy into weapons. The deal should be seen for what it is: "a cap for a cap," with a limited rollback on each side for the next six months. Technical details have yet to be worked out, State Department says, meaning six-month countdown to permanent deal hasnt started and Iran isnt bound by any new terms. So how come sanctions were lifted and billions of dollars allowed to flow into Irans war chests?


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The fine print, no one knows when these six months begins. The six-month interim agreement with Iran on its nuclear program has not yet started, US State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters. [171] Arak Heavy Water Reactor IR 40: "Iran reaffirmed that under no circumstances will Iran

ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons," the text of the Geneva deal, distributed by the Fars news agency, reads. The text also said: "Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the reactor or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor or install remaining components ." If the plant were completed, Tehran could extract between five and 10 kilos (10-20 pounds) of weapons-grade plutonium a year from spent rods, enough for one nuclear weapon, experts estimate Tehran understands the worlds concerns about its Arak IR 40, but for the Islamic Republic, so what?. For as far as Iran is concerned these interrogatories are illegal and unfounded. In late 2013 work resumed on Tehrans Arak Plant. Iran will press on with construction at a nuclear reactor site at Arak, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif said on 27th November 2013 despite an agreement with Western powers to halt activity.[172] Of the remaining uninstalled major components, the cooling pumps appear the most critical. These pumps, which must be highly reliable for safe operation of the reactor, are in the primary reactor circuit and circulate heavy water that cools the reactor core. Another unfinished task is making the first core load of fuel. As of the May 2013 IAEA safeguards report, Iran had not made any fuel assemblies for the reactor. The IAEA carried out a DIV at the Esfahan Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP), where Iran fabricates Arak fuel rods and assemblies, and confirmed that manufacture of fuel assemblies using nuclear material for the IR-40 reactor had not yet begun. In March 2013, Iran informed the IAEA that it planned to produce 55 fuel assemblies for the reactor by August 2013. The reactor core is estimated to hold up to an estimated 187 fuel assemblies, if all channels in the core are used for fuel. Although fuel assemblies had not been made as of May 2013, Iran was making natural uranium pellets at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant, where afterwards the pellets are inserted into the fuel rods and then the rods joined together into fuel assemblies. According to the May 2013 safeguards report on Iran, the IAEA reported that Iran continued to produce fuel pellets using natural UO2 for the IR-40 reactor. Iran produces natural uranium oxide (UO2) for manufacture into fuel rods at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan [172a]
But The Geneva Interim Agreement: Iran has committed to making no further advances of its activities at Arak and to halt progress on its plutonium track. Iran has committed to:

Not commission the Arak reactor. Not fuel the Arak reactor. Halt the production of fuel for the Arak reactor. No additional testing of fuel for the Arak reactor. Not install any additional reactor components at Arak. Not transfer fuel and heavy water to the reactor site. Not construct a facility capable of reprocessing. Without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent fuel. [173]


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In reality President Obama is contriving in a futile attempt to salvage the November Geneva Agreement, a White House Spokesmans said, some construction is permissible at the Arak Iranian facility [174]. Tehran has stated that its IR-40 heavy water reactor, located near the city of Arak, will begin operating in 2014. This reactor has been under construction since June 2004 and development work goes back at least another decade. United Nations Security Council resolutions, the first of which dates to 2006, have called for Iran to halt construction of this reactor. The reactor poses a notable proliferation threat because it can produce significant amounts of weapons-grade plutonium about 910 kilograms annually or enough for about two nuclear weapons each year. Heavy water reactors are of proliferation concern because they are optimal for the production of high quality weaponsgrade plutonium. The reactors also do not require enriched uranium to produce weapons-usable material, as they are fueled by natural uranium. Iran tried to purchase a heavy water moderated reactor in the 1990s. Tehran secretly approached at least four nuclear suppliers, but was repeatedly turned down. However, unspecified foreign experts provided technical assistance, Iran began constructing the reactor on its own [176] .

Medical Isotope Production Without Highly Enriched Uranium" June 13, 2013, rev. All commonly used medical radioisotopes can be produced without using nuclear reactors or enriching uranium, or can be replaced with other isotopes that can be produced without a fission reaction, or by alternative technologies.
Reactors not using natural uranium fuel require uranium enrichment, therefore justifying enrichment facilities that can be used for the production of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU). All reactors also produce weapons-usable plutonium as a byproduct of normal operation, although those using natural uranium fuel produce the most. Historically, medical isotopes were supplied by separation out of spent uranium fuel, or by exposure of target materials, in some cases including highly enriched uranium, to the neutron flux in a nuclear reactor. In the past, this approach was convenient: medical isotope manufacturers could easily piggy back on the existing capital investment of a nuclear reactor and focus on the isotope chemistry itself. In addition, alternatives to reactor production, including electron or ion accelerators, or spallation neutron sources were expensive. However, the advent of very short-lived positron emitting diagnostic isotopes has created a market for hospital-based ion accelerators, and thus accelerator technology is far less expensive and more capable than in the past. Accelerator technology is now a viable alternative for medical isotope production. For a new source of supply of medical isotopes, accelerators offer several advantages over nuclear reactors. Accelerators present far less of a safety risk to operators or the public nearby. They generate minimal high-level nuclear waste and only modest quantities of low-level waste as a byproduct of medical isotope production. They also require substantially less capital investment than a typical reactor. Most pertinently for this report, accelerators that could be used for medical isotope production present minimal proliferation risk they do not use any uranium, enriched or otherwise, and, except for very large and dedicated accelerator/reactor combinations called accelerator-driven systems, they are incapable of creating bomb-scale quantities of plutonium. The advantages of accelerator production have come to be recognized by isotope suppliers in the US and Canada. After the Mo-99 supply shortage in 2009, commercial operators in both countries have plans to grow capacity by building accelerators, not reactors. Nuclear Medicine without Nuclear Reactors or Uranium Enrichment Derek Updegraff and Seth A. Hoedl, Ph.D. Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy American Association for the Advancement of Science June 13, 2013, rev. pe_Report.pdf


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When a heavy water reactors equipment is brought online the reactor becomes "hot," it cannot be targeted in a military operation for fear of a Chernobyl-like disaster.

The Islamic Republic claims the IR-40 heavy water reactor will be used to produce isotopes for medical, industrial and agricultural uses. Radioisotopes are widely used in medical imaging and cancer treatment. Considered a dividend of nuclear technology, they were an important reason that nuclear powers in the 1950s and 1960s promoted the construction of research reactors around the world. However, many medical isotopes are made in reactors that use highly enriched uranium (HEU), which contains at least 20% of the fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235)enough to be "weapons ready." To note Iranian technicians already make medical isotopes in an aging reactor that uses uranium enriched to 19.75% U-235a hair below bomb-grade. The IR-40 would replace that reactor, but use natural uranium, which is mostly U-238, bombarding natural uranium with neutrons turns out to be a very efficient way to generate plutonium. Such reactors can run on non-enriched uranium as fuel and uses a molecular variant of water as a coolant. But Heavy water reactors also produce more plutonium byproducts than conventional reactors. Iran has two main uranium enrichment facilities. The oldest and largest in Natanz, about 260 kilometers (160 miles) southeast of Tehran is largely built underground and is surrounded by anti-aircraft batteries. Uranium enrichment began in 2006. Another site is known as Fordo, which is built into a mountainside south of Tehran. Its construction was kept secret by Iran until it was disclosed in September 2009 in a pre-emptive move before its existence was revealed by Western intelligence agencies. The area is heavily protected by the Revolutionary Guard. The main research reactor is in Iran's capital, mainly involved in producing isotopes for cancer treatment, Arak heavy water reactor in the central province of Markazi. Iranian officials have long stated that a chief aim of the fission reactor, known as the IR-40, is to make radioisotopes for medicine. Several alternative methods of generating desired medical isotopes would make it harder for would-be proliferators to lay hands on weapon-grade fissile material, argues the 13 June report from the Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy of AAAS (publisher of Science). The technical approaches include an expanded reliance on cyclotrons or spallation neutron sources. High demand for short-lived isotopes used in positron emission tomography, coupled with technical advances in miniaturizing accelerators, has driven down costs. "Accelerator technology is far less expensive and more capable than in the past," write authors Derek Updegraff and Seth A. Hoedl, analysts at AAAS [177].

The Islamic Republic of Iran retains the right to continue enriching uranium


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Not surprisingly, Tehran strongly rejected Washingtons interpretation of the long -awaited interim nuclear agreement reached by the P5+1 nations in Geneva 2013, as Irans Foreign Ministry labeled the factsheet released by the White House as a one-sided interpretation. Iran now claims that the American factsheet, posted a few hours after the deal was announced on the website of the White House, had omitted some key points and is misleading the public by adjusting the language of the original agreement. These Americans are not allowed to release the White House statement (fact sheet) and show double-standard behavior and repeat this attitude to deprive us of our rights, while the cancerous tumor of the region (Israel) will be able to use nuclear bombs, member of the Iranian parliament Alireza Zakani said[178] .
Geneva Interim Agreement: It would halt the progress of Irans program and roll back key elements in every meaningful area of Uranium enrichment? Iran has committed to halt enrichment above 5%: Halt all enrichment above 5% and dismantle the technical connections required to enrich above 5%. Iran has committed to neutralize its stockpile of near-20% uranium: Dilute below 5% or convert to a form not suitable for further enrichment its entire stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium before the end of the initial phase. I just heard the secretary of state say, were going to get a destruction of the 20-percent uranium. That is simply untrue. What is going to happen is the 20-percent enriched uranium is going to be turned into an oxide so its inoperative. That process is completely chemically reversible, which means Iran holds on to 20 percent uranium and can turn it into active stuff any time it wants. This is a sham from beginning to end. It is the worst deal since Munich.
Krauthammer: US-Iran Nuke Agreement The Worst Deal Since Munich November 25th, 2013 by Thomas Jefferson

Insignificant Commitment: Flawed uranium enrichment track. Tehran appears to be committed to stop enriching uranium to a 20% level and convert all the quantity they have into fuel rods or uranium oxide (uranium powder). The 2013 November Interim Geneva Agreement: commitment is not to increase the amount of uranium enriched to a low level 3.5% to 5% which they possess. These restrictions are in fact almost meaningless, as the Iranians have already managed to install nearly 18,000 centrifuges used to enrich uranium. With such an amount of centrifuges, they can enrich uranium to any level they want within a short period of time. At the moment they already have more than 8 tons of uranium enriched to a 3.5-5% level, which is enough for four to five atom bombs of the size dropped on Hiroshima. So the Iranians can quietly accept the neutralization of their ability to enrich and accumulate uranium at a 20% level. They can skip the stage of enrichment to 20%, and through the centrifuges they have already installed enrich any amount they want to a level of fissile material


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The promise of inspections does not extend to the Parchin military site, where IAEA inspectors suspect that Iran at one time tested

triggering devices for nuclear weapons. Tehrans consistently denies IAEA access to military facilities at Parchin Complex, and sadly the issue was not even addressed in the 2013 Geneva Conference In the November 2011 IAEA [180] . On 28 November Iranian Officials promised "Iran Safeguards report on Iran, the IAEA disclosed that information is ready to discuss the issue of granting access to the from member states indicated [181]., base in Parchin" this quickly changed on 21 that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel December, The International Atomic Energy Agency or chamber at the Parchin (IAEA) inspectors have neither the right nor any duty military complex in 2000 to to inspect Irans military and missile sites. The conduct high explosive and hydrodynamic experiments agencys inspectors have no right and no responsibility related to the development of to do it. There is no authority in the world responsible nuclear weapons. After constructing the chamber at the for inspecting such facilities, and there is no treaty in Parchin site, some 30 kilometers that regard, either, Head of the Atomic Energy southeast of Tehran, Iran constructed a building around Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi said on 21 the large cylindrical object. December 2013 [181a] . According to the report, a large The 2013 November Interim Geneva Agreement does not include an immediate Iranian commitment to uncover the efforts it has made and is still making to develop the explosive device and warhead. As opposed to uranium enrichment, these efforts are taking place in relatively small labs which are easy to hide [182]. Secretary of State John Kerry stated the 2013 November Interim Geneva Agreement was only a holding action, meant to keep the Iranian nuclear program in check for six months. According to Kerry this was so further negotiators could pursue a far tougher and more lasting agreement. The Iranian Nuclear Road Map will be taken only within subsequent steps. However these incremental steps require joint conference negations and Iranian agreements before any steps by Tehran. This process could take years at the dawdling pace the Islamic Republic implements to drag out nuclear discussions. Currently we do not even know when the six months holding action period will begin [183].
earth berm was subsequently constructed between the building containing the cylinder and a neighboring building, indicating the probable use of high explosives in the chamber. The IAEA obtained satellite images showing this chamber before the roof was placed on the building. The large Parchin complex is dedicated to research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets, and high explosives. The complex is owned by Irans Defense Industries Organization, and has hundreds of buildings and test sites. It is a logical site to conduct high explosive work related to nuclear weapons development, which can be hidden among the conventional high explosive activities. This strategy has been pursued by other proliferant states seeking to hide nuclear weapons development work. Parchin etail/parchin/


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The 2013 November Interim Geneva Agreement, leaves Irans nuclear infrastructure intact. Iran keeps every one of its 19,000 centrifuges yes, 19,000 including 3,000 second-generation machines that produce enriched uranium at five times the rate of the older ones. Not a single centrifuge is dismantled. Not a single facility that manufactures centrifuges is touched. In Syria, the first thing the weapons inspectors did was to destroy the machines that make the chemical weapons. Then they went after the stockpiles. It has to be that way. Otherwise, the whole operation is an exercise in futility. Take away just the chemical agents, and the weapons-making facilities can replace them at will,
Opinion Writer Suckers deal By Charles Krauthammer,

A little-noticed provision of the 2013 November Interim Geneva Agreement of the deal paves the way for U.S. companies such as Boeing and General Electric to inspect and repair Iran's American-made planes inside Iran.

The deal paves the way for U.S. companies such as Boeing and General Electric to inspect and repair Irans aging American-made planes inside the country. The Islamic Republic can even buy new aircraft and refurbish its aviation fleet. International sanctions against the countrys aviation industry were partly lifted in the November Interim Geneva Agreement ,Iranian deputy transport minister Alimohammad Nourian stated on November 26 2013 [184] But Rep. Brad Sherman (D-Calif.), a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs panel said in November 2013, the planes could be used to promote terrorism and support Syrias Bashar Assad. America should exploit some of the vagaries in the agreements language and prevent Boeing from repairing Iranian aircraft until we h ave a final deal, Otherwise we will have made a permanent irreversible concession in a temporary agreement [185]. The critical issue overlooked a large part of Tehrans commercial aviation fleet belongs to the IRGC & MODAFL. Also upgrading Tehrans air power with modern technology will no doubt fall into the hands of the Armed Forces of Iran providing new deadly capabilities. This same technology will find its way into Irans UAVS and combat drones.
In 2011 the US Treasury Department Treasury Sanctioned U.S. Department of the Treasury took action to designate two major Iranian commercial entities: Tidewater Middle East Co. (Tidewater) and Iran Air. Tidewater is a port operating company

owned by Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that has been used by the IRGC for illicit shipments. Irans national airline carrier, Iran Air, is a commercial airline used by the IRGC and Irans Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) to transport military related equipment. Treasury also designated an individual and an entity for their ties to a company that provided support and weapons to Hezbollah on behalf of the IRGC.

Tehran is aiming for over one billion dollars in international aviation commerce. The country's fleet of more than 150 jetliners from airbus, Boeing Co. BA +1.85% and other plane makers consists of outdated models with an average age of more than 20 years, according to French research firm AeroTransport Data Bank. [221] Iran is looking to buy 50 aircraft from Boeing, one of the worlds leading aerospace companies. [222]


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Iran Air Iran Air serves as Irans national air carrier, operating a fleet of approximately 40 aircraft covering 35 international and 25 domestic destinations. Iran Air Tours is a subsidiary that operates a portion of Iran Airs domestic flights. Iran Air has provided support and services to MODAFL and the IRGC through the transport and/or transfer of goods for, or on behalf of, these entities. On numerous occasions since 2000, Iran Air shipped military-related electronic parts and mechanical equipment on behalf of MODAFL. MODAFL was designated by the U.S. Department of State in October 2007 under E.O. 13382 and has brokered a number of transactions involving materials and technologies with ballistic missile applications. Iran Air has shipped military-related equipment on behalf of the IRGC since 2006, and in September and November 2008, Iran Air shipped aircraft-related raw materials to a MODAFLassociated company, including titanium sheets, which have dual-use military applications and can be used in support of advanced weapons programs. Rockets or missiles have been transported via Iran Air passenger aircraft, and IRGC officers occasionally take control over Iran Air flights carrying special IRGC-related cargo. The IRGC is also known to disguise and manifest such shipments as medicine and generic spare parts, and IRGC officers have discouraged Iran Air pilots from inspecting potentially dangerous IRGCrelated cargo being carried aboard a commercial Iran Air aircraft, including to Syria. Additionally, commercial Iran Air flights have also been used to transport missile or rocket components to Syria. Adopted in March 2008, UNSCR 1803 called upon all States in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and from Iran of aircraft owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft is transporting goods prohibited under UNSCR 1803 or previous UNSCRs

The Geneva agreement requires the US and its negotiating partners to license safety related inspections and repairs as well as the supply and installation of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil aviation and associated services inside Iran. The deal stipulates that sanctions relief could apply to the national carrier, Iran Air, which has been singled out for carrying military equipment, and to other airlines that haven't been designated. The Treasury Department says the details of the aircraft provision need to be finalized by the negotiator [187].
Enrichment or Not to Enrich?

President Obama and Kerry announced 24 November agreement new deal did not recognize Irans right to enrich uranium [188]. They were quickly contradicted by the Iranian president and senior negotiator as well as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, claimed victory over America in the nuclear agreement reached in Geneva between the Islamic Republic and the 5+1 world powers. Khamenei in a statement thanked President Hassan Rouhani and his negotiating team for their achievement in Geneva.


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I thank God that the new government was able to legitimize the Iranian nations nuclear program on the international stage and take the initial step in a way that the nuclear rights and the enrichment rights of the Iranian nation are acknowledged by world powers where before they had tried to deny them, and (the agreement will) open the way for future big strides in technical and economic progress, Khamenei said [189].


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In early December Obamas White House confirmed that it is prepared to let the Islamic Republic keep a limited uranium enrichment program under any final nuclear accord reached with Tehran [190] . But just what does limited uranium enrichment mean?

Reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency, analyses prepared by leading research institutions such as, the Arms Control Association, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Federation of American Scientists point to the fact, the vast majority of Teh rans enrichment capability came online during the Obama administration [191]. So what is the truth? If Tehran won recognition for enrichment rights in the November Interim Geneva Agreement, it blows the bottom out of the Non-Proliferating Treaty because in no time all the signatories may start enriching uranium with permission from the big powers. Neither is there any point in making Iran join the NPTs Additional Protocol for snap inspections. In a 2012 Mohammad Mohammadi, an Iranian international affairs and nuclear program expert, wrote, Iran is in a position now that it does not necessarily need to compromise with the U.S. The talk of a military attack by Israel and some American officials in itself caused many Western leaders, diplomats, military officials and others to openly state that such an option cannot be implemented against Iran and that it will be devastating for the region and world, Mr. [191a] Mohammadi said.
The ineffectiveness of the American policies toward Iran has now reached an acute point where the intelligence to avoid a checkmate over Irans nuclear program is not visible in the White House,

In his article, titled The Lessons from the Past for the Negotiations, Mr. Mohammadi wrote: Looking back at the past decade, all th e red lines by America and the West over Irans nuclear issue have now been transformed into acceptance. America has always adopted radical actions at first that have changed to symbolic measures later. Iran has always known that America and the West needed a way to solve the nuclear issue with some honor, and today it is quite visible that with the defeat of Americas policies toward Iran, the talk about a need to solve the Iranian nuclear issue diplomatically is a way to obtain that honor.


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Persian Chess: Rendering the November 24, 2013 P5+1 Geneva The United States initially demanded Interim Agreement Worthless. In January 2014 over a third of that Iran suspend all its nuclear Irans parliament signed a bill introduced on January 1 that, if approved, will oblige the government to enrich uranium to 60 activities, Mr. Mohammadi said. percent level. Today, though, the Americans have Broken Promises: Iran Ignores the Geneva Deal January 3, given up on that, and what Obama 2014 From By Callum Wood is asking is the halt of the enrichment to the 20 percent level with a full acceptance of Irans enrichment rights to the 5 percent level. Enriching uranium to the 20 percent level is a critical step to achieving nuclear weaponization. The Americans have also changed their language, Mr. Mohammadi said, where at first they claimed that they had evidence that Iran was working to make the nuclear bomb. Now, though, they state openly that Iran has not yet decided to make a bomb. This change in their demands and in their language can only mean one thing, they are incapable of stopping Irans nuclear program. [192]

Tehran Advances Across Redlines: President Obama, Since I took office, Ive made clear my determination to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. As Ive said many times, my strong preference is to resolve this issue peacefully, and weve extended the hand of diplomacy. Yet for many years, Iran has been unwilling to meet its obligations to the international community. So my administration worked with Congress, the United Nations Security Council and countries around the world to impose unprecedented sanctions on the Iranian government . Ultimately, only diplomacy can bring about a durable solution to the challenge posed by Irans nuclear program. As President and Commander-in-Chief, I will do what is necessary to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. But I have a profound responsibility to try to resolve our differences peacefully, rather than rush towards conflict. Today, we have a real opportunity to achieve a comprehensive, peaceful settlement, and I believe we must test it. While todays announcement is just a first step, it achieves a great deal. For the first time in nearly a decade, we have halted the progress of the Iranian nuclear program, and key parts of the program will be rolled back. Iran has committed to halting certain levels of enrichment and neutralizing part of its stockpiles. Iran cannot use its next-generation centrifuges, which are used for enriching uranium. Iran cannot install or start up new centrifuges, and its production of centrifuges will be limited. Iran will halt work at its plutonium reactor. And new inspections will provide extensive access to Irans nuclear facilities and allow the international community to verify whether Iran is keeping its commitments. But through strong and principled diplomacy, the United States of America will do our part on behalf of a world of greater peace, security, and cooperation among nations. Statement by President Obama On First Step Agreement On Iran's Nuclear Program November 23, 2013

There has been harsh rhetoric concerning unambiguous red line to stop Tehrans nuclear advance. However the pattern is clear, as the Islamic Republic has crossed each red line, the White House has retreated to the next and, in effect, hit the repeat button. From conversion of uranium, to production of low-enriched uranium, nuclear weapons designs, and now enrichment.


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The text of the Geneva interim agreement, however, declares that any final agreement with Iran will include a "mutually defined enrichment program." President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif have both declared that these terms in the Geneva agreement enshrine Iran's right to enrich uranium.
United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI)

Tehrans nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi has said Iran will never abandon the Arak heavy water reactor, considering it a red line in talks with world powers, But you should know that it is a red line which we will never cross, likewise enrichment of uranium. [193] Under November Interim Geneva Agreement reached with six world powers Tehran will attain access to billions of dollars of revenues from limited sales of oil and petrochemicals and trade in gold and other precious metals, and more. [194] Given that the Islamic Republic has one of the worlds largest reserves of both oil and gas, its the perfect location for the international community to start drilling. China, Iran's largest oil client, in 2013 bought 16.01 million tons of Iranian crude oil, or an average of 428,160 bpd.

Indian refiners are ready to start transferring cash owed for Iranian oil. India is Irans second-largest buyer and now owes Tehran about US$5.3 billion for oil imports, according to government and refining sources. Indias refiners in mid-October received a request by the National Iranian Oil Company to settle some of those dues in Euros via Turkeys state-run bank Halkbank as soon as possible. The refiners had used that payment route until February, when it was blocked by sanctions. Irans biggest oil buyers are China, India, South Korea and Japan. [195] Various countries like India were
given oil & gas by Iran as credit. These countries avoided sanctions since there were no cash transactions and both parties simply agreed on payments after sanctions were lifted.


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Chinese Petroleum Companies

Tehran has executed 724 people in 18 months, including China is recognized for their dozens after Rouhani was elected in June. Rouhanis investment capital and intolerance of civil liberties such as freedom of religion, enthusiasm to acquire energy press, speech and association and equal rights for women and ethnic minorities reflect his genuine values and resources even notwithstanding worldview. of the expense. The longstanding initiatives by Iran Nuclear Deal Doesnt Pass Common Sense Test December 2, 2013 Yoram Ettinger National Petroleum Corp., nuclear-deal-doesnt-pass-common-sense-test/ running in tandem with a $60 billion global investment plan over the next decade. China National Petroleum is in various phases of developing three fields in the Islamic Republic, including work on one of the world's biggest natural-gas fields, and on enhancing recovery from a small, older oil field. [196]

To date, China has been opposed to approve significant sanctions against Iran, in large part since of the broad and deep partnership that the two countries have developed over the past three decades. Collaboration between Beijing and Tehran centers on Chinas energy

requirements and Tehrans plentiful resources. This also includes notable non-energy economic ties, arms sales and defense cooperation, and geostrategic balancing against the United States. Chinas interest in the Middle East & Africa is first and foremost energydriven dependence. In 1993, when it became a net oil importer for the first time, Beijing embarked on a go out (zhouchuqu) policy to procure energy assets elsewhere to feed its growing economy. China has also embarked on rapid military modernization and enhancing its long-range power projection capabilities. [197] For Europe the November Interim Geneva Agreement, the EU obtains something crucially significant: a source of non-Russian oil. Russia currently has a stranglehold on European oil and gas supplies. Europe depends on imported oil and gas.
Perhaps some of President Obamas strategies are to quietly make sure that these huge international oil & gas sales are denominated in US dollars?

When Tehrans opens up its oil and gas fields and invites the multinationals in; it means that the country will have access to the multinationals technology. This technology will unlock not only the vast conventional oil and gas potential that Iran already has but also the unconventional oil and gas that could dwarf Irans current reserves. This is not just billions, but trillions of barrels of oil. [198]


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The interim agreement between Islamic Republic of Iran and the international powers known as P5+1, United States, Russia, Britain, France, China and Germany over Tehran's controversial nuclear program is causing a geopolitical storm. But countries struggle with their imploding petro-driven economic architecture, Irans oil & gas market offer relief. With trade barriers removed there in billions of dollars in commerce to be made. Tehrans long and bloody affairs as the leader in international terror seems of little note. While Africa and the Middle East region are engulfed in unending wars of carnage with Syria as the main and bloodiest battlefront. The Islamic Republic shadows falls in these conflicts. However Tehran is now presented as a country increasingly integrated into the family of nations and as an element that will help resolve its own nuclear crisis, other than the one responsible for the crisis in the first place. The strategic significance of this image is that Tehran is increasingly distanced from its status as a radical sponsor of International terrorism. As such a state and its nuclear transgression constitute a legitimate object of military action. The wide perception in the Middle East and Africa Tehran is defeating America on all fronts. Washington influence and military in the region is on the retreat. The Islamic republic complex and powerful cyber PR machine is doing everything possible to assert this belief. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Jawed Zarif is moving quickly to capitalize on the momentum generated by the deal by touring Arab Gulf States. Visiting the Qatari capital of Doha, home to the most important United States military command in the region, CENTCOM Forward Headquarters, Mr. Zarif said Iran sought reconciliation with Saudi Arabia, emphasizing the recent nuclear deal and saying Iran posed no threat to other countries in the region. We believe that Iran and Saudi Arabia should work together in order to promote peace and stability in the region , he was quoted as saying by news agencies. This agreement cannot be at the expense of any country in the region . [199] In a December T.V. discussion, Former Saudi intelligence Chief Prince Turki Al Faisal Al Saud of Saudi Arabia delivered a message President Barack Obama asking him to wake up from his sleep, in reference to prevailing rapprochement between the Islamic Republic and the International Community regarding Geneva interim agreement reached over Irans nuclear program. Saudi Arabia is extremely worried that the Geneva agreement with Tehran will allow it a free-hand in the region at the expense of Gulf countries. The Geneva interim agreement comes against a backdrop of long-growing regional and sectarian tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia as they compete for power and influence through proxies in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. [200]
The advent of the Islamic Iranian Revolution in 1979 dramatically altered the dynamics of the region. As well as igniting military conflicts with neighboring Iraq, the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran saw a dramatic turn towards hostility in relations with the Sunni Gulf monarchs, in which the unresolved claim to the Persian Gulf Islands became a rallying point.


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Bahrain serves as the regional headquarters to the US Navy Fifth Fleet operating in the Persian Gulf. Tehran claims sovereignty over Bahrain (calling it "Iran's 14th province") and has even claimed to have found "historical proof" for the claim. In February 2009 Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, advisor to Supreme Leader Khamenei, said that until its independence in 1970, Bahrain was Iran's 14th province and even had representation in the Iranian parliament. The Islamic Republic for over a decade has been trying to set ablaze the tiny island into Iraqi like conflict

The Commander of the Fifth Fleet is responsible for an area encompassing about 2.5 million sq miles of water area, including the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Oman and parts of the Indian Ocean. Countries in the fleet's area of responsibility are: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. The Fifth Fleet includes aircraft carriers, destroyers and other ships that rotationally deploy from the U.S., plus a few smaller ships that are based in the Gulf for longer periods. The Fifth Fleet protects shipping lanes in the Gulf and nearby waters. It is the naval arm of Central Command, responsible for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its aircraft perform combat missions over both countries. The naval headquarters also coordinates the operations of over 20 U.S. and allied warships in Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 and 152 that seek to interdict the movement of terrorists, pirates, arms, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related technology and narcotics across the Arabian Sea. In March 2008, Bahrain took a turn in a rotation to command CTF-152, and it commanded again in December 2010. Bahrain commanded an anti-piracy task force in Gulf/Arabian Sea waters in October 2010. These operations are offshoots of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, which ousted the Taliban after the September 11 attacks. Bahrain allowed the stationing of 17,500 U.S. troops and 250 U.S. combat aircraft at Shaykh Isa Air Base that participated in the Desert Storm offensive against Iraqi forces. Bahrain and the United States subsequently decided to institutionalize that expanded cooperation by signing a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) on October 28, 1991, for an initial period of ten years. The DCA remains in effect. The pact reportedly not only provides the United States access to Bahrains air bases and to pre -position strategic materiel (mostly U.S. Air Force munitions), but also requires consultations with Bahrain if its security is threatened, and it expanded exercises and U.S. training of Bahraini forces. Bahrain is one of the smallest Arab States with only 1.3 million inhabitants, but it plays a major role in the overall security of the Gulf region and the Middle East. It is a small island, linked to the Saudi Arabian mainland by a 15-mile causeway, taking one straight into the desert kingdom's Eastern province, the largest oil-producing region in the world. Bahrain has been wracked by near-daily violence since early 2011. Originally imitating Tunisia and Egypt's Arab Spring demonstrations, the island's protests quickly developed into sectarian affairs. The majority of Bahrain's roughly one million citizens are Shiite, but the Khalifa royal family is Sunni. Bahrain is one of the more volatile regions on the face of the globe, where all the ingredients for an explosive situation are present: oil, religion and politics. The Fifth Fleet of the United States Navy is responsible for naval forces in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and coast off East Africa as far south as Kenya. It shares a commander and headquarters with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT). Ships of the U.S. Navys 5th Fleet a fleet representing tens of billions of dollars are based there, with responsibility for 7.5 million square miles of seas from the Arabian Gulf to the Red Sea to the Gulf of Oman. Some 2,300 American personnel are stationed on the Fifth Fleet headquarters 100-acre base, and thousands of the fleets 15,000 sailors land in Bahrain on and off throughout the year. The deep water port in Bahrain, Khalifa bin Salman, is one of the few facilities in the Gulf that can accommodate U.S. aircraft carriers and amphibious Ships. Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs November 6, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 95-1013


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IRGC OF elements target Bahrain Officials & US Fifth Fleet

In 2013 Bahrain court released details of IRGC-QF cell targeting U.S. Fifth Fleet Intelligence. The IRGC-QF backed Imam Army included Bahrainis at home and abroad and members of other nationalities. "Investigation has also revealed that a member of the IRGC-QF codenamed 'Abu Naser' masterminded the whole terror operation," Bahrain court quoted Bahraini security Intelligence chief Major-General Tariq Hassan al-Hassan as saying. Abu Nasser supplied the group with $80,000, Hassan said, and instructed it to gather information, recruit and obtain covert weapons storage in Bahrain.
Bahrain Criminal Court, capping a four-month trial, ruled that the cell targeted key facilities in Bahrain, including the U.S. Navys Fifth Fleet and other military bases. Three of the defendants received military training at camps belonging to the IRGC-QF and in Iraq, the court said in a statement on Nov. 3. They also received courses on how to dismantle weapons, detonate explosives, deceive police forces and transfer information. The four defenda nts, all sentenced to life, were also found guilty of plotting the assassination of leading Bahraini officials. The cell, which trained in Iran and Iraq, was said to contain at least 30 members, six of them sentenced to 15 years. The defendant, one of the men who headed the terrorist group and recruited its members, traveled to the Islamic Republic continuously through Oman to meet Iranian Revolutionary Guard along with other defendants, the court said. IRGC -QF was said to have trained the Bahraini cell in the use of AK-47 assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and C4 explosives. The court identified the IRGC handler as Abu Nasser, who transferred $80,000 for the operations. We will gather the fish together was a secret code that the Bahraini defendants used with their Iranian counterparts, meaning the defendants would gather the weapons between Iran and Bahrain, the court said. We will provide earth information, meant the defendants would provide Iran with information about key locations in Bahra in using Google Earth and other. [202] The IRGC-QF began its operations to over thrown the Government of Bahrain starting shortly after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. In 1981 an attempt was made to overthrow the Bahraini regime, led by a network calling itself the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain. The organization was founded by the Ayatollah Modarresi, an Iraqi cleric supported by Iran and affiliated with the Khomeini revolution. In previous affairs Iran and Hezbollah were accused of handling terrorist cells in Bahrain, training them and providing them with weapons. IRGC-QF efforts have particularly accelerated in the past two years beginning around the time of the Arab Spring and the withdrawal of US Troops from Iraq. On February 5, 2012 five improvised IEDs exploded in Manama, the capital of Bahrain. Ms. Samira Ibrahim Rajab, Bahraini minister of information, said that the methods and means used by those responsible for the explosions and the way they had been carried out indicated the involvement of Hezbollah. She added that the groups behind the explosions were the same ones who had been carrying out terrorist attacks in Bahrain for the previous ten months. According to the Bahraini authorities, the five IEDs bore the trademarks of Hezbollah. The Bahrain News Agency reported that their modus operandi proved the operatives had been trained outside Bahrain and that "the hallmarks of Hezbollah are crystal clear". Exploiting the Shi'ite community in Bahrain for subversion and terrorism is a permanent part of the Tehrans irregular warfare carried out by the IRGC -QF and its branch Hezbollah. The most recent example was in Yemen, where on January 23, 2013, a ship was intercepted and found to be carrying a large quantity of weapons from Tehran. The weapons were en route to the Shi'ite Houthi rebels in north Yemen which the IRGC-QF has been supporting for over two decades.


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The Illusion Continues 7 Dec. 2013 Under the Nov. 24 interim accord with the six world powers, Iran promised not to start operating centrifuges or install any more for a period of six months. But the agreement seems to, technically, allow Tehran to continue with advanced nuclear enrichment capabilities. Irans Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi said that production of the new generation of centrifuges was in line with IAEOs approach to enhance level of enrichment machinery and increase the amount of fuel Iran needs to operate the power plants and medical research reactor. He added that the new generation of centrifuges have been produced with a higher capacity compared to the first and second generation of machinery and have undergone preliminary tests.

Source: Institute for Security and International Studies; Bipartisan Center; USA TODAY research Reporting by Oren Dorell, graphic by Janet Loehrke and Denny Gainer, USA TODAY


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Tehrans Maritime Imports are the corner stone in acquiring black-markets military and nuclear materials, missile components and other forms of advanced technology . In addition its maritime imports of dual purpose goods are crucial for developing, advancing CBRN programs and arsenals.

Tehrans major port of entry is the Bandar-Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz. The Shahid Rajaee Port Complex at Bandar Abbas, located at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz is Iran's most important container terminal and some 90% of Iran's container traffic passes through the Shaheed Rajaee complex. After arriving at the Shahid Rajaee Port Complex, imported goods are distributed throughout the country by trucks and freight trains. The Tehran Bandar Abbas railroad, opened in 1995, connects Bandar-Abbas to the railroad system of Central Asia via Tehran and Mashhad. Other major ports include Bandar e-Anzali and Bandar e-Torkeman on the Caspian Sea and Khorramshahr and Bandar-e Emam Khomeyni on the Persian Gulf. [205]
Global Maritime transport dominates international trade in licit and illicit goods. It accounts for the majority of seizures and suspect shipments of military equipment and dual-use goods (goods that have both civilian and potential military applications, including in the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles) originating from or destined for embargoed states such as Iran and North Korea. It is the primary means of delivering shipments of conventional arms to actors involved in conflicts in Africa. Sea transport plays a major role in global flows of narcotics and associated chemical precursors. It is also the main mode of transport for other illicit and potentially destabilizing commodities, such as smuggled tobacco, oil and counterfeit goods,
Maritime Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows SIPRI Policy Paper No. 32 Hugh Griffiths and Michael Jenks January 2012 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Dual-use goods / components can be used for development of Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear weapons. Other dual-use commodities can be used for the manufacture of a variety of missiles to cruise missiles. Most dual-use goods originate from or destined for embargoed states such as Islamic Republic of Iran, Syria and North Korea. Black market arms and arms proliferation networks are increasingly adopting techniques pioneered by drug trafficking organizations that integrate their logistics operations within the global supply chain through the use of sealed shipping containers, which are carried aboard vessels that are owned by mainstream shipping companies and engaged in licit trade. Such techniques represent the most cost-effective method when traffickers are confronted by well-resourced and coordinated surveillance operations supported by international agreements such as United Nations arms embargoes and counter-narcotics conventions.. [206]
This relationship of crime to conflict to irregular warfare , insurgency and its little brother, terrorism is the dominant factor that is changing the conduct of irregular warfare in the 21st century from what we knew in the 20th. Other factors are the communications revolution, human migration, arms trafficking and there are others. But there is so much illicit money out there estimated to be one-fifth of the worlds GDP that it is having an enormous political impact, and one such impact is to fund terrorist and insurgent groups.. (continued)


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One way to look at the Taliban and its associated warlord supporters, for example, is as big smuggling operations drugs, money, arms, you name it. The same is true of the Colombian FARC, or virtually any insurgency in the world today. In the 21st Century, crime, terrorism and insurgency are blending in new political and social combinations that will call for new understandings of irregular warfare and approaches in counterinsurgency. Although some still deny the reality, one need look no further than the impact and reach of the Mexican criminal cartels now called Transnational Criminal Organizations to see the face of modern irregular warfare, insurgency and terrorism. Despite the hard work and sacrifice of operators in the field, and some notable successes, we the United States government are poorly organized to meet those challenges, in my opinion,
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Prepared Statement of Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.) March 27, 2012

The Failure of International Sanctions &

Shell Games

The current principal objective of international sanctionsto compel the Islamic Republic of Iran to verifiably demonstrate that its nuclear program is for purely peaceful uses. Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), carries an estimated one third of the country's dry bulk and container seaborne trade, has faced European Union sanctions for its alleged role in smuggling banned weapons, including measures implemented on July 26, 2010. [207]

Since 2010, 23 IRISL ships have visited 12 ports in the EU a total of 149 times, according to analysis including vessel movements and port calls. These include 96 visits to Malta, 14 to Antwerp, and 10 to Rotterdam. Two EU countries also still provide what critics call "flags of convenience" to the majority of the firm's fleet. The Reflagging of Iranian maritime vessels: Malta flags 48 vessels and Cyprus 12, out of a total of 144 vessels identified by the United States and the EU as IRISL vessels. Under the EU sanctions, all of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), assets were ordered frozen and all commercial transactions banned. [208] However, none of these actives are illegal thanks to a special clause that had been negotiated by Malta during EU internal negotiations, contracts between the sanctioned Iranian state shipping line and the Malta Freeport will remain valid until November 2013, although Malta is reportedly prepared to review that on condition that other countries follow suit. In addition exemptions do allow some existing contracts to be honored. [209]


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Illicit Nuclear Procurement Networks and Nuclear Proliferation: Challenges for Intelligence, Detection, and Interdiction Jack Boureston and James A. Russell April 2009 page 35


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Until 2011, IRISL Was Ranked The 23rd Largest Container Line In The World Now It's Not Even Listed In the Top 100

In January 2012, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published a study confirming that the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line (IRISL) has renamed nearly a quarter of its shipping fleet (90 out 123 vessels) in order to evade international sanctions. SIPRI reported that the Iranian shipping companies reflagging efforts, aimed at shielding their vessels from international scrutiny, has meant that on paper the Islamic Republic's maritime fleet has shrunk dramatically. Until 2011, IRISL was ranked the 23rd largest container line in the world. Now it's not even listed in the top 100. [210]
Iranian Weapons Smugglers Are Using Respectable Shipping Companies Out Of Europe To Move Illegal Weapons Into The Islamic Republic

One of the reasons why Tehran has reflagged many of its ships is so that shippers and maritime security agencies do not know they are moving Iranian vessels. SIPRI research uncovered Iranian weapons smugglers are using respectable shipping companies out of Europe to move illegal weapons into the Islamic Republic; though this was mostly done without the consent or knowledge of the companies. Most of the vessels originally identified as belonging to IRISL are listed as being owned and operated by companies that don't appear on the U.S. Sanctions/ blacklist. These companies are invariably located far from the IRI, in places such as Hong Kong, Germany, the Isle of Man, Malta or Cyprus. [211]
IRISL shipping fleet company has also reflagged a "significant percentage" of its fleet to further mask its clandestine arms shipments to Tehran's allies, such as Syria, and proxies, such as Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon. [212]

Tehrans Mosaic Military Doctrines Geostrategic and Geopolitical Power Politics has allow ed the Islamic Republic to construct a Global Shiite Crescent bridgehead. With Tehrans sponsorship of terrorists proxies and nonaligned militant Islamic extremists groups asserts regional control in MENA. This virulent Mosaic Military Doctrines Power Politics has succeeded in destabilizing the Middle East region without the UN or any other major international organizations stopping it. Irans Geopolitical mass media tactics buries the International community with an avalanche of deniability and political innocence. As a result, Iran has been able to expand its power and manipulate events in the region free from constraints. [213] Today the Islamic Republic has successfully broken the final restraints that have prevented it from building a nuclear arsenal.
We need to change our thinking and how we allocate resources. Old definitions of crime, terrorism, insurgency, irregular warfare and so forth often stovepipe our responses among government agencies and funding streams; worse, they cramp our mental responses and force them into irrelevant directions, while our enemies, unrestrained, simply adapt and carry on,
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Prepared Statement of Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.) March 27, 2012


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In November 2012 Geneva, US Secretary of State John Kerry, Tehrans Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, and foreign ministers from Russia, China, and Europe signed a deal to suspend aspects of Iranian nuclear work in exchange for some sanctions relief. With this first step, we have created the time and the space in order to be able to pursue a comprehensive agreementto ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon," Kerry told assembled diplomats and journalists. President Barack Obama. Today, that diplomacy opened up a new path toward a world that is more secure a future in which we can verify that Irans nuclear program is peaceful and that it cannot build a nuclear weapon. President Obamas Folly, Genevas Negotiations and interim arrangement has not halted nor delayed the Islamic Republic threats in any area of International concern. What President Obama folly has achieved is the dismantlement and eradication of hard earned United Nations Security Council Resolutions / Negotiated Agreements with Iran [214]. United Nations Security Council Sanctions against Iran
UNSCR 1929 (2010): Expands ban on sale of heavy weapons and missile technology to Iran; prohibits Iran from investing in nuclear and ballistic missile technology; authorizes countries to inspect all Iranian cargo if it is suspected of carrying WMDrelated materials, imposes financial sanctions on entities working with Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (a government company suspected of financing WMD development); sanctions additional Iranian entities. Noting with serious concern the role of elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution), including those specified in Annex D and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007) and Annex II of this resolution, in Irans proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, 9. Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities; UNSCR 1737 (2006): Prohibits member nations from selling equipment to Iran that could aid its nuclear or ballistic missile development; sanctions Iranian entities involved in those activities. UNSCR 1747 (2007): Prohibits member nations from purchasing arms-related material from Iran; urges member nations and international institutions not to enter financial commitments with Iran; sanctions additional Iranian entities. UNSCR 1803 (2008): Requires member nations to bar individuals involved in Irans WMD development from entering their territory; expands restrictions on sale of WMD equipment to Iran; urges member nations to restrict transactions with Iranian banks; authorizes inspections of Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lane cargo suspected of carrying WMD-related materials; sanctions additional Iranian entities. Fact Sheet: Iran Sanctions March 2013 By Ari Kattan Updated by Usha Sahay

In 1994, President Clinton had his "Peace for Our Time" moment when he negotiated his Agreed Framework that would supposedly denuclearize North Korea. Pyongyang exploded this fantasy with a series of nuclear tests culminating in a credible threat to make nuclear missile strikes on South Korea, Japan, and the United States in March 2013.


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In exchange for superficial concessions, Iran achieved three critical breakthroughs. First, it bought time to continue all aspects of its nuclear-weapons program the agreement does not cover (centrifuge manufacturing and testing; weaponization research and fabrication; and its entire ballistic missile program). Indeed, given that the interim agreement contemplates periodic renewals, Iran may have gained all of the time it needs to achieve weaponization not of simply a handful of nuclear weapons, but of dozens or more. Second, Iran has gained legitimacy. This central banker of international terrorism and flagrant nuclear proliferators is once again part of the international club. Much as the Syria chemical-weapons agreement buttressed Bashar al-Assad, the mullahs have escaped the political deep freezer. Third, Iran has broken the psychological momentum and effect of the international economic sanctions. While estimates differ on Irans precise gain, it is considerable ($7 billion is the lowest estimate), and presages much more. Tehran correctly assessed that a mere six-months easing of sanctions will make it extraordinarily hard for the West to reverse direction, even faced with systematic violations of Irans nuclear pledges. Major oil-importing countries (China, India, South Korea, and others) were already chafing under U.S. sanctions, sensing President Obama had no stomach either to impose sanctions on them, or pay the domestic political price of granting further waivers. Abject surrender by the United States, What does Israel do now? John R. Bolton | The Weekly Standard November 24, 2013

The Six Month Interim Agreement did not roll back the most Critical Parts of the Iranian Nuclear Threat. In no way, shape or form did this agreement place any notable limits on Iran's nuclear program as stated and promised by President Obama. In an avalanche of White House political obfuscation, this Interim agreement obscured the most urgent concerns including Irans enrichment capabilities; its existing stockpiles of enriched uranium; the number and capabilities of its centrifuges; and its ability to create weaponsgrade plutonium employing the Arak heavy water reactor.

As the International community ocean shipping financial highways unfolds to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the long established Iranian military black market acquirement will rapidly expand obtaining state-of the-art warfare technology. The IRGC-QF will have a vast new global arena to covertly move through and unitize. Tehrans booming commerce will bury its illicit activities throughout an economic labyrinth multi-layered procurement network. Tehran will be able to acquire advanced complex related equipment and technologies for its nuclear and missile programs .. The foundation is already been established. Opening Tehrans doors to the global community allows infective elements from Irans complex multifaceted espionage strategic and tactical agencies.


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Obamas White House is establishing relations with Iran on two vital economic but separate fronts. First, an Iran/US Chamber of Commerce,

this has already been created and will officially begin operating by late December 2013 or early January 2014. The 2nd is there will soon be direct flights between the United States and Islamic Republic will be established in the near future. Flights would connect Kish Island in southwest Iran with New York. The flights will arrive and depart only from the Island of Kish, an international tax-free trading zone. As such, United States citizens will not need Iranian visas. Direct flights will "enable Tehran to export domestic products to the US and import hightech products and raw materials from America [215] .
The US, Britain, France, including Germany will loosen trade sanctions. These will be melting away within a 190 day time frame. As a result, the current evidence points to, Iran rebounding to its maximum possible amount of oil extraction during the six months. Russia and China who already conduct billions of dollars in commerce will expand even more. Bloomberg reported $500 million will be restored in lost trade from easing auto sanctions, according to an anonymous source close to the Obama administration. International auto sanctions forced Iran to produce its own cars. Sanctions relief for Irans auto industry will boost sales, and French automakers Peugeot and Renault poised to gain. After the 1979 Iranian revolution American models mostly faded from the market. Fords and Chevrolets arent uncommon they are imported and sold through third parties. Peugeot and Seoul-based Kia Motors were Tehrans largest automakers before sanctions. [216].

Opening Tehrans doors to the global community allows infective elements from Irans complex multifaceted espionage strategic and tactical agencies. And Iran is building a cyber warfare capability that is retaliatory in nature. Little is known of the sophistication of statebased cyber espionage capabilities, of Iran. Tehran views economic espionage as an essential tool in achieving national security and economic prosperity. Their economic espionage programs combine collection of open source information, HUMINT, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and cyber operations to include computer network intrusions and exploitation of insider access to corporate and proprietary networks to develop information for a competitive edge over the United States and other rivals. For example in 2013 The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran hacked unclassified U.S. Navy computers. U.S. officials said the attacks were carried out by hackers working for Tehrans government or by a group acting with the approval of Iran. For the Iranian regime, however, the conclusion is clear. War with the West, at least on the cyber front, has been joined, and the Iranian regime is mobilizing in response. In recent months, it reportedly has launched an ambitious $1 billion governmental program to boost national cyber capabilitiesan effort that involves acquisition of new technologies, investments in cyber defense, and the creation of a new cadre of cyber experts. It has also activated a cyber army of activists which, while nominally independent, has carried out a series of attacks on sites and entities out of favor with the Iranian regime, including social networking site Twitter, Chinese search engine Baidu, and the websites of Iranianreformist elements. The Iranian Cyber Threat to the U.S. Homeland Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies and Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Ilan Berman Vice President American Foreign Policy Council April 26, 2012 24/docs/Cyber-071d.pdf

Access to American, EU auto industry and technology will boost the Armed Forces of Iran. Irans military industrial complex will be able to exclusively refit and modernize it mechanized and armored forces. Light armored vehicles, Self Propelled Artillery, to main battle tanks will be vastly enhance with superior engines. The Armed Forces mobile missile and cruise missile forces will emerge with greater rapid deployment and quick reaction capabilities.

US companies wasted no time in reaching out to Tehran about possible business opportunities. American corporations realize huge profit potential, the Islamic Republic market has been starved from sanctions and it is an enormous market with cash available revues. The relaxation of sanctions on Iran promises an opening for international companies that have been sidelined from one of the Middle East's largest consumer markets. Tehran needs imported products for all aspects of its economy, as well as foreign-made parts for some domestic industries American companies are playing a dangerous game in thinking of going back into Iran now, said Nathan Carleton, spokesman


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for United Against Nuclear Iran. An interim diplomatic agreement that has consistently been described as temporary and reversible is not a justification to rush back into Iran or do business with the regime. Sanctions must still be obeyed and enforced. [217] Tehrans Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh named 7 Western oil companies the Islamic Republic wants to return. The seven in order: Total of France, Royal Dutch Shell, Italys ENI,

Norways Statoil, Britains BP and U.S. companies Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips. Iran has the worlds fourth largest proved national reserves of oil most of it cheap to produce. [218] Cheap production means higher profits for oil corporations. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has started a significant reform campaign hoping to bring oil production back to the pre-sanction level of 4.2 million barrels per day within six months and increase it to the prerevolution level of 6 million barrels per day within 18 months. The 18 months does not appear to be a realist time frame but it does prove Iran is willing to vest considerable amount of its wealth to achieve these goals [219]. In 2013 Mehdi Hosseini, in charge of revising Iran's oil investment contract, told Reuters that oil companies will find it hard to pass up Iran's "low cost, low risk" investment opportunities that will be offered on more attractive commercial terms. "We need technology and investment from the IOCs to help reverse the depletion of these oilfields ," he said. Tehran wants Western oil companies to revive its giant ageing oilfields and develop new oil and gas projects once sanctions are lifted. "We will have many promising projects for the international oil companies," said Hosseini, an Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh's former deputy. "Brown fields, green fields and exploration blocks in both oil and gas" international oil companies (IOCs) could play a role in rehabilitating ageing onshore oilfields of Ahwaz, Gachsaran and Marun the backbone of Iran's production as well as Agha Jari and Bibi Hakimeh more modest, onshore producers , Hosseini said. Zanganeh and other top Iranian officials say the revival of these and other fields will allow the country to raise production to 4 million bpd within six months of sanctions being lifted. Western experts are more conservative, saying 3 million to 3.5 million bpd is more likely [219a]. With sanctions lifted, the Islamic Republic could swiftly recover about fifty percent of its offline production within 12 to 18 months, about 500,000 to 750,000 barrels per day. Asia is now the world's greatest net oil importing region, larger than Europe and North America combined. Generally, this has led to increased codependency between OPEC and emerging Asian countries, principally India and China. China has massive projects with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. [220]Tehran is aiming for over one billion dollars in international aviation commerce. The country's fleet of more than 150 jetliners from airbus, Boeing Co. BA +1.85% and other plane makers consists of outdated models with an average age of more than 20 years, according to French research firm AeroTransport Data Bank. [221] Iran is looking to buy 50 aircraft from Boeing, one of the worlds leading aerospace companies. [222]
According to President Obamas White House the sanctions relief allows Islamic Republic to acquire aviation components for safety purposes while seeking to ensure that they can't be used for military ends. However that is an empty claim there is no real way to ensure the flood of international commerce will not be covertly pipelined into Irans Arm Forces, especially the IRGC.


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Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz stated that the sanctions relief package offered to the Islamic Republic could be worth as much as $40 billion to Tehran. Steinitz said according to

Israeli analysis sanctions put in place by Washington and European Union in 2012 cost the Islamic Republic around $100 billion per year, or nearly a quarter of its output. "The sanctions relief directly will reduce between 15 to 20 billion dollars out of this amount," Steinitz said, suggesting that the weakening of the sanctions regime could eventually result in a $40 billion boost to the Iranian economy. "This is very significant. It's not all the sanctions. It's not the core sanctions about oil exports and the banking system, but it's very significant relief for the Iranians," he said. President Obamas White House rebuttal to Steinitz's estimate, State Department spokeswoman Jennifer Psaki criticized Steinitz's research findings, and said his "number, I can assure you, it is inaccurate, exaggerated, and not based on reality,.
During negotiations in Geneva, the P5+1 countries backtracked from their opening position and approved much more significant relief in a wide variety of areas: commerce in gold, the Iranian

The 10th International Exhibition of Energy will be held January 13-16, 2014 in the Kish Island, southern Iran. The event will be held at the Kish International Exhibition Center and will be attended by the foreign companies from 18 countries including 10 European countries, according to the official website of the exhibition. The number of participants has increased by 60 percent compared to the last year, the Mehr News Agency quoted the exhibitions organizer Mahmoud Sadiqi Some 150 Iranian companies and 50 foreign firms from China, Turkey, India, Italy, Netherlands, South Korea, Taiwan, Azerbaijan, Japan, Malaysia, France, Austria, United Arab Emirates, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Australia and Russia will showcase their products and services in the expo, he added.
Kish to host 10th intl. energy expo 04 December 2013 16:43

petrochemical industry, the car industry and replacement parts for civilian aircraft. According to Israel, Washington now concedes in their talks with Israel that the sanctions reliefs are worth much more. According to a US Israeli security sources, Economics is a matter of expectations. The Iranian stock exchange is already rising significantly and many countries are standing in line to renew economic ties with Iran based on what was already agreed in Geneva. The sources mentioned Chinas desire to renew contracts worth some $9 billion to develop the Iranian oil industry and the interest some German companies are showing for deals with Tehran [223].
International economic consortiums will engage in a feeding frenzy to get into the Islamic Republic as no one wants to be left behind when Irans markets opens up. Corporations fully realize Iran will be handing out the most lucrative and profitable contracts first to entice business enterprises, so everyone will try to get in first. This flood of global commercial enterprises will pour through the open doors of Tehran. Contrary to President Obama and his top advisors declarations alleging that sanctions can be quickly restored, simple common sense rules it out.


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Iran, the Moharebehs, anyone one who is designated as waging war against God and therefore should be executed.

Behind Khomeinis Wall of Islamic Totalitarianism According to the constitution of Iran; the Supreme Leader Khamenei sets the direction of foreign and domestic policies. He is commander in chief of the armed forces and controls intelligence operations. Hence, both Irans Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and IRGC Intelligence, including the Quds Force, report directly to the Supreme Leader. The president is the second-highest-ranking official in Iran. However, the constitution limits his authority in such a way that it subordinates the entire executive branch and specifically MOIS and a small number of other ministries including the foreign and oil Ministries to the Supreme Leader. Irans Ministry of Intelligence and Security The Islamic Republic intelligence service includes 30,000 people who are engaged in covert and clandestine activities that range from spying to stealing technology to terrorist bombings and assassinations. Irans Ministry of Intelligence and Security, known as MOIS, is one of the largest and most dynamic intelligence agencies in the Middle East. The ministry actively supports Irans radical Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) that has been involved in terrorist bombings from Argentina to Lebanon. Every minister of intelligence must hold a degree in ijtihad (the ability to interpret Islamic sources such as the Quran and the words of the Prophet and imams) from a religious school, abstain from membership in any political party or group, have a reputation for personal integrity, and possess a strong political and management background. The spy service operates in all areas where Iran has interests, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Central Asia, Africa, Austria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, France, Georgia, Germany, Turkey, Britain, and the Americas, including the United States. Iranian activities in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela have raised alarm among U.S. government officials. In Latin America, Irans intelligence agencies are mostly the IRGC-QF who uses Hezbollah to achieve their goals. Iranian intelligence is expanding operations in the Middle East and Mediterranean by setting up electronic eavesdropping stations. IRGC-QF is the main covert action arm of the Tehran regime, but both the MOIS and IRGC cooperate closely [224].

The Islamic Republic of Iran has executed 529 people this year, including more than 300 since President Hassan Rouhani assumed office in August, according to a tally compiled by the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC). The number of executions have significantly spiked since Rouhani took office, leading some to argue that this clashes with his image as a moderate reformer. Iran now has the dubious honor of being the global leader per capita in executions, according to the IHRDC. Khomeinist law allows capital punishment for persons who have reached puberty, defined as nineyears-old for girls and fifteen for boys. In 2012 there were more than a hundred juvenile offenders on death row. Moharebeh, the term is widely used by Iran's Islamic Judiciary, citing Sharia law, meaning defying God, enemy of God. It is a capital crime in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The means used can be from stoning to death, firing squad or hung. IRIs Article 500 of the penal code states that anyone who undertakes any form of propaganda against the state will be sentenced to between three months and one year in prison, but the code leaves propaganda undefined. Under Article 513, offenses deemed to be an insult to religion can be punished by death, or prison terms of one to five years for lesser offenses, with insult similarly undefined. In 2010, the government broadened the definition of the crime of Moharebeh, or enmity against God, in order to convict activists and journalists. Other articles provide sentences of up to two years in prison, up to 74 lashes, or a fine for those convicted of intentionally creating anxiety and unease in the publics mind, spreading false rumors, writing about acts that are not true, and criticizing state officials, though many prison sentences have been arbitrarily harsh, ranging from 6 to more than 10 years. Many of those executed by mainly by hanging, were accused of being a Moharebeh, Many others were hung in secrecy and after being convicted of crimes during closed trials that human rights observers classified as unfair and lacking in international standards. The execution figures are compiled from both official and unofficial reports in the Iranian media and elsewhere. The Iranian government has officially acknowledged at least 400 executions in 2013. The President Obamas White House callously admits Iranian human rights issues are not even on the table during the nuclear negotiations. But Obama Diplomacy maintains removal of sanctions is an important component of outreach to the Iranian People.
1). International Campaign for Human Rights Movement in Iran 2). Iran: Freedom of the Press 2011


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Hence speaking out against the Supreme Leader is speaking out against God, that being blasphemy and that means death.

The Shiites believe that in every age there was an infallible Iman, a descendent of Ali; The Imams have the secret knowledge that makes possible a true interpretation of the Koran. They are the source of all truth, and the only beings with the right to men's obedience. There is one voice in the Islamic Republic of Iran that has the final say in all matters, and that is the Supreme Leader Khamenei. Khamenei selected by Khomeini as his successor. Khamenei has carefully crafted and kept the appearance of a semi-democracy state. He has structured parliament so there can be debate and disagreements. However from the Iranian President to the barking dogs of Iranian parliamentary is a wall of insulation for who is really in power. This choreographed play provides a barrier of anonymity to the power of the Supreme Leader. In fact, it is Khamenei who decides who will run and hold for any governmental office, or any Armed Forces position. The Presidential Office serves at the pleasure of the Supreme Leader. It is a grand deception which the International community and the IAEA must traverse, this seemly complex and hierarchy structure in order to resolve various issues. In reality, it is a race track which the Office of the Supreme Leader forces the IAEA and world community to run laps in. It also deflects the preponderance of Iranian and global criticism away from Khamenei. The Presidential Office becomes the lighting rod, Iranian parliamentary and IRGC leaders become the bearer of obligation. This is the wall the IAEA and International community continually breaks itself upon.
The Doctrine of Taqiyya; (Persian Ketman) Meaning, Religious Dissimulation, is a practice emphasized in Shi'a Islam. The word "Taqiyya" literally means: "Concealing or disguising one's beliefs, convictions, ideas, feelings, opinions, and/or strategies at a time of eminent danger, whether now or later in time, to save oneself from physical and/or mental injury." A one-word translation would be "Dissimulation." Taqiyya is of fundamental importance in Islam. Practically every Islamic sect agrees to it and practices it We can go so far as to say that the practice of Taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream , Taqiyya is very prevalent in Islamic politics, especially in the modern era. It was Khomeini that perfected Taqiyya as a political tool on a grand scale to grain power, for him anything which allows Islam to trumpet is permissible. [225]
Khomeini "I don't want to be the leader of the Islamic Republic; I don't want to have the government or the power in my hands. I only guide the people in selecting the system." -Ayatollah Khomeini (in an interview with an Austrian TV reporter, Paris, November 16, 1978) "It is the Iranian people who have to select their own capable and trustworthy individuals and give them the responsibilities. However, personally, I can't accept any special role or responsibility." -Ayatollah Khomeini (in an interview with Le Journal newspaper, Paris, November 28, 1978) "After the Shah's departure from Iran, I will not become a president nor accept any other leadership role. Just like before, I limit my activities only to guiding and directing the people." -Ayatollah Khomeini (in an interview with Le Monde newspaper, Paris, January 9, 1979)


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Khomeinis bloody rise to power: from its inception, his true intentions were hidden, camouflaged, cloaked in decency. His words of democratic process, and democratic openness, obscured a monster, in order to give birth to a most brutal form of Islam, Where anyone, anything is slaughtered, butchered, to give rise to Ayatollah Khomeinis conception of what the world should be. His chaos of Islamic Militant Theocratic Totalitarianism has been set free, it roams the world.

The rise of Ayatollah Khomeini cannot be fully addressed in this Security Briefing; however it is paramount in understanding the Islamic Republic. There is a free in-depth report available from the Association of Geo strategic Analysis, The Rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It can be downloaded at this link.

Understanding Khomeinism strategy and tactics of Taqiyya and the Persian negotiation landscape is curial and it explains why Washington and the IAEA have been losing. When the Obama administration signaled its desire to sit down to negotiations with the Iranians, the Iranians hardened their stand on the nuclear issue. For Persians, talking before winning shows weakness, and the Iranian government interpreted Obamas attempts at dialogue as a sign of weakness. What we in the West see as good-will, the Iranians understand as enfeeblement, so they had no incentive to soften their positions. And when Iranians smell weakness, like others in the Middle East, they go in for the kill.
Negotiations are opportunities to best others, to demonstrate power, and to defeat opponents. Iranians do not see bargaining as an opportunity to establish win-win situations. Contracts are little more than pieces of paper Iranians will sign, if these papers can advance their interests. Their signatures are not guarantees that they will carry out the terms of the contract. In politics, Iranians negotiate only after defeating their enemies. During these negotiations, the victor magnanimously dictates to the vanquished how things will be conducted thereafter. Signaling a desire to talk before being victorious is, in Iranian eyes, a sign of weakness or lack of will to win, The Sources of Iranian Negotiating Behavior - Strategic Perspectives by Harold Rhode Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs / Institute for Contemporary Affairs (October 5, 2010)

President Obamas Grand Iranian Strategy, checked mated by the Islamic Republic

8 December 2013 President Obama, At the end of six months if we cannot make a deal we are no worse off, but we have greater leverage the international community to apply sanctions, the chances of a final, comprehensive nuclear agreement being struck with Tehran are less than 50-50, [226] .This has to be one of the most contorted white washing rhetorical acts in the growing political legacy of President Obama. With total disregard of the historical precedence, Obama embraces the same disastrous policy that enabled North Korea to develop into a nuclear power.


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The Six Month Interim Agreement did not roll back the most Critical Parts of the Iranian Nuclear Threat. In no way, shape or form did this agreement place any notable limits on Iran's nuclear program as stated and promised by President Obama. This 2013 November Interim Geneva Agreement obscured the most urgent concerns including Tehrans enrichment capabilities; its existing stockpiles of enriched uranium; the number and capabilities of its centrifuges; and its ability to generate weapons-grade plutonium employing the Arak reactor. Since the time of the Shah of Iran, Tehran has concealed the scope of its nuclear industrial activities, which included development of uranium enrichment technology that can be used for reactor fuel or nuclear weapons. The tip of Tehrans nuclear iceberg unveiled in 2003; the IAEA and Washington aimed to turning back Irans enrichment program to zero. Nothing has worked from UN Security Council Resolutions to punishing sanctions. The Islamic Republic of Iran shrugged the IAEA and Washington, even in the wake of a hundred billion dollars in losses from sanctions. Unabated Tehran steadily built up its enrichment capabilities. In fact, Tehran has made it clear, it will indefinitely continue unfettered development of sensitive nuclear capabilities including for uranium enrichment, plutonium production, and for producing nucl ear weapons. In addition, Irans nuclear delivery means from ballistic to cruise missiles will continuously evolve becoming more deadly.
The reality is the Islamic Republic of Iran is on trajectory in becoming an International super power along the same lines as poverty stricken Pakistan, whose nuclear arsenal is ranked 5th in the world and growing. Sixty percent of Pakistan's population is living below poverty line; a World Bank report entitled World Development Indicators (WDI) 2013. The international poverty line is two dollars a day or an income of Rs 200 per day. The report shows that 21 percent of Pakistan's population lives below $1.25 per day. Pakistans HDI value and rank Pakistans HDI value for 2012 is 0.515 in the low human development category positioning the country at 146 out of 187 countries and territories. [227] 2013: Economically, trouble looms. Pakistan, with its small tax base, poor system of tax collection, and reliance on foreign aid, faces no real prospects for sustainable economic growth. The government has been unwilling to address economic problems that continue to constrain economic growth. The government has made no real effort to persuade its disparate coalition members to accept much-needed policy and tax reforms, because members are focused on retaining their seats in upcoming elections. Sustained remittances from overseas Pakistanis (roughly $13 billion from July 2011 to June 2012, according to Pakistans central bank) have helped to slow the loss of reserves. However, Pakistan has to repay the IMF $1.7 billion for the rest of this fiscal year for money borrowed as part of its 2008 bailout agreement; growth was around 3.5 percent in 2012; and foreign direct investment and domestic investment have both declined substantially. James R. Clapper Director of National Intelligence March 12, 2013 Pakistan Page 18


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Pakistan is not an oil rich country like Tehran, yet it has been able to field some of the most modern technology capabilities for its armed forces. Motivated by ongoing hostilities with India, Pakistan embarked upon an intense ballistic missile development program in the early 1980's. Overcoming technical naivet, substantial disadvantages in infrastructure and human capital relative to India, the imposition of U.S. and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) sanctions, Pakistan has attained a sophisticated missile arsenal in only 30 years. [228] Pakistani nuclear arsenal is ranked 5th in the world and growing. Islamabads nuclear numbers are increasing. Pakistan possesses what is understood to be the worlds fastest -/growing nuclear weapons program, anticipated on present trends to outnumber the British stockpile in under a decade, and possibly the French shortly thereafter. The growth of its plutonium/production infrastructure underpins this expansion, by some estimates enabling the production of up to thirty warheads per year. The rapid expansion of Pakistans plutonium production is also important in this regard. Plutonium undergoes fission more readily than uranium, which means it can assist in making warheads with better yield-/to-/weight ratios. That enables warheads to be manufactured that can fit onto smaller missiles. Creating new roles for nuclear missiles also requires more missiles and therefore more fissile material for the warheads. Plutonium is better able to meet that demand. [229]
Pakistan is building a large atomic-energy site in Karachi; $9.6 billion nuclear site is expected to be finished in 2019. The complex will feature two Chinese ACP-1000 atomic reactors. China also will supply enriched uranium to run the reactors, according to officials. [230]

Pakistans nuclear trajectory is, however, undergoing an even more shocking shift, the development of tactical nuclear weapons, which have become increasingly central to Pakistani nuclear thinking in the past three years. This significantly and enduringly raises the risks of nuclear warfighting and accidents in periods of crisis. The greater concern is that Pakistan is developing a new generation of short-/range, nuclear-/capable ballistic and cruise missiles. Pakistan's Deadliest Weapon - Babur Cruise Missile can be equipped with a conventional or atomic warhead and possesses a claimed range of 700 km (430 mi). The Babur cruise missile was created to prevent radar recognition and permeate enemy's air defenses. The Hatf-VII Babur cruise missile developed in Pakistan was attributed by the military as having stealth features. Babur is a low-flying, terrain-hugging missile, which can strike targets both at land and sea with pinpoint accuracy. The missile is equipped with modern cruise missile technology of Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) and Digital Scene Matching and Area Co-relation (DSMAC), it can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads. The missile's guidance system utilizes a mixture of inertial navigation systems, American GPS satellite guidance and terrain contour matching (TERCOM). More complex variants of the Babur cruise missile are in development. Subsequent variants are planned to possess a range of 1000 kilometers (621 mi) and be able to be launched from Pakistan Navy submarines like Agosta 90B Khalid class. [231] The same off the shelf military technology Pakistan military utilized to create the lethal nuclear Babur cruise missile will soon be available to Tehrans military industrial complex.


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The Islamic Republic has made intentions clear it is an emerging as a Islamic military juggernaut. Tehran fully intends to become a nuclear super power. But President Obama is deaf, dumb and blind, to the threat from Iran. It is not just nuclear enrichment, its Khomeinists radical Islamic regional and global aspirations. Its the Islamic Republic waging wars of International terror.
Distinct similarities can be identified between Khomeinis ideology and that of Marxists. Where Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels claimed that the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles, Khomeini identified the holy struggle of the Muslim community of believes (ummat) against Jews imperialists, their agents and their machinations as propelling history. For Khomeini Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are committed to truth and justice ..those who struggle against imperialism , such as the Shina Imams who put on military dress and went into battles and wars ..they killed and were killed. Iran unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards is turning theocracy into military dictatorship AEI Press (April 18, 2013) page 204 The IRGC from the first year of the 1979 Iranian Revolution considered itself the sword arm that would be thrust into the world to pave the way for Khomeinists view of a global community based on his beliefs. As apparent in the IRGC emblem, at the base of its coat of arms is the number 1357 refers to the year 1979 which not only commemorates the year of the revolution and the establish of the Islamic Republic but the emergence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who heralds a worldwide Islamic Revolution.

Obamas approach to the clerical dictatorship in Tehran has been a policy of foreboding exsanguinates intimidation.

Obamas White House views Israels determined posture against the onslaught of the Islamic Republic as Israeli adventurism with Iran. In a 2012 CBSs 60 Minutes interview, President Obama likened Israels expressions of concern over a nuclear Iran to noise he tries to ignore [233]. Obamas White House considers itself as pursuing a strategy of maximizing pressure on Tehran both through sanctions and by creating a credible military threat. This is colorful brilliantly sounding diplomatic policy, which is hollow for it has only inflamed, embolden Iran. Allowing Iran to kill US Troops with impunity is hardly a creditable sane policy of diplomacy.
Khamenei who calls Israel a "cancerous tumor which must be uprooted from the region ; Iran explodes with unending progression of Israeli genocidal threats that burst through the Middle East and into the worldwide news arena. Former Iranian Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made himself the center of global attention with his infamous reproaches that Israel must be wiped off the map. This hate Israeli pr opaganda flows from every facet of the Islamic Republic. In 2012 Chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, elaborated the Iranian nation will remain committed to the full annihilation of the Zionist regime of Israel to the end [235]. These Israeli death threats have come with such regularity most of the world has become indifferent. President Obama has successfully painted this issue as no more than petty bickering between quarreling rivals and treats it as such.


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There is an incomprehensible ambiguity concerning Tehrans irregular war operations against the tiny state of Israel. As if Irans spending of several billion dollars in asymmetrical warfare is of little note. The thousands of rockets that have pounded Israel on almost a daily basis for over a decade owe their origin to Iran. For Washington they are of no real consequence. Washington and the global community appear totally baffled when Israel verbally retorts against Tehran. Israel in its endeavors to put an end to the raging asymmetrical hostilities is consistently vilified as the evil entity. In an early 2012 Ayatollah Khamenei delivered a fiery anti-Israel speech shortly after a successful Iranian satellite launch, From now onward, we will support and help any nations, any groups fighting against the Zionist regime across the world, and we are not afraid of declaring this, The Zionist regime is a true cancer tumor that will be definitely will be cut off, Khamenei said during a rare Friday prayer lecture at Tehran University [236].

INCITEMENT TO COMMIT GENOCIDE Under Art. 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a person who directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide has committed a crime against international law. Notably, there is no explicit requirement in this subsection of Art. 25 that genocide actually be committed. Conservative interpreters might be quick to assume such a requirement, but the drafting in Art. 25(3)(b) provides that one who orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crimein this context war crimes and crimes against humanityis liable only if that crime in fact occurs or is attempted. In other words, incitement to war crimes and crimes against humanity is punishable only if the crime occurs or attempted, but incitement to genocide is punishable regardless of the crimes actually occurring or being attempted. The ICTR's Trial Judgment in Nahimana presented historical evidence that the drafters of the U.N. Genocide Convention intended that incitement convictions not require genocidal acts ( 678).

President Obama treats Israel like Britains Chamberlain behaved toward Czechoslovakia during his meeting with Hitler in 1938. From the White House meetings with Tehran, to International community conferences, Americas vital ally is left out in the cold. The nature of these meetings and proceedings are essential to the welfare and security of the tiny state of Israel.

Former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani considered an Iranian reformist, said in 2001: the application of an atomic bomb would not leave anything in Israel, but the same thing would just produce damages in the Muslim world . The Islamic Republic of Iran area is 70 times greater than Israel; this fact creates a temptation for Iranian leaders to realize their objective of annihilating Israel. With 70% of the Israeli population concentrated in cities on the Mediterranean Coastal Plain, Iranian leaders might face the temptation of initiating a strategic or a limited tactical nuclear attack based on Rafsanjanis calculation. During the IranIraq War Rafsanjani was the de facto commander-in-chief of the Iranian Armed Forces. Israel is not much bigger than the US state of New Jersey has a population of 7.8 million; Iran has a population of 74.8 million [237].


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Israel Stands Alone? , America the leader of the free

world, the most powerful country on the face of the earth , The President of the United States, Barack Hussein Obama II, will not breath a word or lift a finger to stop the Islamic Republic of Iran from killing the men and women of our Nations Armed Forces. Nor will this President acknowledge Tehrans International wars of terror The President of the United States, Barack Hussein Obama II, for all intents and purposes has Surrendered Unconditionally to the Islamic Republic of Iran..
Tehrans dedicated to the goal of destroying the State of Israel, Iranian political, religious and military leaders have expressed their desire to annihilate Israel repeatedly. The international community to quickly forget the Islamic Republic has spent a couple of billion dollars in wars to wipe Israel off the map. It was Iran that has/ is pursuing war through its radical militants such as Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel. The Islamic Republic facilitates indiscriminately targeting & killing Israeli children, Israeli civilians, through suicide bombers and rocket attacks. The Voices of Asininity; Sorrowfully this is the kind of thinking not only abundant in mainstream American media, but the global community's fabric as well, some glaring examples The Islamic Republics aversion toward Israel does not mean that it wants to destroy it physically, however. Rhetoric aside, the Iranian government appears to recognize Israel as a powerful military and political actor,
Iran After the Bomb How Would a Nuclear-Armed Tehran Behave? Alireza Nader 2013 RAND page 22

One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerat ed is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international system. Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. (did this author forget Iraq, Syria ?)
Why Iran Should Get the Bomb Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability By Kenneth N. Waltz July/August 2012 Issue

There is a pervasive fear that is being spread by American, Israeli and Sunni Gulf leaders that the most dangerous development in modern history will be the capacity of Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. It is especially understandable that Israel, composed mostly of Jews, many of whom are from Holocaust families, would be especially vulnerable to the fear of sudden and mass extermination by inveterate enemies.
Could a Nuclear Iran Bring About More Stability, Rather Than Less? /12/2012 Marc Gopin Director, CRDC, George Mason University,


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The Stability-Instability Paradox The Islamic Republic also recognizes Israels conventional and nuclear military superiority. Tehran perhaps would not use nuclear weapons against Israel directly, as that could lead to Irans destruction. Nuclear arms will not change Irans fundamental interests and strategies. However it would provide Iran with the ability to reshape the Middle Easts geopolitical & military order. Nuclear weapons will reinforce Irans deterrent capabilities, they will provide additional military capability barrier. A nuclear armed Iran will have much greater influence and power in the region. The Question of Deterrence; A Nuclear Armed Iran and Israel.

There Is No Evidence in the Past 100 Years of Sanctions History to Support Its Premise as a Viable Tool Between 1990 and 2003, former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein confronted the twentieth centurys most devastating economic sanctions. In theory, he could have won relief by fully cooperating with United Nations weapons inspectors on his countrys WMD program, yet he refused to do so until the bitter end. In reality, he had no reason to give in; he believed that the United States would block the lifting of sanctions as long as he remained in power. And, despite those crippling sanctions, he hung on to power until deposed in 2003 by U.S. military forces. Opponents of the recent interim nuclear agreement with Iran seem to think that, somehow, this time would be different. They argue that the sanctions are working and that further tightening the squeeze would force Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, perhaps by fomenting regime change. But there is no evidence in the past 100 years of sanctions history to support that premise.

In 1954, B.H. Liddell Hart surmised that, To the extent that the H-bomb reduces the likelihood of fullscale war, it increases the possibility of limited war pursued by widespread local aggression. U.S. Cold War plans and policies for massive retaliation against the former Soviet Union quickly foundered on this conundrum [238]. Robert Jervis offered a more generalized and yet succinct formula for the StabilityUnsanctioned Sanctions The United States' Instability Paradox in The Illogic of Nuclear Real Leverage on Iran Strategy (1984): To the extent that the military By Kimberly Ann Elliott DECEMBER 10, 2013 balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence. berly-ann-elliott/unsanctionedsanctions?nocache=1 The point is often made in the strategic literature that the greater the stability of the strategic balance of terror, the lower the stability of the overall balance at lower levels of violence [239]. In short in makes small wars more likely. America and her Cold War adversaries fought each other from the fields of Vietnam to Afghanistan. These two wars caused tremendous loss of lives (Vietnam Conflict America lost some 60,000 lives) on both sides with dire economic consequences for the countries The Soviet Union, ending a long silence about the exact number of its casualties in the war in Afghanistan, said that 13,310 soldiers had been killed, 35,478 wounded and 311 are missing [240]. For Israel and the Islamic Republic the paradigm is more complex, because its about nuclear/conventional/unconventional warfare. There is an unprecedented geostrategic differential threat matrix for the tiny state of Israel. Nuclear weapons are ill-suited for addressing certain security threats and that low-level violence against nuclear-armed states. Israels nuclear weapons have not deterred the Iranian proxy Hamas and Hezbollahs rocket attacks against Israel.


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Israel Strategy of Amimut; (Hebrew for opacity or ambiguity) Israel has never represented itself as a nuclear armed state; neither has it ever conducted atomic bomb tests. Israel neither affirms nor denies its possession of nuclear weapons.

The Israeli government declines to state anything definitive about Israel's nuclear pursuits. Opacity and weapon of last resort these are then the two pillars of Israels nuclear policy. Washington was a close partner of Israel in shaping the policy of opacity. Nuclear analysts George Perkovich and Pierre Goldschmidt of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have emphasized that Israel has never threatened the existence of any other state with nuclear weapons. Nor has Israel by any other means threatened. These Nuclear analysts and many other nuclear experts endorsee Israel as a responsible custodian of nuclear weapons with respect to both its nuclear doctrine and the procedures it has in place to govern their use. George Perkovich and Pierre Goldschmidt point out Israel's doctrine remains one of "defensive last resort" and Iranian Nuclear Weapons And The Instabilitythat its procedural safeguards designed to minimize Stability Instability Paradox: A (Prospective) the risk of inadvertent or accidental use. Even during Case Study Of The Iran Israel Dyad By LCol Desmond Brophy Par le lcol Desmond Brophy the darkest hours in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, 26 April 2011 Israel was cautious not to make any public display in deed or word of its nuclear capability. As early as 6/Brophy.pdf 1963, Israel was among the signatories of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and, consistent with its commitment to opacity, it later signed also the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty calling for a ban on all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion. Israel engages an active role in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, has harmonized its nuclear export control legislation, and regulations with the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, is a state party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and has cooperated with the committee charged with implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which obligates all UN constituent states to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For Israel, its government officials, security analysts and even the general public, nuclear opacity is one of the Jewish state's greatest strategic and diplomatic success stories. It has provided Israel with the best of all possible worlds: the benefits of nuclear deterrence to protect against existential threats but almost none of the potential political drawbacks of possessing nuclear weapons. If Israel went public about its bomb, it could face tangible costs. The policy and practice of nuclear opacity codified in 1969 in a secret accord between Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and U.S. President Richard Nixon. Although this agreement has never been openly acknowledged or documented, its existence revealed in 1991 by the Israeli journalist Aluf Benn, and more knowledge came out in some recently declassified memos regarding Nixon's 1969 conference with Meir recorded by Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger [241].

The introduction of Irans nascent nuclear weapons capability will have a decidedly destabilizing effect in the Middle East-and beyond. At the most basic level, Bleeks definition of nuclear instability is such that the mere introduction of nuclear weapons creates a certain de-stabilizing effect. Futher, this instability will be intensified through a sharp increase in the nuclear danger due to politico-military, technological, and counter-force first-strike destabilizers. As the subsequent analysis will show, although both sides of the dyad contribute to nuclear instability, the Iranian contribution is asymmetrically high. There is no clear evidence indicating that Iran is purposefully creating nuclear instability to reduce the threat of existential conventional attack. Such a deduction is strongly indicated by the fact that Iran a rational actor genuinely concerned about regime change has taken unilateral steps to destabilize the nuclear level vis-a-vis its conflict with Israel.


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Nuclear-armed states, like Israel, have been attacked and theories of the stability/instability paradox claim that strategic nuclear deterrence could make the world safe for low-level conflicts. Even theorists of the stability/instability paradox admit that nuclear weapons impose constraints on the use of conventional military power because, while nuclear weapons may encourage low-level conflict, states could still be deterred from engaging in high-level conventional conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level,
Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig Managing the Atom Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 2009-14November 2009

For Israel and the Islamic Republic the paradigm is more complex, because its about nuclear/conventional/unconventional warfare. It is also about the geographic strategic & tactical disadvantages of Israels small size. Some military Analysts have argued mutual nuclear destruction equation would stabilize the Iran and Israel conflict. These analysts hypothesis is based on Pakistan and India nuclear deterrence for example; Yet over a decade on, and multiple crises later/the 1999 Kargil conflict, a prolonged 2001-/02 military standoff, and the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks/ neither India nor Pakistan have experienced anything as perilous as the Cuban scare (The Cuban missile crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union brought the world to the brink of nuclear war in October 1962) Shashank Joshi 2013 Pakistans Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Dj` Vu? The Washington Quarterly [242]. A few western analysts, including Kenneth Waltz, Sumit Ganguly, and Devin Hagerty, have argued the same case , because these events did not cascade into full-blown wars or nuclear exchanges, deterrence optimism is in order [243] . Clearly as shown in the illustration to the left, the tiny country of Pakistan has greater geostrategic depth, compared to Israel. India would be incapable of defeating Pakistan, its nuclear field forces even with several strategic nuclear strikes. Irans armed forces lack the credible ability to project conventional military power over Israel. Their relative weakness precludes them from: using military force to secure their interests. The advantages afforded by a viable nuclear military option changes the Islamic Republics strategic position and its armed forces projection capacities. Tehran incurs fewer strategic costs and even has the potential to accrue a strategic and tactical nuclear first strike capability through its militant proxy the Hezbollah. The Scud missiles which Tehran has been slowly filtering into Hezbollahs missile arsenals are a critical example . [244]. Contemplate just what could Israels military option be is the Lebanese Hezbollah launched a nuclear missile for Iran? A Hezbollah weapons platform could vary from a Radiological (dirty bomb) to an EMP.


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Israel is bordered on the North by Lebanon, on the East by Syria and Jordan, on the South by the Gulf of Aqaba (Gulf of Eilat), on the SW by Egypt, and on the West by the Mediterranean Sea. Comparatively, the area occupied by Israel is slightly smaller than the state of New Jersey. The total land boundary length is 1,017 km (632 mi) and the coastline is 273 km (170 mi) [244] .
With 70% of the Israeli population concentrated in cities on the Mediterranean Coastal Plain. Tehran faces the temptation of initiating a preemptive nuclear attack, based on Rafsanjanis calculation. This preemptive assault could be a limited EMP, to small precision delivered tactical nuclear munitions. Israels 170 mile long coastline is a considerable military vulnerability; this opens up the tiny state a strike from Mediterranean Sea. From a submarine launched nuclear cruise missile. An innocent appearing cargo ship or related could launch anything from a Scud to cruise missile. In this era where Drones and UAVs are fast becoming a technological high-level air weapons platform, they are expanding field of war as a first strike weapon threat. Chief of US Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert told the Senate Armed Services Committee 2012 he fears that Iranian attack in the Persian Gulf, Irans attack drones could get in under U.S. air defense systems, Mattis indicated, the Iranians are developing their irregular warfare capabilities "faster than we anticipated." [245] In 2010, the Assad regime transferred Scud-D missiles, as well as a number of M600 missiles (that have a 250km range (155mi) and carry a 500Kg warhead) a clone of the Iranian Fateh-110 is a single-stage solid-propellant, surface-to-surface missile. Syria provided Hezbollah operatives with training on using the Scuds at a base near Damascus,
Breaking the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nexus James Woolsey 11th April 2013 - Joint Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Playing a deadly game of cat and mouse Israels intelligence has been uncovering weapons smuggling axis of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. This is an ever changing and ongoing struggle in which "every imaginable method is employed." For over two decades, the Israeli intelligence, IDF Military Intelligence and the MOSSAD, has been playing a game of wits, and cat and mouse with the intelligence establishments of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Israel is trying to obtain as much information as possible on the weapons supply "food chain," beginning with Iran's decision to supply weapons, through their transfer to Syria and until their arrival at the bunkers. Deliveries have been flown in recent years from Iran through Turkey to the airport in Damascus, mostly by Iran Air planes. A special unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard is responsible for the flights. However recently the IRGC prefers to fly the weapons through Iraq, with which it has friendly relations. The US government has complained to Iraq on several occasions for turning a blind eye to the flights, but to no avail [246].


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Caroline Glick is an American-born Israeli journalist, newspaper editor, and writer. She writes for Makor Rishon and is the deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post. In her 14 November article was clear picture of how injured and bewildered the people of Israel are over Obamas policies and his treatment of their tiny state. I am just presenting high lights, COLUMN ONE: The demise of Pax Americana By Caroline B. Glick 11/14/2013 The US remains the most powerful actor in the world. But last week, American credibility was shattered. What happened in Geneva last week was the most significant international event since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union signaled the rise of the United States as the sole global superpower. The developments in the six-party nuclear talks with Iran in Geneva last week signaled the end of American world leadership. Global leadership is based on two things power and credibility. The United States remains the most powerful actor in the world. But last week, American credibility was shattered. Secretary of State John Kerry spent the first part of last week lying to Israeli and Gulf Arab leaders and threatening the Israeli people. He lied to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and the Saudis about the content of the deal US and European negotiators had achieved with the Iranians. Kerrys threats were laced with bigoted innuendo. He claimed that Israelis are too wealthy to understand their own interests. If you dont wise up and do what I say, he intoned, the Europeans will take away your money while the Palestinians kill you. Oh, and aside from that, your presence in the historic heartland of Jewish civilization from Jerusalem to Alon Moreh is illegitimate After all, the twice-elected president of the United States has dispatched his secretary of state to threaten and deceive US allies while surrendering to US foes. It is now an indisputable fact that the US government may use its power to undermine its own interests and friends worldwide, [247] President Obama has done little to nothing as thousands of rockets have fallen upon the tiny country of Israel, The majority were supplied by the Islamic Republic of Iran, fired by its proxy the Hamas in Gaza and the Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Iran Must Attack Israel by 2014 In 2012 Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameneis strategy specialist Alireza Forghani provided the legal and religious justification for the annihilation of Israel and the Jewish people, in a document published on conservative Farsi website Alef. In his document, outlined the reasons why, In the name of Allah, Iran must attack Israel by 2014. Forghani called the Jewish state a cancerous tumor for the Middle East and reminded his readers that All our troubles are due to Israel! Every Muslim is obliged to equip himself against Israel, he urged, reasoning that if the Muslim world does not attack Israel in the near future, the opportunity could be lost and it may not be possible to stop them.


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The document explained that the war against Israel must be carried out in the name of defensive jihad or the protecting of Islam against aggressors who want to gain domination over the Muslims and kill them. The document also provides a "concise description of mid- and long-range ballistic missiles that can target territories of this regional cancerous tumor" and destroy Israel in "less than nine minutes [248]." The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, invited then-Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar to breakfast while he was visiting Iran. The Spanish official party decided to begin by asking the ayatollah a friendly or neutral question rather than a hostile or critical one. The subject drifted towards Israel, Israel to him was a kind of historical cancer and anomaly, a country condemned to disappear. At some point he said very clearly, though softly as he spoke, that an open confrontation against the US and Israel was inevitable, and that he was working for Iran to prevail in such a confrontation. It was his duty as the ultimate stalwart of the Islamic global revolution. [249] On 20th November 2013 during Genevas intensive delicate nuclear negations, Irans supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared to the world, Israel as the warmongering rabid dog of the Middle East, The Zionist regime is doomed to destruction, because this despicable regime was formed by power and imposed on the world, and nothing which is imposed will last, Throughout 2013 Khamenei gave such statements, giving blessings to those who fight against Israel and says, Peace be upon the children of our nation, peace be upon t he brave jihadists in Palestinian and Lebanese resistance. Today the Islamic world and the whole world are witnesses to great revelations that show change in international affairs. Ayatollah Khamenei has been promising a restructuring of the Middle East, promising the annihilation of Israel, There is no doubt that victory awaits the Palestinian people in the future, and the myth of Zionist power over this region will completely vanish, Allah willing. [250] From his Hezbollah Leader Nasrallah in Lebanon, Some think that the fall and destruction of Israel is only good for Palestinians, However, such an event will be good for all the countries of the region, and one cannot separate this threat Israel from Jordon, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. For this reason, the annihilation of Israel is in the national interest of Jordon, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. Nasrallah, quoted by Amar news, an Iranian media outlet, recalled a statement by the founder of the Islamic Republic: Imam Ruhollah Khomeini provided a clear and precise definition for Israel when he called this regime Israel a cancerous tumor. And the only way to cure it is not to give it time, not give in to it and eradicate its roots. In 2011 Tehrans regime created and released a foreboding Islamic apocalypse cinematic venture. This apocalypse video The Coming Is Upon Us, in a dramatic presentation it portrayed a vast global upheaval beginning in the Middle East which would usher in a golden age of Islam and the return of the Mahdi. The key propaganda feature was the destruction of Israel. [251] There are three prominent features of Iranian calls for the destruction of Israel
1. What is striking is that these declarations calling for Israel's destruction are being voiced by a broad spectrum of the Iranian leadership, including different senior officers in the Revolutionary Guard. Moreover, these spokesmen are not talking about a long historical process regarding Israel's elimination, but rather a development that is to take place in the near term. Finally, these calls for the destruction of Israel for the most part are not made in the context of an Iranian retaliatory strike, and are not contingent upon what actions Israel will take.

2. 3.


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The foundation of the Islamic regime is opposition to Israel and the perpetual subject of Iran is the elimination of Israel from the region, Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Irans Armed Forces Zionists: Scream until your destruction November 15, 2011 Perhaps most worrisome of all was an article posted on the website of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on April 24, 2011. It imagines, in a chilling, matter-offact fashion, the day after Irans first nuclear-bomb test. The article concludes: The day after Irans first nuclear test will be an ordinary day for us Iranians, but many of us will have a new gleam in our eyes a gleam of national pride and might.[Koran 8:60:] And prepare against them what force you can and horses tied at the frontier, to frighten thereby the enemy of Allah and your enemy
The Iranian Leaderships Continuing Declarations of Intent to Destroy Israel 2009-2012 Prof. Joshua Teitelbaum Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall

Since 2001, in volition of UN Security Council Resolutions the Islamic Republic and its ally Syria has continuously smuggled a vast array of deadly military weapons under the guise of legitimate commerce. Iran is covertly using ships, flags and ports of blameless countries, so Iranian arms and rockets can flow to Hamas to Hezbollah and other radical militants. The tiny state of Israel is repeatedly incepting these cargo ships filled with tons of illegal military equipment. The IRGC-QF uses existing commercial transportation air, sea and land routes. Iran consistently uses sea routes to ship weapons. Recently, following sanctions imposed on the large Iranian shipping companies (HDS, IRISL), Iran turned to European and international shipping companies for their arms shipments. Tehran surreptitiously hides the true nature of this cargo without informing international shipping companies. To that end Iran extensively uses shell corporations and false documentation, claiming shipping cargo contains innocent materials (such as milk powder and polyethylene pellets). The weapons are generally stowed behind the innocent shipping cargos. By shipping weapons, the Islamic Republic violates a series of UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1747, which forbids Iran to export arms. Iran's use of international shipping companies and European ports to export arms is a methodical and gross violation of international shipping laws and a genuine danger to both the ships themselves and the ports involved. In August 2010 a shipment of arms from Iran was sent by sea to Syria, apparently meant for Hezbollah in Lebanon. It departed from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas on August 6, it held seven tons of an explosive called RDX, packed in sacks labeled "milk powder," which is


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similar in appearance to RDX (marketed as a white powder). This type of explosive is used in the warheads of Hezbollah's missiles and rockets. Iran and Syria continue to act in direct violation of international law and blatantly breach UN Security Council Resolutions; Syria as an accessory to smuggling arms to terrorist groups in Gaza; Iran by transferring arms under any circumstances. UN Security Council Resolution 1747 (24 March 2007) proscribes the transfer of arms from Iran and calls upon States to prohibit the procurement of such UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001) called upon States to refrain from the provision of any form of support to terrorist organizations and to eliminate the supply of weapons to such groups items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft. UN Security Council Resolution 1860 (8 January 2009) called upon all Member States to prevent illicit trafficking in arms and ammunition to the Gaza Strip


In 2005 Israels government forcefully removed 10,000 Israelis living in Gaza. The theory was if the Arab Palestinians had their own miniState it would usher in an era of peace and stability. In did not the Iranian backed Hamas seized control of the Gaza strip. Iran and its Hamas proxy turned Gaza into military bunker, where thousands of rockets have been fired into the heartland of Israel.
Urgent Need for Kindergarten Bomb Shelters 2012
NITZAN, Israel) United with Israel has been notified by local Israeli official Yossi Dahari of the urgent need for kindergarten bomb shelters in Nitzan, a coastal town located near Ashkelon, ( being rocketed by Hamas in Gaza0 in southern Israel. Children are living in fear of attack and have literally nowhere to run when the Code Red sirens blast. Once again, United with Israel is turning to YOU our global community of Israel supporters for help. Nitzan is a community of refugees from the once thriving Jewish communities of Gush Katif (in the Gaza Strip). Nearly 10,000 Jewish residents were forced to abandon their homes during one of the most painful and tragic episodes in Israels history, the 2005 Disengagement from Gaza. Instead of leading to peace, the Disengagement led to a sharp increase in rocket attacks into southern Israeli towns.


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Starting in 2001 and by 2012, some 12,800 rockets and mortars, (an average of 3 attacks every single day), struck Israel. Routine rocket fire has been a reality for residents of Southern Israel near the Gaza strip. In addition to firing rockets, Hamas has engaged in other methods of terrorism against Israeli civilians. On 7 April 2011, Hamas operatives fired a Kornet antitank missile at a school bus in southern Israel, injuring the driver and killing a teenager. Israel with little to no help from Washington and the Israel community in 2012 was forced to conduct Protective Defensive Operations (Operation Pillar of Defense) and attacked Hamas rocket forces in Gaza. During the course of the operation, Hamas and other terrorist groups fired 1,529 rockets into Israeli communities. Hamas openly conducts indiscriminate military strikes against Israeli civilians. November 2012 witnessed a major escalation of Hamas rocket capabilities, as the Iranian Fajr-5 artillery rocket was employed for the first time. With a range of about 46.6 miles (75 kilometers), carries a 200 lb warhead, it had twice the range of rockets previously used by Hamas. The Fajr-5 missiles were smuggled from Iran to Gaza through Egypt's Sinai Peninsula [253] In 2012 it was estimated Hamas rocket arsenal was a hodgepodge of rocket warfare ranging from primitive made rockets Qassams to SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and Iranian-made Fajr-5 rockets. According to a May 2011 report by the Shin Bet security agency, Iranian rockets are concealed and sent by sea or otherwise to Sudan. From there they travel north, in truck convoys, to Egypt and into the Sinai Peninsula. They travel through the deserts, the rockets hidden in containers, said Yoni Fighel, a colonel in reserves in the Military Intelligence Corps and a research fellow at the Institute for Counter-Terrorism [254] . Since the 1980s Tehran has poured at least two billion dollars in arming funding the Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas with goal to wipe Israel off the map. Hezbollah remains the most technically-capable terrorist group in the world, a shared Iranian-Syrian strategic interest in the Middle East and un-disputably the military superpower in Lebanon. Hezbollah remains a vital ally and a major strategic partner of two state-sponsors of terrorism, Syria and Iran, with a global financial and criminal network that aims to bleed American & Israeli interests in every part of the world. Tehran has armed the Hezbollah from SCUD missiles to cruise missiles and UAVS. Since the end of the 2006 war, Hezbollah has undergone the largest recruitment and training drive in its thirty-year history, swelling its ranks with dedicated cadres and reviving its former multi-sectarian reservist units. In terms of weapons procurement, Hezbollah has focused on acquiring long-range rockets fitted with guidance systems to target a list of specific areas in Israel. Estimates vary on how many armed fighters Hezbollah can actually call on at any one time; an open source report stated that Hezbollah has around 25,000 full time fighters and 35,000-40,000 reservists. Other reports cite as many as 20,000 fighters of all types. These include the hundreds of specially trained technicians and engineers needed to service Hezbollahs rocket arsenal [255].


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Iranians exercise more control than ever over Hezbollah. IRGC General Hassan Madavi, Commander of the Lebanon Corps of the Revolutionary Guards, sits in Beirut alongside scores of Iranian officers and experts.

A 2011 Pentagon official reported Hezbollah had 50,000 rockets and missiles, including 40-50 Fatah 110 missiles and 10 SCUD-C and unknown number of SCUD-Ds. Scud-D has a range of up to 750 kilometers (466 miles), meaning it can hit almost anywhere inside Israel. The missile can carry some 1,000 kilos (about 2,200 pounds) of explosives. Theoretically, it can be armed with chemical warfare agents. Furthermore, some 10,000 Hezbollah fighters have been provided with a broad range of modern weapons, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guards have trained Hezbollah teams to operate these weapons [256]. With the help of Tehran in the 2006 Hezbollah forces in Lebanon fired some 8,000 rockets into Israel, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian structures. Hezbollahs means of attack relied on unguided weapons that had no capacity to hit military targets with any precision. It repeatedly bombarded cities, towns, and villages without any apparent effort to distinguish between civilians and military objectives. In doing so, Hezbollah, as a party to an armed conflict governed by international humanitarian law, violated fundamental prohibitions against deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians [257]. Rockets fired by Hezbollah in 2006 lacked guidance systems. Thus, Hezbollah forces could direct a rocket at a general target, but without precision. Many of those rockets that struck hit the most densely populated coastal areasthe city of Haifa and the string of its suburbs to the north and east known as HaKrayot were 220mm rockets packed with thousands of 6mm steel spheres (sometimes referred to as steel ball bearings) which sprayed out upon impact with great force. These spheres are devastating anti-personnel weapons: while incapable of inflicting serious damage to hard military structures or materiel, they penetrate human flesh and organs within a wide radius of the rocket blast. Hezbollah also fired an undetermined number of cluster munition rockets loaded with submunitions (i.e., explosives) that, upon impact, dispersed 3mm steel spheres over a wide footprint. Each 220mm rockets are densely packed with some 40,000-80,000 anti-personnel steel ball bearings [258]. During the 34 days of fighting of the second Lebanon war about one third of the Israeli population (i.e., about two million people) were within range of the 4,000 rockets launched by Hezbollah. Between 350,000 and 500,000 residents left their homes and became internally displaced persons, while another 1,000,000 were forced to live in bomb shelters [259] .

Today Israel remains the only country in the world where its civilian population is openly threatened, targeted with missiles and cruise missiles tipped with chemical and biological warfare agents. This is a public policy of such states as the Islamic Republic of Iran, its ally Syria and their radical militant proxies the Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and etc. Tehran and Damascus hold Israel hostage in the International political arena. They threaten military action if direct military intervention is committed by Washington and the EU against their states. For Tehran, this is related to its ongoing clandestine nuclear program for the production of an atomic bomb. With Syria, these threats are related to direct external intervention in its ongoing civil war. Syria has even added the threat of biological warfare against Israel [260].


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Asymmetrical war of Attrition: The rocket warfare being conducted against Israel very much reflects a blending of strategic bombing and an overall war of attrition . However

there is an unseemly paradox here, it is a systematically organized and executed attack from the air not aimed at physical massive collateral damage, but designed to hemorrhage and atrophy the Israeli economy, gradually exhaust and demoralize the people of Israel. This asymmetrical war of attrition also carries a multi-dimensional international propaganda strategy. The Fourth goal of air power according Giulio Douhet was collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him. Targets would include such things as the populations support for the war and the enemys culture. By taking the war to the people and generating unrest within a society a small group can make a large group do what they want. Support for asymmetrical rocket warfare from State sponsors of terrorism, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and Syria is perfectly suited for them because they do not have to declare war upon the opponent such as Israel, and can strike where and when they want. All the planning, prepositioning forces and execution of an assault can be accomplished before the opponent realizes what is going on. A good example is the 2012 when Israel was attacked for the first time by long range rockets like the M-75 with a range of up to 80 kilometers (about 50 miles). The Low risk high return is reflected in international political paralysis, where an opponent can only wage war on the proxies and not their sponsors. This guide is to a very complex subject which is at the center of the Middle East crisis. Whereas Hamas and Hezbollah fire rockets indiscriminately into Israeli communities they also embed their military forces into a civilian population. Hospitals, schools, Mosques and homes become bunkers from which their launch their rockets. Retaliatory Israeli airstrikes into civilian areas inflame regional and world opinion, placing international political pressure on Israel to relent. Asymmetrical rocket warfare strategic goal is maximizing the indirect costs of their attacks rather than maximizing the direct costs.


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Attrition This rocket attacks are

explicitly conducted against noncombatants. This is to impose costs on the general population so that the government capitulates to some (or all) of attackers demands. Radical militant Islam has come to understand that the private and government sectors will undertake mass economic expenditures designed to reduce the number, severity and/or consequences of terrorist attacks. Thus Asymmetrical rocket warfare primary damage to a society is the economic cost protection burden. A good example is Israels billion dollar expenditures for missile defense measures. These ever expanding defensive costs erode the vitality of a country.
Hybrid Wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder Hybrid Wars blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare. The term Hybrid captures both their organization and their means. Organizationally, they may have a hierarchical political structure, coupled with decentralized cells or networked tactical units. Their means will also be hybrid in form and application. In such conflicts, future adversaries (states, state-sponsored groups, or self funded actors) will exploit access to modern military capabilities including encrypted command systems, man-portable air to surface missiles, and other modern lethal systems, as well as promote protracted insurgencies that employ ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and coercive assassinations. This could include states blending high-tech capabilities, like anti-satellite weapons, with terrorism and cyber-warfare directed against financial targets. Conflicts will include hybrid organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas, employing a diverse set of capabilities. Additionally, states can shift their conventional units to irregular formations and adopt new tactics, as Iraqs Fedayeen did in 20 03. In such conflicts we will face major states capable of supporting covert and indirect means of attack, as well as Thomas Friedmans super-empowered fanatics capable of highly lethal attacks undercutting the sinews of global order. Cunning savagery, continuous improvisation and rampant organizational adaptation will mark this form of warfare. Such wars will not be conventional, low in intensity or short
Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars Frank G. Hoffman Potomac Institute for Policy Studies Arlington, Virginia December 2007


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Estimations of over one billion of dollars Iran has invested into the Hezbollah over the since 1980 (including armaments and intelligence capabilities comparable to a mediumsized European state) are intended first and foremost to deter against the possibility of an attack by the West and/or Israel against Irans nuclear facilities. Architects of such an attack have to assess Hezbollahs response, certainly a complicating factor in any plan to challenge Irans nuclear ambitions.
Hezbollah on Offense Nicholas Blanford, Bilal Y. Saab March 8, 2011


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Israeli Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been labeled a warmonger, a wolf-crier and an opponent of peace at any price because of his policies on Iran. Here's what Netanyahu's critics are saying: His warnings of a bad deal are designed to undermine measures to slow Iran's nuclear program and test its openness to long-term solutions. His insistence on strengthening, rather than easing, sanctions will weaken Iranian moderates and drive them from the negotiating table precisely what Netanyahu allegedly wants. Similarly, his demands for dismantling Iran's uranium enrichment facilities and removing its nuclear stockpile are intended to replace diplomatic options with military ones. The critics claim that he is again playing the doomsayer, the spoiler of efforts to avoid conflict and restore Iran to the community of nations [261] . The Center of the Storm, Israel
The tiny country of Israel not much bigger than a breadbox, about the size of the US State of New Jersey, and is home to over seven and half million souls. No other country in modern history was had to suffer the siege of Asymmetrical Rocket Warfare, as the tiny state of Israel. No other country in the world is openly and continually threatened with genocidal warfare. No other country in the world must employ an active missile defense system 7 days a week 24hrs a day to prevent rocket strikes within its communities. Israel is the only country in the world where ever man woman and child is issued a gasmask.

How does Washington and the International community become so incompetent with policies and directives void of any reality bases premises? It is as if Tehrans wars of asymmetrical terrorism are no more than one day affair composed of misunderstandings. The thousands of dead that Iran has laid before their feet are unseen and incomprehensible. The tiny nation of Israel is enduring a multi-billion dollar Iranian war siege for the sake of international diplomacy and peace.


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North Korea achieved a nuclear weapons capability during the Clinton administration in 1994, and not during the Bush administration with their first test in 2006. We know from our own experience, and from that of other nations, that nuclear testing is not necessary to develop a nuclear weapon. Little Boy, the first nuclear weapon ever built, was developed and used successfully by the U.S. to destroy Hiroshima, without nuclear testing. Hiroshima was the test [262] . In the November nuclear talks Iran agreed to concessions that not only fall short of "rolling back the vast majority of the advances Iran has made in the past five years," but that shorten its breakout time by "only a month to a few months." The interim deal allows Iran to continue enriching uranium to 5% purity and to keep building new centrifuges to repair worn ones. Tehran will have to convert its 20% enriched stock either to fuel or to diluted 5% stock, but those processes can be easily reversed within weeks. More controversially, Iran seems to have secured language under which the international community acknowledges that a comprehensive agreement will still allow Tehran to enrich uranium. The U.S. has long rejected Iran's claim that it has a "right" to enrich, and last October lead U.S. negotiator Wendy Sherman told Congress that "the President has circumscribed what he means by the Iranian people having access access, not right, but access to pea ceful nuclear energy in the context of meeting its obligations." The interim language, however, describes a future comprehensive solution as involving "a mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program." Iranian state media carried boasts by among others Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif that the U.S. had caved on its long-standing position. The U.S. and Britain both flatly denied Irans interpretation of the interim language with Secretary of State John Kerry saying as much and the White House further denying it on a late-night background call
Analysts: Iran Deal "Beginning of End" of Sanctions Regime, U.S. Caved on Enrichment "Right by Staff | 11.24.13

UN Security Council adopted six resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that called on Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment and its activities for the eventual production of plutonium. Chapter VII resolutions are binding international law. But now Geneva interim agreement says that the suspension is no longer necessary. What does that mean for the binding nature of Chapter VII resolutions? Third, turning to the question of plutonium production, Iran is building a heavy-water nuclear reactor whose by-products may be reprocessed for the production of plutonium, another radioactive material used in the manufacture of atomic bombs. Up until now, the IAEA & other nuclear nonproliferation entities have been encouraging states not to erect heavy-water reactors, but instead to accept light-water nuclear reactors which have no risk of being used for plutonium production. At present the Arak heavy-water facility is of little issue. [185]
Khamenei celebrated the signing of Obamas self proclaimed historical agreement with proclaim across the internal media stage, he insinuation Americas atomic bombs dropped on Japan in WWII was unwarranted, because Japan had surrendered. Khamenei especially targeted Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Khamenei Plastered the internet with posters calling Israel Sinister, Unclean Rabid Dog [263].


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As yet, there are only limited unclassified data that allow open sources to assess the size and nature of any Iranian plans to deploy a nuclear-armed force; determine what role various types of aircraft and missiles might play; determine how such a force will be based; and assess what kinds of command, control, computer, communications, and intelligence (C4I) systems Iran might deploy As Pakistan demonstrated during its own weapons development efforts, Iran can leave its ability to design a functioning weapon through modeling and simulation a matter of speculation. Non-critical testing of a weapons design or subcritical testing of a fractional explosion is an issue. A nuclear underground test does not reveal the level of progress in weapons design. Testing of simulated warheads may not be detected by inspectors or intelligence agencies and is further hidden due to its lack of reliance on telemetry. Iran can also create a whole new set of layers to hide a covert program, and it can carry on creating new technologies like improved centrifuges and reactor development which it later can use to set up new enrichment sites in much smaller deep mountain shelters or surface buildings in the nuclear equivalent of a shell game. Virtually every such activity can be explained away if discovered, or denied with varying levels of credibility. Many can also have legitimate dual uses in civil programs, research, or actually be for civil uses. There is no magic point where a nation reaches the breakout level and there are many intermediary stages where Iran can quietly ready its nuclear program for a nuclear test. Going on to enrich material to the level where a weapon can be assembled leaves great ambiguity as to Irans intentions and what it may conceal, as well as presents major problems in terms of outside assessments of how far Iran has actually progressed The military annexes to the November 2011 IAEA report indicated that Iran has made major progress in assembling all the technology and developing the manufacturing skills and equipment necessary to design a fission warhead. The annexes indicated that Iran is closer to building a warhead small enough to mount on a missile and test it through simulated explosive testing than has previously been publically reported. IAEA reporting since that time has provided more indicators that Iran is close to being able to test a Uranium fission device once it obtains weapons grade Uranium, and key US experts indicate that Iran may have acquired more weapons design and passive test data than the IAEA has yet announced.
The Gulf Military Balance Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions By Anthony H. Cordesman and Bryan Gold Burke Chair in Strategy U.S.-Iranian Competition Series 2013
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. During his time at CSIS, he has completed a wide variety of studies on energy, U.S. strategy and defense plans, the lessons of modern war, defense programming and budgeting, NATO modernization, Chinese military power, proliferation, counterterrorism, armed nation building, security in the Middle East, and the Afghan and Iraq conflicts. Before joining CSIS, Cordesman served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. He directed the analysis of the lessons of the October War for the secretary of defense in 1974, coordinating the U.S. military, intelligence, and civilian analysis of the conflict. He also served in numerous other government positions, including in the State Department and on NATO International Staff. In addition, he served as director of policy and planning for resource applications in the Energy Department and as national security assistant to Senator John McCain. He had numerous foreign assignments, includi ng posts in the United Kingdom, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iran, as well as with NATO in Brussels and Paris. He has worked extensively in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal. Cordesman is the author of numerous studies on energy policy, national security, and the Middle East.


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Misreading the Islamic Republic of Iran

Some say the Islamic Republic is a rational actor, some say an irrational actor. What is the answer? In a 2012 interview with CNN, Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that we are of the opinion that Iran is a rational actor, from which he derived his conclusion that we also know, or we believe we know, that Iran has not decided to make a nuclear weapon [264].
SO IS Iran a lunatic state or a rational actor? Well, its a hell of a lot more rational than US foreign policy is today. One of the great unresolved questions of Barack Obamas presidency is whether he can successfully resolve Americas conflict with Iran over its nuclear weapons program

There is no evidence in the past 100 years of sanctions history, which provides any credible evidence they will work on Iran. Between 1990 and 2003, former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein confronted the twentieth centurys most devastating economic sanctions. In theory, he could have won relief by fully cooperating with United Nations weapons inspectors on his countrys WMD program, yet he refused to do so until the bitter end. And, despite those crippling sanctions, he hung on to power until deposed in 2003 by U.S. military forces. Opponents of the recent interim nuclear agreement with Iran seem to think that, somehow, this time would be different. They argue that the sanctions are working and that further tightening the squeeze would force Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, perhaps by fomenting regime change. But there is no evidence in the past 100 years of sanctions history to support that premise. Unsanctioned Sanctions The United States' Real Leverage on Iran By Kimberly Ann Elliott December 10, 2013 berly-ann-elliott/unsanctionedsanctions?nocache=1 Squeezing Iran into Submission: Why It Aint Gonna Happen That Way 11/12/13 Kimberly Ann Elliott

So Iran still wants to get as much power as it can, while minimizing the associated risks; Nuclear weapons are thus for Iran primarily a defensive shield enabling it to carry out conventional aggression with impunity. As Ive insisted for many years, it is increasingly clear that Iran will get nuclear weapons. We should start discussions in that framework. The recent brilliant decision of the Iranian elite which is not only more ruthless but strategically smarter than Western leadership to make President Hassan Rouhani its representative to the West guarantees it.
Is Iran A Lunatic State Or A Rational Actor? Neither: It Is A Rational Aggressor; By Barry Rubin 10/13/2013 Professor Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center (GLORIA).

The Islamic Republics foreign policy Persian Chess transits are hardly the product of an untenable mind. Iran has consistently objectively weighted risks and rewards of different courses of procedures through its worldwide paradigm of global progressive activities. Irans Geo-strategic Mosaic Military/ Political Doctrine has routed Washington, dived US Congress. The IRGC-QF forces are killing American & EU troops with impunity. From Israel to Europe, from America to Saudi Arabia the Persian chess motilities have fragmented decades of alliances. The International Atomic Energy Commission, six hard fought United Resolutions concerning the Islamic Republic's unwarranted/ military nuclear endeavors are rendered impenitent. Tehrans diplomatic grand stratagems have penetrated the international communitys once closed doors to it becoming a nuclear superpower.


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. Tehran has found the light at the end of the sanctions tunnel. Iran believes and with good reason ultimately Washington will acquiesce allowing Iran to become a nuclear armed state as it did with India.
Nearly 70 nations have expressed support for the P5+1 November 24. Geneva deal The Islamic Republics foreign Persian Chess grand strategy/ Mosaic doctrine effectively coordinated and directed all the resources of the nation, towards the attainment of the political objects as defined by Khomeinis radical Islamic fundamental policies, herein in lays the heart of the danger.


Khomeinis theocratic government principle of guardianship of the jurisprudent was kept hidden until after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The idea that the ruler of the state must be the person best qualified to interpret Islam and enforce Muslim law upon the people is enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic, which vests full power in the jurisprudent (faqih) at its head in the position commonly known as Supreme Leader. Khomeini perceived himself as Gods appointed, in his grandiose sense of self worth he could do anything, say anything since he was the hand of God. The Iranian people were chosen to be his tools. Originally Khomeini did not believe his heavenly army would require nuclear weapons since they were Gods Holy Warriors, an Army whic h would sweep everything before them, they were unstoppable. Saddam Hussein invasion and the Iran Iraq war shook the very foundations of Khomeinis Islamic grandiose vision s. Understanding Iran-Iraq war unveils the obscure secret regions which direct Khomeinis Islamic theocracy. The Iran-Iraq war lasted nearly eight years, from September of 1980 until August of 1988. It ended when Iran accepted United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 598, leading to a 20 August 1988 cease-fire. There were 1,250,000 casualties (high estimate) died on both sides. According to Iranian war records, Casualty figures are highly uncertain, though estimates suggest more than one and a half million war and war-related casualties -perhaps as many as a million people died, many more were wounded- and millions were made refugees. The Iraqis suffered an estimated 375,000 casualties. Another 60,000 were taken prisoner by the Iranians. The war claimed at least 300,000 Iranian lives and injured more than 500,000, out of a total population which by the war's end was nearly 60 million [266] .
Tens thousands Iranian killed, thousands more maimed from Saddams chemical warfare agents, the once grand Iranian land of the Shah ravaged. Tehrans once grand infrastructure lay in rubble, its economy insolvent. The financial loss was also enormous, at the time exceeding US$600 billion for each country ($1.2 trillion in total). But shortly after the war it turned out that the economic cost of war is more profound and long-lasting than the estimates right after the war suggested. [266a] The question no one asks which is key to interpreting the Khomeinis hideous theocracy, at the end of the Iran Iraq war why did Khomeini begin executing thousands of Iranians?


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1988-1989 Bloody purges, Children as young as 13 were hanged from cranes, six at a time, in a barbaric two-month purge of Iran's prisons on the direct orders of Ayatollah Khomeini, reported in a book by his former deputy. More than 30,000 political prisoners were executed in the 1988 massacre, from The Memoirs of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri,

As many as 20,000 -30,000 political prisoners were executed between 1988If we have on had the instruments 1989. Accompanying these executions was which we will obtain over five years it is a systematic political elimination of the possible for us to have a power to carry Khomeini's once revolutionary allies who he out destructive or reciprocal operations turned against. Khomeini's government the ability to create noticeable quantities of laser and atomic weapons banned their periodicals and arrested their which are the requirements of war in this leaders. Pro-government Islamist thugs day and age, I can say that by Gods will beat their protestors, and smashed and we could carry out an offensive looted their newsstands, bookstores, and operation. offices. [267] These Gruesome details are Irans Revolutionary Guard, The Threat that from the book, The Memoirs of Grand grows while America sleeps Steven O Hern Potomac Books Inc. (October 2012) page 166 Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri (Deceased), one of the co-founders of the Islamic regime. The most damning of the letters and documents published in the book is Khomeini's fatwa decree calling for all Mojahedin (any opponents of the Iranian regime are labeled) to be killed. He was once considered Khomeini's anointed successor, he refused. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri awoke to the true brutality of Khomeinism radical Islam. Khamenei was quickly chosen to be Khomeinis heir. In April 1989 three months before his death Khomeini had the constitution revised so that the Leader needed only be an expert on Islamic jurisprudence and possess the appropriate political and managerial skills. Since Khameneis religious credentials were inferior, and the decision raised stern criticism from Tehrans clerical elites in Qom [268].

Khomeini restarted the nuclear program after realizing how close Saddam Hussein was to building a nuclear weapon and how devastating the chemical weapons had been against Iranian Forces. Khomeini views about nuclear weapons changed so much that soon after agreeing to a cease - fire that ended the war with Iraq, he wrote a letter to Irans military and political leaders ,

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was forced into signing a cease fire, with Saddam Hussein Ayatollah Khomeini in July 1988, said his decision to accept a cease-fire with Iraq was more deadly to me than taking poison, but took the step because the country`s military and political leaders had persuaded him it was in the interest of the revolution. [269]


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The Lost Peace movement of Iran 1988

By 1987, there were increasing signs that Iranian morale was breaking as reflected in the failure of several government campaigns to recruit "martyrs" for the front.[270] The Israeli historian Efraim Karsh wrote that it was signs of declining morale in 198788 that played a major role in Iran's decision to accept the ceasefire of 1988 [271]. The conflict turned into a war of attrition, with each side showing a marked disregard for the human cost, Khomeini sent thousands of young Iranians to their death in "human-wave" attacks.
Basij was founded by the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to provide volunteers for "human wave" attacks in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). Outgunned by the much better trained and equipped Iraqi army of Saddam Hussein and held at bay by Iraqi minefields, the Basij were tens of thousands of boys as young as 12 who were drafted to serve as martyrs. With golden-colored keys around their necks to enter paradise, they were trained to run straight into Iraqi fire and through the minefields in wave after bloody wave. The impoverished families from which the boys were selected were rewarded with emoluments hard to resist. Following the death of their children, families were publicly praised. At least 100,000 Iranian boys were thus sacrificed.
Iran has historically always had an extremely motivated military cadre. While their equipment still limits IRIs potential, military units participate in large, combined arms exercises with numerous smaller ones between them. The strong sense of nationalism as well as Militant Islamic religious fervor of the IRGC combines into a very unique complex war-enemy ideology which shapes the individual soldier into a lethal tactical- strategic tool. This can be compared to the Japanese soldier mind set of WWII.

A Key to Paradise around Their Necks: Iran's Suicide Battalions by Arnaud De Borchgrave UPI Editor at Large Washington (UPI) Jul 05, 2007

On 28 February 1984, Iran poured 150,000 men into an offensive across the marshes of Howeizah towards the Iraqi frontlines. Thousands of Iranian children took part and died, the Iraq defenses held. [272]
Iranians began quietly protesting the death and carnage, this growing protest across the country was a critical event which forced Khomeini to sign the ceasefire with Iraq. Enraged Ayatollah Khomeini began slaughtering Iranian peace makers, perceived enemies and political prisoners.

In late July 1988, the Islamic Republic of Iran began summarily interrogating, torturing and executing thousands of political prisoners throughout the land. The massacre extended into the fall. Well planned and intentionally performed in secret, the executions effectively eliminated any remaining political opposition to then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeinis regime.


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Although the exact number of victims not known, thousands of prisoners tortured and executed over the course of only a few months. The victims included prisoners who served their sentences but refused to recant their political views, other prisoners who were serving sentences of imprisonment, and people confined for lengthy periods but not been to trial, and former prisoners rearrested. The executions began pursuant to a fatwa declared by Ayatollah Khomeini immediately following his announcement Iran had agreed to a cease-fire with Saddam Hussein. The fatwa created three-man commissions to determine who should be executed. The commissions, known by prisoners as Death Commissions, questioned prisoners about their political and religious beliefs, and determined who should be executed and/or tortured. The questioning was brief, not public there were no appeals and these prisoners executed the corresponding day or soon after questioning [273].
Then President Khamenei, (now supreme leader) was present in the meeting where Supreme Leader Khomeini ordered the massacre of thousands of Iranians held in prison.

Then President Khamenei was present in the meeting where Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the massacre. Khamenei strongly supported Khomeini's order and persistently defended the fatwa against international condemnation. President Khamenei carried out Khomeini's order, from August 1988 until February 1989 under his Presidential office he conducted the "prison massacres" in which perpetrated the killings of thousands of political prisoners, (estimated over 30,000) men, women and children. According to Amnesty International, "it came to the biggest wave of homicides from those that took place during the first and second years following the Iranian revolution in 1979. As President and the highest ranking executive authority in 1988, Khamenei bears primary responsibility for the massacre. As President, he allowed unlimited governmental resources to be used in implementing Khomeini's order. Khamenei acknowledged his responsibility and defended the massacre of political prisoners "With respect to executions, mass executions in Iran, have we banned capital punishment?, No !, We in the Islamic Republic have capital punishment for those who deserve to be executed. Do you think we should give sweets to a prisoner who has connections with the activities of the Monafeqin who attacked the Islamic Republic's borders? If his connection with that group revealed, what should we do to him? He is condemned to execution, and we will execute him. We do not joke with this (Tehran radio, December 12, 1988.) [274]
The crushing hand of Khomeinis radical theocracy still holds the Iranian People, and continues to slaughter the Iran People to this day. This hand will soon have a nuclear arsenal.


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Criminals should not be tried. The trial of a criminal is against human rights. Human rights demand that we should have killed them in the first place when it became known that they were criminals, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah by Baqer Moin June 15, 2000 P 208

Unmistakably Tehran does not govern Iran by the consent of the people. The exclusive method Khamenei retains power is through sheer brutality, torture and executions. Neither was the rise of the Islamic Government of Iran embraced by the preponderance Iranians, it was imposed on them. This Radical Islamic governance arose exclusively through skillful deception by Khomeini by manipulating the Islamic principles of al Taqiyya. In reality the Iranian People were duped and forced to travel down this road.
Tehrans Supreme Leader has the final say on nuclear decision making. He is not constrained by his previous fatwas, which he can alter or reverse, or the opinions of other mujtahids (Islamic jurists). And if he believes that expediency calls for the acquisition, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons, WMDs religious principles would not prevent or constraint him from doing so. In reality the Islamic Republics true directions, conatus making, flows through one mans personality and politics unaffected by the will of other men, the decisions of other institutions, or even the moral scruples of religion.
Nuclear Fatwa Religion and Politics in Irans Proliferation Strategy Michael Eisenstadt and Mehdi Khalaji Policy Focus #115 | September 2011

The Islamic Republic nuclear Taqiyya propaganda skillfully crafted with glittering generalities which relies heavily on emphasizing a higher religious ideology abhorrent of "collateral damage" and indiscriminate killing and destruction. These glittering generalities are intensely emotionally appealing words so closely associated with highly valued concepts and beliefs that they carry conviction without supporting information or reason. They appeal to such emotions as love of country, home; desire for peace, freedom, glory, honor, etc. They ask for approval without examination of the reason. Though the words and phrases are vague and suggest different things to different people, their connotation is always favorable [275] . In nearly all matters in life it is beneficial to assess a persons activities and accomplishments rather than charming declarations.
Reality based determinations and assessments become paradoxically aborted when it comes to the Islamic Republic of Iran and its quest for a nuclear arsenal.


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The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results - Albert Einstein

The Islamic Republic of Iran chaotic and complex character of hybrid threats, its irregular warfare and military operational and strategic planning has proven difficult for analysts who aggrievedly adhere to traditional threat methodologies & concepts. Forecasting Tehrans strategy & tactics has been elusive due to the complex and broad nature of its capabilities, covert and compartmentalization it employs. Tehrans militant proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah and etc. are hydra practicing unpredictable and unrestricted warfare; its hybrid threat concept has been dismissed by many because of oil addicted economies, and exploited by others to suit parochial political agendas.
The Islamic Republics asymmetrical rocket warfare being conducted against Israel very much reflects a blending of strategic bombing and an overall war of attrition.

Iranian Ayatollah Affirms Legitimacy of Suicide Operations, Approves Killing Israeli Civilians Including Children Ayatollah Mesbah-e Yazdi: An inquirer asked him whether suicide bombing operations were considered suicide and were therefore forbidden, and whether Israeli civilians, especially children, were to be regarded as illegitimate targets, like civilians elsewhere. In his reply, Ayatollah Mesbah-e Yazdi expressed regret that the inquirer had apparently bought into the propaganda of the enemies of Islam, which presented martyrdom operations as suicide, and that the inquirer was wasting his time on this issue instead of focusing on "uprooting the Zionist regime" and its supporters. The Ayatollah ruled that when defending Islam and the Muslim ummah necessitated martyrdom, it was not considered suicide. Iranian Ayatollah Approves Killing Israeli Civilians, including Children 30 May 2011 10:01 RIGHT SIDE NEWS

However there is an unseemly dilemma, it is a systematically organized and executed attacks from the air are not aimed at physical massive collateral damage, but designed to hemorrhage and atrophy the Israeli economy, gradually exhaust and demoralize the people of Israel. This asymmetrical war of attrition also carries a multi-dimensional international propaganda strategy. Whereas Hamas and Hezbollah fire rockets indiscriminately into Israeli communities they also embed their military forces into a civilian population. Hospitals, schools, Mosques and homes become bunkers from which their launch their rockets. Retaliatory Israeli airstrikes into civilian areas inflame regional and world opinion, placing international political pressure on Israel to relent. Asymmetrical rocket warfare strategic goal is maximizing the indirect costs of their attacks rather than maximizing the direct costs. This explicitly attack noncombatants the aim is to impose costs on the general population so that the government capitulates to some (or all) of their demands. Radical militant Islam has come to understand that the private and government sectors will undertake expenditures designed to reduce the number, severity and/or consequences of terrorist attacks.


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It is commonly misunderstood just how vulnerable Israel actually. Some 70 percent of its population and 80 percent of its industrial capacity are concentrated in the narrow coastal strip between the Mediterranean Sea and the West Bank. The adjacent West Bank hills topographically dominate the relatively flat and exposed coastal plain, providing a distinct advantage to an attacker for observation, rocket fire, or other and defense from an Israeli ground response. Since its founding in 1948, Israel has suffered from several regional asymmetries in relation to its neighbors that restrict its capacity for self-defense. Israels population of 7.5 million lives in an area of less than 10,000 square miles including the disputed West Bank, while surrounded by Arab countries with a population of three hundred million and territories 650 times larger than Israel.
Former Director of IDF Intelligence; President of the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Zeevi Farkash

Tehrans Military Mosaic Doctrines irregular warfare and military operational strategic & tactics defeated America & her allies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Tactical applications of explosively formed penetrators, (EFPs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has caused thousands of casualties and maimed tens of thousands more. EFPs & IEDs has cost America billions of dollars on the battlefields. Whereas US military leaders are bragging about combat effectiveness and winning battles they are and h ave lost the war. President Obamas lack of military expertise, micromanagement and Rules of Engagement (ROE) are a repeat of ruinous American Vietnam conflict policies. This Islamic Republic of Iran with uncovered secret and hidden nuclear research faculties, which points to even more hidden ones, mountains of evidence which supports nuclear weapons dimensions to its nuclear activities, the Islamic Republic of Iran was found guilty in US Federal Court and fined some 6 billion dollars for its role in the 9/11 attacks, supports and directs attacks against US Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, origin and epic center for the cult of the Islamic suicide bomber belief and I could go on and on There is a bewildering paradox, the International Community along with their vast Intelligence agencies acknowledged, confronted, the rise of Communism, and its goal of global domination. They comprehended communism darkness which endeavored to reshape the world in its image. Yet when it comes to the threat of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its vision of world subjugation, its irregular international wars for global domination, there is but a faint whisper of protest. As if Jungian archetypes from past religious wars had possessed their intellectual perceptions and reasoning. Drowning in their ocean of economic oil addiction, the International Community is quickly sinking into a cesspool of white washing politics and blissful ignorance. With delusional rapture by the manta of, containment, as the Islamic Republic of Irans irregular international wars spread to epidemic levels. This Islamic Republic will soon have a nuclear umbrella.


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On 30 September 1938, Neville Chamberlain announced "peace for our time" on the steps of 10 Downing Street, straight after returning from Munich,

where he and government leaders from France, Italy and Germany had signed an agreement over the division of Czechoslovakia in the hope of averting war. When Neville Chamberlain struck the Munich agreement with Hitler, he was widely hailed as the 'savior of Europe' Two newly-declassified documents show Chamberlain was ready to make more deals with Hitler after Munich, which would have the happiest and most far-reaching effects for the relationship between the two countries. The papers reveal Chamberlain told Hitler that it would have the greatest effect on public opinion in England if, in the event of war, they had a pact in place not to use poison gas, not to bomb each others civilians and to spare cities with cultural treasures. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain held secret talks with Hitler's henchmen to work out ways of making the Nazis look more sympathetic to ordinary Britons, classified documents released last week reveal. The cloak-and-dagger meetings in London came shortly after Chamberlain signed his disastrous appeasement deal with Hitler in Munich in September 1938, declaring 'peace for our time' on his return to Britain. The meetings were held without the knowledge of the Cabinet and Foreign Office. Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax only learned of them later because of an MI5 mole in the German embassy. [a]

Mark Twain was asked one time if he thought if history repeated itself, to which he replied, 'History does not repeat itself, but it often rhymes, [b]


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a). Chamberlain's secret bid to reach a deal with Hitler, revealed in newly released documents By ABUL TAHER 3 September 2011 Neville Chamberlain and appeasement When Neville Chamberlain struck the Munich agreement with Hitler, he was widely hailed as the 'saviour of Europe' The Guardian, Friday 4 September 2009 b).

1). North Korea's Choice: Bombs over Electricity Summer 2010 2) The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency. ttp:// 3). Irans Nuclear Program: Tehrans Compliance with International Obligations Paul K. Kerr Analyst in Nonproliferation July 31, 2013 4). Is Iran on the way to acquiring an atomic bomb ? Background information on a current topic revised version, January 2004 Author: Dr. Christoph Wirz 5). History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue Latest ACA Resources Updated: October 2013 6).Arms Control Today September 2013 Time to Solve the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle Daryl G. Kimball


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7). IAEA and Iran 8). IBID 7 9). The Parchin Military Complex Aug. 23, 2013 Defense Industries Organization (DIO) 10). ISIS Reports Update on the Parchin Site by David Albright and Robert Avagyan August 22, 2013 11). Rethinking Our Approach to Iran's Search for the Bomb By MAY 7, 2012 Anthony H. Cordesman 12). IBID 11 13). IBID 11 14). Soviet scientist denies helping Iran develop atomic bomb By Guy Falconbridge MOSCOW | Thu Nov 10, 2011 (Reuters) - A Soviet scientist has denied being the brains behind Iran's nuclear program, despite U.S. media reports that he helped put Tehran on the threshold of making an atomic bomb, a Russian newspaper said on Thursday. 15) ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Part II - Irans Work and Foreign Assistance on a Multipoint Initiation System for a Nuclear Weapon by David Albright, Paul Brannan, Mark Gorwitz and Andrea Stricker November 13, 2011 16). Revisiting Danilenko and the Explosive Chamber at Parchin: A Review Based on Open Sources by David Albright and Robert Avagyan September 17, 2012 17). The Gulf Military Balance Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions and Options for Deterrence, Defense, Containment, and Preventive Strikes By Anthony H. Cordesman and Bryan Gold July 18, 2013 Page 42 18). Security Council Distr.: General 12 June 2012 Original: English United Nations S/2012/ 19) SHAHAB 3 VARIANTS 20). IBID 19 21) Ukraine Leader Confirms Missile Sales To Iran U.S. Officials Says Rockets Could Aid Tehran's Nuke Program Exclusive By Preston Mendenhall And Robert Windrem NBC News March 31st, 2005 22)NBC Correspondent Preston Mendenhall Is On Assignment In Ukraine. NBC Investigative Producer Robert Windrem Contributed To This Report From New York.Msnbcenespanol.Com/Id/7349303/ 23)Ukraine Reveals $32bln Weapons Embezzlement, Mosnews, December 19th, 2005. Http://Www.Mosnews.Com. 24). Source: Bill Gertz, "Missiles Sold To China And Iran," Washington Times, April 6th, 2005. 25). Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris characterize Pakistan as having, "the world's fastest-growing nuclear stockpile." According to the SIPRI 2013 Yearbook, Pakistan possesses between 100 and 110 nuclear weapons. However, the International Panel on Fissile Materials concluded in 2013 that Pakistan possesses fissile material sufficient for over 200 weapons. Pakistan Nuclear, NTI 26). United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Grand Jury Indictment: United States of America v. Parviz Khaki and Zongcheng Yi, May 7, 2012, unsealed July 12, 2012. ent.pdf 27). Improvised Nuclear Devices And Nuclear Terrorism1 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) 28). Understanding the Nuclear Weapons Threat 29). September 12, 2013 Syrias Past, Secret Nuclear Program Poses Proliferation Risks By David Albright and Robert Avagyan 29a) THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE Volume III: The Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula Anthony H. Cordesman and Robert M. Shelala II May 29, 2013 29b). In Heavy WaterIrans Potential Plutonium Production Mark Hibbs OP-ED SEPTEMBER 12, 2013 JANES INTELLIGENCE REVIEW 30). Debate Fact Check: Obamas Watered Down Sanctions Have Sent The Wrong Message To Irans Leaders Posted October 23, 2012


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31). Irans Golden Loophole May 2013 By Gary Clark, Rachel Ziemba and Mark Dubowitz _RGE_Iran_Gol_Report__May_2013_FINAL_2.pdf 31a). The talented Mr Erdogan by Spengler Tuesday December 4, 2012 from Asia Times . 32). Analysis: German-Iranian trade booming By BENJAMIN WEINTHAL, JERUSALEM POST CORRESPONDENT 11/04/2012 33). Aug 10, 2013 IEA: New Oil Tankers to Boost Irans Crude Oil Export Capacity 000237 34). Fri Jul 26, 2013 Iran to Launch Largest Floating Oil Storage Terminal in Persian Gulf 000492 35). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military spending and armaments, 2012 , Yearbook 2013 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security 35a) THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions By Anthony H. Cordesman, Bryan Gold MAY 27, 2013 36). The Rise of The Subcontractor State: Politics of Pseudo-Privatization In The Islamic Republic Of Iran Int. J. Middle East Stud. 45 (2013), 45 70 doi:10.1017/S0020743812001250 Kevan Harris Cambridge University Press 2013 37). Iran Military 37a). FACT SHEET: Iran's Submarine Force Jun 21, 2012 - Christopher Harmer 37b). INEGMA Special Report No. 4 Iranian Mining of the Strait of Hormuz Plausibility and Key Considerations Sabahat Khan Analyst Institute of Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) January 2010 37c). The Gulf Military Balance Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions By Anthony H. Cordesman, Bryan Gold MAY 27, 2013 38). The Revolutionary Guards' Looting of Iran's Economy Ali Alfoneh | AEI Online June 23, 2010 ). The Rise of The Subcontractor State: Politics of Pseudo-Privatization In The Islamic Republic Of Iran Int. J. Middle East Stud. 45 (2013), 45 70 doi:10.1017/S0020743812001250 Kevan Harris Cambridge University Press 2013 39). Iran revolutionary guards commander becomes new president of OPEC Rostam Ghasemi joins Ahmadinejad cabinet as oil minister, automatically making him head of global oil organisation Saeed Kamali Dehghan 3 August 2011 39a). The Growing Threat of Iran's Sea Power Iran's expanded maritime capacity might be enough to economically disrupt the West By SEAN BRANDES, JAMIE BARNETT, YONAH ALEXANDER November 14, 2012 (40)U.S. Intelligence and the Indian Bomb Jeffrey Richelson, Editor April 13, 2006 41) "A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations," January-February 2009 issue of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Read the Documents 1a-d: The Shah's Statements on Nuclear Weapons: "Without Any Doubt" 1a: U.S. Embassy Paris cable 15305 to Department of State, "Interview with Shah," 24 June 1974, Unclassified 1b: U.S. Embassy Paris cable 15445 to Department of State, "Further Remarks by Shah on Nuclear Weapons," 25 June 1974, Unclassified 1c: U.S. Embassy Tehran cable 5192 to Department of State, "Shah's Alleged Statement on Nuclear Weapons," 25 June 1974, Confidential 1d: U.S. Embassy Tehran cable 5389 to Department of State, "Iran's Intentions in Nuclear Matters," 1 July 1974, Confidential


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42) U.S.-Iran Nuclear Negotiations in 1970s Featured Shah's Nationalism and U.S. Weapons Worries Newly Declassified Documents Reveal remarkable Continuity with Today's U.S.-Iran Nuclear Controversy National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 268 Edited by William Burr Posted - January 13, 2009 43) The Physics Research Center and Irans Parallel Military Nuclear Program By David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Stricker February 23, 2012 44)Irans New Foreign Minister: Ali Akbar Salehi January 31, 2011 | Mehrzad Boroujerdi 44a). U.S. nuclear expert: Iran official linked to past program BY TABASSUM ZAKARIA WASHINGTON Tue May 15, 2012 45). On February 23, 2012, ISIS released the report, The Physics Research Center and Irans Parallel Military Nuclear Program, ( 45a). Formerly secret telexes reveal Irans early use of deceit in nuclear program By Joby Warrick, Published: February 22, 2012 46). Irans Nuclear Odyssey: Costs and Risks ALI VAEZ, KARIM SADJADPOUR REPORT APRIL 2, 2013 46a) Russia set to build a new nuclear plant for Iran BY TIMES OF ISRAEL STAFF August 12, 2013 47). IBID 46 48). Iran plans to build more nuclear reactors in quake-prone area By Yeganeh Torbati DUBAI | Wed Apr 10, 2013 49). Got Water? Nuclear Power Plant Cooling Needs 50). What does the Doha Climate Gateway mean for Africa? Not nearly enough, given the continents vulnerability By: Richard Munang and Zhen Han From Africa Renewal: May 2013 - 51).Iran's Water Crisis: A Bigger Threat Than Israel? Payvand News - 07/19/13 51ab). United Nations World Water Assessment Programme Published in 2012 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 52). Irans crisis on the roads Bijan Khajehpour November 6, 2013 53).Iran Opens New Uranium Mines Yellow Cake Plant Reuters 04/09/2013 Iran, Uranium Mines 54). Uranium mining %20chain%20ADVANCED.pdf 55). Water reserves of 77 dams in Iran drop by 70 per cent 3 November 2013, 56). Irans Environment: Greater Threat than Foreign Foes October 28, 2013 | 9:30am David Michel -environmentgreater-threat-foreign-foes 56a). Bijan Khajehpour July 9, 2013 56b). Iran imports $12 billion worth of staple food in 18 months 29 December 2013 Baku, Azerbaijan 57). The looming death of Lake Uromiyeh and what it means for Iran By Gary Lewis, UN Resident Coordinator Islamic Republic of Iran 28 Oct 2013 58). Timeline: Major earthquakes in Iran 17 Apr 2013 8598695.html What could finally topple Iran's regime? Earthquakes By Daniel Nisman, Op-ed contributor / May 15, 2013


Page 183 59). Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons Amy F. Woolf Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy December 19, 2012 60). Understanding North Korea and Iran by Dr. Peter Vincent Pry February 26, 2013 Family Security Matters 60a). The Past As Prologue: A Cautionary Tale Of The U.S. Experience With Tactical Nuclear Weapons By David O. Smith Jan. 2012 61). The Future of Pakistans Nuclear Weapons Program Christopher Clary second Nuclear Age Oct 2013 62). Addressing Pakistan's Atomisation Yogesh Joshi and Frank ODonnell Yogesh Joshi is Research Scholar a t Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Frank ODonnell is Research Scholar at Kings College, London. March 8, 2013 63). The End of Over Kill, Reassessing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy Benjamin Friedman, Christopher Preble, and Matt Fay 2013 by the Cato Institute. 64) IBID 61 65). Dr. Peter Vincent Pry President, EMPact America Statement Before The Congressional Caucus On EMP The Capitol Room HVC 200 February 15, 2011 66). NUCLEAR TERRORISM and EMP ATTACK 67). IBID 66 68). Iran and the Shahab 3 By Jeffrey | 7 March 2006 | 69). Persia in Space: Implications for U.S. National Security By James Mazol Research Associate, George C. Marshall Institute 70). Understanding North Korea and Iran by DR. PETER VINCENT PRY February 26, 2013 71). October 21, 2013 Three reasons the US should pay attention to Israel's Iran fears By Clare M. Lopez 72). June 16, 2008 Swiss Smugglers Had Advanced Nuclear Weapons Designs By David Albright 73). IBID 70 74). Underestimating North Korea and Iran Feb. 26, 2013 Dr. Peter Vincent Pry 74a). On North Korea's Polar Trajectory 'Satellite Launch' March 16, 2013 75). August 8, 2013, Report: Iran has built new rocket-launching site 76). 30 Years of Terror Sponsored by Iran Matthew Levitt Matthew Levitt directs The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and is author of Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God. 77). Threat To The Homeland Irans Extending Influence in the Western He misphere Dr. Matthew Levitt Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Written Testimony before House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency July 9, 2013 78) Latin America as an Arena for Iran and Hezbollah's Terrorist, Subversive and Criminal Activities The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 78a) IRAN AND THE GLOBAL JIHAD Exploring how the impossible became inevitable Kronos Ad visory, LLC USA Prepared by Ronald Sandee and Michael S. Smith II Released March 2013 78b)Defining terrorism to exculpate terrorists Michael Rubin | Operational Environment Watch May 07, 2013 78c). 30 Years of Terror Sponsored by Iran Matthew Levitt New York Daily News October 23, 2013 79). Shannon N. Kile, Phillip Schell and Hans M. Kristensen, "World Nuclear Forces," SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), 80). Nuclear Fatwa Religion and Politics in Irans Proliferation Strategy Michael Eisenstadt and Mehdi Khalaji Policy Focus #115 | September 2011 81). Iran To Hold The Great Conference Of Death To America In Tehran OCTOBER 25, 2013 -tohold-the-great-conference-of-death-to-america-in-tehran 81a). Leader US Most Hated Power among World Nations November 03, 2013 TEHRAN (Tasnim) 82). The Infamous Chant By cgcs_admin Fri Nov 8 Written by ASL 19 for the IMP 83). U.S. Congress gestures in an unusual direction: toward diplomacy with Iran BY MAX FISHER July 19 2013 84). Obama accepts Irans enrichment 2009 Regressing on Iran


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by Michael Rubin Townhall Magazine August 2012 85). Exclusive Obamas Secret Iran Dtente by Eli Lake, Josh Rogin Nov 8, 2013 85a). U.S.-Iran Thaw Grew From Years Of Behind-the-Scenes Talks Secret Efforts Planted Seeds for Obama Call With Rouhani By Jay Solomon and Carol E. Lee Nov. 7, 2013 86). Obama Cuts Human Rights Group Documenting Iran Irans watchdogs still need help The Boston Globe Editorial Board November 1, 2009 87). China agrees to finance Iranian petrochemical projects Baku, Azerbaijan, Nov. 11 88). Iran's Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq By BILL ROGGIO December 5, 2007 89). Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani: A Biography Ali Alfoneh | Middle Eastern Outlook January 24, 2011 90). Leaked Reports Detail Irans Aid for Iraqi Militias By Michael R. Gordon And Andrew W. Lehren Published: October 22, 2010 91). Iraq, Afghanistan War Wounded Pass 50,000 Posted: 10/25/2012 12:36 pm EDT Updated: 10/26/2012 12:41 pm EDT 91a) 2013 6,750 U.S. service members have died in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom 91b) 92) Iraqi IEDs? Iranian IEDs? How About U.S.-Iranian IEDs By Mark Thompson Oct. 25, 2011 Iraqi IEDs? Iranian IEDs? How About U.S.-Iranian IEDs | 92a). Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs For Immediate Release Tuesday, October 25, 2011 Five Individuals Indicted in a Fraud Conspiracy Involving Exports to Iran of U.S. Components Later Found in Bombs in Iraq 93). The Decline Of The IED by James Dunnigan October 18, 2011 94). TERRORISM & INSURGENCY 30-Sep-2011 Jane's Intelligence Review Shia strength - Iraqi militants adapt to the US drawdown 95). MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform by Christopher J. Lamb, Matthew J. Schmidt, and Berit G. Fitzsimmons Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 6 National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2009 96). Mahdi Army 97). PolicyWatch 1492 Iran's Ongoing Proxy War in Iraq Michael Knights Policy #1492 March 16, 2009 98).State Sponsors: Iran Author: Greg Bruno Updated: October 13, 2011 99). Iranian soldier captured in Afghanistan, The Telegraph, August 31st, 2011, 100) Syrias Path to Islamist Terror By Michael Rubin | Middle East Quarterly Monday, November 23, 2009 101). The Driver: An exclusive look inside the mysterious death and life of the world's most dangerous terrorist not named Osama bin Laden. By Mark Perry | May/June 2013 102). Detailed records captured by US shed light on links in terror chain leading to Iraq Oct 2007 DOSSIER: Khalaf Al Rashdan 103). The Sinjar Records: A Case Study of the Origins and Motivations of Al Qaeda in Iraq Recruits William Capstone Advisor: Dan Schneider 2011 Spring Semester Honors in International Studies Major in United States Foreign Policy School of International Service,%20William.pdf?sequence=1 104). Syrias Path to Islamist Terror by Michael Rubin Middle East Quarterly Winter 2010 105). Iran's Suicide Brigades Terrorism Resurgent by Ali Alfoneh Middle East Quarterly Winter 2007, pp. 37-44 106). Suicide Bombing as Worship Dimensions of Jihad by Denis MacEoin Middle East Quarterly Fall 2009, pp. 15-24 107). Iranian Womens Magazine Shut Down for Publishing Investigative Article on Martyrdom Movement By: M. Nissimov, Y. Mansharof and A. Savyon


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108). Iran's Suicide Brigades Terrorism Resurgent Ali Alfoneh | Middle East Quarterly January 01, 2007 109). Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (Sept 1993) el%20Since.aspx 110). US General Calls Out Iran 111). Iran, Hezbollah train Iraqi Shia "Secret Cells" By BILL ROGGIO July 2, 2007 112). U.S. finds Karbala PJCC mockup inside Iran By BILL ROGGIO June 9, 2007 113). Iran, Hezbollah train Iraqi Shia "Secret Cells" By BILL ROGGIO July 2, 2007 114). Three Iranian Qods Force agents captured in IraqBy BILL ROGGIO March 13, 2009 115). Treasury Designates Individuals, Entity Fueling Iraqi Insurgency 1/9/2008 116). Slain Syrian Official Supported Al Qaeda In Iraq By Thomas Joscelyn July 24, 2012 117). Blowback in Syria Jul 24, 2012 By Thomas Joscelyn 118). Syrias Path to Islamist Terror by Michael Rubin Middle East Quarterly Winter 2010 119). Nouri al-Maliki - Fast Facts By CNN Library December 10, 2012 120). The Fall and Rise And Fall Of Iraq Kenneth M. Pollack July 2013 121). Iraq 2013: Deadliest year since 2008 with 7,000+ killed Published time: November 08, 2013 122). Ex Iran Guard commander visits White House with Iraq leader The Washington Times December 12, 2011 By Ashish Kumar Sen 123). Iranian Qods Force Agents Detained in Irbil Raid By Bill Roggio January 14, 2007 124). Obama Frees Iranian Terror Masters The Release of the Irbil Five Is A Continuation of A Shameful Policy Andrew C. McCarthy July 11, 2009 Nationalreview.Com 125). US releases 'dangerous' Iranian proxy behind the murder of US troops By Bill Roggio December 31, 2009 126) Iranian Influence In The Levant, Iraq, and Afghanistan Frederick W. Kagan Kimberly Kagan Danielle Pletka A Report Of The American Enterprise Institute 127). US releases 'dangerous' Iranian proxy behind the murder of US troops By Bill Roggio December 31, 2009 128). Ali Daqduq The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center January 4, 2012 129). Why couldn't the US prosecute Musa Ali Daqduq? By Bill Roggio March 7, 2013 130). U.S. District Court Rules Iran Behind 9/11 Attacks December 23, 2011 131). Abu Musab al Suri released from Syrian custody: report By Bill Roggio February 6, 2012 132). Free Radical Bashar al-Assad appears to have let one of the world's most prominent jihadist ideologues out of jail. He's playing with fire. By Aaron Y. Zelin | February 3, 2012 133). Abu Musab Al Suri http://Www.Globalterroralert.Com/Pdf/0705/Abumusabalsuri.Pdf 134). Journal of Strategic Security Volume 6 Number 1 Spring 2013 Analysis of Abu Musa b al-Suris Call to Global Islamic Resistance M.W. Zackie University of Cambridge pp. 1 -18 / 135). VA Stops Releasing Data On Injured Vets As Total Reaches Grim Milestone By Jamie Reno November 01 2013 136).Female Prisoners Raped Before Execution Lest They Go To Paradise Published on August 26, 2010 by Iran Briefing 136a).Rape In Irans Prisons Reports New Report on Rape in Iranian Prisons June 29, 2011 | 137) Human Rights in Iran Authors: Jayshree Bajoria, and Robert McMahon, Editor Updated: May 22, 2013


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138). Deputy FM: Some 50-100 thousand Iranians left country after 2009 protests 29 December 2013 Baku, Azerbaijan, Iranian refugees 'trapped' in Turkey awaiting asylum process 28 December 2012 139). A list compiled the following year by the Mojahedin-e Khalq cited 7,746 persons who had lost their lives through executions, in street battles, or under torture in the short period from June 1981 to Sept. 1983." (The Reign of the Ayatollahs by Shaul Bakhash p.221-222)"... in late summer and early autumn of 1989 ... thousand of political prisoners were dispatched. ... Amnesty International documented 3000 killed. Other sources estimated between 6000-10,000 executed. Many were nonviolent demonstrators." (p.278, Khomeini: Life of the 10). Ayatollah by Baqer Moin Thomas Dunne Books, c2000) Iran Human Rights Documentation Center 129 Church Street New Haven, Connecticut 06510, USA Deadly 140)Fatwa Irans 1988 Prison Massacre , September 2009 This list was compiled by the Mission for Establishment of Human Rights in Iran (MEHR Iran). It lists the number of executed at 4,525. 141). History of Human Rights Abuses by the Islamic Republic of Iran (Pre-June 2009 Elections) Law and Human Rights in The Islamic Republic of Iran Amnesty International, February 1, 1980 Law And Human Rights in The Islamic Republic of Iran Amnesty International Secretariat Southampton Street London WC2E 7HF England A report covering events within the seven month period following the Revolution of February 1979 Montazeri Memoirs Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, Khatirat-I Ayatollah Montazeri, Majmuiyyih Payvastha Va Dastniv isha [Memoir of Ayatollah Montazeri, The Collection Of Appendices And Handwritten Notes] 303, 306 (2001) [Hereinafter Montazeri Memoirs]. Khomeini fatwa led to killing of 30, 000 in Iran' By Christina Lamb, Diplomatic Correspondent 12:00AM GMT 04 Feb 2001 142). Khamenei says Iran will not step back from its nuclear rights By REUTERS 11/20/2013 143). Irans Rouhani Says Uranium Enrichment Red Line By AP / Nasser Karimi Nov. 10, 2013 : Irans Rouhani Says Uranium Enrichment Red Line | 144). Obama urges skeptical senators to hold off on Iran sanctions during talks Published November 20, 2013 145). Vol. 13, No. 30 12 November 2013 The Emerging Geneva Agreement with Iran Dore Gold 146). The Revolutionary Guards and the International Drug Trade Sami Kronenfeld and Yoel Guzansky November 1st, 2013 Joby Warrick, In Iran, Drug Trafficking Soars as Sanctions Take Bigger Bite, The Washington Post, November 1, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost. com/2012-11-01/world/35504357_1_global-drug-drug-dealers-drug-trade. Matthew Levitt, Hizbullah Narco-Terrorism: A Growing Cross-Border Threat, IHS Defense Risk and Security Consulting, September 2012, p. 34. INSANITY: FOUR DECADES OF U.S. COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Walther December 2012 The 147) UNODC publications - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013 Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan And Central Asia: A Threat Assessment 2012 148). James R. Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2013), Reports/2013%20ATA%20SFR%20for%20SSCI%2012%20Mar%202013. pdf. 149). Iron Triangle of Terror: Iran, Hezbollah, and Los Zetas? Dec 2012 150). PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 7, Issue 4 Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and the Globalization of Supply by Joel Hernndez 2013 151). FOUR DECADES OF U.S. COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Walther December 2012 The 152). Rouhani Deceptive Tactics to Advance Iranian Nuke BY RYAN MAURO Sun, November 10, 2013 153). November 13, 2013 Dangerous Times: Obama and the Crisis of Evil By James Lewis 153a) LIST OF NAMES Military Purge High Officers Terrifying November 21st, 2013 Fired majors plan to sue for reinstatement Jan. 3, 2012 -


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153b). General Jim Mattis bio summary. Marine Gen. James Mattis Commander, U.S. Central Command 153c). 19 Unforgettable Quotes From Retiring US Marine General James 'Mad Dog' Mattis 154). Court reveals Iranian operatives in charge of Obamas Iran policy since 2009 SEPTEMBER 26, 2012 BY DOUG BOOK 155). 156). Time to Move from Tactics to Strategy on Iran 2013 The Atlantic Council of the 157). IBID 156 158). Court reveals Iranian operatives in charge of Obamas Iran policy since 2009 SEPTEMBER 26, 2012 BY DOUG BOOK NIAC Loses Defamation Suit Pro-Tehran group harshly criticized by judge, forced to pay attorneys fees Posted on September 22, 2012 Court Reveals Iranian Operatives In Charge Of Obamas Iran Policy Since 2009 September 28, 2012 159). Treacherous Alliance The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. by Trita Parsi New York: Yale University Press, 2007. Reviewed by Michael Rubin Middle East Quarterly Spring 2008 160). "Blame Israel and pale the Iranian regime's anti-Semitism" The pro-Tehran lobby and its anti-Israeli crusade Report by: Hassan Daioleslam August 2011 160a). Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone General Provisions 160b). Iran Backs Nuclear-Free Middle East in Dig at Israeli Arsenal By Ladane Nasseri & Jonathan Tirone - Feb 19, 2013 5:18 AM PT 160c). North Korea Country Profile Nuclear NTI 161). Khamenei controls massive financial empire built on property seizures By Steve Stecklow, Babak Dehghanpisheh and Yeganeh Torbati November 11, 2013 162). US Must Return Iran's Frozen Assets without Precondition: Former Envoy October 20, 163). JOURNAL ESSAY Jahangir Amuzegar 164). Securing the Gulf Key Threats and Options for Enhanced Cooperation Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy February 19, 2013 165) IBID 164 166).IBID 164 166a). The Mystery of the Sunken Gyros By Vladimir Orlov & William C. Potter Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists November/December 1998 167). Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal: How Iran Would Apply its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in a Future Conflict By Jahangir Arasli No. 10 April 2007 ISSN 1863-6039 pages 168). ARMS CONTROL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 169). Yadlin Scope of Iranian retaliation to potential strike is exaggerated By YAAKOV LAPPIN 12/05/2013 170). Iran deal wont kick in until nuclear inspections, pushing start into 2014 IAEA must verify Tehrans cooperation before Geneva agreement implemented, but agency expected to be ready only in January BY GEORGE JAHN November 27, 2013, 171). US: Six-month clock on Iran nuclear deal hasnt started By JTA, REUTERS 11/27/2013 172). Iran will continue construction at Arak nuclear site: Zarif November 27, 2013 172a). July 15, 2013 Update on the Arak Reactor By David Albright and Christina Walrond 173). CSIS Geneva The Best Deal with Iran That We Can Get One that Focuses on the Real Threat and Needs for Arms Control By Anthony H. Cordesman NOV 24, 2013


Page 188 174). US says some work okay at Arak nuclear site Nuclear fuel production, testing and control systems advances are all disallowed, though some construction is permissible at Iranian facility BY AP AND SPENCER HO November 27, 2013 175). IBID 172a 176). Iran Nuclear NTI 177). Nuclear nonproliferation and Iran's nuclear medical reactor July 12, 2013 by Salman Hameed 178). Nov 27, 2013 Iran Angry at US Negative Moves after Geneva Deal 178). Iran: White House gave false details of nuclear agreement November 27, 2013 179). The Geneva deal, Pros and Cons November 24, 2013 Ron Ben-Yishai.. Israel Opinion://,7340,L-4457133,00.htm 180). U.N. Nuclear Inspectors Invited to Iranian Facility By ALAN COWELL November 28, 2013 181). Iran ready to consider admitting IAEA experts to military base in Parchin after restoration of trust source 28 November, 181a). IAEA has no right, duty to visit military sites: Salehi Dec 21, 2013 Press TV Iran 182). Pros and cons of Geneva deal Analysis: Greatest danger is that interim agreement will become permanent, leaving Iran as 'threshold country' Published: 11.24.13, 11:17 / Israel Opinion,7340,L-4457133,00.html 183). Longer-Term Deal With Iran Faces Major Challenges By MICHAEL R. GORDON Published: November 24, 2013 184) .Iran May Refurbish Aviation Fleet After Nuclear Deal By Trend News Agency November 30, 2013 185). OBAMA'S NUKE DEAL WITH IRAN PAVES THE WAY FOR US COMPANIES TO REBUILD IRAN'S IDLE AIR FORCE November 28, 2013 186). Fact Sheet: Treasury Sanctions Major Iranian Commercial Entities 187). IBID 185 188). Seven loopholes favoring a nuclear Iran in deal signed by the world powers DEBKA file Exclusive Analysis November 24, 2013, 189). Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claims victory for nuclear program 11/24/2013 190). White House Prepared to Let Iran Keep Enriching Uranium Adam Kredo December 4, 2013 191). Iran enrichment capacity expanded dramatically on Obama's watch By James Rosen Published December 04, 191a). KAHLILI: Iran nuclear compromise no longer needed By Reza Kahlili April 9, 2012 Regime says its close enough to building bomb that West cant stop it 192). IBID 191a 193). Iran will not abandon Arak heavy water reactor Tehran declares facility a red line as it invites UN watchdog to visit site December 1, 2013 194). Iran to get access to billions of dollars under atom deal, says U.S. Reuters, Geneva 24 November 2013 195). India owes Iran $5.3-billion for oil imports and its ready to start the cash transfer next week after new deal Nidhi Verma, Reuters | 25/11/13 | 196). China Plans to Keep Iran Oil Projects Moving Ahead By Shai Oster and Simon Hall By Shai Oster And Simon Hall May 19, 2010


Page 189 197). Chinas Strategic Shift Toward The Region Of The Four Seas: The Middle Kingdom Arrives In The Middle East By Christina Lin* Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) 198). The Iranian Deal: What The Big Six Really Have To Gain 11/27/2013 Marin Katusa, 199). Iran Takes Charm Offensive to the Persian Gulf Emirates News Agency, via Reuters By Thomas Erdbrink December 4, 2013 200). Prince Turki tells Obama to wake up Saudi Arabia looks forward to permanent accords that rid the region of weapons of mass destruction By Habib Toumi, Bureau Chief December 4, 2013 201). Bahrain-Iran Foreign Relations By Will Fulton, Ariel Farrar-Wellman July 14, 2011 202). Bahrain IRGC cell targeted US Fifth Fleet in court details IRGC link, finds cell targeted U.S. Fifth Fleet November 10, 2013 Bahrain Details IRGC Link Middle East Newsline November 05, 2013 ABU DHABI [MENL] Bahrain has released details of Iranian support for a Shi'ite insurgency cell. 203). Bahrain as a Target Preferred by Iran for Terrorism and Subversion Issued on 28/02/2013 204). Iran provides IAEA with information on new generation of entrifuges: official Tehran, Dec 7, IRNA 205). The Big Business Behind Iran's Proliferation, It is increasingly difficult to draw a neat line between Iran's legitimate economy and its proliferation rackets. Dec. 2011 By Emanuele Ottolenghi , Claudia Rosett 206). Maritime Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows SIPRI Policy Paper No. 32 Hugh Griffiths and Michael Jenks January 2012 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ). Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Prepared Statement of Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.) March 27, 2012 207). 208). Two-thirds of sanctioned Iranian ships visits to EU ports are via Malta February 17, 2012 209).IBID 208 210). Maritime Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows Hugh Griffiths and Michael Jenks SIPRI Policy Paper Jan 2012 211). IBID 210 212). IBID 210 213). Iran's Military Doctrine Michael Connell 214). The White House Office of the Press Secretary For Immediate Release November 23, 2013 Statement By The President On First Step Agreement On Iran's Nuclear Program 215). Pact With Iran -- Now That the Dust Settled Micah D. Halpern 12/09/2013 216). Back in business What Iran deal means and who benefits from it November 28, 2013 217). US businesses reach out quickly to partners in Iran See a population with money to spend By Tim Devaney The Washington Times December 8, 2013 218). Iran names 7 Western oil companies it wants to return Reuters, Vienna KSA 5 December 2013 219). Iran Deal Has Western Firms Eager to Resume Business By Daniel Michaels, Benot Faucon and David Pearson Nov. 24, 2013 219a). Iran says wants oil majors to revive ageing oilfields 07 December 2013 220). The Future of OPEC | Stratfor DECEMBER 4, 2013 | 221). Iran needs at least $1 billion annually to renew its ageing aviation fleet, the director of the Civil Aviation Organization of Iran .


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Iran Deal Has Western Firms Eager to Resume Business By Daniel Michaels, Benot Faucon and David Pearson Nov. 24, 2013 222) IBID 217 223). U.S. dismisses Israeli assessment on Iran as 'exaggerated, not based on reality' State Department rejects Israeli estimate that sanctions relief offered to Iran in Geneva is worth $40 billion to Tehran. By Haaretz | Nov. 14, 2013 223a) Israeli officials: U.S. admits Iran will get $20b from sanctions relief U.S. officials admit to Israeli colleagues that they greatly underestimated the economic benefits Tehran would reap from Geneva accord. By Amos Harel | Dec. 11, 2013 224). Irans Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Offices Irregular Warfare Support Program December 2012 225). How Taqiyya Alters Islams Rules of War Defeat ing Jihadist Terrorism by Raymond Ibrahim Middle East Quarterly Winter 2010, pp. 3-13 226). Obama gives up on Iran By Jennifer Rubin December 9 , 2013 227). 60 percent population living below poverty line: World Bank report May 19, 2013 ZAHEER ABBASI 228). Pakistan A Country Profile NTI 229). IBID 228 230). Pakistan Starts Work on New Atomic Site, With Chinese Help Nov. 27, 2013 231). Specialist in Nonproliferation March 19, 2013 )Pakistan Test Fires Nuclear Armed Cruise Missile September 17, 2012 232). Iran unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards is turning theocracy into military dictatorship AEI Press (April 18, 2013) page 205 233). Both President Obama and Ahmadinejad Liken Israeli Concerns Over Nuclear Iran to Noise September 23, 2012 234). Khamenei: Iran will back any nations, any groups fighting Israel By Thomas Erdbrink, February 03, 2012 235). Iran Military Goal Full Annihilation of Israel May 21 2012 RJM 236).IBID 234 237). Forward thinking By YAA KOV LAPPIN 11/11/2013 238). The Stability-Instability Paradox By Krepon | 2 November 2010 | 239). For America, Life Was Cheap in Vietnam By Nick Turse October 9, 2013 240). Nuclear Security 2012 Challenges of Proliferation and Implication for the Korean Peninsula edited by Jung Ho Bae and Jae H. Ku 241). Bringing Israels Bomb Out of the Basement Has Nuclear Ambiguity Outlived Its Shelf Life? By Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller FROM OUR September/October 2010 Issue )Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: The Israeli perspective Shlomo Ben Ami September 2009 242). Pakistans Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Dj` Vu? The Washington Quarterly J Summer 2013 Center f or Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly 243). The Stability-Instability Paradox By Krepon | 2 November 2010 244). Israel Targeted Iranian Missiles in Syria Attack By Anne Barnard, Michael R. Gordon and Jodi Rudoren May 4, 2013 245). Israel - Location, size, and extent 245). U.S. Central Command Worried About Iranian Irregular Warfare March 22, 2012 246). In Depth: How Iranian Weapons Reach Hezbollah By Yossi Melman, Sof Hashavua 05/25/2013 Http://Www.Jpost.Com/Defense/In-Depth-How-Iranian-Weapons-Go-Through-Syria-To-Hezbollah-314313 247). COLUMN ONE: The demise of Pax Americana By Caroline B. Glick 11/14/2013 248). Iran must attack Israel by 2014' By JPOST.COM STAFF 02/09/2012


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249). Breakfast With The Supreme Leader by Elliott Abrams February 1, 2013 250). Kerry steadfast on Iran talks despite Khameneis harsh words for Israel By Anne Gearan, Published: November 20 251). Destruction of Israel guaranteed, ayatollah says Iran's supreme leader promises Jewish land to Palestinians 08/11/2013 252). The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center March 15, 2011 253). Operation Pillar of Defense: An Initial Strategic and Military Assessment by Dr. Eitan Shamir BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 189, December 4, 2012 Iran's Agenda in the Gaza Offensive | Stratfor The Role of Long range Rockets in an Israel Hamas Cease-fire November 20, 2012 | 0141 Irans IRGC transferred Fajr 5 long range rocket technology to Hamas 254). From sewage pipes with wings to sophisticated missiles How Hamas acquired its 10,000 -rocket arsenal BY MITCH GINSBURG November 21, 2012 255) Col. (ret.) Dr. Jacques Neriah, January 10, 2011 Iran Steps Up Arming Hizbullah Against Israel 256). The Role of Long range Rockets in an Israel Hamas Cease-fire November 20, 2012 | 0141 257). Volume 19, No. 3(E) Civilians under Assault Hezbollahs Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War Human Right Watch April 30, 2007 258). IBID 256 259). The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War by Uzi Rubin, June 2007 In the Aftermath of Operation Pillar of Defense The Gaza Strip, November 2012 Shlomo Brom, Editor Memorandum No. 124 December 2012 260). Threat And Response: Israeli Missile Defense Aug 16, 2012 - Christopher Harmer Israel Hizbullah got Scud D missiles from Syria with 700 km range Special to February 27th, 2013 | 261) Why Netanyahu won't yield Michael Oren - The Los Angeles Times, November 21st, 2013 Israeli Prime 262). 263). Khamenei Plasters Internet with Posters Calling Israel Sinister, Unclean Rabid Dog by Staff | 11.22.13 264). IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz Speaks at the BESA Center By BESA Center October 9, 2013 265). Mark Fitzpatrick Overwhelming global vote for the Iran nuclear deal Date: 20 December 2013 266). History of Iran , Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 December 21, 2013 266a) "Iran-Iraq War MSN Encarta" (http:/ / encarta. msn. com/ encyclopedia_761580640_2/ Iran-Iraq_War. html). Iran-Iraq War MSN Encarta. 20 August 1988 267). Ayatollah by Baqer Moin Thomas Dunne Books, c2000) Iran Human Rights Documentation Center 129 Church Street New Haven, Connecticut 06510, USA Deadly 268). Country of Origin Information Report Iran 26 January 2010 UK Border 269). Khomeini: Gulf Truce A Necessary `Poison July 21, 1988|By Stephen Franklin, Chicago Tribune. 270). Karsh, Efraim The Iran-Iraq War 1980 1988, London: Osprey, 2002 page 74 271). 272). Khomeinis Forgotten Sons, The Story of Irans Boy Soldiers Iran Brown Grey Seal Books London England 1990 273). Speaking For The Dead: Survivor Accounts of Iran's 1988 Massacre Iran Human Rights Documentation Center November 2009 (Revised January 2010)


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Deadly Fatwa: Irans 1988 Prison Massacre Iran Human Rights Documentation Center 2010 274). The Massacre of Political Prisoners in Iran, 1988 Report of an Inquiry Conducted by Geoffrey Robertson QC UK 275). ISIS Report April 2012 Internal IAEA information links the Supreme Leader to 1984 decision to seek a nuclear arsenal


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