You are on page 1of 60


3 #1 CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ABLAZA CONSTRUCTION & FINANCE CORPORATION G.R. NO. L-33022, APRIL 22, 1975.................... 3 #2 BACANI VS. NACOCO ........................................................... 4 #4 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RAMBUYONG .......... 5 #5 MACEDA VS. MACARAIG, 197 SCRA 771 .............................. 5 DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION ............................... 6 #7 & #97 SAGIP KALIKASAN VS. PADERANGA, 6/19/2008 ...... 6 #10 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS VS. DANES B. SANCHEZ, G.R. NO. 165569, JULY 29, 2010 ................................................... 7 HLURB (PD 957/PD 1344) ......................................................... 8 #11 C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. HON. ROMEO J. HIBIONADA, G.R. NO. 80916, NOVEMBER 9, 1990................... 8 #12 & 28 HLC CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND HENRY LOPEZ CHUA, PETITIONERS, VS. EMILY HOMES SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (EHSHA) ET.AL [G.R. NO. 139360. SEPTEMBER 23, 2003] ................................................................. 9 #13 AND 133 SPS. CHUA VS. HON. JACINTO G. ANG, G.R. NO. 156164, SEPTEMBER 4, 2009 ....................................................... 10 TOLL REGULATORY BOARD (PD 1112) ................................... 11 #S 19, 68 AND 94 CEFERINO PADUA VS. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, G.R. NO. 141949, OCTOBER 14, 2002 .........................11 QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER....................................................... 13 #25 AND #84 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS , G.R. NO. 134625, AUGUST 31, 1999......................................................................... 13 FORUM SHOPPING ................................................................ 15 #28 HLC CONSTRUCTION VS. EMILY HOMES SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (EHSHA)............................... 15 #29 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND DENNIS M. VILLAIGNACIO VS. ATTY. GIL A. VALERA AND COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 164250, SEPTEMBER 30, 2005.................... 15 #30 EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR VS. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, G.R. NO. 149335, JULY 1, 2003 ........... 16 #31 JESUS CABARRUS, JR. VS. JOSE ANTONIO BERNAS, [A.C. NO. 4634, SEPTEMBER 24, 1997] ............................................... 17 #32 TOMAS G. VELASQUEZ VS. HELEN B. HERNANDEZ, [G.R. NO. 150732., AUGUST 31, 2004] .................................................. 18 #33 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. ROLSON RODRIGUEZ, G.R. NO. 172700, JULY 23, 2010 ........................... 19 QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER................................................ 20 #43 AVELINA B. CONTE AND LETICIA BOISER-PALMA, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), [G.R. NO. 116422, NOVEMBER 4, 1996] ................................................................. 20

#44 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), G.R. NO. 162372, OCTOBER 19, 2011 ......................................................................................... 21 #45 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 135808, OCTOBER 6, 2008 ...................................................................... 22 #46 KILUSANG MAYO UNO ET. AL. VS. THE DIRECTORGENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, AND THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, G.R. NO. 167798, APRIL 19, 2006 ............................................................................................24 #47 REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN ROMULO L. NERI, G.R. NO. 180046, APRIL 2, 2009 ............................................................................................ 25 POWER TO ISSUE SUBPOENA............................................... 26 #51 EV A N G E L I S T A V S J A R E N C I O, 6 8 S C R A 9 9 ..................................................................................................26 IMPLEMENTING RULES OR INTERPRETATIVE POLICIES ... 29 #53 TANADA V. TUVERA ......................................................... 29 #55 GSIS VS. COA ..................................................................... 29 #56 PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT .................................................. 31 #57 PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT CORPORATION VS. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR.............................................. 32 #58 AND #154 HONASAN VS. DOJ PANEL (SUPERSEDED BY OMB-DOJ MOA 3/29/12), 4/13/2004.......................................... 34 REQUIREMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS ......... 36 #63 ALCALA VS. SCHOOL PRINCIPAL VILLAR....................... 36 #64 MANUEL LAXINA VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN .. 37 #65 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. VICTORIO N. MEDRANO ................................................................................. 37 #67 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS MASING ................... 38 #68 CEFERINO PADUA VS. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, G.R. NO. 141949, OCTOBER 14, 2002 .................................................39 #69 DOH VS CAMPOSANO ......................................................39 #70 MALINAO VS REYES .......................................................... 41 DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS........... 42 #74 CSC VS. ALBAO 472 SCRA 548 G.R. NO. 155784 OCTOBER 13, 2005........................................................................................42 #75 ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-49711, NOVEMBER 7, 1979 ..................... 43 #76 SINGSON, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PAL, G.R. NO. 122389, JUNE 19, 1997....... 43 #84 UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS , G.R. NO. 134625, AUGUST 31, 1999 ........................................... 44

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE BRIEF #85 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NAPOCOR) VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. NOS. 90933-61 MAY 29, 1997............................................................... 44 #86 LINCOLN GERARD, INC. VS. NLRC, G.R. NO. 85295, JULY 23, 1990 ....................................................................................... 45 #89 SARAH P. AMPONG VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. 46 #90 ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED VS. HONORABLE APOLONIO G. EXEVEA ET. AL., G.R. NO. 117565, NOVEMBER 18, 1997.......... 47 #91 VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, VS. DITA MAQUILAN, G.R. NO. 155409, JUNE 8, 2007 ................................................................. 48 #92 EDWIN RAZON Y LUCEA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 158053, JUNE 21, 2007 ......................... 49 #93 ATTY. ROMEO S. PEREZ, VS. HON. JUDGE CARLOS ABIERA, A.M. NO. 223-J, JUNE 11, 1975 ..................................... 49 CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS ...................................................................... 50 #94 CEFERINO PADUA VS. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, G.R. NO. 141949, OCTOBER 14, 2002 ................................................ 50 DOCTRINE OFEXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ............................................................................. 50 #97 SAGIP KALIKASAN VS. PADERANGA, 6/19/2008 ............. 50 DISTINCTION BETWEEN DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION & DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES............................................... 50 #108 AND # 131 THE ALEXANDRA CONDO CORP. VS. LLDA, 599 SCRA 453 ............................................................................. 50 PRINCIPLE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER OF CONTROL.......... 51 #124 AND #125 BITO-ONON VS. JUDGE YAP-FERNANDEZ ... 51 PRESIDENTS POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION ............. 53 #125 BITO-ONON VS. JUDGE YAP-FERNANDEZ .................... 53 FINDING OF FACTS ............................................................... 53 #127 BAYANI BAUTISTA VS. PATRICIA ARANETA ................. 53 # 128 TERESITA G. FABIAN VS. NESTOR V. AGUSTIN .......... 54 WHEN MAY COURTS REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS ............................................................................................... 56 # 131 THE ALEXANDRA CONDO CORP. VS. LLDA, 599 SCRA 453 .............................................................................................. 56 THREE-FOLD RESPONSIBILITY ............................................ 56 #133 SPS. CHUA VS. HON. JACINTO G. ANG, G.R. NO. 156164, SEPTEMBER 4, 2009 .................................................................. 56 #139 AND #166 GARCIA VS. MOJICA, 314 SCRA 207 ................ 56 OMB JURISDICTION ............................................................. 58 #154 HONASAN VS. DOJ PANEL (SUPERSEDED BY OMB-DOJ MOA 3/29/12), 4/13/2004 ........................................................... 58

WHO ARE NOT SUBJECT TO OMB DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY?......................................................................... 58 #158 AND #162 MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ, 221 SCRA 46 .............58 #161 AND #165 GARCIA VS. MIRO, 582 SCRA 127 .....................59 #162 MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ, 221 SCRA 46 ..............................59 #165 GARCIA VS. MIRO, 582 SCRA 127......................................59 CASES ON PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION .................................. 59 #166 GARCIA VS. MOJICA, 314 SCRA 207 .................................59


wholly void", "no contract between the petitioner and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NATL GOVT #1 CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ABLAZA CONSTRUCTION & respondent Ablaza Construction and Finance Corporation was ever perfected because only the first stage, that is the award of the contract to the lowest responsible bidder, was completed."

FINANCE CORPORATION G.R. NO. L-33022, APRIL 22, 1975 By: Bianca Cezar Facts: This is a petition made by the Central Bank which was sentenced to pay respondent Ablaza Construction and Finance Corporation for damages for breach of contract. In this case, it appears that after going thru the process of usual bidding, CB awarded to Ablaza a construction contract and allowed the latter to commence work. However, on a certain date the Bank then refused to proceed with the project unless the plans were revised and a lower price were agreed to by Ablaza. Now CB raises the issue that there was no perfected contract between the parties as there was no compliance with the requirement under Section 607 of the Revised Issue: WON the aforementioned provisions apply to the Central Bank so as to render void the contract entered into by CB and Ablaza. No. Is Central Bank part of National government? No. Ruling: It is of the courts view that contracts entered into by petitioner Central Bank are not within the contemplation of Sections 607 and 608. Immediately to be noted, Section 607 specifically refers to "expenditure(s) of the National Government" and that the term "National Government" may not be deemed to include the Central Bank. Under the Administrative Code itself, the term "National Government" refers only to the central government, consisting of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the government, as distinguished from local governments and other governmental entities and is not synonymous, therefore, with the terms "The Government of the Republic of the Philippines" or "Philippine Government", which are the expressions broad enough to include not only the central government but also the provincial and municipal governments, chartered cities and other governmentcontrolled corporations or agencies, like the Central Bank. To be sure the Central Bank is a government

Administrative Code which provides that: Section 607. Certificate showing appropriation to meet contract. Except in the case of a contract for personal service or for supplies to be carried in stock, no contract involving an expenditure by the National Government of three thousand pesos or more shall be entered into or authorized until the Auditor General shall have certified to the officer entering into such obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract is available for expenditure on account thereof. xxx CB contends that in view of such omission and considering the provisions of Section 608 of the same code to the effect that "a purported contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the next preceding section hereof shall be

instrumentality. But it was created as an autonomous body corporate to be governed by the provisions of its charter, Republic Act 265, "to administer the monetary and banking system of the Republic."As such, it may acquire and hold such assets and incur such liabilities as result directly from


operations authorized by the provisions of this Act, or as are essential to the proper conduct of such operations." It has capital of its own and operates under a budget prepared by its own Monetary Board and otherwise appropriates money for its operations and other expenditures independently of the national budget. It does not depend on the National Government for the financing of its operations; it is the National Government that occasionally resorts to it for needed budgetary accommodations. Its prerogative to incur such liabilities and expenditures is not subject to any prerequisite found in any statute or regulation not expressly applicable to it. For these reasons, the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code invoked by the Bank do not apply to it. #2 Bacani vs. NACOCO By: Mae Bungabong Facts: Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers

Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. NACOCO set up set up as a defense that it is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court but Bacani and Matoto argued that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether the National Coconut Corporation may be considered as included in the term Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided for in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Held: No, it is not. Reason: GOCCs do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation like NACOCO. National Coconut Corporation was organized with the purpose of adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the Unit ed States and of providing Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned. It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court has aptly said, The mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a

assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of the case Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the

stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Bacani and Matoto complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. Upon inspecting the books of NACOCO, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts paid. the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that the National


public corporation (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586-587). #4 Republic of the Philippines vs. Rambuyong By: Mae Bungabong Facts: Alfred Chu filed a case for collection of a sum of money and/ or damages against the National Power Corporation which was raffled to the RTC of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay Branch 24. Appearing for Chu is Atty. Richard Rambuyong who was the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition of Atty. Rambuyong arguing that under Sec. 90(b) RA 7160 (LGC), sanggunian members are prohibited to appear as counsel before any court wherein any office, agency or

power and production of electricity from other sources, as well as transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis, to improve the quality of life pursuant to the State policy embodied in Section 9, Article 2 of 1987 Constitution. With this, the LGC prohibits a sanggunian member (Atty. Rambuyong) to appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC. #5 Maceda vs. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 By: Mides Cerbo FACTS: The National Power Corporation was created by CA 120. In 1949, it was given tax exemption by RA 358. NPC was further strengthened by RA 6395 in 1971. In 1984, PD 1931 was passed removing the tax exemption of NPC and other GOCCs. There was a reservation, however, that the president or the Minister of Finance upon recommendation by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board may restore or modify the exemption. In 1985, the tax exemption was revived. It was again removed in 1987 by virtue of EO 93 w/c again provided

instrumentality of the government is the adverse party. NPC argued that being a GOCC, it is embraced within the term instrumentality. The RTC favoured Rambuyong. The CA upheld the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition Issue: Whether NPC is an instrumentality of government such Atty. Rambuyong, as a sanggunian member, should not appear as counsel against it. Held: Yes, NPC is government instrumentality thus, Atty. Rambuyong should not appear as counsel against it. Reason: Based on jurisprudence, Maceda vs Macaraig, Jr., 1997 197 SCRA 771 (1991), the Court stated that NPC is a government instrumentality with the enormous task of undertaking development of hydroelectric generation of

that upon FIRB recommendation it can again be restored. In the same year, FIRB resolved to restore the exemption. The same was approved by Cory through exec sec Macaraig acting as her alter ego. Maceda opined the FIRB resolution averring that the power granted to the FIRB is an undue delegation of legislative power. His claim was strengthened by Opinion 77 issued by DOJ Secretary Ordoez. ISSUE: Whether or not Opinion 77 can be given credence. HELD: The SC ruled that there is no undue delegation of legislative power. First of all, since the NPC is a GOCC and is non-profit it can be exempt from taxation. Also, Opinion 77 issued by DOJ Sec Ordoez was overruled by Macaraig. This action by Macaraig is valid because the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, has the power to modify, alter or reverse the construction of a statute given by a department secretary pursuant to the presidents control power.


DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION #7 & #97 Sagip Kalikasan vs. Paderanga, 6/19/2008 By: Mides Cerbo FACTS: This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge filed by retired Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan, against Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City. On or about 30 January 2005, the Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans

On 1 February 2005, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) OIC Loreto A. Rivac (Rivac) sent a notice to NMC Container Lines, Inc. asking for explanation why the government should not confiscate the forest products.3 In an affidavit4 dated 9 February 2005, NMC Container Lines, Inc.'s Branch Manager Alex Conrad M. Seno stated that he did not see any reason why the government should not confiscate the forest products and that NMC Container Lines, Inc. had no knowledge of the actual content of the container vans. On 2, 9, and 15 February 2005, DENR Forest Protection Officer Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted notices on the CENRO and PENRO bulletin boards and at the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown owner about the administrative adjudication scheduled on 18 February 2005 at the Cebu City CENRO. Nobody appeared during the adjudication.5 In a resolution6 dated 10 March 2005, Rivac, acting as adjudication officer, recommended to DENR Regional Executive Director Clarence L. Baguilat that the forest products be confiscated in favor of the government. In a complaint7 dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses. HELD: Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law as a serious offense. It is punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.38 Section 10 of Rule 140 classifies conduct unbecoming a judge as a light offense. It is punishable by (1)

containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).1 On 30 and 31 January 2005, a team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG, DENR, and the Philippine Coast Guard inspected the container vans at a port in Mandaue City, Cebu. The team discovered the undocumented forest products and the names of the shippers and consignees. The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and other pertinent transport documents covering the forest products, as required by DENR Administrative Order No. 07-94. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time, the DENR considered them as abandoned and, on 31 January 2005, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Richard N. Abella, issued a seizure receipt to NMC Container Lines, Inc.2


a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; or (4) admonition with warning.39 The Court notes that this is Judge Paderanga's third offense. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga,40the Court held him liable for grave abuse of authority and simple misconduct for unceremoniously citing a lawyer in contempt while declaring himself as having "absolute power" and for repeatedly telling a lawyer to "shut up." InBeltran, Jr. v. Paderanga,41 the Court held him liable for undue delay in rendering an order for the delay of nine months in resolving an amended formal offer of exhibits. In both cases, the Court sternly warned Judge Paderanga that the commission of another offense shall be dealt with more severely. The instant case and the two cases decided against him demonstrate Judge Paderanga's arrogance,

making it impossible for him to take the nursing board examinations, and depriving him of the opportunity to make a living. The respondent prayed that the RTC order UST to release his ToR and hold UST liable for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. Instead of filing an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that they refused to release respondent's ToR because he was not a registered student, since he had not been enrolled in the university for the last three semesters. Petitioners also filed a Supplement to their Motion Dismiss, alleging that respondent sought

administrative recourse before the CHED through a lettercomplaint. Thus, petitioners claimed that CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of the instant case in the RTC was premature. Issues: 1) WON The CHED exercises quasi-judicial power over controversies involving school matters and has primary jurisdiction over respondent's demand for the release of his ToR.

incorrigibility, and unfitness to become a judge. Judge Paderanga has two other administrative cases pending against him one42 for gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and grave abuse of authority, and the other43 for gross misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law . #10 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS vs. DANES B. SANCHEZ, G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010 By: Madel Cervantes Facts: This case began with a Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Sanchez against the UST and its Board of Directors, the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University Registrar for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondent's ToR. In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he graduated from UST in 2002 with a Bachelor's Degree of Science in Nursing. When respondent sought to secure a copy of his ToR with the UST Registrar's Office, UST refused to release his records despite repeated attempts secure the same


2.) WON respondent violated the rule against forumshopping when he sought recourse with both the CHED and the RTC. Held: 1.) No. The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Thus, an essential requisite for this doctrine to apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However, petitioners have not shown that the CHED possesses any such power to "investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions." Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 otherwise known as the Higher Education Act of 1994,



certainly does not contain any express grant to the CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power. 2.) No. Respondent is not guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Here, there can be no forum shopping precisely because the CHED is without quasi-judicial power, and cannot make any disposition of the case - whether favorable or otherwise. HLURB (PD 957/PD 1344) #11 C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. HON. ROMEO J. HIBIONADA, G.R. NO. 80916, NOVEMBER 9, 1990 By: Bianca Cezar Facts: The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments having been completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for specific performance and damages in the RTC. It was then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The trial court however, denied the motion to dismiss and upheld the jurisdiction of the regular courts over the said case. Issue: Who has jurisdiction over the case. The HLURB. Ruling:

P.D. No. 1344 specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority as follows: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. Subsequently, under E.O. No. 648, the regulatory functions conferred on the NHA were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which was later on renamed as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. It is clear from Section 1(c) of the above quoted PD No. 1344 that the complaint for specific performance with damages filed by Diongon with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental comes under the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Diongon is a buyer of a subdivision lot seeking specific performance of the seller's obligation to deliver to him the corresponding certificate of title. In the Solid Homes case, for example, the Court affirmed the competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to award damages. It was held that: Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative jurisdiction, agencies is well recognized need for in our


because the


competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized


character and because of companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. xxx xxx xxx In sum, the complaint for specific performance and damages was improperly filed with the respondent court, jurisdiction over the case being exclusively vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. #12 & 28 HLC CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION petitioners, vs. AND EMILY HENRY HOMES LOPEZ CHUA,

The HLURB[8] is the government agency empowered to regulate the real estate trade and business, having exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: (a) (b) unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refunds and any other

claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; (c) and cases involving specific performance of

contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.[9] In this case, respondents complaint was for the


HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (EHSHA) [G.R. No. 139360. September 23, 2003] By: Bianca Cezar Facts: Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association

reimbursement of expenses incurred in repairing their defective housing units constructed by petitioners. Clearly, the HLURB had jurisdiction to hear it. b. #28 FORUM SHOPPING The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient.[4] However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective - It does not thereby prohibit substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.[6] Respondents EHSHA filed the complaint against petitioners as a group, represented by their homeowners association president Mr. Samaon M. Buat. Respondents raised one cause of action which was the breach of contractual obligations and payment of damages. They

(EHSHA) and 150 individual members filed a civil action for breach of contract, damages and attorneys fees with the Regional Trial Court against the developers of Emily Homes Subdivision for allegedly using substandard materials in the construction of their houses and for not adhering to the house plan specifications. When respondents asked the

HLC to repair their defective housing units, the petitioners failed to do so. Issue: Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, claiming that: a. It was the HLURB and not the trial court which had jurisdiction over the case. YES. b. The defective certification on non-forum shopping which was signed only by the president of EHSHA and not by all its members warrants the dismissal of the complaint. NO. Ruling: a. #12 DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

shared a common interest in the subject matter of the case, being the aggrieved residents of the poorly constructed and developed Emily Homes Subdivision. Due to the collective nature of the case, there was no doubt that Mr. Samaon M.



Buat could validly sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of all his co-plaintiffs. In cases therefore where it is highly impractical to require all the plaintiffs to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping, it is sufficient, in order not to defeat the ends of justice, for one of plaintiffs, acting as representative, to sign the certificate provided that, as in Cavile et al., the plaintiffs share a common interest in the subject matter of the case or filed the case as a collective, raising only one common cause of action or defense.

The petitioners allege that the private respondents did not construct and failed to deliver the contracted condominium unit to them and did not register the Contract to Sell with the Register of Deeds.

However, the complaint was dismissed because it was held that it is the HLURB that has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices.

Issue: Finally, though there was no forum shopping in this case, the trial court should have nonetheless dismissed the complaint for a more important reason it had no jurisdiction over it. It is the HLURB, not the trial court, which had jurisdiction over respondents complaint. ____________________________________________________ #13 and 133 SPS. CHUA VS. HON. JACINTO G. ANG, G.R. NO. 156164, SEPTEMBER 4, 2009 By: Bianca Cezar Facts: Sps. Chua as buyers and Fil-Estate Properties (FEPI) as developers, executed a contract to sell a condominium unit. Despite the lapse of 3 years, FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted condominium unit to the petitioners. As a result, the petitioners filed a Complaint accusing the private respondents of violating P.D. No. 957. Section 39 of which provides: Sec. 39. Penalties. - Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Decree and/or any rule or regulation that may be issued pursuant to this Decree shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years:xxx A. Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. P.D. No. 1344 clearly provides the scope of jurisdiction of the HLURB. Its jurisdiction is limited to cases which involve: #13 HLURB Topic Ruling: WON the jurisdiction to entertain criminal complaints in relation to real estate business and practices is still lodged with the HLURB. No. The Jurisdiction of the HLURB is limited to decisions over contractual rights and obligations of the parties and does not include jurisdiction over criminal complaints.



From the foregoing, the HLURBs jurisdiction over contractual rights and obligations of parties under subdivision and condominium contracts is clear. But hand in hand with this definition and grant of authority is the provision on criminal penalties for violations of the Decree, provided under the Decrees Section 39. Significantly, nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests the HLURB with jurisdiction penalties. to impose the Section 39 criminal

of the "Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement" (STOA), authorizing it, as the investor, to apply for and if warranted, to be granted an interim adjustment of toll rates in the event of a "significant currency devaluation." On November 2001, the TRB issued the questioned Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway, effective January 1, 2002. Petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo Zialcita assailed the

#133 Three-Fold Responsibility The fundamental principle is that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions, subject only to the rules on forum shopping. But when the law clearly provides that an administrative finding of violation must first be obtained before recourse can be made to criminal prosecution, such law must be complied with. E.g. the law in the prosecution of unfair labor practices, where no criminal prosecution for Unfair Labor Practice can be instituted without a final judgment in a previous administrative proceeding. Where the law is silent (e.g. PD 957), the fundamental principle fully applies.

validity and legality of TRB Resolution No. 2001-89 before the RTC. Padua alleged among others that the Resolution No. 2001-89 : 1. Was issued without the required publication and in

violation of due process; 2. It was issued without basis considering that while it

was signed by three (3) of the five members of the TRB, none of them actually attended the hearing. Zialcita on the other hand asserts that: 1. The provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant

and that the TRB violated its own Charter, Presidential TOLL REGULATORY BOARD (PD 1112) #s 19, 68 and 94 CEFERINO PADUA vs. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, G.R. No. 141949, October 14, 2002 By: Bianca Cezar Facts: WON there was a violation of administrative due process The focal point upon which these two consolidated cases converge is whether Resolution No. 2001-89 issued by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) is valid. 1. Tracing back the events that led to the issuance of the said Resolution, it appears that on February 2001 the Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CITRA) filed with the TRB an application for an interim adjustment of the toll rates at the Metro Manila Skyway Project, on the basis of the provisions 2. Though the resolution was signed by the Executive Director and the 4 other directors, none of them really There was no publication; (#68 Requirement of Administrative Due Process) and that when the TRB issued its resolution approving the increase in Toll rates because Issues: WON the remedies initiated by the petitioners in the RTC are proper. NO. (#19 Toll Regulatory Board) Decree No. 1112,[17] when it promulgated Resolution No. 2001-89 without the benefit of any public hearing.



attended the hearings. (#94 Cardinal Primary Rights in Administrative Proceedings) Ruling: #19 Toll Regulatory Board Remedy of the interested Expressway user who finds the toll rate adjustments to be onerous, oppressive and exorbitant is to file a petition for review of the adjusted toll rates with TRB. The issue

court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, is indispensable. Between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former."[24] In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[25] it was ruled: "x x x, if the case is such that its determination requires the

involves question of facts xxx. TRB decision is appealable within 10 days to the Office of President. The remedy of prohibition initiated by petitioner Zialcita violates the twin doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. P.D. No. 1112 explicitly provides that "the decisions of the TRB on petitions for the increase of toll rate shall be appealable to the Office of the President within ten (10) days from the promulgation thereof." Section 9(3) of P.D. No. 1894 reiterates this instruction. and so are the provisions in the TRB Rules of Procedure. Obviously, the laws and the TRB Rules of Procedure have provided the remedies of an interested Expressways user. The initial proper recourse is to file a petition for review of the adjusted toll rates with the TRB. The need for a prior resort to this body is with reason. The TRB, as the agency assigned to supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities, has the necessary expertise, training and skills to judiciously decide matters of this kind. As may be gleaned from the petition, the main thrust of petitioner Zialcitas argument is that the provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant, oppressive, onerous and unconscionable. This is obviously a question of fact requiring knowledge of the formula used and the factors considered in determining the assailed rates. Definitely, this task is within the province of the TRB. We take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and

expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court." #68 Requirement of Administrative Due ProcessApproval in a TRB resoluntion of provisional toll rates of public utilities without publication and by TRB Directors who did not attend personally the hearing. Even granting that petitioners recourse to the instant remedies is in order, the Court cannot still rule in their favor. For one, it is not true that the provisionaI toll rate adjustments were not published prior to its implementation. Records show that in fact they were published on 3 separate dates in three newspapers of general circulation. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that even if there was no publication, the said resolution would still be valid because under Letter of Instruction No. 1334-A, the TRB may grant and issue ex-parte to any petitioner, without need of notice, publication or hearing, provisional authority to collect, pending hearing and decision on the merits of the petition, the increase in rates prayed for or such lesser amount as the TRB may in its discretion provisionally grant. That LOI No. 1334-A has the force and effect of law finds

exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this era of clogged











consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate." Thus, it is logical to say that this mandate was rendered precisely to ensure that in cases where the hearing or reception of evidence is assigned to a subordinate, the body or agency shall not merely rely on his recommendation but instead shall personally weigh and assess the evidence which the said subordinate has gathered." Be that as it may, it must be stressed that the TRBs authority to grant provisional toll rate adjustments does not even require the conduct of a hearing. To clarify the intent of P.D. No. 1112 as to the extent of the

proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former President (Ferdinand E. Marcos) are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent

proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President." The issue that the resolution was signed by TRB directors who did not personally attend the hearing is discussed in the next topic.

#94 Cardinal Primary Rights in Administrative Proceedings There is nothing irregular that the TRB Resolution No. 200189 authorizing provisional toll rate adjustment at Metro Manila Skyway effective 01.01.02 was signed by the TRB Exec. Director & Four Directors, none of whom personally attended the hearing For another, Petitioner Padua would argue that while these Directors signed the Resolution, none of them personally attended the hearing. This argument is misplaced. Under our jurisprudence, an administrative agency may employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to receive evidence, conduct hearing and make reports, on the basis of which the agency shall render its decision. Such a procedure is a practical necessity.[32] Thus, in Mollaneda vs. Umacob,[33] it was ruled: xxx "It must be emphasized that the appointment of competent officers to hear and receive evidence is commonly resorted to by administrative bodies or agencies in the interest of an orderly and efficient disposition of administrative cases. x x x

TRBs power,[35] Former President Marcos further issued LOI No. 1334-A expressly allowing the TRB to grant ex-parte provisional or temporary increase in toll rates. Hence, it is clear that a hearing is not necessary for the grant of provisional toll rate adjustment. The practice is not something peculiar. It was ruled in a number of cases that an administrative agency may be empowered to approve provisionally, when demanded by urgent public need, rates of public utilities without a hearing. The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final hearing. Accordingly, Padua and Zialcitas respective remedies were dismissed. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER #25 and #84 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS , G.R. No. 134625, August 31, 1999 By: Bianca Cezar

"x x x Corollarily, in a catena of cases, this Court laid down the cardinal requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, one of which is that "the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent Facts: Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the



University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP). After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, she worked on her dissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the

On the basis of such report, a letter was sent to Celine informing her of the withdrawal of her Ph.D degree. Celine then raised the matter to the Trial Court which dismissed the same. Upon appeal however, the CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court on the basis that Celine was denied due process. Hence this petition. Issue: a. WON Celine was denied of Due Process. No. (#84

Philippines." However, after going over her dissertation, the assistant Dean informed the CSSP Dean Paz that there were portions in Celines dissertation that was lifted from various published works without proper acknowledgment.

Due Process in Administrative Proceedings) b. WON the UP Board of Regents has the authority to

Nonetheless, Celine was allowed to defend her dissertation and was able to have a passing mark. Dean Paz in a letter, then requested the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, to exclude Celine from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding the latters dissertation. Apparently, the letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time and Celine was able to graduate. Subsequently, the assistant dean formally charged Celine with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Various ad hoc committees were then formed to investigate the plagiarism charge against Celine. In a letter, Dean Paz informed Celine of the charges against her and in a subsequent letter; Celine was summoned to a meeting and was asked to submit her written explanation to the charges against her. During the meeting, Celine was informed of the charges against her and was provided a copy of the findings of the investigating committee. Celine on the other hand submitted her written explanation in a letter. Subsequently, the investigating committees submitted their report with the same conclusion, - that there was indeed an overwhelming proof of massive lifting and even admission on the part of Ms. Celine that she plagiarized, and so the Committee recommended the withdrawal of the doctoral degree of Ms. Celine.

withdraw the Ph.D already conferred. Yes. (#25 Quasi Judicial Power) Ruling: #84 With regard to the first issue, the court held that it cannot be said that Celine was denied of Due Process. First, from the facts of the case it is clear that various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense and consequently all investigations resulted in a finding that Celine committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.27 A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.28 In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her29 and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she was able to do30 Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she



sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.31 Second., it is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. And Third, Celine cannot contend that she was entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla committee as part of her right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,34 we held: Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. . .

#25 Anent the second issue, the UP Board of Regents has the authority to withdraw the conferment of a degree founded on fraud. Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines.38 It has the power confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council.39 If follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a university's highest

academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity. FORUM SHOPPING #28 HLC CONSTRUCTION vs. EMILY HOMES


In sum: (Please See Case #12 under HLURB Topic) 1. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due #29 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO vs. ATTY. GIL A. VALERA and COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 164250, September 30, 2005 By: Bianca Cezar Nature: Petition for review on certiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman and Villa Ignacio, in his capacity as the special prosecutor, seeking the reversal of the CA decision setting aside the Preventive suspension order issued by VillaIgnacio against respondent Atty. Gil A. Valera. process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of; 2. Due process in an administrative context does not

require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice; and 3. Due Process in disciplinary cases involving students

need not necessarily include the right to cross examination.



Facts: Respondent Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs in charge of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group. The office of Ombudsman received a Sowrn complaint filed by the Director of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) and Atty. Adolfo Casareo against respondent Valera for entering into a compromise agreement with Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. in Civil Case No. 01-102504 to the prejudice of the government. Petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio the Issued a Preventive suspension order against Atty. Valera, VillaIgnacio likewise denied Valeras motion for reconsideration. Even before his motion for reconsideration was acted upon, however, respondent Valera already filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition as he sought to nullify the Order of preventive suspension issued by petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio. The appellate court then rendered the assailed Decision setting aside the Order of preventive suspension and directing petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to desist from taking any further action. Hence this petition. Issue: PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PETITION FILED BEFORE THE COURT A QUO SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON FORUM SHOPPING or WON there was Forum Shopping in this case. YES. Ruling: Respondent Valeras alleged non-compliance with the rule on non-forum shopping when he filed the petition for certiorari with the appellate court, the appellate court correctly overlooked this procedural lapse. In this case, it was ruled that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio had no authority to issue a preventive suspension order. Hence, the appellate courts decision in relaxing the rule

requiring the certification on non-forum shopping is justified. #30 EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR vs. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 149335, July 1, 2003 By: Bianca Cezar Facts: On July 15, 1995, private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN addressed to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco an unverified letter-complaint, accusing petitioner Edillo Montemayor, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. Accordingly, the letter-complaint and its attached

documents were indorsed by the Philippine Consulate General of San Francisco, California, to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC)1 for investigation. Petitioner pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman which was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The PCAGC after conducting its own investigation found that the complaint has basis and the Office of the president in turn concurred with the PCAGC finding and ordered petitioners dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits. Issue: Whether or not the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic. NO. Ruling: The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative



powers.15 Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner was

forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise. Facts: Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and Code of professional Resposibility for knowingly subverting and perverting the truth when he falsify certified (sic) and

administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar. Hence, the petitioners dismissal was just proper after it was established that he acquired properties whose value is disproportionate to his income in the government service. #31 JESUS CABARRUS, JR. vs. JOSE ANTONIO BERNAS, [A.C. No. 4634, September 24, 1997] By: Bianca Cezar QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS The function of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an investigative agency whose findings are It undertakes investigation of

verified under oath in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, that: He has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other Tribunal or agency. Where verification-certification was already

placed under oath and was conveniently notarized in both cases at the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI Issue: The core issue to be resolved here is whether respondent Atty. Bernas transgressed Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91, and administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping. Ruling: There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. Therefore, a party to a case resort to forum shopping because by filling another petition involving the same essential facts and circumstances, xxx, respondents approached two different for a in order to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, [4] In this case, there is no forum shopping to speak of Atty. Bernas, merely requested the assistance of the NBI to investigate the the alleged fraud and forgery committed by Mr. Jesus Cabarrus.[5] The filing of the civil case for conveyance and damages before the

merely recommendatory.

crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may require. It renders assistance when requested in the

investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those person responsible for defrauding his client. The courts, tribunal and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and those who not only hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, but to make binding orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those



Regional Trial Court of Pasig City does not preclude respondent to institute a criminal action. The rule allows the filing of a civil case independently with the criminal case without violating the circulars on forum shopping. #32 TOMAS G. VELASQUEZ vs. HELEN B. HERNANDEZ, [G.R. No. 150732., August 31, 2004] CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. HELEN B. HERNANDEZ, [G.R. No. 151095. August 31, 2004] By: Bianca Cezar Facts: Petitioner Tomas G. Velasquez received a letter informing him of the alleged infractions committed by respondent, Helen B. Hernandez, such as soliciting, accepting, and receiving sums of money, in exchange for transfer or promotion of complainant teachers. Acting on the letter, petitioner Velasquez convened a fact-finding committee to determine the veracity of the alleged violations of respondent and to render a formal report and

the withdrawal of Informations for direct bribery filed against respondent and de la Cruz. After due proceedings, the CSC issued a Resolution finding respondent guilty of the charges against her and ordering her dismissal from the service. The appellate court however reversed the decision of the CSC saying that though the cause of action in the CSC and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman are distinct; nevertheless, it said that in order to obviate the risk of violating the rule, petitioners should have attached the certification against non-forum shopping. Issue: WON the formal charge filed in the CSC should contain a certificate against Forum Shopping? No. Ruling: Forum shopping consists of filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.[5] It may also consist in a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari.[6] The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs. A party, however, cannot be said to have sought to improve his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action where no unfavorable decision has ever been rendered against him in any of the cases he has brought before the courts.[7] In not a few cases, this Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping as where the elements of litis pendentia are

recommendation. The committee after due investigation recommended the filing of administrative and criminal complaints against respondent. A formal charge for Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Abuse of Authority, and Violation of Section 22 (k) Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 and other related laws was filed against respondent. Meanwhile, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra issued a Resolution entitled, People of the Philippines v. Helen Hernandez, This Resolution, arose from the sworn complaints filed by the complaining teachers, indicting respondent and a certain Luzviminda de la Cruz for violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Respondent and dela Cruz were charged with direct bribery. However, upon motion filed by respondent and her co-accused, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman ordered



present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.[8] Stated differently, there must be between the two cases (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) that the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.[9] It is significant to note that the action filed before the CSCCAR is administrative in nature, dealing as it does with the proper administrative liability, if any, which may have been incurred by respondent for the commission of the acts complained of. In stark contrast, the case filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, which incidentally was not initiated by herein petitioners but by the complainant teachers, deals with the criminal

Negros Occidental received a similar complaint5 against Rodriguez. Now Rodriguez alleges that complainants violated the rule against forum shopping. Notwithstanding, the Ombudsman found Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty and oppression. The Court of Appeals however set aside for lack of jurisdiction the Decision of the Ombudsman and directed the sangguniang bayan to proceed with the hearing on the administrative case. The appellate court reasoned that the sangguniang bayan had acquired primary jurisdiction over the person of Rodriguez to the exclusion of the Ombudsman. Issues: Whether complainants violated the rule against forum shopping when they filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against Rodriguez. NO. Ruling: The facts in the present case are analogous to those in Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman,29 which likewise involved identical administrative complaints filed in both the Ombudsman and the sangguniang panlungsod against apunong barangay for grave misconduct. The Court held therein that the rule against forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases.30 Thus, even if complainants filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against private respondent, they did not violate the rule against forum shopping because their complaint was in the nature of an administrative case.1avvphi1 In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion

accountability of the respondent for violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Unmistakably, the rule on forum shopping would find no proper application since the two cases although based on the same essential facts and circumstances do not raise identical causes of action and issues.[10] It would, therefore, be absurd to require the certification of forum shopping to be attached to the formal charge filed before the CSC, for the evil sought to be curbed by the proscription against forum shopping is simply not extant in the instant case. #33 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ROLSON RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010 By: Bianca Cezar Facts: On August 2003, the Ombudsman in Visayas received a complaint4 for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty against Rolson Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Negros Occidental. On September 2003, the sangguniang bayan of



of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.31 In this case, since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent jurisdiction. It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.32 When herein complainants first filed the complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to

Retirement Law), the law amending CA 186(the GSIS Charter). Issue: WON COA abused its discretion when it disallowed in audit petitioners claims for benefits under SSS Res. 56? No. Ruling: It is clear from the clauses and provisions of Resolution 56 that its financial assistance plan constitutes a supplemental retirement/pension benefits plan and Sec. 28 (b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan -- other than the GSIS -- for government officers and employees. Though it may be disputed that Res 56 was promulgated for laudable purposes, it simply cannot be tolerated for such reason alone as the said Resolution clearly contravenes the

thesangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants.

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER #43 AVELINA B. CONTE and LETICIA BOISER-PALMA, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), [G.R. No. 116422, November 4, 1996] By: June Ylanan Facts: Petitioners Avelina Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former employees of the Social Security System (SSS) who retired from government service. They availed of

provision of law and is therefore invalid, void and of no effect. SSS had no authority to maintain and implement such retirement plan, particularly in the face of the statutory prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render them nugatory. It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.[15] A rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid.[16] The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.

compulsory retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 660. In addition to retirement benefits provided under R.A. 660, petitioners also claimed SSS financial assistance benefits granted under SSS Resolution No. 56, series of 1971. Their applications were however denied because of respondent COAs 1989 ruling disallowing all claims for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56 for the reason that the scheme of financial assistance authorized by the SSS constituted additional retirement benefits, and the scheme partook of the nature of a supplementary pension/retirement plan proscribed by RA 4968 (The Teves



Due to the invalidity of Res. 56, it cannot be said that respondent COA abused its discretion. #44 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), G.R. No. 162372, October 19, 2011 By: June Ylanan LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Facts: On May 30, 1997, Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as "The Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997" (the GSIS Act) was enacted and approved. Pursuant to the powers granted to it under Section 41(n) of R.A. No. 8291 or the GSIS Act of 1997, the GSIS Board of Trustees, approved Board Resolution No. 326 wherein they adopted the GSIS Employees Loyalty Incentive Plan (ELIP). The same Board Resolution was later amended by Board Resolution No. 360. Dimagiba, the corporate auditor of GSIS, communicated to the President and General Manager of GSIS that the GSIS RFP was contrary to law. However, the GSIS Legal Services Group opined that the GSIS Board was legally authorized to adopt the plan. Believing that the GSIS RFP was "morally indefensible," Dimagiba sought the assistance of COA. In response, COAs General Counsel Alquizalas issued a Memorandum to COA Commissioner Flores regarding the GSIS RFP. Alquizalas opined that the GSIS RFP is a supplementary retirement plan, which is prohibited under Republic Act No. 4968, or the "Teves Retirement Law," thus null and void for being violative of the said law; and Section 41(n) of Republic Act No. 8291, which speaks of an early retirement plan or financial assistance. In response, Commissioner Flores issued a Memorandum which contains a disallowance in audit the portion of

retirement benefits granted under the GSIS RFP, or the excess of the benefits due the retirees. Issue: WON the GSIS Retirement Financial Plan is valid, in light of the GSIS Act of 1997, and the Government Service Insurance Act as amended by the Teves Retirement Law. The GSIS Retirement/Financial Plan is Null and Void Ruling: Section 41 (n) of R.A. 8291 provides that the GSIS shall exercise the power to design and adopt an Early Retirement Incentive Plan (ERIP) and/or financial assistance for the purpose of retirement for its own personnel It is clear from the foregoing that Section 41(n) of Republic Act No. 8291 contemplates a situation wherein 1. GSIS, due to reorganization, streamlining of its organization, or some other circumstance, which calls for the termination of some of its employees, 2. must design a plan to encourage, induce, or motivate these employees, 3. who are not yet qualified for either optional or compulsory retirement under our laws, 4. to instead voluntarily retire. This is the very reason why under the law, the retirement plan and financial assistance scheme to be adopted is in reality an incentive scheme to encourage the employees to retire before their retirement age. Such is not the case with the GSIS RFP. Its very objective, "[t]o motivate and reward employees for meritorious, faithful, and satisfactory service," which falls exactly within the purpose of a retirement benefit, which is a form of reward for an employees loyalty and lengthy service, in order to help him or her enjoy the remaining years of his life.



Furthermore, to be able to apply for the GSIS RFP, one must be qualified to retire under Republic Act No. 660 or Republic Act No. 8291, or must have previously retired under our existing retirement laws. This only means that the employees covered by the GSIS RFP were those who were already eligible to retire or had already retired. Certainly, this is not included in the scope of "an early retirement incentive plan or financial assistance for the purpose of retirement." Without a doubt, the GSIS RFP is a supplementary retirement plan, which is prohibited by the Teves Retirement Law. As the court held in the Conte case: Section 28(b) [of C.A. No. 186] as amended by R.A. No. 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan other than the GSIS for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. The GSIS RFP was not created because of valid company reorganization. Its purpose did not include the granting of benefits for early retirement. Neither did it provide benefits for either voluntary or involuntary separation from GSIS. It was intended for employees who were already eligible to retire under existing retirement laws. While the GSIS may have been clothed with authority to adopt an early retirement or financial assistance plan, such authority was limited by the very law it was seeking to implement. Borrowing the words in the Conte case, "it is beyond cavil that [the GSIS Retirement/Financial Plan] contravenes [Section 28(b) of C.A. No. 186 as amended by R.A. No. 4968 or the Teves Retirement Law], and is therefore invalid, void, and of no effect. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other government office or agency to put up its own supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such financial assistance.

Another compelling reason to nullify the GSIS RFP is that it allows, and in fact mandates, the inclusion of the years in government service of previously retired employees. To credit the years of service of GSIS retirees in their previous government office into the computation of their retirement benefits under the GSIS RFP, notwithstanding the fact that they had received or had been receiving the retirement benefits under the applicable retirement law they retired in, would be to countenance double

compensation for exactly the same services. Board Resolution Nos. 326, 360, and 6 are thus declared ILLEGAL, VOID, and OF NO EFFECT.

Retirement Benefit vs. Early Retirement Incentive Plan and Financial Assistance under R.A. 8291 The purpose of a retirement benefit is to reward an employees loyalty and lengthy sevice, in order to help him enjoy the remaining years of his life. While the latters

purpose is to encourage the employees to retire before their retirement age. #45 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008 By: June Ylanan DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Facts: On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information.



Consequently, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, when it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC pronounced that some of the officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised Securities Act. The respondents in turn filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which promulgated a Decision in favor of the IRC. It determined that there was no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the IRC allegedly violated. The CA likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for the SEC to initiate and file any suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Thus, it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative proceedings may possibly be held against the respondents without violating their rights to due process and equal protection. Issue: WON the SEC has no statutory authority to initiate and file any suit against IRC and its directors with respect to Section 30 (INSIDER'S DUTY TO DISCOLSED [sic] WHEN TRADING) and Section 36 (DIRECTORS OFFICERS AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS) of the Revised Securities Act. The SEC has authority. Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act do not require the enactment of implementing rules to make them binding and effective. Ruling: The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any implementing rules for Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had against the respondents without violating their right to due process and equal protection. This is untenable. In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may concern Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised

Securities Act, this Court upholds these provisions as legal and binding. It is well settled that every law has in its favor the presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes. The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable

construction that will support the law may be given. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted. The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and regulations is based on the impracticability of lawmakers' providing general regulations for various and varying details of management. To rule that the absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know. It is well established that administrative authorities have the power to

promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into effect its



general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative or deviate from the mandate of the statute. Moreover, where the statute contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no impediment to its implementation. #46 KILUSANG MAYO UNO et. al. vs. THE DIRECTORGENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006 By: June Ylanan Facts: This case involves two consolidated petitions seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 420 requiring all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to streamline and harmonize their identification systems to ensure the attainment of the following objectives: a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden xxx b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing of government services; xxx d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of governmentissued ID cards; and e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service. Issues: WON EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President. No.

Ruling: There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary. The same is true for government entities under the Executive department. If government entities under the Executive department decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of any legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative power. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall have control of all executive

departments, bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation. Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government. The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under



EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and userfriendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation. What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed. In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all

citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420. #47 REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE

PHILIPPINES vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI, G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009 By: June Ylanan DECISION CARPIO, J.: Facts: This case is a result of the leakage in the June 2006 Nursing Board Examination which prompted then President GMA to issue EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. In response thereto, then CHED Chairman Carlito Puno approved the IRR of the said EO 566. Then CHED chairman further advanced that While it may be true that regulation of review centers is not one of the mandates of CHED under Republic Act 7722, however, by virtue of EO 566 issued by the president, the CHED now is the agency that is mandated to regulate the establishment and operation of all review centers. Thus this case. Issue: Whether or not EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction. Yes. Whether or not the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power. Yes.



Ruling: The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them, and this power is vested with the Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them, and this power was vested in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. The president also exercises administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.

enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi legislative power. Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs. Hence, Executive Order No. 566 and its IRR was declared VOID for being unconstitutional. POWER TO ISSUE SUBPOENA #51 Ev a n g e l i s t a v s J a r e n c i o, 6 8 S C R A 9 9 By: Llana Masiga FACTS: Pu r s u a n t t o h i s s p e c i a l p o w e r s a n d d u t

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the

i e s u n d e r S e c t i o n 6 4 o f t h e R ev i s e d A d ministrative Code, 1 the President of t he Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Op erations (PARGO) under Executive O rd er No. 4 of January 7, 1966, charging it with the responsibility of investigatin g cases of graft and corruption. For a realistic performance of these f unctions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigati ng committee under Secti ons 71 and 58 0 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnes

administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. In this case however, EO 566 is not supported by any enabling law. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress



ses by subpoena or subpoena duces tec um, administer oaths, take testimony o r evidence relevant to the investigatio n.

stigations are useful for all administra tive functions, not only for rule makin g, adjudication, and licensing, but als o for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general poli cy, for recommending, legislation, and

On June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Ev angelista, as Undersecretary of the Ag ency, issued to respondent Fernando M analastas, then Acting City Public Serv ice Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad te stificandum commanding him "to be an d appear as witness at the Office of th e PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... th en and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therei n. Instead of obeying the subpoena, resp ondent Fernando Manalastas filed on J une 25, 1968 with the Court an Amende d Petition for prohibition, certiorari a nd/or injunction with preliminary inju nction and/or restraining order and as sailed its legality.

for purposes no more specific than illu minating obscure areas to find out wha t if anything should be done. An admin istrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proce edings of a legislative or judicial natu re, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may r equire the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiri es into evils calling for correction, an d to report findings to appropriate bo dies and make recommendations for ac tions.

Petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, par ISSUE: Whether or not PARGO enjoys t he authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact finding investigations a. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, e mpowered it to "summon witness, admi nister oaths, and take testimony relev ant to the investigation" with the auth ority "to require the production of doc RULING: uments under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the fl ow of fact, the gathering, the organiza tion and the analysis of evidence. Inve the same restrictions and qualification s as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character."



To hold that the subpoena power of th e agency is confined to mere quasi -jud icial or adjudicatory functions would t herefore imperil or inactivate the agen cy in its investigatory functions. More than that, the enabling authority itsel f (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixe s no distinction when and in what func tion should the subpoena power be exe rcised. Similarly, The court sees no re ason to depart from the established ru le that forbids differentiation when th e law itself makes none.

reluctant if not unable to summon evi dence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not foll ow that an administrative agency char ged with seeing that the laws are enfor ced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition wh ich is not dependent upon a case or co ntroversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion th at the law is being violated or even ju st because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusator y duties are delegated by statute to an

Rightly, administrative agencies may e nforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adju dication is involved, and whether or n ot probable cause is shown and even b efore the issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a wa rr ant, that a specific charge or complain t of violation of law be pending or tha t the order be made pursuant to one. I t is enough that the investigation be f or a lawfully authorized purpose.The p urpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charg e, but upon which to make one if the d iscovered evidence so justifies. Its obl igation cannot rest on a trial of the va lue of testimony sought; it is enough t hat the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to ha ve info rmation that might shed so me h elpful light. Because judicial power is

administrative body, it, too may take s teps to inform itself as to whether the re is probable violation of the law. In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcemen t if the inquiry is (1) within the autho rity of the agency; (2) the demand is n ot too indefinite; and (3) the informat ion is reasonably relevant.

There is no doubt that the fact -findin g investigations being conducted by th e Agency upon sworn statements impli cating cert ain p ublic officials of the C ity Government of Manila in anomalou s transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the infor mation sought to be elicited from resp ondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, is re asonably relevant to the investigation



s. ____________________________________________________ IMPLEMENTING RULES OR INTERPRETATIVE POLICIES #53 TANADA v. TUVERA By: Bembem Sarno FACTS: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of PDs which they claimed have not been published as required by law and a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of theses decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the OG all unpublished PDs which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. ISSUE: WON publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates HELD: YES. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides, Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ... In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material

for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. #55 GSIS vs. COA By: Bembem Sarno FACTS:



In November 1936, Congress enacted Commonwealth Act No. 186, creating the Government Service Insurance System (hereafter GSIS) to provide insurance coverage and retirement benefits to government officials and employees, replacing the existing pension systems established in prior laws. Sec. 4 ofCom. Act No. 186 provided that:

resolution (No. 566) of the GSIS board of trustees adopted on December 11, 1987, which was after the death of Gen. Asuncion. ISSUE: WON the heirs of Asuncion are entitled to receive the GSIS benefits HELD:

Sec. 4. Scope of application of System. Regular membership in the system shall be compulsory upon xxx xxx xxx d) All officers and enlisted men of the Regular Force, Philippine Army; On December 2, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers enacted Executive Order No. 79, Section 1 (c) of which provides: Sec. 1 (c). A reserve officer who has satisfactorily rendered a total of ten (10) years continuous active commissioned military service shall not be reverted to inactive status, except upon his own request or for cause, up to the time he reaches the compulsory retirement of thirty (30) years of service or-fifty six (56) years of age, whichever comes later but not later than sixty (60) years of age. On November 16, 1987, Brig. General Arturo T. Asuncion met his untimely death in a helicopter crash. On December 11, 1987, the board of trustees of the GSIS in resolution No. 566, approved the compulsory insurance coverage of reserve officers of the AFP. The heirs of Asuncion then filed a claim with the GSIS for payment of death benefits due to him as a member of the System and subsequently received the payments. In the course of audit of the account the auditor disallowed in audit the payment of the claim, pointing out that he was not a member of the GSIS at the time of his death on November 15, 1987, in a helicopter crash. According to auditor Gaborne, Executive Order No. 79, dated December 2, 1986, was effective only on its implementation by YES. The aforecited executive order provides for compulsory membership in the GSIS of qualified reserve officers of the AFP like General Asuncion. It was effective at the time of the death of General Asuncion. Hence, it becomes the duty of the auditor to approve and pass in audit the valid claim of his heirs for death benefits. The Commission on Audit's disallowance amounts to a grave abuse of discretion. By the terms of this enactment, qualified reserve officers, meaning, those who have satisfactorily rendered a total of ten (10) years of continuous active duty commissioned service in the AFP shall not be reverted to inactive status except upon their own request, or for cause. Thus, they have the same status as regular commissioned officers of the AFP, who are unquestionably compulsory members of the System. The President issued the executive order on December 2, 1986. It was published in the Official Gazette on December 22, 1986. Thus, E. O. No. 79 is effective fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette, or on January 07, 1987. 4 At that time, the late General Asuncion was a reserve officer who had rendered a total of ten (10) years of continuous active duty service commission in the AFP. Hence, he was compulsorily covered as a member of the GSIS on the date he died on November 15, 1987, in line of duty in a helicopter crash. Consequently, his heirs are entitled to payment of death benefits.



The optional insurance policy referred to, however, is distinct from the compulsory coverage membership in the GSIS. The optional insurance policy was issued on the basis of a voluntary application under existing regulations and lapsed in April, 1984, due to non- payment of premiums. On the other hand, qualified reserve officers were covered by compulsory membership in the GSIS under Executive Order No. 79 effective on January 07, 1987, regardless of whether or not the premiums were paid. Of course, the unpaid premiums, if any, may be deducted from the proceeds of the policy.

10). Paragraph 5.6 of DBM- CCC No. 10 discontinued effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary, not otherwise enumerated under paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 thereof. Affected PITC employees filed an appeal before the COA but the latter denied such appeal. ISSUE: WON DBM-CCC No. 10 is valid and enforceable HELD: NO. DBM-CCC No. 10 which was issued by the DBM





pursuant to Section 23 17 of RA 6758 mandating the said agency to issue the necessary guidelines to implement RA 6758 has been declared by this Court in De Jesus, et al. vs.Commission on Audit, et al. as of no force and effect due to the absence of publication thereof in the Official Gazette

CORPORATION VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT By: Bembem Sarno FACTS: PITC is GOCC created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 252 primarily for the purpose of promoting and developing Philippine trade in pursuance of national economic development. In 1988, the BOD approved a Car Plan Program for qualified PITC officers. Under such car plan program, among others, includes that an eligible officer is entitled to purchase a vehicle, fifty percent (50%) of the value of which shall be shouldered by PITC while the remaining fifty percent (50%) will be shouldered by the officer through salary deduction over a period of five (5) years. In 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), entitled "An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates save for certain additional compensation such as representation and transportation allowances which were exempted from consolidation into the standardized rate. To implement RA 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No.

or in a newspaper of general circulation. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada , publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to

government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of said



circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper or general circulation in the Philippines to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. DBM-CCC No. 10 has been re-issued in its entirety and submitted for publication in the Official Gazette per letter to the National Printing Office dated March 9, 1999. Would the subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time that the above-mentioned items were disallowed in audit? NO. Publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and regulations before the same affects their rights and interests. From the time the COA disallowed the expenses in audit up to the filing of herein petition the subject circular remained in legal limbo due to its nonpublication. As was stated in Tanada vs.Tuvera. "prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with, for the reason that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. #57 Philsa International Placement Corporation vs. The Secretary of Labor By: June Ylanan Facts: Petitioner Philsa International Placement and

Private respondents filed a case before the POEA for

illegal dismissal, payment of salary differentials, illegal deduction/withholding of salaries, illegal exaction/refund of placement fees and contract substitution. It was alleged that they made to sign another contract which reduced some of their benefits and privileges days after they started to work. The employer also subsequently forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work from 48 hours to 60 hours per week without any corresponding increase in their monthly salary and because they refused to sign the third contract the employer terminated their services and repatriated back to the Philippines They sought for Philsa to return their placement fees and for the payment of the unexpired portion of their contract however, Philsa refused. On the aspect of money claims the POEA rendered

a decision in favor of the private respondents. As both elt aggrieved by the said POEA Decision, petitioner and private respondents filed separate appeals from the August 31, 1988 POEA Decision to the NLRC. NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA

Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials. Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC. Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari. Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the

Services Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philsa) is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985,

August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents money claims, the POEA issued a separate Order dated August 29, 1988 resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents complaint. In this Order, the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful deduction. Accordingly, Philsa is ordered to refund the

private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson.

placement fees in the amount of P2,500.00 to Rodrigo L. Mikin, P4,000.00, each, to Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric A.P. Leyson plus restitution of the salaries withheld in the



amount of SR1,000.00 to Vivencio A. de Mesa. Petitioner deposited the check equivalent to the claims of private respondents and paid the corresponding fine under protest. From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently denied Issue: 1. Whether petitioner cannot be held for illegal

POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register. POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00.

exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1983 is void for lack of publication. 2. Whether the administrative circular is not among

those requiring publication as it is addressed only to a specific group of persons and not the general public

It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid

Held: On the first issue. In Taada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows: We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must

delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. On the second issue: The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. Association of Service In the case of Phil. vs. Torres, the


administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented.

also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only

exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions



issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions. #58 and #154 Honasan vs. DOJ Panel (superseded by OMB-DOJ MOA 3/29/12), 4/13/2004 By: Mides Cerbo Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations (persons), Powers of the Ombudsman (consti), concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation (consti) Law Applicable: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code Facts: August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo

that: o

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated

June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo

Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the new government. They had a blood compact and that he only participated due to the threat made by Senator Honasan when he said Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil. o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio

Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who were present during the NRP meeting he attended, having a press conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood compact wound. August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with

Matillano filed an affidavit-complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part: o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by

counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which

military personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan, II o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan in a house located in San Juan, Metro Manila

should be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari

Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala,

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation Issues:

in behalf of the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.



Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95001, the office of the Ombudsman should deputize the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation. Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was not published Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan. Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit 1. No.

conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers and employees. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary

jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation. 2. No. In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640

Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute

(1954). The only circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986),

The Honorable Court rules that: o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in

The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989,

nature, that is regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so called letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in performance of their duties. OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the office of the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.

Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, All recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to




No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive

He contended that their school is located in the rural area where no banks are operating, such that it has been the practice of teachers to authorize the principal to claim, receive and encash the checks in their behalf. He explained that complainants did not receive the entire amount of P312.00 because they authorized the E and E Lending Investors to deduct certain amounts from their checks as payment for their respective loans. As for the Loyalty Benefits, respondent alleged that complainants received the

jurisdiction or not will not resolve the present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel. REQUIREMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS #63 Alcala vs. School Principal Villar By: Mae Bungabong Facts: Respondent Jovencio D. Villar is the School Principal of Lanao National High School, Pilar, Cebu City.

entire amount due them and that he deducted nothing therefrom. He asserted that the real reason behind the filing of the complaint was to force him to resign so that one of the complainants could apply for his post. Perla Alcala et. al., filed with the Office of the





against On June 22, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and dismissing him from service.

respondent for dishonesty.

Complainants alleged that on August 18-22, 1997, they attended a mass training/seminar at the Consolacion National High School, Consolacion, Cebu. Respondent asked them to submit their respective Certificates of Appearance for the preparation of the vouchers for the refund of their expenses during the said training/seminar but all of them were not able to receive the right amount for reimbursement which is P312.00. Furthermore, On appeal, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the latter was without jurisdiction over administrative complaints against public school teachers. It ruled that the governing law is Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and not Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

complainants alleged that sometime in November 1997, Melecio Alcala, Diosdada Borinaga, Helen Lendio, and Rolando Torceno received from respondent P1,500.00 each representing Loyalty Benefits. They learned, however, from the DECS Division Office that they were entitled to receive P2,000.00 each,

Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not Office of the Ombudsman amply

Villar claimed that he was in fact authorized by the complainants to claim and encash their checks at the E and E Lending Investors where most of them have existing loans.

afforded Villar due process in administrative proceedings which set aside the jurisdictional infirmities raised by Villar before the CA.



Held: Yes, it has. Reason: Since respondent was amply afforded due process in an administrative proceeding, the essence of which is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Not only did respondent file a counter-affidavit and a motion for reconsideration, he also participated in the hearings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. Verily, participation in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto amounts to a waiver of jurisdictional infirmities.

dismissing the complaint for lack of substantial evidence but upon review, and with the approval of the Ombudsman, petitioner was found guilty of grave misconduct and meted the penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of material benefits. Petitioner is that he was deprived of his right to administrative due process when he was dismissed from service without substantial evidence and without

consideration of the evidence he proffered. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner is stopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Whether or not petitioner was denied due process in the proceedings before the Ombudsman. RULING: Petitioner is stopped from questioning the Ombudsmans

In the same vein, respondent in this case should be barred under the principle of estoppel by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should have resolved the appeal on its merits, considering that respondents right to procedural due process was properly observed.

jurisdiction. He participated in the proceedings by filing his counter-affidavit and he also did not inform the

Ombudsman that there was another existing administrative case at the time the proceedings in the Ombudsman was on-going. Petitioners participation in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection bars the parties from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them.








OMBUDSMAN By: Leslie R. Respicio FACTS: Evangeline Ursal, a barangay Clerk of Batasan Hills, Quezon City filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint for attempted rape against Laxina, a Barangay Chairman of Brgy. Batasan Hills, Quezon City. Ursal filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and DILG similar complaint-affidavits charging petitioner with grave misconduct for the alleged attempted rape. The Office of the Ombudsman exonerated petitioner from the charge,

Petitioner was accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the formal charge and given a chance to present evidence in his behalf. He was not denied due process. More importantly, the decision of the Ombudsman is well supported by substantial evidence. #65 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. VICTORIO N. MEDRANO By: Leslie R. Respicio FACTS: Dumalaog (Ma. Ruby), a teacher at Jacobo Z. Gonzales Memorial National High School in Bian, Laguna



filed a sworn letter-complaint before the OMB for Luzon charging her superiorherein respondent, Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the school and concurrently the principal of San Pedro Relocation Center National High School in San Pedro, Laguna, with (1) violation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 and (2) grave misconduct. Medrano allegedly made sexual advances on Ma. Ruby and abused her sexually. The OMB found petitioner guilty and imposed the penalty of dismissal. Medrano contends that under the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, his case should be heard by an investigating committee of the DepEd. ISSUE: Whether or not OMB has jurisdiction over Medranos case. RULING: The Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the existence of some "proper disciplinary authorit[ies]," such as the investigating committee of the DepEd mentioned in Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Thus, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the petitioner "may refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of

By: Liz Tuballa Facts: Florita A. Masing and Jocelyn A. Tayactac, the principal and office clerk respectively, of Davao City Integrated Special School were administratively charged before the OMB for Mindanao for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees and to account for public funds. Respondent Masing contended that she may be

administratively dealt with only by following the procedure prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 or the The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers which provides Section 9. Administrative Charges.Administrative

charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School

Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization and a

supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The Committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings; Provided, however, That where the school

appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers or employees." The administrative authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not exclusive but concurrent with the proper committee of DepEd. The administrative complaint against Medrano should have been referred to the proper committee of DepEd for the institution of administrative proceedings. However, Medrano is now barred from assailing the act of the OMB because the OMB had already concluded the proceedings and rendered a decision. He had actively participated in the administrative proceedings before petitioner. Medrano only questioned the jurisdiction of OMB after the latter rendered an adverse decision. #67 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS MASING

superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education. Further, respondents cited the ruling in Fabella v. Court of Appeals to be applicable in their case. In Fabella, the SC ruled that Section 9 of RA 4670 reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with

administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Right to due process of law requires compliance with these requirements laid down by RA 4670. Issue:



Whether or not public school teachers pursuant to the ruling in Fabella v. Court of Appeals can only be proceeded against administratively through the committee under section 9 of RA No. 4670.

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; (3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in accordance with law; (4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary

Ruling: The SC ruled that Fabella, however, does not apply to the cases at bar. The public schoolteachers in Fabella were charged with violations of civil service laws, rules and regulations in administrative proceedings initiated by the DECS Secretary. In the case at bar, respondents Masing and Tayactac were administratively charged in letter-complaints duly filed before the Office of the Ombudsman

ascertainment of facts; (5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or (6) Are otherwise irregular, justification. Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations immoral or devoid of

for Mindanao. The charges were for violations of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, collecting unauthorized fees, failure to remit authorized fees, failure to account for public funds, oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits. In short, the acts and omissions complained of relate to respondents conduct as public official and employee, if not to outright graft and corruption. Further, the SC ruled that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil. As the principal and

involving them. #68 CEFERINO PADUA vs. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, G.R. No. 141949, October 14, 2002 By: Bianca Cezar (Please See Case #19 Under Toll Regulatory Board Topic) #69 DOH vs Camposano By: Liz Tuballa Facts: A complaint was filed before the DOH resident

primary complaints and action center against erring public officers and employees, it is mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution. In conjunction therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints, viz: Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which: (1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

Ombudsman against the respondents arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules. The OMB recommended charge the filing the of a formal for




dishonesty and gave misconduct.



Respondents argue that the PCAGC did not have The Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the respondents and their co-respondents for Grave jurisdiction over them, because they were not presidential appointees. The Court ruled that the investigation was authorized under Administrative Order No. 298 which created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the administrative charges filed and not investigated pursuant to EO 151. The Committee was directed by AO 298 to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 38 to 40 of the Civil Service Law (PD 807), as amended. The SC held that, the Chief Executives power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the President Ramos also found the respondents guilty and recommended the case to the DOH Secretary for appropriate action. The DOH Secretary subsequently ordered the dismissal of the respondents. Issue: Whether or not the PCAGC has jurisdiction to investigate the case. Ruling: The SC held that the PCAGC has jurisdiction to investigate the case. Executive Order (EO) No. 151 granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate administrative complaints against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and corruption. charges EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to investigate presidential, not non-presidential, investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. On the matter of administrative procedure, the SC held that the department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based. In the case at bar, the secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC. Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties. Due process in administrative proceedings requires

Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019 as recommended by the Ombudsman. An ad-hoc committee to investigate the case was created through an Administrative Order issued by then Executive Secretary Torres. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption. After the investigation, the PCAGC it issued a resolution finding the respondents guilty as charged. The resolution further recommended to the President that the penalty of dismissal from the government service be imposed.


compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself;


The EO specifically tasked the PCAGC

investigate presidential appointees charged with graft and corruption. Further, Section 3 of the same EO states that the Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving graft and corruption filed in any form or manner against presidential appointees.



(4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and 7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.

decision could only be considered as a recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Committee and he was not bound thereby. The Sanggunian on October 21, 1994, voting 7 to 2, acquitted respondent Mayor of the charges against him. The vote was embodied in a Decision and signed by all members who had thus voted. Malinao argued that the first Sanggunian decision had already become final and executory for failure of Mayor Red to appeal. Petitioner further complains that no notice of the session by the Sanggunian on October 21, 1994 was given to her. Issue:

#70 Malinao vs Reyes By: Liz Tuballa Facts: Petitioner Virginia Malinao is Human Resource Manager III of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. Respondent Mayor Wilfredo Red filed a case against her in the Office of the Ombudsman for gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence. While the case was pending, he appointed a replacement for petitioner. Petitioner Malinao filed an administrative case, against respondent Mayor in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque, charging him with abuse of authority and denial of due process. Subsequently, the case was taken up in executive session of the Sanggunian. The Sanggunian, by the vote of 5 to 3 of its members, found respondent Mayor guilty of the charge. The result of the voting was embodied in a Decision signed by only one member of the Sanggunian, who did so as Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee. Respondent Mayor filed a manifestation before the Sanggunian, questioning the Decision on the ground that it was signed by only one member. He contended that the

Whether or not the first Decision has become final and executory for failure of respondent Mayor to appeal. Whether or not the second Sanggunian Decision which in effect reversed the first decision is valid. Ruling: The SC found the petitioners contention to be without merit. In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving elective local officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must be in writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. The SC ruled that what the Sanggunian, did during the executive session was not to render a decision. Neither may the so-called Decision prepared by

Sanggunian Member and Presiding Chairman of the blue ribbon Committee be regarded as the decision of the Sanggunian for lack of the signatures of the requisite majority. The voting following the deliberation of the

members of the Sanggunian did not necessarily constitute their decision unless this was embodied in an opinion prepared by one of them and concurred in by the others. The Sanggunian, at its session on October 21, 1994, took another vote and, 7 to 2, decided to dismiss the case against



respondent Mayor.

This time its decision was made in

Issue: WON CSC has original jurisdiction to institute the administrative case against respondent. Held: It is true that Section 47 (2), Title 1 (A), Book V of EO No. 292 gives the heads of government over their offices own

writing, stating the facts and the law on which it was based, and it was signed by the members taking part in the decision. This, according to the SC, is the decision of the Sanggunian. The SC ruled that no notice of the session by the Sanggunian is required to be given to the petitioner since the deliberation of the Sanggunian is an internal matter. DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS #74 CSC vs. Albao 472 SCRA 548 G.R. No. 155784 October 13, 2005

original disciplinary jurisdiction

subordinates. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. It is only when the penalty imposed exceeds the aforementioned penalties that an appeal may be brought before the CSC which has appellate jurisdiction over the same in accordance with Section 47 (1) Title 1(A), Book V of EO No. 292

Due Process in Administrative Proceedings By: Madel Malone-Cervantes Facts: The Office of the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines issued an original and permanent

The present case, however, partakes of an act by petitioner to protect the integrity of the civil service system, and does not fall under the provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted by it directly. Sec. 12, par. 11 thus states: Section 12. Powers and Functions -- The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: ... (11)Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. . . . This is an integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the law or the rules of the service.

appointment for the position of Executive Assistant IV to respondent Ranulfo P. Albao. In a letter addressed to the Director of the Civil Service Commission Field

Office, Manila, the Office of the Vice President requested the retrieval of the said appointment paper. Instead of heeding the request, petitioner CSC-NCR disapproved the appointment. Thereafter, petitioner CSC issued an Order holding that it has found, after a fact-finding investigation, that a prima facie case exists against respondent Albao for Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents (He stated in his PDS that he took and passed the Assistant Electrical Engineer Examination with a rating of 71.64%; supported by report of rating purportedly issued by PRC. However, PRC informed CSC that the name of respondent does not appear on the masterlist of examinees.) Respondent questions the jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative case.



Therefore petitioner is vested with the power to institute motu proprio the administrative proceedings against respondent for alleged falsification of eligibility committed by respondent in connection with his appointment to a permanent position in the Office of the Vice President. #75 Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-49711, November 7, 1979

being human, a person is presupposed not to admit that he committed an error.

In this case, the petitioners were deprived of due process, which means fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines. #76 SINGSON, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

By: Bianca Cezar Facts: Secretary Gozon while he was still the director of mines dismissed the case filed by herein petitioner Zambales Chromite Mining which sought to have the petitioner declared as the rightful and prior locator of certain mining claims. The said decision was appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending, Gozon was appointed as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself from exercising appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of mines, he consequently affirmed the said decision. The decision of Gozon as Secretary was then assailed by Zambales but the RTC dismissed such on the basis that disqualification of a judge to review his own decision under the rules of court does not apply to administrative proceedings.

COMMISSION and PAL, G.R. No. 122389, June 19, 1997 By: Bianca Cezar Facts: Miguel Singson lodged a complaint against PAL for illegal dismissal. Then Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino declared

petitioner's dismissal illegal and ordered his reinstatement with backwages. Respondent PAL appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the 2nd Division of NLRC which composed of Commissioners Calaycay, Rayala and Raul T. Aquino himself. The 2nd Division reversed the decision of then Labor Arbiter Aquino and dismissed the complaint against PAL. reconsideration, commissioners When petitioner filed a motion for the taking 2nd Division with only two




Calaycay and Rayala, denied the motion. Issue: WON Singson was deprived of due process on account of Raul T. Aquinos participation as commissioner of the 2nd division of the NLRC in reviewing his own decision as a

Issue: WON Gozon validly decided on a case on his appellate jurisdiction which he also had decided while he was still Director of Mines. No. Ruling: It was void. The rationale behind it is the same as the prohibition of a judge which was later on promoted to the CA to decide in its appellate jurisdiction a decision he made as a trial judge. There can be no real review of the case as

former labor Arbiter. Yes. Ruling: Commissioner Aquino cannot be considered as impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. Furthermore, the resolution of the respondent NLRC is also void for the Division that handed it down was not composed of three impartial commissioners. The infirmity of the

resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for



reconsideration commissioners

of and


petitioner the



by of

(c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties.



Commissioner Aquino. The denial of petitioners right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.

In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 7 we laid down the requisites of procedural due process in administrative proceedings, to wit: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have something to support itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;

It is self-evident from the ruling case law that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is the subject of review. Thus, we have ruled that "the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review.

#84 UP BOARD OF REGENTS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS , G.R. No. 134625, August 31, 1999 By: Bianca Cezar (Please See Case #25 Under Quasi-Judicial Power Topic) #85 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NAPOCOR) vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. Nos. 90933-61 May 29, 1997 By: Bianca Cezar Facts:

(7) the Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. In addition, administrative due process includes Pursuant to PCI's sub-contract with Westinghouse, over six (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; thousand workers were hired to undertake the civil works for the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP). After the completion of certain phases of work at the power plant, the services of the workers were terminated. The dismissed employees did not receive any separation pay. As a consequence, cases for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of benefits were filed before the Labor Arbiter against PCI. NAPOCOR entered into an agreement with Westinghouse as principal contractor and Power Contractors Inc. (PCI) as sub-contractor for the construction of the power plant in Morong, Bataan.



On 1986, the Labor Arbiter ordered NAPOCOR and Westinghouse impleaded as additional parties-respondents. Copies of said Order were served on counsel for respondent workers and counsel for respondent PCI but not on respondent Westinghouse. A copy of the Order requiring the parties to submit their memoranda was served on the ACCRA Law Firm, purportedly the counsel for Westinghouse. The law firm, however, promptly filed a Manifestation stating that it did not enter its appearance as counsel for Westinghouse in the consolidated cases.7 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance in the cases as counsel for NAPOCOR. During the proceedings, however, Atty. Restituto O. Mallo represented NAPOCOR as the deputized Special-Attorney of OSG. On December 29, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision, which held that NAPOCOR, PCI and Westinghose jointly and severally liable for the adjudged separation pay and money claims. A copy of the decision was served on NAPOCOR through the deputized special attorney who received the same on January 18, 1989. The OSG however, was not served with a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision. The ACCRA Law Office, having likewise received a copy of the decision, again filed a Manifestation that it never entered its appearance as counsel for Westinghouse. NAPOCOR then filed its appeal memorandum only on February 22, 1989. The Labor Arbiter on the otherhand denied due course of such for being filed out of time. Undaunted, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal and Appeal memorandum questioning thedenial on the ground that the OSG was not served a copy of the 12.29.1989 decision. The OSG further alleged that the Appeal filed on 02.22.1989 was filed on time. Issue :

The first issue raised by petitioner revolves around the service of the Labor Arbiter's decision on the special attorney and not on the OSG. Petitioner alleges that it was denied due process because its counsel, the OSG, was not served a copy of the said decision. It thus claims that the period to appeal did not commence to run because the decision was never served on the OSG. Hence, petitioner's appeal memoranda filed by the special attorney on February 22, 1989 and by the OSG on July 17, 1989 were filed seasonably. The petition has merit. Ruling: The lawyer deputized and designated as "special attorneyOSG" is a mere representative of the OSG and the latter retains supervision and control over the deputized lawyer. The OSG continues to be the principal counsel for the National Power Corporation, and as such, the Solicitor General is the party entitled to be furnished copies of orders, notices and decisions. The deputized special attorney has no legal authority to decide whether or not an appeal should be made. 25 As a consequence, copies of orders and decisions served on the deputized counsel, acting as agent or representative of the Solicitor General, are not binding until they are actually received by the latter. It has been likewise consistently held that the proper basis for computing the reglementary period to file an appeal and for determining whether a decision had attained finality is service on the OSG. 27 In the present controversy, only the special attorney was served with a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Since service of said decision was never made on the OSG, the period to appeal the decision to the NLRC did not commence to run. Hence, the appeal memorandum filed by the OSG on July 17, 1989 was not filed belatedly. #86 Lincoln Gerard, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 85295, July 23, 1990 By: Bianca Cezar



Facts: Alfonso Balignasay was employed in the petitioners furniture factory. When Balignasay was dismissed, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and on October 1987, the labor arbiter decided on Balignasays favor. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioners counsel on December 1987. On August 1988 however, the petitioner through its new counsel filed an unverified petition for relief of judgment alleging that it was denied due proess because it was not furnished a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision, and that its former counsel failed to inform it about the decision.

Facts: On 1991, A Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) was held in Davao City. A certain Evelyn Junio-Decir applied for and took the examination and passed the said examination. At the time of the PBET examinations, petitioner Sarah P. Ampong (nee Navarra) and Decir were public school teachers. Later, Ampong transferred to the Regional Trial Court where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III. On July 1994 however, it was discovered by the Civil Service Regional Office that it was petitioner Ampong who took and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir. The CSRO after conducting a preliminary investigation,

Issue: WON the petitioner was denied due process because the decision of the Labor Arbiter was served upon its former counsel who did not inform it about the adverse decision. No.

determined the existence of a prima facie case against Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and so a case was formally filed against them. Even before filing an Answer, petitioner Ampong voluntarily appeared at the CSRO and admitted to the wrongdoing. When reminded that she may avail herself of the services of

Ruling: Well-settled is the rule that when a party appears by counsel in an action in court or administrative body, all notices required to be given must be served to the counsel and not to the client, for the rule is that notice to the counsel is notice to the client. In the present case, records show that the petitioners former counsel did not withdraw its appearance; hence, service of a copy of the decision on the law firm was valid. Furthermore, the petitioner may not complain of lack of due process because the negligence of its counsel does not constitute a denial of due process.

counsel, petitioner voluntarily waived said right. On March 1996, the CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty, dismissing them from the service. Hence the present case where Ampong assails her confession, arguing that it was given without aid of counsel. Contending further that in police custodial investigations, the assistance of counsel is necessary in order for an extrajudicial confession to be made admissible in evidence against the accused in a criminal complaint. If assistance was waived, the waiver should have been made with the assistance of counsel. Issue:








COMMISSION By: Bianca Cezar

WON assistance of a counsel is essential in administrative due proceedings. NO. Ruling:



While a partys right to the assistance of counsel is sacred in proceedings criminal in nature, there is no such

counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. On August 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, alleging that he suffered a stroke which constrained him from attending the hearing. It was however determined that the counter-affidavit submitted together with the documentary evidence thereto is already sufficient such that a judicious determination of the case based on the pleadings submitted is already possible. Hence, following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report finding

requirement in administrative proceedings. In Lumiqued v. Exevea,31 this Court ruled that a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel. Moreover, the administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.32 Furthermore, petitioners admission was given freely. There was no compulsion, threat or intimidation and as found by the CSC, petitioners admission was substantial enough to support a finding of guilt. #90 ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED vs. Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA et. Al., G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997 By: Bianca Cezar Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to

Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him which led to the issuance of AO No. 52 which dismissed Lumiqued from the service with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits. Hence the present case. The petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him. Issue: WON assistance of a counsel is an indispensable right during an investigation for the purpose of determining if Lumiqued can be held administratively liable. No. Ruling: then The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right

Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order. The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed against Lumiqued charging him with malversation through falsification of official documents, violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations "by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the falsification of accounting entries and oppression and harassment. The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his counter-affidavit.

Lumiqued then according filed his counter-affidavit. Committee hearings on the complaints were

conducted on July 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by



afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. 23 It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation

#91 VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, VS. DITA MAQUILAN, G.R. NO. 155409, JUNE 8, 2007 By: Bianca Cezar Facts: Virgilio Maquilan and private respondent Dita Maquilan are spouses who had once had a blissful married life. However, when Virgilio discovered that Dita was having an illicit sexual affair, he filed a case of adultery against her and her paramour. Consequently, both Dita and her paramour were convicted and were sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Thereafter, Virgilio filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and during the pretrial of the said case, Virgilio and Dita entered into a compromise agreement and the same was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge. Subsequently, Virgilio filed a Motion praying for the repudiation of the compromise agreement on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement. Issue: WON the alleged negligence of Virgilios lawyer, would give him the right to repudiate the Compromise Agreement. No. Ruling: In Salonga v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court held: [I]t is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority

conducted by the committee was only for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal prosecution. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an

administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding such as in this case, Lumiqued, has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of the Civil Service Act and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules of the Administrative Code. Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself . Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in

is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them. Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the Court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its

administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.



application "results in the outright deprivation of one's property through a technicality." x x x x13 None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case. Hence, the petition was dismissed. #92 EDWIN RAZON Y LUCEA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 158053, JUNE 21, 2007 By: Bianca Cezar Facts: Edwin Razon filed a notice of appeal when he was convicted for the crime of homicide by the RTC. The CA in turn required him through his counsel Atty. Gallardo to file an appellants brief. However on a certain date, without filing the said appellants brief, Atty. Gallardo instead filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the Accused-appellant on the ground that Razon had consistently shown his disinterest in the case by not attending much needed conferences. On August 1999, the CA granted Atty. Gallardo's motion to withdraw as counsel and directed Razon anew to cause the entry of appearance of his new counsel or manifest whether he wanted the CA to appoint a counsel de oficio to defend him, within five days from notice with warning that failure to comply with said Resolution shall cause the dismissal of his appeal. Razon however consistently failed to comply with the said directives, and so the CA issued the herein assailed Resolution dismissing Razons appeal. Petitioner Razon now contends that the CA erred in dismissing his appeal, pointing out that the same was caused by the negligence of Atty. Gallardo, his former counsel. Issue: WON the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to file appellant's brief. Yes. Ruling:

The CA may dismiss an appeal for failure to file appellant's brief on time. It is given the discretion which must be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case. In this case, the CA gave petitioner sufficient opportunity to file his appellant's brief. Instead of complying, however, petitioner chose to ignore the many directives of the CA and now puts the blame on his former counsel Atty. Gallardo, who was allegedly guilty of gross negligence. Even if the Court were to admit that Atty. Gallardo was negligent, the rule is that negligence of counsel binds the client. The only exception is when the negligence of said counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. No such excepting circumstance can be said to be present in this case because as properly observed by the appellate court, petitioner himself was guilty of negligence. Hence the present petition was dismissed. #93 ATTY. ROMEO S. PEREZ, VS. HON. JUDGE CARLOS ABIERA, A.M. NO. 223-J, JUNE 11, 1975 By: Bianca Cezar Facts: On September 23, 1971, Atty. Romeo S. Perez filed a case for "grave misconduct, gross dishonesty and serious

inefficiency" unbecoming of a judge against Hon. Judge Carlos Abiera. On September 27 of the same year, Judge Abiera retired from the service upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of seventy.

Respondent judge now asserts that because he has retired from the government service, the Court lost jurisdiction to take disciplinary action against him and perforce has to dismiss the case because the relief prayed for in the complaint that he be dishonorably discharged from the



service and be barred from any appointment in public office is unnecessary considering that by reason of his age, he is in fact barred or disqualified to be appointed to any other office in the government service. Respondent cites in his favor the case against Hon. Jesus Quintillan, where an administrative complaint against a Judge who already retired during the pendency of the case was dismissed.

#94 CEFERINO PADUA vs. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, G.R. No. 141949, October 14, 2002 By: Bianca Cezar (Please See Case #19 Under Toll Regulatory Board Topic) DOCTRINE REMEDIES #97 Sagip Kalikasan vs. Paderanga, 6/19/2008 OFEXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE

Issue: WON the Court has been divested of jurisdiction to proceed and resolve the present charge against Judge Abiera due to the fact that he already retired from the service. No.

By: Mides Cerbo (Please see Case #7 under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction Topic) DISTINCTION BETWEEN DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY

JURISDICTION & DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF Ruling: The cessation from office of respondent Judge either because of resignation, retirement or some other similar cause does not per se warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint which was filed against him while still in the service. It was not the intent of the Court in the case of Quintillan to set down a hard and fast rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge renders moot and academic the administrative case pending against him; nor did the Court mean to divest itself of jurisdiction to impose certain penalties short of dismissal from the government service should there be a finding of guilt on the basis of the evidence. The jurisdiction acquired at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS by: Mides Cerbo FACTS: Philippine Realty and Holdings, Inc. (Phil Realty), which constructed and developed The Alexandra Condominium Complex, transferred to The Alexandra Condominium Corporation (TACC)such condominium complex by virtue of a Deed of Conveyance. Subsequently (after 5 ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES #108 and # 131 The Alexandra Condo Corp. vs. LLDA, 599 scra 453

years),Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) advised TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards, and informed TACC that it must put up its own Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) for its effluent discharge to meet government standards. Since constructing an STP would be expensive (P15M), TACC tried to experiment with other methods of cleaning its waste water. However, the wastewater still failed to meet government standards. For this violation, LLDA imposed a P1000 daily fine on TACC until the wastewater standard. with discharge TACC complies entered with into for the an the

government agreement







construction of theS TP for P7.5M. LLDA issued an Order requiring TACC to pay the fine (~P1M) representing the penalty from until the STP was constructed. TACC requested LLDA to condone the imposition of the penalty of P1,000 per day in recognition of the remedial and corrective measures it undertook to comply with government standards. TACC further argues that the non-compliance with government standards was due to the omission and fault of Phil Realty. This was denied by LLDA.TACC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The CA denied TACCs petition. ISSUE: 1.W/N TACC complied with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. NO.2.W/N TACC is the one liable to pay the fine. YES.RATIO: Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first madewith the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for review.

standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations." Powers of the LLDA to Impose Penalty LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. Under Section 4-A of RA 4850, as amended, LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards .It is clear that the responsibility to comply with government standards lies with TACC, because Phil Realty turned over the project to TACC five years before LLDA advised TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards. If, as claimed by TACC, the non-compliance was due to the omission and fault of Phil Realty, TACCs recourse is to file an action, if warranted, against Phil Realty in a proper court. TACC cannot escape its liability to LLDA by shifting the blame to Phil Realty. Hence, the LLDA did not abuse its discretion in issuing its 4 September 2003 Order. Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards and from such other wrongful act or

A premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible. In this case, TACC has an administrative recourse before the DENR Secretary which it should have first pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. This is because under Executive order No. 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR "for policy and program coordination and/or administrative supervision. And although under the same order, DENR only has administrative power over LLDA, a subsequent EO 192 mandates the DENR to "promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution" and to "promulgate ambient and effluent

omission of a person, private or public, juridical or otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to be earmarked for water quality control and management. ____________________________________________________ PRINCIPLE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER OF CONTROL #124 and #125 Bito-onon vs. Judge Yap-Fernandez By: Mae Bungabong Facts: Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay

Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the



Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. On the other hadn, Elegio Quejano, Jr. is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the


Thus, this petition.







position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the Held: COMMITTED

ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS. said election. Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with Yes. It was issued by the DILG Secretary in excess of

the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997. Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the decision

his authority. Yes. She did.

of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). Reason: Onon filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered by the BES in any post proclamation electoral protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of officers and directors. In RTC dismissed the petition of Onon. The RTC The Court ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 97-

193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely

ratiocinated that the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government2 is vested with the power "to establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units."The RTC added that DILG Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his rule-making power as provided for under Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code.Consequently, the RTC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for review filed by Quejada.



"monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government. Public respondent judge therefore committed grave

them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. PRESIDENTS POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION #125 Bito-onon vs. Judge Yap-Fernandez By: Mae Bungabong (Please See Case #124 under the Principle of Presidential Power of Control Topic)

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not dismissing the respondent's Petition for Review for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies and for lack of jurisdiction.



Facts: 1. Bautista alleged that he is the lawful tenant and

actual possessor of THREE (3) HECTARES, more or less, The President's power of general supervision over parcel of land, formerly owned by Gregorio Araneta II, and situated at Carmel Farms, Tungkong Mangga, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Tenancy relationship between the former owner and plaintiff started way back in 1978. From then on, plaintiff cultivated and possessed the subject landholding in an open, peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted manner. 2. Bautista's peaceful possession and cultivation was local government units is conferred upon him by the Constitution. The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." This is distinguished from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter." Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is disturbed and, even interrupted, when a group of armed security guards, through force and intimidation, entered the subject landholding and threatened plaintiff with bodily harm. These group of armed security guards, allegedly, were sent by herein defendant Patty Araneta, successor of Gregorio Araneta II. They warned plaintiff to vacate and to stop cultivating the subject landholding. 3. In his complaint, plaintiff initially asked the Board the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. Officers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace to issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendant, through her security guards, from continued employment of threat and harassment against his person.



Also, plaintiff asked the Board to issue a preliminary injunction, during the pendency of the case, for the maintenance of status quo and for the recognition of his right as tenant on the subject landholding.

agencies when supported by substantial evidence should be final and conclusive. Reason: We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner


On March 11, 1991, Araneta received, through her

is not a tenant of the disputed land. Bautista admitted that he does not even know the landowner Factual findings of DARAB are not supported by

assistant, a letter from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan requesting for a meeting which had been set two (2) months prior to the receipt of said letter. Incidentally, not a single meeting materialized. Instead, meetings with the Barangay Captain of Tungkong Mangga, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan were scheduled including one on July 17, 1991, which was maliciously pre-empted by the filing of the complaint for Peaceful Possession with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 5. Araneta contended that Bautista has no cause of

substantial evidence. This Court can not sustain Bautistas argument that

he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by

administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts. This Court is not necessarily bound by these findings specially if they are mere conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence.1wphi1 # 128 TERESITA G. FABIAN vs. NESTOR V. AGUSTIN By: Mae Bungabong Facts: 1. The instant controversy arose from the verified

action against her as the former is not a tenant on the subject landholding. She added that the subject landholding does not fall under the coverage of the comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL) as it appears to be 18% in slope. 6. DARAB denied the petition of Araneta and favoured

Bautista. 7. 8. Issue: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED The CA reversed DARABs decision. Hence, this petition. letter-complaint1 dated July 24, 1995 filed by Teresita Fabian, petitioner, with the Office of the Ombudsman, charging Nestor Agustin, herein respondent, with grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral acts, and oppression. 2. Fabian alleged therein that she was the major


stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction and Development Corporation (PROMAT) engaged in

SHOULD BE FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE. Held: The CA did not erred in disregarding settled

construction business. In 1986, PROMAT participated in the various biddings for the construction of government projects within the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED) of the Department of Public Works and Highways

jurisprudence that factual findings of administrative



(DPWH). Respondent is the incumbent District Engineer of the FMED. 3. Fabian further averred that "respondent became a


After the investigation Graft Investigation Officer Benitez found respondent guilty of grave


misconduct as well as irregular or immoral acts and recommended his dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits under the law 7. Graft Investigator and Legal Officer Andrew

persistent suitor" and refused to deal with PROMATs liaison officer, insisting that she personally attend to her companys projects with FMED, otherwise, her papers "would get stuck in his office." Respondent relentlessly pursued her and one time invited her to a snack at the Philippine Plaza Hotel. After finishing her drink, she felt dizzy. Taking advantage of her "semi-conscious state," he brought her to a motel and raped her. That was the beginning of a hateful relationship. Her attempts to extricate herself proved futile since he constantly warned her that PROMAT would no longer do business with FMED unless the relationship continues. Whenever she tried to avoid him, he would go to her house in the middle of the night and create a scene by blowing the horn of his car, pounding at the gate, shouting on top of his voice and pelting her windows with stones. As a result of these disturbances, she suffered nervous breakdown and was eventually operated for breast cancer on October 1994. 4. On May 22, 1995, one Winnie Gutierrez and

Ammuyutan made similar finding and recommendation 8. Then Ombudsman Desierto, approved the said

finding and recommendation with modification in the sense that the offense is only misconduct and that the penalty is suspension from office for one (1) year without pay 9. Eventually, Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero

dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. 10. Then the Court of Appeals, in its original Decision,

reinstated Ombudsman Desiertos Order dated February 26, 1996 finding respondent guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the service for one (1) year without pay. 11. Later, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended

Decision, this time, affirming the Guerrero Joint Order dismissing the administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence. 12. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in Hence, this petition

respondents elder brother, Honorato Agustin, persuaded petitioner to meet respondent as he would apologize to her for his misdeeds. She agreed and met respondent at Lasap Restaurant, Tomas Morato Street, in Quezon City. After sometime, his two companions went out of the restaurant. Not wanting to be alone with respondent, she attempted to leave. But respondent suddenly embraced her and fondled her breast area, saying, "Tingnan nga kung talagang tinanggal na ang suso mo." Out of extreme outrage and embarrassment, she lost consciousness and had to be brought to the nearest hospital. 5. In his counter-affidavit, treated as his comment on

affirming the Guerrero Joint Order. 2. Whether or not Fabian was able to prove her

charges by substantial evidence. Held: 1. 2. The CA erred in affirming the decision of Guerrero Fabian was able to prove her charges by substantial

the complaint, Agustin vehemently denied petitioners allegations, claiming that he accepted her various

evidence. Reason:

invitations in order to discuss the projects of PROMAT.




The CA erred in affirming the decision the Guerrero

purpose of administrative disciplinary proceedings which is to weed out the undesirables and secure the faithful and efficient performance of official functions." It bears emphasis that respondent admitted that because of his position, petitioner was awarded various government projects worth millions and that he had illicit relationship with her. His negative assertion relative to the Lasap Restaurant incident is weak in light of the positive declaration of petitioner and those of the employees who witnessed the same. We misconduct, thus find respondent and guilty of acts grave and

Joint Order because in the first place Fabian was able to prove her charges by substantial evidence against Agustin. After carefully reviewing all the evidence obtaining in this case, we find the positive declarations of petitioner and her witnesses in their sworn statements more credible than those of respondent. In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required to hold respondent liable for the charges against him. Here, we are convinced that petitioners charges are supported by substantial evidence jurisprudentially defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. We quote with approval the following findings and observations of Graft Investigation Officer Benitez, sustained by the Court of Appeals in its original Decision, thus: "The complainants evidence and respondents admissions stand for the requisite substantial evidence which in an unprejudiced mind reasonably supports a conclusion that indeed the administrative offenses, subject of the complaint had been committed. The uncontroverted facts show that respondent courted complainant and established intimate relationship with her. On account of that affair, or at least in the course thereof, her firm was awarded a number of contracts by the office of which respondent was the head. From these contracts even the respondent averted that she derived windfall profits. Times were, through complainants persuasion, respondent



oppression.1a\^/ Indeed, by his conduct, respondent violated the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.Public servants must bear in mind this constitutional mandate at all times to guide them in their actions during their entire tenure in the government service. WHEN MAY COURTS REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE

DECISIONS # 131 The Alexandra Condo Corp. vs. LLDA, 599 scra 453 by: Mides Cerbo (Please See Case #108 Under Distinction between Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies) THREE-FOLD RESPONSIBILITY #133 SPS. CHUA VS. HON. JACINTO G. ANG, G.R. NO. 156164, SEPTEMBER 4, 2009 Refer to Case #13 under HLURB Topic

interceded for complainants firm whenever it was involved in contract violations. This alone constitutes grave misconduct in office. "Here we have the inglorious spectacle of a married public works official carrying an illicit affair with a lady contractor and in the course thereof, showering her with windfall profits out of public works projects. "This kind of misconduct in office amounts to a betrayal of public trust and we have to be true to the

#139 and #166 Garcia vs. Mojica, 314 scra 207



By: Mides Cerbo FACTS: On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which period was to commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter. Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After his investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation. ISSUES: 1. WON Garcia may be held administratively liable.NO. In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still re-elects him, then such re-election is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. However, in the present case,

voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character. For his part, petitioner contends that the only conclusive determining factor As regards the peoples thinking on the matter is an election. On this point, we agree with petitioner. That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the officials re-election, except that it must be prior to said date. The above ruling in Salalima applies to this case. Petitioner cannot anymore beheld administratively liable for an act done during his previous term, that is, his signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig. The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later. While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be held administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he may not.

respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have



2. WON the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the LGC.No. Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong.* The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman.

been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months. Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts Held:

SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. A judge who The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong. OMB JURISDICTION #154 Honasan vs. DOJ Panel (superseded by OMB-DOJ MOA 3/29/12), 4/13/2004 By: Mides Cerbo (Please See Case #58 under Implementing Rules or Interpretative Policies Topic) WHO ARE NOT SUBJECT TO OMB DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY? #158 and #162 Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 scra 46 By: Mides Cerbo Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.



Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. #161 and #165 Garcia vs. Miro, 582 scra 127 by: Mides Cerbo Facts: City Mayor Garcia was charged by Ombudsman Special Prosecution Officer Jesus Rodrigo Tagaan for violation of the Anti-Graft Law as a result of his having entered into a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt batching plant for three years. The joint affidavits of State Auditors Cabreros and Quejada alleged that petitioner entered into the contract without available funds appropriated to cover the expenditure in violation of Sections 85 and 86 of P.D. 1445 or the State Audit Code of the Phil.; that petitioner exceeded the authority granted him by the Sangguniang Panlungsod; and that the contract is manifestly

government. In Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286, we held that even unverified and anonymous letters may suffice to start an investigation. The Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay, or dismiss investigations against them. The joint affidavits of State Auditors Cabreros and Quejada contain allegations specific enough for petitioner to prepare his evidence and counterarguments. The fact that Special Prosecution Officer Tagaan already resigned from his office and that his name was withdrawn as complainant in the case is of no consequence. First, Tagaans report and affidavit still form part of the records of the case. He can still be called by subpoena, if necessary. Second, Tagaan was only a nominal party whose duty as special prosecutor was to investigate the commission of crimes and file the corresponding complaint whenever warranted. Since the illegal acts committed are public offenses, the real complainant is the State, which is represented by the remaining complainants. #162 Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 scra 46 By: Mides Cerbo (Please See Case #158 under Who are not subject to OMB Disciplinary Authority?) #165 Garcia vs. Miro, 582 scra 127 by: Mides Cerbo (Please See Case #161 under Who are not subject to OMB Disciplinary Authority?) CASES ON PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION #166 Garcia vs. Mojica, 314 scra 207 By: Mides Cerbo ( See Case #139 under Three-Fold Responsibility Topic)

disadvantageous to the City. Note however that thereafter, Special Prosecution Officer Tagaan resigned from his office and his name was withdrawn as complainant in the case. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, Garcia filed with the Supreme Court a petition to prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation on the ground that there is no sufficient complaint. Issue: Whether or not the complaint/affidavits filed against Garcia is sufficient in form or manner. Held: For purposes of initiating a preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman, a complaint in any form or manner is sufficient. The Constitution states that the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the