CAUSE NO. C-2013-1082B MONIQUE RATHBUN § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § 207
TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT § DAVID MISCAVIGE, RELIGIOUS § TECHNOLOGY CENTER, CHURCH § OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, § STEVEN GREGORY SLOAT, AND § MONTY DRAKE § § Defendants. § COMAL COUNTY, TEXAS
DEFENDANT CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL’S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Before the Court is the motion of Defendant Church of Scientology International (“CSI”) to dismiss Plaintiff’s petition (now the Second Amended Petition, or “SAP”) and each of the four causes of action alleged under it, pursuant to the Citizens Participation Act, Chapter 27 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which is the Texas anti-SLAPP statute enacted in 2011, as amended by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., Ch. 1042 (H.B. 2935), §1, eff. June 14, 2013 (“the Statute”). For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the motion must be granted and Plaintiff’s SAP must be dismissed in its entirety.
I. PROCEDURE UNDER THE STATUTE
1.
A “SLAPP” is a “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” Chapter 27 provides for an early and expedited dismissal of such lawsuits, which seek to shut down and silence citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights. The Statute’s purpose “is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, [and] associate freely.”
Id.
§27.002.
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The legislature has determined that unmeritorious lawsuits subject to chapter 27 should be dismissed early in litigation, generally before parties must engage in discovery.
. . .
The supporters of the bill leading to the enactment of chapter 27 noted that the bill’s purposes were to allow a prevailing movant of a motion to dismiss to achieve dismissal “earlier than would otherwise be possible” and to avoid costly legal expenses, including discovery expenses, even before the summary judgment stage of litigation. . . . Requiring a proper movant for dismissal under chapter 27 to engage fully in litigation, including a possible trial, would eviscerate these purposes and would ignore the legislature’s determination that customary procedures are inadequate in some respects to protect defendants in cases falling within chapter 27’s guidelines. Likewise, requiring proper chapter 27 movants generally to proceed through litigation when they should be entitled to dismissal harms a broader purpose of chapter 27 to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law.
, 411 S.W.3d 530, 539 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth, 2013, no pet.)(internal citations and quotations omitted). The Statute provides for dismissal of a lawsuit that “is based on, relates to, or is in response to a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association.”
Id.
§27.003(a). Courts are directed that the entire Statute “shall be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose and intent fully.”
Id.
§27.011(b).
2.
Under the Statute, a court is required to dismiss a “legal action” “if the moving party shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the legal action is based on, relates to, or is in response to the party’s exercise of: (1) the right of free speech; (2) the right to petition; or (3) the right of association.”
Id.
§27.005(b). In making this determination, the court is to consider the pleadings and the supporting and opposing affidavits.
Id.
§27.006. Each cause of action set forth in a petition, as well as the petition itself, is deemed a “legal action” and is subject to a motion to dismiss under the Statute.
Id.,
§§27.001(6), 27.003(a). 3.
To avoid dismissal a plaintiff must “establish[]
by clear and specific evidence
a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim[s] in question.”
Id.
§27.005(c)(emphasis added). “The purposeful inclusion of a ‘clear and specific evidence’ requirement indicates that
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the non-movant must satisfy an elevated evidentiary standard under § 27.005(c).”
Rehak Creative Services, Inc. v. Witt,
404 S.W.3d 716, 726 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied)(specifically rejecting argument that court should “import into Chapter 27 the ‘scintilla of evidence’ concept applicable in the context of a no-evidence motion for summary judgment”)
; accord
,
Farias v. Garza
, 04-13-00094-CV, 2014 WL 300983, *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 29, 2014, no. pet. h.). To meet her burden of “clear and specific evidence,” a plaintiff cannot rely on “presumptions, inferences or intendment.”
Rehak Creative Services, Inc.,
404 S.W.3d at 726;
Farias
at *2;
Rio Grande H2O Guardian v. Robert Muller Family P'ship Ltd.
, 04-13-00441-CV, 2014 WL 309776, *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 29, 2014, no. pet. h.). Rather, a plaintiff must present evidence that is “unambiguous,” “sure,” and “free from doubt,” and that is “explicit.”
KTRK Television, Inc. v. Robinson
, 409 S.W.3d 682, 689 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied);
accord, Farias
at *2(“‘Clear’ means ‘free from obscurity or ambiguity,’ ‘easily understood,’ ‘free from doubt,’ or ‘sure.’ . . . ‘Specific’ means ‘constituting or falling into a specifiable category,’ ‘free from ambiguity,’ or ‘accurate.’”). 4.
Even if a plaintiff can establish clear and specific evidence of a prima facie case for each element of her claim, the Court nevertheless “shall dismiss a legal action against the moving party if the moving party establishes by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element of a valid defense to the non-movant’s claim.”
Id.
§27.005(d). Thus, for example, even if a libel plaintiff can establish by prima facie evidence the elements of a libel, a court is required to dismiss the action if the defendant can establish a First Amendment or other defense to the libel cause of action. 5.
The Statute provides an expedited procedure pursuant to which the parties may submit affidavits or declarations, which they have done. The Statute further provides that a
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