Inside Bitcoins Conference, Dec 10-11, 2013

Best Practices for Using and Securing Bitcoins
"# $ecem%er, &#"'

Alan Reiner Founder & CEO Armory Technologies, nc!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

(ist of To)ics
• • • • • • Introduction Bitcoin storage methods Bitcoin Basics The wedding of cryptography and money Security Practices The future of Bitcoin best practices

Learn to hold your own Bitcoins and let the power of decentralized money shine!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

*ho Am +
• Alan Reiner , “etotheipi” on the • Mathematician, Statistician, SW Developer, Perfectionist , ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining

• Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 , !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum

• A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% , Sub&category' “ultra&paranoid crypto&nerd”

© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013 • &no'n for (security at all costs) .*hat is Armory+ • Armory Bitcoin Wallet is a free. !urrently a tool tailored to ad$anced)power users . *ecently funded" will de$elop beginner+s interface . Sometimes “con$enience” is one of those costs.. (ne of four such applications featured on bitcoin. open$source "es%top application for securin! Bitcoins yourself .

ot for Be!inners# . 0ots of ad$anced features . . Printable paper backups #with fragmenting-% • . Inc.ultiple&wallet interface . Sign transactions from an air&gapped computer • Also innovate" many other features .*hat is Armory+ • *ven after t'o years.eed Bitcoin&/t running in background #for security-% . allets that only ha$e to be backed up one time . Armory is still one of the only 'ays for non$e+perts to use (col" stora!e) . . 2013 .eed to download blockchain .create" Armory because the best practices 'ante" 'ere not available else'here © Armory Technologies. .

.e!ative/ Take control of your own money #and lose it%(If yo !re sing Bitcoin to remo"e third-#!rties from the e$ !tion.Bitcoin Basics • Bitcoin has the potential to revolutioni..e payments . 1arness the opportunities" mitigate the risks' win&win • Positive/ Take control of your own money #and sa$e%• . 2013 . The same way email changed written communications • Bitcoin is complicate" . yo h!"e to t!%e o"er the res#onsi&ilities of those third-#!rties'( © Armory Technologies. hopefully • Bitcoin creates both tremen"ous opportunities an" tremen"ous ris%s . Inc. But it will get easier.

2013 .t-s .ust a Ba%y • 0he infrastructure aroun" Bitcoin is still bein! built • Relatively spea%in!. Inc. *elati$ely unknown for years • 1ots of venture capital flo'in! in to turn it into somethin! much bi!!er • Still a lot of soul$searchin! to "o by the community Bitcoin may end up being the TCP/IP of money – ad anced payment systems will be built off of it! but only de elopers ha e to interact with it directly © Armory Technologies. Bitcoin is still in its infancy . Started only fi$e years ago #2334% .

© Armory Technologies. & t it r!rely e*ceeds +0.000. .000 3SD/ .-D. Inc.*hy Bitcoin+ • Sho' me another payment system that you can pay someone 2 0. but it certainly is po'erful# • 0here is no other payment system li%e this# • -f only 'e coul" ma%e it safe an" usable444 )Cert!in ty#es of tr!ns!ctions m!y re$ ire fees. 2013 . To and from anywhere in the world . Irre$ersible . ith 73.early instantaneously . 25)6 without restrictions .33 in fees8 . !an+t be fro9en or sei9ed #without direct access to your wallet% • Bitcoin is not perfect.01 .

2013 . Built from standard" trusted crypto algorithms Bitcoin shares many of the same properties as gold (no one iss es gold. f ngi&le.ot controlled by any one entity' run by all users of the system simultaneously• 1imite" Supply . e!sy to identify. The entire schedule of Bitcoin generation was announced in 2334 and cannot be changed . Inc. Predetermined inflation" no printing)debasing • Secure# 5theoretically6 . d r!&le( © Armory Technologies. .33333333 Bitcoins . There will only e$er be 2:"333"333.e" . the s ##ly is limited.*hy Bitcoin+ • Decentrali.

Bitcoin Storage O)tions • With Bitcoin. .ay hold BT! properly but use poor user auth !ounterparty risk . <2&byte secret #pri$ate key% can control 7millions .ay be more diligent about security than you .oney now stored directly on phone" computer" paper" etc • Store Bitcoin yourself 7 =ull control o$er your money 7 !annot be sei9ed or stolen if secured properly $ It+s easy to lose <2 bytes if you+re careless- • 1et someone else hol" your Bitcoin 7 $ $ $ . *aises the stakes of computer and network security . 2013 .o Bitcoin insurance © Armory Technologies. no' ("ata) is (money) . . Inc.

000 37.100. -ometimes.000 Bitcoinic! (61( 1*ch!nge Bitcoinic! (62( 1*ch!nge Bitfloor In# ts.100 +23. ne 2011 /t.000 22.000 0B.000 +1.000 +2. 0o* . ly 2012 -e# 2012 9ct 2013 :o" 2013 1*ch!nge 4!llet 2.000 35. © Armory Technologies. (Chin!( 1*ch!nge 4!llet 1*ch!nge -ometimes sers get some of their o<n money &!c%.000 2. Inc.Third/Party Ris0 • 0he history of Bitcoin is fille" 'ith users trustin! thir"$parties to hol" their money & !urrently" there is no e>ui$alent of =?I! for Bitcoin "ate #er ice #er ice Type BTC Lost / #tolen $#" %alue &at time of loss' .200. ne 2011 /yBitcoin /!y 2012 .100 2.000 +51.000 +1.000 20.100. 2013 .000 +280.

. . and dangerous. 2013 .. Inc.ot e$eryone makes backups .o one eApects their hardware to fail *"ucate yourself. learn the ris%s. learn the tools.1olding 2our O3n Bitcoin • Hol"in! your o'n is li%e harnessin! fire . Can be extremely useful.. Bsers are not used to truly irreco$erable data. an" e+periment 5'ith small amounts6 © Armory Technologies. @eep your fires small until you are eAperienced • Sometimes the bi!!est threat to users is themselves .

Inc. But we+re not done yet © Armory Technologies. 2013 .1olding 2our O3n 4cont5 • Most users shoul" not be hol"in! life$chan!in! amounts of Bitcoin themselves • Most users shoul" not be trustin! thir"$parties to protect life$chan!in! amounts of B08 for them • Wait444 so. 'hat are users suppose" to "o 9#9 Ans'er/ Most users shoul" not be puttin! life$ chan!in! amounts of money into Bitcoin yet# • Bitcoin is still the Wil" West of money • People li%e me are buil"in! safer tools : infrastructure .

2013 .Cryptography ( Bitcoin ) #hort! *on+Technical Introduction © Armory Technologies. Inc.

there are t'o main concerns/ . 2013 . Authenticity of communications #sign C $erify% • Bitcoin protocol "oes not use encryption . Privacy of communications #encrypt C decrypt% . “Are you authorized to move this money?” • All users create a private %ey 5secret6 an" a public %ey 5"istribute"6 © Armory Technologies. The Bitcoin protocol only uses “authentication” . Inc.Pu%lic/Pri6ate 7ey Cry)to • .n the internet.

:9P:ePD/Eefi2?.is the signing authority on th!t &!n% !cco nt • All users ma%e %eypairs for (account) mana!ement . Inc. account number .e".PTfT0DS0m$6?i$ li%e ! ban.%ee# it secret so only you c!n ! thori?e #!yments A Bitcoin a""ress is <ust a representation of a public %ey/ Such as' “:. 2013 .a” © Armory"e to #!yers to de#osit money in yo r =!cco nt> .Pu%lic and Pri6ate 7eys • 0hin% of Bitcoin as a "ecentrali. public ban% .

Inc. 2013 . you can create those si!natures# #so your wallet includes them in your balance% © Armory Technologies.E8am)le 9et3or0 • All Bitcoins have a public (unloc%) con"ition • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ provi"e a si!nature that verifies a!ainst a specifie" public %ey • -f you have the private %ey.

) Bitcoin Transaction Bitcoin might ma.e a lot more sense after this demo--- © Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 .

© Armory Technologies. 2013 nitial Conditions • .ll coins are locked using public keys A" B and 8 #so far% • . Inc.ssume the Bitcoin network has 2: coins • .lice and Bob ha$e all the pri$ate keys associated with those coins #and a couple eAtra unused keys% .

Inc. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions .© Armory Technologies.

© Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions .

Inc. 2013 *ho o3ns 3hat+ .© Armory Technologies.

Inc. 2013 Payment Re:uest • Bob will re>uest = B08 from .lice • Bob+s wallet will select unused pri$ate key *" and then create a payment address #based on the public key *% • Bob sends the address to .© Armory Technologies.lice re>uesting payment .

© Armory Technologies. Inc. She also selects an unused key #D% to send the 2 BT! back to herself #change% . 2013 Create Transaction • Alice+s wallet selects some coins that she knows she can sign for #at least 5 BT!% • She will use the F BT! associated with A #think of it like a 7F bill% • Alice creates a transaction spending the F BT! .

2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice uses pri$ate key A to sign the transaction • The signature is mathematically linked to e$ery detail of the transaction .© Armory Technologies. Inc. If the transaction changes at all" the signature will break #the math stops working% .

. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice “broadcasts” the transaction to the Bitcoin network • Bsers of the network $erify' . The F BT! is unspent The sig corresponds to public key A The sig is $alid for this particular transaction . . Inc.© Armory Technologies.

© Armory Technologies.ll users update their databases . Inc. 2013 Final Condition • The original F&BT! bill is destroyed and 2 new bills totaling F BT! created • .

send to others% • Public %eys let you/ . 2013 . 1andwritten sigs can be #maliciously% transplanted between documents" Bitcoin signatures can+t be • Wallets contain a lot of private %eys . *ecei$e money See a$ailable coins)balance • 0ransactions usually have 2 parts #payment C change% • Si!natures are mathematically lin%e" to the si!ne" "ata .*hat 1a6e *e (earned+ • Private %eys let you (unloc%) an" (re$loc%) coins un"er other public %eys #i.e. . Inc. Bses a new key for e$ery recei$ing operations © Armory Technologies.

ow we can appreciate “col" stora!e” #aka “offline wallets”% . (nly public keys are re>uired to recei$e payments and $erify transactions . Inc. 2013 . Private keys are only re>uired to mo$e the coins -t is possible to %eep the private %eys on an offline computer an" receive money to it usin! the public %eys )rmory <!s designed to do e*!ctly this' It is the gold st!nd!rd of <!llet sec rity &est #r!ctices © Armory Technologies.Cold Storage • .

2013 . Inc.#ecurity Best+Practices (for "!rying le"els of #!r!noi!( © Armory Technologies.

early all system become more inconvenient as you increase security# . 1onestly" this is why Bitcoin may not be ready for primetime-f you>re !oin! to hol" a lot of Bitcoin it>s 'orth sacrificin! some convenience to protect yourself © Armory Technologies. Inc.Security 6s! Con6enience • . The easiest systems are usually the least secure. !ommit to doing security right • A lot of users "on>t have the patience for this . 2013 .

ac" but a lot of work in indows- © Armory Technologies..ost de$s keep a special offline EPE private key Hust for this. Gou download installers from a malicious website . . it "oes not matter 'here you !ot it from# There are slides at the end that eAplain in detail This is $ery easy in 0inuA C . The installers are replaced during or after download • Miti!ation/ . 2013 ./<erify 2our nstallers • Ris%s/ .P.n attacker tampered with the installers on the real website . Eet the de$eloper+s EPE public key and $erify- -f the installer has a vali" si!nature from the correct ?P? %ey. . Inc.ll wallet de$s sign their installers using known EPE keys = .

0he most common reason users lose coins is "ue to not havin! an unencrypte" bac%up# = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if your hard dri$e fails = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if you forget your password = Gour family cannot inherit your Bitcoins if you get hit by a bus .n encrypted backup is useless if you forget the password = . physical security is not a concern 0H*R*@.n encrypted backup is useless if you get hit by a bus and your family would like to inherit your fortune @or most users.R*/ Ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up offline an" secure it# #paper" ?I? or BSB key% . -t is critical your bac%up be unencrypte"# = . "i!ital security is the most important @or most users.Bac0u) 2our *allets • Ris%s/ .

but the "ata 'ill be recoverable in A07 years Armory 0echnolo!ies recommen"s that you use paper bac%ups 'henever possible 8opy the "ata by han" if necessary Most thin!s that "estroy paper also "estroy "i!ital Armory @!#er B!c% # .Bac0u)s> $igital 6s! Pa)er • Ho' much are you 'illin! to bet that your 8D or 3SB %ey 'ill still 'or% in A$ 0 years from no'9 . If it+s more than your wallet $alue" don+t use it • -f you use "i!ital bac%ups. ma%e multiple copies . Store together" at least one will work • Paper fades over time.

0/ At the time of this 'ritin! 5Dec 20 B6/ . !ll <!llet de"elo#ers <ill &e im#lementing the one-time-only &!c% # fe!t res .R0A. ma%e a paper bac%up. then never 'orry a!ain# In the ne*t fe< months. one time.Bac0u) Fre:uency • -MP. Bitcoin-Qt wallets must be backed up e$ery :33 transactions .ddress reuse is bad" but probably better than losing money . Armory and Electrum wallets only re>uire one backup" e$er = Infinite pri$ate keys generated from a single seed = Print your seed on a piece of paper for reliable storage -f you use Armory or *lectrum. Multibit and Bitcoin Wallet for Android re>uire regular backups unless you always reuse addresses #not good practice-% = .

Store each fragment in a different location = SecurityJ.Fragmented Bac0u)s • Ris%s/ . Bse M&of&. If you are concerned about physical security" a single&sheet unencrypted backup is a single&point of failure • Miti!ation' . “Shamir+s Secret Sharing” . Armory is the only 'allet offerin! this# -t is calle" (@ra!mente" Bac%ups) 0r!#hic for 3-of-8 B!c% # . =or instance" <&of&D' print A “fragments”" need any B .ttacker needs to steal multiple fragments = *edundancyJyou can lose pieces and it still works8urrently.

Fragmented Bac0u)s ArmoryAs Br!gmented B!c% # Interf!ce .

0/ Cour 'allet pass'or" is your encryption %ey for your 'allet# • -f you for!et your pass'or".ake an unencrypted backup- -f you>ve ever for!otten a pass'or". your 'allet 'ill be permanently encrypte" an" your coins 'ill be lost# . .unless you ha$e an unencrypted backup • . ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up# ..o really/ ->m serious your coins 'ill be lost forever .R0A.*allet Pass3ords • -MP. Bsers are not used to the idea of truly" irreco$erable data ..

ithout stretching' :"333"333 & D"333"333 passwords)sec ith stretching' D & D3 passwords)sec • -f %ey$stretchin! is not use". they can !uess/ . *ecommended :3&:2 characters with key&stretching 3se a stron! pass'or". *ecommended :2&:F characters for no key&stretching . !on$erting your password into the encryption key is a computationally&intense process . Armory+s key&stretching is resistant to EPB&acceleration • -f someone !ets your encrypte" 'allet. ma%e unencrypte" bac%ups# . must lon!er pass'or"s . .Pass3ord (ength • Armory an" Bitcoin$Dt both use (%ey$stretchin!) .

000 ye!rs .!///!/// computers could be used to brea. .700 ye!rs 130 d!ys 21C ye!rs 333. Computer 10 min 7 d!ys 1C.2 ch!rs (<ith stretching( .2 ch!rs (no stretching( 0 ch!rs (<ith stretching( 1 ch!rs (<ith stretching( . your wallet encryption 8!a$eats' used <3&character alphabet to simulate poor entropy of human&generated passwords. Truly random passwords of these lengths will be much more secure.000.!///!/// Computers Instant Instant C d!ys Instant 2 ho rs 333 ye!rs If your wallet is aluable enough! a bot+net of .Pass3ord (ength Time to brute&force your wallet password8 Password Length 0 ch!rs (no stretching( 1 ch!rs (no stretching( .

hen you reuse addresses you make it far worse . you may 'ant to reuse a""resses any'ay if you "o not create bac%ups re!ularly4 (l!c% of #ri"!cy is s !lly #referred to losing coins( © Armory Technologies. Bsually ha$e an option to eAplicitly create -f you are usin! Bitcoin$Dt. . *eusing addresses can hurt other users+ pri$acy as well • Miti!ation/ . Inc. Multibit C An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet reuse addresses by default . Multibit or An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet. Some users force reuse due to lack of understanding or simplicity of backups This is doing more harm than good in Armory C *lectrum . Bitcoin$Dt.$o 9ot Reuse Addresses • Ris%s/ . 2013 . Bitcoin is actually not $ery good at anonymity . Armory and *lectrum do not reuse addresses by default .

2013 .e <ust ho' much privacy information is lea%e" by interactin! 'ith heavily$reuse" a""resses# © Armory Technologies. Inc. *eusing the same public&pri$ate keypair is eApected C safe throughout the rest of internet security . . But it is egregiously bad for pri$acy in Bitcoin • 0here are conte+ts in 'hich it is o%ay. but not stan"ar" .Address Reuse & Pri6acy • Discussion/ . ?onation addresses' all users donating know it is hea$ily reused" and accept being linked to it 3sers "o not reali.ddress reuse is mostly a pri$acy issue" not a security issue .

Inc. Both automatically generate new addresses for all operations K you ha$e to go out of your way to reuse . Both produce backups that work fore$er = .o matter how many new addresses you use" a backup made when the wallet was created will always work- © Armory Technologies. you have no e+cuse for reusin! a""resses# .Address Reuse & Pri6acy • -f you are usin! Armory or *lectrum. 2013 .

ore confirmations means more confidence . SiA confirmations is generally considered irre$ersible • 8onfirmations come on avera!e every 0 minutes . .ctually eAponential random' usually B0 sec to =A min © Armory Technologies. The first confirmation is the most important . . Inc.*hat are Confirmations+ • Bitcoin transactions are not instantaneous • *ach confirmation is increase" consensus that the transaction actually happene" . 2013 .

(r" you+re willing to eat the loss when re$ersed • Attac%s on . Inc. Lust not that many people doing it right now • Attac%s on one$ confirmation t+ reEuire a bit more resources = But they are possible- © Armory Technologies. 2013 .ero$confirmation transactions unless there is pre$e+istin! trust# .ero$confirmation t+ are easy an" cheap .Confirmation Ris0s • Do not trust .

. . . This is much more reliable with an offline computer . Gou want to make sure you send it to the right place.ake sure they are who you think they are. This will not work in all en$ironments #not e$eryone has an SS0 certificate% • Pic% up the phone an" call the other parties . The “payment protocol” hopes to sol$e this by using SS0 concepts to pre$ent address tampering .anually $erify the address before eAecution .n attacker could replace the correct address with his own on its way to your wallet software • 0his is a serious security issue# .Call/to/<erify Addresses • -f you are sen"in! lar!e amounts of Bitcoin/ .

2013 . Inc.Cold #torage and the 3oly 4rail © Armory Technologies.

ll wallets are “hot” by default (8ol") 'allet 5(offline 'allet)6 . The pri$ate keys are on an internet&attached system . . Transactions are signed offline .1ot 6s! Cold (Hot) Wallet . Pri$ate keys created and ne$er lea$e the offline computer . Eold standard of security .

1ot 6s! Cold Security
• All %no'n, ma<or Bitcoin breaches to "ate/ , !oins stored on a hot wallet , (r unencrypted backups stored on an “hot” computer

• 8ompromisin! a col" 'allet reEuires one of the follo'in!/ , Physical access , MAtremely ad$anced BSB $iruses , Bser accidentally installing malicious software

Setting u) the Offline Com)uter
5nline computer 5ffline computer

• 5 6 -nstall Armory

• 5 6 -nstall Armory • 526 8reate ne' 'allet • 5B6 8reate paper bac%up
, !opy by hand" if necessary

• 5=6 8reate ('atchin!$ only) copy of 'allet • 5A6 8opy to 3SB "rive • 5F6 -mport ('atchin!$ only) 'allet

Cour ('atchin!$only) 'allet has only public %eys, no private %eys#

$oing an Offline Transaction
5nline computer 5ffline computer

• 5 6 8reate transaction
, Same as you would with a hot wallet

• 526 Save unsi!ne" transaction to 3SB • 5B6 1oa" t+ from 3SB • 5=6 Revie' for accuracy#
, ;ll benefit is lost if you don+t re$iew on the clean" offline computer

• 5F6 1oa" si!ne" transaction, broa"cast to net'or%

• 5A6 Si!n the transaction, save to 3SB

It has no access to the network to know where your money is. not security . !onfirm incoming transactions . It can re$iew transactions and re>uest confirmation • Remember. Eenerate addresses .S)litting roles 5nline computer 5ffline computer • 0he 'atchin!$only 'allet behaves i"entically to a re!ular 'allet. but cannot si!nGspen" . See balances • 0his computer cannot "isplay balances . the offline 'allet is the si!nin! authority4 . It does nothing else but read and sign transactions- • An attac%er !ettin! the online 'allet is a breach of privacy.

Includes employees -f you nee" a hot 'allet. offline$'allets are an invaluable tool . %eep it small.o one 'ho !ains access to the server can steal it# . All 'ebservers an" on$site computers should only use watching-only wallets! = Securely collect payments to the offline wallet = Track your wallet balance = Track and $erify all payments)transactions = . &eep bul% of your fun"s in an offline computer = Gou can e$en keep it in a safe&deposit boA. Inc.$oing it Right • -f you are runnin! any %in" of online Bitcoin business. 2013 . perio"ically refill from the col" 'allet © Armory Technologies.

35 using . Inc.2 = . It+s an offline computer because the computer is offline • Mi+ an" match versions to your heart>s content .ffline' Bbuntu :3.43 © Armory Technologies.nline' indows OP using .N6. 2013 . The following setup works fine' = .rmory 3.rmory 3.FA? • 0here is no special version of Armory for offline .

the best 'ay to move "ata bet'een online : offline computer is 3SB "rives . 2013 .35 or :2.35 .ffline Bun"les) . Inc. ill install and run on the first boot of a fresh install of Bbuntu :3.nce you !o "o'n the (col" stora!e) path you are implementin! serious security • As of this 'ritin!. The offline computer needs no other software at all- © Armory Technologies.Use (inu8 • . e are working on better methods for secure transfer • Armory 'ebsite has 3buntu (. 0inuA has a much better history of resisting BSB& based attacks .

2013 .lso adds an eAtra layer of security "id I mention! ma.ake it eAclusi$e for Bitcoin processing • 3se full$"is% encryption to protect privacy .inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses .inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses • De"icate a computer for the creatin! transactions . Inc. ithout it" someone not authori9ed can still see the wallet $alue and transaction history .e unencrypted bac. .ups6 © Armory Technologies. . .E8tra Credit • De"icate a small 3SB %ey for offline transactions . .

Inc.The 7uture Coming #oon! © Armory Technologies. 2013 .

great tradeoff for security and con$enience • 1ardware wallets hold the private keys and si!n on the "evice .1ard3are *allets • . It will only emit the public keys Tre?or D!rd<!re 4!llet • The 0re. The private keys cannot be read from it . 2013 .or is the most anticipated 1 • Should be released in Lanuary" 23:5 wallet © Armory Technologies. Inc.

1ard3are *allets • Har"'are 'allets are an H0I solution . Should be supported by all maHor wallet apps • Will be a hu!e 'in for convenience : security © Armory Technologies. !onnect directly to online computer $ia BSB • 0he 'allets they use are stan"ar"i. They lack fleAibility .ore difficult to audit .e" . . .nother layer of trust re>uired . 2013 . Inc.

2013 . 1ere+s B public keys" sign with any 2 private keys . 1ere+s a public key" sign with its private key to mo$e • Much more comple+ con"itions are possible/ .@ulti/Signature Transactions • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ . Inc. This is a 2$of$B multi&signature transaction © Armory Technologies.

beforeP • Ces# @ra!mente" bac%ups also use (M$of$. Inc. from ! single com# ter The fr!gments only need to &e collected if <!llet is lost M$of$. Multi$Si! / lti-sign!t re tr!ns!ctions !re networ. this soun"s familiar# .+enforced / lti#le # &lic %eys !re incl ded in the unloc.@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting • Wait a sec. Bac%ups Br!gmented &!c% #s !re for sec ring yo r &!c% # All tr!ns!ctions still re$ ire ! single sign!t re. 2013 .&of&.) M$of$. 1a$en+t we seen . conditions of the coins :et<or% e*#ects m lti#le sigs for e"ery tr!ns!ction © Armory Technologies.

2013 . Multi$Si! © Armory Technologies. Bac%ups M$of$. Inc.@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting M$of$.

ations .ll money handled by the company goes into <&of&D .A Critical PuAAle Piece • Multi$si!nature transactions are critical for lar!e or!ani. =i$e board members of a company all create wallets . Inc.ll wallets currently ha$e a single point of failure • Cou can have/ . . allets are managed by employees" who may steal . .ll money re>uires < signatures to be mo$ed © Armory Technologies. . 2013 .

2013 . Inc.89tras #tuff that I wanted to present but couldn:t fit © Armory Technologies.

Roc%et Scientist. Soft'are Developer. ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining • Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 . Perfectionist .org • Mathematician. “etotheipi” on the bitcointalk. Inc. Sub&category' “ultra&paranoid crypto&nerd” © Armory Technologies.*ho Am + • Alan Reiner . !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum • A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% . 2013 .

Accom)lishments • Be careful 'ho you trust# .. inclu"in! the (Security) Panel at San Jose 20 B4 © Armory Technologies. Inno$ated cold storage" one&time paper backups • Discovere" the ('hoops$your$'allet$isn>t$actually$ encrypte") bu! in Bitcoin$Dt 04= . Geah" whoops. Inc. But I do ha$e some street cred. • 8ore Developer of Armory Bitcoin Wallet .. 2013 .. • Spo%e on multiple "iscussion panels at Bitcoin conferences. Secure wallet software' open&source" popular" trusted ..

acQ takes effort in .?*RPR-. Presintalled in 0inuA C . ! . thorou!hly$truste" crypto tool .deb> . indows' ?ownload !p!='in and S1. it m!y &e signed' “sha256sum <filename>” % .in *(.ost tools ha$e search C import function #0inuA C .ac' ?o nothing" it+s all pre&installed.nyone can create a “$alid” signature K but not from the de$eloper+s key- )If it is ! . . The result looks something like this' f98c7a798122167c98c0a798122167f9030a7 . Mach de$eloper+s “keyI?” should be well&known' mine is 4NN<222< • 5B6 Do'nloa" the installers an" si!ne" hash filesK . Because it+s hard in indows" I $erify my indows indows installers in 0inuA Steps • 5 6 ?et ?P? an" file$hashin! tool . 0inuA C .de& inst!ller (.ac' “gpg --recv-keys <keyID>” . in' use right&click gpg5win menuQ 0inuA C . only need = dpkg-sig –verify *.ac' “gpg -v sha256hashes.2DF file hash tool #Hash8alc is good% • 526 -mport the ?P? %eys to your %eyrin! 5only "one once6 . . MA&* S3R* 0H* @-. !ompare to the hashes in the signed file • 5=6 Lerify the si!nature on the hashes file . 1ash the installer file #0inuA C .<erify 2our nstallers • ?P? is a po'erful.asc” .0 MA08H*S 0H* *MP*80*D &*C .

P. 2013 . Inc. 7eys of @aBor *allets • The most sensiti$e part of using EPE keys is the fingerprint distribution • So here they are.#most EPE apps only show last N chars% © Armory Technologies..

Gou literally take your wealth with you to your gra$e • .nd all your backups are encrypted .Brain3allets 4don-t use themC5 • 1umans are really bad at memori9ing things • Gou will lose coins • Gour family will ne$er reco$er your coins if you die .ny system that re>uires your brain to be useful is essentially a brainwallet • This is why . Gou ha$e a brainwallet- © Armory Technologies. 2013 . If all your wallets are encrypted . . Inc.rmory hates encrypted backups' .

MAercise all the best practices on the maHority of your funds . Bse multiple wallets #.rmory C . @eeps most of your funds secured" periodically refill low& security wallets . Bsually means funds are super&secure&but&incon$enient" or not properly secured • Miti!ation/ .Segregate Funds %y Security • Ris%s/ . 1a$ing all your funds in a single wallet" means all funds ha$e the same security .ultibit ha$e nati$e support% .

2013 . Gou import a key that someone else has .S3ee) 6s! m)ort • Definitions/ . Importing really only makes sense with address reuse = I already told you not to do that- • Serious Security to consi"er . “S'eepin!” an address)key means sending all the coins owned by that key to a new address #one you control% . Inc. They sweep the key after you ha$e deli$ered When in "oubt. “-mportin!” an address means to add the private key to your wallet K usually so it can be reused • When to s'eep vs import . Sweep if anyone else has e$er had access to the private key . That person pays you for ser$ices)goods . SW**P © Armory Technologies.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful