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Best Practices for Using and Securing Bitcoins
"# $ecem%er, &#"'
Alan Reiner Founder & CEO Armory Technologies, nc!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
(ist of To)ics
• • • • • • Introduction Bitcoin storage methods Bitcoin Basics The wedding of cryptography and money Security Practices The future of Bitcoin best practices
Learn to hold your own Bitcoins and let the power of decentralized money shine!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
*ho Am +
• Alan Reiner , “etotheipi” on the bitcointalk.org • Mathematician, Statistician, SW Developer, Perfectionist , ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining
• Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 , !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum
• A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% , Sub&category' “ultra¶noid crypto&nerd”
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
. (ne of four such applications featured on bitcoin.*hat is Armory+ • Armory Bitcoin Wallet is a free. Sometimes “con$enience” is one of those costs.. *ecently funded" will de$elop beginner+s interface .org • &no'n for (security at all costs) . !urrently a tool tailored to ad$anced)power users . open$source "es%top application for securin! Bitcoins yourself . .
eed Bitcoin&/t running in background #for security-% . Sign transactions from an air&gapped computer • Also innovate" many other features . . 0ots of ad$anced features .*hat is Armory+ • *ven after t'o years. . . 2013 .ultiple&wallet interface .eed to download blockchain . Inc. allets that only ha$e to be backed up one time . Printable paper backups #with fragmenting-% • .create" Armory because the best practices 'ante" 'ere not available else'here © Armory Technologies.ot for Be!inners# . Armory is still one of the only 'ays for non$e+perts to use (col" stora!e) .
But it will get easier. hopefully • Bitcoin creates both tremen"ous opportunities an" tremen"ous ris%s .e!ative/ Take control of your own money #and lose it%(If yo !re sing Bitcoin to remo"e third-#!rties from the e$ !tion. The same way email changed written communications • Bitcoin is complicate" .. yo h!"e to t!%e o"er the res#onsi&ilities of those third-#!rties'( © Armory Technologies.e payments ..Bitcoin Basics • Bitcoin has the potential to revolutioni. Inc. 1arness the opportunities" mitigate the risks' win&win • Positive/ Take control of your own money #and sa$e%• . 2013 .
*elati$ely unknown for years • 1ots of venture capital flo'in! in to turn it into somethin! much bi!!er • Still a lot of soul$searchin! to "o by the community Bitcoin may end up being the TCP/IP of money – ad anced payment systems will be built off of it! but only de elopers ha e to interact with it directly © Armory Technologies. 2013 .t-s . Inc. Started only fi$e years ago #2334% .ust a Ba%y • 0he infrastructure aroun" Bitcoin is still bein! built • Relatively spea%in!. Bitcoin is still in its infancy .
ith 73.33 in fees8 . 25)6 without restrictions . & t it r!rely e*ceeds +0.*hy Bitcoin+ • Sho' me another payment system that you can pay someone 2 0.000.-D. © Armory Technologies. Inc.01 . . Irre$ersible . !an+t be fro9en or sei9ed #without direct access to your wallet% • Bitcoin is not perfect.000 3SD/ . To and from anywhere in the world . 2013 . but it certainly is po'erful# • 0here is no other payment system li%e this# • -f only 'e coul" ma%e it safe an" usable444 )Cert!in ty#es of tr!ns!ctions m!y re$ ire fees.early instantaneously .
*hy Bitcoin+ • Decentrali.e" .33333333 Bitcoins . 2013 . Inc. Predetermined inflation" no printing)debasing • Secure# 5theoretically6 . There will only e$er be 2:"333"333. . f ngi&le. the s ##ly is limited. The entire schedule of Bitcoin generation was announced in 2334 and cannot be changed . d r!&le( © Armory Technologies.ot controlled by any one entity' run by all users of the system simultaneously• 1imite" Supply . e!sy to identify. Built from standard" trusted crypto algorithms Bitcoin shares many of the same properties as gold (no one iss es gold.
2013 . .o Bitcoin insurance © Armory Technologies.Bitcoin Storage O)tions • With Bitcoin.ay be more diligent about security than you . <2&byte secret #pri$ate key% can control 7millions . no' ("ata) is (money) . *aises the stakes of computer and network security .oney now stored directly on phone" computer" paper" etc • Store Bitcoin yourself 7 =ull control o$er your money 7 !annot be sei9ed or stolen if secured properly $ It+s easy to lose <2 bytes if you+re careless- • 1et someone else hol" your Bitcoin 7 $ $ $ . Inc.ay hold BT! properly but use poor user auth !ounterparty risk . .
Inc. (Chin!( 1*ch!nge 4!llet 1*ch!nge -ometimes sers get some of their o<n money &!c%.000 +2. 0o* .100 2.Third/Party Ris0 • 0he history of Bitcoin is fille" 'ith users trustin! thir"$parties to hol" their money & !urrently" there is no e>ui$alent of =?I! for Bitcoin "ate #er ice #er ice Type BTC Lost / #tolen $#" %alue &at time of loss' . ly 2012 -e# 2012 9ct 2013 :o" 2013 1*ch!nge 4!llet 2.000 +280. -ometimes.000 +51.000 20. © Armory Technologies.100 +23.000 +1.100.100.000 22.000 35.000 37.000 2.000 +308. ne 2011 /yBitcoin /!y 2012 .io 0B. 2013 .200.000 Bitcoinic! (61( 1*ch!nge Bitcoinic! (62( 1*ch!nge Bitfloor In# ts.000 +1. ne 2011 /t.
@eep your fires small until you are eAperienced • Sometimes the bi!!est threat to users is themselves .1olding 2our O3n Bitcoin • Hol"in! your o'n is li%e harnessin! fire . and dangerous.o one eApects their hardware to fail *"ucate yourself. 2013 . learn the ris%s.. . Can be extremely useful. Bsers are not used to truly irreco$erable data. an" e+periment 5'ith small amounts6 © Armory Technologies. Inc. ..ot e$eryone makes backups . learn the tools.
1olding 2our O3n 4cont5 • Most users shoul" not be hol"in! life$chan!in! amounts of Bitcoin themselves • Most users shoul" not be trustin! thir"$parties to protect life$chan!in! amounts of B08 for them • Wait444 so. 'hat are users suppose" to "o 9#9 Ans'er/ Most users shoul" not be puttin! life$ chan!in! amounts of money into Bitcoin yet# • Bitcoin is still the Wil" West of money • People li%e me are buil"in! safer tools : infrastructure . Inc. 2013 . But we+re not done yet © Armory Technologies.
Inc.Cryptography ( Bitcoin ) #hort! *on+Technical Introduction © Armory Technologies. 2013 .
n the internet. The Bitcoin protocol only uses “authentication” . Authenticity of communications #sign C $erify% • Bitcoin protocol "oes not use encryption . 2013 . “Are you authorized to move this money?” • All users create a private %ey 5secret6 an" a public %ey 5"istribute"6 © Armory Technologies.Pu%lic/Pri6ate 7ey Cry)to • . there are t'o main concerns/ . Inc. Privacy of communications #encrypt C decrypt% .
a” © Armory Technologies.Pu%lic and Pri6ate 7eys • 0hin% of Bitcoin as a "ecentrali.is li%e ! ban.gi"e to #!yers to de#osit money in yo r =!cco nt> .is the signing authority on th!t &!n% !cco nt • All users ma%e %eypairs for (account) mana!ement . account number . Inc.e".:9P:ePD/Eefi2?. public ban% .%ee# it secret so only you c!n ! thori?e #!yments A Bitcoin a""ress is <ust a representation of a public %ey/ Such as' “:. 2013 .PTfT0DS0m$6?i$f.
you can create those si!natures# #so your wallet includes them in your balance% © Armory Technologies.E8am)le 9et3or0 • All Bitcoins have a public (unloc%) con"ition • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ provi"e a si!nature that verifies a!ainst a specifie" public %ey • -f you have the private %ey. 2013 . Inc.
2013 .e a lot more sense after this demo--- © Armory Technologies. Inc.) Bitcoin Transaction Bitcoin might ma.
lice and Bob ha$e all the pri$ate keys associated with those coins #and a couple eAtra unused keys% .© Armory Technologies. Inc.ll coins are locked using public keys A" B and 8 #so far% • . 2013 nitial Conditions • .ssume the Bitcoin network has 2: coins • .
Inc. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions .© Armory Technologies.
2013 Bitcoin Transactions .© Armory Technologies. Inc.
2013 *ho o3ns 3hat+ .© Armory Technologies. Inc.
Inc.lice re>uesting payment .© Armory Technologies. 2013 Payment Re:uest • Bob will re>uest = B08 from .lice • Bob+s wallet will select unused pri$ate key *" and then create a payment address #based on the public key *% • Bob sends the address to .
Inc.© Armory Technologies. 2013 Create Transaction • Alice+s wallet selects some coins that she knows she can sign for #at least 5 BT!% • She will use the F BT! associated with A #think of it like a 7F bill% • Alice creates a transaction spending the F BT! . She also selects an unused key #D% to send the 2 BT! back to herself #change% .
2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice uses pri$ate key A to sign the transaction • The signature is mathematically linked to e$ery detail of the transaction .© Armory Technologies. If the transaction changes at all" the signature will break #the math stops working% . Inc.
. .© Armory Technologies. Inc. The F BT! is unspent The sig corresponds to public key A The sig is $alid for this particular transaction . 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice “broadcasts” the transaction to the Bitcoin network • Bsers of the network $erify' .
Inc.© Armory Technologies. 2013 Final Condition • The original F&BT! bill is destroyed and 2 new bills totaling F BT! created • .ll users update their databases .
Bses a new key for e$ery recei$ing operations © Armory Technologies. 1andwritten sigs can be #maliciously% transplanted between documents" Bitcoin signatures can+t be • Wallets contain a lot of private %eys . 2013 . . send to others% • Public %eys let you/ . *ecei$e money See a$ailable coins)balance • 0ransactions usually have 2 parts #payment C change% • Si!natures are mathematically lin%e" to the si!ne" "ata .*hat 1a6e *e (earned+ • Private %eys let you (unloc%) an" (re$loc%) coins un"er other public %eys #i. Inc.e.
ow we can appreciate “col" stora!e” #aka “offline wallets”% . Private keys are only re>uired to mo$e the coins -t is possible to %eep the private %eys on an offline computer an" receive money to it usin! the public %eys )rmory <!s designed to do e*!ctly this' It is the gold st!nd!rd of <!llet sec rity &est #r!ctices © Armory Technologies. (nly public keys are re>uired to recei$e payments and $erify transactions . Inc. 2013 .Cold Storage • .
#ecurity Best+Practices (for "!rying le"els of #!r!noi!( © Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 .
The easiest systems are usually the least secure. 2013 . !ommit to doing security right • A lot of users "on>t have the patience for this .Security 6s! Con6enience • . Inc. 1onestly" this is why Bitcoin may not be ready for primetime-f you>re !oin! to hol" a lot of Bitcoin it>s 'orth sacrificin! some convenience to protect yourself © Armory Technologies.early all system become more inconvenient as you increase security# .
ac" but a lot of work in indows- © Armory Technologies. Eet the de$eloper+s EPE public key and $erify- -f the installer has a vali" si!nature from the correct ?P? %ey..n attacker tampered with the installers on the real website . it "oes not matter 'here you !ot it from# There are slides at the end that eAplain in detail This is $ery easy in 0inuA C . . The installers are replaced during or after download • Miti!ation/ . 2013 .ost de$s keep a special offline EPE private key Hust for this.ll wallet de$s sign their installers using known EPE keys = ./<erify 2our nstallers • Ris%s/ . . Gou download installers from a malicious website .P. Inc.
-t is critical your bac%up be unencrypte"# = .n encrypted backup is useless if you get hit by a bus and your family would like to inherit your fortune @or most users. physical security is not a concern 0H*R*@. 0he most common reason users lose coins is "ue to not havin! an unencrypte" bac%up# = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if your hard dri$e fails = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if you forget your password = Gour family cannot inherit your Bitcoins if you get hit by a bus .n encrypted backup is useless if you forget the password = .R*/ Ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up offline an" secure it# #paper" ?I? or BSB key% .Bac0u) 2our *allets • Ris%s/ . "i!ital security is the most important @or most users.
If it+s more than your wallet $alue" don+t use it • -f you use "i!ital bac%ups. Store together" at least one will work • Paper fades over time. ma%e multiple copies . but the "ata 'ill be recoverable in A07 years Armory 0echnolo!ies recommen"s that you use paper bac%ups 'henever possible 8opy the "ata by han" if necessary Most thin!s that "estroy paper also "estroy "i!ital Armory @!#er B!c% # .Bac0u)s> $igital 6s! Pa)er • Ho' much are you 'illin! to bet that your 8D or 3SB %ey 'ill still 'or% in A$ 0 years from no'9 .
Armory and Electrum wallets only re>uire one backup" e$er = Infinite pri$ate keys generated from a single seed = Print your seed on a piece of paper for reliable storage -f you use Armory or *lectrum. !ll <!llet de"elo#ers <ill &e im#lementing the one-time-only &!c% # fe!t res . then never 'orry a!ain# In the ne*t fe< months.0/ At the time of this 'ritin! 5Dec 20 B6/ . one time. ma%e a paper bac%up. Bitcoin-Qt wallets must be backed up e$ery :33 transactions . Multibit and Bitcoin Wallet for Android re>uire regular backups unless you always reuse addresses #not good practice-% = .R0A.Bac0u) Fre:uency • -MP.ddress reuse is bad" but probably better than losing money .
Fragmented Bac0u)s • Ris%s/ . =or instance" <&of&D' print A “fragments”" need any B . “Shamir+s Secret Sharing” .ttacker needs to steal multiple fragments = *edundancyJyou can lose pieces and it still works8urrently. Armory is the only 'allet offerin! this# -t is calle" (@ra!mente" Bac%ups) 0r!#hic for 3-of-8 B!c% # . Bse M&of&. Store each fragment in a different location = SecurityJ. If you are concerned about physical security" a single&sheet unencrypted backup is a single&point of failure • Miti!ation' .
Fragmented Bac0u)s ArmoryAs Br!gmented B!c% # Interf!ce .
R0A. your 'allet 'ill be permanently encrypte" an" your coins 'ill be lost# .. Bsers are not used to the idea of truly" irreco$erable data .*allet Pass3ords • -MP.. ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up# .0/ Cour 'allet pass'or" is your encryption %ey for your 'allet# • -f you for!et your pass'or".ake an unencrypted backup- -f you>ve ever for!otten a pass'or".o really/ ->m serious your coins 'ill be lost forever . .unless you ha$e an unencrypted backup • .
ma%e unencrypte" bac%ups# . Armory+s key&stretching is resistant to EPB&acceleration • -f someone !ets your encrypte" 'allet. *ecommended :2&:F characters for no key&stretching . . !on$erting your password into the encryption key is a computationally&intense process . must lon!er pass'or"s . ithout stretching' :"333"333 & D"333"333 passwords)sec ith stretching' D & D3 passwords)sec • -f %ey$stretchin! is not use". they can !uess/ . *ecommended :3&:2 characters with key&stretching 3se a stron! pass'or".Pass3ord (ength • Armory an" Bitcoin$Dt both use (%ey$stretchin!) .
2 ch!rs (<ith stretching( .000 ye!rs .700 ye!rs 130 d!ys 21C ye!rs 333.2 ch!rs (no stretching( 0 ch!rs (<ith stretching( 1 ch!rs (<ith stretching( . Computer 10 min 7 d!ys 1C.!///!/// computers could be used to brea. .Pass3ord (ength Time to brute&force your wallet password8 Password Length 0 ch!rs (no stretching( 1 ch!rs (no stretching( .000. Truly random passwords of these lengths will be much more secure. your wallet encryption 8!a$eats' used <3&character alphabet to simulate poor entropy of human&generated passwords.!///!/// Computers Instant Instant C d!ys Instant 2 ho rs 333 ye!rs If your wallet is aluable enough! a bot+net of .
Bsually ha$e an option to eAplicitly create -f you are usin! Bitcoin$Dt.$o 9ot Reuse Addresses • Ris%s/ . Bitcoin is actually not $ery good at anonymity . you may 'ant to reuse a""resses any'ay if you "o not create bac%ups re!ularly4 (l!c% of #ri"!cy is s !lly #referred to losing coins( © Armory Technologies. *eusing addresses can hurt other users+ pri$acy as well • Miti!ation/ . Bitcoin$Dt. hen you reuse addresses you make it far worse . Inc. Multibit C An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet reuse addresses by default . Armory and *lectrum do not reuse addresses by default . . Some users force reuse due to lack of understanding or simplicity of backups This is doing more harm than good in Armory C *lectrum . 2013 . Multibit or An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet.
*eusing the same public&pri$ate keypair is eApected C safe throughout the rest of internet security . 2013 .Address Reuse & Pri6acy • Discussion/ .ddress reuse is mostly a pri$acy issue" not a security issue . But it is egregiously bad for pri$acy in Bitcoin • 0here are conte+ts in 'hich it is o%ay. but not stan"ar" . ?onation addresses' all users donating know it is hea$ily reused" and accept being linked to it 3sers "o not reali. . Inc.e <ust ho' much privacy information is lea%e" by interactin! 'ith heavily$reuse" a""resses# © Armory Technologies.
you have no e+cuse for reusin! a""resses# .Address Reuse & Pri6acy • -f you are usin! Armory or *lectrum.o matter how many new addresses you use" a backup made when the wallet was created will always work- © Armory Technologies. 2013 . Inc. Both automatically generate new addresses for all operations K you ha$e to go out of your way to reuse . Both produce backups that work fore$er = .
2013 . Inc. SiA confirmations is generally considered irre$ersible • 8onfirmations come on avera!e every 0 minutes .*hat are Confirmations+ • Bitcoin transactions are not instantaneous • *ach confirmation is increase" consensus that the transaction actually happene" . . . The first confirmation is the most important .ctually eAponential random' usually B0 sec to =A min © Armory Technologies.ore confirmations means more confidence .
(r" you+re willing to eat the loss when re$ersed • Attac%s on .ero$confirmation transactions unless there is pre$e+istin! trust# . 2013 . Inc.Confirmation Ris0s • Do not trust .ero$confirmation t+ are easy an" cheap . Lust not that many people doing it right now • Attac%s on one$ confirmation t+ reEuire a bit more resources = But they are possible- © Armory Technologies.
. This will not work in all en$ironments #not e$eryone has an SS0 certificate% • Pic% up the phone an" call the other parties . This is much more reliable with an offline computer . .anually $erify the address before eAecution .ake sure they are who you think they are.Call/to/<erify Addresses • -f you are sen"in! lar!e amounts of Bitcoin/ . Gou want to make sure you send it to the right place. .n attacker could replace the correct address with his own on its way to your wallet software • 0his is a serious security issue# . The “payment protocol” hopes to sol$e this by using SS0 concepts to pre$ent address tampering .
Inc.Cold #torage and the 3oly 4rail © Armory Technologies. 2013 .
. Pri$ate keys created and ne$er lea$e the offline computer . The pri$ate keys are on an internet&attached system .1ot 6s! Cold (Hot) Wallet .ll wallets are “hot” by default (8ol") 'allet 5(offline 'allet)6 . Eold standard of security . Transactions are signed offline .
1ot 6s! Cold Security
• All %no'n, ma<or Bitcoin breaches to "ate/ , !oins stored on a hot wallet , (r unencrypted backups stored on an “hot” computer
• 8ompromisin! a col" 'allet reEuires one of the follo'in!/ , Physical access , MAtremely ad$anced BSB $iruses , Bser accidentally installing malicious software
Setting u) the Offline Com)uter
5nline computer 5ffline computer
• 5 6 -nstall Armory
• 5 6 -nstall Armory • 526 8reate ne' 'allet • 5B6 8reate paper bac%up
, !opy by hand" if necessary
• 5=6 8reate ('atchin!$ only) copy of 'allet • 5A6 8opy to 3SB "rive • 5F6 -mport ('atchin!$ only) 'allet
Cour ('atchin!$only) 'allet has only public %eys, no private %eys#
$oing an Offline Transaction
5nline computer 5ffline computer
• 5 6 8reate transaction
, Same as you would with a hot wallet
• 526 Save unsi!ne" transaction to 3SB • 5B6 1oa" t+ from 3SB • 5=6 Revie' for accuracy#
, ;ll benefit is lost if you don+t re$iew on the clean" offline computer
• 5F6 1oa" si!ne" transaction, broa"cast to net'or%
• 5A6 Si!n the transaction, save to 3SB
not security . !onfirm incoming transactions . the offline 'allet is the si!nin! authority4 . See balances • 0his computer cannot "isplay balances . It can re$iew transactions and re>uest confirmation • Remember.S)litting roles 5nline computer 5ffline computer • 0he 'atchin!$only 'allet behaves i"entically to a re!ular 'allet. It has no access to the network to know where your money is. Eenerate addresses . It does nothing else but read and sign transactions- • An attac%er !ettin! the online 'allet is a breach of privacy. but cannot si!nGspen" .
$oing it Right • -f you are runnin! any %in" of online Bitcoin business.o one 'ho !ains access to the server can steal it# . &eep bul% of your fun"s in an offline computer = Gou can e$en keep it in a safe&deposit boA. Includes employees -f you nee" a hot 'allet. Inc. 2013 . offline$'allets are an invaluable tool . perio"ically refill from the col" 'allet © Armory Technologies. %eep it small. All 'ebservers an" on$site computers should only use watching-only wallets! = Securely collect payments to the offline wallet = Track your wallet balance = Track and $erify all payments)transactions = .
nline' indows OP using . Inc. It+s an offline computer because the computer is offline • Mi+ an" match versions to your heart>s content . The following setup works fine' = .rmory 3.35 using .rmory 3. 2013 .FA? • 0here is no special version of Armory for offline .2 = .43 © Armory Technologies.ffline' Bbuntu :3.N6.
ffline Bun"les) . 2013 .35 .nce you !o "o'n the (col" stora!e) path you are implementin! serious security • As of this 'ritin!. 0inuA has a much better history of resisting BSB& based attacks . The offline computer needs no other software at all- © Armory Technologies. e are working on better methods for secure transfer • Armory 'ebsite has 3buntu (. Inc. ill install and run on the first boot of a fresh install of Bbuntu :3.Use (inu8 • .35 or :2. the best 'ay to move "ata bet'een online : offline computer is 3SB "rives .
E8tra Credit • De"icate a small 3SB %ey for offline transactions .ups6 © Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 . .inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses • De"icate a computer for the creatin! transactions . .inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses . .lso adds an eAtra layer of security "id I mention! ma. . ithout it" someone not authori9ed can still see the wallet $alue and transaction history .e unencrypted bac.ake it eAclusi$e for Bitcoin processing • 3se full$"is% encryption to protect privacy .
Inc.The 7uture Coming #oon! © Armory Technologies. 2013 .
It will only emit the public keys Tre?or D!rd<!re 4!llet • The 0re. Inc.1ard3are *allets • . The private keys cannot be read from it .or is the most anticipated 1 • Should be released in Lanuary" 23:5 wallet © Armory Technologies. great tradeoff for security and con$enience • 1ardware wallets hold the private keys and si!n on the "evice . 2013 .
Should be supported by all maHor wallet apps • Will be a hu!e 'in for convenience : security © Armory Technologies. They lack fleAibility . .e" . !onnect directly to online computer $ia BSB • 0he 'allets they use are stan"ar"i.ore difficult to audit .1ard3are *allets • Har"'are 'allets are an H0I solution . 2013 .nother layer of trust re>uired . . Inc.
Inc. This is a 2$of$B multi&signature transaction © Armory Technologies. 1ere+s a public key" sign with its private key to mo$e • Much more comple+ con"itions are possible/ .@ulti/Signature Transactions • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ . 1ere+s B public keys" sign with any 2 private keys . 2013 .
2013 . this soun"s familiar# . beforeP • Ces# @ra!mente" bac%ups also use (M$of$. from ! single com# ter The fr!gments only need to &e collected if <!llet is lost M$of$.) M$of$. conditions of the coins :et<or% e*#ects m lti#le sigs for e"ery tr!ns!ction © Armory Technologies.+enforced / lti#le # &lic %eys !re incl ded in the unloc.@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting • Wait a sec. 1a$en+t we seen . Inc.&of&. Bac%ups Br!gmented &!c% #s !re for sec ring yo r &!c% # All tr!ns!ctions still re$ ire ! single sign!t re. Multi$Si! / lti-sign!t re tr!ns!ctions !re networ.
Bac%ups M$of$. Multi$Si! © Armory Technologies.@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting M$of$. Inc. 2013 .
2013 . =i$e board members of a company all create wallets . Inc.ll money re>uires < signatures to be mo$ed © Armory Technologies. .ll money handled by the company goes into <&of&D .ations . . .ll wallets currently ha$e a single point of failure • Cou can have/ .A Critical PuAAle Piece • Multi$si!nature transactions are critical for lar!e or!ani. allets are managed by employees" who may steal .
2013 .89tras #tuff that I wanted to present but couldn:t fit © Armory Technologies. Inc.
*ho Am + • Alan Reiner . Soft'are Developer. !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum • A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% . “etotheipi” on the bitcointalk.org • Mathematician. 2013 . Perfectionist . Sub&category' “ultra¶noid crypto&nerd” © Armory Technologies. Roc%et Scientist. Inc. ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining • Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 .
• 8ore Developer of Armory Bitcoin Wallet . • Spo%e on multiple "iscussion panels at Bitcoin conferences.. inclu"in! the (Security) Panel at San Jose 20 B4 © Armory Technologies. Geah" whoops. Inno$ated cold storage" one&time paper backups • Discovere" the ('hoops$your$'allet$isn>t$actually$ encrypte") bu! in Bitcoin$Dt 04= . Secure wallet software' open&source" popular" trusted . But I do ha$e some street cred.Accom)lishments • Be careful 'ho you trust# ... Inc.. 2013 .
! .nyone can create a “$alid” signature K but not from the de$eloper+s key- )If it is ! . Mach de$eloper+s “keyI?” should be well&known' mine is 4NN<222< • 5B6 Do'nloa" the installers an" si!ne" hash filesK . it m!y &e signed directly. !ompare to the hashes in the signed file • 5=6 Lerify the si!nature on the hashes file .<erify 2our nstallers • ?P? is a po'erful.de& inst!ller (. thorou!hly$truste" crypto tool .ost tools ha$e search C import function #0inuA C .ac' “sha256sum <filename>” % .ac' “gpg -v sha256hashes. 1ash the installer file #0inuA C .asc” .ac' “gpg --recv-keys <keyID>” .deb> . Because it+s hard in indows" I $erify my indows indows installers in 0inuA Steps • 5 6 ?et ?P? an" file$hashin! tool . The result looks something like this' f98c7a798122167c98c0a798122167f9030a7 . 0inuA C . MA&* S3R* 0H* @-.0 MA08H*S 0H* *MP*80*D &*C . only need = dpkg-sig –verify *.acQ takes effort in .ac' ?o nothing" it+s all pre&installed. in' use right&click gpg5win menuQ 0inuA C . Presintalled in 0inuA C . . . indows' ?ownload !p!='in and S1.in *(.?*RPR-.2DF file hash tool #Hash8alc is good% • 526 -mport the ?P? %eys to your %eyrin! 5only "one once6 .
7eys of @aBor *allets • The most sensiti$e part of using EPE keys is the fingerprint distribution • So here they are.P.#most EPE apps only show last N chars% © Armory Technologies. 2013 .. Inc.
. Gou literally take your wealth with you to your gra$e • . Gou ha$e a brainwallet- © Armory Technologies.nd all your backups are encrypted . If all your wallets are encrypted .rmory hates encrypted backups' .Brain3allets 4don-t use themC5 • 1umans are really bad at memori9ing things • Gou will lose coins • Gour family will ne$er reco$er your coins if you die .ny system that re>uires your brain to be useful is essentially a brainwallet • This is why . Inc. 2013 .
Bsually means funds are super&secure&but&incon$enient" or not properly secured • Miti!ation/ .Segregate Funds %y Security • Ris%s/ . @eeps most of your funds secured" periodically refill low& security wallets . 1a$ing all your funds in a single wallet" means all funds ha$e the same security .ultibit ha$e nati$e support% .rmory C . MAercise all the best practices on the maHority of your funds . Bse multiple wallets #.
S3ee) 6s! m)ort • Definitions/ . SW**P © Armory Technologies. Importing really only makes sense with address reuse = I already told you not to do that- • Serious Security to consi"er . They sweep the key after you ha$e deli$ered When in "oubt. Sweep if anyone else has e$er had access to the private key . Inc. 2013 . That person pays you for ser$ices)goods . Gou import a key that someone else has . “-mportin!” an address means to add the private key to your wallet K usually so it can be reused • When to s'eep vs import . “S'eepin!” an address)key means sending all the coins owned by that key to a new address #one you control% .
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