Inside Bitcoins Conference, Dec 10-11, 2013

Best Practices for Using and Securing Bitcoins
"# $ecem%er, &#"'

Alan Reiner Founder & CEO Armory Technologies, nc!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

(ist of To)ics
• • • • • • Introduction Bitcoin storage methods Bitcoin Basics The wedding of cryptography and money Security Practices The future of Bitcoin best practices

Learn to hold your own Bitcoins and let the power of decentralized money shine!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

*ho Am +
• Alan Reiner , “etotheipi” on the bitcointalk.org • Mathematician, Statistician, SW Developer, Perfectionist , ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining

• Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 , !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum

• A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% , Sub&category' “ultra&paranoid crypto&nerd”

© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

(ne of four such applications featured on bitcoin.. open$source "es%top application for securin! Bitcoins yourself ..org • &no'n for (security at all costs) . !urrently a tool tailored to ad$anced)power users . *ecently funded" will de$elop beginner+s interface . .*hat is Armory+ • Armory Bitcoin Wallet is a free. Sometimes “con$enience” is one of those costs.

*hat is Armory+ • *ven after t'o years. . Inc. Printable paper backups #with fragmenting-% • .ultiple&wallet interface .eed to download blockchain . 2013 . 0ots of ad$anced features .eed Bitcoin&/t running in background #for security-% . .ot for Be!inners# .create" Armory because the best practices 'ante" 'ere not available else'here © Armory Technologies. Sign transactions from an air&gapped computer • Also innovate" many other features . . allets that only ha$e to be backed up one time . Armory is still one of the only 'ays for non$e+perts to use (col" stora!e) .

Inc.Bitcoin Basics • Bitcoin has the potential to revolutioni.e!ative/ Take control of your own money #and lose it%(If yo !re sing Bitcoin to remo"e third-#!rties from the e$ !tion. yo h!"e to t!%e o"er the res#onsi&ilities of those third-#!rties'( © Armory Technologies.e payments .. 1arness the opportunities" mitigate the risks' win&win • Positive/ Take control of your own money #and sa$e%• . 2013 . hopefully • Bitcoin creates both tremen"ous opportunities an" tremen"ous ris%s . But it will get easier. The same way email changed written communications • Bitcoin is complicate" ..

ust a Ba%y • 0he infrastructure aroun" Bitcoin is still bein! built • Relatively spea%in!.t-s . Started only fi$e years ago #2334% . Bitcoin is still in its infancy . 2013 . Inc. *elati$ely unknown for years • 1ots of venture capital flo'in! in to turn it into somethin! much bi!!er • Still a lot of soul$searchin! to "o by the community Bitcoin may end up being the TCP/IP of money – ad anced payment systems will be built off of it! but only de elopers ha e to interact with it directly © Armory Technologies.

01 . Irre$ersible . & t it r!rely e*ceeds +0. !an+t be fro9en or sei9ed #without direct access to your wallet% • Bitcoin is not perfect. To and from anywhere in the world . 25)6 without restrictions . Inc.*hy Bitcoin+ • Sho' me another payment system that you can pay someone 2 0.-D.000 3SD/ .33 in fees8 .000. but it certainly is po'erful# • 0here is no other payment system li%e this# • -f only 'e coul" ma%e it safe an" usable444 )Cert!in ty#es of tr!ns!ctions m!y re$ ire fees. ith 73.early instantaneously . 2013 . © Armory Technologies. .

e" . the s ##ly is limited.33333333 Bitcoins . f ngi&le. Inc.ot controlled by any one entity' run by all users of the system simultaneously• 1imite" Supply . . The entire schedule of Bitcoin generation was announced in 2334 and cannot be changed .*hy Bitcoin+ • Decentrali. 2013 . d r!&le( © Armory Technologies. Predetermined inflation" no printing)debasing • Secure# 5theoretically6 . Built from standard" trusted crypto algorithms Bitcoin shares many of the same properties as gold (no one iss es gold. There will only e$er be 2:"333"333. e!sy to identify.

*aises the stakes of computer and network security . .Bitcoin Storage O)tions • With Bitcoin. 2013 . no' ("ata) is (money) .o Bitcoin insurance © Armory Technologies.ay hold BT! properly but use poor user auth !ounterparty risk .oney now stored directly on phone" computer" paper" etc • Store Bitcoin yourself 7 =ull control o$er your money 7 !annot be sei9ed or stolen if secured properly $ It+s easy to lose <2 bytes if you+re careless- • 1et someone else hol" your Bitcoin 7 $ $ $ . . <2&byte secret #pri$ate key% can control 7millions . Inc.ay be more diligent about security than you .

000 35. © Armory Technologies. -ometimes. ly 2012 -e# 2012 9ct 2013 :o" 2013 1*ch!nge 4!llet 2. 0o* .100.io 0B.100 +23.000 +280.200.100 2. (Chin!( 1*ch!nge 4!llet 1*ch!nge -ometimes sers get some of their o<n money &!c%.100.000 +1. 2013 .000 22.000 +1.000 20.000 +51. ne 2011 /yBitcoin /!y 2012 .000 2.000 +308.Third/Party Ris0 • 0he history of Bitcoin is fille" 'ith users trustin! thir"$parties to hol" their money & !urrently" there is no e>ui$alent of =?I! for Bitcoin "ate #er ice #er ice Type BTC Lost / #tolen $#" %alue &at time of loss' .000 +2. ne 2011 /t. Inc.000 Bitcoinic! (61( 1*ch!nge Bitcoinic! (62( 1*ch!nge Bitfloor In# ts.000 37.

..ot e$eryone makes backups .o one eApects their hardware to fail *"ucate yourself. @eep your fires small until you are eAperienced • Sometimes the bi!!est threat to users is themselves . an" e+periment 5'ith small amounts6 © Armory Technologies. Bsers are not used to truly irreco$erable data.. learn the tools.1olding 2our O3n Bitcoin • Hol"in! your o'n is li%e harnessin! fire . . 2013 . Can be extremely useful. and dangerous. learn the ris%s. Inc.

2013 . Inc. 'hat are users suppose" to "o 9#9 Ans'er/ Most users shoul" not be puttin! life$ chan!in! amounts of money into Bitcoin yet# • Bitcoin is still the Wil" West of money • People li%e me are buil"in! safer tools : infrastructure .1olding 2our O3n 4cont5 • Most users shoul" not be hol"in! life$chan!in! amounts of Bitcoin themselves • Most users shoul" not be trustin! thir"$parties to protect life$chan!in! amounts of B08 for them • Wait444 so. But we+re not done yet © Armory Technologies.

Cryptography ( Bitcoin ) #hort! *on+Technical Introduction © Armory Technologies. 2013 . Inc.

Privacy of communications #encrypt C decrypt% . Authenticity of communications #sign C $erify% • Bitcoin protocol "oes not use encryption .Pu%lic/Pri6ate 7ey Cry)to • . The Bitcoin protocol only uses “authentication” . Inc. there are t'o main concerns/ .n the internet. “Are you authorized to move this money?” • All users create a private %ey 5secret6 an" a public %ey 5"istribute"6 © Armory Technologies. 2013 .

account number .is the signing authority on th!t &!n% !cco nt • All users ma%e %eypairs for (account) mana!ement . public ban% .is li%e ! ban.a” © Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 .:9P:ePD/Eefi2?.PTfT0DS0m$6?i$f.gi"e to #!yers to de#osit money in yo r =!cco nt> .e".Pu%lic and Pri6ate 7eys • 0hin% of Bitcoin as a "ecentrali.%ee# it secret so only you c!n ! thori?e #!yments A Bitcoin a""ress is <ust a representation of a public %ey/ Such as' “:.

Inc. 2013 . you can create those si!natures# #so your wallet includes them in your balance% © Armory Technologies.E8am)le 9et3or0 • All Bitcoins have a public (unloc%) con"ition • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ provi"e a si!nature that verifies a!ainst a specifie" public %ey • -f you have the private %ey.

2013 .) Bitcoin Transaction Bitcoin might ma.e a lot more sense after this demo--- © Armory Technologies. Inc.

ll coins are locked using public keys A" B and 8 #so far% • .© Armory Technologies.ssume the Bitcoin network has 2: coins • .lice and Bob ha$e all the pri$ate keys associated with those coins #and a couple eAtra unused keys% . Inc. 2013 nitial Conditions • .

Inc.© Armory Technologies. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions .

© Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions .

2013 *ho o3ns 3hat+ .© Armory Technologies. Inc.

lice • Bob+s wallet will select unused pri$ate key *" and then create a payment address #based on the public key *% • Bob sends the address to . Inc.© Armory Technologies.lice re>uesting payment . 2013 Payment Re:uest • Bob will re>uest = B08 from .

© Armory Technologies. 2013 Create Transaction • Alice+s wallet selects some coins that she knows she can sign for #at least 5 BT!% • She will use the F BT! associated with A #think of it like a 7F bill% • Alice creates a transaction spending the F BT! . Inc. She also selects an unused key #D% to send the 2 BT! back to herself #change% .

Inc.© Armory Technologies. If the transaction changes at all" the signature will break #the math stops working% . 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice uses pri$ate key A to sign the transaction • The signature is mathematically linked to e$ery detail of the transaction .

Inc. The F BT! is unspent The sig corresponds to public key A The sig is $alid for this particular transaction .© Armory Technologies. . 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice “broadcasts” the transaction to the Bitcoin network • Bsers of the network $erify' . .

2013 Final Condition • The original F&BT! bill is destroyed and 2 new bills totaling F BT! created • . Inc.© Armory Technologies.ll users update their databases .

send to others% • Public %eys let you/ . *ecei$e money See a$ailable coins)balance • 0ransactions usually have 2 parts #payment C change% • Si!natures are mathematically lin%e" to the si!ne" "ata .e. 1andwritten sigs can be #maliciously% transplanted between documents" Bitcoin signatures can+t be • Wallets contain a lot of private %eys . Inc. Bses a new key for e$ery recei$ing operations © Armory Technologies. .*hat 1a6e *e (earned+ • Private %eys let you (unloc%) an" (re$loc%) coins un"er other public %eys #i. 2013 .

Cold Storage • .ow we can appreciate “col" stora!e” #aka “offline wallets”% . Private keys are only re>uired to mo$e the coins -t is possible to %eep the private %eys on an offline computer an" receive money to it usin! the public %eys )rmory <!s designed to do e*!ctly this' It is the gold st!nd!rd of <!llet sec rity &est #r!ctices © Armory Technologies. (nly public keys are re>uired to recei$e payments and $erify transactions . Inc. 2013 .

#ecurity Best+Practices (for "!rying le"els of #!r!noi!( © Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 .

The easiest systems are usually the least secure. 1onestly" this is why Bitcoin may not be ready for primetime-f you>re !oin! to hol" a lot of Bitcoin it>s 'orth sacrificin! some convenience to protect yourself © Armory Technologies.early all system become more inconvenient as you increase security# . Inc. !ommit to doing security right • A lot of users "on>t have the patience for this .Security 6s! Con6enience • . 2013 .

ac" but a lot of work in indows- © Armory Technologies./<erify 2our nstallers • Ris%s/ . The installers are replaced during or after download • Miti!ation/ .ost de$s keep a special offline EPE private key Hust for this. .P. 2013 .ll wallet de$s sign their installers using known EPE keys = . Eet the de$eloper+s EPE public key and $erify- -f the installer has a vali" si!nature from the correct ?P? %ey. .. it "oes not matter 'here you !ot it from# There are slides at the end that eAplain in detail This is $ery easy in 0inuA C . Gou download installers from a malicious website . Inc.n attacker tampered with the installers on the real website .

n encrypted backup is useless if you get hit by a bus and your family would like to inherit your fortune @or most users. physical security is not a concern 0H*R*@.n encrypted backup is useless if you forget the password = .R*/ Ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up offline an" secure it# #paper" ?I? or BSB key% .Bac0u) 2our *allets • Ris%s/ . "i!ital security is the most important @or most users. 0he most common reason users lose coins is "ue to not havin! an unencrypte" bac%up# = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if your hard dri$e fails = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if you forget your password = Gour family cannot inherit your Bitcoins if you get hit by a bus . -t is critical your bac%up be unencrypte"# = .

If it+s more than your wallet $alue" don+t use it • -f you use "i!ital bac%ups. Store together" at least one will work • Paper fades over time.Bac0u)s> $igital 6s! Pa)er • Ho' much are you 'illin! to bet that your 8D or 3SB %ey 'ill still 'or% in A$ 0 years from no'9 . but the "ata 'ill be recoverable in A07 years Armory 0echnolo!ies recommen"s that you use paper bac%ups 'henever possible 8opy the "ata by han" if necessary Most thin!s that "estroy paper also "estroy "i!ital Armory @!#er B!c% # . ma%e multiple copies .

Bitcoin-Qt wallets must be backed up e$ery :33 transactions .R0A.Bac0u) Fre:uency • -MP. ma%e a paper bac%up. one time. Multibit and Bitcoin Wallet for Android re>uire regular backups unless you always reuse addresses #not good practice-% = .ddress reuse is bad" but probably better than losing money . then never 'orry a!ain# In the ne*t fe< months.0/ At the time of this 'ritin! 5Dec 20 B6/ . !ll <!llet de"elo#ers <ill &e im#lementing the one-time-only &!c% # fe!t res . Armory and Electrum wallets only re>uire one backup" e$er = Infinite pri$ate keys generated from a single seed = Print your seed on a piece of paper for reliable storage -f you use Armory or *lectrum.

=or instance" <&of&D' print A “fragments”" need any B . If you are concerned about physical security" a single&sheet unencrypted backup is a single&point of failure • Miti!ation' . Bse M&of&.ttacker needs to steal multiple fragments = *edundancyJyou can lose pieces and it still works8urrently.Fragmented Bac0u)s • Ris%s/ . “Shamir+s Secret Sharing” . Store each fragment in a different location = SecurityJ. Armory is the only 'allet offerin! this# -t is calle" (@ra!mente" Bac%ups) 0r!#hic for 3-of-8 B!c% # .

Fragmented Bac0u)s ArmoryAs Br!gmented B!c% # Interf!ce .

.ake an unencrypted backup- -f you>ve ever for!otten a pass'or". .unless you ha$e an unencrypted backup • . ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up# .. Bsers are not used to the idea of truly" irreco$erable data .*allet Pass3ords • -MP.R0A.0/ Cour 'allet pass'or" is your encryption %ey for your 'allet# • -f you for!et your pass'or". your 'allet 'ill be permanently encrypte" an" your coins 'ill be lost# .o really/ ->m serious your coins 'ill be lost forever .

ithout stretching' :"333"333 & D"333"333 passwords)sec ith stretching' D & D3 passwords)sec • -f %ey$stretchin! is not use". must lon!er pass'or"s . ma%e unencrypte" bac%ups# .Pass3ord (ength • Armory an" Bitcoin$Dt both use (%ey$stretchin!) . . !on$erting your password into the encryption key is a computationally&intense process . *ecommended :2&:F characters for no key&stretching . they can !uess/ . *ecommended :3&:2 characters with key&stretching 3se a stron! pass'or". Armory+s key&stretching is resistant to EPB&acceleration • -f someone !ets your encrypte" 'allet.

Pass3ord (ength Time to brute&force your wallet password8 Password Length 0 ch!rs (no stretching( 1 ch!rs (no stretching( .700 ye!rs 130 d!ys 21C ye!rs 333.2 ch!rs (<ith stretching( .2 ch!rs (no stretching( 0 ch!rs (<ith stretching( 1 ch!rs (<ith stretching( .000 ye!rs . Computer 10 min 7 d!ys 1C.000.!///!/// computers could be used to brea. your wallet encryption 8!a$eats' used <3&character alphabet to simulate poor entropy of human&generated passwords.!///!/// Computers Instant Instant C d!ys Instant 2 ho rs 333 ye!rs If your wallet is aluable enough! a bot+net of . . Truly random passwords of these lengths will be much more secure.

Inc. 2013 . Some users force reuse due to lack of understanding or simplicity of backups This is doing more harm than good in Armory C *lectrum . . *eusing addresses can hurt other users+ pri$acy as well • Miti!ation/ . Bitcoin$Dt. Multibit C An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet reuse addresses by default . hen you reuse addresses you make it far worse . Bsually ha$e an option to eAplicitly create -f you are usin! Bitcoin$Dt. Multibit or An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet.$o 9ot Reuse Addresses • Ris%s/ . you may 'ant to reuse a""resses any'ay if you "o not create bac%ups re!ularly4 (l!c% of #ri"!cy is s !lly #referred to losing coins( © Armory Technologies. Armory and *lectrum do not reuse addresses by default . Bitcoin is actually not $ery good at anonymity .

but not stan"ar" . *eusing the same public&pri$ate keypair is eApected C safe throughout the rest of internet security . Inc.Address Reuse & Pri6acy • Discussion/ . But it is egregiously bad for pri$acy in Bitcoin • 0here are conte+ts in 'hich it is o%ay. 2013 .e <ust ho' much privacy information is lea%e" by interactin! 'ith heavily$reuse" a""resses# © Armory Technologies.ddress reuse is mostly a pri$acy issue" not a security issue . ?onation addresses' all users donating know it is hea$ily reused" and accept being linked to it 3sers "o not reali. .

o matter how many new addresses you use" a backup made when the wallet was created will always work- © Armory Technologies. Both automatically generate new addresses for all operations K you ha$e to go out of your way to reuse .Address Reuse & Pri6acy • -f you are usin! Armory or *lectrum. Inc. you have no e+cuse for reusin! a""resses# . 2013 . Both produce backups that work fore$er = .

*hat are Confirmations+ • Bitcoin transactions are not instantaneous • *ach confirmation is increase" consensus that the transaction actually happene" .ore confirmations means more confidence . The first confirmation is the most important . SiA confirmations is generally considered irre$ersible • 8onfirmations come on avera!e every 0 minutes . 2013 . . Inc. .ctually eAponential random' usually B0 sec to =A min © Armory Technologies.

Lust not that many people doing it right now • Attac%s on one$ confirmation t+ reEuire a bit more resources = But they are possible- © Armory Technologies.ero$confirmation t+ are easy an" cheap . 2013 .Confirmation Ris0s • Do not trust .ero$confirmation transactions unless there is pre$e+istin! trust# . Inc. (r" you+re willing to eat the loss when re$ersed • Attac%s on .

This is much more reliable with an offline computer . This will not work in all en$ironments #not e$eryone has an SS0 certificate% • Pic% up the phone an" call the other parties .Call/to/<erify Addresses • -f you are sen"in! lar!e amounts of Bitcoin/ .ake sure they are who you think they are. Gou want to make sure you send it to the right place.n attacker could replace the correct address with his own on its way to your wallet software • 0his is a serious security issue# . The “payment protocol” hopes to sol$e this by using SS0 concepts to pre$ent address tampering . .anually $erify the address before eAecution . . .

Inc.Cold #torage and the 3oly 4rail © Armory Technologies. 2013 .

. The pri$ate keys are on an internet&attached system . Eold standard of security . Transactions are signed offline . Pri$ate keys created and ne$er lea$e the offline computer .1ot 6s! Cold (Hot) Wallet .ll wallets are “hot” by default (8ol") 'allet 5(offline 'allet)6 .

1ot 6s! Cold Security
• All %no'n, ma<or Bitcoin breaches to "ate/ , !oins stored on a hot wallet , (r unencrypted backups stored on an “hot” computer

• 8ompromisin! a col" 'allet reEuires one of the follo'in!/ , Physical access , MAtremely ad$anced BSB $iruses , Bser accidentally installing malicious software

Setting u) the Offline Com)uter
5nline computer 5ffline computer

• 5 6 -nstall Armory

• 5 6 -nstall Armory • 526 8reate ne' 'allet • 5B6 8reate paper bac%up
, !opy by hand" if necessary

• 5=6 8reate ('atchin!$ only) copy of 'allet • 5A6 8opy to 3SB "rive • 5F6 -mport ('atchin!$ only) 'allet

Cour ('atchin!$only) 'allet has only public %eys, no private %eys#

$oing an Offline Transaction
5nline computer 5ffline computer

• 5 6 8reate transaction
, Same as you would with a hot wallet

• 526 Save unsi!ne" transaction to 3SB • 5B6 1oa" t+ from 3SB • 5=6 Revie' for accuracy#
, ;ll benefit is lost if you don+t re$iew on the clean" offline computer

• 5F6 1oa" si!ne" transaction, broa"cast to net'or%

• 5A6 Si!n the transaction, save to 3SB

the offline 'allet is the si!nin! authority4 . It does nothing else but read and sign transactions- • An attac%er !ettin! the online 'allet is a breach of privacy. It has no access to the network to know where your money is. See balances • 0his computer cannot "isplay balances . not security . It can re$iew transactions and re>uest confirmation • Remember. but cannot si!nGspen" . !onfirm incoming transactions .S)litting roles 5nline computer 5ffline computer • 0he 'atchin!$only 'allet behaves i"entically to a re!ular 'allet. Eenerate addresses .

All 'ebservers an" on$site computers should only use watching-only wallets! = Securely collect payments to the offline wallet = Track your wallet balance = Track and $erify all payments)transactions = .o one 'ho !ains access to the server can steal it# . perio"ically refill from the col" 'allet © Armory Technologies. 2013 . Inc. Includes employees -f you nee" a hot 'allet. &eep bul% of your fun"s in an offline computer = Gou can e$en keep it in a safe&deposit boA. %eep it small.$oing it Right • -f you are runnin! any %in" of online Bitcoin business. offline$'allets are an invaluable tool .

43 © Armory Technologies.2 = .35 using .rmory 3. The following setup works fine' = . 2013 . Inc. It+s an offline computer because the computer is offline • Mi+ an" match versions to your heart>s content .ffline' Bbuntu :3.N6.nline' indows OP using .rmory 3.FA? • 0here is no special version of Armory for offline .

2013 . Inc.35 . ill install and run on the first boot of a fresh install of Bbuntu :3. 0inuA has a much better history of resisting BSB& based attacks .ffline Bun"les) . The offline computer needs no other software at all- © Armory Technologies. e are working on better methods for secure transfer • Armory 'ebsite has 3buntu (.Use (inu8 • . the best 'ay to move "ata bet'een online : offline computer is 3SB "rives .35 or :2.nce you !o "o'n the (col" stora!e) path you are implementin! serious security • As of this 'ritin!.

inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses • De"icate a computer for the creatin! transactions . .e unencrypted bac. . . Inc.lso adds an eAtra layer of security "id I mention! ma.inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses .ups6 © Armory Technologies. ithout it" someone not authori9ed can still see the wallet $alue and transaction history . .ake it eAclusi$e for Bitcoin processing • 3se full$"is% encryption to protect privacy . 2013 .E8tra Credit • De"icate a small 3SB %ey for offline transactions .

Inc. 2013 .The 7uture Coming #oon! © Armory Technologies.

great tradeoff for security and con$enience • 1ardware wallets hold the private keys and si!n on the "evice . 2013 . Inc.1ard3are *allets • . It will only emit the public keys Tre?or D!rd<!re 4!llet • The 0re. The private keys cannot be read from it .or is the most anticipated 1 • Should be released in Lanuary" 23:5 wallet © Armory Technologies.

2013 . . !onnect directly to online computer $ia BSB • 0he 'allets they use are stan"ar"i.nother layer of trust re>uired . Inc. They lack fleAibility .ore difficult to audit .e" . Should be supported by all maHor wallet apps • Will be a hu!e 'in for convenience : security © Armory Technologies. .1ard3are *allets • Har"'are 'allets are an H0I solution .

This is a 2$of$B multi&signature transaction © Armory Technologies. 2013 .@ulti/Signature Transactions • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ . Inc. 1ere+s B public keys" sign with any 2 private keys . 1ere+s a public key" sign with its private key to mo$e • Much more comple+ con"itions are possible/ .

from ! single com# ter The fr!gments only need to &e collected if <!llet is lost M$of$. Multi$Si! / lti-sign!t re tr!ns!ctions !re networ.&of&.@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting • Wait a sec. 1a$en+t we seen . 2013 . Bac%ups Br!gmented &!c% #s !re for sec ring yo r &!c% # All tr!ns!ctions still re$ ire ! single sign!t re.) M$of$. this soun"s familiar# . beforeP • Ces# @ra!mente" bac%ups also use (M$of$. Inc. conditions of the coins :et<or% e*#ects m lti#le sigs for e"ery tr!ns!ction © Armory Technologies.+enforced / lti#le # &lic %eys !re incl ded in the unloc.

Inc. Multi$Si! © Armory Technologies.@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting M$of$. Bac%ups M$of$. 2013 .

. allets are managed by employees" who may steal . =i$e board members of a company all create wallets . . Inc. . 2013 .ations .ll money handled by the company goes into <&of&D .ll money re>uires < signatures to be mo$ed © Armory Technologies.A Critical PuAAle Piece • Multi$si!nature transactions are critical for lar!e or!ani.ll wallets currently ha$e a single point of failure • Cou can have/ .

Inc.89tras #tuff that I wanted to present but couldn:t fit © Armory Technologies. 2013 .

Sub&category' “ultra&paranoid crypto&nerd” © Armory Technologies. ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining • Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 . Roc%et Scientist. !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum • A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% . “etotheipi” on the bitcointalk. Inc.org • Mathematician.*ho Am + • Alan Reiner . 2013 . Perfectionist . Soft'are Developer.

2013 . Inc.. • 8ore Developer of Armory Bitcoin Wallet .. Secure wallet software' open&source" popular" trusted . inclu"in! the (Security) Panel at San Jose 20 B4 © Armory Technologies.Accom)lishments • Be careful 'ho you trust# . Inno$ated cold storage" one&time paper backups • Discovere" the ('hoops$your$'allet$isn>t$actually$ encrypte") bu! in Bitcoin$Dt 04= .. Geah" whoops. But I do ha$e some street cred. • Spo%e on multiple "iscussion panels at Bitcoin conferences..

deb> . 1ash the installer file #0inuA C . ! .<erify 2our nstallers • ?P? is a po'erful. The result looks something like this' f98c7a798122167c98c0a798122167f9030a7 . indows' ?ownload !p!='in and S1. .acQ takes effort in . Presintalled in 0inuA C .in *(. thorou!hly$truste" crypto tool .ost tools ha$e search C import function #0inuA C .?*RPR-.ac' ?o nothing" it+s all pre&installed. it m!y &e signed directly. in' use right&click gpg5win menuQ 0inuA C . 0inuA C .nyone can create a “$alid” signature K but not from the de$eloper+s key- )If it is ! . !ompare to the hashes in the signed file • 5=6 Lerify the si!nature on the hashes file . MA&* S3R* 0H* @-. Mach de$eloper+s “keyI?” should be well&known' mine is 4NN<222< • 5B6 Do'nloa" the installers an" si!ne" hash filesK .2DF file hash tool #Hash8alc is good% • 526 -mport the ?P? %eys to your %eyrin! 5only "one once6 .0 MA08H*S 0H* *MP*80*D &*C .asc” .ac' “gpg --recv-keys <keyID>” .de& inst!ller (. .ac' “sha256sum <filename>” % . Because it+s hard in indows" I $erify my indows indows installers in 0inuA Steps • 5 6 ?et ?P? an" file$hashin! tool .ac' “gpg -v sha256hashes. only need = dpkg-sig –verify *.

. 7eys of @aBor *allets • The most sensiti$e part of using EPE keys is the fingerprint distribution • So here they are.#most EPE apps only show last N chars% © Armory Technologies. 2013 . Inc.P.

. Gou literally take your wealth with you to your gra$e • .rmory hates encrypted backups' . If all your wallets are encrypted . 2013 .nd all your backups are encrypted . Gou ha$e a brainwallet- © Armory Technologies. Inc.ny system that re>uires your brain to be useful is essentially a brainwallet • This is why .Brain3allets 4don-t use themC5 • 1umans are really bad at memori9ing things • Gou will lose coins • Gour family will ne$er reco$er your coins if you die .

@eeps most of your funds secured" periodically refill low& security wallets . Bsually means funds are super&secure&but&incon$enient" or not properly secured • Miti!ation/ . Bse multiple wallets #. MAercise all the best practices on the maHority of your funds .rmory C . 1a$ing all your funds in a single wallet" means all funds ha$e the same security .ultibit ha$e nati$e support% .Segregate Funds %y Security • Ris%s/ .

S3ee) 6s! m)ort • Definitions/ . That person pays you for ser$ices)goods . Gou import a key that someone else has . They sweep the key after you ha$e deli$ered When in "oubt. Sweep if anyone else has e$er had access to the private key . Importing really only makes sense with address reuse = I already told you not to do that- • Serious Security to consi"er . “-mportin!” an address means to add the private key to your wallet K usually so it can be reused • When to s'eep vs import . Inc. SW**P © Armory Technologies. “S'eepin!” an address)key means sending all the coins owned by that key to a new address #one you control% . 2013 .

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