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Best Practices for Using and Securing Bitcoins
"# $ecem%er, &#"'
Alan Reiner Founder & CEO Armory Technologies, nc!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
(ist of To)ics
• • • • • • Introduction Bitcoin storage methods Bitcoin Basics The wedding of cryptography and money Security Practices The future of Bitcoin best practices
Learn to hold your own Bitcoins and let the power of decentralized money shine!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
*ho Am +
• Alan Reiner , “etotheipi” on the bitcointalk.org • Mathematician, Statistician, SW Developer, Perfectionist , ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining
• Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 , !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum
• A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% , Sub&category' “ultra¶noid crypto&nerd”
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
Sometimes “con$enience” is one of those costs.org • &no'n for (security at all costs) . .*hat is Armory+ • Armory Bitcoin Wallet is a free.. (ne of four such applications featured on bitcoin.. open$source "es%top application for securin! Bitcoins yourself . !urrently a tool tailored to ad$anced)power users . *ecently funded" will de$elop beginner+s interface .
.eed to download blockchain . 2013 . Sign transactions from an air&gapped computer • Also innovate" many other features . 0ots of ad$anced features . Inc.ultiple&wallet interface . Printable paper backups #with fragmenting-% • .ot for Be!inners# .create" Armory because the best practices 'ante" 'ere not available else'here © Armory Technologies. Armory is still one of the only 'ays for non$e+perts to use (col" stora!e) . allets that only ha$e to be backed up one time . .eed Bitcoin&/t running in background #for security-% . .*hat is Armory+ • *ven after t'o years.
e!ative/ Take control of your own money #and lose it%(If yo !re sing Bitcoin to remo"e third-#!rties from the e$ !tion. 1arness the opportunities" mitigate the risks' win&win • Positive/ Take control of your own money #and sa$e%• . Inc.Bitcoin Basics • Bitcoin has the potential to revolutioni. 2013 . But it will get easier.. hopefully • Bitcoin creates both tremen"ous opportunities an" tremen"ous ris%s . The same way email changed written communications • Bitcoin is complicate" .e payments .. yo h!"e to t!%e o"er the res#onsi&ilities of those third-#!rties'( © Armory Technologies.
Bitcoin is still in its infancy .t-s .ust a Ba%y • 0he infrastructure aroun" Bitcoin is still bein! built • Relatively spea%in!. 2013 . Started only fi$e years ago #2334% . *elati$ely unknown for years • 1ots of venture capital flo'in! in to turn it into somethin! much bi!!er • Still a lot of soul$searchin! to "o by the community Bitcoin may end up being the TCP/IP of money – ad anced payment systems will be built off of it! but only de elopers ha e to interact with it directly © Armory Technologies. Inc.
but it certainly is po'erful# • 0here is no other payment system li%e this# • -f only 'e coul" ma%e it safe an" usable444 )Cert!in ty#es of tr!ns!ctions m!y re$ ire fees.01 . ith 73. Inc.000 3SD/ . 2013 . & t it r!rely e*ceeds +0.*hy Bitcoin+ • Sho' me another payment system that you can pay someone 2 0. !an+t be fro9en or sei9ed #without direct access to your wallet% • Bitcoin is not perfect.33 in fees8 . Irre$ersible .early instantaneously . To and from anywhere in the world .-D. . © Armory Technologies. 25)6 without restrictions .000.
There will only e$er be 2:"333"333.*hy Bitcoin+ • Decentrali. . Inc.33333333 Bitcoins . Built from standard" trusted crypto algorithms Bitcoin shares many of the same properties as gold (no one iss es gold. e!sy to identify. The entire schedule of Bitcoin generation was announced in 2334 and cannot be changed . 2013 .ot controlled by any one entity' run by all users of the system simultaneously• 1imite" Supply . Predetermined inflation" no printing)debasing • Secure# 5theoretically6 . f ngi&le.e" . the s ##ly is limited. d r!&le( © Armory Technologies.
Bitcoin Storage O)tions • With Bitcoin. . no' ("ata) is (money) . <2&byte secret #pri$ate key% can control 7millions . Inc. *aises the stakes of computer and network security .ay hold BT! properly but use poor user auth !ounterparty risk .ay be more diligent about security than you . .oney now stored directly on phone" computer" paper" etc • Store Bitcoin yourself 7 =ull control o$er your money 7 !annot be sei9ed or stolen if secured properly $ It+s easy to lose <2 bytes if you+re careless- • 1et someone else hol" your Bitcoin 7 $ $ $ . 2013 .o Bitcoin insurance © Armory Technologies.
(Chin!( 1*ch!nge 4!llet 1*ch!nge -ometimes sers get some of their o<n money &!c%.io 0B.000 +1.000 +1. 0o* .000 +51. © Armory Technologies. ne 2011 /t.100 2.000 +308.000 22. 2013 .000 +2.100.000 Bitcoinic! (61( 1*ch!nge Bitcoinic! (62( 1*ch!nge Bitfloor In# ts. Inc.100 +23.000 20.000 +280. -ometimes.100.000 37. ly 2012 -e# 2012 9ct 2013 :o" 2013 1*ch!nge 4!llet 2.200.000 35. ne 2011 /yBitcoin /!y 2012 .Third/Party Ris0 • 0he history of Bitcoin is fille" 'ith users trustin! thir"$parties to hol" their money & !urrently" there is no e>ui$alent of =?I! for Bitcoin "ate #er ice #er ice Type BTC Lost / #tolen $#" %alue &at time of loss' .000 2.
.o one eApects their hardware to fail *"ucate yourself.. .ot e$eryone makes backups . learn the tools.. Can be extremely useful. Bsers are not used to truly irreco$erable data. learn the ris%s. Inc. 2013 . an" e+periment 5'ith small amounts6 © Armory Technologies. and dangerous.1olding 2our O3n Bitcoin • Hol"in! your o'n is li%e harnessin! fire . @eep your fires small until you are eAperienced • Sometimes the bi!!est threat to users is themselves .
1olding 2our O3n 4cont5 • Most users shoul" not be hol"in! life$chan!in! amounts of Bitcoin themselves • Most users shoul" not be trustin! thir"$parties to protect life$chan!in! amounts of B08 for them • Wait444 so. But we+re not done yet © Armory Technologies. 'hat are users suppose" to "o 9#9 Ans'er/ Most users shoul" not be puttin! life$ chan!in! amounts of money into Bitcoin yet# • Bitcoin is still the Wil" West of money • People li%e me are buil"in! safer tools : infrastructure . Inc. 2013 .
Cryptography ( Bitcoin ) #hort! *on+Technical Introduction © Armory Technologies. 2013 . Inc.
2013 . The Bitcoin protocol only uses “authentication” .n the internet. there are t'o main concerns/ . Inc. “Are you authorized to move this money?” • All users create a private %ey 5secret6 an" a public %ey 5"istribute"6 © Armory Technologies. Privacy of communications #encrypt C decrypt% .Pu%lic/Pri6ate 7ey Cry)to • . Authenticity of communications #sign C $erify% • Bitcoin protocol "oes not use encryption .
a” © Armory Technologies.is the signing authority on th!t &!n% !cco nt • All users ma%e %eypairs for (account) mana!ement . account number .gi"e to #!yers to de#osit money in yo r =!cco nt> .:9P:ePD/Eefi2?.Pu%lic and Pri6ate 7eys • 0hin% of Bitcoin as a "ecentrali.e". Inc. public ban% . 2013 .%ee# it secret so only you c!n ! thori?e #!yments A Bitcoin a""ress is <ust a representation of a public %ey/ Such as' “:.is li%e ! ban.PTfT0DS0m$6?i$f.
E8am)le 9et3or0 • All Bitcoins have a public (unloc%) con"ition • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ provi"e a si!nature that verifies a!ainst a specifie" public %ey • -f you have the private %ey. Inc. you can create those si!natures# #so your wallet includes them in your balance% © Armory Technologies. 2013 .
e a lot more sense after this demo--- © Armory Technologies.) Bitcoin Transaction Bitcoin might ma. 2013 . Inc.
Inc.lice and Bob ha$e all the pri$ate keys associated with those coins #and a couple eAtra unused keys% . 2013 nitial Conditions • .© Armory Technologies.ll coins are locked using public keys A" B and 8 #so far% • .ssume the Bitcoin network has 2: coins • .
Inc.© Armory Technologies. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions .
Inc.© Armory Technologies. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions .
Inc.© Armory Technologies. 2013 *ho o3ns 3hat+ .
lice re>uesting payment .© Armory Technologies.lice • Bob+s wallet will select unused pri$ate key *" and then create a payment address #based on the public key *% • Bob sends the address to . Inc. 2013 Payment Re:uest • Bob will re>uest = B08 from .
Inc. 2013 Create Transaction • Alice+s wallet selects some coins that she knows she can sign for #at least 5 BT!% • She will use the F BT! associated with A #think of it like a 7F bill% • Alice creates a transaction spending the F BT! . She also selects an unused key #D% to send the 2 BT! back to herself #change% .© Armory Technologies.
If the transaction changes at all" the signature will break #the math stops working% . Inc.© Armory Technologies. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice uses pri$ate key A to sign the transaction • The signature is mathematically linked to e$ery detail of the transaction .
.© Armory Technologies. . Inc. The F BT! is unspent The sig corresponds to public key A The sig is $alid for this particular transaction . 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice “broadcasts” the transaction to the Bitcoin network • Bsers of the network $erify' .
2013 Final Condition • The original F&BT! bill is destroyed and 2 new bills totaling F BT! created • . Inc.ll users update their databases .© Armory Technologies.
Bses a new key for e$ery recei$ing operations © Armory Technologies.*hat 1a6e *e (earned+ • Private %eys let you (unloc%) an" (re$loc%) coins un"er other public %eys #i. Inc. *ecei$e money See a$ailable coins)balance • 0ransactions usually have 2 parts #payment C change% • Si!natures are mathematically lin%e" to the si!ne" "ata . 2013 . . send to others% • Public %eys let you/ .e. 1andwritten sigs can be #maliciously% transplanted between documents" Bitcoin signatures can+t be • Wallets contain a lot of private %eys .
Inc.ow we can appreciate “col" stora!e” #aka “offline wallets”% . Private keys are only re>uired to mo$e the coins -t is possible to %eep the private %eys on an offline computer an" receive money to it usin! the public %eys )rmory <!s designed to do e*!ctly this' It is the gold st!nd!rd of <!llet sec rity &est #r!ctices © Armory Technologies.Cold Storage • . 2013 . (nly public keys are re>uired to recei$e payments and $erify transactions .
2013 . Inc.#ecurity Best+Practices (for "!rying le"els of #!r!noi!( © Armory Technologies.
Inc. 1onestly" this is why Bitcoin may not be ready for primetime-f you>re !oin! to hol" a lot of Bitcoin it>s 'orth sacrificin! some convenience to protect yourself © Armory Technologies. !ommit to doing security right • A lot of users "on>t have the patience for this . 2013 .Security 6s! Con6enience • . The easiest systems are usually the least secure.early all system become more inconvenient as you increase security# .
Eet the de$eloper+s EPE public key and $erify- -f the installer has a vali" si!nature from the correct ?P? %ey. 2013 . The installers are replaced during or after download • Miti!ation/ .n attacker tampered with the installers on the real website . .ac" but a lot of work in indows- © Armory Technologies. it "oes not matter 'here you !ot it from# There are slides at the end that eAplain in detail This is $ery easy in 0inuA C . Gou download installers from a malicious website ./<erify 2our nstallers • Ris%s/ .ll wallet de$s sign their installers using known EPE keys = .ost de$s keep a special offline EPE private key Hust for this.P. .. Inc.
Bac0u) 2our *allets • Ris%s/ . physical security is not a concern 0H*R*@.n encrypted backup is useless if you forget the password = . 0he most common reason users lose coins is "ue to not havin! an unencrypte" bac%up# = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if your hard dri$e fails = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if you forget your password = Gour family cannot inherit your Bitcoins if you get hit by a bus .R*/ Ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up offline an" secure it# #paper" ?I? or BSB key% . -t is critical your bac%up be unencrypte"# = .n encrypted backup is useless if you get hit by a bus and your family would like to inherit your fortune @or most users. "i!ital security is the most important @or most users.
ma%e multiple copies . but the "ata 'ill be recoverable in A07 years Armory 0echnolo!ies recommen"s that you use paper bac%ups 'henever possible 8opy the "ata by han" if necessary Most thin!s that "estroy paper also "estroy "i!ital Armory @!#er B!c% # .Bac0u)s> $igital 6s! Pa)er • Ho' much are you 'illin! to bet that your 8D or 3SB %ey 'ill still 'or% in A$ 0 years from no'9 . Store together" at least one will work • Paper fades over time. If it+s more than your wallet $alue" don+t use it • -f you use "i!ital bac%ups.
one time. Bitcoin-Qt wallets must be backed up e$ery :33 transactions . Multibit and Bitcoin Wallet for Android re>uire regular backups unless you always reuse addresses #not good practice-% = .ddress reuse is bad" but probably better than losing money .Bac0u) Fre:uency • -MP. Armory and Electrum wallets only re>uire one backup" e$er = Infinite pri$ate keys generated from a single seed = Print your seed on a piece of paper for reliable storage -f you use Armory or *lectrum.R0A. then never 'orry a!ain# In the ne*t fe< months.0/ At the time of this 'ritin! 5Dec 20 B6/ . ma%e a paper bac%up. !ll <!llet de"elo#ers <ill &e im#lementing the one-time-only &!c% # fe!t res .
ttacker needs to steal multiple fragments = *edundancyJyou can lose pieces and it still works8urrently. Armory is the only 'allet offerin! this# -t is calle" (@ra!mente" Bac%ups) 0r!#hic for 3-of-8 B!c% # . If you are concerned about physical security" a single&sheet unencrypted backup is a single&point of failure • Miti!ation' .Fragmented Bac0u)s • Ris%s/ . Bse M&of&. “Shamir+s Secret Sharing” . Store each fragment in a different location = SecurityJ. =or instance" <&of&D' print A “fragments”" need any B .
Fragmented Bac0u)s ArmoryAs Br!gmented B!c% # Interf!ce .
0/ Cour 'allet pass'or" is your encryption %ey for your 'allet# • -f you for!et your pass'or"..ake an unencrypted backup- -f you>ve ever for!otten a pass'or".unless you ha$e an unencrypted backup • . your 'allet 'ill be permanently encrypte" an" your coins 'ill be lost# .R0A.*allet Pass3ords • -MP..o really/ ->m serious your coins 'ill be lost forever . Bsers are not used to the idea of truly" irreco$erable data . ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up# . .
ma%e unencrypte" bac%ups# . ithout stretching' :"333"333 & D"333"333 passwords)sec ith stretching' D & D3 passwords)sec • -f %ey$stretchin! is not use".Pass3ord (ength • Armory an" Bitcoin$Dt both use (%ey$stretchin!) . *ecommended :2&:F characters for no key&stretching . *ecommended :3&:2 characters with key&stretching 3se a stron! pass'or". they can !uess/ . must lon!er pass'or"s . . !on$erting your password into the encryption key is a computationally&intense process . Armory+s key&stretching is resistant to EPB&acceleration • -f someone !ets your encrypte" 'allet.
.000 ye!rs .Pass3ord (ength Time to brute&force your wallet password8 Password Length 0 ch!rs (no stretching( 1 ch!rs (no stretching( .000.!///!/// Computers Instant Instant C d!ys Instant 2 ho rs 333 ye!rs If your wallet is aluable enough! a bot+net of .700 ye!rs 130 d!ys 21C ye!rs 333. Computer 10 min 7 d!ys 1C.!///!/// computers could be used to brea. Truly random passwords of these lengths will be much more secure.2 ch!rs (no stretching( 0 ch!rs (<ith stretching( 1 ch!rs (<ith stretching( .2 ch!rs (<ith stretching( . your wallet encryption 8!a$eats' used <3&character alphabet to simulate poor entropy of human&generated passwords.
Multibit C An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet reuse addresses by default . you may 'ant to reuse a""resses any'ay if you "o not create bac%ups re!ularly4 (l!c% of #ri"!cy is s !lly #referred to losing coins( © Armory Technologies.$o 9ot Reuse Addresses • Ris%s/ . Bitcoin is actually not $ery good at anonymity . Bsually ha$e an option to eAplicitly create -f you are usin! Bitcoin$Dt. hen you reuse addresses you make it far worse . Multibit or An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet. Inc. *eusing addresses can hurt other users+ pri$acy as well • Miti!ation/ . Some users force reuse due to lack of understanding or simplicity of backups This is doing more harm than good in Armory C *lectrum . Armory and *lectrum do not reuse addresses by default . . Bitcoin$Dt. 2013 .
?onation addresses' all users donating know it is hea$ily reused" and accept being linked to it 3sers "o not reali. But it is egregiously bad for pri$acy in Bitcoin • 0here are conte+ts in 'hich it is o%ay.ddress reuse is mostly a pri$acy issue" not a security issue . Inc.Address Reuse & Pri6acy • Discussion/ . but not stan"ar" . 2013 .e <ust ho' much privacy information is lea%e" by interactin! 'ith heavily$reuse" a""resses# © Armory Technologies. . *eusing the same public&pri$ate keypair is eApected C safe throughout the rest of internet security .
Both produce backups that work fore$er = .o matter how many new addresses you use" a backup made when the wallet was created will always work- © Armory Technologies. Both automatically generate new addresses for all operations K you ha$e to go out of your way to reuse . 2013 .Address Reuse & Pri6acy • -f you are usin! Armory or *lectrum. Inc. you have no e+cuse for reusin! a""resses# .
2013 .*hat are Confirmations+ • Bitcoin transactions are not instantaneous • *ach confirmation is increase" consensus that the transaction actually happene" . Inc. SiA confirmations is generally considered irre$ersible • 8onfirmations come on avera!e every 0 minutes .ore confirmations means more confidence . . The first confirmation is the most important . .ctually eAponential random' usually B0 sec to =A min © Armory Technologies.
ero$confirmation t+ are easy an" cheap . 2013 .ero$confirmation transactions unless there is pre$e+istin! trust# . Lust not that many people doing it right now • Attac%s on one$ confirmation t+ reEuire a bit more resources = But they are possible- © Armory Technologies.Confirmation Ris0s • Do not trust . (r" you+re willing to eat the loss when re$ersed • Attac%s on . Inc.
anually $erify the address before eAecution .n attacker could replace the correct address with his own on its way to your wallet software • 0his is a serious security issue# . . This is much more reliable with an offline computer . .ake sure they are who you think they are. The “payment protocol” hopes to sol$e this by using SS0 concepts to pre$ent address tampering . Gou want to make sure you send it to the right place. This will not work in all en$ironments #not e$eryone has an SS0 certificate% • Pic% up the phone an" call the other parties .Call/to/<erify Addresses • -f you are sen"in! lar!e amounts of Bitcoin/ . .
Cold #torage and the 3oly 4rail © Armory Technologies. 2013 . Inc.
1ot 6s! Cold (Hot) Wallet . . Transactions are signed offline . The pri$ate keys are on an internet&attached system . Eold standard of security . Pri$ate keys created and ne$er lea$e the offline computer .ll wallets are “hot” by default (8ol") 'allet 5(offline 'allet)6 .
1ot 6s! Cold Security
• All %no'n, ma<or Bitcoin breaches to "ate/ , !oins stored on a hot wallet , (r unencrypted backups stored on an “hot” computer
• 8ompromisin! a col" 'allet reEuires one of the follo'in!/ , Physical access , MAtremely ad$anced BSB $iruses , Bser accidentally installing malicious software
Setting u) the Offline Com)uter
5nline computer 5ffline computer
• 5 6 -nstall Armory
• 5 6 -nstall Armory • 526 8reate ne' 'allet • 5B6 8reate paper bac%up
, !opy by hand" if necessary
• 5=6 8reate ('atchin!$ only) copy of 'allet • 5A6 8opy to 3SB "rive • 5F6 -mport ('atchin!$ only) 'allet
Cour ('atchin!$only) 'allet has only public %eys, no private %eys#
$oing an Offline Transaction
5nline computer 5ffline computer
• 5 6 8reate transaction
, Same as you would with a hot wallet
• 526 Save unsi!ne" transaction to 3SB • 5B6 1oa" t+ from 3SB • 5=6 Revie' for accuracy#
, ;ll benefit is lost if you don+t re$iew on the clean" offline computer
• 5F6 1oa" si!ne" transaction, broa"cast to net'or%
• 5A6 Si!n the transaction, save to 3SB
but cannot si!nGspen" . Eenerate addresses . the offline 'allet is the si!nin! authority4 . See balances • 0his computer cannot "isplay balances .S)litting roles 5nline computer 5ffline computer • 0he 'atchin!$only 'allet behaves i"entically to a re!ular 'allet. not security . It has no access to the network to know where your money is. !onfirm incoming transactions . It does nothing else but read and sign transactions- • An attac%er !ettin! the online 'allet is a breach of privacy. It can re$iew transactions and re>uest confirmation • Remember.
All 'ebservers an" on$site computers should only use watching-only wallets! = Securely collect payments to the offline wallet = Track your wallet balance = Track and $erify all payments)transactions = . perio"ically refill from the col" 'allet © Armory Technologies. 2013 . %eep it small.o one 'ho !ains access to the server can steal it# . Inc. Includes employees -f you nee" a hot 'allet. &eep bul% of your fun"s in an offline computer = Gou can e$en keep it in a safe&deposit boA.$oing it Right • -f you are runnin! any %in" of online Bitcoin business. offline$'allets are an invaluable tool .
The following setup works fine' = .ffline' Bbuntu :3.43 © Armory Technologies.nline' indows OP using .35 using . Inc. 2013 .rmory 3.rmory 3.FA? • 0here is no special version of Armory for offline .N6. It+s an offline computer because the computer is offline • Mi+ an" match versions to your heart>s content .2 = .
the best 'ay to move "ata bet'een online : offline computer is 3SB "rives .35 .ffline Bun"les) .nce you !o "o'n the (col" stora!e) path you are implementin! serious security • As of this 'ritin!. 0inuA has a much better history of resisting BSB& based attacks .35 or :2.Use (inu8 • . The offline computer needs no other software at all- © Armory Technologies. ill install and run on the first boot of a fresh install of Bbuntu :3. Inc. 2013 . e are working on better methods for secure transfer • Armory 'ebsite has 3buntu (.
e unencrypted bac.inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses . 2013 .lso adds an eAtra layer of security "id I mention! ma.inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses • De"icate a computer for the creatin! transactions .ake it eAclusi$e for Bitcoin processing • 3se full$"is% encryption to protect privacy . . .E8tra Credit • De"icate a small 3SB %ey for offline transactions . . Inc.ups6 © Armory Technologies. ithout it" someone not authori9ed can still see the wallet $alue and transaction history . .
2013 . Inc.The 7uture Coming #oon! © Armory Technologies.
1ard3are *allets • . It will only emit the public keys Tre?or D!rd<!re 4!llet • The 0re. Inc. The private keys cannot be read from it . great tradeoff for security and con$enience • 1ardware wallets hold the private keys and si!n on the "evice .or is the most anticipated 1 • Should be released in Lanuary" 23:5 wallet © Armory Technologies. 2013 .
They lack fleAibility .ore difficult to audit . 2013 .nother layer of trust re>uired . !onnect directly to online computer $ia BSB • 0he 'allets they use are stan"ar"i. Inc. . Should be supported by all maHor wallet apps • Will be a hu!e 'in for convenience : security © Armory Technologies.1ard3are *allets • Har"'are 'allets are an H0I solution .e" . .
1ere+s a public key" sign with its private key to mo$e • Much more comple+ con"itions are possible/ . This is a 2$of$B multi&signature transaction © Armory Technologies.@ulti/Signature Transactions • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ . 2013 . Inc. 1ere+s B public keys" sign with any 2 private keys .
Multi$Si! / lti-sign!t re tr!ns!ctions !re networ. conditions of the coins :et<or% e*#ects m lti#le sigs for e"ery tr!ns!ction © Armory Technologies.+enforced / lti#le # &lic %eys !re incl ded in the unloc. Bac%ups Br!gmented &!c% #s !re for sec ring yo r &!c% # All tr!ns!ctions still re$ ire ! single sign!t re. 2013 .&of&. from ! single com# ter The fr!gments only need to &e collected if <!llet is lost M$of$.) M$of$. Inc.@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting • Wait a sec. 1a$en+t we seen . this soun"s familiar# . beforeP • Ces# @ra!mente" bac%ups also use (M$of$.
Multi$Si! © Armory Technologies. Inc.@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting M$of$. Bac%ups M$of$. 2013 .
. =i$e board members of a company all create wallets . allets are managed by employees" who may steal .ll money handled by the company goes into <&of&D .A Critical PuAAle Piece • Multi$si!nature transactions are critical for lar!e or!ani. 2013 . Inc.ations . .ll money re>uires < signatures to be mo$ed © Armory Technologies.ll wallets currently ha$e a single point of failure • Cou can have/ . .
89tras #tuff that I wanted to present but couldn:t fit © Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 .
*ho Am + • Alan Reiner . Inc. “etotheipi” on the bitcointalk. Soft'are Developer. Roc%et Scientist. Sub&category' “ultra¶noid crypto&nerd” © Armory Technologies. Perfectionist . 2013 . ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining • Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 . !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum • A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% .org • Mathematician.
. Secure wallet software' open&source" popular" trusted . But I do ha$e some street cred.Accom)lishments • Be careful 'ho you trust# . • 8ore Developer of Armory Bitcoin Wallet .. 2013 . Inno$ated cold storage" one&time paper backups • Discovere" the ('hoops$your$'allet$isn>t$actually$ encrypte") bu! in Bitcoin$Dt 04= .. Geah" whoops. Inc. • Spo%e on multiple "iscussion panels at Bitcoin conferences. inclu"in! the (Security) Panel at San Jose 20 B4 © Armory Technologies..
The result looks something like this' f98c7a798122167c98c0a798122167f9030a7 . only need = dpkg-sig –verify *.ac' ?o nothing" it+s all pre&installed.deb> . in' use right&click gpg5win menuQ 0inuA C . Because it+s hard in indows" I $erify my indows indows installers in 0inuA Steps • 5 6 ?et ?P? an" file$hashin! tool . Mach de$eloper+s “keyI?” should be well&known' mine is 4NN<222< • 5B6 Do'nloa" the installers an" si!ne" hash filesK . Presintalled in 0inuA C .ac' “gpg --recv-keys <keyID>” .2DF file hash tool #Hash8alc is good% • 526 -mport the ?P? %eys to your %eyrin! 5only "one once6 . .de& inst!ller (.ac' “gpg -v sha256hashes. indows' ?ownload !p!='in and S1.0 MA08H*S 0H* *MP*80*D &*C .?*RPR-. ! .<erify 2our nstallers • ?P? is a po'erful.nyone can create a “$alid” signature K but not from the de$eloper+s key- )If it is ! .ac' “sha256sum <filename>” % . !ompare to the hashes in the signed file • 5=6 Lerify the si!nature on the hashes file . it m!y &e signed directly.ost tools ha$e search C import function #0inuA C . 0inuA C . MA&* S3R* 0H* @-. . thorou!hly$truste" crypto tool .acQ takes effort in .in *(. 1ash the installer file #0inuA C .asc” .
2013 ..P. Inc.#most EPE apps only show last N chars% © Armory Technologies. 7eys of @aBor *allets • The most sensiti$e part of using EPE keys is the fingerprint distribution • So here they are.
Brain3allets 4don-t use themC5 • 1umans are really bad at memori9ing things • Gou will lose coins • Gour family will ne$er reco$er your coins if you die . Gou ha$e a brainwallet- © Armory Technologies.nd all your backups are encrypted . 2013 . Gou literally take your wealth with you to your gra$e • . Inc. .ny system that re>uires your brain to be useful is essentially a brainwallet • This is why .rmory hates encrypted backups' . If all your wallets are encrypted .
rmory C . Bsually means funds are super&secure&but&incon$enient" or not properly secured • Miti!ation/ . Bse multiple wallets #. 1a$ing all your funds in a single wallet" means all funds ha$e the same security .Segregate Funds %y Security • Ris%s/ . MAercise all the best practices on the maHority of your funds .ultibit ha$e nati$e support% . @eeps most of your funds secured" periodically refill low& security wallets .
Importing really only makes sense with address reuse = I already told you not to do that- • Serious Security to consi"er . That person pays you for ser$ices)goods . Gou import a key that someone else has . SW**P © Armory Technologies. 2013 . Inc. “-mportin!” an address means to add the private key to your wallet K usually so it can be reused • When to s'eep vs import . Sweep if anyone else has e$er had access to the private key . “S'eepin!” an address)key means sending all the coins owned by that key to a new address #one you control% .S3ee) 6s! m)ort • Definitions/ . They sweep the key after you ha$e deli$ered When in "oubt.
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