Inside_Bitcoin | Bitcoin | Public Key Cryptography

Inside Bitcoins Conference, Dec 10-11, 2013

Best Practices for Using and Securing Bitcoins
"# $ecem%er, &#"'

Alan Reiner Founder & CEO Armory Technologies, nc!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

(ist of To)ics
• • • • • • Introduction Bitcoin storage methods Bitcoin Basics The wedding of cryptography and money Security Practices The future of Bitcoin best practices

Learn to hold your own Bitcoins and let the power of decentralized money shine!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

*ho Am +
• Alan Reiner , “etotheipi” on the bitcointalk.org • Mathematician, Statistician, SW Developer, Perfectionist , ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining

• Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 , !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum

• A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% , Sub&category' “ultra&paranoid crypto&nerd”

© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

open$source "es%top application for securin! Bitcoins yourself . Sometimes “con$enience” is one of those costs... .*hat is Armory+ • Armory Bitcoin Wallet is a free.org • &no'n for (security at all costs) . *ecently funded" will de$elop beginner+s interface . !urrently a tool tailored to ad$anced)power users . (ne of four such applications featured on bitcoin.

. 0ots of ad$anced features .eed to download blockchain .ultiple&wallet interface . .ot for Be!inners# . Armory is still one of the only 'ays for non$e+perts to use (col" stora!e) .*hat is Armory+ • *ven after t'o years.create" Armory because the best practices 'ante" 'ere not available else'here © Armory Technologies. Sign transactions from an air&gapped computer • Also innovate" many other features . . 2013 . Printable paper backups #with fragmenting-% • . allets that only ha$e to be backed up one time . Inc.eed Bitcoin&/t running in background #for security-% .

e!ative/ Take control of your own money #and lose it%(If yo !re sing Bitcoin to remo"e third-#!rties from the e$ !tion. But it will get easier.e payments . hopefully • Bitcoin creates both tremen"ous opportunities an" tremen"ous ris%s ..Bitcoin Basics • Bitcoin has the potential to revolutioni. The same way email changed written communications • Bitcoin is complicate" .. Inc. 1arness the opportunities" mitigate the risks' win&win • Positive/ Take control of your own money #and sa$e%• . 2013 . yo h!"e to t!%e o"er the res#onsi&ilities of those third-#!rties'( © Armory Technologies.

t-s . Started only fi$e years ago #2334% . *elati$ely unknown for years • 1ots of venture capital flo'in! in to turn it into somethin! much bi!!er • Still a lot of soul$searchin! to "o by the community Bitcoin may end up being the TCP/IP of money – ad anced payment systems will be built off of it! but only de elopers ha e to interact with it directly © Armory Technologies. Inc.ust a Ba%y • 0he infrastructure aroun" Bitcoin is still bein! built • Relatively spea%in!. Bitcoin is still in its infancy . 2013 .

but it certainly is po'erful# • 0here is no other payment system li%e this# • -f only 'e coul" ma%e it safe an" usable444 )Cert!in ty#es of tr!ns!ctions m!y re$ ire fees. © Armory Technologies.-D.*hy Bitcoin+ • Sho' me another payment system that you can pay someone 2 0. . 2013 . & t it r!rely e*ceeds +0. !an+t be fro9en or sei9ed #without direct access to your wallet% • Bitcoin is not perfect.33 in fees8 . Irre$ersible .000 3SD/ . Inc.000.early instantaneously . ith 73. To and from anywhere in the world . 25)6 without restrictions .01 .

Built from standard" trusted crypto algorithms Bitcoin shares many of the same properties as gold (no one iss es gold. f ngi&le. Inc. Predetermined inflation" no printing)debasing • Secure# 5theoretically6 . . e!sy to identify. d r!&le( © Armory Technologies. There will only e$er be 2:"333"333. 2013 . the s ##ly is limited.*hy Bitcoin+ • Decentrali. The entire schedule of Bitcoin generation was announced in 2334 and cannot be changed .ot controlled by any one entity' run by all users of the system simultaneously• 1imite" Supply .33333333 Bitcoins .e" .

. .Bitcoin Storage O)tions • With Bitcoin. <2&byte secret #pri$ate key% can control 7millions .ay hold BT! properly but use poor user auth !ounterparty risk . *aises the stakes of computer and network security .o Bitcoin insurance © Armory Technologies.oney now stored directly on phone" computer" paper" etc • Store Bitcoin yourself 7 =ull control o$er your money 7 !annot be sei9ed or stolen if secured properly $ It+s easy to lose <2 bytes if you+re careless- • 1et someone else hol" your Bitcoin 7 $ $ $ . Inc.ay be more diligent about security than you . no' ("ata) is (money) . 2013 .

ne 2011 /yBitcoin /!y 2012 .100.000 37.000 +1. © Armory Technologies. ne 2011 /t.000 22.000 +1.io 0B. ly 2012 -e# 2012 9ct 2013 :o" 2013 1*ch!nge 4!llet 2.200.000 +308.000 +51.000 2. 0o* . (Chin!( 1*ch!nge 4!llet 1*ch!nge -ometimes sers get some of their o<n money &!c%.000 Bitcoinic! (61( 1*ch!nge Bitcoinic! (62( 1*ch!nge Bitfloor In# ts.Third/Party Ris0 • 0he history of Bitcoin is fille" 'ith users trustin! thir"$parties to hol" their money & !urrently" there is no e>ui$alent of =?I! for Bitcoin "ate #er ice #er ice Type BTC Lost / #tolen $#" %alue &at time of loss' . Inc.100. 2013 . -ometimes.000 20.000 +280.000 +2.100 2.000 35.100 +23.

1olding 2our O3n Bitcoin • Hol"in! your o'n is li%e harnessin! fire . @eep your fires small until you are eAperienced • Sometimes the bi!!est threat to users is themselves . learn the ris%s. Can be extremely useful. . and dangerous.. . learn the tools.ot e$eryone makes backups . Inc.o one eApects their hardware to fail *"ucate yourself. 2013 . Bsers are not used to truly irreco$erable data. an" e+periment 5'ith small amounts6 © Armory Technologies..

2013 . 'hat are users suppose" to "o 9#9 Ans'er/ Most users shoul" not be puttin! life$ chan!in! amounts of money into Bitcoin yet# • Bitcoin is still the Wil" West of money • People li%e me are buil"in! safer tools : infrastructure .1olding 2our O3n 4cont5 • Most users shoul" not be hol"in! life$chan!in! amounts of Bitcoin themselves • Most users shoul" not be trustin! thir"$parties to protect life$chan!in! amounts of B08 for them • Wait444 so. But we+re not done yet © Armory Technologies. Inc.

Cryptography ( Bitcoin ) #hort! *on+Technical Introduction © Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 .

there are t'o main concerns/ . Authenticity of communications #sign C $erify% • Bitcoin protocol "oes not use encryption . Privacy of communications #encrypt C decrypt% .Pu%lic/Pri6ate 7ey Cry)to • .n the internet. Inc. The Bitcoin protocol only uses “authentication” . “Are you authorized to move this money?” • All users create a private %ey 5secret6 an" a public %ey 5"istribute"6 © Armory Technologies. 2013 .

Pu%lic and Pri6ate 7eys • 0hin% of Bitcoin as a "ecentrali.is li%e ! ban. public ban% .is the signing authority on th!t &!n% !cco nt • All users ma%e %eypairs for (account) mana!ement .%ee# it secret so only you c!n ! thori?e #!yments A Bitcoin a""ress is <ust a representation of a public %ey/ Such as' “:. Inc. 2013 . account number .PTfT0DS0m$6?i$f.gi"e to #!yers to de#osit money in yo r =!cco nt> .a” © Armory Technologies.e".:9P:ePD/Eefi2?.

E8am)le 9et3or0 • All Bitcoins have a public (unloc%) con"ition • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ provi"e a si!nature that verifies a!ainst a specifie" public %ey • -f you have the private %ey. you can create those si!natures# #so your wallet includes them in your balance% © Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 .

Inc.) Bitcoin Transaction Bitcoin might ma. 2013 .e a lot more sense after this demo--- © Armory Technologies.

lice and Bob ha$e all the pri$ate keys associated with those coins #and a couple eAtra unused keys% .ll coins are locked using public keys A" B and 8 #so far% • .ssume the Bitcoin network has 2: coins • .© Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 nitial Conditions • .

2013 Bitcoin Transactions .© Armory Technologies. Inc.

2013 Bitcoin Transactions .© Armory Technologies. Inc.

Inc. 2013 *ho o3ns 3hat+ .© Armory Technologies.

2013 Payment Re:uest • Bob will re>uest = B08 from .lice • Bob+s wallet will select unused pri$ate key *" and then create a payment address #based on the public key *% • Bob sends the address to .lice re>uesting payment .© Armory Technologies. Inc.

Inc.© Armory Technologies. 2013 Create Transaction • Alice+s wallet selects some coins that she knows she can sign for #at least 5 BT!% • She will use the F BT! associated with A #think of it like a 7F bill% • Alice creates a transaction spending the F BT! . She also selects an unused key #D% to send the 2 BT! back to herself #change% .

© Armory Technologies. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice uses pri$ate key A to sign the transaction • The signature is mathematically linked to e$ery detail of the transaction . Inc. If the transaction changes at all" the signature will break #the math stops working% .

. The F BT! is unspent The sig corresponds to public key A The sig is $alid for this particular transaction . Inc.© Armory Technologies. . 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice “broadcasts” the transaction to the Bitcoin network • Bsers of the network $erify' .

© Armory Technologies.ll users update their databases . Inc. 2013 Final Condition • The original F&BT! bill is destroyed and 2 new bills totaling F BT! created • .

Inc. Bses a new key for e$ery recei$ing operations © Armory Technologies. . 1andwritten sigs can be #maliciously% transplanted between documents" Bitcoin signatures can+t be • Wallets contain a lot of private %eys . send to others% • Public %eys let you/ . 2013 .*hat 1a6e *e (earned+ • Private %eys let you (unloc%) an" (re$loc%) coins un"er other public %eys #i.e. *ecei$e money See a$ailable coins)balance • 0ransactions usually have 2 parts #payment C change% • Si!natures are mathematically lin%e" to the si!ne" "ata .

2013 . Private keys are only re>uired to mo$e the coins -t is possible to %eep the private %eys on an offline computer an" receive money to it usin! the public %eys )rmory <!s designed to do e*!ctly this' It is the gold st!nd!rd of <!llet sec rity &est #r!ctices © Armory Technologies. (nly public keys are re>uired to recei$e payments and $erify transactions .Cold Storage • .ow we can appreciate “col" stora!e” #aka “offline wallets”% . Inc.

Inc.#ecurity Best+Practices (for "!rying le"els of #!r!noi!( © Armory Technologies. 2013 .

2013 .early all system become more inconvenient as you increase security# . !ommit to doing security right • A lot of users "on>t have the patience for this . Inc. The easiest systems are usually the least secure.Security 6s! Con6enience • . 1onestly" this is why Bitcoin may not be ready for primetime-f you>re !oin! to hol" a lot of Bitcoin it>s 'orth sacrificin! some convenience to protect yourself © Armory Technologies.

it "oes not matter 'here you !ot it from# There are slides at the end that eAplain in detail This is $ery easy in 0inuA C .ac" but a lot of work in indows- © Armory Technologies. Gou download installers from a malicious website .n attacker tampered with the installers on the real website ./<erify 2our nstallers • Ris%s/ . . Inc.ll wallet de$s sign their installers using known EPE keys = . 2013 . The installers are replaced during or after download • Miti!ation/ .ost de$s keep a special offline EPE private key Hust for this..P. Eet the de$eloper+s EPE public key and $erify- -f the installer has a vali" si!nature from the correct ?P? %ey. .

R*/ Ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up offline an" secure it# #paper" ?I? or BSB key% .n encrypted backup is useless if you forget the password = .Bac0u) 2our *allets • Ris%s/ . "i!ital security is the most important @or most users. physical security is not a concern 0H*R*@.n encrypted backup is useless if you get hit by a bus and your family would like to inherit your fortune @or most users. -t is critical your bac%up be unencrypte"# = . 0he most common reason users lose coins is "ue to not havin! an unencrypte" bac%up# = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if your hard dri$e fails = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if you forget your password = Gour family cannot inherit your Bitcoins if you get hit by a bus .

Bac0u)s> $igital 6s! Pa)er • Ho' much are you 'illin! to bet that your 8D or 3SB %ey 'ill still 'or% in A$ 0 years from no'9 . but the "ata 'ill be recoverable in A07 years Armory 0echnolo!ies recommen"s that you use paper bac%ups 'henever possible 8opy the "ata by han" if necessary Most thin!s that "estroy paper also "estroy "i!ital Armory @!#er B!c% # . Store together" at least one will work • Paper fades over time. ma%e multiple copies . If it+s more than your wallet $alue" don+t use it • -f you use "i!ital bac%ups.

Bitcoin-Qt wallets must be backed up e$ery :33 transactions . !ll <!llet de"elo#ers <ill &e im#lementing the one-time-only &!c% # fe!t res . then never 'orry a!ain# In the ne*t fe< months. ma%e a paper bac%up. Armory and Electrum wallets only re>uire one backup" e$er = Infinite pri$ate keys generated from a single seed = Print your seed on a piece of paper for reliable storage -f you use Armory or *lectrum.Bac0u) Fre:uency • -MP.0/ At the time of this 'ritin! 5Dec 20 B6/ .ddress reuse is bad" but probably better than losing money . Multibit and Bitcoin Wallet for Android re>uire regular backups unless you always reuse addresses #not good practice-% = . one time.R0A.

=or instance" <&of&D' print A “fragments”" need any B .ttacker needs to steal multiple fragments = *edundancyJyou can lose pieces and it still works8urrently. “Shamir+s Secret Sharing” . Bse M&of&.Fragmented Bac0u)s • Ris%s/ . Armory is the only 'allet offerin! this# -t is calle" (@ra!mente" Bac%ups) 0r!#hic for 3-of-8 B!c% # . If you are concerned about physical security" a single&sheet unencrypted backup is a single&point of failure • Miti!ation' . Store each fragment in a different location = SecurityJ.

Fragmented Bac0u)s ArmoryAs Br!gmented B!c% # Interf!ce .

unless you ha$e an unencrypted backup • .ake an unencrypted backup- -f you>ve ever for!otten a pass'or". your 'allet 'ill be permanently encrypte" an" your coins 'ill be lost# . .R0A.o really/ ->m serious your coins 'ill be lost forever ...*allet Pass3ords • -MP. Bsers are not used to the idea of truly" irreco$erable data . ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up# .0/ Cour 'allet pass'or" is your encryption %ey for your 'allet# • -f you for!et your pass'or".

they can !uess/ . Armory+s key&stretching is resistant to EPB&acceleration • -f someone !ets your encrypte" 'allet. ithout stretching' :"333"333 & D"333"333 passwords)sec ith stretching' D & D3 passwords)sec • -f %ey$stretchin! is not use". ma%e unencrypte" bac%ups# . !on$erting your password into the encryption key is a computationally&intense process . *ecommended :2&:F characters for no key&stretching .Pass3ord (ength • Armory an" Bitcoin$Dt both use (%ey$stretchin!) . must lon!er pass'or"s . . *ecommended :3&:2 characters with key&stretching 3se a stron! pass'or".

700 ye!rs 130 d!ys 21C ye!rs 333.000 ye!rs . .!///!/// Computers Instant Instant C d!ys Instant 2 ho rs 333 ye!rs If your wallet is aluable enough! a bot+net of . Computer 10 min 7 d!ys 1C.2 ch!rs (no stretching( 0 ch!rs (<ith stretching( 1 ch!rs (<ith stretching( .Pass3ord (ength Time to brute&force your wallet password8 Password Length 0 ch!rs (no stretching( 1 ch!rs (no stretching( . your wallet encryption 8!a$eats' used <3&character alphabet to simulate poor entropy of human&generated passwords.2 ch!rs (<ith stretching( .!///!/// computers could be used to brea.000. Truly random passwords of these lengths will be much more secure.

*eusing addresses can hurt other users+ pri$acy as well • Miti!ation/ . Bitcoin$Dt. Armory and *lectrum do not reuse addresses by default . Inc. 2013 . . Some users force reuse due to lack of understanding or simplicity of backups This is doing more harm than good in Armory C *lectrum . hen you reuse addresses you make it far worse . Bitcoin is actually not $ery good at anonymity . you may 'ant to reuse a""resses any'ay if you "o not create bac%ups re!ularly4 (l!c% of #ri"!cy is s !lly #referred to losing coins( © Armory Technologies. Bsually ha$e an option to eAplicitly create -f you are usin! Bitcoin$Dt. Multibit or An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet.$o 9ot Reuse Addresses • Ris%s/ . Multibit C An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet reuse addresses by default .

*eusing the same public&pri$ate keypair is eApected C safe throughout the rest of internet security .ddress reuse is mostly a pri$acy issue" not a security issue . But it is egregiously bad for pri$acy in Bitcoin • 0here are conte+ts in 'hich it is o%ay. 2013 . Inc. ?onation addresses' all users donating know it is hea$ily reused" and accept being linked to it 3sers "o not reali.e <ust ho' much privacy information is lea%e" by interactin! 'ith heavily$reuse" a""resses# © Armory Technologies.Address Reuse & Pri6acy • Discussion/ . but not stan"ar" . .

you have no e+cuse for reusin! a""resses# . Both automatically generate new addresses for all operations K you ha$e to go out of your way to reuse . Inc.Address Reuse & Pri6acy • -f you are usin! Armory or *lectrum. 2013 . Both produce backups that work fore$er = .o matter how many new addresses you use" a backup made when the wallet was created will always work- © Armory Technologies.

Inc.ore confirmations means more confidence . 2013 . .ctually eAponential random' usually B0 sec to =A min © Armory Technologies.*hat are Confirmations+ • Bitcoin transactions are not instantaneous • *ach confirmation is increase" consensus that the transaction actually happene" . . The first confirmation is the most important . SiA confirmations is generally considered irre$ersible • 8onfirmations come on avera!e every 0 minutes .

(r" you+re willing to eat the loss when re$ersed • Attac%s on . 2013 . Lust not that many people doing it right now • Attac%s on one$ confirmation t+ reEuire a bit more resources = But they are possible- © Armory Technologies.ero$confirmation transactions unless there is pre$e+istin! trust# . Inc.ero$confirmation t+ are easy an" cheap .Confirmation Ris0s • Do not trust .

Gou want to make sure you send it to the right place. This is much more reliable with an offline computer . This will not work in all en$ironments #not e$eryone has an SS0 certificate% • Pic% up the phone an" call the other parties .anually $erify the address before eAecution .Call/to/<erify Addresses • -f you are sen"in! lar!e amounts of Bitcoin/ . . The “payment protocol” hopes to sol$e this by using SS0 concepts to pre$ent address tampering .ake sure they are who you think they are. .n attacker could replace the correct address with his own on its way to your wallet software • 0his is a serious security issue# . .

Cold #torage and the 3oly 4rail © Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 .

Transactions are signed offline .1ot 6s! Cold (Hot) Wallet .ll wallets are “hot” by default (8ol") 'allet 5(offline 'allet)6 . Eold standard of security . Pri$ate keys created and ne$er lea$e the offline computer . . The pri$ate keys are on an internet&attached system .

1ot 6s! Cold Security
• All %no'n, ma<or Bitcoin breaches to "ate/ , !oins stored on a hot wallet , (r unencrypted backups stored on an “hot” computer

• 8ompromisin! a col" 'allet reEuires one of the follo'in!/ , Physical access , MAtremely ad$anced BSB $iruses , Bser accidentally installing malicious software

Setting u) the Offline Com)uter
5nline computer 5ffline computer

• 5 6 -nstall Armory

• 5 6 -nstall Armory • 526 8reate ne' 'allet • 5B6 8reate paper bac%up
, !opy by hand" if necessary

• 5=6 8reate ('atchin!$ only) copy of 'allet • 5A6 8opy to 3SB "rive • 5F6 -mport ('atchin!$ only) 'allet

Cour ('atchin!$only) 'allet has only public %eys, no private %eys#

$oing an Offline Transaction
5nline computer 5ffline computer

• 5 6 8reate transaction
, Same as you would with a hot wallet

• 526 Save unsi!ne" transaction to 3SB • 5B6 1oa" t+ from 3SB • 5=6 Revie' for accuracy#
, ;ll benefit is lost if you don+t re$iew on the clean" offline computer

• 5F6 1oa" si!ne" transaction, broa"cast to net'or%

• 5A6 Si!n the transaction, save to 3SB

the offline 'allet is the si!nin! authority4 . Eenerate addresses . but cannot si!nGspen" . It does nothing else but read and sign transactions- • An attac%er !ettin! the online 'allet is a breach of privacy.S)litting roles 5nline computer 5ffline computer • 0he 'atchin!$only 'allet behaves i"entically to a re!ular 'allet. It has no access to the network to know where your money is. !onfirm incoming transactions . See balances • 0his computer cannot "isplay balances . It can re$iew transactions and re>uest confirmation • Remember. not security .

%eep it small.o one 'ho !ains access to the server can steal it# . Includes employees -f you nee" a hot 'allet. 2013 . perio"ically refill from the col" 'allet © Armory Technologies.$oing it Right • -f you are runnin! any %in" of online Bitcoin business. offline$'allets are an invaluable tool . &eep bul% of your fun"s in an offline computer = Gou can e$en keep it in a safe&deposit boA. All 'ebservers an" on$site computers should only use watching-only wallets! = Securely collect payments to the offline wallet = Track your wallet balance = Track and $erify all payments)transactions = . Inc.

FA? • 0here is no special version of Armory for offline . It+s an offline computer because the computer is offline • Mi+ an" match versions to your heart>s content .2 = . Inc.rmory 3.nline' indows OP using .ffline' Bbuntu :3. The following setup works fine' = .35 using . 2013 .N6.43 © Armory Technologies.rmory 3.

35 or :2. 0inuA has a much better history of resisting BSB& based attacks . ill install and run on the first boot of a fresh install of Bbuntu :3. e are working on better methods for secure transfer • Armory 'ebsite has 3buntu (.Use (inu8 • . The offline computer needs no other software at all- © Armory Technologies.ffline Bun"les) .35 . the best 'ay to move "ata bet'een online : offline computer is 3SB "rives . Inc. 2013 .nce you !o "o'n the (col" stora!e) path you are implementin! serious security • As of this 'ritin!.

lso adds an eAtra layer of security "id I mention! ma. . ithout it" someone not authori9ed can still see the wallet $alue and transaction history .inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses . 2013 .e unencrypted bac.E8tra Credit • De"icate a small 3SB %ey for offline transactions . . Inc. .inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses • De"icate a computer for the creatin! transactions . .ake it eAclusi$e for Bitcoin processing • 3se full$"is% encryption to protect privacy .ups6 © Armory Technologies.

2013 . Inc.The 7uture Coming #oon! © Armory Technologies.

2013 .1ard3are *allets • .or is the most anticipated 1 • Should be released in Lanuary" 23:5 wallet © Armory Technologies. It will only emit the public keys Tre?or D!rd<!re 4!llet • The 0re. The private keys cannot be read from it . great tradeoff for security and con$enience • 1ardware wallets hold the private keys and si!n on the "evice . Inc.

Should be supported by all maHor wallet apps • Will be a hu!e 'in for convenience : security © Armory Technologies.nother layer of trust re>uired .e" . They lack fleAibility .1ard3are *allets • Har"'are 'allets are an H0I solution . . Inc. 2013 . . !onnect directly to online computer $ia BSB • 0he 'allets they use are stan"ar"i.ore difficult to audit .

2013 . This is a 2$of$B multi&signature transaction © Armory Technologies. 1ere+s a public key" sign with its private key to mo$e • Much more comple+ con"itions are possible/ . 1ere+s B public keys" sign with any 2 private keys . Inc.@ulti/Signature Transactions • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ .

@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting • Wait a sec. from ! single com# ter The fr!gments only need to &e collected if <!llet is lost M$of$.&of&.+enforced / lti#le # &lic %eys !re incl ded in the unloc. conditions of the coins :et<or% e*#ects m lti#le sigs for e"ery tr!ns!ction © Armory Technologies. Bac%ups Br!gmented &!c% #s !re for sec ring yo r &!c% # All tr!ns!ctions still re$ ire ! single sign!t re. this soun"s familiar# . Multi$Si! / lti-sign!t re tr!ns!ctions !re networ. beforeP • Ces# @ra!mente" bac%ups also use (M$of$. 2013 .) M$of$. Inc. 1a$en+t we seen .

@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting M$of$. 2013 . Bac%ups M$of$. Inc. Multi$Si! © Armory Technologies.

ll wallets currently ha$e a single point of failure • Cou can have/ .ll money handled by the company goes into <&of&D . =i$e board members of a company all create wallets . allets are managed by employees" who may steal . Inc. . . 2013 .A Critical PuAAle Piece • Multi$si!nature transactions are critical for lar!e or!ani.ations .ll money re>uires < signatures to be mo$ed © Armory Technologies. .

2013 . Inc.89tras #tuff that I wanted to present but couldn:t fit © Armory Technologies.

Roc%et Scientist. !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum • A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% . Soft'are Developer.org • Mathematician. ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining • Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 .*ho Am + • Alan Reiner . Perfectionist . Inc. “etotheipi” on the bitcointalk. Sub&category' “ultra&paranoid crypto&nerd” © Armory Technologies. 2013 .

Accom)lishments • Be careful 'ho you trust# .. • Spo%e on multiple "iscussion panels at Bitcoin conferences. Inc.. Inno$ated cold storage" one&time paper backups • Discovere" the ('hoops$your$'allet$isn>t$actually$ encrypte") bu! in Bitcoin$Dt 04= . inclu"in! the (Security) Panel at San Jose 20 B4 © Armory Technologies. • 8ore Developer of Armory Bitcoin Wallet .. Geah" whoops. Secure wallet software' open&source" popular" trusted .. But I do ha$e some street cred. 2013 .

de& inst!ller (. in' use right&click gpg5win menuQ 0inuA C . !ompare to the hashes in the signed file • 5=6 Lerify the si!nature on the hashes file .in *(.?*RPR-.ac' ?o nothing" it+s all pre&installed.ac' “sha256sum <filename>” % .deb> .2DF file hash tool #Hash8alc is good% • 526 -mport the ?P? %eys to your %eyrin! 5only "one once6 . The result looks something like this' f98c7a798122167c98c0a798122167f9030a7 .nyone can create a “$alid” signature K but not from the de$eloper+s key- )If it is ! .<erify 2our nstallers • ?P? is a po'erful. Presintalled in 0inuA C . Because it+s hard in indows" I $erify my indows indows installers in 0inuA Steps • 5 6 ?et ?P? an" file$hashin! tool . it m!y &e signed directly.asc” . 0inuA C .0 MA08H*S 0H* *MP*80*D &*C . Mach de$eloper+s “keyI?” should be well&known' mine is 4NN<222< • 5B6 Do'nloa" the installers an" si!ne" hash filesK . .ac' “gpg --recv-keys <keyID>” . only need = dpkg-sig –verify *. 1ash the installer file #0inuA C . thorou!hly$truste" crypto tool . . ! .acQ takes effort in .ac' “gpg -v sha256hashes.ost tools ha$e search C import function #0inuA C . indows' ?ownload !p!='in and S1. MA&* S3R* 0H* @-.

#most EPE apps only show last N chars% © Armory Technologies.P. Inc. 7eys of @aBor *allets • The most sensiti$e part of using EPE keys is the fingerprint distribution • So here they are.. 2013 .

If all your wallets are encrypted .rmory hates encrypted backups' .Brain3allets 4don-t use themC5 • 1umans are really bad at memori9ing things • Gou will lose coins • Gour family will ne$er reco$er your coins if you die . Gou literally take your wealth with you to your gra$e • . 2013 . Inc. .nd all your backups are encrypted . Gou ha$e a brainwallet- © Armory Technologies.ny system that re>uires your brain to be useful is essentially a brainwallet • This is why .

Segregate Funds %y Security • Ris%s/ . MAercise all the best practices on the maHority of your funds .ultibit ha$e nati$e support% . @eeps most of your funds secured" periodically refill low& security wallets . Bse multiple wallets #. Bsually means funds are super&secure&but&incon$enient" or not properly secured • Miti!ation/ .rmory C . 1a$ing all your funds in a single wallet" means all funds ha$e the same security .

2013 . That person pays you for ser$ices)goods . Gou import a key that someone else has . SW**P © Armory Technologies.S3ee) 6s! m)ort • Definitions/ . “-mportin!” an address means to add the private key to your wallet K usually so it can be reused • When to s'eep vs import . Importing really only makes sense with address reuse = I already told you not to do that- • Serious Security to consi"er . They sweep the key after you ha$e deli$ered When in "oubt. “S'eepin!” an address)key means sending all the coins owned by that key to a new address #one you control% . Inc. Sweep if anyone else has e$er had access to the private key .

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