Inside Bitcoins Conference, Dec 10-11, 2013

Best Practices for Using and Securing Bitcoins
"# $ecem%er, &#"'

Alan Reiner Founder & CEO Armory Technologies, nc!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

(ist of To)ics
• • • • • • Introduction Bitcoin storage methods Bitcoin Basics The wedding of cryptography and money Security Practices The future of Bitcoin best practices

Learn to hold your own Bitcoins and let the power of decentralized money shine!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

*ho Am +
• Alan Reiner , “etotheipi” on the • Mathematician, Statistician, SW Developer, Perfectionist , ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining

• Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 , !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum

• A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% , Sub&category' “ultra&paranoid crypto&nerd”

© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

*hat is Armory+ • Armory Bitcoin Wallet is a free. !urrently a tool tailored to ad$anced)power users . (ne of four such applications featured on • &no'n for (security at all costs) . . Sometimes “con$enience” is one of those costs. open$source "es%top application for securin! Bitcoins yourself . *ecently funded" will de$elop beginner+s interface ...

0ots of ad$anced features . Sign transactions from an air&gapped computer • Also innovate" many other features . Printable paper backups #with fragmenting-% • . . Armory is still one of the only 'ays for non$e+perts to use (col" stora!e) . allets that only ha$e to be backed up one time .eed Bitcoin&/t running in background #for security-% .eed to download blockchain . .ot for Be!inners# .*hat is Armory+ • *ven after t'o years.create" Armory because the best practices 'ante" 'ere not available else'here © Armory Technologies. Inc.ultiple&wallet interface . . 2013 .

The same way email changed written communications • Bitcoin is complicate" . 2013 ... 1arness the opportunities" mitigate the risks' win&win • Positive/ Take control of your own money #and sa$e%• .Bitcoin Basics • Bitcoin has the potential to revolutioni. But it will get easier. hopefully • Bitcoin creates both tremen"ous opportunities an" tremen"ous ris%s .e payments .e!ative/ Take control of your own money #and lose it%(If yo !re sing Bitcoin to remo"e third-#!rties from the e$ !tion. Inc. yo h!"e to t!%e o"er the res#onsi&ilities of those third-#!rties'( © Armory Technologies.

2013 .t-s .ust a Ba%y • 0he infrastructure aroun" Bitcoin is still bein! built • Relatively spea%in!. Inc. *elati$ely unknown for years • 1ots of venture capital flo'in! in to turn it into somethin! much bi!!er • Still a lot of soul$searchin! to "o by the community Bitcoin may end up being the TCP/IP of money – ad anced payment systems will be built off of it! but only de elopers ha e to interact with it directly © Armory Technologies. Bitcoin is still in its infancy . Started only fi$e years ago #2334% .

01 . Irre$ersible .000.33 in fees8 . . but it certainly is po'erful# • 0here is no other payment system li%e this# • -f only 'e coul" ma%e it safe an" usable444 )Cert!in ty#es of tr!ns!ctions m!y re$ ire fees. Inc.000 3SD/ . © Armory Technologies. !an+t be fro9en or sei9ed #without direct access to your wallet% • Bitcoin is not perfect.early instantaneously .*hy Bitcoin+ • Sho' me another payment system that you can pay someone 2 0.-D. To and from anywhere in the world . 25)6 without restrictions . ith 73. 2013 . & t it r!rely e*ceeds +0.

the s ##ly is limited. . 2013 . Predetermined inflation" no printing)debasing • Secure# 5theoretically6 . d r!&le( © Armory Technologies. Built from standard" trusted crypto algorithms Bitcoin shares many of the same properties as gold (no one iss es gold.ot controlled by any one entity' run by all users of the system simultaneously• 1imite" Supply .33333333 Bitcoins . f ngi&le. There will only e$er be 2:"333"333. e!sy to identify. Inc.*hy Bitcoin+ • Decentrali.e" . The entire schedule of Bitcoin generation was announced in 2334 and cannot be changed .

Inc. .Bitcoin Storage O)tions • With Bitcoin.oney now stored directly on phone" computer" paper" etc • Store Bitcoin yourself 7 =ull control o$er your money 7 !annot be sei9ed or stolen if secured properly $ It+s easy to lose <2 bytes if you+re careless- • 1et someone else hol" your Bitcoin 7 $ $ $ . *aises the stakes of computer and network security .o Bitcoin insurance © Armory Technologies.ay hold BT! properly but use poor user auth !ounterparty risk . 2013 .ay be more diligent about security than you . no' ("ata) is (money) . <2&byte secret #pri$ate key% can control 7millions . .

Third/Party Ris0 • 0he history of Bitcoin is fille" 'ith users trustin! thir"$parties to hol" their money & !urrently" there is no e>ui$alent of =?I! for Bitcoin "ate #er ice #er ice Type BTC Lost / #tolen $#" %alue &at time of loss' .000 22.000 35.000 +51. © Armory Technologies.000 +308.000 37.200. 0o* .000 + 2. ne 2011 /t. (Chin!( 1*ch!nge 4!llet 1*ch!nge -ometimes sers get some of their o<n money &!c%.100 2. ly 2012 -e# 2012 9ct 2013 :o" 2013 1*ch!nge 4!llet 2. ne 2011 /yBitcoin /!y 2012 .000 +1. Inc.000 20. -ometimes.000 +280.000 +2. 2013 .io 0B.000 Bitcoinic! (61( 1*ch!nge Bitcoinic! (62( 1*ch!nge Bitfloor In# ts.100 +23.

. Can be extremely useful. Bsers are not used to truly irreco$erable data...ot e$eryone makes backups . an" e+periment 5'ith small amounts6 © Armory Technologies. and dangerous. learn the tools. learn the ris%s. @eep your fires small until you are eAperienced • Sometimes the bi!!est threat to users is themselves .o one eApects their hardware to fail *"ucate yourself.1olding 2our O3n Bitcoin • Hol"in! your o'n is li%e harnessin! fire . 2013 . . Inc.

1olding 2our O3n 4cont5 • Most users shoul" not be hol"in! life$chan!in! amounts of Bitcoin themselves • Most users shoul" not be trustin! thir"$parties to protect life$chan!in! amounts of B08 for them • Wait444 so. But we+re not done yet © Armory Technologies. 'hat are users suppose" to "o 9#9 Ans'er/ Most users shoul" not be puttin! life$ chan!in! amounts of money into Bitcoin yet# • Bitcoin is still the Wil" West of money • People li%e me are buil"in! safer tools : infrastructure . 2013 . Inc.

2013 .Cryptography ( Bitcoin ) #hort! *on+Technical Introduction © Armory Technologies. Inc.

Inc. Privacy of communications #encrypt C decrypt% .n the internet. Authenticity of communications #sign C $erify% • Bitcoin protocol "oes not use encryption . The Bitcoin protocol only uses “authentication” . there are t'o main concerns/ . “Are you authorized to move this money?” • All users create a private %ey 5secret6 an" a public %ey 5"istribute"6 © Armory Technologies. 2013 .Pu%lic/Pri6ate 7ey Cry)to • .

public ban% .PTfT0DS0m$6?i$f. 2013 .:9P:ePD/Eefi2?.e".gi"e to #!yers to de#osit money in yo r =!cco nt> .%ee# it secret so only you c!n ! thori?e #!yments A Bitcoin a""ress is <ust a representation of a public %ey/ Such as' “:.a” © Armory the signing authority on th!t &!n% !cco nt • All users ma%e %eypairs for (account) mana!ement . Inc.Pu%lic and Pri6ate 7eys • 0hin% of Bitcoin as a " li%e ! ban. account number .

you can create those si!natures# #so your wallet includes them in your balance% © Armory Technologies. 2013 .E8am)le 9et3or0 • All Bitcoins have a public (unloc%) con"ition • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ provi"e a si!nature that verifies a!ainst a specifie" public %ey • -f you have the private %ey. Inc.

e a lot more sense after this demo--- © Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 .) Bitcoin Transaction Bitcoin might ma.

ll coins are locked using public keys A" B and 8 #so far% • .© Armory Technologies.lice and Bob ha$e all the pri$ate keys associated with those coins #and a couple eAtra unused keys% .ssume the Bitcoin network has 2: coins • . Inc. 2013 nitial Conditions • .

Inc.© Armory Technologies. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions .

2013 Bitcoin Transactions .© Armory Technologies. Inc.

Inc. 2013 *ho o3ns 3hat+ .© Armory Technologies.

2013 Payment Re:uest • Bob will re>uest = B08 from . Inc.© Armory Technologies.lice re>uesting payment .lice • Bob+s wallet will select unused pri$ate key *" and then create a payment address #based on the public key *% • Bob sends the address to .

She also selects an unused key #D% to send the 2 BT! back to herself #change% . Inc. 2013 Create Transaction • Alice+s wallet selects some coins that she knows she can sign for #at least 5 BT!% • She will use the F BT! associated with A #think of it like a 7F bill% • Alice creates a transaction spending the F BT! .© Armory Technologies.

© Armory Technologies. Inc. If the transaction changes at all" the signature will break #the math stops working% . 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice uses pri$ate key A to sign the transaction • The signature is mathematically linked to e$ery detail of the transaction .

Inc. .© Armory Technologies. The F BT! is unspent The sig corresponds to public key A The sig is $alid for this particular transaction . . 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice “broadcasts” the transaction to the Bitcoin network • Bsers of the network $erify' .

ll users update their databases . Inc.© Armory Technologies. 2013 Final Condition • The original F&BT! bill is destroyed and 2 new bills totaling F BT! created • .

. Inc. 1andwritten sigs can be #maliciously% transplanted between documents" Bitcoin signatures can+t be • Wallets contain a lot of private %eys .*hat 1a6e *e (earned+ • Private %eys let you (unloc%) an" (re$loc%) coins un"er other public %eys #i. send to others% • Public %eys let you/ . Bses a new key for e$ery recei$ing operations © Armory Technologies. 2013 . *ecei$e money See a$ailable coins)balance • 0ransactions usually have 2 parts #payment C change% • Si!natures are mathematically lin%e" to the si!ne" "ata .e.

Inc.Cold Storage • . (nly public keys are re>uired to recei$e payments and $erify transactions . Private keys are only re>uired to mo$e the coins -t is possible to %eep the private %eys on an offline computer an" receive money to it usin! the public %eys )rmory <!s designed to do e*!ctly this' It is the gold st!nd!rd of <!llet sec rity &est #r!ctices © Armory Technologies. 2013 .ow we can appreciate “col" stora!e” #aka “offline wallets”% .

2013 . Inc.#ecurity Best+Practices (for "!rying le"els of #!r!noi!( © Armory Technologies.

1onestly" this is why Bitcoin may not be ready for primetime-f you>re !oin! to hol" a lot of Bitcoin it>s 'orth sacrificin! some convenience to protect yourself © Armory Technologies. 2013 .Security 6s! Con6enience • . Inc.early all system become more inconvenient as you increase security# . The easiest systems are usually the least secure. !ommit to doing security right • A lot of users "on>t have the patience for this .

n attacker tampered with the installers on the real website .ost de$s keep a special offline EPE private key Hust for this. ./<erify 2our nstallers • Ris%s/ .P. 2013 . . it "oes not matter 'here you !ot it from# There are slides at the end that eAplain in detail This is $ery easy in 0inuA C . The installers are replaced during or after download • Miti!ation/" but a lot of work in indows- © Armory Technologies. Eet the de$eloper+s EPE public key and $erify- -f the installer has a vali" si!nature from the correct ?P? %ey. Inc. Gou download installers from a malicious website .ll wallet de$s sign their installers using known EPE keys = .

R*/ Ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up offline an" secure it# #paper" ?I? or BSB key% . "i!ital security is the most important @or most users. -t is critical your bac%up be unencrypte"# = . physical security is not a concern 0H*R*@.n encrypted backup is useless if you forget the password = .Bac0u) 2our *allets • Ris%s/ .n encrypted backup is useless if you get hit by a bus and your family would like to inherit your fortune @or most users. 0he most common reason users lose coins is "ue to not havin! an unencrypte" bac%up# = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if your hard dri$e fails = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if you forget your password = Gour family cannot inherit your Bitcoins if you get hit by a bus .

ma%e multiple copies . but the "ata 'ill be recoverable in A07 years Armory 0echnolo!ies recommen"s that you use paper bac%ups 'henever possible 8opy the "ata by han" if necessary Most thin!s that "estroy paper also "estroy "i!ital Armory @!#er B!c% # . If it+s more than your wallet $alue" don+t use it • -f you use "i!ital bac%ups. Store together" at least one will work • Paper fades over time.Bac0u)s> $igital 6s! Pa)er • Ho' much are you 'illin! to bet that your 8D or 3SB %ey 'ill still 'or% in A$ 0 years from no'9 .

one time.0/ At the time of this 'ritin! 5Dec 20 B6/ . Armory and Electrum wallets only re>uire one backup" e$er = Infinite pri$ate keys generated from a single seed = Print your seed on a piece of paper for reliable storage -f you use Armory or *lectrum. ma%e a paper bac%up.Bac0u) Fre:uency • -MP. !ll <!llet de"elo#ers <ill &e im#lementing the one-time-only &!c% # fe!t res .R0A. Bitcoin-Qt wallets must be backed up e$ery :33 transactions . then never 'orry a!ain# In the ne*t fe< months.ddress reuse is bad" but probably better than losing money . Multibit and Bitcoin Wallet for Android re>uire regular backups unless you always reuse addresses #not good practice-% = .

If you are concerned about physical security" a single&sheet unencrypted backup is a single&point of failure • Miti!ation' . Bse M&of&. =or instance" <&of&D' print A “fragments”" need any B . Store each fragment in a different location = SecurityJ. Armory is the only 'allet offerin! this# -t is calle" (@ra!mente" Bac%ups) 0r!#hic for 3-of-8 B!c% # . “Shamir+s Secret Sharing” .Fragmented Bac0u)s • Ris%s/ .ttacker needs to steal multiple fragments = *edundancyJyou can lose pieces and it still works8urrently.

Fragmented Bac0u)s ArmoryAs Br!gmented B!c% # Interf!ce .

.R0A.0/ Cour 'allet pass'or" is your encryption %ey for your 'allet# • -f you for!et your pass'or".. .o really/ ->m serious your coins 'ill be lost forever .unless you ha$e an unencrypted backup • .ake an unencrypted backup- -f you>ve ever for!otten a pass'or".*allet Pass3ords • -MP. Bsers are not used to the idea of truly" irreco$erable data . ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up# . your 'allet 'ill be permanently encrypte" an" your coins 'ill be lost# .

ithout stretching' :"333"333 & D"333"333 passwords)sec ith stretching' D & D3 passwords)sec • -f %ey$stretchin! is not use". must lon!er pass'or"s . *ecommended :2&:F characters for no key&stretching .Pass3ord (ength • Armory an" Bitcoin$Dt both use (%ey$stretchin!) . . Armory+s key&stretching is resistant to EPB&acceleration • -f someone !ets your encrypte" 'allet. they can !uess/ . ma%e unencrypte" bac%ups# . *ecommended :3&:2 characters with key&stretching 3se a stron! pass'or". !on$erting your password into the encryption key is a computationally&intense process .

000.!///!/// computers could be used to brea. Truly random passwords of these lengths will be much more secure.2 ch!rs (<ith stretching( . Computer 10 min 7 d!ys 1C.!///!/// Computers Instant Instant C d!ys Instant 2 ho rs 333 ye!rs If your wallet is aluable enough! a bot+net of .2 ch!rs (no stretching( 0 ch!rs (<ith stretching( 1 ch!rs (<ith stretching( .000 ye!rs . . your wallet encryption 8!a$eats' used <3&character alphabet to simulate poor entropy of human&generated passwords.700 ye!rs 130 d!ys 21C ye!rs 333.Pass3ord (ength Time to brute&force your wallet password8 Password Length 0 ch!rs (no stretching( 1 ch!rs (no stretching( .

Some users force reuse due to lack of understanding or simplicity of backups This is doing more harm than good in Armory C *lectrum . Inc. 2013 . Multibit C An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet reuse addresses by default . hen you reuse addresses you make it far worse . Bitcoin is actually not $ery good at anonymity . Armory and *lectrum do not reuse addresses by default . *eusing addresses can hurt other users+ pri$acy as well • Miti!ation/ . Multibit or An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet. Bsually ha$e an option to eAplicitly create -f you are usin! Bitcoin$Dt.$o 9ot Reuse Addresses • Ris%s/ . you may 'ant to reuse a""resses any'ay if you "o not create bac%ups re!ularly4 (l!c% of #ri"!cy is s !lly #referred to losing coins( © Armory Technologies. . Bitcoin$Dt.

But it is egregiously bad for pri$acy in Bitcoin • 0here are conte+ts in 'hich it is o%ay.e <ust ho' much privacy information is lea%e" by interactin! 'ith heavily$reuse" a""resses# © Armory Technologies. *eusing the same public&pri$ate keypair is eApected C safe throughout the rest of internet security . ?onation addresses' all users donating know it is hea$ily reused" and accept being linked to it 3sers "o not reali.ddress reuse is mostly a pri$acy issue" not a security issue . . Inc. 2013 . but not stan"ar" .Address Reuse & Pri6acy • Discussion/ .

o matter how many new addresses you use" a backup made when the wallet was created will always work- © Armory Technologies.Address Reuse & Pri6acy • -f you are usin! Armory or *lectrum. you have no e+cuse for reusin! a""resses# . Both produce backups that work fore$er = . Inc. 2013 . Both automatically generate new addresses for all operations K you ha$e to go out of your way to reuse .

. Inc. . 2013 . The first confirmation is the most important .*hat are Confirmations+ • Bitcoin transactions are not instantaneous • *ach confirmation is increase" consensus that the transaction actually happene" . SiA confirmations is generally considered irre$ersible • 8onfirmations come on avera!e every 0 minutes .ctually eAponential random' usually B0 sec to =A min © Armory Technologies.ore confirmations means more confidence .

Lust not that many people doing it right now • Attac%s on one$ confirmation t+ reEuire a bit more resources = But they are possible- © Armory Technologies. 2013 .ero$confirmation t+ are easy an" cheap . (r" you+re willing to eat the loss when re$ersed • Attac%s on .Confirmation Ris0s • Do not trust .ero$confirmation transactions unless there is pre$e+istin! trust# . Inc.

Call/to/<erify Addresses • -f you are sen"in! lar!e amounts of Bitcoin/ . . The “payment protocol” hopes to sol$e this by using SS0 concepts to pre$ent address tampering .n attacker could replace the correct address with his own on its way to your wallet software • 0his is a serious security issue# . This is much more reliable with an offline computer . . This will not work in all en$ironments #not e$eryone has an SS0 certificate% • Pic% up the phone an" call the other parties .ake sure they are who you think they are. . Gou want to make sure you send it to the right place.anually $erify the address before eAecution .

2013 .Cold #torage and the 3oly 4rail © Armory Technologies. Inc.

1ot 6s! Cold (Hot) Wallet . The pri$ate keys are on an internet&attached system .ll wallets are “hot” by default (8ol") 'allet 5(offline 'allet)6 . Eold standard of security . Transactions are signed offline . . Pri$ate keys created and ne$er lea$e the offline computer .

1ot 6s! Cold Security
• All %no'n, ma<or Bitcoin breaches to "ate/ , !oins stored on a hot wallet , (r unencrypted backups stored on an “hot” computer

• 8ompromisin! a col" 'allet reEuires one of the follo'in!/ , Physical access , MAtremely ad$anced BSB $iruses , Bser accidentally installing malicious software

Setting u) the Offline Com)uter
5nline computer 5ffline computer

• 5 6 -nstall Armory

• 5 6 -nstall Armory • 526 8reate ne' 'allet • 5B6 8reate paper bac%up
, !opy by hand" if necessary

• 5=6 8reate ('atchin!$ only) copy of 'allet • 5A6 8opy to 3SB "rive • 5F6 -mport ('atchin!$ only) 'allet

Cour ('atchin!$only) 'allet has only public %eys, no private %eys#

$oing an Offline Transaction
5nline computer 5ffline computer

• 5 6 8reate transaction
, Same as you would with a hot wallet

• 526 Save unsi!ne" transaction to 3SB • 5B6 1oa" t+ from 3SB • 5=6 Revie' for accuracy#
, ;ll benefit is lost if you don+t re$iew on the clean" offline computer

• 5F6 1oa" si!ne" transaction, broa"cast to net'or%

• 5A6 Si!n the transaction, save to 3SB

S)litting roles 5nline computer 5ffline computer • 0he 'atchin!$only 'allet behaves i"entically to a re!ular 'allet. Eenerate addresses . but cannot si!nGspen" . See balances • 0his computer cannot "isplay balances . !onfirm incoming transactions . It has no access to the network to know where your money is. It does nothing else but read and sign transactions- • An attac%er !ettin! the online 'allet is a breach of privacy. It can re$iew transactions and re>uest confirmation • Remember. not security . the offline 'allet is the si!nin! authority4 .

2013 . &eep bul% of your fun"s in an offline computer = Gou can e$en keep it in a safe&deposit boA. perio"ically refill from the col" 'allet © Armory Technologies.o one 'ho !ains access to the server can steal it# . offline$'allets are an invaluable tool . %eep it small. Includes employees -f you nee" a hot 'allet.$oing it Right • -f you are runnin! any %in" of online Bitcoin business. All 'ebservers an" on$site computers should only use watching-only wallets! = Securely collect payments to the offline wallet = Track your wallet balance = Track and $erify all payments)transactions = . Inc.

FA? • 0here is no special version of Armory for offline . The following setup works fine' = .N6. 2013 .rmory 3.35 using .2 = . Inc.43 © Armory Technologies. It+s an offline computer because the computer is offline • Mi+ an" match versions to your heart>s content .nline' indows OP using .ffline' Bbuntu :3.rmory 3.

2013 . e are working on better methods for secure transfer • Armory 'ebsite has 3buntu (. 0inuA has a much better history of resisting BSB& based attacks .ffline Bun"les) . Inc. ill install and run on the first boot of a fresh install of Bbuntu :3. The offline computer needs no other software at all- © Armory Technologies.35 or :2.nce you !o "o'n the (col" stora!e) path you are implementin! serious security • As of this 'ritin!.35 . the best 'ay to move "ata bet'een online : offline computer is 3SB "rives .Use (inu8 • .

.ake it eAclusi$e for Bitcoin processing • 3se full$"is% encryption to protect privacy .lso adds an eAtra layer of security "id I mention! ma. ithout it" someone not authori9ed can still see the wallet $alue and transaction history .inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses • De"icate a computer for the creatin! transactions . 2013 . . Inc. .ups6 © Armory Technologies.E8tra Credit • De"icate a small 3SB %ey for offline transactions .e unencrypted bac. .inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses .

2013 .The 7uture Coming #oon! © Armory Technologies. Inc.

or is the most anticipated 1 • Should be released in Lanuary" 23:5 wallet © Armory Technologies.1ard3are *allets • . The private keys cannot be read from it . 2013 . great tradeoff for security and con$enience • 1ardware wallets hold the private keys and si!n on the "evice . Inc. It will only emit the public keys Tre?or D!rd<!re 4!llet • The 0re.

.1ard3are *allets • Har"'are 'allets are an H0I solution . . !onnect directly to online computer $ia BSB • 0he 'allets they use are stan"ar"i. Inc.ore difficult to audit .e" . 2013 .nother layer of trust re>uired . They lack fleAibility . Should be supported by all maHor wallet apps • Will be a hu!e 'in for convenience : security © Armory Technologies.

1ere+s B public keys" sign with any 2 private keys . This is a 2$of$B multi&signature transaction © Armory Technologies.@ulti/Signature Transactions • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ . Inc. 2013 . 1ere+s a public key" sign with its private key to mo$e • Much more comple+ con"itions are possible/ .

2013 .@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting • Wait a sec.) M$of$. Bac%ups Br!gmented &!c% #s !re for sec ring yo r &!c% # All tr!ns!ctions still re$ ire ! single sign!t re.&of&.+enforced / lti#le # &lic %eys !re incl ded in the unloc. 1a$en+t we seen . beforeP • Ces# @ra!mente" bac%ups also use (M$of$. this soun"s familiar# . from ! single com# ter The fr!gments only need to &e collected if <!llet is lost M$of$. conditions of the coins :et<or% e*#ects m lti#le sigs for e"ery tr!ns!ction © Armory Technologies. Multi$Si! / lti-sign!t re tr!ns!ctions !re networ. Inc.

@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting M$of$. 2013 . Inc. Multi$Si! © Armory Technologies. Bac%ups M$of$.

ll money handled by the company goes into <&of&D . allets are managed by employees" who may steal . Inc.A Critical PuAAle Piece • Multi$si!nature transactions are critical for lar!e or!ani.ll wallets currently ha$e a single point of failure • Cou can have/ . . . 2013 .ll money re>uires < signatures to be mo$ed © Armory Technologies.ations . . =i$e board members of a company all create wallets .

89tras #tuff that I wanted to present but couldn:t fit © Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 .

2013 . ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining • Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 . • Mathematician. !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum • A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% . Sub&category' “ultra&paranoid crypto&nerd” © Armory Technologies. “etotheipi” on the bitcointalk. Roc%et Scientist.*ho Am + • Alan Reiner . Soft'are Developer. Perfectionist .

inclu"in! the (Security) Panel at San Jose 20 B4 © Armory Technologies. 2013 . • Spo%e on multiple "iscussion panels at Bitcoin conferences.. Secure wallet software' open&source" popular" trusted . • 8ore Developer of Armory Bitcoin Wallet .Accom)lishments • Be careful 'ho you trust# ... Inc. Inno$ated cold storage" one&time paper backups • Discovere" the ('hoops$your$'allet$isn>t$actually$ encrypte") bu! in Bitcoin$Dt 04= . But I do ha$e some street cred.. Geah" whoops.

ac' “gpg --recv-keys <keyID>” .deb> .ac' ?o nothing" it+s all pre&installed. The result looks something like this' f98c7a798122167c98c0a798122167f9030a7 . MA&* S3R* 0H* @-. ! . . thorou!hly$truste" crypto tool . indows' ?ownload !p!='in and S1. 1ash the installer file #0inuA C .ac' “sha256sum <filename>” % . !ompare to the hashes in the signed file • 5=6 Lerify the si!nature on the hashes file .in *(.asc” . 0inuA C .de& inst!ller (. only need = dpkg-sig –verify *. Because it+s hard in indows" I $erify my indows indows installers in 0inuA Steps • 5 6 ?et ?P? an" file$hashin! tool . .nyone can create a “$alid” signature K but not from the de$eloper+s key- )If it is ! .2DF file hash tool #Hash8alc is good% • 526 -mport the ?P? %eys to your %eyrin! 5only "one once6 .ac' “gpg -v sha256hashes.?*RPR-.ost tools ha$e search C import function #0inuA C . Mach de$eloper+s “keyI?” should be well&known' mine is 4NN<222< • 5B6 Do'nloa" the installers an" si!ne" hash filesK .acQ takes effort in . in' use right&click gpg5win menuQ 0inuA C . it m!y &e signed directly. Presintalled in 0inuA C .0 MA08H*S 0H* *MP*80*D &*C .<erify 2our nstallers • ?P? is a po'erful.

.#most EPE apps only show last N chars% © Armory Technologies. Inc. 7eys of @aBor *allets • The most sensiti$e part of using EPE keys is the fingerprint distribution • So here they are. 2013 .P.

rmory hates encrypted backups' . Gou ha$e a brainwallet- © Armory Technologies. .nd all your backups are encrypted .ny system that re>uires your brain to be useful is essentially a brainwallet • This is why .Brain3allets 4don-t use themC5 • 1umans are really bad at memori9ing things • Gou will lose coins • Gour family will ne$er reco$er your coins if you die . 2013 . Inc. If all your wallets are encrypted . Gou literally take your wealth with you to your gra$e • .

ultibit ha$e nati$e support% .Segregate Funds %y Security • Ris%s/ .rmory C . 1a$ing all your funds in a single wallet" means all funds ha$e the same security . MAercise all the best practices on the maHority of your funds . Bsually means funds are super&secure&but&incon$enient" or not properly secured • Miti!ation/ . @eeps most of your funds secured" periodically refill low& security wallets . Bse multiple wallets #.

Sweep if anyone else has e$er had access to the private key . SW**P © Armory Technologies. 2013 . “-mportin!” an address means to add the private key to your wallet K usually so it can be reused • When to s'eep vs import . Gou import a key that someone else has . That person pays you for ser$ices)goods . Inc. They sweep the key after you ha$e deli$ered When in "oubt.S3ee) 6s! m)ort • Definitions/ . “S'eepin!” an address)key means sending all the coins owned by that key to a new address #one you control% . Importing really only makes sense with address reuse = I already told you not to do that- • Serious Security to consi"er .

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