Inside Bitcoins Conference, Dec 10-11, 2013

Best Practices for Using and Securing Bitcoins
"# $ecem%er, &#"'

Alan Reiner Founder & CEO Armory Technologies, nc!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

(ist of To)ics
• • • • • • Introduction Bitcoin storage methods Bitcoin Basics The wedding of cryptography and money Security Practices The future of Bitcoin best practices

Learn to hold your own Bitcoins and let the power of decentralized money shine!
© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

*ho Am +
• Alan Reiner , “etotheipi” on the bitcointalk.org • Mathematician, Statistician, SW Developer, Perfectionist , ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining

• Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 , !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum

• A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% , Sub&category' “ultra&paranoid crypto&nerd”

© Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013

*hat is Armory+ • Armory Bitcoin Wallet is a free. *ecently funded" will de$elop beginner+s interface .org • &no'n for (security at all costs) . Sometimes “con$enience” is one of those costs. (ne of four such applications featured on bitcoin. . open$source "es%top application for securin! Bitcoins yourself . !urrently a tool tailored to ad$anced)power users ...

ot for Be!inners# . 2013 . Printable paper backups #with fragmenting-% • . allets that only ha$e to be backed up one time . .ultiple&wallet interface . Inc.eed to download blockchain .eed Bitcoin&/t running in background #for security-% . . Sign transactions from an air&gapped computer • Also innovate" many other features . Armory is still one of the only 'ays for non$e+perts to use (col" stora!e) .create" Armory because the best practices 'ante" 'ere not available else'here © Armory Technologies. 0ots of ad$anced features . .*hat is Armory+ • *ven after t'o years.

The same way email changed written communications • Bitcoin is complicate" . 1arness the opportunities" mitigate the risks' win&win • Positive/ Take control of your own money #and sa$e%• . yo h!"e to t!%e o"er the res#onsi&ilities of those third-#!rties'( © Armory Technologies.Bitcoin Basics • Bitcoin has the potential to revolutioni.. But it will get easier. 2013 .e payments . hopefully • Bitcoin creates both tremen"ous opportunities an" tremen"ous ris%s . Inc.e!ative/ Take control of your own money #and lose it%(If yo !re sing Bitcoin to remo"e third-#!rties from the e$ !tion..

Started only fi$e years ago #2334% . *elati$ely unknown for years • 1ots of venture capital flo'in! in to turn it into somethin! much bi!!er • Still a lot of soul$searchin! to "o by the community Bitcoin may end up being the TCP/IP of money – ad anced payment systems will be built off of it! but only de elopers ha e to interact with it directly © Armory Technologies.t-s . Inc.ust a Ba%y • 0he infrastructure aroun" Bitcoin is still bein! built • Relatively spea%in!. 2013 . Bitcoin is still in its infancy .

01 . To and from anywhere in the world . 25)6 without restrictions . Inc.000 3SD/ . & t it r!rely e*ceeds +0. Irre$ersible . !an+t be fro9en or sei9ed #without direct access to your wallet% • Bitcoin is not perfect.-D. © Armory Technologies.*hy Bitcoin+ • Sho' me another payment system that you can pay someone 2 0.000.33 in fees8 .early instantaneously . but it certainly is po'erful# • 0here is no other payment system li%e this# • -f only 'e coul" ma%e it safe an" usable444 )Cert!in ty#es of tr!ns!ctions m!y re$ ire fees. ith 73. 2013 . .

Inc. 2013 . the s ##ly is limited. Predetermined inflation" no printing)debasing • Secure# 5theoretically6 . e!sy to identify.ot controlled by any one entity' run by all users of the system simultaneously• 1imite" Supply . There will only e$er be 2:"333"333. d r!&le( © Armory Technologies. Built from standard" trusted crypto algorithms Bitcoin shares many of the same properties as gold (no one iss es gold.e" . .33333333 Bitcoins .*hy Bitcoin+ • Decentrali. The entire schedule of Bitcoin generation was announced in 2334 and cannot be changed . f ngi&le.

no' ("ata) is (money) . *aises the stakes of computer and network security .ay be more diligent about security than you . Inc.o Bitcoin insurance © Armory Technologies. .ay hold BT! properly but use poor user auth !ounterparty risk . <2&byte secret #pri$ate key% can control 7millions .oney now stored directly on phone" computer" paper" etc • Store Bitcoin yourself 7 =ull control o$er your money 7 !annot be sei9ed or stolen if secured properly $ It+s easy to lose <2 bytes if you+re careless- • 1et someone else hol" your Bitcoin 7 $ $ $ .Bitcoin Storage O)tions • With Bitcoin. 2013 . .

© Armory Technologies.100. ne 2011 /t.000 35. (Chin!( 1*ch!nge 4!llet 1*ch!nge -ometimes sers get some of their o<n money &!c%.000 20. 2013 . ne 2011 /yBitcoin /!y 2012 . 0o* .000 +2.Third/Party Ris0 • 0he history of Bitcoin is fille" 'ith users trustin! thir"$parties to hol" their money & !urrently" there is no e>ui$alent of =?I! for Bitcoin "ate #er ice #er ice Type BTC Lost / #tolen $#" %alue &at time of loss' .200. Inc.000 37.100 +23.000 +51.000 +1.100.100 2. -ometimes.000 2.000 22.000 +308.000 Bitcoinic! (61( 1*ch!nge Bitcoinic! (62( 1*ch!nge Bitfloor In# ts.000 +280. ly 2012 -e# 2012 9ct 2013 :o" 2013 1*ch!nge 4!llet 2.000 +1.io 0B.

an" e+periment 5'ith small amounts6 © Armory Technologies.. Can be extremely useful. learn the tools. learn the ris%s. Inc.ot e$eryone makes backups .1olding 2our O3n Bitcoin • Hol"in! your o'n is li%e harnessin! fire . Bsers are not used to truly irreco$erable data. . . and dangerous.o one eApects their hardware to fail *"ucate yourself. 2013 . @eep your fires small until you are eAperienced • Sometimes the bi!!est threat to users is themselves ..

2013 . 'hat are users suppose" to "o 9#9 Ans'er/ Most users shoul" not be puttin! life$ chan!in! amounts of money into Bitcoin yet# • Bitcoin is still the Wil" West of money • People li%e me are buil"in! safer tools : infrastructure .1olding 2our O3n 4cont5 • Most users shoul" not be hol"in! life$chan!in! amounts of Bitcoin themselves • Most users shoul" not be trustin! thir"$parties to protect life$chan!in! amounts of B08 for them • Wait444 so. Inc. But we+re not done yet © Armory Technologies.

2013 . Inc.Cryptography ( Bitcoin ) #hort! *on+Technical Introduction © Armory Technologies.

Inc. 2013 .Pu%lic/Pri6ate 7ey Cry)to • .n the internet. there are t'o main concerns/ . “Are you authorized to move this money?” • All users create a private %ey 5secret6 an" a public %ey 5"istribute"6 © Armory Technologies. Privacy of communications #encrypt C decrypt% . The Bitcoin protocol only uses “authentication” . Authenticity of communications #sign C $erify% • Bitcoin protocol "oes not use encryption .

PTfT0DS0m$6?i$f. 2013 . account number . Inc.a” © Armory Technologies. public ban% .is li%e ! ban.is the signing authority on th!t &!n% !cco nt • All users ma%e %eypairs for (account) mana!ement .gi"e to #!yers to de#osit money in yo r =!cco nt> .Pu%lic and Pri6ate 7eys • 0hin% of Bitcoin as a "ecentrali.%ee# it secret so only you c!n ! thori?e #!yments A Bitcoin a""ress is <ust a representation of a public %ey/ Such as' “:.e".:9P:ePD/Eefi2?.

2013 .E8am)le 9et3or0 • All Bitcoins have a public (unloc%) con"ition • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ provi"e a si!nature that verifies a!ainst a specifie" public %ey • -f you have the private %ey. Inc. you can create those si!natures# #so your wallet includes them in your balance% © Armory Technologies.

e a lot more sense after this demo--- © Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 .) Bitcoin Transaction Bitcoin might ma.

2013 nitial Conditions • . Inc.ll coins are locked using public keys A" B and 8 #so far% • .lice and Bob ha$e all the pri$ate keys associated with those coins #and a couple eAtra unused keys% .ssume the Bitcoin network has 2: coins • .© Armory Technologies.

2013 Bitcoin Transactions .© Armory Technologies. Inc.

© Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions .

© Armory Technologies. 2013 *ho o3ns 3hat+ . Inc.

lice re>uesting payment .© Armory Technologies. Inc. 2013 Payment Re:uest • Bob will re>uest = B08 from .lice • Bob+s wallet will select unused pri$ate key *" and then create a payment address #based on the public key *% • Bob sends the address to .

© Armory Technologies. She also selects an unused key #D% to send the 2 BT! back to herself #change% . Inc. 2013 Create Transaction • Alice+s wallet selects some coins that she knows she can sign for #at least 5 BT!% • She will use the F BT! associated with A #think of it like a 7F bill% • Alice creates a transaction spending the F BT! .

2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice uses pri$ate key A to sign the transaction • The signature is mathematically linked to e$ery detail of the transaction . Inc.© Armory Technologies. If the transaction changes at all" the signature will break #the math stops working% .

© Armory Technologies. Inc. The F BT! is unspent The sig corresponds to public key A The sig is $alid for this particular transaction . 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice “broadcasts” the transaction to the Bitcoin network • Bsers of the network $erify' . . .

© Armory Technologies. Inc.ll users update their databases . 2013 Final Condition • The original F&BT! bill is destroyed and 2 new bills totaling F BT! created • .

*hat 1a6e *e (earned+ • Private %eys let you (unloc%) an" (re$loc%) coins un"er other public %eys #i. Bses a new key for e$ery recei$ing operations © Armory Technologies. Inc. *ecei$e money See a$ailable coins)balance • 0ransactions usually have 2 parts #payment C change% • Si!natures are mathematically lin%e" to the si!ne" "ata . 1andwritten sigs can be #maliciously% transplanted between documents" Bitcoin signatures can+t be • Wallets contain a lot of private %eys .e. . 2013 . send to others% • Public %eys let you/ .

ow we can appreciate “col" stora!e” #aka “offline wallets”% . (nly public keys are re>uired to recei$e payments and $erify transactions . Inc.Cold Storage • . 2013 . Private keys are only re>uired to mo$e the coins -t is possible to %eep the private %eys on an offline computer an" receive money to it usin! the public %eys )rmory <!s designed to do e*!ctly this' It is the gold st!nd!rd of <!llet sec rity &est #r!ctices © Armory Technologies.

2013 . Inc.#ecurity Best+Practices (for "!rying le"els of #!r!noi!( © Armory Technologies.

early all system become more inconvenient as you increase security# . !ommit to doing security right • A lot of users "on>t have the patience for this .Security 6s! Con6enience • . 1onestly" this is why Bitcoin may not be ready for primetime-f you>re !oin! to hol" a lot of Bitcoin it>s 'orth sacrificin! some convenience to protect yourself © Armory Technologies. Inc. The easiest systems are usually the least secure. 2013 .

2013 .P./<erify 2our nstallers • Ris%s/ .ll wallet de$s sign their installers using known EPE keys = . . Inc.. it "oes not matter 'here you !ot it from# There are slides at the end that eAplain in detail This is $ery easy in 0inuA C . Gou download installers from a malicious website . Eet the de$eloper+s EPE public key and $erify- -f the installer has a vali" si!nature from the correct ?P? %ey.ost de$s keep a special offline EPE private key Hust for this. The installers are replaced during or after download • Miti!ation/ .n attacker tampered with the installers on the real website .ac" but a lot of work in indows- © Armory Technologies. .

Bac0u) 2our *allets • Ris%s/ . -t is critical your bac%up be unencrypte"# = .n encrypted backup is useless if you forget the password = . physical security is not a concern 0H*R*@.n encrypted backup is useless if you get hit by a bus and your family would like to inherit your fortune @or most users.R*/ Ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up offline an" secure it# #paper" ?I? or BSB key% . 0he most common reason users lose coins is "ue to not havin! an unencrypte" bac%up# = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if your hard dri$e fails = Gou lose all your Bitcoins if you forget your password = Gour family cannot inherit your Bitcoins if you get hit by a bus . "i!ital security is the most important @or most users.

but the "ata 'ill be recoverable in A07 years Armory 0echnolo!ies recommen"s that you use paper bac%ups 'henever possible 8opy the "ata by han" if necessary Most thin!s that "estroy paper also "estroy "i!ital Armory @!#er B!c% # .Bac0u)s> $igital 6s! Pa)er • Ho' much are you 'illin! to bet that your 8D or 3SB %ey 'ill still 'or% in A$ 0 years from no'9 . ma%e multiple copies . Store together" at least one will work • Paper fades over time. If it+s more than your wallet $alue" don+t use it • -f you use "i!ital bac%ups.

Bitcoin-Qt wallets must be backed up e$ery :33 transactions . then never 'orry a!ain# In the ne*t fe< months. Armory and Electrum wallets only re>uire one backup" e$er = Infinite pri$ate keys generated from a single seed = Print your seed on a piece of paper for reliable storage -f you use Armory or *lectrum. one time. Multibit and Bitcoin Wallet for Android re>uire regular backups unless you always reuse addresses #not good practice-% = .0/ At the time of this 'ritin! 5Dec 20 B6/ .ddress reuse is bad" but probably better than losing money . !ll <!llet de"elo#ers <ill &e im#lementing the one-time-only &!c% # fe!t res .Bac0u) Fre:uency • -MP.R0A. ma%e a paper bac%up.

If you are concerned about physical security" a single&sheet unencrypted backup is a single&point of failure • Miti!ation' .ttacker needs to steal multiple fragments = *edundancyJyou can lose pieces and it still works8urrently. Armory is the only 'allet offerin! this# -t is calle" (@ra!mente" Bac%ups) 0r!#hic for 3-of-8 B!c% # . =or instance" <&of&D' print A “fragments”" need any B .Fragmented Bac0u)s • Ris%s/ . “Shamir+s Secret Sharing” . Bse M&of&. Store each fragment in a different location = SecurityJ.

Fragmented Bac0u)s ArmoryAs Br!gmented B!c% # Interf!ce .

. your 'allet 'ill be permanently encrypte" an" your coins 'ill be lost# . .o really/ ->m serious your coins 'ill be lost forever .R0A.0/ Cour 'allet pass'or" is your encryption %ey for your 'allet# • -f you for!et your pass'or".ake an unencrypted backup- -f you>ve ever for!otten a pass'or".unless you ha$e an unencrypted backup • .*allet Pass3ords • -MP.. ma%e an unencrypte" bac%up# . Bsers are not used to the idea of truly" irreco$erable data .

!on$erting your password into the encryption key is a computationally&intense process . . ithout stretching' :"333"333 & D"333"333 passwords)sec ith stretching' D & D3 passwords)sec • -f %ey$stretchin! is not use". must lon!er pass'or"s . they can !uess/ . *ecommended :2&:F characters for no key&stretching . Armory+s key&stretching is resistant to EPB&acceleration • -f someone !ets your encrypte" 'allet. ma%e unencrypte" bac%ups# .Pass3ord (ength • Armory an" Bitcoin$Dt both use (%ey$stretchin!) . *ecommended :3&:2 characters with key&stretching 3se a stron! pass'or".

Truly random passwords of these lengths will be much more secure. .2 ch!rs (<ith stretching( .Pass3ord (ength Time to brute&force your wallet password8 Password Length 0 ch!rs (no stretching( 1 ch!rs (no stretching( . Computer 10 min 7 d!ys 1C.!///!/// Computers Instant Instant C d!ys Instant 2 ho rs 333 ye!rs If your wallet is aluable enough! a bot+net of .000. your wallet encryption 8!a$eats' used <3&character alphabet to simulate poor entropy of human&generated passwords.000 ye!rs .!///!/// computers could be used to brea.2 ch!rs (no stretching( 0 ch!rs (<ith stretching( 1 ch!rs (<ith stretching( .700 ye!rs 130 d!ys 21C ye!rs 333.

2013 . Multibit C An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet reuse addresses by default . hen you reuse addresses you make it far worse . Multibit or An"roi" Bitcoin Wallet. Bitcoin is actually not $ery good at anonymity . . Inc. *eusing addresses can hurt other users+ pri$acy as well • Miti!ation/ . Some users force reuse due to lack of understanding or simplicity of backups This is doing more harm than good in Armory C *lectrum . Bsually ha$e an option to eAplicitly create -f you are usin! Bitcoin$Dt. Armory and *lectrum do not reuse addresses by default . you may 'ant to reuse a""resses any'ay if you "o not create bac%ups re!ularly4 (l!c% of #ri"!cy is s !lly #referred to losing coins( © Armory Technologies.$o 9ot Reuse Addresses • Ris%s/ . Bitcoin$Dt.

ddress reuse is mostly a pri$acy issue" not a security issue . .Address Reuse & Pri6acy • Discussion/ . 2013 . *eusing the same public&pri$ate keypair is eApected C safe throughout the rest of internet security . but not stan"ar" . But it is egregiously bad for pri$acy in Bitcoin • 0here are conte+ts in 'hich it is o%ay.e <ust ho' much privacy information is lea%e" by interactin! 'ith heavily$reuse" a""resses# © Armory Technologies. Inc. ?onation addresses' all users donating know it is hea$ily reused" and accept being linked to it 3sers "o not reali.

Inc. Both automatically generate new addresses for all operations K you ha$e to go out of your way to reuse .o matter how many new addresses you use" a backup made when the wallet was created will always work- © Armory Technologies. you have no e+cuse for reusin! a""resses# . Both produce backups that work fore$er = . 2013 .Address Reuse & Pri6acy • -f you are usin! Armory or *lectrum.

ore confirmations means more confidence . SiA confirmations is generally considered irre$ersible • 8onfirmations come on avera!e every 0 minutes . Inc. The first confirmation is the most important . 2013 .ctually eAponential random' usually B0 sec to =A min © Armory Technologies. . .*hat are Confirmations+ • Bitcoin transactions are not instantaneous • *ach confirmation is increase" consensus that the transaction actually happene" .

ero$confirmation transactions unless there is pre$e+istin! trust# . (r" you+re willing to eat the loss when re$ersed • Attac%s on . Inc. Lust not that many people doing it right now • Attac%s on one$ confirmation t+ reEuire a bit more resources = But they are possible- © Armory Technologies.ero$confirmation t+ are easy an" cheap . 2013 .Confirmation Ris0s • Do not trust .

. This will not work in all en$ironments #not e$eryone has an SS0 certificate% • Pic% up the phone an" call the other parties . This is much more reliable with an offline computer .Call/to/<erify Addresses • -f you are sen"in! lar!e amounts of Bitcoin/ . . Gou want to make sure you send it to the right place.n attacker could replace the correct address with his own on its way to your wallet software • 0his is a serious security issue# .ake sure they are who you think they are. The “payment protocol” hopes to sol$e this by using SS0 concepts to pre$ent address tampering . .anually $erify the address before eAecution .

2013 . Inc.Cold #torage and the 3oly 4rail © Armory Technologies.

Eold standard of security .1ot 6s! Cold (Hot) Wallet . Transactions are signed offline . The pri$ate keys are on an internet&attached system . Pri$ate keys created and ne$er lea$e the offline computer .ll wallets are “hot” by default (8ol") 'allet 5(offline 'allet)6 . .

1ot 6s! Cold Security
• All %no'n, ma<or Bitcoin breaches to "ate/ , !oins stored on a hot wallet , (r unencrypted backups stored on an “hot” computer

• 8ompromisin! a col" 'allet reEuires one of the follo'in!/ , Physical access , MAtremely ad$anced BSB $iruses , Bser accidentally installing malicious software

Setting u) the Offline Com)uter
5nline computer 5ffline computer

• 5 6 -nstall Armory

• 5 6 -nstall Armory • 526 8reate ne' 'allet • 5B6 8reate paper bac%up
, !opy by hand" if necessary

• 5=6 8reate ('atchin!$ only) copy of 'allet • 5A6 8opy to 3SB "rive • 5F6 -mport ('atchin!$ only) 'allet

Cour ('atchin!$only) 'allet has only public %eys, no private %eys#

$oing an Offline Transaction
5nline computer 5ffline computer

• 5 6 8reate transaction
, Same as you would with a hot wallet

• 526 Save unsi!ne" transaction to 3SB • 5B6 1oa" t+ from 3SB • 5=6 Revie' for accuracy#
, ;ll benefit is lost if you don+t re$iew on the clean" offline computer

• 5F6 1oa" si!ne" transaction, broa"cast to net'or%

• 5A6 Si!n the transaction, save to 3SB

not security . but cannot si!nGspen" . It has no access to the network to know where your money is. See balances • 0his computer cannot "isplay balances . the offline 'allet is the si!nin! authority4 . It does nothing else but read and sign transactions- • An attac%er !ettin! the online 'allet is a breach of privacy. It can re$iew transactions and re>uest confirmation • Remember.S)litting roles 5nline computer 5ffline computer • 0he 'atchin!$only 'allet behaves i"entically to a re!ular 'allet. Eenerate addresses . !onfirm incoming transactions .

All 'ebservers an" on$site computers should only use watching-only wallets! = Securely collect payments to the offline wallet = Track your wallet balance = Track and $erify all payments)transactions = .o one 'ho !ains access to the server can steal it# . perio"ically refill from the col" 'allet © Armory Technologies.$oing it Right • -f you are runnin! any %in" of online Bitcoin business. offline$'allets are an invaluable tool . Includes employees -f you nee" a hot 'allet. &eep bul% of your fun"s in an offline computer = Gou can e$en keep it in a safe&deposit boA. 2013 . %eep it small. Inc.

It+s an offline computer because the computer is offline • Mi+ an" match versions to your heart>s content .rmory 3.43 © Armory Technologies. The following setup works fine' = .N6.rmory 3. Inc.2 = .ffline' Bbuntu :3.FA? • 0here is no special version of Armory for offline .35 using . 2013 .nline' indows OP using .

e are working on better methods for secure transfer • Armory 'ebsite has 3buntu (. 2013 .35 . the best 'ay to move "ata bet'een online : offline computer is 3SB "rives .35 or :2.Use (inu8 • . ill install and run on the first boot of a fresh install of Bbuntu :3. The offline computer needs no other software at all- © Armory Technologies.ffline Bun"les) .nce you !o "o'n the (col" stora!e) path you are implementin! serious security • As of this 'ritin!. 0inuA has a much better history of resisting BSB& based attacks . Inc.

e unencrypted bac.ups6 © Armory Technologies.inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses . Inc. .inimi9e eAposure to potential $iruses • De"icate a computer for the creatin! transactions .ake it eAclusi$e for Bitcoin processing • 3se full$"is% encryption to protect privacy . . 2013 .lso adds an eAtra layer of security "id I mention! ma.E8tra Credit • De"icate a small 3SB %ey for offline transactions . ithout it" someone not authori9ed can still see the wallet $alue and transaction history . . .

2013 . Inc.The 7uture Coming #oon! © Armory Technologies.

great tradeoff for security and con$enience • 1ardware wallets hold the private keys and si!n on the "evice .or is the most anticipated 1 • Should be released in Lanuary" 23:5 wallet © Armory Technologies. It will only emit the public keys Tre?or D!rd<!re 4!llet • The 0re.1ard3are *allets • . Inc. The private keys cannot be read from it . 2013 .

!onnect directly to online computer $ia BSB • 0he 'allets they use are stan"ar"i.nother layer of trust re>uired .1ard3are *allets • Har"'are 'allets are an H0I solution . Inc. They lack fleAibility . Should be supported by all maHor wallet apps • Will be a hu!e 'in for convenience : security © Armory Technologies.ore difficult to audit . . 2013 . .e" .

2013 .@ulti/Signature Transactions • Most coins have a simple unloc% con"ition/ . Inc. 1ere+s B public keys" sign with any 2 private keys . This is a 2$of$B multi&signature transaction © Armory Technologies. 1ere+s a public key" sign with its private key to mo$e • Much more comple+ con"itions are possible/ .

1a$en+t we seen .) M$of$. this soun"s familiar# . from ! single com# ter The fr!gments only need to &e collected if <!llet is lost M$of$. Inc.&of&. Multi$Si! / lti-sign!t re tr!ns!ctions !re networ.+enforced / lti#le # &lic %eys !re incl ded in the unloc. conditions of the coins :et<or% e*#ects m lti#le sigs for e"ery tr!ns!ction © Armory Technologies. Bac%ups Br!gmented &!c% #s !re for sec ring yo r &!c% # All tr!ns!ctions still re$ ire ! single sign!t re. beforeP • Ces# @ra!mente" bac%ups also use (M$of$.@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting • Wait a sec. 2013 .

Bac%ups M$of$. 2013 . Inc.@ulti/Sig 6s! Fragmenting M$of$. Multi$Si! © Armory Technologies.

allets are managed by employees" who may steal .ll money handled by the company goes into <&of&D .ations . .ll money re>uires < signatures to be mo$ed © Armory Technologies.A Critical PuAAle Piece • Multi$si!nature transactions are critical for lar!e or!ani. =i$e board members of a company all create wallets . . .ll wallets currently ha$e a single point of failure • Cou can have/ . 2013 . Inc.

Inc.89tras #tuff that I wanted to present but couldn:t fit © Armory Technologies. 2013 .

“etotheipi” on the bitcointalk. ith a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining • Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 20 .org • Mathematician. Roc%et Scientist.*ho Am + • Alan Reiner . !ontribute to documentation" standards" security discussions" etc" on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum • A hu!e ner"# #you ha$e to be to do what I do% . 2013 . Soft'are Developer. Sub&category' “ultra&paranoid crypto&nerd” © Armory Technologies. Perfectionist . Inc.

.. But I do ha$e some street cred. Geah" whoops. 2013 ..Accom)lishments • Be careful 'ho you trust# . Inno$ated cold storage" one&time paper backups • Discovere" the ('hoops$your$'allet$isn>t$actually$ encrypte") bu! in Bitcoin$Dt 04= . • 8ore Developer of Armory Bitcoin Wallet . • Spo%e on multiple "iscussion panels at Bitcoin conferences. inclu"in! the (Security) Panel at San Jose 20 B4 © Armory Technologies. Inc.. Secure wallet software' open&source" popular" trusted .

.ac' ?o nothing" it+s all pre&installed. The result looks something like this' f98c7a798122167c98c0a798122167f9030a7 .ac' “gpg --recv-keys <keyID>” .nyone can create a “$alid” signature K but not from the de$eloper+s key- )If it is ! .in *(. Because it+s hard in indows" I $erify my indows indows installers in 0inuA Steps • 5 6 ?et ?P? an" file$hashin! tool . in' use right&click gpg5win menuQ 0inuA C .ac' “gpg -v sha256hashes. Mach de$eloper+s “keyI?” should be well&known' mine is 4NN<222< • 5B6 Do'nloa" the installers an" si!ne" hash filesK .asc” . MA&* S3R* 0H* @-. Presintalled in 0inuA C .acQ takes effort in . 1ash the installer file #0inuA C .?*RPR-.deb> .ost tools ha$e search C import function #0inuA C .de& inst!ller (.ac' “sha256sum <filename>” % .2DF file hash tool #Hash8alc is good% • 526 -mport the ?P? %eys to your %eyrin! 5only "one once6 . . !ompare to the hashes in the signed file • 5=6 Lerify the si!nature on the hashes file . 0inuA C . ! . indows' ?ownload !p!='in and S1.<erify 2our nstallers • ?P? is a po'erful. only need = dpkg-sig –verify *. thorou!hly$truste" crypto tool . it m!y &e signed directly.0 MA08H*S 0H* *MP*80*D &*C .

7eys of @aBor *allets • The most sensiti$e part of using EPE keys is the fingerprint distribution • So here they are.. Inc.P. 2013 .#most EPE apps only show last N chars% © Armory Technologies.

rmory hates encrypted backups' . .nd all your backups are encrypted . Gou literally take your wealth with you to your gra$e • . Gou ha$e a brainwallet- © Armory Technologies. If all your wallets are encrypted .ny system that re>uires your brain to be useful is essentially a brainwallet • This is why . 2013 . Inc.Brain3allets 4don-t use themC5 • 1umans are really bad at memori9ing things • Gou will lose coins • Gour family will ne$er reco$er your coins if you die .

rmory C .Segregate Funds %y Security • Ris%s/ . Bsually means funds are super&secure&but&incon$enient" or not properly secured • Miti!ation/ . @eeps most of your funds secured" periodically refill low& security wallets . Bse multiple wallets #. 1a$ing all your funds in a single wallet" means all funds ha$e the same security .ultibit ha$e nati$e support% . MAercise all the best practices on the maHority of your funds .

SW**P © Armory Technologies. Gou import a key that someone else has .S3ee) 6s! m)ort • Definitions/ . That person pays you for ser$ices)goods . “S'eepin!” an address)key means sending all the coins owned by that key to a new address #one you control% . Inc. 2013 . They sweep the key after you ha$e deli$ered When in "oubt. “-mportin!” an address means to add the private key to your wallet K usually so it can be reused • When to s'eep vs import . Importing really only makes sense with address reuse = I already told you not to do that- • Serious Security to consi"er . Sweep if anyone else has e$er had access to the private key .

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