AIR FORCE REVIEW

Vol 1, No 3

COMMANDER'S CORNER

Choosing to be Champions
Nothing will top the feeling of an Air Force, finally turned fully modern and fully capable and empowered to bring the war to the enemy, day or night. ---LT GENERAL BENJAMIN P DEFENSOR, JR AFP

As far as military arts is concern, the international dateline separating the past century and the new millennium may have been the eleventh of September, or more precisely in that words of U.S President Bush, "the tick of the clock at the 46th minute of the eight hour of the eleventh day" of September 2001. Since that fateful moment, the world has never been the same. Business and commerce, international relations, government policies and programs, social consciousness, security systems and military strategy - have all turned as one to face a common enemy: terror. The great American resolve to strike back and smoke out the terrorists and "all those who harbor them" has inexorably reshaped how today's and tomorrow's fighting will be done. And one thing has become evidently clear: there is no substitute for airpower and for modern equipment. A little over three months after the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were brought down by hijacked planes, the last stronghold of the Talibans succumbed, mainly to precise air assaults, and Afghanistan was liberated through a definitive bomb-and-bread strategy. Even as the hunt for terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden continues, the United States has already invested heavily in the development of new technologies and cyber warfare systems that would ride on the capabilities of the Air Force. These include low-observable technologies, nanotechnologies, parallel processing, quantum computing and biometrics that can track all adversaries and destroy their remotest facilities. In our case, the way to fight has not drastically changed. Doctrine and Strategy have not been adjusted yet to the demands of the new battlespace. And real appreciation for airpower has remained on a footmarch. Fortunately, the Philippine Air Force has always risen to the challenge. Last year,, in a show of dominant precision, the planes of the Air Force smashed the majority of the camps of the MILF and scattered the Abu Sayyafs. And this year, our story just got better. Driven hard by maintenance problems, we still increased our operational readiness rates by reconfiguring former training planes into combat assault aircraft. PAF research and innovation turned the traditional side firing helicopters into forward-firing gunships. And result once validated our faith. Our trainer-turned-combat planes blasted Nur Misuari's house in Silangka, Jolo and other camps and quickly decided the outcome of the latest misadventure of the MNLF.

And the accuracy and courage of our pilots had been evident all over Mindanao, from Cotabato to Cabatangan. Away from the battlefield, limitations notwithstanding, our C-130s flew to the aid of our OFWs in the Pacific islands and demonstrated commitment to peacekeeping East Timor. Our workaholic Hueys proved age does not really matter. Our search and rescue capabilities heroically matched many life-and-death situations. The point is: we haven't had the best of everything. But we have been making the best of everything we have. This has made the huge difference. The key has been our desire to deliver no matter what. The key has been our commitment to excel and create a culture of champions. Our strategic vision for the Air Force, really, is to define victory in peace and in war. No matter where you look nowadays, there aren't many successes in battle not connected to the capabilities of the Air Force, to the advantages of stealth, radar or satellite technology. This is the reason I have been preaching the gospel of the first force. This is also the reason I have painted the vision of champions in service, for champions defy the odds and triumph. Champions exert their best and triumph. Champions innovate and triumph. In the recent AFP-PNP Olympic Games, the Air Force emerged champions once more, but champions in record-breaking fashion, winning 17 golds, 9 silvers, and 4 bronzes, and registering no fourth-place finishes in any events. Army, the closest rival came with 6 golds. The gold medals of the army, Navy, and PNP combined, in fact, still fell four gold medals short of our golden haul. In short, the Air Force, the Air Force dominated. The record back-to-back championship in the 29-year old Games is a rousing yearender. Still nothing feels quite like the role of a real champion in battle, for our country and people. Nothing will top the feeling of an Air Force, finally turned fully modern and fully capable and empowered to bring the war to the enemy, day or night. Time and again, we have proven we have the best airmen warriors and athletes. But the best cannot rely on skill and guts alone. The best always act with the times, with new power-enhancing capabilities. We know our choice.

A CAMPAIGN STRATEGY TO MODERNIZE THE PHILIPPINE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
LTC ELDON NEMENZO

The Philippines is like a blind beggar sitting on a mountain of gold. Within the country’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are potential recoverable hydrocarbon deposits worth an estimated US $ 26.3 Trillion. More than enough to lift the country from the centuries long morass of poverty and underdevelopment. But no sensible foreign investor would come in, because the government cannot guarantee a climate of security to underwrite their investments. The Philippines does not have a credible external defense capability to protect her own interests and territorial integrity. This need was recognized by the 9 Congress of the Philippines. Republic Act No. 7898 was signed into law on 23 February 1995. It mandated the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and appropriated P 164.553 B. Congressional Joint Resolution No. 28 became a law on 19 December 1996. It approved the AFP Modernization Program and decreed that the priority shall be development by a credible air and naval defense capability. The legislative mill has laid the foundations of the AFP modernization program five years ago. The ball is now on the hands of the Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines to do its part. The Philippine Air Force should adopt a strategy, parallel to legislation, to pump prime the implementation process, Such strategy aims on the sideline, to promote awareness in society of the opportunities lost in each day the modernization is delayed. On the other hand, it presents alternative courses of action other than those specifically mentioned in our laws to improve and enhance the modernization program. The strategy of indirect pressure negates the use of combat force. It rather employs psychological pressure, mainly through propaganda and diplomatic maneuvers, with sufficient intelligence support, to achieve political objectives. Unlike a direct strategy, force is not a decisive factor. For a better perspective of this strategy, it is necessary to define campaign and strategy in greater deal. Raoul Henri Alcala defines campaign as a plan that establishes a path to the strategic goal. The U.S. Army FM 100-5 sees it as a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war. Joint Publication 1-02 defines campaign plan as a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space. Strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty and ambiguity dominate. It is a complex decision-making process that connects the ends sought with the ways and
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means of achieving those ends. Strategy is an abstract interplay which springs from the clash between two opposing wills. The aim of strategy is to fulfill the objectives laid down by policy, making the best use of resources available. Its desired outcome is to force the enemy to accept the terms one wish to impose on him. The means could be material or moral. The art of strategy consists in choosing the most suitable means from those available and so orchestrating their results that they combine to produce a psychological pressure sufficient to achieve the moral effect required.

Strategic Assumptions Assumption 1. National Security, particularly the survival interests of the Philippines and of the Filipino nation, is a primordial concern of the national leadership (President and Congress). The grinding weight of poverty in the country suggests that food security and national economic development are higher in the national security agenda than defense preparedness. What the civilian decision-makers fail to realize is the vital role of a modern Philippine Air Defense System (PADS) in securing our sources of marine food supply and hydrocarbon products. Contrary to popular misperception, a modern PADS creates the atmosphere for the attainment of both concerns. Assumption 2. The channels of mass media are powerful shapers of public opinion and national consensus. Various researches on the informative and persuasive powers of media suggest that they are 100% effective in conveying knowledge, 60% effective in changing attitudes and 30% effective in changing behavior. “Some of the most important combat of tomorrow will take place in the media battlefield,” wrote Alvin Toffler. In his book Wars and Anti-wars, he premised that, “at strategic level, adroit propaganda can actually help make or break alliances. He even proposed the use of meta-propaganda, a form of media tactics to discredit the other side’s propaganda, the aim of which is to produce wholesale disbelief and to generate maximum sympathy or hatred for each set of viewers. Assumption 3. Our public policy decision-makers (the President and Congress) are politicians who are sensitive to public opinion. Survival in Philippine politics rests on popularity. The mathematics of voter addition means that our politicians must always cater to the needs and clamor of the greater majority of the voting population. Assumption 4. The average Filipino is not aware of the hydrocarbon and marine resources in our EEZ. Likewise, they do not know the need for a modern PADS in relation to the protection and exploitation of these resources. They do not know that a judicious development strategy on the use of these resources has the potential to lift the country from the centuries-long quagmire of poverty. Filipinos do not know that beyond enhancing national defense and security, the PADS directly benefit their lives due to its civilian and joint-use applications.

Characteristics of the Strategy Cumulative, Coordinated Strategy. This strategy is a collection of individual, coordinated actions that can eventually create significant results. The various units and

offices of the PAF contribute their resources and efforts so that the psychological pressure would become wide ranging and compelling. Sustained Strategy. The methodology is to keep the pressure going without any respite. The PAF should be able to back staff the legislative effort through all its phases. This requires close coordination with critical personalities in both chambers of Congress. Likewise, a favorable climate for the consideration of the bills must be generated through the use of inter-personal and media channels of communication and persuasion. Moral Ascendancy Strategy. The PAF, as the proponent of the PADS, must be viewed as having moral ascendancy over the other interest groups. All actions must be consistent with the accepted norms of behavior. The benefit moral ascendancy [supported by media] could give was articulated by Dr. Segundo E. Romero: “The media can encourage a balance of power among unequal parties where appropriate, or where the claims of parties are not equally just, strengthen the hand of the party with the more compelling moral claim.”

Elements of the Strategy Psychological Ploys. This strategy employs propaganda through the mass media to dish out deliberated information that could, in the long run, persuade or pressure rival interests to concede that modernization of the PADS serve higher national strategic objectives. The aim of this approach is to attack the mind of opponents by issuing carefully constructed propaganda statements, and to achieve psychological advantage over them. It is beneficial to seize every opportunity to gain public sympathy or positive public opinion for the PAF legislative agenda. The dangers of not modernizing the PADS should be propagated. The supporting communication campaign should highlight foreign intrusions into our territory and the EEZ and the country’s powerlessness against such transgressions due to the lack of a modern PADS. It can likewise inform the public of the consequent losses for the continuing inaction: Filipino fishermen deprived of livelihood; More expensive but less marine protein supply for everyone; Continued non-exploitation of vast natural hydrocarbon reserves, thus chaining the Philippines to a perpetual state of poverty and underdevelopment. Diplomatic Maneuvers. This strategy requires diplomacy with key personalities to actively promote the greater interest served by fast-tracking the PAF legislative agenda. Opinion leaders and media practitioners are vital targets. They must write and speak about the issue, in sustained and deliberate effort, to inform and persuade the decisionmakers and the Filipino public. They must put up a campaign to produce compelling pressure. Interpersonal diplomacy play a key role in policy adoption. Studies suggest that personal channels of communication are often more effective in changing beliefs, attitudes and behavior than the mass media. PAF liaison officers and back staffers must develop strong rapport with pinpointed Congressional supporters and their staff. This salience, coupled with the positive atmosphere generated by the media campaign, facilitate decision-making in favor of the PAF agenda. Intelligence Support. Policy made without intelligence support, or inadequate support can succeed only by accident. “Knowing the adversary” is critical. Discovering

enemy intentions is as important as discovering his capabilities. It is a sad commentary that the DND-AFP does not know exactly how much BCDA is making out of the AFP reverted base lands. The DND-AFP likewise have not kept close tabs at the intended utilization of these lands and how these could affect the remaining military reservations within BCDA areas. Until this author’s research on Mactan, the PAF did not know how much MCIAA-MEPZA were making from the lease of the area. Hence, the PAF could not countercheck the validity of the argument that MCIAA-MEPZA did not have the funds to honor their commitments in the Tri-partite MOA. The selected campaign strategy is based on the strategy of indirect pressure. This strategy avails largely of psychological means to pressure decision-makers and key personalities to accept the PAF legislative agenda as their own. Psychological ploys, diplomacy and intelligence support are combined with appropriate interpersonal and mass media channels of communications to generate an atmosphere conducive for the passage of PAF sponsored bills into laws. The development of a credible air defense capability is the primordial aim of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) Modernization Program. Central to this goal is the build up of a robust and modern Philippine Air Defense System (PADS). As conceptualized, the PADS shall be an integrated system consisting of the following core components: 1. Air Surveillance System. A network of land-based air-to-ground radar system shall be strategically located at various sites around the country. These sites shall provide 24-hour monitoring of the Philippine airspace and detection of any intruding enemy/hostile aircraft. These radar sites shall be electronically linked with each other and to centralized command and control centers. At the primary and alternate Air Defense Operations Centers (ADOC), the different plots are interfaced into a single, onesky radar picture covering the entire Philippine airspace. In case of unidentified and/or hostile intrusions, the ADOC scrambles fighter/interceptor aircraft to meet the aerial threat as far out of Philippine territory as possible. In addition to its air defense surveillance function, plots from the military radar system can also be extracted by the Air Transportation Office (ATO) for a real time civil airways management. The resulting civilian Philippine airways one-sky picture will allow the ATO to optimize civil and commercial air traffic volume in the country's territorial airspace while enhancing the safety of air navigation. Since the government earns revenues from all overflight, the system will result to a more efficient, accurate and automated billing of all overflight charges. 2. Surface Surveillance System. In addition to the land-based network, a fleet of Long Range Patrol Aircraft (LRPA) shall provide surface surveillance on the country’s internal waters and the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The LRPA shall monitor hostile naval intrusions, foreign poaching, dumping of toxic wastes, and other illegal activities within the Philippine maritime domain. A host of sensors are to be fitted aboard the LRPA, allowing these aircraft to meet various mission requirements. The LRPA shall also be electronically linked to the command and control centers, allowing the decision makers real-time information on the events transpiring within the country’s surface domain for a timely and appropriate response. As with the military radar system, the LRPA can have civil defense, police, environmental, and other civilian applications. Surface surveillance data can also be shared with the appropriate agencies – say, with the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) for anti-smuggling operations or with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for pin-pointing and combating oil leaks or

even illegal logging activities. Since the LRPA will allow the Philippines to keep a close watch of its maritime domain, fishing activities can be monitored and fishing licenses for trawlers can be strictly enforced, allowing the government to increase its revenue collection from these activities. 3. Interceptor Squadrons. A number of Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) aircraft shall provide the critical response capability against hostile aerial and naval targets. The MRF are to be geographically dispersed in various forward operating air bases for prompt response to any threat. The requirements of the modern battlespace dictate that the MRF must have all-weather, day and night operational capability. 4. Search and Rescue System. Endemic to the entire system is a built-in Search and Rescue (SAR) capability. A fleet of SAR helicopters capable of extended ranges will conduct rescue missions on downed friendly aircraft and vessels during combat situations. Peacetime utilization of SAR helicopters include rescue of distressed vessels and crafts within the Philippine area of responsibility. These assets can likewise be used as air ambulances in cases of road mishaps and similar emergencies. These four core capabilities form the foundation upon which the entire Philippine Air Defense System is built. The System is intrinsically weak and unbalanced if one or more capabilities are wanting. It must be underscored that the PADS has both military and civilian applications. The one-sky radar picture is a vital cog of national defense preparedness. However, it also allows efficient civil airways management and will tremendously enhance the safety of civil and commercial air traffic in the country from its present level. Its surface mirror will substantially upgrade the country’s maritime and forest management capability, resulting in better maritime safety enforcement, environmental protection, and higher revenues for the government. The importance of a modern Philippine Air Defense System (PADS) cannot be understated. The Philippine Air Force (PAF) is the first line of our country’s military defense. The vital cog of our national defense capability is the PADS. The PADS forms the core of the Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) network of the entire Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The PADS connects the President (as Commander-in-Chief) and the AFP Chain-of-Command with the deployed, operational units, allowing a timely and coordinated defense response in times of war. The PADS makes possible the real time monitoring of unfolding scenarios within the country’s territorial and defense battlespace, allowing the execution of efficient defense campaigns and operations. The PADS is an indispensable instrument for securing vital national interests -- the patrimony, territorial and sovereign integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and the welfare, way of life and survival of the Filipino nation. As a plan of action to operationalize this campaign strategy, the author proposes the following: (1) Creation of the Directorate for Legislative-Executive Affairs at A-5 to back-staff the legislative effort; (2) Crafting of a communications/public relations campaign plan to complement the legislative initiatives; (3) Synchronize current negotiations and Command decisions with the desired objective; and (4) Conduct Seminars on Negotiations among Commanders and Project Managers of air bases/air stations which are vulnerable to real estate speculations by other interests groups. As part of the proposed campaign strategy, this author recommends the following action plan for the PAF:

1.

Create the Directorate for Legislative-Executive Affairs (DLEA) under the

Office of the ACofAS for Plans, A-5. This office shall have the primary responsibility of advancing the PAF Legislative Agenda. Its creation is needed since the Liaison Office for Legislative Affairs (LOLA), AFP and the AFP Technical Working Group for Legislative Affairs (AFPTWGLA) have been found to be inadequate organizational mechanisms for bringing about the desired policy changes. It must be underscored though, that the problem cannot be addressed merely by adding another organizational box in A-5. This office must be adequately staffed and properly supported to attend to its functions. It is necessary to have some competent lawyers, proficient in the drafting of bills, under this office. To fill this need, the PAF may need to tap its reservist base of human resource. Close liaisoning functions with the policy decision-makers necessitate a dedicated Director (not necessarily a lawyer), embued with high emotional and cognitive intelligence. D, LEA should be empowered and should have the commensurate resources needed to back-staff the legislative effort, including a) The drafting of proposed bills; b) The drafting of Committee Reports; and c) Providing needed information to key players in the policy environment. 2. Make a Communication/Public Relations (PR) Campaign Plan to

complement the modernization agenda. This Campaign Plan may be generated internally or may entail the hiring of PR Consultants. Nevertheless, a strong inter-office coordination may be needed during the campaign plan implementation, particularly among A-5, PIO and A-7. It is essential that this campaign plan should be implemented in a coordinated, sustained and timely fashion. PR Campaign need not be expensive to implement since with good planning, the PAF can tap its reserve of goodwill and other government informational agencies such as the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), PTV4 and the like. Radio talk show programs offer the cheapest alternative, with the widest audience base.

3.

Synchronize current negotiations and Command decisions with the desired

end-state. It is asinine for the PAF to continuously surrender real estate it still controls to BCDA and other agencies while it is pursuing a legislative agenda that would generate income from these land holdings. The various seemingly attractive offers being dangled before the Command are designed precisely to complete the land alienation process before the attendant legislative remedies are adopted. If the PAF falls into this trap, it will be presented with a fait accompli by the time the bills are scheduled for public hearing. The negotiating spectrum is wide enough to allow various stalling techniques, provided the Command keeps its eyes on the objective – continuing sources of funds to modernize the PADS. 4. Conduct Seminars on Negotiations for Commanders/Project Managers of

bases/air stations that are being eyed for conversion/alternative uses. The current mess in inter-agency agreements involving PAF real estate is a reflection of how poor AFP/PAF decision makers are (or were) in negotiations (past Commanding Generals, PAF not exempted). Military officers are supposed to be experts in strategy and in the art of warfare. And yet, civilians running other agencies have succeeded in extracting concessions on the use of some military reservations which are patently disadvantageous to the interests of the PAF and the AFP.

A unique window of opportunity exists with the incoming Congress for the PAF to advance its legislative agenda. To generate a more favorable climate for the passage of these initiatives into laws, the adoption of this campaign strategy means that the PAF can influence the climate of decision-making. Our decision-makers, being politicians, will be highly sensitive to public opinion. But media shall have educated the public on the merits of the issues, and the policy makers will be compelled to ride on the issue and adopt the PAF legislative initiatives to modernize the PADS.

UTILIZATION OF FOREIGN TRAINED PAF OFFICERS AT THE AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
By LTC LARRY S GUMBA PAF (GSC)

For the past decades, the education and training of the Armed Forces of the Philippines have continuously developed the human resources toward excellence, competence, and professionalism. The education and training programs have vigorously pursued to strengthen, upgrade, and enhance the efficiency of the AFP units and personnel in maintaining a high state of discipline, professional competence, and technical proficiency in response to the required roles that the AFP performs. As a strategic concern, the AFP personnel should be well trained to perform its tasks effectively and efficiently, as the individual soldier remains the most potent weapon system and most important asset of any armed forces. With the onset of the new millennium, the Department of National Defense, in its memorandum to the AFP, had provided fresh directions and guidance to the AFP foreign education and training program in order “to derive maximum benefit from it commensurate to its cost and to systematize its planning and implementation.” Considering the cost-benefit that the military organization will derive, the memorandum rationally stressed on the correct attitude as basic ingredient in understanding that the capability building for education and training needs more than expertise and resources. Such attitude should manifest itself, among others, in a nationalistic spirit which considers indigenous training equal to or comparable to foreign training; a correct appreciation of the crucial role to the accomplishment of the AFP mission of the training institutions and the personnel who man them, such that only the most suited, those who know what to teach and how to impart what they know, are assigned to training institutions; and the effective utilization of foreign graduates, especially those sent abroad on studies which are not or only partially available in-country, in order that the maximum practical benefit can be derived from their training. The primary purpose of foreign education and training therefore is to keep abreast of developments and trends. Strategically, the AFP must be well trained to perform its assigned tasks effectively and efficiently, as an individual soldier remains the most potent weapon system in any armed forces. Considering the cost-benefit that the AFP will derived the primary purpose of foreign education and training is to keep abreast of the developments and trends worldwide and help develop our in-country training capabilities. Categorically, our local schools must be the regular schools of the AFP and not the schools abroad. On the other hand, however, the general policy guidance on the utilization of foreign trained students to the local schools and training institutions, particularly in the Philippine Air Force has not been very effective. The vagueness and gray areas of this guidance resulted to its non-compliance, unwillingness of the foreign graduates to be assigned at the training institutions, and became the main reason in creating vacuum in the in-house capability building for education and training in the PAF. The Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), the only premier school in the PAF that educates and prepares officers to "assume positions of higher responsibility", should

further enhance its in-house training capability standard at par or even excel the schools of other branches of service through effective utilization of foreign trained officers. From 1996 to 2000, 4 or 11% out of 36 PAF officer graduates from foreign countries in various career courses were not assigned at the ACSC. Only 6 or 16.6 were assigned at the college with less than the required one-year assignment period. Military politics (militics) played the main reason followed by lack of positions in the UMD of the ACSC. Several solutions are recommended to once and for all answer the problems on foreign graduated utilization at the college. Analysis and studies revealed that existing policy on the utilization of foreign trained military personnel needs revision. The Circular 10, GHQ AFP dated 21 June 1993 must address the utilization of foreign-trained military personnel in the local training schools and institutions giving strict measures to counterbalance the problem of militics. Likewise, the Unit Manning Document of the ACSC must be amended to allocate positions for foreign-trained graduates commensurate to their ranks. For instance, the Army Command and Staff College has 16 positions for Colonels. This will optimize utilization trained officers and at the same time establishing adequate, competent core of faculty and instructors at the college. To update the resource and reference materials at the ACSC library as well the knowledge and ideas of the faculty and students, a PAF Letter Directive must be issued that all graduated of foreign schooling, training, seminars, symposia and other related fora will submit a formatted After-Foreign Training Reports within a time period including the Programs of Instruction, course curricula, manuals, pamphlets and other reference materials to ACSC, free of charge to photocopies. These materials will provide current educational trends and developments worldwide, which are basis for curriculum development and review as well as doctrines. With the proper utilization of foreign-trained PAF officers, the ACSC could attain its grand vision of becoming one of the best air power educational institutions in Asia.

Accreditation Process of Philippine Air Force Reserve Units
By LT COL ANTONIO L BAUTISTA The defense of our country and protection of its territorial integrity/national sovereignty is the primary mission of the military establishment. Additionally, multifaceted tasks such as relief and rehabilitation, search and rescue, medical-dental missions and manning of agencies/entities vital to public interests are also being delegated to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in times of calamities and emergencies. With these, the government views the AFP as a reliable partner and ready to act whenever called upon. Officially, The Philippine Air Force started to coordinate rescue efforts among civilian entities tasked or required to do on 24 April 1969 when the RATSS was organized pursuant to Executive Order 176. The efforts concentrated mostly in conducting medical dental mission to underprivileged Filipinos. However civilian entities who were joining these missions were not properly accredited and have activated their stations including their equipment for humanity sake. This relationship lasted for about 22 years. In 1987, the current constitution of the Philippine was approved. Sec. 4., Article II of such Constitution provides that the Government may call upon the people to defend the State, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens maybe required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service. Then, on June 27 1991 Republic Act 7077, otherwise known as the Citizen Armed Force or Armed Forces of the Philippines Reservist Act was approved. The law provides the development, administration, training, maintenance, and utilization of the Citizen Armed Force (CAF) of the AFP. Further, the Act also provides that the CAF shall be provided maximum opportunity to participate in socio economic development. The Law likewise provides that as the President shall approve upon the recommendation of the SND, certain private and government entities, corporations, establishments, and organizations who shall be organized as affiliated units of the Reserve Force. These affiliated units shall be constituted by appropriate orders to be issued by the SND, given unit designation and assigned to the appropriate reserve components of the AFP. These units shall be utilized in times of war or emergency to ensure continuous and uninterrupted provision of the essential services they are rendering. Moreover, the passage of Republic Act 7898 otherwise known as AFP Modernization Law further strengthened the basis for the existence of affiliated Reserve units. The law provides that the AFP shall be composed of 20% regular forces and 80% reserve component which can be developed into an effective, efficient and responsive citizen-based force. With the reserve component as nucleus, the AFP can expand in times of war, invasion, rebellion and times of calamities, for socio-economic development and in the operation and maintenance of the essential private and public utilities. Particularly, the PAF can form affiliated units in the following areas; 1) Government and private airports, 2) Warehouse facilities at NAIA, 3) Aircraft manufacturing companies, 4) Government and private hospitals closest to air bases, 5) Government and private air transport entities, 6) Government and private aerospace, maintenance and service facilities.

Additionally, Circular Number 6, GHQ, AFP, dated 3 June 1995 was published. The circular provides general procedures concerning affiliated Reserve Units especially on organization, training, commission/ enlistment in the Reserve Force, call to active duty, removal and separation, and evaluation. However, it is sad to note that until today, the PAF has not yet come up with a written and detailed document to implement Circular Number 6, GHQ, AFP dated 3 June 1995. Despite this handicap, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Retirees and Reservist Affairs, A-10 had already processed 18 applications for PAFARUS affiliation; 17 of which are already approved. The 18 companies underwent an accreditation process which can be considered acceptable. However, it was found to be full of loopholes and lapses. In the absence of written document to support the process, the probability of short circuiting the process or disregarding some of the steps are highly possible. Based on interviews with some personnel assigned at OA-10, and ARC, they told this writer that their basis in coming up with this flow chart is Circular Number 6, GHQ, AFP, dated 3 June 1995 which has general applications and provisions, resulting to numerous and different interpretations. To discuss the present process, the solicitation of PAFARUS applicants are being conducted not only by the ARC specifically RATSG but also by A-10, a supposed nonoperating coordinating staff of the CG, PAF. Target companies are briefed on the requirements and advantages they can derive by being a PAFARU. Then, RATSG should complete the supporting documents of the applicant company such as profile, organization, air assets, equipment, employees and their skills. A draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the applicant company and the PAF will also be prepared by RATSG. A Background Investigation Check (BIC) of the applicant company and its employees is also to be conducted by ARC. The complete supporting papers of the company will be forwarded to CG, PAF (Attn: A-10) for processing. With regards to the companies solicited by A-10, the papers are directly being processed at OA-10 with the RATSG having no knowledge about it. All draft MOAs will be forwarded to Air Judge Advocate for legal opinion. The Director, RFD, OA-10 assigns a unit designation to the company. After the legal opinion, A-10 prepares a MOA for signature of the Head of the Company and CG, PAF. It will be sent to the Chief of Staff, AFP thru J-10 for proper Staff action and then recommended to the Secretary of National Defense for notation. Then, it will be recommended to the President approval/disapproval. If approved, the Adjutant General will issue orders of the approval of the affiliation. A-10 thru ARC will inform the newly affiliated unit of the approval. Then, PAFGH will conduct limited physical examination to the employees of the PAFARUS. EP rank shall be conferred to the employee and ARC will schedule the conduct of Military Orientation Training (MOT) to the personnel of the company. After the completion of the MOT, the TO & E of the PAFARU will be validated by A-3. Supporting papers for commission of PAFARU officers will be submitted to higher headquarters for approval. Resultantly, some behavioral problems among OA-10 and RATSG personnel came out since A-10, who is an HPAF Staff got involved in directly soliciting applicant companies. Some personnel of ARC specifically RATSG are adamant and lack aggressiveness in soliciting entities that would be members of PAFARUS because they felt insulted with the soliciting initiatives of OA-10 personnel. There were instances when some RATSG personnel were directed to perform PAFARU related activities. However, they replied that since their Office is only an extension of A-10 and some of their activities are being undertaken by OA-10 personnel, then, A-10 will be in better position to undertake the instruction. Unless a written publication is published by HPAF detailing the accreditation process, then, it is expected that the same level of disenchantment of RATSG personnel will continue. In addition, the military unit designation assigned to PAFARUS was not in accordance with the existing policies in organizing units as prescribed by PAF Manual 17-

3 dated April 1982 because A-3 was not involved in this activity. A-10 through the Director, Reserve Force Development issued military unit designation to PAFARUS applicants without any coordination with A-3. Recently, A-10 requested A-3 for revalidation of the rd Table of Organization & Equipment (TO & E) of the 4443 Rescue Light Airlift Squadron, a PAFARU. Said TO & E will be used in determining the rank distribution for the personnel of the Unit. Unluckily, after a thorough revalidation of the TO&E by the Management Engineering Team (MET) from the Directorate of Manpower and Organization, OA-3, it was found out that the PAFARU can not even be considered a squadron due to its limited aircraft and manpower inventory. Hence, its present designation should be downgraded to a flight instead of being a squadron. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7077 clearly provides that organization, structure, manning and equipment of reserved units shall confirm to the organization of the regular force. It is safe to assume that this shortcoming had happened because of pressure, inaccurate/hasty initial validation of its personnel/equipment prior to its accreditation or for lack of clear cut policy or procedure on the accreditation. In reality, Circular Number 6 does not provide any provisions with respect to Background Investigation Check (BIC) of PAFARUS applicants including its employees. However, it provides that security clearance for the employees of PAFARUS cannot be waived. The strict conduct of BIC to an applicant is a must that should be conducted accordingly and cannot be done half haphazardly. Personnel who can pose threat to national security should be barred from entering the military service. Based from the interviews I conducted with some personnel of the ACCS for Intel, C-2, ARC, they revealed that only limited BIC was conducted to these companies before they were accredited as PAFARUS. The Command can only hope that nobody from the roster of employees of these PAFARUS are members of any underground movement or espousing instability. Nowadays, many companies and corporations have been infiltrated by members of the underground movement in disguise of being members of cause-oriented groups. Remember the saying “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”. At least if BIC was conducted properly, the possibility of having infiltrators through the PAFARUS will be reduced. Another problem besetting the process is the long, tedious and bureaucratic procedures in conferring officer rank. The current accreditation process provides that the commissionship papers of the officers of PAFARUS applicants will be sent to the President through proper channels and this can only be done after the completion of the MOT unlike the enlisted personnel where ranks can immediately be conferred to them after the completion of the MOT. Consider the amount of time these company officers will spend waiting for the approval of their commissionship, the enthusiasm sometimes wears off. The ultimate loser will be the Command because of the amount of resources and initiatives the PAF has already invested into these officers. There was even a company where only the CEO was commissioned and none of the personnel in the company was conferred the military rank. In case of mobilization, said officers of the PAFARU will not have any control personnel to command and the command cannot impose its orders. Another short fall of the current practice is the failure of the employees of the PAFARUS to undergo a Physical Examination (PE) that will qualify them into the military service. Interviews revealed that PAFARU employees only underwent very limited physical test before they undertook the MOT. Since the PE conducted to them was not stringent, chances are that some of the PAFARU employees are not physically fit for military training. It is quite a luck that until today, nobody from PAFARU personnel who had undergone MOT had perished during the training. With the PAF motto “One Mission Many Roles”, the Command expects plenty of activities which may not be accomplished by the PAF using its active personnel and its dwindling resources. In this situation, the Command will really feel the need for the help

from the PAFARUS be it in terms of manpower, equipment, supplies, and other resources. Relatedly, our records will show that for the last 6 years, an average of 17 typhoons passed though our country yearly. Normally, destruction of properties and human sufferings as an aftermath of typhoons are severe and damages. The destructive effects of the typhoons and earthquakes, airplane crashes and other calamities may compel the regular PAF component to be too pre-occupied with the conduct of search and rescue, relief and rehabilitation and possible medical-dental missions to the affected population and take their time off to the real mandate of the Command. Experience will tell us that whenever something goes wrong and becomes uncontrollable, specially during times of calamities, the government usually calls up the AFP, to conduct immediate actions in as much as the AFP is the only entity that is well organized and ready to respond at a moment’s notice. During these times of emergency, the AFP can further utilize the PAFARUS and perform missions related to relief and rehabilitation in the calamity affected area. Based on records on file at RATSG, the PAFARUS had already conducted 13 Medical-Dental civac missions, treated 14,032 patients and rescued 10 people in two daring rescue operations since 1998. With this downloading of task to PAFARUS, the regular component of the PAF can concentrate on its primary mission of air defense and support to surface forces. The author honestly feels that with these realities, the PAF really needs an unlimited number of PAFARUS; provided that these companies will successfully passed the stringent accreditation requirements and process of PAFARUS affiliation. The situation at HPAF today in as far as the PAFARUS accreditation is concerned is similar to a law that has been enacted but waiting for the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). This resulted to confusion and varied interpretations since Circular No. 6, GHQ, AFP, contains general provisions. The provisions were interpreted differently by different Heads of offices and personnel working on the process. In these aspects, personality and subjectivity were very prevalent. In our regimented organization where completeness, objectivity and preciseness are requisites in our day to day activities, doubts and assumptions must be reduced to the minimum. This is the reason why at any level of Command, Operation Plan, Implementing Plan, Fragmentation Order, Addenda, and Radio Messages are written, transmitted and published very clearly so that the order, instructions, procedures will be understood and implemented correctly. Little elbowroom can be given for personnel interpretation. Likewise, in the field of education, a written, well discussed and defined Program of Instructions (POI) will be a good basis for the conduct of the course. Subjectivity if not eliminated will be reduced at barest minimum and hopefully better output will be produced. It can be deduced that in the absence of a written document as basis for PAFARUS accreditation of HPAF, personality of the implementers maybe always subjective. It is about time, HPAF must solve this shortcoming since the avalanche of applications from PAFARUS applicants is still about to come. Unless HPAF comes out with a written document in accrediting PAFARU applicants, the degree of objectivity will always be sacrificed in favor of the wealthy, corrupt and the powerful. In this case, professionalism in the military service will not be achieved since the PAFARUS that are not properly accredited will already become part and parcel of the military service. Finally, there is really a need for HPAF to publish a written Letter Directive to govern the process of accreditation of PAFARUS applicants.

ATTACK TALE

SF- 260TP Blasted Nur’s House
By MAJOR JESS D MADLANGBAYAN PAF

When the Jaguars are set foot at ACP Zamboanga on the morning of 21 November 2001 on its first deployment mission under a new guise as the SF-260TP Warriors (coined as the multi-cab), the Edwin Andrew Air Base fightline was heaving like a combat zone. Piles of iron bombs were seen on the backside of the parking ramp, 2 OV-10s were being uploaded with 4 Mk-82 (500lb) bombs each, 2 MG-520s loaded with rockets and machine guns were flying over the area, 1 C-130 had just landed carrying reinforcement troops, and scores of high ranking Army and Air Force officers were boarding the 4 UH- 1Hs bound for Jolo. Just after the 3 TPs completed their engine shutdown, BGEN NELSON ENSLAO, 3 TOW Commander, approached the pilots and enthusiastically welcomed them to the “war zone”. Be ready for an airstrike anytime, we need you here… go! Go! Go! As he pumped his first in assurance. Meanwhile, the O-10s and the MG-520s were conducting airstrikes in succession for 3 straight days in the hinterlands of Jolo, Sulu against the MNLF rebels loyal to outgoing ARMM Governor Nur Misuari. The chaos started when MNLF rebels began th pounding the 104 Bde, PA and the TOG 9, Jolo with mortars at the dawn of 19 Nov 2001. Although the damage done was minimal, such incident signaled the counter- strike by the military. Three MNLF strongholds were blasted with rockets and bombs for the past 3 days leaving heavy casualties on the rebel side. From their original strongholds, the rebels were forced by the combined aerial bombardment and ground assault to withdraw to the mountainsides. The TP pilots, fresh from a weeklong gunnery-training mission at Crow Valley Range were so eager to test their mettle in real combat scenario. While the OV-10 and MG520 pilots were throttling along with successive airstrike missions. The TP pilots waited in th earnest on when their first combat mission will begin. The good news came when the 15 Strike Wing attack pilots were called upon to report at SOUTHCOM HQS for target briefing. The primary target came out to be the house of Nur Misuari in Silangka, Sulu, about 20 miles from Jolo town. Since the target is situated within the populated area, rocket (2.75” FFAR) is decided to be the most appropriate ordnance for such to avoid hitting nearby houses, hence a perfect chance for the TP. On 1030H 22 Nov, flight of 3 SF-260TP took off for Sulu Island with the mission: “destroy the house of Nur Misuari in Silangkan”. Coursing the route through GPS-195 Tracker, the Jaguars reached the target area after about 35 minutes of flight. “Jaguars, check your sight” the leader ordered as the flight circled the target for positive identification. The Wingmen radioed “Tally ho! The target”, that is the bungalow type house painted in blue in the middle of row of houses along the shoreline. The pilots knew that they only have a couple of chances for a high angle delivery and a very low release altitude before the enemy’s. 50 Cal Machine Gun gets active.
rd

Pumping high with adrenalin, the lead pilot descends to 1,500ft pattern altitude and initiates roll-in to target. “It must be a sure hit… it must be”, the pilot muttered as he tracked the pipper onto the target. The altitude countdown began… 1,200 ft… 1000 ft… 800 ft… fire! Then “kaboom!” 4 K223 rockets blasted out from the launcher and smacked right into the target. Four gaping holes appeared on the center of the roof. With that the remaining rocket propellant and warhead explosions are sure enough to penetrate the soft roof and start the fire. Seconds later, thick smoke and traces of flame billowed from the holes. The Wingmen (2 TPs) fired their shots on the immediate vicinity of the house to ensure that nothing of the target left untouched. The Jaguars then proceeded to their next target: a cluster of nipa houses at the foot of Mt Tukay reported to be a rallying point of the withdrawing rebel forces. To say the least, the targets were totally destroyed after a series of precision rocketry by the Jaguars. As they headed home, the Jaguars saw from a distant a towering smoke from the House of Nur, still burning. With that, the maiden combat mission flight of the SF-260TP was concluded successfully and, indeed, very fulfilling as regards to the value of the target hit. The precision targeting and pilot’s bravery proved once again the professionalism of PAF pilots. In the aftermath of these clashes, the Air Force blasted several Misuari’s hideouts in 4 Sulu towns leaving 113 killed, including 100 rebels while the ground troops captured at least 5 MNLF camps in Jolo.

National Search and Rescue Plan
- An imperative
By CPT IAN DC VIVES PAF Search and Rescue (SAR) is a very delicate and dangerous undertaking. As such, for SAR to be safe and successful it must be governed by universal rules and principles, it must have methods, and it must have order. SAR as a system must be embodied into a set of well defined documents to guide all players in a SAR system. International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual In 1998, two agencies of the United Nations devoted to aeronautical and maritime transportation safety, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) respectively, came up with the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR Manual). “The primary purpose of the three volumes of the IAMSAR manual is to assist States in meeting their own Search And Rescue (SAR) needs, and the obligations they accepted under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)”- The Philippine Government is a signatory to these conventions. Any commitment made by the government in the conventions is expected by the international community to be fulfilled. The manual provides guidelines to a “common approach” and “harmonization” of states toward SAR: it is the accepted standards on SAR efforts worldwide. Evidently, the manual aims to professionalize global SAR services. Search and Rescue as a System The Philippines being a signatory to international air and maritime organization conventions is tasked to set-up a SAR system. The major component of the global SAR system is the Rescue Coordination Center (PRCC) responsible for SAR services within its Search and Rescue Region (SRR), which incidentally is the Flight Information Region (FIR) of each state, as part of a global SAR system; ICAO’s Annex 12 and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue require that SAR providers establish an RCC for each SRR. RCC is on top of the SAR organizational hierarchy. Other organizational components are the following: 1. 2. Rescue Sub-center (RSC) – support an RCC within its SRR. SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC) – responsible in handling a SAR incident On-scene Coordinator (OSC) – coordinates the on-scene activities of all participating facilities.

3.

4.

Search and Rescue Unit (SRU) – Unit with specialized equipment and trained personnel, as well as other resources which can be used to conduct SAR operations.

Present Philippine SAR System Set-up The Philippine Rescue Coordination Center (PRCC), as mandated internationally, is the lead agency when aeronautical and maritime disasters occur. While the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) through the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) is responsible with regard to natural or man-made disasters. Through NDCC has the mandate to take charge of disaster management in the entire country, it does not have the competence possessed by PRCC when it comes to aeronautical and maritime disasters. In many cases however OCD takes over aeronautical and maritime disasters even if they are not the experts in this field. Usually, PRCC people help in the SAR effort behind the scene as it is being overshadowed by NDCC people. Both agencies do not have the resources to mount an effective SAR effort because both depend primarily on the AFP on the operational aspects remotely direct the operation with people from the AFP, usually the designated Task Force Commander (an SMC) calling the shots. Usually the Philippine Air Force through 505 Search and Rescue Group is first on the scene as they are the only unit with specialized equipment, trained personnel and air assets to react immediately. But when NDCC steps in and assigns it own SMC or Task th Force Commander and OSC, 505 SRG people give way. The reluctance of PRCC to assert its mandate during aeronautical and maritime situations is incomprehensible. PRCC personnel in this aspect are trained well to handle the situation than NDCC personnel; They are trained on how to “direct” SAR operations following international procedures – procedures espoused by ICAO and IMO. Air and sea mishaps have “technical and legal” aspects that SAR players have to deal with, that is why designated SMC and OSC must be from PRCC. As defined by the IAMSAR Manual, 505 SRG is a mere Search and Rescue Unit (SRU) which can be directed by higher agencies like the PRCC and NDCC through the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) to perform search and rescue missions. In reality however, th th the 505 SRG can be described as a SAR System in its own right; 505 SRG possess all the components of a SAR System and performs the roles of any SAR player – it can ably perform the function of NDCC, RCC, RSC, SMC, OSC, and SRU at the same time as experience would show. The Unit most of the time is first on the disaster site and th therefore, assumes the role of an on-scene-commander (OSC). The 505 SRG personnel aggressively pursue the OSC and SMC role in many cases inasmuch as its resources are used extensively in the SAR effort. They take orders from immediate superiors of their th unit. Orders however, should come from PRCC or NDCC. The 505 SRG people could not be blamed on their apparent one-man-army attitude as sometimes orders are vague and confusing because of too many people wanting to join the fray – local government units, local personalities, political personalities and even kibitzers are sometimes meddling. The intention to help is noble, however, it just makes the situation more complicated. Initial confusion is evident during the early stages of the SAR. Disorganization result in miscoordination of SAR operations miscoordination. Swift reaction suffers because of delays in the decision making process. The problem has been going on for too long and up to the present.
th th

NIGHT SURFACE ATTACK OF OV-10 PILOTS
By 1LT ARNOLD P TAPIA PAF
The recent Mindanao crisis and the recurring Abu Sayyaf problem revealed time and again the enemy's foremost advantage in protracted warfare knowledge of terrain. They very well knew all avenues of approach leading to their camps and strongholds making it difficult for the government forces to infiltrate and wipe their defenses. Furthermore, they exploit this advantage to operate under the cover of darkness by moving troops, logistics and other supplies. Thus, at the onset of dawn, our own troops are left confounded where their next positions would be. As evident on the Mindanao campaign last year, targets given the night before by ground forces are often changed the following morning as soon as the sun rises. Unknown to many, this dilemma was partly solved by the introduction of the Night Surface Attack (NSA) tactics first tested in March 1995. It employed OV-10A aircraft to illuminate a 3-mile zone representing a target after which airstrikes were conducted using conventional tactics. One tactic employed is the use of a "Low level/Skip" bombing considered one of the most accurate methods of delivering fall-away ordnance. Another is the use of "Dive Attack" at an angle of 60 degrees, which is the most widely used daylight delivery technique. The "Pop Up" technique was also applied simulating delivery on a heavily defended encampment. Lastly, the so-called "Fighting Wheel" technique used for flexibility and continuity of delivery was employed. All these sorties were conducted using no-moon, half-moon and full-moon condition despite the absence of night surveillance equipment. Yearly after that, proficiency for pilots were conducted to further hone their skills and adaptation towards this new tactics. It involves an academic phase where a review on topics like spatial disorientation, instrument flying, cockpit lighting system, night operation procedures, and night proficiency maneuvers are being thoroughly discussed. During the initial flying phase, Instrument Approach Touch and Go and Formation Navigation are conducted prior to an advance flying phase involving target acquisition, Forward Air Control (FAC) procedures, and different delivery techniques. The most recent and useful training for NSA was with the US Marines during the Balikatan 2000 where the pilots of the OV-10A were introduced to Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) eliminating the need for flares at no-moon condition. Furthermore, it was during this exercise that the efficacy of the OV-10As for night mission operations were solidly established due to its inherent attributes such as: navigational equipment (GPS, VOR, TACAN IFF, ADF); communication package (VHF-AM, VHF-FM, UHF, HF); sufficient cockpit lighting; endurance of 5 ½ hours; 300 nautical miles combat radius; paradrop capability (five fully equipped paratroopers); and a wide variety of payload (2.75 FFAR, 110-750 lbs Bx, .50 cal & M60 machineguns). Although not yet applied on any formal conflict here in the Philippines, the OV10As were already being used for NSA during the 60's and early 70's in the war-torn Vietnam. Its utilization proved successful in disrupting the supply flow of the famous HoChi Minh Trail, and supporting beleaguered outposts almost overrun by the Vietcongs. In today's setting, we can apply this tactic when the enemies thought that they have complete control of the night. In terms of reach, where conventional artillery could not, NSA could. First, it can soften formidable defenses prior to a lightning assault by our

ground forces. During siege operation, re-supply and reinforcement at nighttime could be spotted and bombed thereby isolating them from outside world. And whenever the enemy decides to preposition their troops for the next day or simply leave their posts and regroup elsewhere under the cover of darkness, our eyes in the sky would catch them unaware with nowhere to hide. Its implementation in the way we conduct war would redefine our own battlefront. No longer will darkness be an enemy's ally. No longer will "rest and recuperation" be a part of their vocabulary when the night comes. Constant bombardment striking from the different positions would disorient them and give them second thoughts on their next move. When there is chaos, individual morale will weaken. And all this would lead to their eventual downfall.

THE SURFACE ATTACK AIRCRAFT: JET, PROPELLER OR ROTARY?
By CPT CHITO G MAYUGA PAF BACKGROUND Paragraph 2, section 5B of the AFP Modernization Law states that the Philippine Air Force (PAF) must have the capability to provide air support to ground and naval forces. The envisioned acquisition of the Surface Attack Aircraft (SAA) was deemed essential to address this. However, because of the diversity of air support missions, which include close air support, tactical strike, maritime attack and air interdiction among others, the best platform type, that is jet, propeller or rotary driven aircraft has yet to be decided.

TERMS Air Interdiction- air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. An action to divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Air Munitions- air launched weapons, such as missiles, bombs, rockets, and other ordnance required to conduct offensive and defensive military operations. Close Air Support- air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly surface forces. Surface Attack Aircraft- a combat airplane designed primarily to carrying out attacks on surface targets normally referred to as medium-value, such as hostile ships, enemy defense installations and tactical targets. The aircraft will also be used as a lead-in aircraft for fighter training. DISCUSSION Assessment of Threats

The best angle of approach to determine which platform type the envisioned SAA would be to address the PAF’s ground and naval air support role is to determine and study the present threat and the perceived threat. The present threat revolves around internal security operations. These include, in the recent past, close air support missions against the MILF, the Abu Sayyaf, and through the years against the NPAs. The targets in CAS are generally tactical in nature and of low value, which comprise bunkers, nipa huts and highly mobile enemy troops. The threats to air assets that arise from CAS missions are 50 caliber machine guns and small arms fire. However, PAF strike units received intelligence reports of shoulder borne surface to air missile possessed by the MILF during the Camp Abu Bakar air campaign. This report, although not confirmed prompted strike aircraft to release air munitions at higher altitude levels. Besides CAS, air support also encompasses air interdiction under the present threat. This particular mission was markedly demonstrated when the F-5s made the initial strike against the heart of Camp Abu Bakar, without forward air control and when ground troops are still far-off the premises of the camp. The perceived threat arises from the tension at the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) brought about by opposing claimant countries, which includes the Philippines. The tension particularly heightened in 1995 when China erected structures at Mischief, a shoal within R.P.’s 200nm EEZ. An armada of military vessels that were sighted northwest of Pag-asa in 1996 hinted the threat of a foreign military take-over of the runway-laden island. The threat to air assets in the KIG are ship borne long range surface to air missiles and carrier borne fighter aircraft. The Surface Attack Aircraft vis-à-vis the Threat The envisaged SAA, in order to be effective must be able to address the present tactical threat and the perceived strategic threat in order for it to satisfy the PAF’s role of providing air support to ground and naval forces as required in the AFP Modernization Program. Therefore the SAA must possess certain specific attributes and capabilities consistent to the two-fold threat unique in R.P.’s defense landscape. The following attributes are deemed essential in a tactical and strategic SAA: a. Payload – the platform must have the capability to carry a large number of conventional air-munitions i.e. Bombs, rockets and guns. b. c. d. e. Range – the platform must have range and loiter to KIG. STOL- short take-off and landing capable in unpaved runways Sub-sonic – to negate the difficulty in visual targeting Small turn radius – to negate the difficulty in visual targeting

f. Speed – the platform must have a respectable speed to travel the expanse of the South China Sea and to survive surface to air fires g. h. i. Less turn around time – to assure continuous combat operation Survivability features – i.e. ejection features, armor plates etc. Low operating cost – i.e. low fuel consumption, availability of spares etc.

j. Upgrade possibilities – the platform must have the potential to be interfaced with precision-guided munitions, anti-ship and anti-submarine munitions. k. missiles. Limited air-to-air capability – must be capable of carrying air-to-air

MATRIXED PLATFORM TYPE VS CAPABILITY

CAPABILITY Huge payload Range STOL Sub-sonic Small turn radius Speed Less turn around time Survivability features Low operating cost Upgrade possibilities Limited air-to-air capability

JET 4 4 4 4 4 4 unknown 4 4 4 4

PROPELLER 4 4 4 4 4 7 unknown unknown 4 7 7

ROTARY 7 7 4 4 4 7 unknown 7 4 7 7

The PAF’s role of providing air support to ground and naval forces as based on the present threat and perceived threat implies that the SAA must have tactical and strategic attributes and potential. As based on above matrix, it is the jet driven platform that is more resilient to both potential. The jet SAA has both speed and limited air to air capability essential in providing air support and cover to naval forces in the expanse of the South China Sea. Likewise, it also has CAS potential because it is subsonic, has payload, has range and endurance and is capable of take-off and landing in short, unpaved runways. A propeller driven platform and a rotorcraft is more akin to tactical operations only. Their potential in providing air support to naval forces is in question due to their lack of speed. Furthermore, a rotorcraft has no range to KIG. Both platforms have no air to air capability and the possibility of interfacing them with precision-guided munitions, antiship and anti-submarine weapons appears to be in doubt.

There are however exceptions to these. The Argentine IA 58 PUCARA, although prop driven, has air-to-air and anti-ship strike capabilities. Its maximum airspeed is Mach 1. Nonetheless, the PUCARA is an exception rather than the rule. The weakness of the PUCARA is its very long take-off roll of 3,500 ft. Moreover, the problem with prop driven SAAs is its limited number of choices for selection. There are not many aircraft companies that manufacture prop driven platforms in the strike role. The acquisition and operating cost of both the prop driven SAA and the rotorcraft is much less than the acquisition and operating cost of the jet SAA, therefore its use in the tactical environment wherein targets are generally of low value appears to be more suitable and feasible. The employment of a jet SAA in tactical situations targeting mere bunkers and nipa huts seems to be incongruently costly. However this cost can be negated as it can double-up as MRF lead-in trainer. Additionally, it must also be assumed that in the future, the enemies of the state will have the potential to destroy PAF air assets. It is no secret that a foreign country is supplying the Abu Sayyaf arms and high caliber weapons. The possibility of shoulder borne surface to air missile getting into its hands is very real and slow and low flying aircraft are susceptible to these. Considering above discussions, the PAF has the following options: PAF OPTIONS 1. Option I: Acquisition of one squadron (12 aircraft) of Jet SAA Advantages Can address both tactical and strategic roles Can double-up as MRF lead-in trainer Numerous choices in the world market Numerous using countries Resilient to PGM interface Disadvantages Higher acquisition cost Cost of operation may not be proportional to cost of targets in the tactical scenario

2.

OPTION II: Acquisition of one squadron of Prop driven SAA Advantages Not very costly to acquire and maybe to operate

Can land in unprepared surfaces Cost of operation in the tactical role is proportionate with costs of target Disadvantages Not very many choices in the world market today Lesser number of using countries Only few are specifically designed in the strike role, others are primarily trainers No smart weapons kit 3. OPTION III: Mixed acquisition of both types Advantages Solves the problem of first two options Aircraft specific missions: Prop SAA will be employed in CAS and other tactical scenarios, Jet SAA will be employed at South China Sea for naval operations support and will double up as lead in to MRF Disadvantages Cost of maintaining two types of aircraft Problem of spares of two types aircraft CONCLUSION: 1. The SAA must have the capability to address a two-fold threat: the present threat, which is internal and tactical in nature, and the perceived threat, which revolves around KIG claims, which are external and strategic in nature. 2. A Jet driven SAA is the most resilient and adaptable platform to address both threats in that it has tactical capabilities in ISO; speed, range and limited air to air capability in the strategic environment of naval support in the expanse of the South China Sea. Its cost of operation against low value hostile targets may at times be not feasible, however, this cost is negated as it has lead-in trainer potential to the MRF. 3. A propeller driven SAA is most suitable in the close air support and counter-insurgency role in ISO. Its cost of operation is proportional to low value hostile targets and its flight characteristics of low airspeed and small radius of turn is tailor made in the environment of visual targeting. However, its naval support in the external environment of the South China Sea and KIG has weaknesses because of airspeed insufficiency and lack of air-to-air capability. Moreover, there are a limited number of selection choices in the world market and few countries utilize this platform type specifically in the attack role.

4. A rotary aircraft is suitable and feasible in close air support and counterinsurgency operations in ISO. However, it has a weakness in free fall bombs delivery as it has no airspeed. It also has no speed and range in the expanse of the South China Sea for naval support. 5. Of the three options cited, option three, that is mixed acquisition of a jet and propeller driven platform appears to be the most acceptable, suitable and feasible because the combination of both addresses the weaknesses of the other. However, a deeper study must be delved into the cost of maintaining two types of aircraft against the cost of maintaining just one type. RECOMMENDATION: A Jet driven SAA is the most adaptable and resilient platform for the PAF to accomplish its air support role for ground and naval forces, however it has options to acquire a combination of the jet type and the propeller type if deemed more feasible.

410TH MAINTENANCE WING STRATEGIC PLAN
By BRIG GEN RICARDO A FAUSTINO AFP

The main goal of the 410th Maintenance Wing strategic plan is the development of the Depot Level Maintenance capabilities and the expansion of its coverage to serve at least the major islands of the country through the Forward Area Maintenance Center (FAMC) concept. The concept is envisioned to provide Non Destructive Inspection, structural repair, oil analysis and other depot level services such as refill of firex to PAF units in Visayas and Mindanao. This will entail deployment of personnel and equipment but this has been considered and are incorporated in our plan. The plan also envisions a single facility for Depot Level Maintenance for all aircraft in the PAF inventory including repair and overhaul of engines and other major components. One should be able to understand the levels of maintenance before he appreciates why Depot level maintenance has to exist as a central unit. DLM requires numerous man hours, highly trained technical work force and special equipment in order to overhaul major and minor aircraft and engine components. With these jobs done by th 410 MW, the flying units can now concentrate on their flying operations and perform only regular maintenance to their fleet. At present, we are capable of performing structural repair and Non-Destructive Inspection to all PAF aircraft. Our engine rehab capability is limited however to the T-53 engine. In the future we hope to cater to the different types of engines existing in the PAF inventory together with the other aircraft components such as gear boxes, governors, and hydraulics system of other types of aircraft in the PAF inventory. We are optimistic that we can do this because we have the manpower skills that can be utilized for the purpose. We have the technical expertise and in order to cater to other aircraft types. We will only need the necessary manuals and special tools in order to perform this job. Although this endeavor might entail a considerable amount as a whole, we are slowly acquiring what we need in small quantities. We are also fortunate that we were given the SF-260 M recovery project which served to refresh the minds of our mechanics and specialist on the work to this type of aircraft. All of these actions are geared towards the ultimate aim of the unit – the centralization of Depot Level Maintenance. The realization of this goal however depends on several factors over which this unit has no control. The foremost of these factors involves the command policies and direction which will greatly affect the existence of the unit, followed by the personalities of the different Commanders of flying units and equally important are the funds that will keep our output as a constant figure at least. All these factors are interrelated since Policies and direction taken by the Command may be influenced by the personalities of the Commanders of different flying units which in turn affects the distribution of funds for aircraft maintenance. A specific case is the funding required for reparable cycle assets (RCA’s). Funds for RCA’s should be handled and managed by this unit through the Air Logistics and Support Command. Funds are

essential factor in maintenance together with Technical expertise and skills of personnel to do the job. The absence of one undermines the capabilities that we possess. It can also affect our output in terms of the number of overhauled/ repair aircraft components. The depot level maintenance plays a vital role in the acquisition of air assets via the aircraft recovery program in the absence of the modernization fund. In fact it is the only way to increase our aircraft fleet as of the moment.

An Interview with the Vice Commander

QUIET ACHIEVER
MAJOR GENERAL NESTOR R SANTILLAN O-5591 is a member of the Philippine Military Academy Class of 1970. He is also a graduate of various local and international courses such as the Turbofan Engine Maintenance Course, Allied Officer Course, Security Intelligence Officer Course, Advanced Security and Intelligence Course and Squadron Officer Course in Maxwell, Alabama, USA. He was a recipient of the CG, PAF award for exemplary performance when he completed his CGSC in 1986. He finished his Master of Defense Studies at the University if New South Wales, Australia, in 1993. A veteran pilot and well-decorated officer, MGEN SANTILLAN held different command and staff positions in the Air Force. Among them were as Assistant Chief of Air Staff for nd Personnel (A-1), and Chief of Intelligence (A-2), Vice-Commander of 2 Air Division, th Commandant of Air Command and Staff College, Wing Commander of 410 Maintenance th Wing, Wing Commander of 220 Airlift Wing, and Commander of the Tactical Operations Command. In his two last positions of major responsibility, GEN SANTILLAN outstandingly th pushed up unit readiness and operational achievements. As 220 Airlift Wing Commander, he posted the highest OR rates for C-130s and N-22B Nomads in the last five years. And as commander of the TOC, based in Mactan, he reinforced further the character of the Air Force as a tactical force multiplier, especially in Mindanao. He assumed the position Vice Commander, PAF, last 12 November 2001, succeeding GENERAL GUILLERMO LORENZO. He is concurrently the Chairman of PAF Modernization and Doctrines Boards. People close to him dub him as PAF’s “Quiet Achiever.”

<THE INTERVIEW>
AFR: How do you see your role as the new Vice Commander of the Philippine Air Force? VC: My role essentially is to serve as the “spare tire” of the CG, PAF. But I clarified that in my assumption speech also month. I said that a spare tire is used only when one of the vehicle’s tires get busted. My job is to ensure that no tires actually get busted. A better analogy would be that of a co-pilot or co-driver. I’ve got to to make sure I assist the CG in all his activities and thrust for the Air Force. I’m glad that more or less I know his style. We worked together at HPAF before and, more than that, I inherited his post as TOC Commander in Mactan last year. I’m proud to say I was able to build on his kind of command legacies. AFR: How do you relate your assignment as TOC Commander to your present responsibility? TOC: Like I said, it afforded me the chance to build on something the CG,PAF did in Mindanao. Familiarity with the CG, PAF’s work ethic is crucial for any commander, and I th got that in Mactan, when I was yet the 220 AW Commander, who shared official neighborhood with him. Knowing how the CG would react or treat certain issues or approach a particular problem is definitely something I can use everyday as his Vice and official alter ego. But over and beyond that, knowing how things fit and match in my higher level is an advantage. You see, as TOC Commander, I implemented policy and led in operations, I saw things from the ground up, I became personally acquainted with the PAF problems in the field, I knew the pilots and mechanics and their families, and I developed

positive relations with the media and the communities we served. Today, as Vice Commander, I see the big picture. What’s good about it is that I know hidden details because of my exposure as TOC Commander. AFR: There are five components of the PAF Modernization Program, do you think that there should be a re-prioritization in its implementation? VC: Let’s briefly review the program. The doctrines development, human resource development, and force restructuring and organizational development have been actually started. However, our objectives in these areas have not been fully realized due to several constraints. The remaining two pillars-capability and material development and bases support and systems development have been influenced heavily by the availability of modernization money. While the Air Force or the AFP has not come up with any official position yet, I personally believe that, yes, a reprioritization of objective must be done to address new challenges. For the past few months, we have all witnessed the necessity of modern technology with which to fight the terror. While other countries have now invested heavily in platforms and systems that enhance target acquisition and ID from 30,000 feet above sea level, and able to see and hit the enemy at night, we have mostly focused on the other pillars. Changing the priorities is the reason our CG, PAF has been stressing the importance of beefing up our capability through non-traditional sources. AFR: As Chairman of various Committee of the Command, what are your plans in the near future? VC: As far as my Committee Chairs are concerned, I don’t see any drastic or dramatic reforms that need to be undertaken. I believe my predecessors welfare of the airman. For instance, our housing program is in full swing, the career development program of officers is being rigidly implemented, and our projects management teams have their hands full. What I can initiate perhaps is the creation of an Oversight Committee for the simultaneous programs of the Air Force, but that would be adding another layer. Another thing that I can pursue is the monitoring program started by General Lorenzo. With a no-nonsense monitoring system covering the command and staff of the PAF, the top leadership can better control and manage resources and build on the amount of valuable feedback from the rest.

LTCOL ELMER R AMON PAF (GSC), a new addition to the staff of the Commanding General, PAF, is a graduate of Master of Development Administration (2001) from the Asia Pacific School of Economics and Management at the Australian National University (ANU); and a graduate of Master in Management Degree (1998) from the Asian Institute of Management (AIM). He was formerly assigned as a tactical attack pilot with the 15 Strike Wing, th PAF; S-211 aircraft combat-ready pilot and Wing Inspector General of the 5 Fighter Wing, PAF; an instructor at the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC); Director for Operations for the PAF Aviation Officers Candidate Scholl (PAFAOCS); Chief, Air rd Operations Center of the 3 Air Divisions; Chief Wing Operations Center and Squadron th rd Commander with the 530 CTW in Zamboanga (now 3 TOW) before being nominated for a NEDA sponsored scholarship in Australia in 1999 – 2001.
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