Vol 2, No 2


Flying in the Changing Times
Lt Col Jose Tony E Villarete PAF The Philippine Air Force is 54 years old. A wealth of experience and lessons learned for the past 54 years of dedicated and exemplary service to the country and its people provide the PAF with valuable inputs in the formulation and development of doctrines. The preponderance of success stories in the application of air power in various conflicts all over the world further strengthens the foundation for the formulation of air doctrines. Voluminous articles, theories, discussion papers and the like are continuously written by various air power advocates which always provide the necessary lights on our path towards doctrines development. However, the fast changing situation in the domestic and international scenes, require us to be more watchful and analytical in our effort to keep our air doctrines dynamic and relevant to the times. The ongoing peace process with the Southern Philippines Secessionist Groups and the Communist Party of the Philippines and the call by the new administration for active participation of the AFP in solving organized crimes, notwithstanding the considerable number of military operations other than war where the AFP has been actively engage, are to be carefully taken into consideration in the review of existing doctrines and in formulating new ones. The PAF has been in the forefront of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and to some extent in developmental efforts such as the conceptualization of the "Air Force City" in Clarkfield, Pampanga as the hub of the aerospace and air transport industry in the country. The development of PAF bases all over the archipelago is premised on the need to improve our military capabilities and at the same time spearhead the upgrading of the much needed aviation engineering support facilities of the country which became imperative in the implementation of the AFP modernization program. The PAF should be able to deal with these domestic changes, visà-vis the emerging new national policies. World events will continue to influence changes in the geopolitical landscape of the Asia Pacific region. The new US administration under President Bush has recently manifested some significant shifts in US foreign policy in the region. The fast changing relationship of the US with Mainland China, Japan and Korea would have far-reaching implications to the region as well as to this country. Needless to say, these developments would affect the Philippines and thus, the need to continuously monitor emerging trends as it relate to doctrine development. As we enter into a new international relations era, the PAF must correspondingly review and develop doctrines and strategies to cope with the changing times. In doing so, we must remain open to the vast oceans of new concepts and ideas that abound in the air power arena today. Technology is a key and critical element to the evolution of air power and should equally be considered along with our past experiences and air power theories in our trek towards the formulation and revision of doctrines.

In our quest for a Faster, Stronger and Better Philippine Air Force, every airman should endeavor to keep pace with the emerging situations both in the country and in the world. Keeping a vigilant watchful eye over the unfolding events will help us in our efforts of developing dynamic and relevant PAF doctrines. As we fly into new horizons, we must not let our mindsets shackle us in chains to the present. Together, let us exploit new concepts and move towards the future --- the skies.

The Essence of the Air Force Anniversary
For over half a century the Philippine Air Force (PAF) has been celebrating its foundation anniversary without fail. Every year, the PAF sought a theme to herald the year past and the year to come. The selected PAF anniversary theme contains hollowed words that were crafted to encapsulate the achievements of the Air Force and at the same time announce it dreams and plans. More often, these themes approximate prophetic visions the man at the helm. This year, the PAF has chosen for itself the theme, "Your First Force; Rising to every Challenge, Whenever, Wherever." The theme fittingly embodies PAF's accomplishments for the year as the result of its sustained focus on airpower.

Several of the world's great Air Force, gained their independence from surface forces in order to move effectively and carry out so-called independent missions-the most being strategic attack. The PAF became an independent service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) due in part to the influence of the US forces. While it is true that the growth of the Philippine military aviation was initially under the aegis of the US forces, the PAF air power doctrine grew to an array of operational requirement unique in the Philippines. After World War II, the PAF was organized as an "Air Defense Air Force" whose mission is to conduct prompt and sustained air defense mission in the defense of the Philippines. Several years after, the PAF had to restructure and redirect its mission so that it can conduct tactical air operations to neutralize internal threats and limited air defense operations to detect, identify, and neutralize external threats whenever possible. Currently the Air Force rediscovers itself by revisiting the doctrine of the air power. The speed, reach, ubiquity, flexibility, maneuverability, perspective, concentration, and responsiveness are strength of the air power characteristic of a true Air Force. With speed and reach, the PAF becomes the first force of the government in conflict or national development tasks. Collectively, the product of the strengths of air power makes the PAF unique.

Air power has limitations and weaknesses despite its vaunted strengths. The PAF, however, need to connect the concept of air power to stark realities in order to harness its strength. The following are several requirements of the Air Force to make air power useful and a reality. The first requirement is the availability of weapons platform-Multi Role Fighters, Long Range Patrol Aircraft, etc. Although the current fleet performs some air power role, the weapons platform stipulated in the modernization program would magnify the current strength of the PAF. The second requirement is to connect the concept of the air power to organizational development. The force structure of the AFP as well as the PAF must conform to the requirement of air power. Intelligence is the key of air power application. Air Power Historian Phillip Meilinger claimed "In essence, Air Power is targeting intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations." Right now, there is no Air Surveillance and Reconnaissance Command that may give out accurate intelligence

report. Additionally, the offensive units of the PAF are often tide up to the ground Commanders thus strike platforms full potentials are not attained. The other requirement is the ability to acquire reliable Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA). The PAF need to accurately assess the results of the air operations. This dilemma has been ongoing between the Air Force and the surface forces. A mutual arrangement to resolve such dilemma will redound to the effectiveness of the over-all military operations. Enhanced air operations is the PAF's raison d'etre as the air arm of the AFP, the PAF should never lost sight that air power doctrine is its essence. Even as the Air Force commits life and honor as the country's first line of defense- first force, it will never abdicate its responsibility to the Filipino people, as their protective carrier and relief bearer as well.

By Lt Col Francisco N Cruz, Jr. PAF
This author believes that locating the enemy’s centers of gravity should be the first agenda of the strategist. Attacking the wrong centers of gravity could lead to enormous costs, human and material. The following research material attempts to give war planners and strategists adequate doctrinal knowledge on selecting the enemy’s centers of gravity that could be applicable to both conventional or insurgency wars, specifically to the AFP campaign against the MILF and the local communist movement. Today, the concept of center of gravity is discussed only in the classroom, never in the war room.

In the realm of physical science, center of gravity (CG) is merely the balancing point of an object. The CG of a 12” ruler, for instance is 6 inches. If the ruler is made of the same material and has the same weight inch-by-inch, it will balance when supported or pivoted at its 6” mark.[1] In similar vein, aircraft engineers describe the “CG point as the balancing point of the entire length of the airplane, from nose to tail.” The importance of the CG location cannot be overstressed. If not located in its proper place, it will cause a litany of aerodynamic problems. Located incorrectly, it can cause the plane to fly very poorly or not at all. If the airplane’s CG is too far behind where it should be, a tail hanging (tail heavy), almost uncontrollable flight will result. A forward CG can make an aerobatic airplane so stable that aerobatics are almost impossible, except for easier ones such as a loop or a roll. [2] It was Carl von Clausewitz who first wrote in a military context the concept of center of gravity, in his classic book “On War.” He taught that, “one must keep the dominant characteristics of both the belligerents in mind and that out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed…” For Clausewitz, the enemy’s capital, the seat of power and government and the center of communications and administration, was the CG at strategic level. But at the operational level the single most important CG is the enemy’s army. In his published work,” A Study of Clausewitz’s Concept of the Military Center of Gravity, Col John Osgood,a US Army retired officer, emphasized Clausewitz's[3] premise that the first task in planning for war is to identify the enemy’s CG, and if possible trace them back to a single one. Any attack against a target that does not further the stated objective of destroying the enemy center of gravity, is therefore a waste of time and resource. The US failure to confront the real threat in Vietnam is his example. He suggested that the US National Command Authority through the Joint Chief of Staff should identify a conceptual strategic CG that can be articulated as part of a statement of grand and military strategy to support and guide the efforts of the commander within the theater and area of operations.[4] Many war strategists after Clausewitz had their own version. Gen Guilio Douhet, the father of strategic air power chose popular will as the CG based on the theory that the

people would eventually rise up and demand their government to make peace. For Billy Mitchell, the target of first importance is the enemy’s army.

John Warden’s model provides a logical foundation for planning offensive operations. Better known as command and control model, it suggests that any nation can be seen as a system having five components, which can be represented as concentric rings—command, essential production, transportation networks, population, and military forces. Each is part of the CG and each represents both strengths and weaknesses. Although rings may be at different levels of development, air power allows one to strike any of them without necessarily hitting enemy armed forces (though defeat of a nation’s armed forces may make all of the other rings vulnerable).[5] The model is actually a specialized targeting plan. In this five-ring model, leadership, or command and control is always the principal center of gravity: the enemy structure is the most critical element, because leaders are the only individuals in a country who can make concessions. Air power must attack the CG directly or if the center is not vulnerable, to strike critical targets on the periphery. The ultimate goal is to cause some form of strategic paralysis or disruption of the will to fight.[6] It is imperative that all actions should be aimed against the mind of the enemy command. Warden elaborated that the essence of war is to apply pressure against the enemy’s innermost strategic ring -its command.

The Gulf War demonstrates the efficacy of Warden’s model. From the moment the first strike was launched, Saddam and his forces would be rendered deaf, dumb and blind. The battle plan was the destruction of Iraqi communication and observation in order to decapitate the Iraqi high command and gain swift ascendancy over Iraqi skies. Iraqi radar sites, command stations, electrical plants and military command posts were to be destroyed, principally with the might and accuracy of F-111s and F-117s. The Allied forces conceived of Pooh Bah’s Party Operations that called for creating blackouts in Iraq. It deploys Kit2 Tomahawk missiles containing bits of glasses and metals which when exploded would short-out transformers.[7]

But prior to the air war, the US National Security Agency (NSA) and the British General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) planned a joint project that would surreptitiously employ bugs and viruses into the enemy computer systems or command and control networks. Their clandestine agents were indeed successful in inserting some hardware into a cargo of computer equipment destined for the Iraqi military, but before the virus would knock off network off line, the air war began.[8] The first salvo of bombings rendered the Iraqi air force incapable of putting up a “token fight” and destroyed the much-feared Republican Guards’ spirit.

Lt Cmdr Jeffrey A Harley, US Navy, in his 1997 thesis entitled “Information, Technology and Center of Gravity,” claimed that CG is the main source of power or strength, which, if destroyed, causes such a debilitating effect as to terminate the war. He enumerated four characteristics of CG, which are relevant to the AFP in its strategy formulation:

a. CG remains the enemy’s principal strength. “To weaken a CG is to imperil the b.
enemy’s ability to continue the conflict; to destroy the CG is to produce a cascading failure that leads to capitulation.” Each enemy has only one of them, at least at each level of war. In a traditional democratic system, for example, one might expect the will of the people or the cohesion of a coalition to serve as the strategic CG, while operational and tactical centers would most likely be the military forces or supporting infrastructure. CG can change as an operation unfolds or as the corresponding strengths and capabilities of the two sides alter. What is the most important one for a given level of war normally depends on the nature of the war itself. A war of attrition or prolonged duration (e.g. Vietnam) tends to de-emphasize tactical or operational achievements, while other types tend to downplay strategic CG (since in them the strategic goal may be attainable by operational success). It is limited or defined by strategy. The level of technology, degree of doctrinal adaptation, and the nature of societal values—such as acceptance of casualties versus risk aversion, or more democratic norms versus totalitarian principles— influence the focus of CG.[9]



According to William W Mendel and Lamar Tooke, a strategist should take painstaking effort in selecting the enemy’s potential center of gravity. “Know your enemy and yourself,” as Sun Tzu taught us. The selection process should pass the dual test of validity and feasibility. In the case of validity, the potential CG should be tested against the criterion of whether imposing one’s will over it creates a deteriorating effect that prevents

our foe from achieving his aims, and allows the achievement of our aims. As for feasibility, one must see whether he has the capability to dominate the enemy’s CG.[10] Mendel and Tooke’s argued that an assessment between forces is required as a starting point for a campaign or operational plan. It will suggest a decision as to whether one’s strength or capabilities permit attacking the enemy CG directly, at the outset. If not an indirect path to the CG through critical vulnerabilities can be followed. Once it has been determined whether to attack the CG or critical vulnerabilities, target lists can be developed. Since the relative strengths and weaknesses of both forces change over the course of conflict, the model calls for reassessments, which restarts the cycle.[11] These assessment and reassessment invariably require the expertise of intelligence analysts.

The Rail Interdiction Program, better known as Operation Strangle, conducted by Far East Forces (FEAF) during the Korean War, was perhaps the most fitting textbook example of an inappropriate targeting or locating enemy CG. This operation was a dismal failure because it didn’t meet the validity-feasibility criteria. Its goal was to paralyze the Communist transportation system between the 39th parallel and the front lines. The term strangle indicated that air interdiction would “strangle” the enemy by choking off his supplies and preventing him from maintaining an army in the field.[12] The Program was useless as a result of lack of careful analysis and re-analysis, wrote Lt Col Michael Kirtland, USAF in his research, Planning Air Operations: Lessons from Operation Strangle in Korean War. He cited several reasons. Firstly, the enemy was able to overcome the difficulties created by the interdiction effort and FEAF proved slow to react to enemy tactical changes. The first enemy reaction was to increase the air defense pressure on FEAF Bomber Command attacks on the bridge system. The slow moving B29s were extremely vulnerable to MiG activity. Secondly, the enemy proved capable in deception techniques, creating the impression of destroyed bridges and rail lines when in fact they were in good working condition. Bypass bridges were rapidly constructed. Thirdly, the enemy was willing to commit a vast amount of human resources to the effort of keeping rail lines open. Manpower was an unlimited resource that was used as human transportation. For example, 100 men would carry mortar shells on their backs. They were actually able to stockpile supplies for future use thus defeating the purpose of the Program.[13] Lastly, the communists could concentrate automatic weapons fire and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) along the rail line to provide the best defense. Because of concentrated AAA fire, FEAF bombs had to be dropped from higher altitudes decreasing their accuracy. Originally designed to last 45 days, the campaign was continually extended lasting seven months.[14] Simply stated the Communist transport systems were not the center of gravity. They were not critical to the enemy’s pursuance of the war. The cost of the Operation was enormous, antiaircraft fires accounted for 243 aircraft lost and another 290 severely damaged. The cost in human terms was 243 airmen killed or missing and 34 wounded.[15]

Having realized the futility of the Rail Interdiction Program, FEAF redirected its campaign from targeting rail network to targeting North Korean dams which later caused flooding of the country’s rice crops (rail systems eventually) posing threat of mass starvation, and ultimately forcing the North Koreans to negotiate for a truce. With a true CG pinpointed at the very start of the air offensive, the Korean War could have ended much earlier and sufferings could have been minimized. The Gulf and Korean Wars bear credence to the fourth air power proposition of Col Philip Meilinger USAF, which states, “in essence, air power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.” He explained: If one does not know air power exists, air power may be ineffective. Intelligence has become a strategic resource. The key to all conflict is intelligence… Being able to strike anything does not mean one should strike everything. Selecting objectives to strike or influence is the essence of air strategy. The doctrines presented in this article have profound importance in the formulation of a palatable strategy against the enemies of the State. The powerful Warden’s command and control model (even though many analysts say is confined only to war between nations) could arguably be used in an insurgency environment. The reason is that the five rings are also present in an insurgent force. The fact that Philippine insurgencies have persisted for decades could have been partly attributed to incorrect selection of CG. An insurgency conflict is a battle of the minds not of forces. The Decision Model by Wendel and Tooke is highly recommended for planners. It is not enough that one knows the enemy’s centers of gravity, it is equally important that he has the resources to overpower them. This is the essence of strategy.

[1] RC Planet, Center of Gravity, December 1998 [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. 1[4] Col John Osgood US Army, A Study of Clausewitz’s Concept of the Military Center of Gravity. 1[5] Col John A Warden USAF, Employing Air Power in the 21st Century, 1992. [6] Ibid. [7] James Adams, The Next World War (Auckland 10, New Zealand, 1998) p. 4. [8] Ibid., p 9. [9] Lt Comdr Jeffrey A Harley US Navy, Information, Technology and the Center of Gravity, NWC Review, 1997 [10] Ibid. [11] Ibid. [12] Lt Col Michael A Kirtland USAF, Planning Air Operations: Lessons from Operation Strangle in the Korean War. [13] Ibid. [14] Ibid. [15] Ibid.

Lt Colonel Ted Evangelista PAF (GSC)
Airpower did it for the AFP as we dealt the final blow on the MILF’s strongholds. It is still airpower that is keeping our hopes alive in the Western front with our struggling air assets in constant patrol. Our national leaders have recognized this potent role of the Air Force. Knowing the strategic role of the PAF, our most important air assets must be secured and maintained. Worldwide, Air Forces are nestled in air bases with the most important collateral facilities for effective functioning. Development in recent years posed both opportunities and threats to our peculiar branch of service. Whereas, PAF used to enjoy independent and uninterrupted use of the bases, other national concerns have brought out ideas on joint-use concepts and commercialization of bases. As a result, Villamor Air Base was reduced to 99.91 hectares from 261.82 hectares. Still persistent are negotiations and top-level talks for the joint use of Fernando Air Base by commercial entities. Benito Ebuen Air Base has shrunk in size in favor of the so called economic development. Wallace Air Station is under similar situation. Antonio Bautista Air Base is likewise under threat with the ATO’s planned expansion of the commercial airport. Security factors dictates that opening the bases for commercial joint-use concept is an added risk factor. With this alone, military bases are better off located apart and independent. But with the government’s thrust towards improved income generation, partly thru sale of government assets, even the armed sector was not spared. Given these developments, how can we ensure the PAF existence? For one, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo categorically declared that PAF units and personnel will not be displaced unless there’s a prepared place for them to go. Safeguards or safety nets were somehow in placed to allow for displaced PAF units and personnel to settle down. Our MOAs with BCDA and concerned agencies stipulates relocation of units and replication of facilities. Nevertheless, even with the best of planners, transition and relocations pose a lot of problems. Even funds caused untold delays contributing to the operational troubles for the PAF. Once again, our airmen have displayed their Filipino resiliency of adapting to changes after changes.

On the opportunities side, these developments offered challenges especially to our planners in re-engineering the Air Force. If plan will push through, VAB will be the site of a modern-day hospital to cater to our men and their families. One-storey buildings were already designs of the past as the shrunk bases give rise to two to four- storey buildings. Even offices have to be designed to maximize available floor space. Faced with this culture of change, the PAF is left with no option but to maximize and take advantage of all the opportunities in the horizon. In the same light, the PAF can start looking for other untapped land areas and reservations from where we can develop our bases. Guimaras and available sites in Palawan offer such hopes. Ultimately, perhaps we can still see the time when our air bases will be free from the friendly claws of private and other government sectors and then we, the airmen, can concentrate on the basic missions which are the raison d’etres of our existence.

Col Manuel L Natividad (PAF) GSC
The complex world environment and the sophisticated military capabilities of wellarmed nations have removed the time buffer previously enjoyed by the United States that allowed it to mobilize and train to an adequate level of readiness before engaging in combat operations. As recent events have illustrated, the U.S. ability to deter attack or act decisively to contain and de-escalate a crisis was not entirely dependent on their combat level readiness alone but also in their adept ability in harnessing alliance with other Multi National Armed Forces towards a common objective. In this concept, the key to fighting and winning is the understanding of how the US train to fight and the familiarity to the peculiarities of combined and joint operations doctrines of the concerned allied nations. In the local scene, the development of Combined and Joint Operations Doctrine falls under the Directorate for Field Training Exercises, Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Education and Training, OA-8. In relation to this, the recent RP-US combined Joint Combined Exercise Training Program, code named TEAK PISTON 01-02, which was held last January in Clark Air Field, Pampanga and Subic Bay, Zambales provided an opportunity for the said Directorate to window new doctrines in combined operations. In the past TEAK PISTON Exercise, delegations from Air Defense Command, 5th Fighter Wing, 205th Tactical Operations Wing, 15th Strike Wing, 220th Air Lift Wing, 710th Special Operations Wing and other major units represented the Command. Fund support for the exercise was released separately to the respective Wings. While the command and control during the course of exercise rest on the shoulders of designated Officer-inCharge (OICs), who is usually the most senior officer in the delegation per unit. Under this set up, we felt that the maxim of “centralize training planning and decentralize training execution” is very difficult to achieve. Since each OIC coordinates directly to his American counterpart, limited interaction can be gained. In this sense, this put more premium on the improvement of individual skills which defeats the main objective of the exercise which is design to enhance the combat readiness of the unit as a whole. Upon the inception of the PEAK PISTON 01-02 in January 2001, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Education and Training, A-8 appointed COLONEL DIEGO B DASALLAS as the RP Exercise Director. He exercised both operational and administrative control over the units. This established a more effective communications between the RP and US contingents. Furthermore, this gave more time to individual unit coordinators to concentrate more in planning, executing, and assessing training.

Take the Lead!
The PAF in Tactical Operations
Capt Enrico B Canaya PAF
Tactical Operations Command rd (TOC), now in its 3 year of existence, has been cited for its laudable achievements in the accomplishment of its mission of providing tactical air operations for the AFP. The significantly increase in combat operations in the Mindanao last year, brought the PAF in the limelight as its fleet of combat assets like the F-5s, OV-10s, MG-520s supported by the UH-1Hs and SAR helis, Nomads, C-130s, and Photo Reccon aircraft all roared into action. The relentless waves of airstrikes drove the enemy forces scampering for refuge from the pounding of heavy bombs and rockets. A tell tale sign that the AFP is on the way to crush them with the Philippine Air Force taking the lead. Despite the limited number of these air assets, the command was able to manage and orchestrate the air operations to optimum performance. Such event brought this Command to occupy the highly regarded pedestal that brought the glory for the Philippine Air Force and the Armed Forces as a whole. The conflict offered an opportunity to enhance future operations to a similar scale. The PAF came to agree that there were still flaws, weaknesses and problems that indeed should be addressed or corrected in order to enhance future conduct of ISO. Interoperability issues may be addressed by: (1) requiring Commanders of Tactical Operations Group (TOG) and pilots to aggressively participate in the planning stage of every joint operation in order to emphasize the supremacy of Air Power, now conceded by world military organizations. TOG Commanders are the “Air Bosses” in their area of responsibility; (2) maintaining a reliable Air-to-Air, Air-to Ground communication, and an effective and secured ground communication network to ensure timely and quick reaction and employment of air assets specially during Close Air Support (CAS) missions; (3) reviewing, redeveloping and testing doctrines and their applicability and reliability particularly on interoperability during joint/combined operations; and (4) maintaining regular joint exercise with ground elements through AGOS, ORE, Forward Air Controlling Proficiency and other related drills. Interoperability means team work.

Anticipation of future requirements in the field by: (1) enhancing Maintenance support and field level capability at the forward operating bases to minimize scheduled and unscheduled maintenance standdown; and (2) Acquiring Photo Intelligence data and maintaining a continuous aerial surveillance in potential target areas. Post Mission Analysis must likewise be given utmost importance in order to determine the effectiveness of operations. Bomb Damage Assessments (BDA) must be timely and accurate. It shall determine the accuracy of delivery and assess the effectiveness of the type of airmunition used. The Tactical Operations Command (TOC), will remain as the defining unit of the Air Force and will always be at the forefront of the AFP’s successes in Internal Security Operation (ISO). With the Commanding General’s rallying call of “faster, stronger, and better” Air Force, the unit will continue to improve towards the achievement of this goal.

Bomb damage caused by PAF aircraft in operations against MILF.

2Lt Mary Pinky C Moises PAF

As darkness creeps in the sky, we remain vigilant in our task. As people succumb to the inviting call of sleep, we remain steadfast on our call. We are the guardians of the Philippine skies, the AIR DEFENSE COMMAND. “The defender of the Philippine skies” is a title that is dearly treasured by the Air Defense Command. Its existence completes the holistic approach of the Philippine Air Force organization in the aspect of air power. As in any basketball game the team target is not only to shoot as many balls for score but also to strongly defend your position. And, that is where the Air Defense Command comes in. Originally, the Command was christened as the 1st Air Defense Division and was organized on 1st April 1962. Four years later, it was renamed as the 1st Air Division with a mission “of conducting air operations within its assigned area of responsibility”. In the fateful day of 23 February 1995, the modernization of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) along with the modernization of the rest of the Armed Forces was sent to full throttle. Two years later, the Air Defense Command was activated as a successor of the 1st Air Division on 01 May 1997. Initially, two units were placed under the Command – the 5th Fighter Wing at Basa Air Base, Pampanga and the 580th Aircraft Control and Warning Wing at Wallace Air Station, La Union. Moreover, the Composite Tactical Groups/Squadrons in the Luzon area originally comprised the command. However, due to the changes on the PAF set-up, the CTGs / CTSs were transferred to the 1st Tactical Operations Wing. At present the Command is on its way pursuing the realization of the 770th Surface to Air Weapons Wing and the Air Traffic Control Group as additional members of its family. Truly, the Air Defense Command had metamorphosed from a small division into a multi-tasked command. The essentiality of the Air Defense Command in the Philippine Air Force and in the country is best illustrated in its mission and functions. Its mission is “to defend, secure, and protect the territory of the Republic of the Philippines”. The ADC mission is best accomplished in the fulfillment of the following functions: provide active air defense; conduct strategic strikes against enemy forces and installations; conduct combat air patrol over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG); provide air surveillance, air warning, aircraft control, command and control and communications network in support of the PAF Air Defense System; Strategically deploy missiles to area and point defense against enemy air attacks; provide air support to combat forces in maritime environment; monitor air and surface traffic on territorial air space, EEZ and KIG; and perform other functions as directed by higher headquarters.

To carry out its mandated task, the Air Defense Command through the Philippine Air Defense System (PADS) is equipped with radar facilities for early warning and fighter aircraft detection. The PADS operation has two functions namely air defense and air space control. Furthermore, the Air Defense Operations consists of the following functions: provide tactical early warning of hostile air activity; identify all air traffic in the Philippine Air Defense Identification Zone (PADIZ); intercept unknown aircraft penetrating the PADIZ and engage hostile aircraft. In addition the air space control is also termed as air surveillance management and control. It encompasses the functions of detection, identification and classification, continuous tracking of airborne objects, control and management of friendly air assets and intercept of unknown airborne objects in assigned area of responsibility. During peacetime operations, airspace control is maintained through cooperative and coordinated efforts of both PAF and Air Transportation Office (ATO). During wartime, the Philippine Air Force is the leading agency. Compared to western air defense standards, the Air Defense Command is like a child struggling to stand on its own feet and running after the more advanced air force of other countries. For several years we helplessly admired in awe the air assets of our neighboring nations. The saga of our self-pity and complaints of what we don’t have is now over. It is true that our air capabilities are limited. It is true that we wait for modernization as a remedy to our earnest desires. But until such time we shall be faithful to our vision: CREDIBLE AIR DEFENSE FOR A FASTER, STRONGER AND BETTER AIR FORCE. We firmly share the ideas of our Commanding General, Lt Gen Benjamin P Defensor Jr, that future generation will fly and fight in the air more and more years to come. And, we will fly, we fill fight and we will win for our people, for only then we can say we have conquered the skies. We shall master the air. Men of character find a special attractiveness in difficulty, since it is only incoming to grips with difficulty that we can realize our potentials. Nothing can break the dedication and the perseverance of the men and women of the Air Defense Command. As our fellowmen are drawn to an inviting sleep of the night, they will be assured in a new tomorrow knowing there is an eye looking up in the sky…the Air Defense Command.

Major Jesus Madlangbayan PAF

The intention to beef up the attack capability of 15th Strike Wing in the wake of the continuous depletion of the OV-10A “Bronco” fleet has led to the reconfiguration of the SF-260TP to the attack mode. The converted SF-260TPs, dubbed as the Turbo Chargers, will then assume the role as the OV-10’s little brother in its ISO missions. It is “Little Brother” in a way that it can fly in formation with the Broncos during airstike missions and expend a maximum payload of 500 pounds of ordnance. The two hardpoints in the underwing can carry a variety of ordnance, such as; bombs (110/260 lbs), rocket launchers (LAU 68/131), flare dispensers (MK-24), practice bomb dispensers (B-37K), and even M-60 machine guns. The main advantage of this aircraft is its agility and superb maneuverability that translates to greater accuracy in hitting targets. The big drawback, on the other hand, is it being a single engine aircraft, no ejection seat, and a history of engine quits. Two incidents of engine quits while airborne and another two during landing roll led to its grounding in 1999 for more than a year. Such incidents, according to the result of the thorough investigation, were caused mainly by -----improper maintenance procedures compounded by a series of incorrect actions on engine discrepancies. Appropriate corrective measures were then adopted, and the aircraft were later released for operation. These telltales of engine quits strike a fear among pilots. In reality, however, there is no such thing as a 100% safe engine. There is always that possibility that something might go wrong even for the latest and the brand new ones. Thus, for the SF-260TP and any single engine aircraft in the world, a balance of good pilotage and good maintenance system spells the right formula for safe flying.

In February this year, Lt General Benjamin P Defensor Jr, CG, PAF, approved the conversion of the remaining SF-260TPs in the PAF inventory to attack configuration. At least, ten are being projected to be completed by August 2001. The conversion project is handled by Air Force Research and Development Center under the command of Colonel Jose R Saplan. To date, six SF-260’s including the Layang II have satisfactorily completed the aerial test fires and other related requirements. Layang II, the flagship project of AFRDC, was the first to complete the conversion and has been involved in a series of test flights and fly-bys since then. There have been some doubts before and, perhaps even now, as regards to the airworthiness of the Layang II aircraft. Where others don’t dare, Captains Rey Rueca and Aris Gonzales came into the picture to test fly and prove the airworthiness of the Layang II. They have now logged in more than 50 flying hours in the aircraft. At the onset of the conversion project, Major Jess Madlangbayan was tapped to spearhead the aerial test fire and evaluation of the Layang II and all the converted SF-260TPs. He formulated the SF260TP delivery parameters and shared techniques in weapons delivery and airstrike tactics. Moreover, the project could not have taken-off without the full support of Colonel L Jose Reyes, the Chief of Air Staff and former A-3, and Col Jose C Nano, A-4, who risked themselves by flying a number of sorties during the gunnery evaluation missions at Crow Valley Gunnery Range. With the transfer of the first two SF-260TPs to 15th Strike Wing in April 2001, there is no turning back now. A colorful service awaits these aircraft as they tread the paths of the legendary AT-28D Trojans and the OV-10A Broncos.

Col Roberto L Ricalde PAF (GSC)

The year 2000 begins the countdown for the new millennium. Many entities had taken forward new programs to be accomplished: concerted efforts for a better future and most probably reach the goal of success. For the Air Reserve Command in the Year 2000, has faced all odds and difficulties in the adjustment to changes in administration and has effectively attained its goal. The activities ranges from the implementation of RA 7077 (AFP Reservist Act) which covers mainly on reserve force development; assistance in relief and rescue operations and development of the PAF affiliated units. The whole year can be generally considered a fruitful one taking into account the numerous services rendered to populace, particularly in environmental protection and conservation through tree planting activities in Zamboanga City, Brookes Point & Puerto Princesa City both in Palawan, Bicol Batangas and Benito Ebuen Air Base, Mactan Island, Cebu; humanitarian services by conducting Medical and Dental Civic Actions in twenty one (21) different areas in the archipelago which benefitted approximately fourteen thousand six hundred ninety four (14,694) patients treated/given free medicines; provided relief and Rescue Operations in eleven (11) occasions following natural and man-made disasters/calamities and to top it all is the conduct of reservist and ROTC trainings that will form part of the ready reserve units of the Philippine Air Force. This is your Air Reserve Command ready to respond to the call of service by providing a faster, stronger and better reserves to provide the base for expansion to our Philippine Air Force in case of war, rebellion, invasion, or disaster/calamities.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force, the Government of Australia or that of the Department of the National Defense, the Philippine air Force of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. This document is approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of this document may be quoted or reproduced without permission, provided a standard source credit is included.

Command and Control of Philippine Maritime Air Surveillance
Col Dexter O Huerto PAF (GSC)

The aim of this paper is to propose a command and control system for maritime air surveillance for the Philippines. This aim will be achieved through the following objectives: · To identify the maritime air surveillance needs and tasks for both civil and military; · To identify the difficulties, options and priorities for these needs and tasks; · To envisage a maritime air surveillance concept of operation; · To evaluate the different forms of command and control; · To design a general concept of command and control system for the AFP; and · To determine the optimal organization and arrangements to meet the Philippines’ needs and tasks. This chapter will provide a strategic overview of the region, which has a direct bearing on the Philippines overall national security interests and concerns, addressing aspects of defense, security, economic development and protection. Another aspect that will be covered is the international commitment of the Philippine government, in particular concerning its relationship with other nations and the joint problems confronting them. Considering these threats and risks, a common factor towards addressing these problems can be viewed by controlling the sea. Again beyond the nation’s control, the modernization program it tried to implement could not be realized due to the economic downturn in the region. The second chapter is a discussion of the needs, tasks and present capabilities of the country’s maritime air surveillance. The basis of the discussion will address the overall objectives of the AFP Modernization Law. These objectives are defence and security of territorial integrity; assistance to other governments in economic development and environmental protection; and protection of its people from natural and artificial calamities. Details of various civil agencies’ concerns and interests in the maritime regime are also outlined. The third chapter is a discussion of basic definitions and principles of command and control. It covers the elements of command and control including; organization, process and facilities. Some new concepts such as the information age are also briefly discussed.

The fourth chapter explores the different issues regarding the establishment of command and control of maritime air surveillance. These issues include: the utilization of the armed forces for maritime air surveillance; the appropriate level of coordination and control; the surveillance requirements; the surveillance resources; the surveillance product and the use of the civil system in contingency operations. Within this baseline, four countries are analyzed and from this analysis conclusions pertinent to the Philippines are derived. The fifth chapter is an assessment of the command and control needs of the Philippines with reference to the different issues discussed in Chapter Four. The sixth chapter covers the proposed command and control for the Philippines’ maritime air surveillance system. The previously discussed elements and basic principles are applied to develop an integrated approach addressing the overall maritime air surveillance requirements. Also covered in this chapter is the recommended concept of operations and corresponding technologies addressing specific tasks. Finally, the chapter includes a recommended action plan. The plan sees the establishment of an overarching organization and the resultant changes in some military and civil government offices. The last chapter summarizes all the discussion in previous chapters and reinforces the importance of unambiguous and integrated command and control of maritime air surveillance. * Book available at OSS,HPAF.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force, the Government of Australia or that of the Department of the National Defense, the Philippine air Force of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. This document is approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of this document may be quoted or reproduced without permission, provided a standard source credit is included.

Doctrine Writing Handbook
Major Noel L Patajo PAF Introduction In all our daily activities, we follow certain rules and procedures that will make doing things more smooth and systematic. Just think of a society without rules, there would be anarchy and chaos. Hence, to put everything in order, certain ways of doing things must be in place. The Philippine Air Force (PAF), like any other organization, has its own set of rules and procedures that guide all Air Force personnel in doing their tasks. This set of rules and procedures are what we call “doctrines”. A mere discussion of doctrine causes some people to shudder, eliciting looks of confusion from some, and looks approaching mockery from others. The varied reactions of PAF officers may have some underpinning reasons anchored to the history of the PAF and the military as a whole. The intent of this book is to dispel the “academic aura” associated with “doctrine” and present clear steps in the formulation, validation, evaluation, and revision of doctrine. Doctrine is dynamic and as environment, organization, people, and equipment change, doctrine should have parallel rational changes. Hence, every airman, more especially the Commanders themselves must be able to review, revise, validate, and if necessary formulate new doctrines. Change in doctrine is required but overall doctrine is usually stable and should require change when major factors such as government policy, weapons systems and enemy threat assessments change. Chapter 1 is about doctrine definition, types, levels, sources and the nature of air power doctrine. In this chapter, the framework of doctrine process will be presented. The chapter discusses the phases of doctrine process and the doctrine writing process framework. Chapter 2 of this handbook relates the background of the PAF development as a major Armed Service, and the PAF’s quest for air power both as a doctrine and practice. Like any air force in the world, the PAF began as a component of the Army. It is therefore prudent to look back to the history of doctrine development of the Armed Forces. The formative years of an institution provide insights to the interpersonal values of its personnel. This Chapter includes several vignettes relating to the Philippine government preparations for World War II. By knowing the mindset of both military and civilian leaders in that tense era, doctrine writers are able to deduce the “best ways” as adopted by those leaders. Doctrinal inclinations by leaders may be discernible from the decisions made prior to the war. The discussion on the development of PAF as a major service deals with the appreciation of the AFP to have an independent air force and events in the world that set the trends for having a separate air force. The PAF quests for air power appreciation deal with the not so distant efforts of the PAF to write its own doctrine and lately, the appreciation of air power as a part of doctrine development within the AFP Modernization Program. Chapter 3 deals with the AFP Five-Step model of doctrine formulation. It is admitted that the article of late Brigadier General Isidro B. Agunod AFP, heavily influenced this

chapter.1[1] The process of doctrine formulation will include strategy and policy formulation process as guides for the formulation framework. It is the intent of this chapter to relate the only Research and Development in Doctrine Development written by an air force officer. Chapter 4 is about Development of Military Doctrine. This chapter shows the framework for consolidation/analysis, development-model-test, revision and validation. This is the “doctrine loop” that distinguishes the writing process from the development of the military doctrine. Chapter 5 deals with the actual doctrine writing processes beginning with the identification of the tasks, set-up of working party, timetable, establishment of objectives, draft, compiling information to fill the outline, producing and endorsing the draft, printing, submission for approval and distribution. The queries of several air force personnel to OSS about doctrine indicate that there are varying degrees of perception and depth of understanding. This handbook utilizes the experience of OSS as it handles the doctrine development component of the PAF Modernization. Whenever possible, comments and suggestions of various officers during the countless meetings about doctrine are included and used to inspire and or justify certain key steps. This research utilizes the various materials for Survey and Research, manuals for Continuous Improvement Process, Strategy and Policy formulations, AFP Doctrine Development Manual, PAF Regulations, SOPs and Circulars, history books like “The Philippine Army 1935-1942” by Ricardo Trota Jose, “Philippine Campaigns” by Uldarico Baclagon, Academy Scribe, and “By Sword and Fire” by Alfonso J. Aluit and the Proposed PAF Air Power Manual, various papers in the Royal Australian Air Force, RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, Air University Maxwell AFB, and other air power papers and journals. The paper used various foreign manuals as well as local manuals as references and a basis of comparison. Doctrines can be dynamic and may change according to the type of conflict, along with corresponding changes in the environment, political directions about the employment of forces, and the doctrine of the threat force in particular. The importance in planning and day-to-day operation of military operations cannot be overemphasized. The role of doctrine in the life of an organization is influenced by professionals who advocate the essence of documenting the day-to-day activities so that the best way of doing things will be continually improved. Through all this, the users of this handbook, especially the doctrine officers, are reminded that steps enumerated are guidance only and not written in stone. Doubtless, there will be better ways for doctrine development and its documentation, but as the immense task of developing and writing doctrine lies ahead, this handbook serves as the initial guide.

* Book available at OSS,HPAF.

1[1] Agunod, Brig General, AFP, The R&D of Doctrine Development, AFPJSCSC Pub, 1981.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force, the Government of Australia or that of the Department of the National Defense, the Philippine air Force of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. This document is approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of this document may be quoted or reproduced without permission, provided a standard source credit is included.


Colonel Fred R Llosa PAF (GSC)
After more than two decades of internal turmoil in the Philippines, almost all the AFP’s resources were used in internal security operations and the external defence of the country was relegated to the back seat. Somehow the presence of the United States forces in the country has provided security umbrella and paradoxically imbued us false hopes of security. The departure of the United States forces from the Philippines in 1991, due to the abrogation of the Bases Agreement by the Philippine Senate and the sudden eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, has left the country devoid of external defence and has become openly vulnerable to foreign incursions and intrusions. The country was left to mend itself against possible external threat, unfortunately, its external defence capabilities were in total disarray. The fighter element of our external defence, the F-5 Freedom fighters that has already seen its heydays, is unable to put up a descent deterrence against external threats. The four surveillance radars that the Americans has provided us for our external warning, has been reduced to only two operational radars with very limited capabilities. The rest of the radars were either deactivated, unmanned or were simply left to decay due to non-availability of spares or non-availability of funds for repair. The present situation is the Philippines is left with only two surveillance radar with very limited capabilities and leaving the rest of the country openly bare and unprotected against external incursion. In 1995 the country woke up to find Chinese structures being put up at the Mischief Reef, locally known as Panganiban Reef, just 120 nautical miles off the west coast of Palawan and well within the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the country. Without the military strength to confront the Chinese, the country was forced to use diplomatic venues to present the problem at hand without any success. Three years after, the country was again shocked to find Malaysian structures at one of its nearest shoals southwest of Palawan. Diplomatic protest, the only available course of action left for the country, again proved futile. These subtle creeping incursion in our territories, when left unabated will one day find us staring at them in our doorstep.

On 23 February 1995, the passing into law of Republic Act Number 7898 better known as the AFP Modernisation Act gave glimmer of hope to the very limited external defence capability of the AFP. Unfortunately, however, the Philippines is one of those hardest hit by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the promise of an unhampered modernisation program was again derailed. One of the options left for the AFP, particularly the PAF was for a joint use of highly valuable but limited resources. On 16 March 1995, The PAF and the ATO signed an agreement for the joint use of equipment and facilities between them in the interest of the Philippine government. This book supports this endeavours as joint use if only to optimise the application and use of such valuable and expensive equipment. This book further recommends that the PAF procured surveillance radars’ optimum utilisation be shared not just for external defence or for air traffic control use but also as a source of information that will be used by other government entities and instrumentalities. This invaluable equipment will become a national asset more than just a PAF tool. Immediately after the end of World War II, the Philippines was granted full independence by the United States. On 04 July 1946, the American flag, that had reigned supreme throughout the archipelago for almost five decades, was hoisted down and the Philippine flag has flown high signaling total independence from foreign dominance ever since.

History will tell that the Philippines was under foreign control since the Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan discovered it in 1521. Its discovery on 16 March 1521 was the start of a long colonial rule of the Spaniards that lasted for more than 300 years. Spain’s defeat by the Americans in the Spanish-American War ended its dominance in the Philippines and the country was ceded to the Americans in 1898. Thereafter, the Philippines was the colony of the United States of America until its granting of independence in 1946. The rule was shortly interrupted during World War II when the Japanese invaded the country in 1941. 04 July 1946, Philippines was granted independence by the United States. Nonetheless, the true essence of independence was never really experienced by the Filipinos despite its granting in July 1946. The presence of the US bases in the Philippines symbolises continued dominance of the Americans in the Philippines. Clarke Air Force Base in Pampanga and the Subic Naval Base in Zambales, two of the US’ largest military installations outside continental USA, projected US dominance not only in the Philippines but also the entire Asia-Pacific region. The defence umbrella that the US forces shrouded the Philippines supplemented the existing air defence coverage of the Philippine Air Force. The surveillance radar used by the PAF and by their USAF counterparts was part of the military hardware that the US government has provided the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The F-86 D/F Sabre Jets and subsequently the F-5 A/B Freedom Fighters, that performed as the fighter interceptors providing the first line of the country’s external defence, were hands down support to the PAF, et gratis.

The Philippine Air Defence Identification Zone (PADIZ) The extent of coverage by the surveillance radar of the Philippine Air Defence Identification Zone (PADIZ) covers only the whole island of Luzon and the northern part of the Visayas. The rest of the Visayas and the entire island of Mindanao, including its adjacent islands, were outside the radar coverage. Incidentally, the focal point of this coverage was noticeably Clarke Air Base and Subic Naval Base. Congruently. the signing of the Mutual Defence Treaty (MTD) by the two governments is based on the principle of mutual security and cooperation, although it is relatively beneficial to the Philippines. The continued presence of the Americans up to 1991 however, serve more to project their dominance in order to protect their vested interest in this part of the world. After the abrogation of the US Bases Agreement in 1991and the departure of the US forces from the Philippines, the problem of external defence came to the fore. The PAF was left with fledging and outmoded F-5 aircraft for air interception and its air defence radars, mostly non-operational due to lack of spares, were unable to provide the necessary surveillance coverage. The deterrent factor of the US forces is gone leaving the whole country openly vulnerable to foreign incursions or invasions. A glaring example of this is the Chinese occupation in 1995 of Mischief Reef, which is just 120 nautical miles from Palawan Island, well within the 200 mile EEZ of the Philippines. Old reliable F-5 aircraft as fighter interceptors The need therefore of a radar system that can provide the desired early warning for the defence of the entire archipelago is primordial. The importance of a credible air defence became extremely necessary not only to deter adventurism by other countries against the Philippines, but also to protect its natural resources within its territorial boundary and inside its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Unfortunately however, the economy of the Philippines has been greatly affected by the Asian economic crisis in 1997. The procurement of a new and sophisticated radar system will take up a big portion of the AFP’s already depleted budget. A joint use of surveillance radars by the PAF for air defence and by the Air Transportation Office (ATO) for air traffic control is proposed as an efficient and sensible application of scarce radar resources.

Initially, the aim of this paper is to present a comprehensive discussion on the joint use of radars by both the Philippine Air Force (PAF) of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Air Transportation Office (ATO) of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). Of importance, there is an existing implementing agreement between PAF and the ATO on the joint use of equipment and facilities signed 21 August 1997. The need for a discussion on the same topic becomes redundant and irrelevant. This paper therefore, will deal on PAF- procured radar providing multifarious application not only for the PAF but also to other government agencies including the ATO. This simply means the surveillance radar procured by the PAF is not just for air defence but would also be a source of information needed by other government instrumentalities in the accomplishment of their assigned tasks or missions. * Bookavailable