You are on page 1of 18

On Meriting Death Author(s): Ramchandra Gandhi Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Jul.

, 1981), pp. 337-353 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398578 . Accessed: 31/08/2013 15:00
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy East and West.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Ramchandra Gandhi On meriting death

we encounter In thinking at itshearttheidea of theinnocence murder through of the victimof murder, a human being killedwithout death at the meriting itself the handsof his killer. The idea of innocence to of pointsbeyond sanctity of humanlifehas an insistence which humanlife,and theidea of the sanctity of sayingprecisely what it comes to less embarrassing makes the difficulty than it might be otherwise.This article is based on the philosophically of humanlifeis nourishment without conviction thatthe idea of the sanctity to lifeperishes. whichtheidea of thehumanright to kill any otherhuman being? Does any humanbeingeverhave the right Of course so, one mightwant to say, givingthe followingrepresentative or intendedto kill another example. Suppose a human being,X, was trying X fromkilling him humanbeing,Y, such thatthe onlyway Y could prevent or intended to killnot Y X. Or let us supposethatX was trying was by killing from Z but some otherhumanbeing,Z, suchthatX could be prevented killing which of defensive if Y killed X. have now the classic context killing, (We only to, self-defensive includes,but is not restricted killing.)If in this situationit Y nor Z merited deathat thehands of X, some werealso thecase thatneither to kill X. Indeed,even if it werethe would want to say thatY had the right deathat thehands of X, some case thatonlyZ, and not also Y, did not merit to killX. would stillwantto say thatY had theright The extra featuresthat have been brought in to describe the general to bear in mind,but forthesake of of defensive are important situation killing of self-defensive restrict ourselves to thesituation let us preliminary argument to killY, theonly or intends thatis, thesortof case whereX is trying killing, him is by killing X fromkilling X, and Y does not merit way Y can prevent deathat thehandsof X. Is one in thissituation really obligedto say thatY has which this question the rightto kill X? Let us consider some difficulties creates. to have the In orderto understand whatit is forY, in thissortof situation, in the idea of Y not death at the kill we to to have had X, bring meriting right to understand than the idea of one hands of X, an idea even more difficult human being having the rightto kill another. To be able to answer the death at the questionlet us take a quick look at the idea of Y not meriting If Y does not merit deathat handsof X. We can see a fewthings immediately. to killY. But thehandsof X, thismeansat leastthatX does not have theright it means more than this. Even if X had the rightto kill Y, it would not death at the hands of X (Y may be old, followthat Y merited neccessarily etcetera. have an ailingwifeand smallchildren, he perhapsalreadydying, may It is important in any discussionof the human rightto life,I think,to or not introduceas early as possible the idea of human beings meriting
at theUniversity Ramchandra Gandhiis Head, Department ofHyderbad ofPhilosophy
reserved. Pressof Hawaii. All rights East and West31, no. 3 (July, 1981). ? by The University Philosophy

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

338 Gandhi

succeeds death at one another'shands,because even if an argument meriting in establishing to killotherhuman humanbeingshave theright thatveryoften followthat in all thesecases any human beings,it would not automatically of another human being. Some of the merited at the hands death being considerations alluded to earlierin parentheses may become decisive,or, in of these,the thoughtof the sanctity of addition to or even independently human lifemay oblige us to say that some human being or beingsdid not merit death at the hands of some otherhumanbeingor beings,even though thelatter had theright to killtheformer. The introduction of the idea of Y not meriting death at the hands of X in the example under consideration, not to be objected to on the then,ought or difficulty of this idea, inasmuchas the idea is groundof the complexity centralto any understanding of the human rightto life. But it could be death at the hands of X, objectedto on anotherground.If Y does not merit thismeans,as has beenpointedout,thatX does not have theright to killY; at this into our attemptto least this much is meant, and we have written understandwhat it is for Y to have the rightto kill X. Is it logically to do this?Can we, in logic,hope to understand whatit is forone permissible to kill anotherin termsof what it is forone humanbeing to have the right humanbeingnotto have the right to kill another, thatthesetwo considering are merely Perhapstheideas of a humanbeing things oppositesof each other? havingand not havingthe rightto kill anotherhuman being requireto be understoodin essential contrastwith each other in some immediateand seemshard to intuitive way. I do not know.On theface of it,thissupposition substantiate. What is theway out then? Let us, experimentally, do away withthe postulatethatY does not merit death at thehands of X, retaining of thesituation, that all the otherelements X is (1) X is trying or intendsto kill Y, and (2) the onlyway Y can prevent fromkillinghim is by killingX. Are our difficulties at an end now? The situation death at thehands of X, allows forthepossibility thatY may merit thatis, thatX may have the right to killY. Let us imaginethatthisis in fact thecase. Let us also, to avoid complications whichwillnot assistcomprehension at thisstage,suppose thatX and Y bothknowthatX has theright to kill Y. We will in that case have to redescribe the situationas follows.We will have to say that(1) in theexercise of his right to killY, X is trying or intends to kill Y, and that(2) the only way Y can prevent X fromkilling him is by X. Does it followfrom to killX? (1) and (2) above thatY has theright killing If not,whynot?Can one say thatin view of X's right to killhim,Y has lost his self-defensive to kill?Can a humanbeingeverlose his self-defensive right kill? to right Let us for a momentbring back the human being Z fromour earliest of the situation, and suppose thatalthoughX has the right to kill description he has no right thisright, to killZ, althoughin act he is Y, and is exercising

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

339

Y or intends to kill Z. Would not we want to say thatin thissituation trying from Z is by has theright to killX, iftheonlyway X can be prevented killing to kill Y and both X Y killing X? And let us not forget thatX has the right to killY, and is and Y know this!If, in spiteof the factthatX has the right to kill X in defenseof Z, whycannot Y Y has the right thisright, exercising in orderto defend thatis, theright, in relationto himself, have thesame right to X? Y the kill retains to If himself, right kill,how can he generaldefensive lose whatcan be subsumedunderthisright, thatis, theself-defensive to right kill?Does one wantto say thatevenifY retains his self-defensive to kill, right this rightof his, in relationto X, is weakerthan X's rightto kill Y? What would be thebasis forsayingthis? The idea of a self-defensive which rightto kill stemsfromconsiderations have to do withthe absolute integrity of a livingbody-in the present case a about thisidea whichsuggests that livinghumanbody-and thereis nothing the absoluteintegrity of a livinghumanbody can become undermined by the thatsome otherhumanbeingmayhave to destroy it. If thisis sound,and right his self-defensive to killX if,in our example,one can say thatY retains right the X has kill fact that the to the situation Y, despite right yields strange In orderto see this,letus supposethatX is an executioner consequences. duly authorizedto kill Y who, let us suppose, is a murderer condemnedby due the processof law to death,and let us further suppose thatX has commenced exercise of his right to killY. Then, if the preceding selfreasoning regarding defensive is sound, Y, the condemnedman, would have the right selfkilling to killX, the executioner, ifthatis the onlyway he can prevent X defensively fromkilling him.Of courseY is unlikely to have theresources to do this,but we are examining not thelikelihoodof such a thing but thetheory, happening themoraltheory whether the"self" happensto be a murderer of self-defense, or a saint. And why should moral or legal theorists wish to deny that a condemnedmurderer has the self-defensive to kill his executioner at the right where this is the self-defense? Would not it be more correct point onlypossible to say thatall thatmorality and law and social policyrequire, if theyrequire this, is that the condemned man ought not to succeed in this enterprise? and generalizing theargument so farwe can say this:No human Summarizing X can have to kill the another human being right being Y and exercisethis Y too acquiringa right without to kill,the right to kill X, at the point right wheretheonlywayY can prevent X from himis by killing X. killing In thelightof theearlierdiscussionlet us return to thesimplest situation of human killinginvolving two human beings,X and Y, which is describable thus:(1) X is trying or intends to killY, and (2) theonlyway Y can prevent X from Y is by killing X. One might killing say thatthesituation yieldsY's selfdefensive to killX. But one also would be forced to say thatevenifX did right not initially have a rightto kill Y, he would now, if the only way X can Y from him is by killing Y. So X and Y have now theright to prevent killing

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

340 Gandhi

thewhole killeach other!Could one say thatin viewof thefactthatX started X X kill Y? What Y to kill than has to has a self-defensive greater right thing, would be the basic of such an assessment?Suppose both X and Y are theirself-defensive exercising rightto kill each other,and as the combat Y (perhaps a skilledAmitabh Bachchan) is it clear that becomes develops more likelyto kill X than vice versa. In additionto noticing this,would one to killY remains weakerthanY's selfwantto say thatX's self-defensive right thatX had to kill X? Would one insteadsay tough-mindedly defensive right asked for it and leave it at that ? As the combat develops it could also of Y. Let us supposethat coursebecomeclear thatX was on thepointof killing of attack.PerhapsX's X is a hardened and Y his unfortunate murderer target or him. Y, desperately motive at firstwas simplyto rob Y or terrorize and X's selffirst then at has resisted X, weakly forcefully. courageously, he had not thought now. Even if initially defensive capacitiesare also stirred thathe had any right to killY, now he does. Does not thischain of reactions who are led compulthrowlighton the psychology of hardenedmurderers who offer resistance? of victims to kill those their sively expecially The conviction that self-defensive killing may always be in orderhas deep roots in human nature. This convictioncan weaken, in saints as well as It is worth but it cannot be undermined murderers, by objectiveargument. of self-defensive the that one's conviction killing regarding legitimacy noting one's life. In comparison,how weak is the may remainintact throughout to kill to defendothers.(Perhaps thisis not a the right conviction regarding Think of escalations of local warfarewith weakness. universally occurring in defense of their kill to theright allies.) everybody invoking the view thathumanbeingsoften Does the preceding strengthen argument as itdoes, itdoes so in an Insofar do have theright to killotherhumanbeings? of its because exposure of the theoretical apparentlyvery puzzling way, and self-defensive of containing killing, of theerrorof supposing impossibility is lost by firstthat the self-defensive rightto kill, if this is indeed a right, One even by condemnedmurderers. in the ritualof human killing, strikers need not be alarmedat the puzzlingcharacterof theseresults.In fact,they and frustrate weaken only the self-righteousness, only the arrogance,of the expectationthat a bit of argumentand a bit of accurate descriptionof situationsof human killingwill suffice suitablyto anchor in the natureof kill human to the human beings.I shall argue here that right alleged things as such is no there thing the human rightever to kill theycannot because human beings. How can this be shown? Has not much of the preceding albeit a of an affirmation, and discussionpointedin the direction argument to kill human beings? of the human right somewhatparadoxicalaffirmation, betweenthe idea of a humanbeinghavingthe Have I not made a distinction kill human another to being,and the idea of a human being meriting right I death at the hands of anotherhumanbeing?But in makingthisdistinction to killhumanbeingslacks out thatthe idea of the humanright was pointing

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

341

the power its advocates have always wantedto investit with,the power to the idea of humanbeingsmeriting death at the hands of and justify generate otherhumanbeings.I shall now say more positively whyI thinkthereis no suchthing as thehumanright to killhumanbeings. whichhas essentially Whenever a human being,X, has a right to do with another human being, Y, a rightinconceivablewithoutthe basis of X's to convince to Y, it shouldbe possibleforX in principle rationally relationship Y thatX has thegivenright in relation to Y. (I use theword "right"and will use the word "duty" in thisarticlein sensesthatcan be, but do not shortly sense have to be, as broad as the rich unitarylegal-moral-political-spiritual whenwe talk of humanrights and duties). whichtheword "human" suggests Let as consider some examples. X Y in all matters has the to expectuttercandor fromhis friend (1) right thathave to do withthebasis of their To expectsuchcandor from friendship. casual acquaintancesor enemiesis irrational. (I am not sure about enemies, is not without though.Perhapsenemiestoo, at any rate those whose enmity in owe one careful of their assessments of and another a lack honor, ambiguity to call such lack communications withone another.But it may be inaccurate unable to of ambiguity "candor"). If Y is at some timeor othersignificantly in be spontaneous in relation to his friend domains cohabit in virtue of X, they X Y to be their if and are this can fail noticed and friends, hardly friendship, to ask Y to talkabout by X. In sucha case X would have an indisputable right the whole thing.If Y refuses, it would a legitimate on X's partto expectation This expectation be able to convinceY thatY owes X an explanation. springs from in relation Y candorin their X's right, to Y, to expectfrom friendship. to expectfromeverymember has theright of it a (2) A humancommunity minimum for the sake of the survivaland growthof sacrifice of self-interest thecommunity. does not possess thisright, inasmuch (An exploitative society Let X be an elderofsucha community as itis nota human and Y a community). of self-interest member thatevena minimum sacrifice on rebellious who thinks his partin relationto thecommunity would be unjustified, or who thinks the minimum too exacting, like that. In this situationX could legitisomething claim over Y was not unmatelyhope to convinceY that the community's at any rate he could, with the aid of Y, redefine the minimum justifiable, sacrifice claimedby thecommunity its members without from abandoningthe of such Here X's would sacrifice. principle again expectation springfromhis of thecommunity's in its relationship withY. An analogous perception right too could hope to convinceeldersof would show thatan individual argument his community of the legitimacy of those of his rights whichthe community has not honored.Suppose now thata humanbeing,X, thinks he has theright to killanother humanbeing,Y. If thereasoning embodiedin theexamples just consideredis sound, it should be possible for X to convinceY in rational thatX had theright to killY. argument Let us not thinkof thosecases wherethe verypossibility of talk,let alone

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

342 Gandhi

rationalargument, can be ruledout, forexample,whereX is on the pointof a mortal blow to hurling upon Y in exerciseof what he takes to be his right killY, and analogous situations of military and civilianviolence,localized or werepossiblein thesesituations, would there (If rationalargument escalatory. be any impending mortalviolenceto worry about?Would X standin need of his right to kill Y? Yes, in an academic sense,one mightargue. But proving can there be an academicright to kill? Torn from a context isn'tevena would-beright of passion,there to kill). Let think us of situations of and and (3) prejudice self-deception presumptuous superiority thathe has theright to killY, he even whereX not onlythinks thathe can talkY intoaccepting thestatusof a deserving imagines perversely victim Soullessfanatics, Nazis, deludedideologues, sparedonlyby X's mercy. and fantasy-inspired semiliterates come to mind.X in our exampleis one such. Can he hope in rationalargument to convinceY thathe (X) has the right to killY? It is a moot pointwhether a personof thissortcan engagein rational at all, especiallywith someone,Y, who is the veryobject of his argument blindness. However,let us attribute perverse unexpectedcapabilitiesto the humanmindand picturea situation whereX does initiate an argument with Y. Y may well tremble beforeX, and it is not beyondthe capacitiesof the humansoul in desparateperilto yieldthrough survivalist to the self-deception mostimplausible In Y and sophistries. thisway may well yieldto suggestions X in argument, of reason. Less dramatically, cultural but thisis no triumph can also oftenextract forinstance, a condemned murderer from, conditioning the acknowledgment of society'srightto kill him. But let us not forget that noneofthesesituations of allegedrational have theopenendednessargument which alone can guarantee-whichis thesoul of rational equalityand freedom between humanbeings.In an allegeddialoguebetween self-confessed argument tormentor and defensivevictimthere is no place for fundamental moral of patience and rational coninquiry,which presupposesan environment sideration. Am I really so counterintuitively, also saying, thatevenifX were apparently or kill Y intended to Y trying unprovoked by anything may have done, and even if the only way Y could stop X fromkillinghim was by killingX, Y wouldnot have theright to killX? I am indeedsaying that.But I shallalso say thatin thatsortof situation it may well be Y's dutyto defendhimself and, if thiscan be done only by killing X, it maybe Y's dutyto kill X. Is not thisa How can Y not have theright to killX ifitcan be his dutyto strange position? do so? Is not duty thanright? In self-defense letme pointout thatit is stronger withby no means unusual forY to be underan obligationto do something, out it being the case that Y has the rightto do that thing.If this can be shownto be a possibility, thena preliminary in satisfactorily generalprejudice our minds against the positionI have just statedwill be removed,the preX-Y example of thepossibility thatin our logically judiced rejection primitive of humankilling itcan be Y's dutyto killX, but not his right.

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

343

Considerthe poor, the deprived, the afflicted of the world.It is clearlyour humandutyto care forthemand alleviatetheirmisery. But is it our right to do so? Can I go to a sickman and demand,as a right, he that allow me to care forhim?This would be an inexcusable imposition upon him. Of course some way would have to be foundof lookingafterhim if he adamantlyand irrationallyrefuseshelp, but not as a right.Sometimes, though,in a similar a personcouldclaim a right to help someonein distress, in addition situation, to acknowledging his duty and expressing his inclination to do so. But he would have to have a veryspecialclaim over thepersonin distress, a claim of love and identity A doctor,merely as a doctor,would not and identification. have such a claim over a patientwho refusestreatment and help, and conor sister, or a friend no right to help him.A parent, a brother sequently might. Such a personcould say to the patient"I want to help you, it is my dutyto to do so, because I love you." I cannotresist help you, but it is also myright the temptationat this point to remark that, eminently laudable though can be, the reason it is often arrogant and organized humanitarianism to see thatit can at bestbe our duty has to do witha failure counterproductive to help the needy,rarelyour right.The more organizedand remotecaring and then it is not becomes,the greateris the risk of it becomingarrogant, less human,less admirable.) else,something caringbut something Do theseexamplesmake moreplausibletheclaim thateven ifit is or could be our dutysometimes to killa humanbeing,it need noteverbe our right? Let us note thata too eager acceptanceof humankilling as beingeven sometimes a right could be disastrous; an acceptanceof it as beingsometimes botha right and a dutycan only resultin insufferable where fearand a self-righteousness sense of the tragic limitationsof the human condition are called for; a of it as beingsometimes a dutyalthoughnever a right seemsmost recognition likely to me to encourage the balance betweencourage and ahirhsdthat thathe has Gandhijitalkedabout. (In theGTta, Arjunacan be seenas claiming no right to kill the enemy, and Sri Krsna can be seen as concedingthispoint but drawingArjuna's attentionto the fact that it is under specific circumstancesthat his dutyis to kill). I am not suggesting that the idea of human a duty(a terrible and painful to killing beingsometimes duty)is by itself likely be corrective of human overeagerness to kill. It can be so onlyin conjunction withtheidea thathumanbeingsneverhave any right to killone another. But I am arguingforthe truth of a certainthesis, not its efficaciousness, althoughI am convincedthat in the sphereof the spirittruthis the most efficacious policy. I thinkthe thesisI am proposingwillbe better ifwe reflect understood not of murder, upon the wrongness important thoughit is to do so, but on the badnessof all humankilling, whether or not wrongness attachesto it. For even whereit is a dutyto kill a human being,the killingstaresus in the face as a disvalue.Far moredisconcerting thanany othermannerof dyingis profound the thought of dyingat the hands of a humanbeing.One mightask whether

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

344 Gandhi

fora terminal in unbearableagonyeuthanasiaadministered by a loved patient one can be seen as representing tenderness and not a profound disvalue,and whether murder is a human the it about and death though dispensation brings tragicis not, like all otherkinds of death, absurd?When, in South Africa, "I Gandhiji saw a potentialmurderer approachinghim,he had the thought shouldnot minddyingat thehands of a brother." thefirst of these Regarding questions,I should like to point out that lovinghands cannot withoutthe severestshock and guilt and moral self-stultification administer death to a loved one. The second questiondescribesa spiritual and not merely a moral a saints can tread. Let us not to path, path only try join them presumptuously in theirsadhana. For the generality of mankindthe pictureof human killing as it should,abhorrent. remains, Let us considermorecloselythedisvalueof humankilling. The badness of human killinghas something with to do the idea of premature unavoidably for is not be all death a death. But this could dying, every by killing premature The murder of a veryold and that thereis to the badness of human killing. sickman is also a shattering for thing, althoughclearlynot due to our regret death. The of human has of course to badness killing something do premature from withtheunnaturalness of it,but thisunnaturalness mustbe distinguished theunnaturalness of deathdue to accidents. Suddennaturaldeathcan be seen or as beingquite similar to deathdue to an accident(runawayblood pressure to is but not death There a for runawaycars, killing. perversion example), about human killing-this is its unnaturalness-thatno accidentinvolves, unlessof course the act of killingis itself accidental.If we could understand the perversionof human killingwe would also, I think,understandthe of itsbadnessin a moraland social way. Human beings feature distinguishing there one another. Without thissustenance intheir moraland sociallivessustain of Human killing is thenegationof thisfoundation can be no humansociety. of mutuality and cooperation.That is its human society,of the principles But are mutuality and cooperationabundantly enoughin evidence perversion. in humansocial lifeto be itshallmark? This is an uncomfortable questionfor of theirrationality of of all kinds,a reminder social and politicalromanticism so of humankilling, forms of humansocial life.The irrationality mostexisting of a reflection would go, is merely of romanticism the tough-minded rebuttal I this think theirrationality of humansocial life,not its perversion. Although is too strong,thereis force in this spoil-sport thought.How mightit be answered? best by contrastThe badness of human killing can perhapsbe understood with the inconstant of nor the indifference it neither with "lettinglive," ing life in of mankind, the social and of exemplification mutuality cooperativeness in the in humanbirth. One might ask whether, but withthegoodnessinherent situationof human existence today, we may stillunqualifiedly demographic has not lost its But humanbirth in humanbirth. talkof thegoodnessinherent

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

345

of numbers, the most goodness,it has only become shroudedin the tragedy of qualityby quantity ironicalinstance of thegeneraldistortion in our times. The goodness inherent in human birthis not always immediately perceived even by those who witnessit most closely,mother,nurse,father, siblings, though neighborsI think invariablydo. And of course wise men do, as withsuch powerand beautyin the tradition of Christian portrayed paintings on the themeof the Adorationof the Magi. That themehas an application outsideChristian also. It takesa certain wisdom,assistedby instinct, theology to unravelthe moral structure of biochemistry and labor and caringwhich humanbirthas it "becomes" in the creativetimebetweenconcepconstitute tion and the acquisition of communicative capacities-a short period of withthetimelessness of selftime,about two years,but fraught chronological whichI believe I shallnow attempt an unravelling of thisstructure, unfolding. is a structure of felicity, thoughI have smallclaimsto wisdom. make it imand nuclearmadnessmay,in the future, Rampant drug-abuse normalhuman beingsto occur. In possible forthe conceptionof potentially will it make thattimeof a merely and not a generative, surviving, humanity, sense to talk of the human rightto life?At its deepestlevel,any talk of the human rightto life is significant only on the assumptionof an indefinite humanfuture. to makethisassumpWhenand whereitwillbecomeimpossible tion, it will begin to become impossiblealso for human beings to thinkof themselves as a species.A dyingspeciesis a speciesonlyby courtesy. And to be able to talkabout thehumanright life to is to be able to talkabout human life in a species-specific a nongenerative will not way, something humanity be able do. if I am in to the that badness of Also, plausibly right thinking human killing can be grasped only in contrastwiththe goodness of human thefollowing birth, conclusionis inescapable:whenhumanbirthbecomesan its goodness will lack any exemplification, and the badness of impossibility, humankilling willbecome difficult to grasp,seriously both the handicapping, and the of human life. Yet human will be theory practice killing always there, but ifhumanbirthcan neverbe there, indicated, capable of beingostensively indicated,the power of the formerwill be incapable of being ostensively in thought. both in the world and (Could it be thatadvocates of unmitigated universalcelibacy have always unconsciouslyanticipatedsuch a fate for mankindand sought,by means of the self-denying whichgoes with morality the advocacyof universal to preparehuman ahimrsd celibacy, beingits center, This would be voluntary as beingsforsuch an eventuality? nongenerativeness for moral and the existential hazards of inevitable preparation nongenerativeness.) of the qualifications made earlier,I shall talk about Assumingthe validity human birthwith the confidencethat, as of now, thereis no reason for be capable of doubtingthat human conceptionand birthwill indefinitely and minimum that a certain and occurring, acceptability normalcywill

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

346 Gandhi

attach to them. Now I can say this: a formof goodness is uncentrally in prenatalhuman existence, it -is the goodness of a questionablyinherent environment and the of wholly cooperative goodness a formof assistanceto human life whichis significantly and substantially of anything independent that any human being does. During pregnancy the human motherdoes not have anything to do to keep the prenatalhuman being verymuch positively she harborsaliveand help it develop.Of courseshe mustnotdo certain things, she mustnot starveherself, killherself or killtheprenatalhumanbeingwithin her.But letus not say thatby not doingthesethings, she makesa contribution to the quickening of her fetalprogeny.To say such a thingwould be like and labor and by the sayingthat human life is sustainedby nourishment absence of death! The prenatal human being also presumablyhas to do nothingto surviveand develop (can any doingbe predicatedof a foetus?). Never again in humanlifeare survival and development assistedby a wholly nor is a comparablefeat of survivaland developcooperativeenvironment, mentachievedwithout theefficaciousness of extremely positivestepsinitiated and others. the condition of communion withGod by oneself Perhaps mystical is the onlyexception to what I have just said. Human prenatalexistence not kind. onlyunquestionably possessesgoodness,itsgoodnessis of a singular Postnatalphases of human birth, fromthe timeof delivery of the human intotheworld,itssituation outsidethebodyof itsmother, all theway progeny to the firm of communicative constitute a spiritual up capacities, acquisition whosebeginning is thebringing intotheworldof a humancreature as an story is the bringing autonomouslivingbeing and whose culmination forth of the the deepest personhoodof such a creature.These are deep ministrations, not the it case that from Were imaginable. they proceed overwhelmingly our debt to those who do us this servicewould be crushingand instinct, destructive of autonomy.With the adventof socialized infant-rearing, based not on instinct thisdangeris probablyunavoidable.This is but commitment, the finalformof the goodnessof humanbirth, the goodnessof ministration. Let us now contrast withtheseformsof goodness,structures of felicity, the unacceptableshape of human killing.It will become clear that its unacceptderives from a strict of theformer. Thereis first of all in the ability perversion act of killing,an insane hasteningof death which is the precise perverse opposite of all that is impliedby the phrase "the quickeningof life." The while quickeningof life in the womb owes nothingto intentional activity, is a veryparticular What in birth is in of human achieved killing piece doing. the formof the autonomyof a livinghumanbody is set at noughtin killing witha ruthless The mortally exactitude. wounded human body is what it is it lost because has autonomy.Its partsand powersdo not hang together, they runout, symbolized blood or vanishing breathand heartbeat. The by flowing of killing of deathis thecreation is this:thecreation of destruction, perversion a spiritualself-contradiction if there is any. What in human birthis the

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

347

forth of self-consciousness, theteasing out of personhood and speech, bringing is in killing thedisregard of pleas, protests, affirmation (the "silencing"of the the world of Human birth the into a humanbeing,but it is is victim). bringing also the welcomingof a human being into the world. Welcomingmust be among the most ancient anthropologicalrites. In human killinganother dateless anthropological rite,the opposite of welcoming, ostracization,reis thrown The victimof human killing out of the ceivesits cosmicdimension. is the oppositeof birth.The universe by a humanbeing.Not death but killing humiliation thisis its of killing is thedeepestanthropological imaginable; sting badness. ultimate is givento man, who has the power to The power of cosmic ostracization kill his fellowhuman being. (Human killingand human birthdo not allow This is because theyare to be nonmetaphorically themselves comprehended. consciousness. Literalunderstanding situatedat the limitsof anthropological or of the world,only of what consciousness can neverbe of anthropological thesedomains). But can man exercisethisterrible fallswithin powerby right? and freedom-securing Glorious and freedom-defining thoughthe exerciseof is to the domain of anthropological field restricted its of is, operation rights in whichI can by right consciousness. This is because whatI claim as territory In thisway myclaim and exercise is alreadyreallymyterritory. situatemyself conof right or rights does not lead me beyondthe world.(Anthropological sciousness has a rightof expansion. It can conceptuallydomesticatethe transcend cosmos,but itcannotby right it). Human killingcannot be grasped withoutthe unavoidablymetaphorical to be made to traverse the thatits victim is soughtby its perpetrator thought time timelessness between the and what or cosmos is or and place placelessness and it is not our rightto tempt beyond. There is hubrisin human killing, or defensive is a necessity, fate.Where,however, self-defensive and in killing that sense a duty,we must in fear and trembling not "transport"a human being beyond the cosmos. We must be able to say to ourselvesthat we are the cosmos fromthe human beingwho is in dangerof doing "withdrawing" in relationto some other human being. It is significant in this the former a connectionto observethat we can speak of a terrible duty, painfuloblibut we cannot talk of a terrible a right, gation,a distressing responsibility, theright a distressing or whatever. (One may ask whether painfulright, right, No. It is not a right at all, althoughit to sacrifice oneselfis a terrible right? for be the saint or a hero, supreme duty.) may, the tragedyand The language of rightsis incapable of comprehending whereit is a or defensive extreme crisisof humankilling. Self-defensive killing, is a terrible, angst-ridden duty.It is a measureof necessity, distressing, painful, kali yuga's mechanistic handicap, our distancefromgrace. (One mightask of killing whether we should be less apologeticwhenit comes to thenecessity in abound of of existence. Raksasas them out raksasas, bombing history surely

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

348 Gandhi

But a raksasais identifiable as one as hardened and soullesstyrants. murderers to ourselves such a or Sri Let us not a Sri Rama a Krsna. arrogate onlyby and demoniac for between human evil.) capacity distinguishing we are never In theperformance of right, of duty, as opposed to theexercise between the farfrom of beingon theedge of a no-man's-land thethought very mundane and the mystical,the profane and the sacred (a no-man's-land of rights whichdefine and extendbut do be theterritory cannot,by definition, But we are not thrown back fromthisedge not transcend humanterritory.) into the mundane realm because duty summonsus to this edge. (Arjuna's recoilfromkilling in the GTtd fromthe frustration of his unconscious springs in killingwill show itself thathis impending as his expectation participation thrownback. Sri right.He goes to the edge unsummonedand is violently to kill.As a ksatriya heroit Krsna does not teachthatit is Arjuna'ssvadharma is Arjuna's svadharma to be readyto kill whenkillingis dharma.)If we have of duty("duty" in its legal-moralin the performance not schooledourselves "human" in thephrase"humanduty"), sensesuggested by theprefix spiritual to a dutyto kill.Our bloodlustor blindtribal we are unlikely to be summoned is reallythe edge of no-man's but the front loyalty may rushus to the front, we land, and if we are sattvicby nature may recoil,but more likelyrajasic willhurlus headlongintomortalsin. On theotherhand,ifwe have blindness of dutyand are summonedby moral schooled ourselvesin the performance we willstay whichis humankilling, the of the no-man's-land to authority edge in ourselves in at our post there, not with submitting joy but sorrow, humility, death.However,clarity both to thejudgment and thelikelihoodof unnatural is our actions not the of given even to saints or consequences, regarding forever be threatened in will and incarnations, participation obligatory killing by doubtand despair. withtheaid of whichwe can judge thatit is thedutyof What are thecriteria humanbeing,Y? Giventheabsolute a certain humanbeing,X, to killanother one thing is clear:it must badnessinherent all humankilling, in humankilling, he can toward the total be the duty of everyhuman being to do whatever will help. An absolute abolitionof humankilling. An analogyfrommedicine humanbody. Cancer is the to theliving badnessattachesto cancerin relation behaviorof the cells of life!This biologicalself-contradiction life-threatening its absolute badness, just as the moral and of cancer is what constitutes itsabsolute is whatconstitutes of humankilling self-contradictoriness spiritual human that badness. Indeed one could say withstrict killingis the analogy individual human that of the of human units behavior life, is, soul-threatening of And mankind. in so the and is cancer just spiritualbody beings, killing so is as the prevention and cure of cancer is an absolute medicalobligation, the prevention and cure of killingan absolute human moral and spiritual obligation. out the Withtheseanalogiesin mindletus boldlyturnto thetaskof spelling

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

349

needed criteria. Let us keep the X-Y situationideallysimple,in the sense of does not morally or practically affect therest assumingthattheX-Y situation of mankind, and thatit is not so affected the rest of mankind. Several kinds by of cases have to be considered. to kill the otheror intends to do so. Clearly (1) NeitherX nor Y is trying X nor Y is underan obligationto do so. (But whatifeither neither is already underan obligationto kill the other?This is to presupposethat we already understand thenatureof suchan obligation, whichwe do not). to kill each otheror intendto do so such thatthe (2) X and Y are trying and utterly to desistfrom only way theycan not do so is foreach forthwith to do so the do and to abandon intention to so. Clearlyeach is underan trying to desistfrom to do so and to abandon forthwith and utterly obligation trying theintention to do so. (What ifX and Y are demonichumanbeingsmankind to kill?Interesting is underan obligation to killbut powerless thoughthiscase is thatwe understand whatit fora humanbeing,or mankind is, it presupposes as a whole,to be underan obligationto kill some otherhumanbeing,which we do not.) to killeach otheror intendto do so, but it is more (3) X and Y are trying likelythat X will kill Y withoutbeing killed by Y than that Y will kill X without of developedmortalcombat beingkilledby X. (This is the situation alluded to earlierherein.)ClearlyX and Y are underan obligationto desist from to killeach otherand to abandon theintention to do so. It would trying be wrong to say that only X is under such an obligation,because their situation is suchthatany slackening on X's partmayenableY to killX. X is to kill Y or intends to killY, but Y is not trying to killX nor (4) trying does Y intend Y to killX, such thattheonlyway can be prevented from being killedby X is by Y killing X. Is Y in thissituation underan obligationto kill X? Only ifY is also underan obligationto live. I willcome back to thisnew in our discussion, element but let me first our simpleX-Y complicateslightly situation because we would not otherwise noticea veryimportant pointconnectedwithcapitalpunishment. is a third humanbeingZ, who is also not trying to killX nor Suppose there intends to do so and who is goingto be killedby X, such thattheonlyway Z can be prevented frombeing killedby X is by Y killing X. In thissituation, whether or notZ is under an obligation to live,Y would be underan obligation to killX. Let us givesocial identities to X, Y, and Z. X is an executioner about to killcondemned Y and Z simultaneously or sequentially. Y would murderers be underan obligationto killtheexecutioner, not to save his own life(Y may not be underan obligationto live), but to save Z's life.Further, the prison themagistrate, and all humanbeingsin attendance would be underan officers, obligation to kill the executioner!I cannot thinkof a stronger argument There is an easy way out of this prison house against capital punishment. dilemma.The magistrate should stay the executioner's hand. In fact,he is

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

350 Gandhi

under an obligation to do so, unless he prefersto be the killer of the executioner and to be killedby thelatter'sreplacement sooneror later!Better should stay his own hand, althoughhe must not stop still,the executioner because he would also be underan obligationto kill his own replacethere, ment lest the latterkill Y and Z! Not the grim tragedyof premeditated but the farcicalsituationdescribedearlierwhich societywould be murder, under a moral obligationto create is the decisiveargument against capital I to some be see subtle which would justify punishment. may failing point but I cannot see in of fault the the capital punishment, any logic preceding as too strong(it could be suitably argument, althoughit mightbe perceived moderated by supposingthateven ifY is underan obligationto be killedby X, X may not be underan obligationto kill Y. Rather,he may be underan obligationto forgive Y.) I will not go into the morecomplexquestionof the of capitalpunishment forsecondoffenders. justification Let us, with this unavoidable and important digressionout of the way, to theideallysimpleX-Y situation return whichI described at (4) above. I had asked whether or not in thissituation Y would be underan obligationto kill thattheanswerto thisquerywould dependon whether X, and I had suggested Y is underan obligationto live. When is a humanbeingunderan obligation to liveor underan obligation to die or neither? Whatever be theanswerto this vexedquestion, and an answerwould resolvethequestionof suicide, one thing at leastis clear.The obligation of defensive is easierto understand than killing theobligation of self-defensive It is easier to see that be one can under killing. an obligationto kill the would-bekillerof a humanbeingotherthan oneself than that one is undera self-evident obligationto kill the would-bekillerof oneself.But thisveryconsideration answersthequestionin our X-Y example Y is underan obligationto live, the answerto earlier,the questionwhether whichwould determine whether or not Y was underan obligationto kill X. The answeris this:If at any timeat all in human lifeY can come underan humanbeing, unquestionable obligationto killthewould-bekillerof another thenhe is under an obligation to liveas far as thislies in hispowerbecausehe mustbe alive in orderto discharge theformer This answercan be obligation. answerwill become available to the question generalizedand the following "Am I underan obligationto live?" the questionof suicide:I am underan obligationto live because I am under an obligationto help other human of ways,ranging fromthe mosttrivial courtesies of lifeto beingsin a variety theirlives if necessary at the cost of my own lifeor at the terrible defending cost of myhavingto killotherhumanbeings,and because mybeingalive is a necessarycondition for the dischargeof this whole range of obligations towardsothers. To return Y is underan obligationto live, once moreto our X-Y situation. because no humanbeingcan be underan obligationto die, and consequently,

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

351

in the situationunder consideration, Y is under an obligationto kill X. A powerful-looking counterexample suggestsitselfat this point, but it can be citedonlylater. fruitfully to killY because X is underan obligation to killY or intends (5) X is trying frombeing killedby X is by Y to do so. The only way Y can be prevented X. Is Y underan obligationto killX? Our first to thisquestion reaction killing is probablyto say thatifX is underan obligation to killY, thenY is underan to be killedby X. That beingso, how can Y be underan obligation obligation to prevent thisfrom and thattoo by killing X? But can we say that happening, Y's obligationto let X killhimis his primary Would not we want obligation? to say thatY's primary is to releaseX from theobligation to killY? obligation Even ifyou are obligedto killme you are obligedto me! X is obligedto Y and Y can releasehimfrom thisbond. How? Let us fillout our example. Let us suppose thatY is trying to kill X or intendsto kill X (withoutthe reverse frombeing beingthecase) such thattheonlyway X can be prevented killedby Y is by X killing Y. In thisway X comes undertheobligationto kill Y. But themoment Y ceases to tryor intendto killX, X's obligationto killY willalso ceace. If even after Y ceases to be a threat to X's life,X continues to will Y and intends kill then the roles be will to reversed. now come Y, try undertheobligationto killX, and X cease to be underan obligationto killY. or intending to killX does X come underan Only ifY is unstoppably trying be killedby X. obligationto kill Y and Y underan obligationto let himself But letus not forget thatY in thissituation is also, and indeedmoreprimarily, under an obligationto let go of X. At what point in his would-bemortal assault on X does Y come more underthe obligationto let X kill him than underthe obligationto let go of X? There is, of course,a point of no return here,but untilthatpointis reachedY is both underan obligationto let go of X and to letX killhim.SupposingY does getto killX, wouldY now be under an obligationto bringX back to life?I thinkso, but it is an obligationY (as to be underan cannotin all eternity fulfill. What a terrible everyman) thing, fulfill! that one can never This is another obligation surely aspect of the badnessof killing. and X, the first Suppose, however,thatjustice triumphs, targetof mortal attack,gets to kill Y, in dischargeof a clear obligationto do so. Is X now under an obligationto bringY back to life?No, surely!Even if he could Y back to life,thereis no guaranteethat Y would not succeed in bringing him to X forbringing pounce upon him again. But would not Y be grateful back to lifeand mendhis ways?Human beingsare veryungrateful creatures, and we cannot take risks!But can thisbe a decisivereason fordisowning an of The is that the of human badness obligation? killing. obligation undoing Merelybecause it is not in our powerto bringthisabout, or because it might be risky,we cannot deny that we are under this obligation. Does ought

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

352 Gandhi

presupposecan? Perhaps,but not in thiscase. The badness of killingis too involved.All killing, or great,and thereis no logical impossibility obligatory must create a not, humanly unallayableanxiety. At theend of (4) earlierI had statedthatno humanbeingcan be underan to die, rather because I have alreadyprovideda counterobligation carelessly, that In I have conceded that therecould be to assertion. above example (5) be killedby X. situations whereY would be underan obligation to let himself But he would also be undera variety of otherobligations, moreprimary ones, such as the obligationto let go of X, not injurehim too seriously, and the X. to wishthatdespitehimself he (Y) wouldbe stoppedfrom obligation killing kill Y And insofar to as X may be lackingthepowerself-defensively Y, would be under the obligation to wish that somebody else would stop him, if he should necessary by killinghim, the obligationto wish that if necessary X I dead before and so on. am about drop harming irreversibly, beinglengthy this because I want to emphasize that wheretherecan be an obligationto allow oneself to die, even to wish that one were dead, perhaps even an to killoneself, human thelifeofanother obligation beinghas to be at stake.If I do not say this I would needlessly in give supportto fallaciousarguments killsY and supportof suicide.Take guilt,greatguilt.Suppose X unjustifiably is stricken withremorse. He maywishhe weredead, wantto killhimself, want to kill so on-the of morbid is enormous. and him, anyone range possibilities But nothing ifanything of thiskindwillmake Y come back to life, could. X is underan obligationto killhimself. He not,underthesecircumstances, simply is underan obligationto annul the arroganceand destructiveness of his act if necessary in conditionsof enforced and creativity, livinga lifeof humility harmlessness. Considera tricky withan incurable and unconexamplenow. X is stricken tainableinfectious disease whichthreatens thelifeof mankind. OnlyX's death can spare mankind.Is X underan obligationto killhimself or let some other humanbeingkillhim?But thisis a bizarreexampleand a dangerous example. to be disThere are situationsin human life which ought very carefully or anything like it. Old and sick people fromthispiece of fantasy tinguished oftenthink,and they are subtlyencouragedin this, that theyare an unand theyoftencontemplate suicide.They burdenon theirfamilies mitigated are utterly A hundred that suicide would be justified. mistakenin thinking alternatives to suicidecan suggest themselves here,ifwe can bringto our care of theguilt-ridden a sufficient imagination. I concessive in the last few paragraphsbeen reluctantly have Although to the idea we sometimes be under an that obligation die, and regarding may I feelthatmorecareful some of can enable me to withdraw although argument the concessions I have made, I would, however,draw attentionto the Even if we are sometimes or can be underan obligationto allow following. ourselves to be killed,to wishthatwe would drop dead, even to killourselves,

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

353

or to invite 'we stillneverhave therightto kill ourselves death' It is the false makes suicides take the final that we do that would-be many supposition "I the to take own life" makes irreversible The have my thought right step. because withwhom can I debate the lonelinesssolipsistic and unredeemable, to take myown life?Withno one exceptmyself, questionof myallegedright on the withself-deception day. Renderthisas an X-X situation, havinga field X-Y of and self-defense follows: model of the situation defense familiar logical X is trying X from or intendsto kill X such thatthe onlyway of preventing X is X X. humorless can fail to be killing by killing Only self-deception liberated this no in of There is self-defense suicide. by piece absurdity. The almost continuousthesisof this essay has been that thereis no such thingas the human rightto kill human beings,not even such a thingas an individual to killhimself. This thesisis identical withthe humanbeing'sright life life in and care of human and itself of its contemplation acknowledgment If I have also argued that,sometimes and mystery. withjustice,we sanctity may be said to be underan obligationto end human lifein defenseor selfI have not wanted to retract the thesisof this article.For such an defense, and an is also a tribute to the obligation, anxiety-laden always embarrassment, in of life, thetribute of our ignorance and incapacity. I findliberation sanctity the thoughtthat human beings do not meritdeath at the hands of one another,althoughoftentheyask for trouble.But human beingshave been eversincetheybegan to be born.Does thismean thatthey-we-merit dying death after thenature all, althoughnot at one another'shands?Do we offend of things in someunavoidableway?Is deatha kindof ransomor sacrifice? Is it These are dark and maya? deep questions,quite beyond my capacities to to even to answer here. attempt begin

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

You might also like