Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5, 4 [7], 2 and Related Passages: A New Interpretation of the Status of the Intelligible Object Author(s): Kevin Corrigan

Source: Hermes, Vol. 114, No. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1986), pp. 195-203 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4476495 Accessed: 16/10/2009 10:39
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KEVIN CORRIGAN: Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5, 4 [71, 2 and Related Passages

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of creating essence to be realized by voi5; in its self-constituting act of vision. This is to say that the action of the One (which consists simply in its being what it is) is prior to the self-constitution of voib;. Kingston (Canada) M. SCHROEDER FREDERIC

PLOTINUS, 'ENNEADS' 5, 4 [7], 2 AND RELATED PASSAGES A New Interpretation of the Status of the IntelligibleObject It is generallyacceptedthat in an early treatise, 5, 4, [7], 2, contraryto Plotinus' normal thinking, the One is regarded as an intelligible object of the Numenian (voIJtOv)'. The One, in its perfectimmobility(reminiscent first vo06q)2 has >>a sort of conperception of itself< and of its entirecontent,
and even possesses )>a thinking different from that of vof)<< (15 - 19: oi5x oIov txx' ECTIV aTuv a'toUT7t6vTa tv adXtT Xai o6v awTj ... Otva oEVthov, xai #j xatav6oat oi3u 5t6o oTovsi ouvCuo9riE1o6oa ?v oTa'sYt dt8'k xai VOiGa& tT?tpW; i XaTa' 'IjVVOi VO6aIV). Only in two other passages, both of

themearly,do similarideasseemto occur. In 5, 6 [24], 2, Plotinusarguesthat since it is not necessaryfor everyintelligibleobject to have a thinkingsubject in itself, then there must be an intelligible object which does not think, namely, the One. Although the One has no knowledge or self-awareness ascribedto it here, it certainlyappearsas an objectof thought,a VOqT6v. The other passage, 5, 1 [10], 7, 5- 63, turns upon an ambiguity.))How does the One generatevot;?<oPlotinusasks. ))Simply by the fact that in its self-questit has vision: this very seeing is the Intellectual-Principle< (trans. MACKENNA:
"H oTi Tr tMnOTOtpoq t6 pa. ipOQ aUTPo &6 opaa a TTIvoivq). Scholarly

I See, for example,E. BRtHIER, Enneades, T. 5, p. 81, n. 1; P. HENRY and H.-R. SCHWYZER, Plotini Opera II, critical apparatus to 5, 4171, 2, 4; also H.-R. SCHWYZER, )>Bewui3t<< und >>Unbewui3t<(bei Plotin, in: Les Sources de Plotin, Entretiens Hardt 5, Vandoeuvres-Geneva 1957, pp. 343 - 390; and P. HENRY'S contribution to a discussion on p. 420 in which the whole problem is set forth; P. HADOT, Review of HARDER (Plotins Schriften) in: Revue Beige De Philologie et d'Histoire, 36, 1958, pp. 159- 160; J. M. RIST, Plotinus. The Road to Reality, Cambridge 1967, p. 42 ff.; T. SLEZAK, Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins, Basel and Stuttgart 1979, p. 163. 2 Numenius fr. 24 (LEEMANS);cf. E. R. DODDS, Numenius and Ammonius, Entretiens Hardt 5, pp. 3-61. 3 See also 5, 1 [10], 7, 10- 17. RIST (Op. cit. p. 45 ff.) argues correctly in my view that the subject of these lines is vo0; against the interpretation of HENRY-SCHWYZER, Plotini Opera II, critical apparatus ad loc. 13*

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opinion is divided as to whetheror not the One converts to itself in this passage. HADOT4 thinks that the subject of the first sentence is the One. that it is Intellect. I agree with HENRY and HENRY and SCHWYZER5 SCHWYZER, but I think that the ambiguityitself has to be explained. acceptedthesisof the One's In this articleI wantto challengethe generally knowledgeor consciousness.I do not believeat presentthat it is possibleto settlethe questiononce and for all froman analysisof 5, 4, 2 alone. Therefore, evidence of 5, 4, 2 with supporting we shallhaveto combinean interpretation from elsewhereto demonstratethe plausibilityof the hypothesisthat the simple identificationof the One and the intelligibleobject is not the most of the evidencebefore us. probableinterpretation
HADOThas written: >)... en tant qu' objet de l'Intelligence, l'Un est i la

fois differentde 1'Intelligence et identique'aelle. Il y a une sortede projection is on the right 6. I believethat this approach de 1'Un au plande 1'Intelligence< track. But how can it be appliedto 5, 4, 2? The chapterseemsto presentan to as ) That<(?xeivo) the intelligible objectreferred unresolved contradiction: One: >>For at line 20 is certainlyby lines 37- 38 the Transcendent That<<, How, then, can an object of substance<<. Plotinus states, >>was transcendent of everything which containseverythingin lines 12- 19 also be transcendent in lines 37ff.? of line 4 with the One. The text identifiesthe voiyTrv HENRY-SCHWYZER not the generating source? reads: >>But why is the Intellectual-Principle Because ... intellectionseeing the intellectualobject towards which it has turned, is consummated, so to speak, by that object, being in itself indeterminatelike sight and determinedby the intellectualobject< (3-7, This is a mistakenidentificationfor the simple reason trans. MACKENNA). that the question Plotinus asks alreadysupposes a fully formed voiq. The question,then, concernsIntellect,not the One, and this makesa differenceto referto the One, the universeof discourse.Whilstthe voto6v mightultimately it can not do so simply and solely, since the universe of discourse is intellectual.And we can extend this to include any indefinitesubject: if a second, howeverindefinite,convertsto a First, it must also convertto pure Unity as itself. Its own referencehas already,howeverindefinitely,added to the context.

4 P. HADOT, Porphyre et Victorinus I, etudes Augustiniennes, Paris, p. 320, n. 4. HADOT alSO believes that 5, 1 [10], 6, 15- 19 confirms the fact of the One's self-conversion. In these lines, however, the phrase tntotpa(pxvto; 6si txFivou is more naturally taken to refer to Intellect. The aiT6 (6, 7 [38], 39, 1 - 2) cannot be interpreted as a >)converOne's dnXij Tt; tntN XiLa&rj itp64o siono. S HENRY-SCHWYZER, Op cit., critical apparatus ad loc. 6 Revue Belge De Philologie et d'Histoire, 36, 1958, pp. 159- 160.

Plotinus, 'Enneads'5, 4 17],2 and RelatedPassages

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It should also be observed that the highest, proper object of thought with the One, but not occupyingthe same universeof discourse, (coincidental and from whichvovg is perfected) is an internal&pxii,originor causeof vol35. Here at 5, 4 [71,2, 7- 10 vo6; containsthe indefinitedyad and the >>One((. A similarpassageis 5, 1 [101,5, 6- 8, wherevoi; holds the One as definer, but is yet indefinitein itself: >>For numberis not first. Evenbefore the dyad there is the One; the dyad is second and having come to be from the One it holds That(One)as definer,but it is itself indefinitefrom its own nature.And when it is defined, numberexists already(((my trans.). Here, then, as in 5, 4, 2, there may well be a 'coincidence'of First Principle and vorOt6v, but the naturalemphasisof discourserests upon the first momentof vovq. Let me take this severalsteps further.It must belong to the natureof an indefinitesubjectto discloseitself. In otherwords,any secondsubjectmustbe unspecified,or ambiguous,untilit culminates in its full nature,vov5. This is a featureof manyof Plotinus'descriptions of the originof the secondprinciple. The fact that it is voO5which is so generatedis the final moment of the description7. But it is also evidentthat ambiguityis a necessarypart of any description of, or argumentfor, the derivationof a fully constitutedsecond principle from a First,because,untilvoi6q is fully constituted,the indefinitesubjectand the One are not properlydistinct, except by an indefiniteothernesswhich is also an indefinite identity. Let me give as an examplea complex argument from 6, 7 [38], 13, 16-21 wherethis fundamentalambiguityis presentedby means of an oscillation between the terms of a disjunction. If a simplex
moves, Plotinus argues, it holds that alone (.xs-vo po'tvov 9Xst); and either it is

the same or has not proceeded,or, if it has proceeded,somethingdifferent remains,so that there are two. And if the second is the same as the First, it remainsone and has not gone forward;but if it is different,then it has gone forth with difference and made from something the same and something different a third one. What is importanthere is not only that the travelling subjectis self-creative,but that the highestmomentof identitywith, and yet
7 Cf. 5, 2 [111],1, 5-11; 6, 7 [381, 16, 14-20; 5, 3 [491, 11, 4-11. We might also comment here on 5, 1 [10], 7, 11 - 13. RIST(Op. cit. p. 47) would translate as follows: >>and furthermore voi5c derives from itself a kind of counsciousness of the power of the One, a consciousness that the One brings Being into existence.<< But we should also observe that Tiq 8UVd4p&W(RisT's >the power of the One<) is ambiguous: is it from the one or of the One? This ambiguity should be preserved. Futhermore, RIST'S translation of o(ov auvaihiotv Tj 86UVA(e0q 6t &vatat o'uiav (>a kind of consciousness of the power of the One, a consciousness that the One brings Being into existence<) is surely not correct, for it is certainly possible for Plotinus to say that Intellect, or X, however indefinite the subject is (there is a certain indefiniteness here despite line 11, A oOx dv 4v voi3,), has a sort of awareness that it is capable of substantial existence. See, for example, 6, 7 [381, 35, 30- 32 (and on this see further below); 5, 3 [49], 14, 15; 6, 8 [39], 18, 16.

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logical distinctionfrom, the First is a necessaryfacet of the travelling,selfarticulating subject whose fullest development as a second principle is unspecifieduntil the end of the argument.Its identityand differenceas voi5; derive from the identity and differenceof the indefinitesecond, where the ambiguityof its natureis essentialto the argument.I propose,therefore,that we have an answerhereto the ambiguityof 5, 1 [10], 7, 5 - 6. Plotinusasks: >>How does the One generatevoi3 ? Simplyby the fact that in its self-questit The subjectof the second sentencemust has vision; this very seeingis voiD;.<< be ambiguous, because in the order of thought its implicit duality (TP
t6pa) 7p6OC a6To GIATPO(pop becomes explicit as voi)s only at the end of the

thirdsentence.It is preciselyfor this reasonthat in my view it makesno sense or that to say that the subjectof the secondsentenceis the One (with HADOT)
it is voit; (with HENRY-SCHWYZER).

Now, in a context wherevoiq is alreadyspecified,it is naturalthat there shouldbe a differentkind of ambiguity.In 5, 4, 2 we are concernedwith the development of Intellect from unity to plurality. NoO; is not the First Priniciplebecauseit is not simplyan object of thought,but a thinkingobject is of thought. Thus, when we come to the second questionat line 12 (>>How this voi5; from the intelligibleobject?<)we are asking, withinan intellectual universeof discourse,how the duality of vow; has arisenout of an unified object. Now, from this intellectualpoint of view, an argumentof procession but of a second from a First must, logically speaking,start from a vOr11OV, end in the difference between the voITOivand the One, since in the first of derivationthe One and the VOqT6v can not yet be momentsof an argument properlydistinct. This logical progression,or distinction,of vo6; from its object, therefore, can only discover the full transcendenceof the One explicitlyin its final moment. This, I propose, is the case in 5, 4, 2. The ultimateobject, the One itself, becomes explicitlydistinct from the highest intelligibleobject only at lines 25 -26 and finallyat line 37, becauseit is only when the full subject is disclosed that one can separate the object into One and intelligibleobject. Hence, in lines 12- 19 the One and transcendent the vo^Tov arecoincident,but it makesa significantdifferencethat Plotinusis this in later speakingof the voiTr6v. It is truethat Plotinus'way of expressing worksmay becomemoreclearand moresubtle,but it certainlyremainsa part of his thinking.At 6, 7 [38], 39, 5 ff., for instance,he statesthat whereasthe One is perfectlyone and has no need of thought,to obtain thoughtone needs vofc, will not distinguishitself from the sameness and difference: )>since intelligibleobjectW (ituTov ts ya'p o5u8taxpPIeI67to'T0o voroi3 tffi tPO6 aVTO&r9pouoaXoet), if thereis no difference;for then therewould not even be two elements.And in the followingchapter(6, 7 [38], 40) he arguesthat the that the self-generating power of Intellect only way one has of determining (13 - 14: &Uvaii ToU yYvVav &p' haUoT;) belongsto Intellectand not to the

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One consists in the fact that something secondary has been generated (10- 12). In other words, it is only becauseof the fully constitutedvoi3; that one can distinguishbetween the power of the One and the self-dependent creative power, or highest moment, of the Second Hypostasis. I conclude, therefore,that in 5, 4, 2, the One is not regarded as an intelligibleobject(nor can it be said to possess knowledgeor even awarenessof itself8), but rather that the nature, and consequences,of the highest, unified intelligibleobject forcefullydisclose the transcendence of the One. In 5, 6, 2, by contrast,the argumentis concernedwith ascent. It takes its starting-pointfrom a universe of discourse which is intellectualand must therefore,firstly, hypothesizein those terms that not everythingwhich is an object for thinking necessarilycontains a thinking subject; otherwise, the Firstwill not be one, but two (4- 7). Secondly,Plotinusarguesthat an object of thought bearsa relationshipto somethingdifferentfrom itself (7- 11: TO ... VOyTOV ktpo)9, but that the ultimategroundof the thoughtmust be selfdependentand therefore, in the strictestsense neither thinking subject nor intelligible object(9). He can now concludethat thereis somethingwhichdoes not think. Startingtherefore,froma worldof intellectuality (maintained to be the sole universeof discourseby Peripatetics,many Middle Platonists and even perhaps associates of his own school) Plotinus reaches his own Transcendent principle,and the need for an hypothesisof an ultimatevonT6v in the courseof the argumentitself. Here too, then, it is clearthat disappears the One is not, in any simple sense, an object of thought. We must now go on to presentsupportingevidencefrom elsewherein the 'Enneads'in orderto show that the languageof 5, 4, 2 is also used in other treatisesof the relationship betweenthe higherand lowerelementsof Intellect itself. But first we must addressa pressingproblem.In the first chapterof a series of notes which Porphyry collected and pressed into service as an independent treatise (3, 9 [13]), Plotinus appears to draw a distinction between an Intellect >>at rest(<and another Intellect which is an >>activity proceedingfromit< and which>>sees< it. Thisdistinctionbetweentwo or more Intellectshe roundly condemnsin a later work, 2, 9 [33], 1, 26ff. (and 6, 19ff.). Ourinterpretation of 5, 4, 2 does not commitus in any wayto a theory
8 Euvaico3Jl41;, xaTav6Tloat, and principally the former, are terms which invariably refer in the 'Enneads' to plurality or incipient plurality. For xaTav67ol4, see principally 5, 3 [491, 1, 1 - 14: forouvaioa1h1oI, see principally, 5, 3 1491, 13, 9 -22; cp. 6, 7, 35, 30 - 32; 5, 8 (31], 11, 23. The evidence, therefore, is overwhelmingiy in favour of the thesis that these terms should, if possible, be understood to refer to the internal genesis of intellectual plurality in 5, 4 (7], 2. 9 In shorthand form this is equivalent to the argument above that the ultimate, internal ground of Intellect is known to be intellectual because of its culmination in the fully constituted Intellect. So also at 3, 8 [30], 9, 6- 1, the intelligible object can not be the One because it does not stand on its own, but is >)yokedwith< intellect.

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of two distinct intellects, but it may be helpful here to acknowledge the similarity between the position of 3, 9, 1 and that of 5, 4, 2. In 5, 4, 2, 8- 10 Plotinus indicates that voiu; is a duality, thinking subject and intelligible object. He then goes on to point out that both elements in the duality are different intelligible objects. Here I follow the reading of HENRYSCHWYZER (as opposed to those of BRSHIER, HARDER and HADOT 1); -EoTt &t xai dOXo T4OpcT' acUTOVOTO6v, and also their interpretation >>est etiam diversus ab uno eo quod post illud (i. e. TO gv) intellegibilis est(<. This, I believe, makes best provision for the statement of lines 25 - 26: voiS yiyvsTcit, dkXo ofov Vo01TOV xvi otov txsivo xcti riiuqga xavis;i&oXovtxeivou. I take this to mean that voi3;, as intelligible object, has both its own difference from and identity with the First, and that it is at the same time an imitation of the First. In other words, its identity is the identity of two in one, its difference is the measure of its procession, and this constitutes a new duality distinct from the First. It would seem necessary, therefore, that because of the >>coincident< identity between the highest intelligible object and the One, >Intellect< must also in some sense be transcendent of itself, as it appears to be in 3, 9 [13], 1. Therefore, the two passages do bear a similarity. The problem of the two distinct intellects in 3, 9 [131, 1 is not susceptible of resolution. Can we in any case expect formal rigour from a collection of notes? However, it is still worth suggesting that perhaps Plotinus does not intend to make two distinct Intellects so much as to show that (in the context of the interpretation of 'Timaeus' 39 E 7 - 9, and in the company of Amelius and Numenius) one is not committed to an isolated intelligible object devoid of intelligence; but rather that the intelligible object is also a subject (15 - 17: XQivoi3v ?Tvat v oTaost X. T. X.) and that the X(iAiUsi TOgV Vo0T6V OUi56i?V derived subject-seeing Intellect is different from that higher duality, but is also its Intellect (6po6Ta . .. txsivov otov txstvov eivaltvoiv txsivou). Of course, one must admit that the formulation is curious (especially in light of 2, 9 [33], 1 and 6). But one must equally admit that Plotinus in fact never dispenses with the notion of the highest of Intellect (however variously this may be described) in perfect rest, containing, and aware of its content, possessing vision of a different kind from that of Intellect hypostasis, and even transcendent of Intellect itself. We may compare some of these passages. In 5, 4 [7], 2, 12 ff., the intelligible object is said to remain in itself, not being in need as the seeing or thinking subject is in need of its object. Similarly in 5, 8 [31], 11, 17 ff., the self, in ascent to the Good, must become an object of a seeing subject<< VTO 0Ea1a of vision >>instead (xaciYsV9o0al d?VT'i OPGVo;

10 For this consult the excellent account of P. stoire, 1958, pp. 159- 160.

HADOT

in: Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Hi-

Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5, 4 [7], 2 and Related Passages

201 Vision at

kt?pOU OWgOe'VoU, o0oc; .X?IsOV iXCsI XXt70VTova Toi0 voiiaop)".

this level is often termed a )>notknowingo, even a foolishness; but it is significantlydescribedas >>a differentway of seeing((,and just as in V, 4 [7], 2, this highestmomentpossessesa certainself-awareness. In chapter35 of 6, 7
[38] Plotinus tells us that not knowing
(TO- gtil

vociv) is a different way of

seeing the One (&XXddXkX; twxtvovIX?7st?v). And in this differentway of seeing, he continues, >)it held its products(y&vvitaTa)and becameawareof these comingto be and dwellingin it (uvIMoeCToXQai ToU'TOv S xvi YcVo.tvCov tVO6VT&V) 12. In the treatiseimmediately following6, 8 [39] (and elsewhere 13), in chapter18, Plotinusarguesthat just as the circleis, so to speak, the centre and at the same time the derivativetracesof the centre(15 - 16: Xai trOTt Ptv otov txetvo, &PU8p6 8t axvi i'vX txsivoU XTX.), so too Intellectand Being vouv ov5vo0v ovTa. Ev ydp. THEILER calls this IapTUpCtvT'Ov oiov 9v Wvi 'daring'14,but I thinkthat the phrase?the intellectin the One<mustbe taken (togetherwith its olov) more seriously;for it is clearlynecessarythat if Intellect is also a self-producer, then it must be in its own natureboth archetype and image'5. In 5, 4 [71,2 this self-awareness is termedxaTavovioit and a vo6lat4different fromthat of Intellect.Here, I think, we shouldrecallthose passageswhere Plotinus states that if we are to posit the perfectunity of the One in accordance with anythingof our understanding, we must do this not in accordance with the thinkingsubject, but ratherXa' TjV v6niiv 16. He goes on to say that v6lrat does not think but is cause of thinkingto another, and that the cause is not identicalto the caused17. Hence it might well be that in his later work Plotinus is more carefulto avoid speakingof a voiiot; whichsurpasses the vo6qoi4 of voi5;. It remainsclear, however,in 6, 7 [38], 40, for example, that thereis a voi`ot; whichdoes not simplybelong to the intellectual object, but is a self-dependentpower of generation.This power proceedstogether
with the highest substantial moment of the vo0c - that - will - be and brings into being the substanceof voiv; hypostasis18. Again, these passages

from earlierand laterworkspresentclearparallelswith 5, 4 [7], 2. All the lanII

Cf. 6,7 [38], 35, 12-15.

12 14

Lines29-32. PlotinsSchriften,4, 6, p. 390.

3 Cf. 6, 6 [341,9, 29; 10, 1-4. 1 Cf. 6, 9 [91, 11, 4- 16;6, 3, 22- 36 - Intellect mustsee rd npb aQkob; this pluralis repea-

ted at lines33 and 35; 5, 5 [32], 8, 22 - 23, Intellect mustsee the Oneby the TCb tavro& ph v@.6, 7 [381,32, 34- 39: the One ist dgop(pov,but so too is Intellectto the degreeit is &P' Eaunf5. 16 6, 9 [9], 6, 50- 55; cf. 5, 6 [241, 6, 8 -11; see especially 7?ptv6ilo1t np64 t(Papjoyijv, 6, 9 [91, 11, 24 -25. 17 6, 9 [91,6, 52- 55;o6 ydxpxctr&T6V voo00vTa Ct TdTrretv at6v, ZtXXd gdkkov xatd Piv
v6Oatv. v6tjat; 8t o'0 vo.i, dXX'aitia Toi) voCiv &XX. t6 8t ariov o0 TaCT&v T 18 6, 7 1381,40, 5-18. aiTMaT@.

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CORRIGAN:Plotinus,'Enneads'5, 417], 2 and RelatedPassages KEVIN

guage of 5, 4 [7], 2, 4- 19, therefore,can be explainedmore satisfactorily sphereof or pre-intellectual withinthe 'Enneads'as applyingto an intellectual discourse. betweenthe act of Finally,we shouldbringout the veryclose relationship the substanceand the act out of the substance.Plotinusclearlydistinguishes to the inthe two acts at 5, 4 [7], 2, 27 - 33, but whenhe appliesthe distinction telligible universethe order of his presentationis most revealing.The first iV TCO statementis the self-abidingprinciple(33 - 34: . .1Xsi 4C'VOVTOqauTO) in termswhichcan the secondis its substantial act, but described oixsup ijOct), only relateit intimatelyto an undefinedsecond principle(34 - 35: bx Tf V auwr4 TsXc?iT11io;xai UvvoVU6cr ?vcpysiaq) and the third statement is the (35 - 36: act whichhas takenits existenceandcometo substantiality generated ouoiav ivac xai ... ?iC, TrO Uni6ataotv Xapoboa f1 yEvvrW06oatvepy&ia between I do not meanto deny that Plotinusmakesa cleardistinction jXOEV). the internaland externaldtpXiof a product19, but I wish ratherto propose that the connexionbetweenthe two can also be intimate.The best exampleof this in the 'Enneads'is Plotinus'casualtransitionfromone to the otherin 6, 7 [38], 21, 4- 5. Intelligibleobjects are good, he states, in virtueof being an activityof the Good, or rather,he correctshimself,from the Good20. We may also see this intimateconnexionin anotherrevealingway. In the applicationof light to the intelligibleuniversethereis a naturalambiguitybeby the mystic.A striking tweenthe lightof the Good and the lightexperienced intelligibleobjects exampleis 5, 5 [32], 7. The more one looks to illuminated the less one sees, but whenone inclinesto the medium,then one sees light and the sourceof light (16- 21). This light is not one thing in another,but >>itself in itself<<, alone, pure, upon itself, suddenlyappearing,so that one is perplexedwhenceit came, fromoutsideor frominside?(32- 35). This ambiguity of identity, and yet difference, with the First is preciselythe ambiguitywe of 5, 4 17], 2. have been urgingin our interpretation I conclude,therefore,that in each of the passagesunderdiscussionthereis
no question of the One's consciousness or of the one being viewed simply as

an object of thought. While it is true that Plotinus' later formulationsare morecarefulon this matter,1suggestthat the ambiguitypresentin theseearly accounts is still fundamentalto his later thinking.The theory of ambiguity herepresentedis, I suggest,a more likely, a more subtleand a morecoherent It also makesbettheorythan any otherwhichidentifiesthe One and voqro6v. the in 'Enneads.'Since ter use of the evidenceavailablefrom other passages there is a parallelin Plotinus' later works with the languageof these earlier passagesit seems more logical to look there first before identifyingthe One
19 Cf. 5, 3 [491, 11, 16-20. Cf. 6, 9 19], 3, 35-36.

20

HEINZ-GUNTHERNESSELRATH:Zu den Quellendes SiliusItalicus

203

and the vort6ov.I suggestinsteadthat we mustevaluatecarefullyin each case the universeof discourseand its effect upon the arguments of derivationof a Second from a First. Wilcox,Canada
KEVINCORRIGAN

ZU DEN QUELLEN DES SILIUS ITALICUS
Rudolf Kasselzur Vollendung des sechzigsten Lebensjahres

Die Frage, welche historiographischen Quellen den 'Punica' des Silius Italicuszugrundeliegen, erfreutesich vor allem im letzten Vierteldes 19.Jhs gr6f3eren und fuhrtedabeizu der Ausbildung Interesses so gegensatzlicher Positionenwie dervon HEYNACHER', derjede Benutzung des LiviusdurchSilius ausschliel3en wollte, und der von BAUER2, der in Livius die nahezu einzige Quelledes Siliussah. In den dreiJ3iger Jahrendieses Jahrhunderts bildetesich dann durchdie Arbeitenvon KLOTZ und NICOL3 eine Art von communisopinio heraus,die einen unbestreitbar grol3en EinfluB3 des Liviusauf Silius anerkennt, daneben aber auf weite Streckender 'Punica' die Benutzungwenigstens einer weiterenhistoriographischen Quelledurchden Dichterpostuliert, die Oftersmit dem Namen des AnnalistenValeriusAntias in Verbindung gebrachtwird4.DieserAuffassungvon derQuellenlage der 'Punica'ist bis heute nicht mehrernsthaftwidersprochen worden;zwarfindensich etwa in W. KisI M. HEYNACHER, Ueber die Stellung des Silius Italicus unter den Quellen zum zweiten punischen Kriege, Programm Ilfeld/Nordhausen 1877 (ilberarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung von HEYNACHERS Dissertation: Ueber die Quellen des Silius Italicus, Jena/Ilfeld 1874). 2 L. BAUER, Das Verhaltnis der Punica des C. Silius Italicus zur dritten Dekade des T. Livius, Diss. Erlangen 1883 (= Acta Seminarii Erlangensis 3, 1884, 103 - 160). Schon vor BAUER auB3erte sich J. SCHLICHTEISEN, De fide historica Silii Italici quaestiones historicae et philologicae, Diss. Konigsberg 1881 sehr kritisch zu HEYNACHERS These und widerlegte sie in vielen Fallen mit einleuchtenden Erklarungen aus der dichterischen Schaffensweise des Silius. (BAUER und SCHLICHTEISEN werden im Folgenden nur noch mit Namen und Seitenzahl im Text zitiert.) Noch vor SCHL1CHTEISEN suchte A. KERER, Uber die Abhangigkeit des C. Silius Italicus von Livius, Programm Bozen 1880 Livius als Vorlage fUr die ersten vier BUcher der 'Punica' zu erweisen. 3 A. KLOTZ, Die Stellung des Silius Italicus unter den Quellen zur Geschichte des Zweiten Punischen Krieges, RhM 82, 1933, 1 - 34; J. NICOL, The historical and geographical sources used by Silius Italicus, Oxford 1936, 3- 125 (beide werden fortan im Text mit Nachnamen und Seitenzahl zitiert). 4 Vgl. KLOTZ 33 f.; NICOL 123 (vorsichtiger als KLOTZ). Bei K.-H. SCHWARTE, Der Ausbruch des Zweiten Punischen Krieges - Rechtsfrage und Uberlieferung (Historia Einzelschriften 43), Wiesbaden 1983, 93 avanciert Antias gar zur wichtigsten Quelle des Silius.

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