District vs Party-list Rep
ABAYON VS HRET CONTENTION: ABAYON 2007 ELECT, AANGAT TAYO SHE IS NOT ELIGIBLE NOT HAVING REPRESENTED THE MARGINALIZED and underrepresented sectors Abayon countered COMELEC has already confirmed status of Aangat TAYO as a national multi-sectoral organization rep. workers, youth, women, urban poor and elderly, she belonging to the women sector. Palparan. It is contended, he does not rep the m&U sectors. [CAFGU victim of members of communists] One Lesaca filed a Petition for quo warranto ousting palparan. Palparan raised same argument (HRET Hhad no jurisdiction). ISSUE is whether or not HRET had jursidiction to hear complaints re: DQ as HR members? HELD: under the Consti, 2 kinds of HR member (1) elected by political constituents [district rep], and (2) by the marginalized sector [party-list rep]. SInce they have been THUS ELECTED, they are members of HR. The Consti vests on HRET jursidiction as sole judge of questions involving DQ's of members of the HR.
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District vs Party-list Rep
MARIANO JR. VS COMELEC G.R. No. 118627 Ponente: Puno, J. 07 March 1995
FACTS: Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen. ISSUES: Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law HELD/RULING: Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself. Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that: Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:
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District vs Party-list Rep
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.
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District vs Party-list Rep
Montejo vs. COMELEC 242 SCRA 415 March 16, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba. Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein. On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.
Issue: Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not. Held: Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside. The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress. Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states that: Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein made.”
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District vs Party-list Rep
Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increases, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.) Notes: Petitioner also prayed for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the 1st district to the 2nd district. It is likewise denied.
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In the case at bar. Both were not granted.District vs Party-list Rep
Bagabuyo vs. merging. Its territory remains completely whole and intact. petitioner prayed for a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction. Other than this. and likewise acts on local government units by setting standards for their creation. abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating. In relation to this.5859) which later became a law (RA No. abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. dividing. of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a city.5 need not. COMELEC FACTS: A representative of the city of Cagayan de Oro file and sponsored a bill (HB No. COMELEC promulgated a resolution implementing the said law for election purposes. X. CDO city politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial line. X Sec. RATIO/DOCTRINE: Creation. involve the division and conversion of a local government unit HELD: Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. Herein petitioner. ISSUE(S): Whether or not the law. Sec. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts. 10 requires the commencement of a plebiscite. merger. Sec. not much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different although they interface and relate with one another. abolition. VI.10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro into two districts. division. Both provisions mentioned above are within the vested authority of the legislature. Art. while legislative apportionment or reapportionment under Art. division. They are related but are different from each other. filed a petition against COMELEC arguing that it cannot implement the law without the commencement of a plebiscite of which is indispensable for the division and conversion of a local government unit. The said law increased the city’s legislative district from one to two. merger. there is only the addition of another legislative district and
the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. no division of CDO city takes place or is mandated. and the Nationaland Local elections proceeded.
Thus. and alteration of boundaries under Art. 9371).
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compact. Hence.821. 9716. runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250. because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250. and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a
new second legislative district. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.
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. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3). Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Comelec [April 7. or each province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1.000 minimum population standard. and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.693. 4264.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. the first district municipalities of Libmanan. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250. entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment. The provision reads: (3) Each legislative district shall comprise.”
Republic Act No. Pamplona. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province. 2010] Facts: This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. and adjacent territory. shall have at least one representative.383. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional.2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. Minalabac.000 or only 176. 9716 originated from House Bill No. as far as practicable. contiguous.000) for the creation of a legislative district.District vs Party-list Rep Aquino III v. Pasacao. 9716.
000 minimum population is only required for a city. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income.000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2. or (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250. Thus.000) square kilometers. by virtue of and upon creation. as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. but not for a province.
Ruling: There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250. the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement.
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. Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation.District vs Party-list Rep Issue: w/n a population of 250. is entitled to at least a legislative district. but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250. of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which.000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province?
Held: We deny the petition. as certified by the Department of Finance.000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district.000.
for violating the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N.
Held: We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3). 9591 (RA
9591). The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No.000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3). Bulacan. the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.
On 1 May 2009. by creating a separate legislative district for the city. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district.030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3. 25. Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos “will be Page 9 of 50
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
Ruling: YES.District vs Party-list Rep ALDABA VS. Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. RA 9591 lapsed into law.”
House Bill No.069. The population of Malolos City was 223. creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos. COMELEC Jan.78 between 1995 to 2000. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254. amending Malolos City Charter. 2010
Facts: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No.
otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative. 2000 is 175.291 in 2000 will grow to only 241.030 by the year 2010.
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. Second.”
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Moreover. Bulacan as of May 1.District vs Party-list Rep 254. certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.291.550 in 2010.” The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3. 2000 is 175.” The Certification further states that it was “issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Based on a growth rate of 3. Bulacan as of May 1.291.” The Certification states that the population of “Malolos.78% per year. the population of Malolos of 175. 135. the Certification states that “the total population of Malolos. intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.78% per year between 1995 and 2000.
in the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual population in support of the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands.576.
On August 14. The NSO. 2786 on June 19.4 The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was P82.502 negative votes. Barbers issued Proclamation No. a province may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance. Based on the official 2000 Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO). Loreto. broken down as follows: Mainland 281. On December 2.416.5
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. Cagdianao. advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Surigao del Norte of the deficient population in the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands. Dinagat.354 Dinagat Island 106. did not certify the result of the special census. 461. 9355 on October 2. 2000 was 481. On April 3. Dinagat. which declared as official. respectively.A. the 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371.534 Siargao Island & Bucas Grande 93. 7610. Previous
decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the province as unconstitutional.433. No. namely. Libjo (Albor). 2006. (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande. It was questioned for constitutionality for not
being in compliance with the population or the land area requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec.000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. or a contiguous territory of at least 2. which do not contribute to the income of the province.3 In July 2003.2 the population of the Province of Surigao del Norte as of May 1. 2006 and August 28.23. passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. No. the Office of the President. Cagdianao. the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census. 2006.000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. 2002. The special census yielded a population count of 371.
The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under R.12 square kilometers. San Jose. No. On July 30. 2003. a plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to determine whether the local government units directly affected approved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands into a distinct and independent province comprising the municipalities of Basilisa. The province is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City.576 inhabitants in the proposed province. with the assistance of an NSO District Census Coordinator. Libjo.111 Surigao City 118. and a population of not less than 250. and Tubajon. 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands. formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. Loreto. otherwise known as The Local Government Code. The result of the plebiscite yielded 69. Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor Robert Lyndon S.Gerrymandering
NAVARRO v ERMITA Facts: Republic Act No.951 Under Section 461 of R. however. for all purposes.696. through its Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs. 1960. It was approved and enacted into law as R. The land area of the proposed province is 802. Basilisa.A.A.943 affirmative votes and 63. 01. San Jose. which is composed of seven municipalities. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities. and (3) Dinagat Island. the Senate and the House of Representatives. and Tubajon.
such was incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus correcting the congressional oversight in said provision and reflecting the true legislative intent. 2007.Gerrymandering
On December 3. a new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their appointment by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. hence. the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction which could trench on the equal protection clause.7
Issue: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional? Held: YES.
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. SC now looked at the central policy considerations in the creation of provinces. They compared the LGC provisions on the creation of municipalities and cities and how they allow an
exception to the land area requirement in cases of non-contiguity as provided for under Sections
442 and 450 of the LGC. the Province of Dinagat Islands began its corporate existence. On July 1. while such exemption was absent under Section 461 of the LGC (provision relating to creation of provinces). In fact. Moreover. as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. 2006. 2007.
Hence. 2007. Another set of provincial officials was elected during the synchronized national and local elections held on May 14.SC concluded that it must have been the intent of the legislators to extend such exception to provinces especially considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago. the elected provincial officials took their oath of office.6 On January 26. the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct province was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. the land area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity.
Petitioner explains his theory in this wise: . 7854. .Qualifications Theory of LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY
The theory of legal impossibility is advanced to justify non-compliance with the constitutional qualification on residency. this theory is an offshoot of Republic Act. established a second Congressional district in Makati in which petitioner ran as a Congressional candidate. THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI. is barely four (4) months old then the one (1) year residence qualification provided by the Constitution is inapplicable. according to petitioner. This law enacted on January 2. an act converting the municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city. Since the second district. No.
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. . 1995. 11 Apparently.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
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. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin. established her domicile in Tacloban. in or about 1938. the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position. The petitioner. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. COMELEC CITATION: 248 SCRA 300 FACTS: Imelda. they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she
became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte. wrote seven months under residency. she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. 1995 and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. In 1965. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959. When Pres. Subsequently. A minor follows domicile of her parents. the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. in an honest misrepresentation. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. when Marcos won presidency. She then pursued her college degree. they lived together in San Juan. which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29. Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949.Qualifications
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. In 1954. Rizal where she registered as a voter. Cirilo Roy Montejo. education. a little over 8 years old. filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes.
A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. To
add. May 11. and acts which correspond with the purpose. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one. her domicile of origin. In the absence and concurrence of all these. her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban. petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban. and May 25. having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte. an act. celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. Marcos. Leyte while living in her brother’s house. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. 4.Qualifications
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile. as her domicile of choice. WHEREFORE. 3. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954.
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. May 7. 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban. the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24.
VI of the Constitution. J. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice. for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. September 18. 120265. His birth certificate places Concepcion. Mateo Bedon and JuanitoIcaro. VI of the Constitution.R. should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections. Aquino. No. COMELEC G. Private respondents Move Makati. Respondents Ponente: KAPUNAN. 6. 1995 Agapito A. Page 16 of 50
. filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which. Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections.Qualifications
Aquino vs. under Sec. Concepcion.Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose. Move Makati. this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority. Makati City. Tarlac. Art. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion. FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Petitioner. At that time. When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable. a duly registered political party. in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections. his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. Petitioner Commission on Elections. it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’soriginal domicile. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City. expressed through the ballot. the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions. 6.: The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved. Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. and Mateo Bedon. HELD: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.Cembo. Art. he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile. the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. To successfully effect a change of domicile.
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.Qualifications Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. In the absence of clear and positive proof. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Marine Corps. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4). petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a naturalborn citizen as required under Article VI. can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. among other.” Teodoro C. citizen in 1990. HELD: petition dismissed YES Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.Natural-Born Citizens
BENGSON VS. “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. In 1994. ISSUE: WON Cruz. 2001 FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case. Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. HRET AND CRUZ
G. No. or Accepting Commission In. Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship
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. As a Consequence.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U. in view of the
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election. in connection with his service in the U. the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. 142840 May 7. a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by. No.A. however.S. Subsequently. section 6 of the Constitution. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. C. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection. In 1985. took an oath of allegiance to the USA.R.S. he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No.
by repatriation. On the other hand. acquired United States citizenship. and 5. by naturalization. 4.A. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien.
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. 2. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship. the Armed Forces of the United States. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II. political economic necessity Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem. Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen. No. he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. R. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to. desertion of the armed forces. or accepting commission in. by direct act of Congress. 2630 provides: Sec 1. may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States. and 3.Natural-Born Citizens
may be reacquired by a former citizen: 1. 3. a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. ** Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1. 2. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover. or return to. Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision.
Mitra FACTS: Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. 881 reads: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Unfortunately. he was not able to regain his seat in the Congress. Article IX of B. Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. Public officers should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity.
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.P.Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior 3. Blg.Voluntary renunciation of office ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another government position? HELD: No. then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and he should therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service. In the 1935Constitution. Grounds when term maybe shortened: 1. In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers.Term vs Tenure Dimaporo v. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. IX Sec.Holding any officer or employment in the government or any subdivision. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present constitution. and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress. Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM.Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest 4.
Section 67. He wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress. it was provided that public office is a public trust. 2. agency. or instrumentality thereof. Dimaporo lost the election.
If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to.
and lead modest lives. Obviously then.L. but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. serve them with utmost responsibility.Term vs Tenure
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67. Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of Public Officers" is more emphatic in stating: Sec.P. loyalty. 881 remains written in the 1987 Constitution. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. The term remains and his successor. Angeles. petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure. petitioner confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office. Blg. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R. In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress. this statutory provision seeks to ensure that
such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy.
Page 21 of 50
.C.). they cannot go back to their former position. act with patriotism and justice. 1. not his term. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people. In fact. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve
the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents. is allowed to serve its unexpired portion. if any.
Under the questioned provision. 76 Phil 12). He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials. and efficiency. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. Article IX of B. Public office is a public trust. integrity.
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals. to wit:
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. agency. it is worthy to note that the Constitution embodies some limitations and prohibitions upon the members of Congress. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill. contrary to the provisions of Article VI. and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress). 4. 3836 “insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives.” The petition seeks to prohibit respondents from “passing in audit the vouchers. commutable at the highest rate received. or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. The provision on vacation and sick leave. It filed the petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2. The same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service. during his term of office. 3836. be interested financially in any contract with.”
The challenge to the constitutionality of the law is centered on the following propositions: 1. including any government-owned or controlled corporation. or its subsidiary.
Before discussing this point. in any case. directly or indirectly. Neither shall he. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office. respectively. or any subdivision. while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service. and their successors in office from paying the said retirement and vacation gratuities. and from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree. which. Section 14 of the Constitution. cannot exceed 24 months. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Section 14.INCREASE IN COMPENSATION PHILCONSA vs GIMENEZ FACTS: PHILCONSA is a a non-profit civic organization. is another attempt of the legislators to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution. and likewise restraining the respondent disbursing officers of the House and Senate. in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government.
3. insofar as members of Congress are concerned. or instrumentality thereof.
However. Again. 2. Article VI..000. Constitution) In addition to the above prohibitions. 187) This goes to show how zealous were the members of the Constitutional Convention in guarding against the temptation for members of Congress to increase their salaries. (Section 16. composed of two bodies. in 1964.00 per annum for each of them. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral Tribunal. as salary. regarding increase of the compensation act including other emoluments? It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly (unicameral body) was fixed at P5. to any civil office which may have been created or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased while they were members of Congress. as stated above. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the Government is an adverse party. during the time for which they are elected. when the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case where an officer or employee of the Government is accused.000. includes in the term compensation “other emoluments.00 per annum. (Section 17. the National Assembly. under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members. that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office. They cannot be financially interested in any franchise. it is significant that. Constitution) 3. and for the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.00 per annum each. 4th ed. fees and perquisites. but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase.000. can We conclude that Congress can validly enact Republic Act 3836. the amount fixed by it was only P5.” This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement
benefits as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term “other emoluments. without violating the provisions in the aforementioned Article VI. 4. and 6.200 per annum by the enactment of the 1940 Constitutional amendment.”
Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded “emolument” as “the profit arising from office or employment.00 per annum each. Vol. In the light of this background. p.
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. providing retirement benefits to its members. They may not hold any other office or employment in the Government without forfeiting their respective seats. no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. the original strict prohibition was modified by the subsequent provision when the Constitutional amendments were approved in 19402 The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14. Article VI. It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely surrounded the Constitution with these limitations and prohibitions upon Members of Congress. of the Constitution. the salary for the Members of Congress was raised to P32. Likewise. (See Aruego. was changed to Congress. 296-300.000. Sinco. They shall not be appointed.” In other words. pp. The Framing of the Constitution. This was raised to P7. the Senate and the House of Representatives.INCREASE IN COMPENSATION
1. Philippine Government and Political Law. Article VI. when the unicameral body. 1. 5. Section 14. This is a practical demonstration or application of the principle of the checks and balances which is one of the peculiar characteristics of our Constitution. to P40. by the enactment of Republic Act 4143. the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) also prohibits members of Congress to have any special interest in any specific business which will directly or indirectly be favored by any law or resolution authored by them during their term of office.
the retirement benefits are granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System. disbursing officer of the House.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of said Republic Act 3836 are patently discriminatory. (Art. subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186. therefore. would relate to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No.)
In the third place.4The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836.Lastly. it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument. part. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI. 660 and. Under Republic Act 3836. which was on June 22. this portion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and elected officers. Sec. whereas. in connection with the hearing of the case.
-VOID. to take effect upon the approval of said Act. III. for these officials. 186. This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No.
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or notice whatsoever to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave privileges to members of Congress. before Justice Labrador. apply with equal force to the elected officers of each House. the Secretaries and Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given the benefits of retirement without having served for twenty years as required with other officers and employees of the Government. such as the Secretaries and the Sergeants-at-arms. Parenthetically. and he revealed that in 1963. Section 14 of the Constitution. 1. 1. In other words. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Congress enacted the retirement law for its members. It is claimed that petitioner learned of this law for the first time only when Jose Velasco. such as the Secretary and Sergeantsat-arms for each House) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members. On the other hand.
It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836. Most grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement laws have to be members or must at least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to the System.INCREASE IN COMPENSATION From the decisions of these cases. 1964. testified on January 30. 1963. a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years’ salary. To provide retirement benefits. because of no age limitation. 186. amending the first paragraph of section 12. it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. and therefore violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. as far as Members of Congress are concerned. all government officers and employees are given only one retirement benefit irrespective of their length of service in the government. under Republic Act 3836. who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age. 3096. the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an Act should be expressed in its title
XXX UNCONSTUTIONAL XXX Page 24 of 50
. as amended by Republic Acts Nos. because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. Republic Act No.
The use of the word “term” in the singular. Philconsa seeks to enjoin the Acting Auditor General to pass this in audit on the ground that 8 of the senators who enacted the bill have terms that will expire on 1969 thus. using the singular form and not the plural. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI.INCREASE IN COMPENSATION
Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30. 1969. 14(now Sec.
In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
QF: Congress enacted RA 4134 and 4642 increasing salaries of Members of the House of Reps for the year of 1965-1966. without distinction or separation between them. It refers to the expiration of the full term of all the Members of both Senate and House of Representatives approving such increase. it violates Art VI. and who took part in the approval of RA 4134. thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. 14(now Sec. 1965.” underscores that in the application of Art. approved just the preceding year 1964. The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30. as a single unit.
Section 10. 1969. The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134. 10) of the Constitution. while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30. when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the House. 1969. Sec.
PHILCONSA v ISMAEL MATHAY Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the
The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure. VI. DOCTRINE: The language of the provision on salaries of Members of Congress is clear. 10). Petition granted. when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired. Sec. Sec 14 of the 1935 Constitution. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. 14(now Sec. the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence.
Issue: Does Sec. the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all
the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective. RATIONALE: To remove personal interest from the increase
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. would have expired only on December 30.
Wherefore. refers to utterances made by Congressman in the performance of their official functions while Congress is in session. Sec 15 of the Constitution
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason. the communication is not absolutely privileged. Cabangbang made the open letter to the president when Congress was not in session.PRIVILEGES . JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG
Facts: Bartolome Cabangbang was a congressman when he wrote an open letter to the president and caused the same to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. “Speech or debate therein” used in Art VI Sec 15 of the Constitution. Section 15.Parliamentary Immunity
Col. Petitioners instituted this present action for recovery of damages for libel against Cabangbang. associating them in purported operational plans for a coup d’etat.
Held: The court ruled in the negative.
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.We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Cabangbang invoked parliamentary immunity averring the letter is a privileged communication under Art VI. The letter allegedly maligned several officials of the AFP. and for any speech or debate therein.
. including Col. Issue: Whether or not the letter in question a privileged communication protected by Art VI. Jimenez. In his defense. felony. be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress. Sec 15 of the Constitution. and in going to and returning from the same. (Article VI. they shall not be questioned in any other place. Cabangbang was not performing his official duty as a Member of Congress. And in causing the communication to be so published. and breach of the peace. the order appealed from is hereby affirmed.
House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour. Congressman Sergio Osmeña. he must show cause why the House should not punish him. however. . Jr. So ordered. he also asked.
the Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House. .
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. We believe. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. President. submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief. the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. 1960. such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to. with the admonition that if he failed to do so. Mr. in his privilege speech of June 23. and adjudication by the Courts.
Ratio: On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be disciplined. that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in
accordance with it. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No..
Whether petitioner is protected by Rule XVII Sec. Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber.PRIVILEGES . 59. principally. created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña. . that a special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be. I am afraid. Pendatun
Facts: On July 14. not only because the Constitution
has conferred jurisdiction upon it. have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. many arguments pro and con have been advanced. They say that even pardons are for sale. certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada K. and the same hereby is. and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case.
Whether petitioner’s words constituted actionable conduct. and is hereby dismissed. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on
the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity. the petition has to be. particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President." Resolved by the House of Representatives.Parliamentary Immunity
Osmena v.. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if
other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate he shall not be held to answer therefore nor be subject to censure by the House.
Held: Accordingly. "The people. Jr.
The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law. Art. be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. 11. is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. VI of the Constitution. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.PRIVILEGES . 2000]
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS Feb. implication or equitable considerations. Jalosjos [Feb. 2000 Facts: The accused-appellant. It may not be extended by intendment. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. Romeo Jalosjos. 3. inspite of its importance. it has constitutional foundations.Freedom from Arrest
People v. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall. including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution.
Section 11. However. 3. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
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petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30. whereas he is
indicted for coup d'etat which is
regarded as a "political offense.R. In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos. however. petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate. there was already conviction. albeit his conviction was pending appeal. PIMENTEL G.e. 179817. ISSUE: • Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists
RULING: The petition is bereft of merit.Freedom from Arrest
TRILLANES V. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted.. 2007.” In the 2007 elections. Justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner.PRIVILEGES . alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case. June 27. two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness."
Furthermore. when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion. i.
FACTS: Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood Incident. Further. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor. petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude. No. xxx A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not
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• • Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case. It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." proves that petitioner's argument bites the dust. the cause for foreboding became real. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties. shall. xxx Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial. No less than the Constitution provides: All persons. both being punishable by reclusion perpetua. be bailable by sufficient sureties. Subsequent events reveal the contrary. in fact. except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong.PRIVILEGES . (Underscoring supplied) The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense. shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisonersappellants like Jalosjos. it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action. whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction. The account. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases.Freedom from Arrest
substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. In cases involving non-bailable offenses. 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. regardless of the stage of the criminal action. Excessive bail shall not be required. circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident. what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention. is beyond cavil. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as. Once it is established that it is so. or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion
Page 30 of 50
. or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29. however. Moreover. before conviction.
1938. otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization Law. and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National AssemblyOn November 7. the petitioner. with costs to said respondent
FACTS Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. comprising solely the City of Manila. 1938. Honorable Sixto de la Costa. with
authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan-
The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment-Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner.R. 1938 G. by
virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2. 1936. with authority to preside over
the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan. No. pursuant to which he took a new oathAfter his appointment and qualification as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District. the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner-On August 1.145. judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District. and holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof. Ninth Judicial District. took effect. the petitioner. ousting him from said office. Judge Dela Costa
November 28. the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth
a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance. 145. the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance. the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent. L-46267
NATURE This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally
occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. the date on which Commonwealth Act No. performed several executive actsOn May 19.-
PROHIBITIONS AND INHIBITIONS Incompatible or Forbidden Office
Zandueta v. 1936. Fourth Judicial District. and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments
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. acting as executive judge. this time of the Fourth Judicial District. and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city.
sanctioned by jurisprudence. by virtue of which his appointment was issued. in addition to another court of the same
category. had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so. accepts
into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary. He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. at least. he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46Corpus Juris. The petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner. he abandons his old office and cannot claim to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued. being aware of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations. and he cannot question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence. par. sec. and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary. presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by
another appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance.The petitioner. is unconstitutional. 166. after taking the necessary oath.
The rule of equity.id. In the case under consideration. 145 to entitle him to repossess the office occupied by him prior to the appointment issued in his favor by virtue of the assailed statute?
HELD When a judge of first instance. qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath. and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not. 145.ISSUE
PROHIBITIONS AND INHIBITIONS Incompatible or Forbidden Office
WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act No. par. 123).. 947. accepted the office and entered into the performance of the duties inherent therein. in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. If the petitioner believed that Commonwealth Act No. he should have accepted it with reservation. 121. enters
virtue of a legal and valid appointment. is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law. he should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or. 767.
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. he would later be stopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law. the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor. thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed. Civil Code). both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one. 2. by implied order of the law(art. —which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him — . 55).145 is unconstitutional.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position. Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the
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. unless specifically authorized by law. (2) NO. Sec.-
PROHIBITIONS AND INHIBITIONS Incompatible or Forbidden Office
FLORES V DRILON FACTS Petitioners. agency or instrumentality thereof. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. the Mayor of Olongapo City. This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits.e. or indirect compensation. (2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance. HELD (1) YES. allowances and other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his appointment. no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision. any present. (5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems. Art. or title of any kind from any foreign government. (3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. office. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post.” ISSUES (1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. 8. double. 7 of Art. or indirect compensation. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations. challenge the constitutionality of Sec. to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). double.S facilities at Subic. nor accept without the consent of the Congress. and thus neglect his constitutents. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government. emolument.
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional. the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority. taxpayers and employees of U. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.
it is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authority to prescribe qualifications where only one. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate.
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. Hence. when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer. his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. In any case.. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Sec. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA. an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office. an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post. he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City. hence. as incumbent elective official. the VicePresident for example. as long as he is an incumbent. Consequently. he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. (5) YES. (3) NO.-
PROHIBITIONS AND INHIBITIONS Incompatible or Forbidden Office
Office of the Mayor without need of appointment.e. and no other. he may be considered a de facto officer. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City. may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his
tenure or during his incumbency. can qualify. Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA. and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void. is entitled to such benefits. although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA. and in accordance with jurisprudence. i. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. (4) YES.
95) “insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation” and consequently ruled that “the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and ExchangeCommission if it wants to be a private corporation. and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties.A. Gordon’s Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration and movant-intervenor PNRC’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision inG. Gordon (respondent) filed for a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration on the promulgated Decision by the Court on July 15. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947. No. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court. the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross.R. The constitutionality of R.” ISSUE Are the provisions of R. the petitioners did not raise its constitutionality. The structure of the PNRC. further declared void the PNRC Charter (as in R. 95. 2011
FACTS Richard J.No. however. being neither strictly private nor public innature. As the court decided.-
PROHIBITIONS AND INHIBITIONS Incompatible or Forbidden Office
Liban v. No. 2009. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. was not raised by the parties as an issue and should not have been passed upon by the Court. Hence. ”Respondent argues that the validity of R. Gordon. The court ruled that it was not the case. as amended. The case brought about by the petitioners was regarding to Gordon’s forfeiture of his seat in the Senate when he accepted the Chairmanship in the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence. 13. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay
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. 2009 were granted. as PNRC is not agovernment-owned and controlled corporation for the purpose of prohibition inSect.A. Art. 175352January 18.A. Richard J. the pronouncement of the Court on the validity of R. 95 should be considered “obiter. In sum. No. 95 valid and constitutional? HELD Yes. R.
G. VI of the 1987 Constitution. 95 was not an issue in theaforementioned case.A. the petitioners did not have standing to file the instant petition.R. the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law.A.A. 175352 dated July 15.
. directly or indirectly. ISSUE: WON Assemblyman Atty. Neither shall he. In the said case. then member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. including any government-owned or controlled corporation. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals.
The respondent Associate Commissioner of SEC granted the leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. or its subsidiary. Fernandez’ ownership of 10 shares. orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government. agency. thus discouraging the Assemblyman from further appearing therein as counsel.
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. questioned the said election in a quo warranto proceeding filed with Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) where they claimed that the stockholder’s votes were not properly counted. he filed an urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case raising real interest therein. He acquired the 10 shares after the fact that he entered his appearance as counsel so he could intervene. Fernandez cannot appear as counsel. during his term of office.
FACTS: In an election for the 11 Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corp. On the basis of which. which won only 5 seats. The Acero Group.-
PROHIBITIONS AND INHIBITIONS Incompatible or Forbidden Office
PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN
Section 14. the Puyat Group won 6 seats to gain control of the Board of management of the Company. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. be interested financially in any contract with. 843 outstanding shares. or any subdivision.
Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez. the Assemblyman acquired P200.00 worth of stock in the subject company representing 10 shares out of 262. or instrumentality thereof. Fernandez circumvented the constitutional prohibition against appearance as counsel before an administrative body HELD: YES. Atty.
Subsequently however. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by President Carlos P. RULING: Upon the ground of separation of powers. 2 on December 31. 1962. who was still President that time. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R. the court resolved that it must decline and refuse jurisdiction in disregarding the Presidential Administrative Order No. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. He then appointed Andres V. 2. it is Malacañan's practice — which we find to be logical — to submit ad interim appointments only when the Commission on Appointments is in session. at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members. As a result. 1961. The latter took oath on the same day. to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it. withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13. On January 2. At noon on December 30. canceling such “midnight” or “last-minute” appointments (350 appointees). Aytona. Aytona was prevented from holding office the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto proceeding. President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office.
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. Garcia. this time.SESSIONS
AYTONA VS CASTILLO
Section 19. Malacañan submitted its appointments on the same day they were issued. 1961. Carlos P. some persons whose names were submitted for confirmation had not qualified nor accepted their appointments. made last minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments was not in session.
We are informed. He issued Administrative Order No. Castillo then contended that Aytona’s appointment had already been revoked by Administrative Order No. Garcia even after the appointees had already qualified. FACTS: On December 29. both exercised the powers of their office. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter qualified immediately. which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress. Nevertheless. obviously because it foresaw the possibility that the incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor. 2 issued by President Macapagal. One good reason for the practice is that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation.
Case dismissed. 1961 recalling. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post. However. challenging Castillo’s right to exercise the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank. therefore making Castillo’s appointment void. and the Commission was not then in session. who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. 1961. as already adverted to.
No. allegedly the only other member of the minority. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and. The following day. alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping. a position that. 134577.OFFICERS
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader? HELD: FIRST ISSUE
The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President.
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.R. unlawfully holding and minority leader exercising the position of Senate
4. 1998 FACTS: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. however. rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. Marcelo B. ISSUES: 1. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? 3." while only those who had voted for him. Franklin M. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto. The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. thus. the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that. stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority. the Senate met in caucus. Drilon as majority leader. Was Respondent Guingona usurping. but still failed to resolve the issue. GUINGONA
G. he was assuming the position of minority leader. belonged to the "minority. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore. according to them." During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority. with the agreement of Senator Santiago." but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus. Juan M. Upon a motion for reconsideration. since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? 2. On the third session day. also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. On July 30. the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. the losing nominee. the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. November 18. By virtue thereof. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority. The following session day. and Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader. 1998. Cuenco about the scope of the Court's power of judicial review)." and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President (read Avelino vs." Sen. the debate on the question continued.
the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." Where no provision of the Constitution. no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader. petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. To recall. it however does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority. such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself." who could thereby elect the minority leader. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus. the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. the person suing must show that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. not by this Court. dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. THIRD ISSUE
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. he was recognized as such by the Senate President. no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
By the above standard. it is. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader. grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
Grave abuse of discretion . A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. Furthermore. the laws. the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.OFFICERS
the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings. however. SECOND ISSUE There was no violation. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful. disregarded or overlooked. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution.such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
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. the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Therefore. wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated. Verily. we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. The Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof. In this case. Therefore.
Before Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President.
Yes. the Court ruled inter alia that there was a constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate. the petitioner. there is unanimity in the view that the minority of ten senators who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. Marciano Jesus Cuenco. 68 and 67 validly approved? HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a political question.
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. Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction. the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-member Senate. MAY QUORUM. were resolution Nos. Cuenco
GR L-2821. Firstly because the minute say so. the judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president. secondly. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco. In view of the separation of powers. as Acting President. because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez. leaving twelve other members who continued meeting and elected the respondent. motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers. and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of
"each House" shall constitute a quorum. Hence. since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators. Thus. "the House: does not mean "all" the members. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. the Court found it injudicious to declare the
petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate. A majority of all the members constitute "the House". ISSUES: (1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter? (2) If it has. 4 March 1949
FACTS: Senator Tañada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof.RULES OF PROCEEDINGS
m. Respondents . 8420. Arroyo's interpellation:(1)the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall(2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p. WIGBERTO E.1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28. RODOLFO ALBANO. In this case. AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.m. THESECRETARY OF FINANCE.m. 1996(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p. to 3:40 p. Facts: The petitioners are challenging the validity of R. or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. No. 8240 affects its validity? Held: The petition was dismissed.
instead of seeking redress in the House. petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review. as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21. According to the findings of the court. RAUL DAZA. of November 21.R. to 3:40 p.
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. 1998 JOKER P. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. LAGMAN.m.A. 1996(4) the published version Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that for this reason they are judicially
enforceable. This contention was invoked by parties. no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who.A. of November 21. EDCEL C. Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. ARROYO. 127255. Arroyo during the committee report for the approval of R. June 26. the alleged violations are merely internal rules of procedures rather than what petitioners claim to be constitutional requirements for enacting laws. although not successfully. They claim that respondents violated the rules of the House which are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution when the Chair of the Committee(Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) allegedly ignored a privileged question raised by Rep. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure. JOHN HENRY R. JOSE DE VENECIA. No. Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting R. Petitioners vs. OSMEA.A.RULES OF PROCEEDINGS
G. ZAMORA. TAADA. andRONALDO B. In this case. 8420 (amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing “Sin Taxes”) by filing a petition for for certiorari and/or prohibition.1996. precisely to support
claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts.
Under our Constitution. March 25. the case of Senate v. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. including. SENATE COMMITTEE
ROMULO L.481. invoking “executive privilege”. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS.R. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. In the case at bar.RULES OF PROCEEDINGS
NERI VS. among others. the head of NEDA. 2008 FACTS: On April 21.
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. the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U. that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. Neri. the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief. does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. such as the area of military and foreign relations. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President. AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY G. (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it. such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.” 2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. 180643. when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project. In the September 18. Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege: 1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power. However. the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. petitioner refused to answer. In particular. NERI.S. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege? HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution. $ 329. existing laws and jurisprudence. petitioner vs. was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project. appointing. Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and. 2007. pardoning.” Simply put. the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. No.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation. SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE. and diplomatic powers.).
And third. the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President. indeed. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing. we are convinced that. Under the “operational proximity” test. subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. shall be afforded the citizen. transactions. Second. like any other right. the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. Not only that. the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President.e. Section 7 of Article III provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. is subject to limitation. petitioner can be considered a close advisor. Access to official records. The right to public information. he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators. and papers pertaining to official acts. Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. and to documents. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development.RULES OF PROCEEDINGS
Using the above elements. or decisions. being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. i. with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
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. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. First.
upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. SANDIGANBAYAN
Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive. Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’ Prerogative to Discipline its Members The pronouncement. Republic Act No.
It would appear.” Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension. the Court in the case of Bayot vs. therefore. April 18.DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
OSMENA V PENDATUN. indeed.
The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days. to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. 128055. punish its Members for disorderly behavior. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance. In fact. and. ISSUE: • Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines
RULING: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. SUPRA SANTIAGO V. A penalty of suspension.
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. as the case may be. and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it. as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has. shall not exceed sixty days. No. with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions. the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law. Sandiganbayan observed:
“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that.”
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives. upon an erring member. behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension. if acquitted. when imposed. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course. approved the application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings. with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members. upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner. the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. the latter is
FACTS: A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that
petitioner. more than once.R.”
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner. suspend or expel a Member.
on its face. in due form. and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. that it was passed by Congress. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal. when the question properly arises. the sanction of the legislative branch of the government. April 30. a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government. whether the Act. and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. to the President. and of the Chief Executive. charged. Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. ISSUES: • • Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill
RULING: Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. a bill of local application. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance. in open session. was filed in the House of Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. respectively. through their presiding officers. thus attested. receives his approval. It is a declaration by the two houses. and to accept. Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps. During discussion at the Senate. when the error was discovered. is essential When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer. 9266. both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures. Villegas
G. as having passed Congress. only the Roxas amendment was included. charged.
FACTS: House Bill No. the Speaker. carries. is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. on its face. of the President of the Senate. respectively. although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present. that a bill.
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. its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. leaving the courts to determine. 1974
• Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress. of an enrolled bill. as having passed Congress. and is deposited in the public archives. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute. all bills authenticated in the manner stated. No. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress. so authenticated. by the President of the Senate.ENROLLED BILL
Astorga vs. of the President of the Senate. the House approved the same. the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. not the Tolentino amendment. and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State. And when a bill." which requires the judicial department "to accept. the entries in the journal should be consulted.R. has received. an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State. with the duty of enacting and executing the laws. and. the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions. L-23475. that it was passed by Congress. Nevertheless. However. and of the President of the United States. not signatures of the officers. carries. is in conformity with the Constitution. thus attested. and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. Approval of Congress. all bills authenticated in the manner stated. when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the House. and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of. with the duty of enacting and executing the laws.
the point is irrelevant in this case. it was later on found out that the said law was not the same as the version approved by the Senate as it was going thru its revision. This We do. With this finding. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors. and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. When courts may turn to the journal Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer. this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses. there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. Facts. and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. defining the powers. The temporary restraining order was also made permanent. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. Ruling. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the President and the Senate Presidents' signatures from RA 4065 or House Bill 9266. 9266. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive. It is merely a mode of authentication. is essential As far as Congress itself is concerned. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. when they withdrew their signatures therein. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law. WON the petition for mandamus. House bill No.ENROLLED BILL
Approval of Congress. 9266. which admittedly is a risky undertaking. injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be granted and compel the respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. However.
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. Issue. therefore. not signatures of the officers. but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did. therefore it did not become a law. what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. The Constitution requires it.The intent of the law making body based on its journals prevailed over technicality of the legal process of enacting a bill. rights and duties of the Vice Mayor of Manila became a law under RA 4065 after both houses and the President signed it. it should not be considered as a law. the Senate President and the President himself sent out a statement saying they are withdrawing their signatures from the House Bill No.
ENROLLED BILL U.S. we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having violated the provisions of Act No.al were charged with the crime of illegal importation of opium. Pon's counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February. 2381. Affirmed the decision. 1914. the vital question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature. 1916 FACTS: The defendant appellant Juan Pons et.R. L-11530 AUGUST 12. the same is null and void. and that. under the Governor-General's proclamation. we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. G. 2381). As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government and the various states. that Act No. under which Pons must be punished if found guilty. and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. the court cited numerous decisions of the various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein laid down. NO. In the case from which this last quotation is taken. is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed. published by authority of law. and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals. was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session was.
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. This settles the question. (1) how that is to be proved. V. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case. PONS. therefore. 2381. namely. Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28. and this reduces itself to two others. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned.
1963. petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33.R. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 95. It is so ordered.765. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts. Soon after the last importation of these products. without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation. 1959. dated November 3.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate. the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. not by judicial decree. February 28. 2609.
is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.ENROLLED BILL
CASCO Philippine Chemical v Gimenez G. upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Section 2. petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6. No. 1959.
Facts: The main facts are not disputed.345. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank. L-17931. Prior thereto.72 paid as margin fee therefor.
Held: WHEREFORE. otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law. 2069. paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No.42. the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers.
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. declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1. with costs against the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. relying upon Resolution No. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. its Circular No.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others. amounted to P86. The postmaster’s conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary. as where.
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.481. frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes. such as the intervenor.175. COA. of this amount.00.431. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court. Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. et al
“Equal Protection” – Franking Privilege of the Judiciary
A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992. and other government offices were withdrawn from them. the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government. Prado implemented Circ. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60. the total volume of frank mails [free of charge] amounted to P90. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PRADO. would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults.00.
Issues. for example. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. including those who do not need it. Acting from this.00. the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it
becoming a law. there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.ENROLLED BILL
PHIL JUDGES ASSOC v. and the Judiciary. RTCs. which may or may not need it at all. the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman. a law prohibiting mature books to all persons. especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored. former executives and their widows among others. HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause.991.
Facts. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn. PJA assailed the said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within the judiciary as it may impair the sending of judicial notices.574.92-28. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection. then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. DOTC SEC. WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional. MTC. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.864.424. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. which definitely needs it. No. MTCC. regardless of age. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege.759. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. In addition. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73. Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary.
. The distinction made by the law is superficial. and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.Violative of the Equal protection clause
Ruling: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act. except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. Therefore. Upon the last reading of a bill. or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege."
.Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days.Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
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. and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage. RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter.ENROLLED BILL
. no amendment thereto shall be allowed.